GUIDE TO THE RL1 TURKESTAN FILE

[The RL1 Turkestan (formerly Soviet Central Asia) file contains general information on the people who occupy five present-day Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan. (There is a more specific file, RQ2, on the Kazak people.) They are located in the southern Soviet Union, stretching from the western shores of the Caspian to Sinkiang, China on the east, and from the Russian SFSR on the north to Iran and Afghanistan on the south, approximately 30-50° north latitude and 52-88° east longitude. It is an area of over 1.5 million square miles occupied by 22.8 million people (1970 census). It is populated mainly by pastoral nomads with pockets of agriculturalists in the oases. The majority of the population speaks Turkic languages (Altaic family) whose names coincide with the names of the republics: Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Turkmen. Karakalpak, another Turkic language, is spoken on the western and southern shores of the Aral Sea. Tadzhik however is a Western Iranian language (Indo-European family). It is actually a dialect of Persian, similar to, but not intelligible with Tehrani Persian. It is spoken in the southeastern area along the Afghanistan border. A detailed linguistic map of Soviet Central Asia may be found in 2: Caroe, category 116, pp. 272A-272C.

There are five sources in the file, numbered 1-2, 4-5, and 8. Three are in English, one is translated from the German, and one from the Russian. The most general introduction to the file is 1: von Schwarz which covers a wide range of topics from history, geography and general ethnography to architecture, politics, and justice.

However, the source is pre-Revolutionary and thus dated. 2: Caroe, although it has a more specific goal, contains more current information. It specifically concerns Turkic nationalism and its confrontation with Soviet domination. Background data on geography, history, and demography, as well as good maps and a comprehensive bibliography, are provided. 4: Leix is a study of textiles with background material on their cultural milieu. 5: Pipes concerns the relations of the Turkic Muslims to Soviet religious, demographic, linguistic, and nationality policies. It is based largely on interviews with emigrees who left during World War II. 8: Kostenko is a nineteenth century (1868-1880) military statistical survey of Turkestan which contains data on the racial, religious, and regional distribution of the population; birth and mortality rates; comparison of population trends between sedentary and nomadic peoples; and some general ethnographic data. Detailed information is provided on a number of population centers such as Tashkent.

This file contains a variety of information on an area that has been a major crossroads of European and Asian cultures since before recorded history. Its material on the relations between the native peoples and the Soviet Union should be particularly useful for acculturation studies, but the researcher should be mindful of the anti-Soviet bias of those sources. The file was processed between 1955 and 1956.]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

PREFACE

ABOUT the middle of the XIXth century the shadow of Russia in Central Asia began to fall across the vision of a Britain which had just succeeded to the Sikhs in the Panjab and was occupied in the consolidation of territories which became known as the North-West Frontier. From that date the external policy of the British government in India was directed mainly to the stabilization of Middle Eastern frontiers and to safeguarding the continued existence of Persia and Afghanistan against the forces of Russian expansion. As a result of that policy the Russian advance was halted, where it still stands, on the Oxus and along the fringe of the Turkmen mountains.

In due course the Soviets succeeded the Tsars in the Turkish lands of Central Asia, and Britain withdrew her forces from a partitioned Indian continent. In Southern and South-Western Asia the bonds of the Commonwealth are now loosened. In Central Asia Soviet Russia remains in control of many million Muslims of Turco-Iranian stock. These territories, once known as Turkistan, are in fact an overlap between the Islamic and the Soviet world. It is the purpose of this book at a moment of solvency brought on by Stalin's death to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist world and the West.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least fifty years. It is extremely hard today to uncover modern sources of real value in a field of peculiar importance and little known outside Soviet Russia. The gap has to be filled mainly from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period in particular — the uneasy interregnum between the October Revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power — I have

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia [RL]

000 drawn, among others, on the writings of Professor Togan of Istanbul University, himself a chief actor in the field and the author of a notable book in Turkish entitled *Bugünkü Türkili* (Turkistan today). Page references to this book would not help the English reader and I have therefore been compelled, with the author's ready permission, to include a number of translated passages. I am also greatly in the debt of Mr. W. E. D. Allen, who has given ungrudgingly of the great store of his own knowledge in this field of orientalia, and of Dr. Stefan Wurm of Vienna University, whose knowledge of Turkic linguistics is unrivalled in any country. The linguistic map is his work. No Turcologist myself, I can plead that a lifetime spent among the neighbouring Muslim peoples of the Afghan borderland provides some of the conditions in which insight can do something to fill the gaps in knowledge. Russia in Transoxiana was never far from the thought of those who looked outward towards the Oxus from Peshawar. To English readers the Oxus is so much more familiar than the Amu Darya that I have been tempted to use the names indiscriminately, as the context suggests.

● 101 128 The accepted linguistic and ethnic classifications of the Turks are somewhat more complex than those adopted in this book, which does not aim at the precise resolution of such problems. The connotation of *Turkey* is clear enough; where distinction is necessary, I have included the Turks of Turkey in the definition *Western Turks*, which also covers the *Azeris* of Azerbaijan and (linguistically though not geographically) the *Turkmens*. On the Volga, in the Urals and in part of the Crimea (before the deportations) the term *Tatar*, or *Turco-Tatar*, has the sanction of usage. In those parts of Central Asia formerly known as *Turkistan* — the real hub of this book — I have avoided the doubtful appellation *Turkistani*, replacing it by *Eastern* or *Central Asian Turk*, and confining the word *Turki* to those Eastern Turks who live in Sinkiang under Chinese dominion. Where more precision is needed in references to the Turks of Russian Central Asia, I have particularized them as *Uzbeks*, *Kazaks*, and so on. Except in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL.7

a few cases, clear from the context, my choice between *Turkish* and *Turkic* is determined by a convention whereby scholars seek to allot the one to peoples and the other to languages. 101 128

The transliteration of names in a Turkic tongue is not to be simply resolved by reference to the canons of Arabists or the Hunterian system. An explanation of the method adopted in the text will be found in an appendix.[1]

In quoting from the great Russian historian Barthold I have used a French translation, which he authorized. It will be stronger thus, without further distillation. If what follows fails to give the picture, it is because (as Barthold truly wrote) —

> L'histoire turque exige des connaissances qui ne se trouvent que rarement réunies chez une seule personne. Il ne suffit donc point d'être turcologue pour écrire l'histoire des peuples turcs. Suivant l'époque qu'on étudie, il faut être également ou bien sinologue, ou bien arabisant, ou bien iranisant.

For the Western writer even that is not enough, for he should be able to go through the Russian medium also. In this region many studies meet and cross.

O. C.

March 1953

The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edgar Newgass for help in the compilation of the index.

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 269-272 -- Analyst]

[p. viii is blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

I

INTRODUCTORY

ALMOST in the centre of Asia, and far removed from the oceans, are two great natural basins of continental land, known until quite recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkistan. Much of the perimeter of both these territories is ringed round by some of the highest mountains in the world, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by peoples in whom a Turkish strain (though overlaying and overlaid by others) may still be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them as the Eastern or Central Asian Turks.

The two parts of this Turkistan are divided from one another by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring all the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-parting, linking the Tienshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkistan and the Chinese Turki dominion now known as Sinkiang.

Of Sinkiang much is known and much has been written. In earlier centuries there was a parallel movement in the history of the Central Asian Turks in the oasis civilizations both west and east of the Pamirs. Certain dynasties held sway on both sides of the mountains, while, farther north, the Ili gap supplied a route for migration, conquest and trade. More recently Sinkiang opened its gates more widely to the West. For the half-century before 1947 the government in India maintained a consulate in Kashghar on behalf of the British government, and until the other day there were British

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as 131
Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized popula- 162
tion in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is ooo
strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge of these peoples with that which has been gathered about Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is immediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India the comparison is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the 101●
Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, ooo
Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

II

THE TURANIAN BASIN

Something too of marvel, if not much of beauty, must there be in a country which presents to the eye a succession of bewildering contrasts; where the scarp of precipitous mountains frowns over an unending plain; where spots of verdure lie strewn like islets amid shoreless seas of sand; where mighty rivers perish in marsh and swamp; where populous cities are succeeded as a site of residence by tents of felt, and sedentary toil as a mode of life by the vagrant freedom of the desert.

CURZON

THERE is no State or Republic of Turkistan on modern maps of the world. Even on maps of the Victorian era Turkistan was divided into its Russian, Chinese and Afghan components, and of the Russian territories a large part east of the Caspian Sea was then known as Transcaspia. The Chinese name of Sinkiang — the New Dominion — came to be applied even in European parlance to the Tarim basin and Jungaria. In Russia, the name of Turkistan during the Basmachi rebellion of the early Soviet days had become a watchword of a larger Turkish nationalism and, with the Kremlin's establishment of what are ostensibly tribal Republics in Central Asia, Russian Turkistan as the name of a region finally disappeared from the atlases. In the USSR the name is now confined to the town near the Sir Darya (Jaxartes) in ancient times known as Yese or Yassi, the home of the celebrated saint Ahmed Yesevi, who lived there in the XIIth century. Thus there remains no territory of Turkistan on the map of today except the relatively small Afghan districts sandwiched between the Amu Darya (Oxus) and the mountains of the Hindu Kush. It is to take the place of the outmoded term that local pride has suggested a

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

101 substitute, Türkili, the Turkish homeland.

In a sense this new habit is a return to the geographical thought which obtained in the early XVIth century, when Babur left his home in the vale of Farghana to become by conquest the ruler of Kabul and later the first Mughul Emperor of Hindustan. In the whole of his Memoirs Babur speaks [1] of Turkistan only three times and that in the connotation of the town of Yese. To him the territories now collectively known as Russian Central Asia were centred on Maveraunnehr, an Arabic term meaning the land beyond the river. This is the *duab* or mesopotamia bounded by the rivers called by the Greeks Oxus and Jaxartes, known to Arab geographers as the Jaihun and Saihun, and to Persians as the Amu and the Sir Darya. European writers conveniently translate Maveraunnahr as Transoxiana.[2]

The lands south of the Amu Darya up to the Hindu Kush Babur knew as Balkh or (farther east) as Badakhshan, while those north of the Sir Darya were roughly divided into Chach or Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughulistan (the Ili valley and Jungaria). Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau then, as now, were known as Khorasan, the eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. The upper valley of the Sir Darya (known to Babur as the Saihun) then, as now, was called Farghana, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers, then possibly connected in one network of waterways, made up the famous delta country of Khorezm, with its capital at Urgench. These old names are woven into the history and aptitudes of the land and its peoples; without them there can be no understanding of the reactions which followed the Tsarist conquest or of the later development under the pressures of the Soviet system.

133 Just as Tigris and Euphrates give life and meaning to the riverain basin of Irak, so do the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya to the much greater Turanian basin. There are other

[1] Bib. I, 12 and 61.

[2] Scholars seem unable to decide between Transoxiana and Transoxania. Barthold and G. Kirk use the former, Arnold Toynbee and M. Czaplicka the latter, Schuyler and Mrs. Beveridge both!

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr
101 and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar,
[197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain-
369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik

The man of the oasis is often small-
boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142]
the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369
beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman; the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly 101
called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appellation Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan, the old North-West Frontier. There too the town populations, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the *indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as 'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word *Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation (as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Tadiks
Kent Turks

•101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, 186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description[1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] 101 Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan[2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — [617] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is ooo replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 442. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kipchak
Uzbek
Nogai

The Kent-Turks may even grasp that they are one nation with other Turks. . . . Seen from this point of view the extended use of the name Uzbek may be a stepping stone to the use of the name Turk to describe the national unity of Turkistan.

The Turkmen with his Oghuz ancestry I have already noted. He is rather to be grouped with the Western Turks. As for the Eastern Turks, I have put forward the tribal name Kipchak as typical of the Turkish stock of the steppe, upon which the Mongol deluge descended. After the Mongol conquest Kipchak disappears as the name of an *ulus*[1] from the pages of the Muslim chronicles. But the Kipchaks, with others like them, supplied the fundamental Turkish element which, overlaid by the Mongol invasion and having joined the Mongols in the wanderings of the Golden Horde, produced in time a mingled Turco-Mongol agglomeration of tribes. From this rough fashioning the Uzbek and the Nogai — also known as the Mangit — issued as pre-eminent. The process worked itself out over the whole range of country from Maveraunnahr, over the Urals, and down to the Volga and the Don, and it is on this ground some of the emigration claim that the cause of the Kazan Tatars of the Volga, and of the Bashkurds[2] in the Urals is one with that of the peoples who were later to be known as the Uzbeks and the Kazaks in Turkistan.

It is interesting, and typical of the Mongol-Turk confusion, that the Uzbek and the Nogai, Turkish tribes, took their name from eponymous Mongol princes of the house of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son and father of the Golden Horde. The imaginative have given the name Uzbek an alternative derivation from the words *öz*, essence, spirit, self, and *beg*, a master — one who is captain of his soul. To each his choice, but Uzbek Khan (1312–40) was an historical prince of the line of Juchi. The picture emerging, which in the main conforms

[1] A Mongol or Turkish nation or tribe. The Pathans too use the word.

[2] The ethnologists set the Bashkurds in the Finno-Ugrian group. But the Bashkurd language belongs to the Turkic, not the Finno-Ugrian, branch of the Altaic system, and their country lay across the way of the Turco-Mongol migrations of the Golden Horde.

Ez Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Uzbek
Nogai
Kazak

101 with Barthold's views, in that it was these Uzbek and Nogai clans, and others of their kind, who became the forerunners of the true (*khigh*) Uzbeks, of the Tatars of Idel-Ural, and of the Kazaks alike. Those of them that became masters of the oases in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses naturally assimilated some degree of the Persianized manner and habit of mind, body and speech prevailing among the sedentary population, until in the end the Turkic-speaking Sarts
181 claimed enlistment under the Uzbek banner. But, as the Basmachi troubles showed as late as 1920, there were many Uzbeks left in the villages and hill-country who retained all their ancient prowess as warriors up to the time of the coming of the Soviets to Turkistan.

Of the Uzbeks proper Togan writes :[1]

> They do not display that Muslim fanaticism and pride in an effete civilisation which is almost a disease among the Kent-Turks. Although today the Uzbeks live a settled life, their tribal divisions have not entirely lost their political and social importance. They are serious, peaceable and honest, but in war they are as courageous and pitiless as ever they were. They love hard exercise and games on horseback called Kökbori. They have retained their aptitude for war, as they shewed in the Basmachi rebellion, and it is surely they who will one day play the chief part in the political life of Turkistan.

101 Those who remained on the steppe took to themselves in time the generic name of Kazak. As stated, the word Kazak means a vagabond or outlaw — one beyond the pale ; it is not a tribal name. The process is not unlike that whereby the branches of the great Ghilzai clans, which cross the North-West Frontier in annual migration from homes in the Afghan highlands to the softer climate of the Indus Valley, are known not by the tribal name of Ghilzais but as Powindahs or graziers. Just as the word *Sart* was used to designate a cultivator or townsman, so Kazak was applied without tribal significance to the nomads of the steppe. In such a country with such a history the ancestry of the Kazaks has been tangled

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 46-7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1958 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kazak

beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirat*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[3] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 85.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India, and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

XII

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

I shall follow the arduous trail blazed by the surveyors, who are charting the course of irrigation systems, by the botanists and forestry experts, who are determining the future flora of the desert, and by the zoologists and ornithologists, who are to populate the new forests and gardens with beasts and birds. I shall meet the soil scientists and agronomists engaged in selecting the crops to be grown on the fields and plantations that will alter the face of the desert. My path will be the path of the archaeologists, who are doing their share to help the canal builders by unearthing the secrets of ancient cultures buried for centuries in the sands. . . .

BORIS KRINITSKY, on Turkmenian Canal [1]

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THE main objective of the two first Five-Year Plans was to create a centre of heavy and light industry in the Urals [2] and beyond, which should be out of reach of any invader, whether Germans coming from the west or Japanese from the east. At an immense cost in human lives and suffering, through scenes of welter and confusion, often sadly lagging but always driven on by a grim determination from above, the great programme staggered through fantastic difficulties during construction until it reached the serious production stage, round about 1935. It was an immense mechanical achievement, and there can be no doubt that it is mainly to Stalin's foresight in building this stronghold that Russia in 1941–2 owed her capacity to stand fast against the German onslaught long enough to receive that unacknowledged margin of assistance from the West which enabled her to survive.

[1] Bib. II, 5. Anthropologists escape notice.

[2] The Urals themselves are just outside Kazakistan, and coincident in the main with Bashkiria, in which is situated Ishimbay. Magnitogorsk is in a narrow strip of RSFSR territory between Kazakistan and Bashkiria. In the industrial picture all this region must be viewed as part of the Central Asian complex.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

Turkestan

101 131 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts [137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only 1 1/8 million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly populated countries in the world.

4:Lelx U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.

101 pulated countries in the world. It is also known
133 as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of
492 this territory, along which the roads run. All
133 commerce goes by way of caravans which re-
484 quire months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

1 [Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]
2 [See cat 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1



Anau in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

/33 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

● /01 /31 [63] By comparison with this desert area Western Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

• 101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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127 The primary sources of information for this essay consisted of the
124 standard literature on Central Asia, pre-Revolutionary and Soviet, and of materials collected in the course of interviews conducted with 31 Muslim refugees from the Soviet Union, most of them from Central Asia.[2] These interviews concentrated on the personal experiences of the informants, and avoided, insofar as possible, references to politics, in order to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of deliberate concealment or lying. All the informants were male, and consisted, in their majority, of persons 30 to 50 years of age, with a high school or *tekhnikum* education, who had left the Soviet Union as laborers or prisoners of war in the course of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. They represented, in other words, largely the middle-aged Soviet "intelligentsia" (in the Communist sense of the word). The conclusions derived from the interviews were placed against the historical background of Central Asia for the purpose of separating the accidental from the essential, on the assumption that generalizations obtained from interviews were both more reliable and more significant in terms of the future when in agreement with pre-Soviet developments in Central Asia. The fact that in the main there is such agreement seems to the author an added reason for confidence in the correctness of the conclusions thus derived.

121 The main criteria used in investigating the cultural tendencies of Central Asian Muslim were five: religion, customs, language, ethnic identity, and the character and trends of the native intelligentsia. An attempt was made in each case to determine the extent and nature of the changes which had occurred under Soviet rule; to ascertain whether these changes agreed with or ran contrary to the spontaneous developments taking place prior to the 1917 Revolution; and finally, to evaluate their meaning in terms of the probable future.

RELIGION

000 The term "religion" comprises at least three distinct phenomena: a belief in the existence of one or more supreme beings; a set of rituals which gives this belief external expression; and a way of life based upon the principles explicitly and implicitly enunciated by the belief's founders. In analyzing the religious life of a community, these aspects must be clearly differentiated.

• 101 Russian Central Asia consists of two main parts, distinguished from each other by historic tradition, culture, and topography: the northern half, the steppe region (today's Kazakhstan), and the southern half, Turkestan (comprising the remaining four Central Asian republics). The

122 [2] These interviews were conducted in the summer of 1953 under the auspices and with the generous assistance of the Institute of Intercultural Studies and the Ford Foundation. I wish to express my particular gratitude to Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, who first suggested this task and was instrumental in enabling me to carry it out. I also would like to thank the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for its kind help in completing this inquiry.

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims. 101 771

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refugees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion. 115 771

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely. 517 771

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to 798 212

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

162/327/1) The Russian population, not counting those in military service, constitutes about 1% of the entire population of the region. It is concentrated primarily in the Semirechie oblast' (44,089 persons, male and female), being mostly village people (Cossacks and peasants), with a small number of residents in the towns of the oblast'. Taken with the non-Russian population the Russian element constitutes over 7% here.

In the Syr-Darya oblast' the Russian population totals 8,447 persons (0.8% of the total population), and is concentrated primarily in the towns of Tashkent (up to 5,000 persons) and Kazalinsk (ca.1500), with a very limited number in other urban settlements of the oblast.

The Russian inhabitants in the towns of the Zeravshan okrug number about 4,000 (about 1% of the population of the okrug). In the Amu-Darya otdel the Russian element consists of 1,184 persons (1%) of whom the majority are Ural Cossack emigrants.

In the Fergana oblast' in 1876 there were 1,229 Russians.

101 162 2) The Tatars have migrated into this region at various time and have figured as traders, exploiting the nomads. Staying in the towns only temporarily, the Tatars have evaded the census, for which reason there must actually be more of them than is shown in the table.

3) The Sarts constitute about 22% of

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the total population of the region and up to 44% of all the sedentary natives. They spring from a mixture of various peoples and represent themselves as sedentary nomads, occupied in agriculture and trade. The Sarts constitute the nucleus of the native town and village population in the southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast and in all the Fergana oblast, and also in the Zeravshan okrug. In the Semirechie oblast there are no solid Sart settlements as yet. Here the Sarts live in small numbers, dispersed among the towns, are newcomers and are occupied in trade. The Sarts will be described in greater detail below.

4) The Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them, constitute numerically the predominant element in the population of the region, 48%. Nevertheless their distribution among the various oblast is by no means equal. /328/ Thus in the Semirechie oblast they are over 78% of the population, in the Syr-Darya oblast, 62%, in the Amu-Darya otdel they are only 29%, in the Fergana oblast not over 17%, and in the Zeravshan okrug barely o.2%.

The primary occupation of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz is cattle raising. Yet a part of these people, these who are poor and do not own cattle, work of necessity in cotton cultivation, or in sowing millet and barley. These poor nomads are called 'iginchi', and they make up the sedentary element of the Kazakh population. In the Syr-Darya oblast, of 124, 325 tents over 50, 000 households belong to such Kazakhs, who are agriculturalists. The total number of iginchi in the okrug comes to about 300, 000 persons, male and female. (1)

1. The Cholo-Kazakhs are counted as

1 [See category 116, pp 46-70 - analyst]

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

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162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have turned into a special family, so to speak, which is known in Central Asia by the name of the Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40% of the total population. On the right bank of the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks constitute about 3% of the population and in the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life, and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans, lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./ Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes, a list of which was appended by him to his well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva (A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes. Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that the classification of Uzbek clans can probably never be explained since the two essential sources for this can never be thoroughly reconciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge (Geographical and statistical information on the Zeravshan okrug) Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

8:Kostenko --9-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki (Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

162 [101] 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

On the Amu-
162 Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive
[618] community composed of twelve separate clans.
They use the land jointly according to common
[423] right.

9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-
162 Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the
101 total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now they have been put on a level with the other groups of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in regard to obligations, and must themselves maintain the irrigation required for their needs.

10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the
101 permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese, meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chinese government in the middle of the last century, just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettlement was undertaken as a form of punishment for these people for their participation in the revolt of 1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley, which was ruined and depopulated at that time.
[162] There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local population. Their form of life is the same as that of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into their hands. They routed the Dungans (under Bayandai) and formed an independent state under the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

101 him in 1871 and annex his dominions to the Empire.

162 11) The Dungans. They are reckoned at about 20,000 persons in the okrug. In the Kuldja region before the last emigration of the Dungans from Kashgaria after its conquest by the Chinese, they totalled 4,030 persons. They lived then and live now in the towns of Suidun, /Sui-ting/ Chinchakhodzi /Ch'ing-shui-ho-tzu/ and Tardzhi /Hui-yuan?/. The Dungans who migrated settled in the Fergana and Semirechie oblast'v. The largest settlement of the Dungan emigrants is in the Tokmak uyezd, 7 versts north of Tokmak in the Karakunus valley, where about 4,000 of them now live. They came in 1878 and as a result of their industry have built up and established excellent farming land.

101 The origin of the Dungans is unclear. According to their own tradition their ancestors, who were moslems, conquered China by force of arms but gradually submitted to the conquered people, adopting their language, customs and costume. Although the Dungans also mixed considerably with the Chinese through intermarriage they still retained their tribal individualism and, most important, their religion. Their hatred for the Chinese is without limit.

141 The Dungans are of medium height and are notably corpulent. They have a high protuberant
142 forehead; their brows are thick and arched; the eyes are slightly raised in the corners; the cheekbones protrude very insignificantly; the face is oval; the mouth is of

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[2] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

162 in the Kuldja region and are the remnants of RL 1
101 military settlers once settled on the Ili river by the Chinese government.

16) The Tadzhiks constitute about 4.5% of the total population of the area. They are Aryans and are related to the Persians. These are the aborigines of the country, some of whom were forced out by the invasions of the Turko-Mongol peoples into the mountainous places, difficult of access. There are therefore two subdivisions of Tadzhiks: those who live in the valleys, and those in the mountains. These people are very intelligent; although oppressed by the Uzbeks, they have nevertheless had a good influence on their oppressors, with whom they have been mixing up to the present time. Within the okrug the largest number of Tadzhiks are in the Khodzhent uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast, where they constitute over 30% of the total population; then in the Zeravshan region they make up over 19% of the total, in the Kurama uyezd (in the mountains) they are 3% and in the Fergana oblast they are 1.6% of the total population. The mountain Tadzhiks in the Zeravshan okrug are called Galchas.

17) The Persians live in small numbers in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Amu-Darya otdel. They are former slaves who were freed when the Russians conquered this region. A large number of them were sent back to their
[795] country at the expense of the state. Being of the Shi'ite religious sect the Persians are in /333/ sharp opposition to all the other Moslem people of Turkestan, who belong to the Sunnite sect.

18) The Hindus are scattered all over the

162 region in commercial industrial centers, where
101 they are moneylenders. Their number is actually much higher than the official figure and they should be counted as at least 3,000 persons. Only Indian men live in Turkestan.

19) The Gypsies, called Liuli by the natives, live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug. Their number is no higher than 1,000 persons, male and female.

20) Jews also live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug where their number is as high asl,974 persons; their total in this area is up to 3,000 persons, male and female. Before the Russian occupation of the region they were terribly oppressed. As in Europe the Jews here are occupied in crafts and in trade.

21) The Arabs are descendants of the conquerors who entered Central Asia in the ninth century. They lead a semi-nomadic life in the environs of Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. They number 2,000 to 3,000 persons.

162 The Division of the Population by Religious Faith

The religious faith with the largest number of adherents among the population of Turkestan is the Sunnite sect of the Moslems. There is only a small number of Persians who are Shiites. The Christians form the next largest group, followed by the pagans and finally by the Jews.

Moslems	2,900,000
Orthodox Christian	57,000
Catholics	2,000

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL]

IX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power. S.U. 636 648 185

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful. T. 101

THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the foundations for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the eighteenth century onwards. S.U 175 [636] 185

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two-pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction. T. 175

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political planning] S.U. [364]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

VI. THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Tu 563 S.U 563

The problem of national minorities is of great importance for the Central Asiatic Republics. Each of the five Central Asiatic 'state nations' has minorities in the other four republics. Some of them are numerically fairly large, such as the Uzbeks in Kirghizistan and Tadzhikistan, or the Turkmenians in Uzbekistan.

In addition there are minorities who have their national territories outside Soviet Central Asia, but inside the U.S.S.R., such as Tartars, Mordvinians, Armenians, etc. Finally, there are ethnical groups who have no national republic either in Central Asia or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. These peoples, the bulk of whom live outside the U.S.S.R., are of considerable interest since they occupy a definite, even if subordinate, place in Russia's policy towards her Central-Asiatic neighbours. Into this category fall the Uigurs and Dungans, who live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Another nationality which may eventually become a tool of Soviet foreign policy are the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. There are also Arabs in Uzbekistan, who theoretically could be a formidable weapon in the hands of Soviet diplomacy, but who for practical reasons could not play this part.*

UIGURS AND DUNGANS

Tu 563 [101]

The Uigurs, a Turkic people racially related to the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, and the Dungans, of mixed Arab and Persian origin, who had kept the Moslem faith but adopted the Chinese tongue, are both peoples of Western China. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the two peoples endeavoured to shake off Chinese rule and set up independent Khanates of their own. When these attempts failed, many Dungans and Uigurs fled into Russian territory. A particularly heavy exodus of the Uigurs took place when, in 1881, Russia restored to China the Kuldzha border district which she had occupied during the Western Chinese troubles of 1871.

The Uigurs and Dungans were readily granted Russian citizenship and

* All these minorities already lived in Central Asia under the Czarist régime. The Soviet Government added to them some other ethnical groups who had not been previously associated with Central Asia. Their members came to the Central Asiatic Republics as inmates of forced labour camps, as evacuees during the war, and also as more or less voluntary settlers. A particularly interesting community formed by the latter is a Korean minority which has been living in the Kzyl Orda Province of Kazakhstan since 1928. The Koreans of Kazakhstan are very successful rice-growers and their collective farms, bearing such names as 'Bolshevik', 'Third International' and 'Gigant', have acquired a certain fame.** Other Korean groups have settled more recently and perhaps less voluntarily in the Khorezm Province and in the Tashkent Province of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Koreans are mostly cotton planters. Politically the Central Asiatic Koreans are without influence, except for one Korean deputy in the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133
102

133
102

78°
84°
90°
52°
44°
36°
Jungarian Gate
Kazakh Gate
Balkhash
Issyk Kul
Tarim Basin
SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA
Physical
Miles
0 100 200 300 400
International boundary
Mountains, over 2000 metres
Mountains, 500 to 2000 metres
Sea level to 100 metres
Below sea level

175
102

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



Adapted from Fraser-Tytler's *Afghanistan*

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Page 73

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

102

Sketch-map of Turkestan.



175 reason in 1866, Tashkent was joined to the regions conquered pre-
361 viously into a single province /Government/ called the Syr Darya province, which was assigned to the general province of Orenburg. Since, however, no governor could get along with the General Governor Kryzhanovski, in 1867, the Syr-Darya province was again separated from Orenburg and combined with the Semirechiye province into a separate General Government which retained the name Turkestan. General Adjutant Konstantin Petrovich von Kauffmann was named first General Governor of Turkestan with his capital in Tashkent, and he later added the region of Samarkand (1868), the districts of Amu Darya (1873), Fergana (1876) and temporarily also the region of Kuldja (1871 to 1881) to the Turkestan General Government.

2. The Meaning and Origin of the Name "Tashkent."

103 Concerning the origin of the name of the town of Tashkent,
361 etymologists have often wracked their brains without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. /150/ The word Taskent means "city of stone," and is a combination of two words from different languages: the Turkish 'tash' (stone) and the Iranian 'kent' (city). Now Tashkent is built not of stone but of clay throughout, and in the surrounding region there is no stone to speak of because the ground on which the town is built is an extensive and thick stratum of loess. One can therefore explain Tashkent according to the theory of 'lucus a non lucendo, as a city in which there is no stone. Many have therefore interpreted the name as indicating a city with the diameter of a 'tash,' since a tash is used by the natives as a unit of measurement, in this case, eight kilometers. I think, however, that the origin of the name Tashkent can be explained much more naturally. The Chinese monk Hsüan Tsang, who passed Tashkent on his pilgrimage to India (629-645 A. D.), calls the town in his travel account Chashkent in Chinese orthography; among the later Arabic writers it appears under the name Shashkent, (1) and

1. Sultan Baber already knows Tashkent by the name Tashkend; he notes expressly, however, that this appeared in the works of earlier writers as Shash or Djadj.

this is oviously the original Indo- European name of the town; for

shash means "six" in Sanskrit, and therefore Shashkent had the same 103
meaning as the Greek Hexapolis. Probably Tashkent developed in 361
ancient times with the five other towns in the Scythian wastes on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, which later bore the names Turkestan, Aniiye-Ata, Chimkent, Otrar and Sauran, of which the last two are long since in ruins, forming a league of six towns, and as the capital of the league it had the name of 'City of Six'. Such word formations, which are known to have been employed often by the ancient Greeks, are still in use in Turkestan today. Thus, for example, the realm founded by Yakub Beg in the Tarym Basin which was originally designated as Alty-Shaar (City of Six), had the name of Djety-Shaar (City of Seven) after Yakub Beg incorporated a seventh city, Kara-Shaar, into his dominion. The later Turkic invaders, for whom the word Shashkent, a foreign word, was incomprehensible, probably changed it, because of its similar sound into Tashkent, which means in their language (city of stone). In similar manner they also changed the name Bakira into Balkh or "capital", the name Chashmkent (well city) into Chimkent or (turf city), and the like. The second /151/ /Figure 48. Caption: Loess landscape near Tashkent Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher.)/ syllable, kent, although it was Indo-European, was /152/left unchanged by the Turkic peoples because they were already accustomed to it; for many other city names in Turkestan had the same formation, such as Kokand, Samarkand, Chimkent, Pskent, Yarkand, etc. 'kand' and 'kent' have the same meaning; the form 'kand' is used when the preceding syllable contains the vowels a, o or u, otherwise it is 'kent'. Thus in our case the correct orthography would be Tashkand, which is also the way the natives pronounce it. The Russians, however, who had little familiarity with linguistics, adopted the form Tashkent from the beginning, and this is now the official name of the town.

3. The Situation of the Town of Tashkent

Tashkent is situated 4° 37' 11" east of Greenwich on a latitude 131
of 41° 19' 32" N. lat.; thus it lies approximately on the parallel of 361
Naples; it is 488 meters above sea level. The coordinates correspond to the observatory of Tashkent, which is one kilometer east of the former city wall.

631 and the judges, and personally arbitrates the more important issues of dispute or crime. The administration of the towns belonging to the khanate is assigned by the khan to governors who bear the title of beg and who administer their district almost independently. the begs name the officials and judges in their regions according to their own good judgment, usually from among their relatives; they gather the taxes, and are only obliged to pay the khan a specified sum every year for their region; and in case of war to produce an army from their region those men capable of bearing arms. Thus in actuality, the khanate consists, of a loose conglomeration of small states, all of which are made up of a larger town and the surrounding villages.

This arrangement has its basis in the local conditions. In Turkestan the individual states do not consist of a cohesive area but of isolated oases, scattered often hundreds of kilometers apart over the endless sandy deserts and hunger steppes. As a result of the great distances, the difficulty of communication and the general insecurity in these sparsely populated regions, it is impossible to keep these faraway oases completely under control by one center. For this reason, it was necessary to arm the governors with great powers of authority for all eventualities, and to transfer to them all responsibility for their oases.

The position of the begs in the Central Asian khanates was formerly quite similar to that of the satraps in the ancient kingdom of Persia. Like the satraps, the begs frequently revolted against their lords, often successfully, and they carried on wars with their neighboring begs without paying any attention to their khan. Only very recently, as a result of Russian influence in the khanates which still survive, the power of the khan over his begs has increased so much that they have to a great extent lost their former independence and sunk to the level of mere officials. The example of the two towns of Shaar and Kitab has contributed especially to the accomplishment of this change in the relation of the beg to the khans. The begs of these towns had also for years revolted together against the Emir of Bukhara and maintained their independence against all attacks on the part of the Emir, but they were conquered at last by the Russians on behalf of the Emir, and taken prisoner and interned within Russian territory, and since then no beg thinks of revolting against his lord.

103 /178/ Because of the circumstances mentioned above, there are also no distinctive names of countries in Turkestan, and each state takes its name from the most important oasis of those belonging to one political unit. Thus Kokand was that state of which the oasis

Kokand was the most important one, and therefore the khan had his seat there. Bukhara has its name from Bukhara, the capital town, and Khiva has its name from the town of Khiva. The name Turkestan itself was originally only a town name, and has been adopted from the unimportant town of Turkestan for the whole area of Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Turkic peoples. (1) 103

1. Present-day Siberia has acquired its name in just the same way, for the Russians transferred the name of the capital town of the Siberian Tatars, Sibir, to the land which was then probably without a name.

The names Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, as names of states, as well as the regional name of Turkestan, are used, it must be emphasized, only by the Europeans; the natives of Turkestan even today mean by these terms only the respective towns.

The same situation arose already in ancient times, for the same reasons, for the chronicler of the campaigns of Alexander used the town names of Baktra and Sogdiana in like manner to designate the respective regions, a circumstance which led to many errors later regarding the geography of antiquity. (cf. my monograph, 'Alexanders des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan' /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great/, Munich, 1893).

As far as the court of the Central Asian khan is concerned, it likewise was organized in all the khanates in a completely similar fashion. The court household of the Khan of Kokand, similar to the ones in Bukhara (Figure 63) p. 16a and Khiva as they still exist, is made up of the following dignitaries: 644

I. Court Officials

1. Kush Begi or 'Grand Falconer', who represents the Khan when he is absent from the capital.
2. Divan-Begi or Chancellor.
3. Taksaba or Cupbearer.
4. Mirakhur or Equerry.
5. Karaul-Begi or Chief of the Bodyguard.
6. Mirza-Bashi or Chief Scribe.

II. Military Officers

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

climes. Because of the distance from the sea, precipitation even 132
on the mountains around the Tarim basin is low, and there is ground for the belief that the glaciers are still shrinking, with a resultant steady diminution of the fertilizing water. In other words, the recession of the ice-age is to this extent and in this area linked with history.[1] A process which is working in Sinkiang has its application also to the very similar conditions of soil and climate obtaining in Russian Central Asia.

Another change, in this case historical, is that in the 133
courses of the two great rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, and possibly even of other waters which empty into the Turanian basin. The records state that more than once in historical times the Oxus[2] (Amu Darya) at least has changed its course as between the Caspian and the Aral Sea. This is an aspect of physical geography at which all who write of Transoxiana glance again and again, with never-failing fascination. The idea runs like a thread through the literature of the region. The general thesis has the support of the Russian historian Barthold, who explains the decline of Khorezm by the shifting of the rivers' course in the XVIth century. He and others write as if they saw the Oxus with the eyes of Matthew Arnold — the great river moving mysteriously across the plain, seeming now to be lost and broken up in little channels 'a foiled circuitous wanderer', yet in the end flowing inevitably forward to release in the Aral Sea — a symbol of the history of the land.

According to Togan,[3] at the time of the Arab conquest the main waters of the Amu Darya (Oxus) flowed not to the Aral but to the now dry Özboy bed, after filling up the Sarikamish depression in the north of the Karakum desert and just below the Ust Yurt escarpment. At that time only one arm reached the Aral Sea, which was a great reed-swamp much smaller than

[1] Bib. I, 87, Sir C. Skrine.

[2] The name Oxus can be variously derived from Ak-su, the White Water, a tributary; or from Oghush (Arabic Vakhsh), the main tributary from the Terskey Abi and Karategin. In its upper course the Oghush is called the Surkhab or Kizilsu — Persian and Turkish for Red River — by the Tajiks and Turks respectively who live on its banks. [103]

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 108 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 form of Hanafi Sunniism,[1] perhaps stimulated by the struggle which Islam had had to conduct with Buddhism for the mastery of that region. In the Hindu Kush, not far south of the rim, the great idols of Bamian, hewn in the rock, still stand to attest the strength which Buddhism once had on the southern fringe of Turan, and it has been suggested that the prevalence of theological schools (*medreses*) in Bukhara and other Turkish cities is to be explained as a relic of Buddhist [103] influence. The Sanskrit word *vihara* means a monastery, and the name Bukhara is probably derived from it.

The first Turkish house to embrace Islam was that of the *Karakhanids*, in the somewhat legendary person of Bughra Khan of Kashghar (d. *circa* A.D. 960). They are known to some historians as the *Ilak Khans*. The domains of this house extended to the north over Yedi Su, and its capital came later to be at a place named Balasagun, now unknown but probably on the Chu River. Bughra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in the year 999 in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from the Samanids, thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries. Flushed with success the Karakhanids tried to carry their conquests farther south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni,[2] with the result that the Amu became the dividing-line between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realms. Early in the XIth century and not long after the establishment of Turkish rule in Transoxiana by the Karakhanids began the famous thrust of the *Ghuzz* or *Oghuz* Turks from the regions north of the Saihun (Sir Darya).

It was this great agglomeration of Turkish tribes, divided into twenty-four clans, which was destined to produce three of the most famous peoples in Islamic history. The first of

[1] The *Hanafi* is regarded as the school of the Sunnat, as opposed to the Shiah, in the most orthodox descent. There are three other Sunni schools, the Hanbali, the Shafii and Maliki. The Hanafi doctrine was that professed by the Ottomans, by the Turks of Transoxiana and by the great majority of Indian and Afghan Muslims.

[2] The first Ghaznavid with his seat at Ghazni between Kabul and Kandahar, the patron of the Persian poet Firdausi and the curse of India in the XIth century.

8:Kostenko 161-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Samarkand

361 Samarkand is situated at 39°38'50" latitude north and 36°57' longitude east (67° east of Greenwich), and is the administrative center of the Zeravshan okrug. This town is set out 6 versts south of the Zeravshan river and the gardens and fields belonging to the town are irrigated by the waters of the river.

The foundation of the town, according to tradition, is ascribed to an Arab sheikh, whose lust for conquest led him to the rich valley of the river Sogda (Zeravshan) in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At that time the town was called Marakanda. The armies of Alexander the Great came as far as this, and the residents of the town showed such strong resistance that, according to tradition, it was burned to its foundations after it was [103] taken. Afterwards it was soon rebuilt and fortified by the slave of Alexander of Macedonia, Samar, in honor of whom it received its name, and then became the capital of Sogdiana, one of the provinces formed on the ruins of the Alexandrian monarchy. The conquest of the region by the Greeks made it possible for Greek civilization to penetrate far into Central Asia, and even now Graeco-Bactrian coins are found in the ruins of ancient cities, lying in the basin of the Amu-Darya.

The Arabs brought a new religion and civilization into their conquered lands. Genghis Khan conquered Samarkand at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and Tamerlane chose it as the capital of his broad empire and thought of making it the first city of the

8:Kostenko 169-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

Khodzhent (Leninabad)

361 The residents of Khodzhent consider
103 their town the oldest of all the towns in Central Asia, since it was founded according to legend by the daughter of Adam, whose name was Khodzhyanda. As a result, say the natives, the town was given the name of Khodzhent.

According to the explanation of some natives, who also consider Khodzhent one of the oldest towns in Central Asia, the /443/ town received the name of Khopchyant (from the two words khop and chyant) because it was built in a beautiful spot, and this is expressed in the words khop and chyant (very nice, beautiful) Later this was changed to Khodzhent. There also exists a third explanation for the name of Khodzhent; saying that it is a compound of the words hodja and kent, i.e., the village of hodjas. For in the town there are extremely many 'aksiyaks', men of the white bone (aristocracy), that is, hodjas.

361 Khodzhent, together with Ura-Tyube, Dzhizak and their regions, have always been a separate dominion, administered from time to time by independent begs. One of these, Ak Buta beg (Uzbek by birth), who ruled Khodzhent at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was particularly important. He was the first to reinforce the town, he built a citadel and divided the town into twenty-four wards. Gul'-bakh, the place of residence of the begs, was built by Shadman beg, born in Tashkent. Later, at the beginning of the present century, Khodzhent was taken by the ruler of Kokand, Alim Khan, and from that time it lost its

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[87] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later, as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

194 (iii) Turkish *ş* to become *sh*, *e.g.* Shah, Sherif, not Şah, Şerif, Chah, Cherif;

(iv) Turkish *h*, when used for Persian or Arabic خ, to become *kh* (not *x*), *e.g.* Khan, Khiva, Sheikh, not Han, Hiva, Şeih;

(v) Turkish *ğ* to become *gh*, *e.g.* oghlu, not oğlu; Chağhatai, not Chagatai.

N.B.—I have considered what to do with Turkish *k* when used for ق. Scientific systems use *q*, but this would involve writing *e.g.* Qazaq, Qirghiz and Samarqand, all somewhat pedantic. Kazak and Kirghiz are probably better (Kazakh often used, following the Russian, is wrong in any case, the Arabic form being قزاق not قزاخ).

7. It is suggested that the text need not be complicated by using commas for *ain* and *hamza*. They are apt to give an air of dust, and are not very important for Turkic languages, for which is needed a system generally phonetic in intention and effect, yet conforming broadly with an educated approach to orientalia.

● 104 8. One name calls for comment. It may be said that Jengis, Jenghis, and Cheng(h)iz Khan are recognizable, but Chingiz is unfamiliar. On the system suggested Chingiz is a correct transliteration of the spelling adopted by Babur and others in Chaghatai. A correct transliteration from the original Mongolian would be Chingis, since there is no ز in the old Mongol writing.

1: von Schwarz, Franz. Turkestan, die Wiege der indogermanischen Völker. [Turkestan, the Cradle of the Indo-European People.] Part III: Way of Life, Customs and Habits of the Sedentary Population of Turkestan, pp. 140-249. Freiburgim Breisgau, 1900.

HRAF Manuscript: Pp. 1-79, 45 plates.

Translated from the German for the Human Relations Area Files.

[The author, a natural scientist, had been a resident in Turkestan, and a keen observer of local customs and institutions. The translated portion of his book covers the following topics: The historical background of Tashkent and its geographical environment, urban settlement patterns, trade and handicrafts, ethnographical data, political institutions and patterns of political behavior, family relations, religious beliefs and practices, administration of justice, educational institutions, description of public and

111 RL1 Turkestan--2

1: von Schwarz, Franz.

private buildings, including methods of construction, architectural design, interior decoration, as well as information on household utensils and furnishings. --Analyst]

Field date: ca. 1895
Analyst: Robert Lee

Evaluation: Natural Scientist--5
Processed in 1956

2: Caroe, Olaf. Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1953.

Pp. x, 300; 4 maps; appendix; bibliography.

Yale: Bj23H. 953C

[This is a readable and sympathetic study of the history and leadership of eastern Turkic nationalism. It is an attempt to make both the preconditions and the pre-occupations of this nationalism comprehensible by brief expositions of (1) physical geography and the issue of water control in the Turanian Basin, (2) early Central Asian history and the Tsarist conquest, (3) the Chagatai literary tradition of Timurid Turkestan, (4) the Merdikar and Basmachi revolts of 1916 and 1922, (5) the meaning of the Sovietization process in Turkestan, (6) demography, mainly in Soviet Kazakhstan, with implications of genocide, and (7) the relations between the Nazi Government and Turkic defectors in World War II.

The author has drawn extensively on Togan's Bügünkü Türkili [Turkestan Today], a history of the eastern Turks, including the Bashkirs,

2: Caroe, Olaf

by an eminent Central Asiatic scholar and formerly active nationalist. Caroe's Bibliography of Russian, French and English sources is comprehensive, and his command of it is adequate to setting Togan's material in perspective. The Appendix faces up to the complexities of transliteration. The topographic historical and linguistic maps are useful aids to the text, and the index seems to be good. --Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Fred Adelman

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111 RL 1 Turkestan

4: Leix, A. Turkestan and Its Textile Crafts. Ciba Review, No. XL, pp. 1433-1465. Basle, Switzerland: August, 1941.

[HRAF ms: pp. 1-86.]

Yale: Upn49. C48. v. 4

[This article is primarily concerned with the textiles found in the various parts of Turkestan, techniques for their production, and the description of the clothing, carpets, mats, and other objects made out of these textiles. There is also, however, background material on the country itself: its climate and topography, the tribes that populate it and their history, and the various patterns of life found in Eastern and Western Turkestan, as they are reflected in the people's crafts. Numerous illustrations are interspersed with the text. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Mary Vorobiov

Evaluation: Unknown--5
Processed in 1955

111 RL1 Turkestan

5: Pipes, Richard. Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects. Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 147-162, 295-308. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955.

Yale: Bj 59a M58 v. 9

[This article is concerned with the status of the Turkic Muslim peoples of Soviet Turkestan with regard to Soviet religious, demographic, linguistic, and nationality policy. It indicates the extent of Russification of these populations as well as their resistance to change and Russian cultural domination. The data are based, to a large extent, on interviews obtained from emigres having left the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The author is Research Associate at the Harvard Russian Research Center. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Eugene Lerner

Evaluation- Social Scientiest-4
Processed in 1955

8: Kostenko, L. F. Turkestanskiy kray. Opyt voenno-statisticheskago obozreniia Turkestanskago voennago okruga. (Turkestan Region: Military statistical survey of the Turkestan Military District.) Volume I, parts 2 and 3. St. Petersburg: A. Transhel', 1880.

Library of Congress: DK854. K. vol. I [HRAF MS: pp. 1-181.]

Translated from the Russian for the Human Relations Area Files by Barbara Kraeder.

[The author was a Colonel of the General Staff and did his research, mostly in the field, from 1868-1880. Part 2 of the source, being a general survey of the population in Turkestan, includes the following information: 1) Statistical breakdown of the population on the basis of racial affinity, regional distribution and religious faith. 2) Specific data on birth and mortality rates, and the population trend among nomadic and sedentary peoples. 3) General ethnographic data on the Kurama, the Kipchaks, the Uzbeks, the Karakalpaks, the Turkmen, the Taranchi, the Dungans, the Kalmyks, the Tadzhiks and various immigrant groups. 4) Detailed description of the cultural traits

8: Kostenko, L. F.

of the Kazakhs and the Sarts. Part 3 of the source is a regional description of Turkestan and includes information on the following topics: 1) Population density of each administrative district. 2) Russian immigration in Turkestan. 3) The characteristics of native dwellings, with an exceptionally minute description of the nomad yurt. 4) Specific data on important populated places such as Tashkent, Vernyy (Alma Ata), Kuldja, Samarkand, Khodzhent (Leninabad), and Ura-Tyube, which includes information on population distribution, settlement patterns, educational and religious facilities as well as industrial and commercial statistics. --Analyst]

Field date: 1868-80 Evaluation: Government Official-4, 5
Analyst: Robert Lee Processed in 1956

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of desert zone of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116, pp. 125-163. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the mountains of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 164-191. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the Steppe of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 90-110. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the Semidesert zone of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 111-124. --Analyst/

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[Page 282 = blank]

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

the Steppe country and Inner Turkestan, and would thus help the communications between the northern and southern part of this rich area, which so far is carried on partly by means of river-ways (Ob, Irtish), and chiefly above the old caravan route. Out of two most important old roads in Central Asia, the first one—Orenburg-Tashkent—was utilized for the Tashkent Railway; the second—Tashkent-Semipalatinsk—is awaiting the same fate. It is the most lively route along which the post, the passenger and goods traffic is carried on. It starts at Kabul-Sai (some 120 versts north of Tashkent), and passes through Chimkent, Aulieata, Pishnek, Viernyi, Kopal, and Sergiupol (the latter lies 272 versts south-east of Semipalatinsk). Branches of smaller roads connect this big route with Pjevalsk and Kulja. 496 [491]

The last plan of the old Russian administration was to connect European Russia with Turkestan by a second line parallel to the Tashkent line, i. e. along the River Amu-Daria.

Western Siberia has gained enormous experience during the present war. At the first stage of the war she was the chief storing-place for army supplies. After the Russian retreat many industries from Poland and Western Russia were transferred here owing to the abundance of coal and other cheap raw products in Western Siberia. 000

See:

Statistical Year Book, edited by the Minister of the Interior (Russ. Petrograd, 1910–16). 113

Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta (Russ. Petrograd, 1910–17).

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity of the Western world.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 railways, regarded as strategic, did not become the highways of international commerce, and permits to travel were notoriously difficult to obtain. During the first part of World War I the seclusion became even more rigorous; the government first used the country as a convenient prison-house for Austro-Hungarians captured on the front in Europe, and later became involved in the bloody suppression of a bitter rebellion leading to famine and pestilence on a vast scale. It took the two revolutions of 1917 to raise the curtain high enough to reveal to the outside world a confused scene fitfully illumined by the torches of many factions, each struggling against a dark background of terror to plant its own light on the ramparts and herald a new dawn. A brief glimpse only, and the curtain fell again.

It is the Soviet habit to allude angrily to the years 1918 to 1920 as the Period of Intervention, meaning it to be inferred that the chaos of these years of transition was brought about by British machiavellian intrigue in a colonial sphere which should have concerned the Russians only. That period in due course I shall consider: here it is enough to say that the limit of British penetration into Turkistan reached no farther than Merv, while the time was far too short to afford any real insight into, much less any control over, the forces then 114 striving for mastery in Russia's Asiatic Empire. It is rather to the men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a period of intense struggle, during which they themselves for a short time figured as founders or upholders of independent national States. These are they who not only knew the inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern. The fact that this fresh inspiration was quickly followed by the bitterest disillusion over the failure of Bolshevik practice to live up to early promises, does not mean that the positive

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reality of the one is necessarily to be measured by the negations of the other. The new thought had come to stay. But at that time events were too strong for native reformers who were unable to turn their opportunities to lasting account. Fortunately some of those men have left memorials in writing, most revealing of their earlier hopes and endurances, and suggestive of what their peoples may yet achieve, should history once more turn in their favour. Among these are Mustafa Chokai and Zeki Velidi Togan (known to the Russians as Chokaiev and Velidov), leaders of the Eastern Turks during the interregnum period, who, first in attempted understanding with the Soviets, and later in conflict with them, strove to win political freedom for the peoples of Turkistan.

For a short time in 1917–18 Chokai presided over an independent government at Kokand in the Farghana Valley, now part of Uzbekistan. In the period between the Wars he wrote and lectured effectively in Western Europe, and was the author of a short book in Russian [1] describing his country's reactions to Soviet domination. I shall return to the story of his death in Germany in 1941: here it need be said only that he is less likely to be remembered for his writings than for having founded and inspired a national operation which later in World War II in other hands attained a considerable momentum.

Togan is that rare product, the professional historian who has been able to record a series of dramatic events in which he had his own, not negligible, part. Not directly from Turkistan himself but a Bashkir (in Turkish, Bashkurd), he came first to prominence as the mainstay of the short-lived republic of Little Bashkiria in the Urals. In the early years of the Revolution he was admitted to the confidences of the high priests of Soviet colonialism, Lenin and Stalin. Turning from them in disillusion in 1920, he spent the next three years behind the scenes in and around Bukhara in an attempt to organize resistance to the re-establishment of Russian rule in its Soviet guise. During that time he saw much of Enver Pasha. After

[1] Bib. III, 9.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLL

114 Enver's death he withdrew to Afghanistan to find his way ultimately to Turkey, where, after some vicissitudes, he attained academic distinction as a professor at the Istanbul University. There he now is. In 1929 he published in modern (Western) Turkish his story of the Eastern Turks,[1] entitled *Bugünkü Türkili*, or *Turkistan today*, adding a fascicule in 1940.

This work is a serious history of the peoples of Turkish stock east of the Caspian, written by a Central Asian Turk with a wide historical sweep and with practical experience gained in the service of these people. It contains long-term reflections based on a study of the traditions of a land little known to Western historians, reflections from the mind of a scholar in Turkic comparative history and literatures. Of the cause and inspirations of the struggles of that time the author has much that is new to relate. His story ranges from intimate discussions with Lenin and Stalin themselves to the epic of Enver Pasha, and from the tribal organizations of the Eastern Turks to the programme of social democratic reform which, like the Young Turks a decade earlier in Istanbul, he and coadjutors drew up for their compatriots. And through it all there runs a flame of ardent patriotism, a spirit that moves upon the waters. The question he poses is whether there are those remaining who can still hear that voice and respond to that spirit. Many of those who might have heard have been crushed beneath the heel of an iron tyranny.

I had thought originally that Togan's book might be brought to English readers by means of a simple translation. But the book is a formidable one, and much of it deals with details of old tradition and tribal organization which would have no meaning for the general reader. Moreover, one of its merits as a scholarly thesis is a certain diffuseness, which, however valuable to the Turkish student, would fail to attract the outside reader, interested in the background and prospects of an almost legendary land. Its message can best be brought to the West by means of a new interpretation, using the

[1] *Bugünkü Türkili* (Istanbul, 1942–7). *Türkili* (Turkic word *il* = tribe or country) is the equivalent of the Persian *Turkistan*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

author's ideas but compressing and sorting them out and, where necessary, relating them to other material. Such a treatment involves a number of changes of presentation and emphasis, which may not represent the views of the original. Yet, just as this treatment enables the interpreter to be more objective, it also gives him the right to be generous in reference to his source. On balance, for readers outside Turkey, the gain may outweigh the loss.

Other guides indeed there are. Some of these are refugees, both of the older emigration who fled the land shortly after the establishment of Soviet rule, and of younger groups whom the conditions of World War II enabled to escape the prison-house. Their names will appear as the story unfolds. There are, too, fitful gleams from behind the curtain. The most rigid frontier defences cannot prevent news filtering through to neighbouring countries whose affinities beget a natural sympathy, welcoming a steady stream of refugees. All these have light to shed. Sometimes too an even brighter illumination proceeds from the statements and admissions of the Kremlin, and particularly of Stalin himself. There is also Soviet publicity, always so sedulous to replace the old with new that it gives prominence to the old things which it would uproot. From time to time informed men [1] from the West have seized an unexpected chance to traverse Turkistan and been able to record what they have understood. But it still remains for someone to gather up the old with the new, and strike a balance which shall determine how far the process of continental assimilation has gone, and to what degree it has altered out of recognition an identity which was the child of a Turco-Iranian history of over one thousand years. In terms of ultimate ideologies, the question is one of the faith which shall prevail in the end, Communism or Islam; or, perhaps more subtly, there is need of a forecast of the several positions, gradations or compromises which may be expected to result from the interaction of the two extremes.

A word of caution will not be amiss. The refugees' books

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 5, 40 and 65 — Bailey, Goldman, Fitzroy Maclean.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

114

are patriots' visions of the land and peoples of their origin and their dreams, seen by them as suffering under a yoke cruel and intolerable. A writer approaching his subject in this spirit will underrate the material progress and prosperity attained under the foreign dominion, setting the profits low in the scale against the loss of freedom. He is likely to belittle the material achievement of the Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet. Nor will he adequately appraise the work of the many Russian scholars and historians of distinction who have made the study of Central Asian peoples and problems a field peculiarly their own. An attempt has here been made to correct this perspective. But, where Togan or others are cited, the reader should remember that a seer does not rate at their worldly value the achievements, or even the power, of the kings whom he denounces. He counts on greater than worldly values. Other nations, resting on their prophets, have preserved a tradition, spiritual and political, against all oppressions. Then why not the Eastern Turks?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

deserts. And this without doubt is the predisposing cause of the migrations over Central Asia from the dawn of history.

The history of what I have called the Turanian basin up to the time of the Russian conquest is extraordinarily confusing. Even the Russian orientalist, V. V. Barthold, who made this field peculiarly his own, was driven to exclaim: 'L'historien qui cherche à l'expliquer se trouve fort embarrassé de distinguer entre les causes et les effets'.[1] It is indeed a pitfall for the unwary, even for one who has spent many months in the country itself. An instance of this is to be found in the heroic journey of the Hungarian Vambéry, who penetrated to Transoxiana in 1863 in the guise of a dervish. When, after his return, he published, among other works, a *History of Bokhara* without adequate knowledge of the labours of Russian scholars in this field, he was mercilessly assailed by a company of *critici furiosi*, among others the Russian orientalist Grigoriev. That the criticism was influenced by professional and national jealousies is indicated by the verdicts of Curzon and the American diplomat Schuyler, the former speaking of the profound sensation caused by Vambéry's voyage and works, and the latter confessing to having indulged in harsh criticism. But Vambéry had in the end to admit that his local knowledge did not equip him to pose as an historian. Like Burton, he was a traveller first.

An immense amount of learning and research has gone into these subjects from the Russian side, both in Tsarist and in Soviet times. The names of Radloff, Barthold and Samoylovich are particularly remarkable in the Central Asian field.[2] Yet it remains true that a popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist. What follows cannot claim to be more than an essay in history: the most that can be done within the narrow limits of a contemporary book is to sketch in historical background enough to enable any who now approach these peoples and problems for the first time to understand something of the forces that have

[1] Bib. I, 7, p. 189.

[2] The reader is referred to the Bibliography at the end of this book.

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

any authority offering them protection against the indigenous 175
population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia 000
between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does 114
at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is 175
understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern 669

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

1:von Schwarz N-S (ca 1800) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

000 Turkestan, die Wiege der indogermanischen Völker
/Turkestan, the Cradle of the Indo-European People/

by Franz von Schwartz

Freiburg im Breisgau, 1900. pp. 140-249

Part III. Way of Life, Customs and Habits of the Sedentary Population of Turkestan

[Title Page]

1:von Schwarz--1 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

/140/ Tashkent, the Capital of Russian Turkestan

1. General Remarks

1. Historical

Tashkent played but a secondary role in the history of Turkestan until its capture by the Russians, who immediately made it the capital of their Central Asian possessions, although in population and wealth, and through its favorable position near the well-watered Chirchik river, it held first place among all the towns of Turkestan of that time. This arose from the following circumstances. 361

First of all, Tashkent is an oasis, completely isolated on all sides. North of Tashkent, 120, 284 and 308 kilometers away, are the three outlying, unimportant towns of Chimkent, Turkestan and Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/; their population can never have been other than small. Immediately beyond these towns begins the fearful Kazakh steppe. East of Tashkent, between it and the Ala Tau mountains /Dzungarskiy Ala-Tau/ lie only solitary little villages, separated from each other by large distances. In the south, Tashkent is cut off from the town of Khodzhent /Leninabad/ and the Fergana valley by sterile steppe land as well as the completely bare Mogol-Tau mountains and the Syr-Darya. In the west, however, a waterless steppe, Bet-Pak-Dala /Hungry Steppe/, 140 kilometers wide, stretches between the Syr-Darya and the town nearest Tashkent, Dzhizak, which also is completely isolated. Thus, although Tashkent, because of its large population and proportionate wealth should have been best suited of all the towns of Turkestan of that time to rule the others, it had to renounce the leading role, because, as a result of its isolated position, it could rely only on its own resources and was not in a position to hold in subjection the far-flung towns and to maintain its position successfully over a long period.

A second important circumstance standing in the way of Tashkent's expansion of power was its exposed position. It always took the first blow from all the attacking hordes entering Turkestan from Dzungaria on the northern piedmont of the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains; first, it had to withstand the Yüeh Chi then the Hsiung-Nu or Huns and the other Turkic peoples, finally the Mongols of Chinggis

361 Khan; likewise, the Russian conquest of Turkestan proper began with the capture of Tashkent. Consequently Tashkent has a more mixed population than any other town in Turkestan; until recent times it has been almost entirely composed of Sarts, the mixed race par excellence.

361 175 Of the earlier history of Tashkent little is known. The date of its origin is unknown, although it certainly goes back far into antiquity. /141/ At the time of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the region of Tashkent was still populated by the Indo-European Scythians, ancestors of the present Slavs /sic/ for at that time the Syr-Darya formed the boundary between the Persian Kingdom and the land of the Scythians. If Tashkent already existed then, as is almost certain on the basis of local relationships, it was in any case the seat of that Scythian king whose subjects Alexander fought on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, and who sent a legation to Alexander after the battle near Khodzhent /Leninabad/ to Alexandria Eskate, founded by Alexander. (1)

1. Cf. my monograph: Alexanders des Grossen Feldzuge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/ Munich, 1893.

Tashkent is first mentioned by a Chinese traveler Hsüan Tsang, who went through it in the Seventh century A. D. on his pilgrimage to India. From the second half of this century on it belonged to the realms established by the Arabs in Central Asia. Later it came under the rule of the Seljuks, who ruled Bukhara from 1004 on, as well as under a series of various other Turkic peoples who constantly were coming from Dzungaria. About the year 1220, Tashkent was taken by Chinggis Khan and remained thereafter under his rule and that of his successors until Tamerlane incorporated it into his great empire. Later it came into the possession of the famous Uzbek Prince Shaibani Khan, who took Bukhara from the last successors of Tamerlane. In 1598 Tashkent was captured by the Kazakhs, whose power reached its height at that time, and it remained in their power until 1723. In that year the Kazakhs were overpowered by the Dzungarians under the command of Galdan Tseren, and pushed back to the west, whereupon Tashkent remained for a time a part of the land of Dzungaria. When this empire was destroyed by the Chinese in 1757, who shortly thereafter slew almost all the Dzungarians, over a million people, Tashkent remained independent for a time, and set up a sort of confederation with the towns of Turkestan and Chimkent, but was forced

from time to time to recognize the supremacy of the emir of Bukhara. 361
In 1814, Tashkent was captured by the Khan of Kokand and remained 175
in his possession until the Russian conquest. Only transitorily did it pass again into the possession of the emir of Bukhara Nasr Allah, when he conquered Kokand in 1840 and executed the current ruler, Khan Mohammed Ali. The association between Kokand and Tashkent was always loose, however, and the Tashkent people revolted at every favorable and unfavorable /142/ opportunity. Tashkent was usually ruled by a beg appointed by the khan, but was also temporarily the residence of the khan and as such was the capital of the Kokand Khanate.

Tashkent was taken by storm by the Russians in 1865. This is not the place for a detailed history of the Russian conquest of Turkestan; I will only explain the general course of events and the circumstances surrounding them, which led the Russians, actually against their will, to advance into Central Asia and to the subjugation of these distant lands.

The advance of the Russians into Turkestan, which ultimately led them in a relatively short time to the borders of India, was brought about by the Kazakhs. As mentioned above, the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, having already seized the towns of Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/, Turkestan and Chimkent, in 1598 captured Tashkent as well and made it their chief stronghold. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, they were so hard pressed by the Dzungarians, that they felt impelled to turn to Russia for aid. Since this help could not be granted by Russia because of her position at that time, the Kazakhs were defeated by the Dzungarians and forced westward, away from the Tashkent region. As a result of this involuntary westward advance of the Middle Horde, the Little Horde/the westernmost Kazakhs/ was cramped in its nomadic grounds. For this reason, in 1732, the Little Horde sought to become subjects of Russia, and this was granted in the following year. Two years later, the Middle Horde also submitted voluntarily to Russian rule. In 1801, part of the Little Horde migrated, with permission of the Russian authorities, into the region vacated by the Kalmycks between the Ural and the Volga Rivers and from that time these Kazakhs have been known as the Inner Horde of Bukey Horde. In 1847 the Great Horde finally submitted to the Russians as well. Eight years later, part of the Kirgiz followed the example of the Kazakhs, when those nomadizing in the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains, likewise submitted to the Russians.

The submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule, however, was in

175 fact only nominal. The Kazakhs understood their relation to the
361 Russians to be one in which the latter were obliged to protect the Kazakhs against enemy attack, while the Kazakhs for their part recognised no obligation to the Russians and with the greatest impartiality plundered the Russian caravans and settlers as much as their neighbors on the Turkestan side. The Russian administrators tried everything possible to establish some order among the Kazakhs and to stop the attacks of banditry /143/ on the Russian settlements and caravans. At first, they sought to achieve this by installing khans who were completely loyal to them. Since these men, however, precisely because they were installed by the Russians, enjoyed no influence with and no attention from the Kazakhs, the irritation increased and almost complete anarchy reigned. The post of honor of khan was, for this reason, entirely abolished in 1833, and the Kazakhs were divided into a number of Volosts /small administrative unit/ and auls /nomadic village/ with elders elected by them, who were subordinate to the Russian district head. This measure, which subsequently proved very useful because thereby the power of the sultan and the previous hereditary tribal heads was permanently broken, created a violent ferment among the Kazakhs, which was used by the eminent Sultan Kasym and his son Kenesary to call for a general uprising of the Kazakhs in 1838 against the Russian rule which was not completely suppressed until 1844.

For all that, the establishment of peace and order in the Kazakh steppe was still unsuccessful, because the Kazakhs were continually incited by their neighbors in Turkestan, the peoples of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva against Russia, and because the Kazakh bandits, after perpetrating an act, could always flee without difficulty to the Central Asian khanates, since the borders along the territories of China, Kokand Bukhara and Khiva were not in Russian hands.

The Russian regime, therefore, had recourse to other means, which finally achieved the end in view, but which entangled the Russians in a new and much more serious action and one of much greater consequence, with the Central Asian khanates. These means consisted in gradually surrounding the whole Kazakh steppe on the Turkestan side with an unbroken line of defences, on the one hand, to make it more difficult for the Kazakhs to slip over the border after an attack on the Russians, and on the other hand to secure themselves against attacks from the Khiva and Kokand. These defences were pushed forward simultaneously from two sides, out from Orenburg /Chkalov/

which had been founded in 1735, and from Siberia, gradually nearing the Syr-Darya on one side, and the Tyan Shan on the other. After the Russians reached the Syr-Darya, near the Aral Sea, they advanced eastward along the river, while a series of fortresses were built from the east along the northern piedmont of the Alexander range /Kirgizskiy khrebet/ until these two fortifications met at Chimkent. From Orenburg, the forts of Emba and Ak-Bulak were established in 1839, Orenburgsk and Uralsk in 1845, Raim or Aralsk in 1847, and Koss-Aralsk and Kara-Butak in 1848. From Siberia /144/ the forts of Kopal, Vernoye /Alma Ata/ and Kastek were established in 1847. Sergiopol /Ayaguz/ was already founded in 1831. -175 361

Until this time the establishment of fortified works proceeded without particular difficulties, being within Russian territory. Upon the continuation east from the Aral Sea, and west from Vernoye /Alma Ata/, there was frequent fighting with Kokand, since further fortresses all had to be built on Kokand territory, for their establishment in the desert was naturally impossible.

The battle was opened from the west by General Perovsky, who took the first Kokand fort on the Syr-Darya, Ak-Mechet', by storm in 1853, despite a brave defence by the Kokand commander, Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg was destined for still greater things, for he later rose to be independent ruler of Kashgar, and as such inspired the respect of Russians and Englishmen alike. On the site of the destroyed Ak-Mechet' a Russian fortification, Fort Perovsk, /Kzyl-Orda/ was established, and in addition the forts of Kazalinsk and Karmakchi, /Dzhusaly/ were built in the same year. In 1861 Fort Dzhulek was added to these. From Vernoye /Alma Ata/ out, where a Russian town was founded in 1854, the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak and Pishpek /Frunze/ were conquered in 1860, and that of Merke in 1862. /From middle page 144 to middle page 149 of the original text has not been translated--Translator/

The capture of Tashkent was, to be sure, against the express will of the Russian regime and Cherniaev was subsequently removed from his position for disobedience. Nevertheless it was impossible to give the town back to Kokand, for the pro-Russian party in Tashkent, which had essentially facilitated the taking of the town, was too compromised, and would have been abandoned without defense to the revenge of its fanatical enemies, and because then Russia would have lost the confidence of the natives of Turkestan for all time. For this

175 reason in 1866, Tashkent was joined to the regions conquered pre-
361 viously into a single province /Government/ called the Syr Darya province, which was assigned to the general province of Orenburg. Since, however, no governor could get along with the General Governor Kryzhanovski, in 1867, the Syr-Darya province was again separated from Orenburg and combined with the Semirechiye province into a separate General Government which retained the name Turkestan. General Adjutant Konstantin Petrovich von Kauffmann was named first General Governor of Turkestan with his capital in Tashkent, and he later added the region of Samarkand (1868), the districts of Amu Darya (1873), Fergana (1876) and temporarily also the region of Kuldja (1871 to 1881) to the Turkestan General Government.

2. The Meaning and Origin of the Name "Tashkent."

103 Concerning the origin of the name of the town of Tashkent,
361 etymologists have often wracked their brains without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. /150/ The word Taskent means "city of stone," and is a combination of two words from different languages: the Turkish 'tash' (stone) and the Iranian 'kent' (city). Now Tashkent is built not of stone but of clay throughout, and in the surrounding region there is no stone to speak of because the ground on which the town is built is an extensive and thick stratum of loess. One can therefore explain Tashkent according to the theory of 'lucus a non lucendo, as a city in which there is no stone. Many have therefore interpreted the name as indicating a city with the diameter of a 'tash,' since a tash is used by the natives as a unit of measurement, in this case, eight kilometers. I think, however, that the origin of the name Tashkent can be explained much more naturally. The Chinese monk Hsüan Tsang, who passed Tashkent on his pilgrimage to India (629-645 A. D.), calls the town in his travel account Chashkent in Chinese orthography; among the later Arabic writers it appears under the name Shashkent, (1) and

1. Sultan Baber already knows Tashkent by the name Tashkend; he notes expressly, however, that this appeared in the works of earlier writers as Shash or Djadj.

this is oviously the original Indo- European name of the town; for

shash means "six" in Sanskrit, and therefore Shashkent had the same 103
meaning as the Greek Hexapolis. Probably Tashkent developed in 361
ancient times with the five other towns in the Scythian wastes on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, which later bore the names Turkestan, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, Otrar and Sauran, of which the last two are long since in ruins, forming a league of six towns, and as the capital of the league it had the name of 'City of Six' Such word formations, which are known to have been employed often by the ancient Greeks, are still in use in Turkestan today. Thus, for example, the realm founded by Yakub Beg in the Tarym Basin which was originally designated as Alty-Shaar (City of Six), had the name of Djety-Shaar (City of Seven) after Yakub Beg incorporated a seventh city, Kara-Shaar, into his dominion. The later Turkic invaders, for whom the word Shashkent, a foreign word, was incomrehensible, probably changed it, because of its similar sound into Tashkent, which means in their language (city of stone). In similar manner they also changed the name Baktra into Balkh or "capital", the name Chashmkent (well city) into Chimkent or (turf city), and the like. The second /151/ /Figure 48. Caption: Loess landscape near Tashkent Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher.)/ syllable, kent, although it was Indo-European, was /152/left unchanged by the Turkic peoples because they were already accustomed to it; for many other city names in Turkestan had the same formation, such as Kokand, Samarkand, Chimkent, Pskent, Yarkand, etc. 'kand' and 'kent' have the same meaning; the form 'kand' is used when the preceding syllable contains the vowels a, o or u, otherwise it is 'kent'. Thus in our case the correct orthography would be Tashkand, which is also the way the natives pronounce it. The Russians, however, who had little familiarity with linguistics, adopted the form Tashkent from the beginning, and this is now the official name of the town.

3. The Situation of the Town of Tashkent

Tashkent is situated 4° 37' 11" east of Greenwich on a latitude 131
of 41° 19' 32" N. lat.; thus it lies approximately on the parallel of 361
Naples; it is 488 meters above sea level. The coordinates correspond to the observatory of Tashkent, which is one kilometer east of the former city wall.

1:von Schwarz--8 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1
Tashkent

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133

In all of Turkestan there are only a few places which have in every sense as favorable a situation as does Tashkent. It lies in a broad valley, flanked on both sides by the low thrust of the Chatkal mountains, a valley which is fed from one side by the river Chirchik, from the other by the Keles. The ground on which Tashkent is built, consists, as already mentioned, of a thick loess stratum which continues all the way to the bank of the Syr-Darya, sixty kilometers away. The terrain of Tashkent is undulating and, like all loess landscapes, furrowed through, here and there, by deep cuts, made by the flowing water. As for water resources, upon which all life and success depends in the steppes of Turkestan, no other town in Central Asia can be compared with Tashkent. Ten kilometers away, the well-watered Chirchik, largest of all the tributaries of the Syr-Darya, flows southeast of Tashkent. The town itself lies upon the Salar, a tributary of the Chirchik, which supplies the fields and gardens east of the town and the Russian town with water through its numerous canals. The deeply cut Bos-su canal flows through the native city, which is also a tributary of the Chirchik. (Figure 48, p. 151)

Tashkent is an oasis surrounded by undulating steppe land. The steppe reaches from the bank of the Syr-Darya to the Chatkal mountains, about eighty kilometers east of Tashkent, and its slopes likewise consist, for the most part, of steppe soil. Every year during the spring rain this steppe is covered with relatively luxuriant steppe grass which dries up immediately when the rainy season ends, whereupon the steppe all the way to the mountains /153/ has a frightfully monotonous, pale appearance throughout the summer. West of Tashkent is an extensive marshy landscape, to which the town is probably indebted for a fair share of its fevers. From the Syr-Darya to the mountains the steppe is covered with a number of villages, which are scattered like oases very far apart along the rivers and in the mountain valleys.

Looking out from Tashkent there is a lovely view of the whole spreading steppe country to the northeast, east and southeast between the town and the mountains, and of the Chatkal mountains themselves, which are covered with snow the greater part of the year. Only during the hottest summer months does the snow disappear from the highest peaks. Because of the extraordinary purity of the air the mountains appear to be much closer than they really are. Only during the dry summer months, when no rain has fallen for a long time, does the view become somewhat overcast by the fine

1: von Schwarz--8a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 [illegible] Turkestan RL1
Tashkent

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

Fig. 48. Loess landscape near Tashkent. Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by C. Merzbacher.)

361 133 dust in constant suspension in the air. When the air is particularly pure one can see from Tashkent the Turkestan mountain range, two hundred kilometers away, the continuation of the Alai mountains, with snow-covered crests, glistening like silver in the sunlight, are a magnificent sight.

[132] Tashkent has a very advantageous position in respect to climate as well. The town is protected in winter from the icy northeast winds by the high mountains in the northeast, so that Tashkent has a much warmer temperature during the coldest part of the year than locations farther west in the open steppe. Furthermore, since the valley of the Chirchik opens to the southwest, the amount of precipitation is relatively great, and Tashkent always has, for this reason, even during the worst droughts, a more than adequate water supply, an advantage of which hardly any other town in Turkestan can boast.

2. A Description of Sart Tashkent

361 ### 1. The Grounds and Fortifications of the Town

The Tashkent of today falls into two sharply separated and fundamentally different parts: the native town, so-called Sart Tashkent, and the Russian town, founded only after the Russian occupation. The later lies between the Bos-su canal and the Salar; Sart Tashkent extends primarily west of the Bos-su canal and has today, on the whole, the same dimensions and the same appearance as it did before the Russian conquest.

All Central Asian towns and even the larger villages divide into three separate parts: the bazaar, the most important part of the town, /154/ the residential quarters, which surround the bazaar, and finally the gardens and fields which surround the town proper from all sides. In Figure 49 this division of Turkestan towns is shown schematically. All the towns more or less approximate the basic type shown in the drawing, and deviate from it only insofar as the respective terrain and water conditions require. In the center of the town is the free bazaar square, in which are held the weekly bazaars or fairs as well as all sorts of public gatherings, executions, and the like. Along the bazaar square the permanent shops are joined together, mostly concentrically, while these again are surrounded by the residential quarters, consisting of simple clay huts. /Figure 49 p. 9a/ The sections we have mentioned so far, which together form the real town, are surrounded by an unbroken

1: von Schwarz--9a N-5 (ca 1895)-1900-RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 49.

[Tashkent]

361 town wall, beyond which extend the gardens and fields of the towns-people. On a place elevated naturally or artifically /155/ /Figure 50, p. 10a. Caption: Palace of the Emir of Bukhara./ /156/ inside the town wall, which is not intended to serve as a bulwark against an outside enemy, but as a castle to defend the ruler or commanding officer against any kind of uprising of the subject townsmen. The ruler or governor therefore always lives in the Urda. (cf. Figure 50, p. 155 and Figure 51, p. 10b, p. 157). From the bazaar square a larger or smaller number of streets lead out in a radial manner through the rows of shops, the houses, and on through the town gates the the outlying gardens and fields to the neighboring villages. Immediately beyond the gardens and fields the dry steppe begins, or the sand or gravel desert, completely without vegetation.

On the basis of the schematic drawing (Figure 49, p. 9a), and taking the climate into consideration, anyone can orient himself easily in any town in Turkestan, without a guide and without knowing a word of the native language, as I myself have proven a hundred times.

Also in Tashkent in earlier days, before the Russian conquest, the main town was surrounded by a high and very strong wall which
333 was made of loess as almost everywhere in Turkestan. For local purposes the loess is the best building material one could wish for. When dry it is as hard as stone, and is therefore very well adapted for the building of walls, because of the extraordinary dryness of the air and the slight precipitation. When dampened with water, however, the loess becomes quite soft and is as easy to work with as ordinary clay. All circular walls, towns walls as well as garden and courtyard walls, are made in the following manner in Turkestan. First, along the place where a wall is to be built, a ditch of the proper width and depth is dug and water is led into it. The earth from the ditch is mixed with straw, and by treading on it with the bare feet it is kneaded into a sticky paste. After this paste has been properly worked, it is piled up on the earth by means of a heavy hoe, used in the field, simply and without any sort of foundation, and is tamped down firmly with the feet. At first only a layer of about 0.6 meters high is laid down, and this is left until it is dry enough to hold the weight of a new layer without its sinking in. Then a second layer of the same height is laid on top, and so it continues until the wall has reached the desired height. The uneven places resulting from this type of building on the sides of the walls are usually eliminated by smoothing over the various layers with the

Schwarz-10a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 44 Palace of the Emir of Bukhara.

1: von Schwarz--10b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 BLI Turkestan BLI



Fig. 84. The palace of the khan of Khiva

hoes before putting on a new layer. The direction of the strokes for 333
one layer will be diagonal, from left /157/ to right, and for the
next one from right to left, and so forth, from which the walls in
Figure 52 (p. 158) retain a marked zigzag effect. /Figure 51. Caption:
The palace of the khan of Khiva/

Considering the nature of the material, the walls must naturally
be thicker at the bottom than at the top. The upper edge of the wall 712
is indented, /158/ and it serves partly as decoration and partly pro- 361
vides loopholes for shooting. Inside the town walls runs a platform on
which the defenders can place cannons, and on which a person can
walk all the way around the entire town. (Figure 53) For the walls
continue without any interruption over rivers, canals, and ravines.
/Figure 52. Caption: Turkestan town wall. / Therefore the water
courses are bridged over with thick beams and on these the walls are
built in the same manner as on dry land. The height of the town walls
differs according to the terrain, the importance of the place, and the
greater or lesser danger of the position. The walls of Tashkent, which
are among the strongest, still standing at the time of my visit in 1874,
had a height of from four and a half to six meters. Their circumfer-
ence was about 25 kilometers. /Figure 53. Caption: Turkestan town
wall, cross section. / The houses were not built against the town walls,
but instead a wide street went around the whole town inside the wall,
clearly to facilitate the defense. The gardens and fields nearly all lay
outside the town walls, but each of them was likewise surrounded by
its own wall, also made of clay. From the basic town twelve gates
led out to the gardens and the nearby settlements, and these were
usually named after the towns /159/ to which they led, as, for ex-
ample, the Kokand gate, the Samarkand gate, etc. The arrangement
of the town gates is quite a characteristic one in Turkestan. To shoot
breaches in a loess wall is very difficult, because thin walls can be
easily penetrated by the bullets without causing further damage, where-
as from thick walls the bullets ricochet. In attacking a Turkestan town,
therefore, the gates must always be stormed. These are therefore
always built as solidly as possible. On both sides of the gate, very
solid, more or less conical, round towers are built with platforms on
which to put the fortification guns (Figures 52 and 54). The gate, pro-
vided with these massive wings, leads into a large, high, quadrangu-
lar hall, the floor of which is raised about two meters above the road.
/Figure 54. Caption: The town gate of Khiva. / In this hall, through
which everyone who walks, rides horseback or drives through the gate

1: von Schwarz--11a N-5 (ca 1895)-1900-Turkestan RL1

712



Fig. 88. Turkestan town wall.

l: von Schwarz --11b[redacted]-5(c.1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig.33. Turkestan town wall, cross section.

l: von Schwarz--11c N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

712

Fig. 14. The town gate of Khiva.

712 361 must pass, the gate watch is placed. During the day the gates are continually open, but at nightfall they are closed and the keys delivered to the chief of police in charge, to avoid any sort of surprise through the carelessness or treachery of the guards at the gate. [496] In the gate halls mentioned above* in those regions which are still independent, the judges often take their places on bazaar days to administer justice to each one who has some sort of request. The punishments decreed are carried out in the same place, so that perhaps those criminals sentenced to hang will be hung upon the ceiling beams, and those visiting the bazaar must pass under them. When General von Kauffmann retreated from the rebellious town of Kokand, immediately after his departure, the Khan he had installed was stuck up like a pig in the bazaar, and when he regained control there for the second time /160/ he ordered the ringleaders to be hung in groups in all the gates of the town, as a horrible example.

In order to assure the safety of their town, the people of Tashkent not only built a very strong wall which was practically impregnable under Turkestan conditions., but they also installed a number [721] of observation posts outside the town. Since declarations of war were not the custom among the people of Turkestan, and the great art of the Turkestan battle leaders lay precisely in the execution of sudden and unexpected attacks in time of peace, the people of Tashkent built a number of artificial conical hills in the steppe, from twelve to fifteen meters high, on which various sentinels were placed, who were supposed to report the approach of enemies. These observation hills are usually found in pairs and are usually located in the even steppe where there are no suitable natural rises in the ground. They extend along the road to Fergana, from which Tashkent was most often exposed to surprise attacks, as far as the modern relay station Uralskaya, seventy kilometers from Tashkent.

Today the town wall of Tashkent, which no longer has any function, has fallen completely into decay, and on the east side, where the Sart and Russian towns meet, it has been entirely levelled because the material of the wall has been used by the Russians and the natives for brick-making.

Like all the towns of Turkestan, Tashkent once had an Urda(1)

1. In the towns inhabited by Tadzhiks, as, for example, Khodzhent/Leninbad/and Samarkand, the fortresses were designated by the name 'Ark' obviously the same root as the Latin arx. /citadel. /

*[cf. cat 86, p. 8 -- Analyst]

or citadel which was blown up by the Russians immediately after 712
the capture of the town. It was located on the upper left bank of 361
the Bos-su canal, and the site today is within the Russian town and barracks and various public and private buildings are built on it.

2. The Bazaar

The bazaar has a meaning for the Central Asians which it is 366
difficult for the European to grasp properly. The Central Asian spends the greater part of his life in the bazaar, and for him it takes the place of our newspapers, restaurants, coffeehouses, townhalls, amusement places, stock exchanges, law courts, etc. At the bazaar the entire public life and a great part of the private life of the male urban population takes place, and day in, day out, in winter and summer almost the entire population, when it is not occupied with work in the fields, is gathered in the bazaar. The bazaar is the real home of the townsman; since his private dwelling serves him primarily as a lodging for the night, and as a depository for his property and his wives and children, he therefore expends relatively /161/ little trouble on it.
p.13a
/Figure 55. Caption: Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace. /

The arrangement of the bazaars is the same everywhere, and 361
the bazaars of the different towns differ from each other only /162/ 366
in size. The bazaar in Tashkent is one of the largest in all Central Asia, containing about four thousand shops and workshops. The streets of the bazaar are relatively wide and mostly covered with reed mats, which are spread along beams diagonally placed over the streets from one row of stalls to another. The result is a pleasant twilight and a refreshing coolness, which is increased by a constant sprinkling of the bazaar streets with water. It is a beneficent contrast to the dazzling sunlight and the stifling ovenlike heat of the nearby streets leading into the dwelling quarters. (Figure 56).
p.14a

The booths which range along both sides of the bazaar streets, 347
serving either for selling goods or as workshops for the various craftsmen, all look alike and have nothing in common with European shops. They are rooms two and a half to three meters high, four and a half to six meters long, and from two to two and a half meters deep, which are completely open to the street. The walls are made of clay or else of reed screens spread over on both sides with clay. The roof also is

1: von Schwarz --13a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 11. Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace.

347 made only of beams, reeds and clay. The floor of the booth is usually raised a few feet above the street level, as is the small footpath which runs along the booths. The booths serve, without difficulty as places to sell all kinds of ware, or as workshops for all kinds of handicrafts, in effect whole industries are carried on at the bazaar. There are no windows or doors in the bazaar stalls, so that the merchants and craftsmen carry on their business all year round in all weather in these places, enclosed by only three walls. At night the shops are closed either by a boarded partition or by folding screens made of reeds. Those merchants who are unable to take all their wares home with them every evening spend the night in their shops, both winter and summer.

Merchants and craftsmen sit on the floor during their work on reed mats or blankets, with their legs crossed, sitting either inside the booth or on the footpath which leads into the booths (Figure 57, p. 15a, p. 165). The buyers also take their places on the ground beside the merchants, unless they prefer, for the sake of greater convenience to undertake the selection of wares on horseback, in which case the wares are brought out one by one to be inspected from the horse. Naturally, since in winter it is not particularly comfortable to sit on the ground which is soaked through, there are a few wooden benches covered with blankets or carpets for the greater comfort of the public in front of the better shops, especially tea houses, and eating places, /163/ (Figure 58, p. 15a, p. 165), and on these one can take his place with his legs crossed and conclude his business comfortably. /Figure 56, p. 14a. Caption: Covered bazaar streets/

366 443 A peculiarity of Central Asian bazzars is the strict separation of various industries and various types of goods /164/ from each other, which makes the search for and the choice of the necessary wares far easier for the buying public. One row of booths is, for example, exclusively devoted to clothing merchants, the next occupied by merchants in cotton material, the third by silk merchants; furs, linen, boots, saddles, metal wares, crockery, vegetables, fruit, meat, in short, everything there is to buy can be bought only in one specific row of booths. In the same manner all the eating places are in one row, where they prepare their national dishes right out on the street before all eyes: 'Plov' /pilaf/, 'pelmene' /small meat dumplings/, 'shashlik' and 'lepeshki' /small meal cakes/; and they poison the air far around with their burned 'shaffet' and 'kunshut' /sesame/ oil.

The handicrafts, like the wares are all organized strictly according to categories. In one street the kettle and teapot smiths make an

1: von Schwarz--14a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Pl.1 Turkestan Pl.1

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

[Tashkent]

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[275] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the
[305] rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.

485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

l: von Schwarz--15a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Pl.1 Turkestan Pl.1

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Fig. 51. Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent.

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

Fig. 52. Wooden platform.

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian
366 bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 172).

291 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the
369 streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining
363 as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

363 Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for the streets
361 of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiquitous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets, running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch. Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very uncomfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy road safely.

[491] In the towns, bridges are built only over those of the numerous brooks and canals with banks which are too high and steep to walk or ride over easily. Otherwise it is left to the pedestrian to get through the water as
[492] best he can. This is based on the fact that in Turkestan every halfway respectable person, man, woman and child is mounted and only the poorest beggars and tramps go on foot; for these there is no pity if they must walk with bare feet through the ice cold water and the knee-deep mud, in the winter.

In Tashkent the streets in the Sart town are considerably better than in many other Central Asian towns, but even here the conditions are such, that among other things, once eleven women drowned in

Fig. 30. Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)

363 the main street as a result of an unlucky chance that just as they
361 were passing through a bottomless mire their carriage broke down and they were unable to work their way out of the soft mud. More than once have I witnessed riders sunk to the waist in the soft ground, and once I saved the life of a youth near the bazaar who fell head first into mud a meter thick when his horse stumbled, and only his legs stuck out. In most recent times, thanks to the efforts of the Russian /169/ administration, the street conditions have improved considerably, but they still leave much to be desired. A fundamental improvement is impossible /Figure 60. Caption: The main street of Tashkent. / without quite disproportionate costs, for the loess base, which becomes bottomless every winter, makes paving and macadamizing far more /170/ difficult, as the Russians have often enough discovered in the laying out of the streets in their town.

A basic fault of the Turkestan streets is that, with the exception of the few main streets, they are so narrow that two carriages cannot pass each other and always one of the two vehicles which meet must back up until he succeeds in passing through a side alley. On bazaar days traffic jams lasting for hours often occur as a result of this. Four-wheeled wagons cannot be used at all in such narrow alleys because one cannot turn around with them. This bad situation is clearly caused by the fact that the street inside the town wall had to be used sparingly in order not to increase the circumference of the town walls too much. For otherwise the Central Asian towns have a disproportionately large expansion since all the houses consist only of a ground floor, and are always surrounded by more or less extensive courts and even gardens.

363 If the streets in Central Asian towns are bad enough for these
351 reasons, their unfavorable aspect is increased substantially by the
361 fact that there are no houses along them but only uniform courtyard walls of yellow clay the endless monotony of which is broken only here and there by a tiny gate which one would sooner take for the entrance to a pigsty than to a human dwelling. For the dwelling houses are all located within the courts, and even the view of the courts, when one opens the gate off the street, is cut off, for behind each gate is a special wall. The height of the court walls which enclose the streets on both sides is arranged so that one cannot see over even when on horseback or riding a camel; they are, therefore, usually three to three and a half meters high. The streets which lead through the dwelling quarter inside the town walls differ in no way

1: von Schwarz--184 N-5 (ca 1896) 1800 RLI Turkestan RLI

Fig. 60. The main street of Tashkent.

from those passing between the gardens and fields outside the circular 363
walls, since the latter are enclosed in walls exactly like those around 351
the dwellings within the town. Therefore, upon entering a strange town 361
the only way to tell whether one is still among the fields and gardens, or already between the rows of houses, is on the basis of whether one has passed through the town gate. In all Central Asian towns the streets are crooked, and continue in a perpetual zigzag, the natives have no notion of a regular arrangement of rows of streets, and preliminary plans in the erection of houses. Only the main streets of Tashkent, which /171/ lead from the bazaar to the outlying districts have a semblance of regularity, although they also possess numerous bends and turns.

The terrible monotony of the streets in Sart Tashkent is only 361
broken here and there by a mosque or 'medrese' /religious school/, by isolated tombs which are found in the middle of the town along the roads, by the rising or downward slope of the ground, and by the many streams, sometimes flowing in deep ravines, which cut across the entire town in all directions. In this respect Tashkent makes a much better impression, in spite of everything, than /Figure 61. p.19a Caption: Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ most of the other towns of Turkestan, most of which lie in more or less level terrain.

Concerning the traffic in the streets of Tashkent, this differs 363
greatly in different parts of the town. In the side streets one sees only 361
isolated riders or strollers; the main streets leading to the bazaar, especially on market days, are filled all day long with endless lines of camel, horse and donkey caravans, wagons, and riders of horses, donkeys and camels, through which it is often difficult to make one's way, even with the assiduous use of the horsewhip. This means is not used only by the Russians, but also and even more widely by the natives /172/ themselves, for in Turkestan everyone who is prominent, either [55%] through rank or wealth, considers himself entitled to enforce his precedence, by the 'ultima ratio' of the 'nagaika,' /whip/ over less fortunate creatures, while the victims of this treatment consider it perfectly in order and use it themselves against those still lower in rank. Yielding is considered a sign of weakness by the Central Asians, and there is no better way of gaining their respect than a show of arrogance and the use of brute force. The Russians, therefore, are born, as it were, to the rule of the Central Asians.

l: von Schwarz--19a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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Fig. 1. Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher.

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

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

Fig. 62. A view of Kuldja (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

1 von Schwarz 21 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad/ and Fergana , and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorperated into Russia. 642

The political and social arrangements were the same in all the Uzbek khanates. (1) The ruling classes were formed by the Uzbeks, 565 554

1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar [641] 643 554

643 again or even have him executed for no reason at all. Most of the
554 influential figures and high dignitaries at the courts of the khans make many changes in the course of their careers as a result of this and moreover even the khans themselves are not always immune. The former envoy of Kokand, Mirza Hakim, who for the betrayal of his fatherland and his Khan later received the title of a Russian state councillor, had earlier been a shopkeeper. The Khan of Khiva, Kulman, was promoted to this position as a result of a conspiracy of day laborers. The former ruler of Kashgar, Yakub Beg, rose from the dregs of the population, having been in his youth a 'batsha', or 'public dancer.' The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, after his first dethronement in Dzhizak, established himself as a shopkeeper, and acquired such a fancy for business that he continued with it after he regained the throne, and declared a large part of the booths of the bazaar of Kokand to be his property. Indeed he did not consider it beneath his dignity to keep bands of musicians, as well as leaders of bears and monkeys, which he ordered led about the fairs on his account, and had them give concerts in private houses, uninvited.

565 Since the post of honor of the father, the bestowal of which unfortunately depended upon the whim of the ruler, was only rarely passed on to his son, the children of high-placed officials often enjoyed no more education than the children of ordinary townsmen and ran around with them barefoot and half-naked in the streets. During my stay of several weeks in Baysun in 1886, where I was the guest of the beg or governor there, the sons of the beg came to my court every day to consume the leftovers of my dinner in the company of my servants and cossacks. To see a former beg or court official or his sons working as dealers in old clothes, carters or even day laborers is not at all unusual.

643 One can see from the following case how uncertain and in-
558 constant the favor of a khan is. During my first trip to Bukhara, a Bukharan who ranked as the best chess-player was staying with the former Emir of Bukhara, Muzafar al-Din, a chess-player who was as passionate a player as he was mediocre. The chess-player was held in great esteem and was overwhelmed by the Emir with /176/ honors and riches. Upon a later visit I met this favorite in a group of ragged vagabonds who were pushing their way into our quarter with the hope of obtaining some of the tidbits from our table which are usually found when guests are being entertained. When I inquired

as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread. 643 558

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah, who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers, and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought directly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir. Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in his absence. 643 [669]

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khanates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials 631

631 and the judges, and personally arbitrates the more important issues of dispute or crime. The administration of the towns belonging to the khanate is assigned by the khan to governors who bear the title of beg and who administer their district almost independently. the begs name the officials and judges in their regions according to their own good judgment, usually from among their relatives; they gather the taxes, and are only obliged to pay the khan a specified sum every year for their region; and in case of war to produce an army from their region those men capable of bearing arms. Thus in actuality, the khanate consists, of a loose conglomeration of small states, all of which are made up of a larger town and the surrounding villages.

This arrangement has its basis in the local conditions. In Turkestan the individual states do not consist of a cohesive area but of isolated oases, scattered often hundreds of kilometers apart over the endless sandy deserts and hunger steppes. As a result of the great distances, the difficulty of communication and the general insecurity in these sparsely populated regions, it is impossible to keep these faraway oases completely under control by one center. For this reason, it was necessary to arm the governors with great powers of authority for all eventualities, and to transfer to them all responsibility for their oases.

The position of the begs in the Central Asian khanates was formerly quite similar to that of the satraps in the ancient kingdom of Persia. Like the satraps, the begs frequently revolted against their lords, often successfully, and they carried on wars with their neighboring begs without paying any attention to their khan. Only very recently, as a result of Russian influence in the khanates which still survive, the power of the khan over his begs has increased so much that they have to a great extent lost their former independence and sunk to the level of mere officials. The example of the two towns of Shaar and Kitab has contributed especially to the accomplishment of this change in the relation of the beg to the khans. The begs of these towns had also for years revolted together against the Emir of Bukhara and maintained their independence against all attacks on the part of the Emir, but they were conquered at last by the Russians on behalf of the Emir, and taken prisoner and interned within Russian territory, and since then no beg thinks of revolting against his lord.

103 /178/ Because of the circumstances mentioned above, there are also no distinctive names of countries in Turkestan, and each state takes its name from the most important oasis of those belonging to one political unit. Thus Kokand was that state of which the oasis

Kokand was the most important one, and therefore the khan had his seat there. Bukhara has its name from Bukhara, the capital town, and Khiva has its name from the town of Khiva. The name Turkestan itself was originally only a town name, and has been adopted from the unimportant town of Turkestan for the whole area of Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Turkic peoples. (1) 103

1. Present-day Siberia has acquired its name in just the same way, for the Russians transferred the name of the capital town of the Siberian Tatars, Sibir, to the land which was then probably without a name.

The names Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, as names of states, as well as the regional name of Turkestan, are used, it must be emphasized, only by the Europeans; the natives of Turkestan even today mean by these terms only the respective towns.

The same situation arose already in ancient times, for the same reasons, for the chronicler of the campaigns of Alexander used the town names of Baktra and Sogdiana in like manner to designate the respective regions, a circumstance which led to many errors later regarding the geography of antiquity. (cf. my monograph, 'Alexanders des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan' /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great/, Munich, 1893).

As far as the court of the Central Asian khan is concerned, it likewise was organized in all the khanates in a completely similar fashion. The court household of the Khan of Kokand, similar to the ones in Bukhara (Figure 63) and Khiva as they still exist, is made up of the following dignitaries: 644 p. 26a

I. Court Officials

1. Kush Begi or 'Grand Falconer', who represents the Khan when he is absent from the capital.
2. Divan-Begi or Chancellor.
3. Taksaba or Cupbearer.
4. Mirakhur or Equerry.
5. Karaul-Begi or Chief of the Bodyguard.
6. Mirza-Bashi or Chief Scribe.

II. Military Officers

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II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzat-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of
554 their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stableboy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consier it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of firty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

634 The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

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lt von Schwarz--26a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RLI Turkestan RLI

Fig. 22. The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

of the khan's court. The most important man at the court of a beg is always the Divan-Begi, who functions as the deputy of the beg in his absence and in addition looks after most of the duties of the beg. For the begs, who are mostly Uzbeks recruited from among the relatives and favorites of the khan, are usually people with no accomplishments and no scholarly training, and they govern their districts more or less in the same way as Sancho Panza, in his time, thought to "govern" his island. In those begdoms which cover an extensive area, particularly in the sparsely populated mountain regions, the beg appoints separate chiefs for the individual outpost towns and villages subject to him. /181/ These are usually chosen from among his relatives, are responsible only to him, and hold the title of 'amlakdar'. 634

The beg's administration is limited primarily to adjudications and the collection of taxes. The ordinary matters of dispute are adjusted by the kazis, who are named by the begs. More important cases as well as criminal matters are decided by the beg himself or by his Divan-Begi.

/Figure 64. Caption: Begs of Khiva (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher). /

The following taxes were exacted in the Khanate of Kokand before the Russian rule: 651

1. Haradj or field tax; this was collected 'in natura'.
2. Tanapna, a tribute in gold from the fruit and vegetable gardens
3. Syaket, a commercial tax, levied from the wares or cattle sold at the bazaar.
4. A bazaar tax, for the right to trade at the bazaar.
5. A weight tax, a tribute which the lessees of the public scales had to pay.
6. A salt tax.

/182/ There is a particular manner in Turkestan in which the begs must deliver their tribute to the khan. It must not be in gold, but in the form of gifts. In Bukhara, for example, the following behavior is observed. Twice a year, in spring and in fall, all the begs, with suites corresponding to their ranks, must be at the residence of the court of the emir and bring him gifts, the kind and number of which are prescribed exactly by the court ceremony, but their worth must correspond to the revenues of the district. These gifts consist of 651 635

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Fig. Begs of Khiva (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

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the following objects:

1. Eighty-six horses, with saddle-cloths of silk and velvet, embroidered of gold and silver, and harnesses with turquoises and other semi-precious stones, mounted in silver.
2. The same number of 'khalats' or festive clothing of which a specified number must be of cashmere, of gold brocade, of velvet, of satin, of woolen cloth, of silk and of silk mixed with cotton.
3. A number of pieces of unworked silk.
4. A number of belts inlaid with turquoises.
5. A specific sum of money, in gold and silver coins.

Upon their arrival at the court, as well as upon their departure, however, the begs also receive gifts from the emir in return, which likewise consist of gold, silk materials, belts, festive clothing, and horses in splendid array, and the value and number of these gifts are calculated on the basis of the rank of the recipient as well as on the amount of goodwill of the emir.

In addition to these regular payments, whenever the emir happens to ride through or remain briefly in their districts, the begs must maintain his entire suite and the army which always accompanies him for the whole period of his stay, and offer him as well as his court officials the customary gifts upon his arrival and likewise upon his departure. The emir of Bukhara always passes the whole summer with his entire court and his bodyguard in the three towns of Karshi, Shaar and Kitab, and lives all this time at the expense of the respective beg, at the same time reckoning the length of his stay in each of the three towns exactly according to their wealth and capacity. The emir undertakes these migrations partly for his health, for it is not healthy to live in Bukhara during the hot weather, because of the lack of water. But he also travels in order to relieve his capital, which, must support him during the winter months. Before the Russian conquest of Samarkand it had been the summer residence of the emir. It is known that a perfectly parallel relationship existed in the ancient kingdom of Persia between the king and the satraps. Hence it follows that the present /183/ situation prevailing in Turkestan was not introduced by the Mongolian Uzbeks, but has its derivation earlier, from the times of the ancient Bactrians and Sogdians, or from the earliest Indo-European times, when Turkestan was still populated

only by Indo-Europeans. 651 635

In the towns where the standing garrisons of troops for the khan were lodged, the respective beg likewise had to support them.

The above-mentioned biannual trips to the court of the emir or khan are the only dark sides in the otherwise enviable existence of the begs. For no beg knows when he sets out whether he will see his town 635 and his family again. Since his entire power and existence is depend- 662 ent upon the often-changing mood of the khan, which in turn depends on the insinuations of his favorites, such a favorite need only to say a word to depose the most powerful beg. Thus the situation in the courts of the Central Asian khans are exactly the same as those so truly and clearly described in the Bible in the story of David, and in the Book of Esther. During my first trip to Hissar in 1875, we found in the village of Derbent no preparations for our reception. It later turned out that this happened because the Beg of Baysun, to whose district Derbent belonged, had not received the necessary communication in time because he was away on a trip. When the court official who had been attached to our party by the emir as a courier imparted this to the emir by letter, the latter became irritated at the beg in question, whereupon one of the court officials used this favorable opportunity in order to procure the post of the beg for one of his relatives: he informed the emir that the Beg of Baysun was really a bad fellow, for among the gifts which he had presented to the emir a torn khalat had been found. This infuriated the emir to such an extent, that without examining the matter further, or giving the probably innocent accused the opportunity to defend himself, he relieved the beg of his position and was irresolute for several days as to whether he should have him hung as well. The begs are thereby forced to send rich gifts to the court officials and favorites of the khan constantly, and to this end they must milk their subjects dry so as to have a spokesman near the khan in case of need. Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that when a khan dies, there is always a general upheaval in the whole administration. During my last official journey in 1888 I found completely new faces in offices and posts of honor everywhere in Bukhara, with the sole exception of the positions held by the brothers of the emir. All the begs from the time of the Emir Muzafar al-Din who had died only shortly before, had /184/ disappeared without trace, along with their numerous officials and favorites. Some

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
652 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported
662 by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time . In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruted from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

person, but without noticeably better luck.

701 /185/ In Bukhara the mercenary troops mentioned above, designated as 'sarbaz' were and are until today made up of infantry and artillery (Figure 65, 66, and 67, p. 31a, 32a, and 32b.) /Figure 65: Caption: [714] The former regular army of Kokand./ The uniform of the sarbaz consists of tall black sheepskin caps, similar to those of the Turkmen, of /186/ heavy leather boots, red khalats or jackets with stand-up collars, and broad yellow breeches, which are put over the khalat and the boots. Soliders uniformed in this manner can have little claim to grace; for as a result of the khalats being stuffed into the trousers, their physical bulk, especially in back is so voluminous as to be strongly reminiscent of Kazakh fat-tailed sheep. The artillerymen have blue coats with red collars. Officers and non-commisioned officers wear in addition long coats made of cloth of red, blue or green, according to their branch of service, and long curved sabers. On top of this they adorn themselves with all possible kinds of cast-off Russian officers' epaulettes and officials' shoulder-straps, which they have received from Russian officers and [713] officials as gifts, or bought from Jewish old-clothes dealers. The arms of the infantry consists of weapons of all possible forms and calibers, beginning with the short, massive blunderbusses from the time of the discovery of America, with a flaring muzzle, all the way to the double-barreled sporting gun of today. Very recently the Bukharan army also received a number of Berdan rifles, which were given the emir by the Emperor of Russia at the time of the coronation. The cannon are mostly muzzle-loaders of the same make. When on the march, the sarbaz are transported on the usual native two-wheeled wagons, since all the Central Asians are poor foot soldiers. The sarbaz infantry and artillery have value only in fighting the natives; when opposing European troops they are without any significance.

726 In case of war in Kokand and Bukhara, the whole remaining male population capable of bearing arms would be called up in addition to the sarbaz. This totally untrained and undisciplined militia was made up solely of cavalry, armed in the most diverse manner with lances, heavy sabers, flintlock and slow-match guns, sticks set in brass slings and bows, or even simply whips (nagaikas). (1)

1. In the last Kokand war (1876) the Russian met fighters who still wore visored helmets and iron coats of mail.

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

Fig. 41. The former regular army of Kokand.

726 They had the same tactical value as the army of Darius did in its time in battle with the Macedonian phalanx of Alexander (Figure 68, p. 191; cf. also Figure 152). A former Kokand officer told me that in the struggles between Kokand and Bukhara the armies on both sides were sometimes over 100, 000 strong. The battles waged between these formidable hordes were relatively bloodless, however. After the first shots had been exchanged by both sides from the great distances, one of the contending parties always wheeled about /187/ /Figure 66. Caption: Bukharan infantry (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./ /188/ and fled, although no one could fathom why just this side fled and not the other. /Footnote containing anecdote omitted./ It was therefore a fully rational act on the part of the Russians to rely upon their own forces in their wars in Central Asia, no matter how few in number and to refuse magnanimously the support, many times offered, of the Bukharan, Kazakh and other native auxiliary troops. /Original text cut out of translation from middle of p. 188 to p. 189, including two footnotes./ /Figure 67. Caption: Bukharan artillery (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

625 For the maintenance of peace and order in the towns of Turkestan there is a special police force consisting of a police chief or /190/ kur-bashi, and a number of policemen or mirshabs. In spite of the primitive organization of the police and the complete absence of street lighting, safety is much greater in the towns of Turkestan inhabited by the natives than in the Russian towns, even though in the latter there are street lights, the police are organized in the European manner, and in addition safety is enforced by a countless horde of nightwatchmen. This is because of the summary and ruthless procedure of the secret police and because the peculiar arrangement described earlier by which all traffic on the streets is forbidden from evening until morning devotions, and everyone seen on the street after dark for whatever reason is arrested. Lovers of nightly adventures, thieves, and other malefactors are therefore in a difficult position. The carrying out of their evil intentions is made easier to some extent, however, in that the policemen and nightwatchmen are obliged to pass the whole night banging on tom-toms, drums and various wooden clappers at brief intervals, partly to frighten the evildoers, and partly to prove that they are at their posts and have not gone to sleep somewhere. For one can count on the honesty and the conscientiousness of the police and the nightwatchmen just as little as on the other people. Those who wander by night on forbidden errands can therefore usually orient themselves with considerable accuracy as to the momentary locations

1: von Schwarz--32a N-5 (ca 1896) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Fig. 66. Bukharan infantry (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

1: von Schwarz--32b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 61. Bukharan artillery (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

of the organs of security, and take the necessary precautions accordingly. At the observatory in Tashkent which /191/ is surrounded by a high wall and which, in addition, has a special night watchman for every single building, there was the curious occurrence that while one of the night watchmen was energetically clapping away in discharge of his duty, his own dwelling, which was within the region he was watching, was completely sacked. 625

As representatives of the population of the towns and villages in regard to the government authorities, there are certain elders, chosen by the people themselves, who are designated as 'aksakals' or "greybeards" and play a role completely analogous to that of European mayors. Sart Tashkent divides into four districts or yurts, /Figure 68. Caption: Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral - Asien.) /Through Central Asia/Leipzig, 1888, F. A. Brockhaus.)/ in which each nominates a special aksakal. These districts, which bear the names Shaikhantaur, Bish-Agach, Sibzor and Kukchi, subdivide further into a larger number of quarters or mahalas, each of which again has its own name. The district of Shaikhantaur, which includes the northeastern part of the town , is divided into forty-eight quarters; the district of Bish-Agach, the part of the town bordering on the Russian town has thirty-two quarters; the northwest part of the town constitutes the Sibzor district, with thirty-eight quarters, and the southwest part is the Kukchi district, with thirty-one quarters. Since its subjection to Russian authority, Tashkent constitutes /192/ administratively a separate part of the Syr-Darya province which includes in addition the districts of Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Amu-Darya, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, and the Kurama or rural district of Tashkent. Today Tashkent is under a Russian captain of the civil guard with the rank of colonel, for whom two assistants are appointed: one for the Russian part of the town, the other, appointed from the native population, for the Asiatic town. With regard to the inner organization of Sart Tashkent, the Russians have changed almost nothing. As before, the natives choose their aksakals and kazis /judges/ themselves, pay the same taxes as before, only on a noticeably diminished scale, and their police organizations also remain unchanged: There is only the limitation that Russians passing through the Sart town at night are not to be arrested. By this compromise the Russians derive a double advantage. In the first place the natives are flattered that no one has disputed their traditional arrangements; secondly the Russians are relieved of the expense of providing street lighting, police, courts of justice and the like; furthermore they have achieved a much greater

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1: von Schwarz--33a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 M.1 Turkestan M.1

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

Fig. Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral-Asien.) /Through Central Asia/ Leipzig, 1888, F. A. Brockhaus. /

632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

593 self must put up with any treatment from them. Only wives born in
562 the better families can force better treatment from their husbands
[586] through their family ties, and in case of mistreatment by their husbands, such wives can by a legal action cause the husbands to separate from them. All other wives are exposed without protection to the arbitrary will of their husbands, who may at any time separate from them or take younger wives besides them if the older ones no longer please them, all this without giving reasons.

The most important circumstance which makes all public life unbearably monotonous and boring in Turkestan towns, and prevents the rise of a real social and family life, is the absolute seclusion, worse than in a cloister, of the women from the world of men. On the street the women must either not appear at all, or else they must be so heavily veiled that nothing at all can be seen of their figures. At home, however, they must live in a special section which can never be entered by any man other than their husbands and children. The groom is not allowed
[584] to see his bride even once before the wedding, and even during the marriage ceremony the bride and groom are in two different places. Thus the men must, unfortunately, depend on the judgments of their female relatives or on professional matchmakers for their choice of wives. Substitutions, such as those by which the patriarch Joseph was tricked by his father-in-law Laban are therefore easily made. At best the wives can live the rest of their lives communicating only with their brothers and parents in addition to their husbands, while all other men are for them as /194/ good as nonexistent. The women cannot take part in any public festivity, not even in family celbrations or receptions of guests in their own houses. A more joyless existence than that of the native wives in the towns of Central Asia can scarcely be imagined. (1)

[839] 1. I will note here that in Turkestan the institution of eunuchs is unknown. Even the harems of the khans there are no eunuchs.

On the whole, however, the life of the men too is in no way enviable as a result of the sharp separation of the sexes. A man without family never meets a female face to face at all, all his life, and is left exclusively to associate with men. The result of these unnatural conditions is an unbelievable moral depravity and a really horrifying increase of all possible unnatural vices.

The married men, too, have relatively little contact with their

593 wives and prefer to pass their time in association with men and to
562 idle about the whole day in the bazaar whenever their time is not taken up with work in the fields, commercial transactions or some kind of handicraft. This has its basis in the complete absence of schooling among all the women, even those of the best families. This is likewise a consequence of the seclusion of the female sex which makes it impossible for women to achieve a higher education in schools. The women are therefore unable to be companionable and good company to their husbands in the best sense.

000 A sense of how boring, even unbearable the whole life is in one of the towns inhabited by natives, as a result of the circumstances described, can only be felt by someone who has once been lost by some misfortune for a period of time in such a town. Such a life, as I can confirm from my own experience, is particularly depressing for Europeans accustomed to association with women and to the European forms of society. For Europeans a long stay in purely Mohammedan towns can be absolutely disastrous, and I have known of several cases, in which living for several years in an exclusively Mohammedan environment has led a man to suicide or madness.

402 There is one positive feature for the women in the towns and villages of Turkestan resulting from their strict separation and cloistered state: they are less drawn into heavy labor than is the case among the Kazakhs, and they are spared the work in the fields and gardens and the heavy work or the handicrafts. The chief task of the Sart and /195/ Tadjik women is the care and rearing of their children, the preparation of food, the making and washing of clothes, the spinning of yarn and the weaving of cloth for clothing for the household, and the like; above all the growing of silkworms is entirely in the hands of the women. All work which must be performed in the open and publicly, such as field and garden cultivation, handicrafts, commercial transactions, cattle raising, is done exclusively by men, which is quite different from the custom among the nomads. All the domestic labor, however, is done by the wives, even among the highest dignitaries and the khans, since there are no female domestic servants, but only male ones. It is not at all unusual for the wives of the highest officials, even of the khans, to send the products of their domestic industry, such as embroidered housecaps, belts, little pockets and the like, to the bazaar to be sold, in order to gain a little income.

1:von Schwarz--37 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs 771
profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs 656
are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially 661
the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of [548]
prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

792 are recruited primarily from labor-shirking vagabonds who prefer to live at the expense of the stupidly credulous people, instead of earning their livelihood through honorable work. For this reason their conduct is no model for the ordinary folk. On the contrary they occupy about the lowest place in relation to moral depravity which a man can reach. /Figure 69. Caption: Duvanas (Moslem mendicant friars). /They are so addicted to the use of opium, 'nasha' or 'hashish', and all possible unnatural vices, that the consequences of their debaucheries are as a rule already visible in their idiotic and bestial facial expressions. Therefore in Turkestan the word duvana is also synonymous with idiot. At the same time, naturally only for mercenary reasons, they are great fanatics and with their public /197/ inflammatory addresses in the streets and bazaars they incite the common people to the same fanaticism and to a blind hate against all people of different faiths. In the Russian dominions, for this reason, the duvanas too are forbidden to hold public sermons. They are not occupied with scientific work nor with any other sort of work, and live solely upon alms, which they collect or rather exact in a showy manner and with the greatest impudence. Among them, gratitude for a gift received is out of the question, for on the contrary, they believe they are doing the donor a favor by receiving alms from him and giving him an opportunity to perform an act pleasing to God.

One may get a general impression of the external appearance of the duvanas from Figure 69, in which there appear two typical specimens of this worthy lot. The most characteristic feature of a duvana's costume is the disproportionately large, tall, conic cap, of carpet material, which they wear summer and winter, and which constitutes the actual uniform of the duvanas, since such caps are not worn by anyone else. For the collection of alms, they carry on their arm or belt a shallow pumpkin gourd, cut in half horizontally. The upper part of the gourd, which is fastened to the larger lower part by a rope just like the lid of the incense burners in the Catholic and Orthodox churches, constitutes the lid of this peculiar poor box. In the left hand, the duvanas carry two short elaborate rods, bound together with an iron ring, and by rattling this they seek to draw the attention of the public to themselves. Their outfit is completed by a long massive staff, which often has various pieces of metal suspended on it, likewise intended for rattling. The entire remaining costume of the duvanas consists of a khalat held together by a rope, which is covered with hundreds of stains of all possible colors, shapes and sizes. Countless rags, often artificially attached, and parts of the lining hang down below this, and the naked body is visible through

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Fig. 38. Duvanas (Moslem mendicant friars).

various holes as large as a hand. Thus in comparison with a Central 792
Asian duvana, Antisthenes and his pupil Diogenes would look like absolute dandies. These khalats, torn and ragged to the point of indecency, are likewise part of the uniform of the duvana; for I have noticed more than once, upon closer inspection, that even when the duvana wore a new khalat, it was completely covered with rags, visibly sewn on, to create the appearance of being damaged. Shirts and any sort of underwear are usually completely absent among the duvanas. Their feet either remain completely bare winter and summer, or else they wear /198/ enormous clumsy slippers of the kind of the famous slippers of the Bagdad merchant Kazem, which in their time brought their master so many thrashings and similar troubles.

The 'ishans' play an entirely different role than the duvanas. Their number is much smaller than that of the duvanas, and many travelers mistakenly take them for Moslem clerics. Actual clergy, in the manner of the Christian church, does not exist among the Moslems at all, as is well known. The mullahs are nothing more than scribes and prayer leaders in the mosques, whose function can be taken over by any proper Moslem without the need of some higher authorization. The ishans are men who, like the duvanas, prefer a parasitic life at the expense of the believers to honorable labor, but at the same time they are too proud and genteel to attach themselves to the duvanas. They are usually men who have seen better days, but have squandered their fortunes in one way or another. They claim to have a monopoly on special piety and holiness, establish themselves beside some mosque or at the grave of an ostensible saint, and pass their free time with a sort of rosary in their hands in outward prayer, at which time they choose by predilection a position where they can be seen by everyone. Since of course the ishans have no time to earn their livelihood, because they pray aloud, their fellow religionists make sure that they lack for nothing, for they believe that they are building themselves a stairway to heaven by the support of such men who are enlightened by God. Thus the ishans lead a comfortable and untroubled life, clothe themselves in the finest materials of some striking color especially red or white, and keep servants and horses. At all festivities and banquets they are given the first place, and at the common prayers they are given the honorary office of the leader of the prayers.

Among the Moslems of Central Asia, a privileged position is 788
enjoyed also by all those who have made a pilgrimage to the grave of the prophet in Mecca. Here also these men bear the title of 'hadji'

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes. [471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

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

Fig. 70. The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand.

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

Fig. n. The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan.

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

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

Fig. 2. Maxim mosque in Tashkent.

576 wear, soiled from the filth of the unpaved streets, before entering
368 a dwelling. For one does not sit on chairs in the dwellings of the natives or in the mosques, but simply sits on the floor. Consequently they do not demand of the Europeans that they pull off their boots before entering a mosque.

346 There are two types of mosques in Turkestan; the large cupola structures of firebricks with high facades and broad gate arches, most of which go back to the time of Tamerlane (Figure 70, p. 199 and Figure 71, p. 200), and the modern mosques, which consist of simple buildings, similar to an ordinary dwelling, with adjoining colonnades, like the one shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). In Tashkent there are only two mosques of the first type: the old half-ruined mosque, Hodja Akhrar, the mosaics of which are still partly preserved and prove that it was built in the same style as the Tamerlane mosque in Samarkand, and the more recent /203 Figure 73. Caption: The Interior of a Mosque in Bukhara. //204/Beklyar Beg mosque, which dominates the bazaar.

All the other mosques in Tashkent, and their number reaches 255, are more or less similar to the Maxim mosque, shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). As a rule they consist of one greater or smaller chamber, constructed of firebrick or simply of clay, and an adjoining portico with carved wooden columns and a level wooden roof. The floor of the portico is always raised several feet above the surrounding court. Sometimes there is no closed space at all, and the mosque then consists solely of a shelter, open in the front with walls constructed of clay. The interior of the mosques (Figure 73, p. 203), exhibits as a rule no decorations nor objects of furnishing, and the walls are in most cases not whitewashed even once. An elevation consisting of some steps built of bricks or clay serves as a pulpit for the mullah who is speaking. The mosques are always oriented in such a way that the wall opposite the entrance, toward which the supplicants turn during the prayer, whenever possible is perpendicular to the direction facing Mecca. Also in their prayers outside the mosque, the Moslems always seek to face toward Mecca, and in this connection they take the matter so seriously, that I have been asked by the inhabitants of all the towns I have visited during my travels, to indicate to them by means of my astronomic instruments as exactly as possible the direction toward Mecca. In every mosque there is a court or

1: von Schwarz--42a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 72 The interior of a Mosque in Bukhara.

346 garden of greater or smaller size with a pond in the middle at which Moslem visitors to the mosque make their prescribed ablutions before the prayers, if they have not already done so at home. These mosque courtyards form a favorite meeting place for all the residents whose only task in life consists in an unbroken delightful idleness, but who consider it beneath their dignity to loiter about with the younger men
793 at the bazaar and in the tea shops. At every mosque there is an 'imam' or permanent leader of prayers, with an assistant, who bears the title of 'sufi,' as well as a caller, endowed with a powerful voice, who must announce from the minaret of the mosque (Figure 74) the time of the morning and evening prayers and at the same time the curfew hour for the public houses. None of these ordinarily receives any regular salary. Instead, voluntary gifts are received, at the time of the high festivals from the vistors of the mosque in question, and at harvest time they are given a specified part of the fruit of the earth.

788 During the group prayers, inside the mosque as well as outside, the participants arrange themselves in rank and file like a detachment of soldiers, while the prayer leader (imam) is at the front in order to be visible to everyone. During the prayer people stand and kneel in rapid succession /205/ and touch the ground with the forehead from time to time; all these movements, to which are added various manipulations of the hands, are made first by the prayer leader and then imitated by the entire group, as though by command. This makes an extremely comical impression upon the non-participants, for the whole thing resembles an exercise in callisthenics more than a religious act, the more so since it all proceeds in deathly silence, for
[562] the prayers are not spoken aloud. Women may not participate in such common prayers nor visit the mosques. /Figure 74, p. 43a. Caption: The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva./

785 The Moslem fasts, which last all through the month of Ramadan, and are designated as 'urza', are completely different from the Christian fasts. They do not consist in abstinence from meat nor of moderation in eating, but instead in the prohibition of food or drink from sunrise to sundown, including even a drink of water. The Moslems are so strict in this connection that they do not even permit themselves to bathe fro some water could get into the body unintentionally through the nose or the ears. It can be easily seen that the observance of such strict fasts, especially during the burning heat of Turkestan, is no trivial thing. But scarcely has the sun set and the evening prayer is finished, before a solemn banquet begins with singing and dancing, a

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

Fig. 14. The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva.

785 sort of compensation for the abstinence endured all through the day, /206/ and this feast sometimes lasts until morning, during which gluttony is as great as is humanly possible. When traveling, these Moslem fasts often drove me nearly to despair. During the days, the men could not be used for anything as a result of lack of sleep, and of hunger and thirst, and at night when one was exausted from the exertions of traveling there was not a moment of peace for all night long the shouting and howling and the noise of drums and all possible musical instruments never ceased. And people regard such unhealthy fasts, alternated with orgies night after night, as deeds pleasing to God.

778 776 As regards superstition, the Central Asian Moslems are second to no other religious body. The tombs and the alleged clothing and relics of their countless saints, whose claim to this rank is usually very questionable, play a great role among them. In Central Asia there are many apocryphal tombs of saints, as for example, the tombs of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, in Mazar -i-Sharif and in Shakh-i-Mardan. There is also the monument to Alexander the Great in Margelan, the tomb of Daniel in Samarkand, and many others. We know from history that Alexander always aspired to the honor of being nominated to the ranks of the gods during his lifetime, although his ambition was never realized; instead of this, he was subsequently granted an honor on which he had not reckoned, namely, to be venerated after two thousand years as a Moslem saint and as a prop-
777 agator of Islam in Central Asia. The Moslems of Turkestan have an
[755] unshakable faith in the healing powers of relics and amulets. Chips from the tombstone (1) are regarded as an infallible means against

1. This tombstone is chiselled from a single block of dark green nephrite, and is of incalculable value. The stone has been cut in half in the middle by an unknown hand, and superstitious Moslems and Russian collecters have broken off pieces from this broken place, as can be seen in Figure 75.

all internal illnesses, which has resulted in an extensive trade in fake particles from the tomb of Tamerlane. How Tamerlane came to have the odor of sanctity is somewhat difficult for Westerners to understand. An equally lucrative trade is carried on by the mullahs with amulets which they have made themselves, and which ostensibly contain miraculous prayer formulas and charms. Their content, however, is often similiar to the

777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sick-
784 ness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show
824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

791 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the
659 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much



Fig. 1a. The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand
(The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)

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

Fig. 2. Amulet Holders.

771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

khanates. The shariat, that is, the Koran, tradition and the decisions 671
of the first caliphs together with their commentaries and a large number of cases of precedence, are laid down in an endless number of books, and these are considered the basis for all administration of justice. Therefore only men who have made the study of these books 693
their life's work, can be judges, that is, the mullahs; and thus they 692
play the roles of theologian and jurist simultaneously. In the Moslem states of Central Asia, there are for all matters of law two courts of law, the kazi (the same as the kadi among the Turks) and the beg or khan. The kazis judge all civil law matters of dispute, and can also decide all lesser offenses. At the same time they also function as notaries and registrars of births, marriages and deaths, so that to them falls the preparation of deeds of purchase and sale, of the contraction of loans, of marriages and divorces and the like. The kazis are appointed for life by the beg or khan himself, after they have passed an exhaustive examination on the shariat. The number of kazis is unlimited, and no particular district is assigned to any. Everyone turns with his request to the kazi in whom he has the greatest confidence. There are no special chambers of justice. Every kazi practices his profession in his dwelling, also in the market and in the gateway halls. The kazis have only one scribe (mirza) to assist them from whom no further knowledge is required than that he have good handwriting. All the pleading is done 'viva voce'. The decisions, however, are [695]
entered in a special book by the mirza, and then confirmed by the kazi by the affixing of his seal. Among the Central Asians it is not the custom at all to sign a document or even a letter, an act of which only a few are capable; instead they always affix their seal in poster colors, in place of a signature. The kazis do not receive a regular salary; their income is made up of the taxes which they collect in the performance of their office as well as of the occasional gifts which they receive at weddings and the like. Those who are not satisfied with the decision of the kazi may appeal to the beg, or in the capitals, to the khan or his deputy.

The beg makes the decision of the higher court himself; in particularly important and difficult cases it becomes the concern of an assembly of the kazis, which makes the decision under the chairmanship of the highest kazi /211/ or kazi-kalyan. This decision may be corroborated by the beg or again it may be reversed. In all the more important cases, especially the criminal cases, the beg decides himself. He alone has the right to decree the heavier corporal punishments or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of the death sentences for himself.

000 or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of
695 the death sentences for himself. The law proceedings before the beg or khan are very succinct and take up very little time. During my trip through Bukhara in 1886, I once had the opportunity to study these proceedings of law in detail. In the town of Kitab where I was the guest of the Beg for two days, I was quartered in the citadel in the same court in which the Beg lived, and in fact my dwelling was just opposite that of the Beg. The second day of my visit was the weekly bazaar day, which for the natives is likewise day court , held for the greater convenience of the country-dwellers, who come on these days into the town from all directions. The Beg had already taken his place early in the morning beside an open window extending down to the ground, and awaited the arrival of the plaintiffs and defendants while reading a book. The latter, who were led in by servants in successive pairs, bowed down to the ground as soon as they were visible to the Beg, and with constant bowing and obviously with great anxiety approached the open window beside which the Beg was squatting. At a given sign the plaintiff began his speech, which was a bombast of one or two minutes, delivered with unbelievable speed and fluency. After the defendant had replied to this in similar fashion, the Beg, without looking up from his book and often without deigning to bestow a single glance on either of them, would deliver his judgment in a few words, immediately and without lengthy deliberation, and against this there was no further appeal. Both parties thereupon showed their gratitude for the judgment received by bowing to the ground repeatedly, and retired apparently in the greatest harmony. However, no sooner had they come under the archway of the gate, where they were no longer in view of the Beg, (I could still see them from my room,) then they usually came to blows all over again, until the men-at-arms serving the beg took them both by the collar and threw them into the street, in order to make way for the next parties. If a defendant was sentenced to corporal punishment, this was carried out on the spot. A carpenter was accused of not finishing a job promptly, for which he had already been paid and the beg sentenced him for this to forty lashes. The contract-breaking carpenter was forthwith seized, dragged before the gate and, to the great /212/ pleasure of the bazaar public, treated to the decreed thrashing. The man in question, the Beg of Kitab, who on this forenoon had settled fifty cases in the given fashion without straining himself particularly, was, by way of exception, a mullah himself and a very enlightened man, and for this reason he decided all matters in dispute personally.

[6816]

all matters in dispute personally. In most cases, however, the begs 000
are completely illiterate persons, with no notion either of the shariat 696
or of reading and writing. In such cases the decision lies in the hands 693
of their divan-begis, who often simply transact legal business. I was once told how these divan-begis actually manipulate justice by the divan-begi of the Beg of Baysun, who had taken a great liking to me. He told me the following quite candidly. If someone has a dispute which he wants straightened out by the beg, he comes to the divan-begi, explains the affair to him, and meanwhile gives gifts to him as well as for the beg, corresponding to the importance of the case. The gifts may be fruit, silken stuffs, khalats or even a horse and trappings. The divan-begi informs the defendant of the complaint received, and the latter must likewise appear with corresponding gifts in order to explain the affair from his point of view. After the divan-begi has heard the arguments on both sides, and received the gifts both for himself and the beg, he reports to the beg about it, expressing at the same time his humble opinion, depending upon the circumstances, that the plaintiff or the defendant should be considered in the right, for the other brought inferior gifts, thereby disclosing his evil intentions. There, as a rule, the matter ends. It is obvious that under such circumstances a poor man has no chance of coming into his own rights, and must be satisfied with every injustice he suffers from the part of the richer man.

In the capitals, goverened by the khan or emir himself, the ruler 692
makes the ultimate judgments in person, and every subject has the right to turn directly to the khan, that is to say, of course, if he is admitted by the courtiers.

The punishments decreed for the criminals in Central Asian khan- 681
ates before the Russian domination, and to some extent in the independent states to the present day, were distinguished for their severity and fearsomeness. For less serious transgressions the bastonnade, arrest, prison and mutilation were decreed, and for more serious crime the death penalty was required, which was carried out in the various states in six different ways.

The bastonnade is practised by an usher of the court placing himself behind the one to be punished, putting the prisoner's arms over his shoulders and holding him by both hands, while a second man works over the prisoner's stripped back with a cudgel about a meter and a half long and as thick as a man's arm. /213/ Whiplashes too are often used instead of the cudgel. These are administered with the ordinary riding whips or nagaikas, and the prisoner receives half the lashes

681 on his back and half on the belly. This type of punishment is particularly horrible because the recipient is often so maltreated by it that his entrails hang out.

697 The manner in which those sentenced to a longer or shorter prison term must serve their sentence is quite distinctive. In Baysun in 1886 on the occasion of a visit to the Beg, I encountered on a terrace inside the fortress gate six individuals who had undergone the bastonnade the day before at the bazaar. They were accused of stealing and had been sentenced by the Beg to the bastonnade and six months imprisonment. Those under sentence were obliged to spend the entire period of their confinement here on this terrace, under the open sky, during which time the beg did not trouble himself about their maintenance or their guard. The feeding and shelter and the guarding of the prisoners was left to their closest relatives, who pledged with their persons and their property that the prisoners would make no break for freedom. The relatives were thereby forced to remain day and night beside those under arrest to prevent them from escaping. This is by all means the simplest, cheapest and most secure means for the state to dispose of its prisoners under sentence.

Horrible is the fate of those under dungeon sentence for various periods or for life. The native prisons, called zindans, are simple, dark, underground holes in the ground, six to twelve meters deep, which are narrow at the top like a bottle, and are closed over the top with a wooden lid. These prisons make any attempt at escape impossible, and at the same time make it unnecessary to keep a large staff of custodians. The prisoners are lowered into these prisons on ropes, as is the drinking water and the food which is brought them by compassionate souls. These are just the same sort of pits as those used for the storage of grain, and often they simply use empty underground storage rooms and deep dried-up wells as prisons. Anything more horrible than staying in such dungeons would be hard to imagine, and any manner of death would be a kindness compared with the life of such prisoners. These people are provided by the state neither with food not with drink, and if they have no relatives to feed them they are thrown entirely upon the charity of the public, which however, for reasons readily understood, avoids whenever possible such places of horror. It must not have been at all unusual in earlier times for the /214/ prisoners to eat the bodies of their deceased companions in misfortune from sheer hunger. Since the prisons have no ventilation at all, and the excrement of the prisoners and even the bodies of the dead are never removed, one can imagine what odors must collect in such

places, where upward of a dozen people are crammed together, whose 697
smell alone in the great heat would be unbearable. Over and above this, the unfortunates are tormented by an enormous number of bugs, ticks, lice, rats and every other sort of vermin, which in such a favorable and fertile medium, multiply to an unbelievable extent. The inmates of these terrible martyr cells are not always real criminals; the majority is completely innocent, brought here by the whims of the ruler and the intrigues of political enemies, and they are often completely forgotten, and must then breathe their last in this kind of hideous surrounding. The two English travelers, Stoddard and Connolly, who were executed by the Emir Nasr Allah in 1842, must have languished in such prisons in the town of Bukhara before they were executed. The Russians have naturally cleaned out such horrors within their possessions, and use all their influence to make the conditions more humane in the states of Central Asia which are still independent; whether they are successful, no one is in a position to know.

Mutilations must have been employed rather frequently in earlier 681
times in Turkestan as legal punishment, judging by the large number 685
of persons one still saw in my time going about as beggars, with missing noses, hands, or even feet. These punishments were usually applied to thieves, whom they wished to render harmless or at least to single out in this fashion. For this reason most of those punished in this manner are Kazakhs, who see nothing wrong in stealing, but on the contrary consider it an honorable sport. The sedentary population fails to see the joke in this respect. The thieves had their hands cut off at the wrists, the feet were cut off at the ankles, but the noses were cut off as smoothly as though they had never had them. The ears of those who had already been legally punished once or more were slit or cut off as well, depending on the circumstances, and this kind of mutilation formed a kind of penalty list for those concerned in any sort of later conflicts with the law.

Death sentences were employed very often in the Central Asian 681
states, just as in Bukhara until the most recent times theft, adultery, 661
prostitution, and even the use of wine was punishable by death. But the greatest number of victims were always provided by the whim and suspicion /215/ of the rulers, who believed they could strengthen their thrones only by means of cruelty and the destruction of all individuals who were in any way suspicious. One may see from the example of the last Khan of Kokand to what extremes many khans went in this respect. He once ordered 20,000 Kipchaks executed, simply from vexation be-

681 cause until that time he had been under the tutelage of a Kipchak, and
661 this had inconvenienced him. The most ruthless tyrant was unquestionably the Bukharan Emir Nasr Allah who ordered the execution not only of the two Englishmen mentioned above, and the Khan of Kokand Mohammed Ali, but even of his own wife and nearest kin. He filled the prisons with favorites fallen into disfavor and with the highest dignitaries.

681 In Turkestan the commonest manner of execution is by cutting the throat; beheading is, on the other hand, not customary. The executioner places the offender in front of him on the ground, with his hands tied, takes him by the chin with his left hand, and cuts his throat in two with an ordinary table knife. As a rule, ordinary criminals are executed publicly in the bazaar in this manner, and little ceremony is made of it. /Figure 77. Caption: The Mir-Arab Minaret in Bukhara. The place of execution for serious criminals. / The executioner leads the criminals turned over to him into the bazaar, on market days without further escort or preliminaries. /216/ There he himself picks out the most elevated spot possible, and slaughters his victims one after another, exactly the way sheep are slaughtered.

Along with throat-cutting, hanging is also in general use. This is considered, as with us, the most disgraceful manner of death. Those condemned to die by the rope are either hanged over the gateways which is done especially in the cases of rebels and political criminals as a horrible example, or they are strung up on gallows which are erected permanently in the bazaar squares of every town. The condemned has a rope put around his neck by which he is pulled up in the air and tied fast about a meter above the ground. The native two-wheeled wagons are also often used for hangings when there happen to be no gallows near by. The person to be hung is fastened by a noose to one of the wagon shafts and then the back end of the wagon is pushed down to the ground, whereby the shaft with the person to be hung is speeded upwards. This manner of hanging was used, for example, for those Russians who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Kokand during the war in 1876 and who refused to be converted to Islam.

In Bukhara, being hurled down from the Minaret of Mir-Arab, shown in Figure 77 (p. 215), is considered the chief punishment. This minaret, which stands in an open square in the center of the town of Bukhara, is built of firebricks and is 52 meters high, the highest tower in all of Central Asia. The gravest criminals are thrown down from the platform of this minaret onto the pavement, which they reach, naturally, only as formless masses. During the stay of the Russian General Matveyev in Bukhara in 1884, a criminal was executed in this manner

1: von Schwarz--52a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

Fig. 11. The Mir-Arab Minaret in Bukhara. The place of execution f
serious criminals.

whose story I will present here because it is characteristic of the situation in Bukhara. The man in question had stolen a sum of about 100,000 marks from a rich merchant and had absconded with his booty to Afghanistan, the America for all of Central Asia. Since the Emir, for this reason, had no way of taking him into custody, he called two of his secret policemen and ordered them to deliver the thief, dead or alive; if they did not, he would have their throats cut; this is the usual perspective for all those who do not succeed in carrying out the orders of the emir which are often quite impossible to fulfill. The two unlucky detectives started on their way dressed as workers, stopped the thief, who had already bought himself wares and a caravan for the stolen gold, and hired themselves out to him as camel drivers. They had to trot along for several weeks on foot behind their victim until they finally /217/ obtained a favorable opportunity to carry out their plan. Then they fell upon the thief during the night, as he slept in the midst of his armed escort, gagged him, and carried him on their shoulders all the way to the Amu-Darya. Naturally they were in constant danger of death because they dared not allow themselves to be met by the Afghans who would have strung them up without further ado. They could therefore march with their dangerous burden only at night and by roundabout ways, but they finally brought their victim successfully to Bukhara. The Emir sentenced the culprit to death by throat-cutting, but since this form of death did not please the prisoner, he confessed that he had also snatched some property from the wakf. This was pure fabrication, but because of it he was sentenced to the ultimate punishment, to be thrown down from the minaret, which is what he had wished. 681

Shooting is used only rarely, and strangely enough, only against women who are found guilty of adultery, prostitution and the like, or whom the khan, for whatever reasons, wishes to punish or simply to eliminate. These are shot with pistols. Those wives of whom the khans have grown weary are not killed but are given away by the khans to their favorites. Thus, for example, the deposed Khan of Kokand, before his transfer to Orenburg /Chkalov/, divided his numerous harem in Tashkent among his acquaintances. Adulteresses were also stoned in earlier times. To this end they were buried in the ground up to the breast, and then stoned to death by the public with rocks or clods of earth. [684]

Until the introduction of Russian rule in Kokand, impalement was also in use, being carried out in different ways. Either the condemned was simply thrust on a sharpened stake, as was also the custom earlier in Turkey, or he was bound to a two-wheeled wagon, with his legs clasped on the wagon shaft, while the stake was fastened to another

681 wagon, and then by running the two wagons together the condemned was run through the body with full force. Finally the stake with the impaled criminal was planted in the ground.

693 Of the earlier institutions of justice, the Russians have kept only
692 the office of the kazi in their Central Asian possessions and even this has undergone certain modifications. They were induced to do this by the fact that it would have been impossible to submit the native Moslems altogether to the regular Russian jurisdiction without infringing profoundly upon their religious views. For these people were accustomed to see all their private disputes and their family affairs adjusted on the basis of the shariat and the Russian judges naturally could not be expected to have a knowledge of this. /218/ The Russian regime, however, renounced the power to nominate the kazis, who earlier had been appointed by the representatives of the state power, and left the choice to the common people. The Russian administration requires only that those chosen as kazis must all be persons over twenty-five years of age, of good reputation and never convicted. The special certificate of qualification which had formerly been required is no longer asked of the kazis. The kazis, like the aksakals are still generally elected for a definite period of years. The office of kazi-kalyan or chief justice has been abolished and all the kazis have the same rank. Each is assigned a special district, within which only the duly qualified kazi has the right to exercise judicial and notary functions. In the town of Tashkent, the number of kazis has been established at four, corresponding to the four old town quarters. The establishment of the kazi's salary or other income from his appointment, in the form of fees or taxes, has likewise been left by the regime to the common people. The kazis decide now as they did before all the disputes of the natives where the sum involved does not exceed 200 marks, and can also decide minor misdemeanors; thus, as judges, their sphere of action is similar to that of a Russian justice of the peace. More important disputes are settled by an assembly of all the kazis in a district. Criminal cases are judged by the regular Russian common law, just as are all disputes between Russians and natives. Moreover, it is left to the discretion of the natives to turn in all their affairs to the Russian jurisdiction, if they prefer.

681 Capital punishment has been abolished in Russia since the rule of the Empress Elizabeth, and all, even the most serious criminals, excepting only those guilty of high treason, are sentenced to deportation to Siberia (most recently also to the island of Sakhalin) and to forced labor. This law holds also for the Central Asian possessions of

Russia. Only those natives guilty of rebellion or the murder of Russian 681
officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by [684]
shooting, by court-martial, instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions
at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers [698]
and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General.
During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases,
of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876.
This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike.

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of 871
Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /219/
large, although education is a private matter, and the native govern-
ments provide neither for the erection of schools nor for the salaries
of teachers. In Turkestan there are two classes of schools, elementary
schools or 'mekhtebes', and higher schools or medreses.

The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in 872
the higher schools. In each elementary school there is only one teacher 875
who instructs the students of all ages in one and the same place. These
teachers receive no fixed salary. Their entire income consists in the
school fees which the students bring them voluntarily, which, however,
are never more than a mark a year at most, and in occasional gifts of
provisions, which they receive every Thursday, and festive clothes
which they receive from the parents of their students at the time of
the high Moslem festivals. There is a special custom that the father
of a boy presents the teacher with a khalat when the boy has progressed
far enough to start reading the Koran.

There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held 872
either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, window-
less chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does
not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appro-
priate mosque.

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held
outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School
attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are fre-
quented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of
the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially
from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

872 Girls and boys are usually taught together; nevertheless there are also special girls' schools, but in these as well, the teaching is done by a mullah. Elementary education begins, as with us, at the age of from five to six years, as a rule, and for the boys usually lasts seven years. Many parents take their boys out of school before this, however, if they can use them in their business or for labor. The whole course is com-
[562] pleted usually only by those who wish to enter a medrese later. For girls school attendance usually ends when they are eight or nine years old, for they are already of marriageable age when they are ten, and must receive instruction before that time in needlework, embroidery, weaving and other domestic tasks.

The instruction is strenuous for teachers and pupils alike, for it lasts nine hours a day, from six o'clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, with only a little free time for recreation and for eating the /220/ modest meals of bread and fruit, which the children have brought with them in their school bags. The pupils have only one day a week free, that is, Friday. Otherwise they have little vacation, only a week each at the time of the three high Moslem festivals.

872 The instruction in the elementary schools of Turkestan is limited
876 primarily to the teaching of reading and writing. There are no courses, as we know them. The pupils are first taught the alphabet, and then they begin to read and copy from selected parts of the Koran, from which they proceed to the reading of various other books. The study of one book is held to be finished when the pupil is able to read it and copy from it without difficulty. Whoever has completed a half dozen books in this manner has finished the course and can proceed to study in a high school if he feels in himself the desire and capacity to do so. In addition to reading and writing the children in the elementary schools also learn the most important prayers and precepts of the Koran and the complicated ceremonies which must be observed during the prayers and the ablutions prescribed by the Koran. The methods of instruction used by the teachers in the elementary schools in Turkestan are characteristic and completely different from our customs and they explain why in these schools the time and work expended by the teacher and pupils corresponds so little to the results obtained. The instruction is already made very difficult by the fact that pupils at all levels must be taught at the same time by one and the same teacher; it is further encroached upon, quite needlessly, in that the various pupils at a given time are not occupied with one subject, such as reading or writing, but each is

876 doing something different. One would think it quite impossible for the
872 teacher to attend to each one. While one is copying his alphabet, another the Koran, a third some other book, a fourth is spelling out the alphabet, a fifth the Koran, a sixth some other author, etc. Since all read at the same time and as loudly as possible, and each reads something different, there results such a confusion and such an infernal racket that one becomes unpleasantly aware of such schools even some distance away, and anyone who is near a school is quite stunned. The teacher sits in the midst of this noisy throng, on the floor, like his pupils, armed with a long switch with which he can reach from his position all the way to those seated on the outermost fringes, and call to order immediately those who do not demonstrate the necessary zeal. As a result the pupils strain their lungs to the utmost and yell until they are as red in the face as lobsters, so that the veins swell out on their foreheads and /221/ their eyes are popping out of their heads; each tries to shout louder than his neighbor in order to earn the favor of the teacher.

/Figure 78, p. 57a. Caption: The Medrese of Rustem Beg in Ura-Tyube./

The pupils squat while they read and write, with their legs crossed and their bodies bent forward, on the floor, which is /222/ covered with a felt carpet or a simple reed mat. During their reading and copying they place their books in front of them on the floor--a good protective device against shortsightedness. Instead of our slates for writing, they use small spade-shaped wooden boards, which they hold firmly by the handle in the left hand, while with the right they draw their attempts at caligraphy with a pointed reed and ordinary ink. When they write on paper, they hold the sheet on the palm of their left hand, and here also a pointed reed and ink are employed. The natives of Turkestan write only on one side of the paper, which has already been covered with a special gloss, while the other side has been left rough.

The discipline which the elementary school pupils receive from their teachers is very strict, and in spite of their small size they are punished with the rod. There exists a characteristic procedure which is rather questionable from the pedagogical point of view in which each of the pupils who informs against another for some offense, receives as a reward for his denunciation, the right to give the offender the first blow of the rod of the punishment which results from his informing.

872 The elementary schools just described can, by their nature deal only with a limited number of pupils, from twenty to thirty approximate-

L. von Schwarz --57a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1



Fig. 78. The Medrese of Rustem Beg in Ura-Tyube.

872 ly. For this reason the number of schools is very large. In Tashkent there are such schools in most of the 149 quarters into which the Sart town is divided. In 1879 Tashkent claimed to have 119 elementary schools, not counting those schools built by the Russians.

874 The Central Asian higher schools or medreses have only a distant similarity to our universities; they would be more comparable to the clerical seminaries in many Catholic countries for the education of theologians. They are boarding schools where teachers and students live together and are fully supported at the expense of the institution. The medreses receive no support from the state but are supported exclusively from the incomes of the wakf foundations, established by the founders of the medrese in question.

346 The medrese buildings (Figure 78, p. 57a, p. 221, Figure 79, p. 58a, and Figure 80, p. 58b, p. 224) are all built in the same style. They are as a rule two-storied (1) edifices of firebricks with a quadrangular /223/ /Figure 79.

1. Here and elsewhere I use the expression two-storied in the Russian sense of the term, while a house consisting only of a ground-floor is designated as one-storied, for I consider the Russian expressions more correct and practical than those used in most parts of Germany.

Caption: The Great Medrese in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./ /224/ groundplan. Inside there is a roomy courtyard, usually paved with firebricks, which is enclosed on all sides by the dwellings of students and scholars. Stables, kitchens and other offices are not found in these institutions. One reaches the courtyard through a gate in the middle of the main facade which is covered by a disproportionately high archway. The living quarters consist of two superimposed rows of cells, which are all of the same size. Before each cell there is a high niche-like entrance-hall which is open at the front. The cells are relatively dark, since they are lighted only by a single window placed over the door, which consists of a wooden grating pasted over with thin paper. /Figure 80, p. 58b. Caption: The Omar Medrese in Kokand./ The teachers and students remain in their cells mostly only at night and during the cold season of the year, but carry on their studies during the warmer weather in the open entrance-halls. The cells are not heated. The entire furnishing of the cells, for scholars and students alike, consists of a reed mat, a few blankets and pillows, which lie rolled up in

1: von Schwarz--58a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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

Fig. 71. The Great Medrese in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

L: von/Schwarz--58b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Bl.1 Turkestan Bl.1

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

Fig. 9. The Omar Medrese in Kokand.

a corner during the day, and are simply spread out on the floor at 346
night; also of a candlestick or an oil lamp, a brass washbowl and water pitcher, and finally, also of a few books, which the resident of the room is studying just at the moment. /225/ Each of the scholars usually has a cell to himself, while the students on the other hand live two to a cell. At the medrese there is also, as a rule, a mosque for the religious needs of those belonging to the medrese.

The business affairs of every medrese are administered by a mut- 874
eval, who, has charge of the management and utilization of the property which has been given to the medrese, the lands, caravansaries, mills, etc., and also the salaries and stipends paid to the teachers and students, as we have said above.

R 590

/Figure 81. Caption: Yunus Hodja, Mullah of Tashkent. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher./

The number of teachers and students in a medrese naturally depends on its income, and for this reason it is restricted for each medrese. In Tashkent the largest and richest is the Beklyar Beg medrese, which supports about 250 students.

Thanks to the undemanding and simple way of life of the natives, the costs of maintenance of a medrese are, by our standards, extremely low, and many European professors receive a higher salary than the whole college of professors and the collective student body of a higher school of the first rank in Turkestan taken together. For this reason the number of medreses is relatively large, the town of Tashkent alone is counted to have seventeen altogether, of which six are distinguished for their wealth and large number of students. Some of these medreses have existed for four or five hundred years. The greateset number of higher schools are in Bukhara, the Rome of the Central Asian Moslems.

The teachers at the medreses are extremely respectable men and honestly deserve the veneration accorded them by the population. They 875
have renounced all the pleasures of the world and live only for knowledge. My former teacher Lamont, formerly Director of the Munich Observatory, was by disposition and way of life the true image of a medrese professor in Turkestan. The latter /226/ receive no honorarium from their students and are entirely dependent upon the modest means granted them by the medrese, which is only enough to provide the simplest food and clothing for themselves. The medrese teachers are mullahs who in most cases have finished their studies at the same medrese. They spend all their time either on their own studies or in the instruction of their students. Outwardly they are distinguished by their very dignified appear-

1: von Schwarz--69a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 31. Yunus Hodja, Mullah of Tashkent. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher.)

875 ance, their simple but exceptionally clean clothing and the colossal proportions of their blinding white turbans, made of Indian gauze material. (Figure 81, p. 225).

874 Admission as a medrese student, is available to everyone, without regard to birth or nationality, who is of the Moslem faith, and has received the necessary preparation in the elementary schools, to the extent that facilities are adequate. The students of the higher schools in Turkestan show themselves to great advantage in comparison with their European fellow-students by their retiring and undemanding life, through which they strive to emulate their teachers, and by their great modesty in social relations. They have not the faintest notion of students' associations, drinking bouts, duels, nocturnal rows and fights with the police. They dress excatly like their teachers, except that their turbans, in keeping with their lesser learning are of smaller proportions than those of their teachers, who are so full of wisdom. The scholarly work of the medrese students occupies almost the entire day; on the other hand their vacations are meted out very stingily and are reduced, as in the lower schools, to a week during each of the three high Moslem festivals.

There are no real courses in the Central Asian higher schools, just as there is nothing like our doctoral degrees, state examinations and state competitions. The students have only a specified number of books to study from thirty to one hundred and forty, depending on the circumstances, and after they have finished them they may claim the title of mullah. The more books a man has studied the greater is his esteem as a scholar, and the better his claim to the highest spiritual and judicial honors.

The languages taught in the medreses of Turkestan, are, in addition to Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Persian is the language of the educated and of the diplomats among the natives of Turkestan, as is French in Europe. Arabic, however, being the language of the Koran, plays the same role among them as Hebrew among our theologians.

The entire curriculum in the Central Asian higher schools is limited primarily to the interpretation of the Koran and the study of the writings of the most eminent Koran interpreters and Moslem teachers of law, and stands even today on just about the same level as it did at the time of the introduction of Islam to Turkestan. Only as much of natural sciences is /227/ tolerated as was already known a thousand years ago by Moslem scholars; all the more recent advances in

astronomy, physics, medicine, chemistry, geography, etc., are 874
absolutely ignored. The supreme principle is still that axiom imputed to the Caliph Omar, that the content of all more recent books is either in the Koran already, and therefore superfluous, or else it is not in the Koran, and is consequently heretical.

The period of study at the medrese varies greatly, according to the abilities of the individual students and the greater or lesser degree of learning which each wishes to attain, and amounts to from fifteen to thirty years. Usually a student remains in the medresse until he is appointed as professor, judge, imam and the like, and in case he loses his position he returns there once more.

The teaching methods of the medrese professors have much in 876
common with the methods adopted by many of our philologists who analyze the ancient classics. They discuss the works they are going through with their students both as to language and substance with a a thoroughness in no way inferior to the hair-splitting of such philologists, so that they often take a whole year to expound a single work. If such a pedant succeeds in interpreting a completely meaningless passage in the Koran in a new way, a passage which has been expounded before in a hundred different ways, then he is a made man, and he will be admired by his students and colleagues just as much as we would admire the discoverer of the law of gravitation or of the cholera bacillus, etc. Students and scholars in such a case come from great distances to gaze in astonishment at such a light of the church, and whenever possible, to take instruction from him. At most, one can only deplore the fact that so much time and labor and so much sincere effort is employed with so little profit upon the eternal repetition of deeds of eras and generations long past, through which mankind and science have not been advanced one single step.

Among all the scholarly schools of Central Asia the medreses of 873
the town of Bukhara enjoy the greatest esteem, and the most celebrated leaders of Moslem scholarship are numbered among their teachers.

In addition to the medreses, which have in view the general education and training of scholars, there are in Tashkent and also in other towns of Turkestan various other special schools, which are established for specific purposes; thus there is the Karikh Khana medrese, in which the students are solely engaged in memorizing the Koran; the Salivat Khana medrese, where only prayers are taught; the Masnavi Khana medrese, in which the works of the writer Masnavi are studied, and the like.

811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The
875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

342 Central Asian is the high outer wall which surrounds the dwelling houses, together with the gardens and courtyards belongint to them; these surround the houses on all sides, and completely shut off the outer world. These outer walls are entered from the street by only one gate, behind which a special inner wall is built in order to obstruct the view into the courtyard from the street. They form, as it were, the fortress of each house owner /229/, which no trespasser has the right to break
183 into. Within his walls the Central Asian is his own master, and the administrative authorities never venture to infringe upon the sacredness of the private dwellings, especially the women's quarters. This is what has made the collection of a more exact population census impossible up to now. For according to Central Asian mores, it is already regarded as an impertinence if one asks the father of a family only for the number of his wives and children, or about events transpiring within his four walls.

/Figure 82, p. 63a. Caption: Cross section of a Sart dwelling

1. Veranda
2. Veranda columns
3. Room door
4. Window opening
5. Hollowed place for overshoes
6. Niches in the wall
7. Smoke hole
8. Pool
9. Fodder trough
10. Alfalfa Supply for the winter
11. Terrace
12. Outer wall./

342 The space enclosed by the outer walls already mentioned is divided into two parts, which are strictly separated and are connected only by a low narrow garden gate. The larger part, lying next to the street, forms the men's quarters. Here the father of the house lives with his grown sons and the male relatives and servants who are always living with him, here he carries on his business, and receives visitors and strangers. /Figure 83, p. 63a. Foundation plan of a Sart dwelling. (The lines in the sketch indicate canals.)

1. Living rooms. 2. Veranda. 3. Sheds. 4. Outhouse. 5. Pond. 6. Terrace./ The other part is alloted exclusively for the residence of the women and children, and it may be entered only by women. Otherwise the only man allowed is the father of the /230/ house. (1)

183 1. The sacredness of the women's quarters is so great in the eyes of the Central Asians, that they are profaned even

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342

Fig. 12. Cross section of a Sart dwelling.



Fig. 13. Foundation plan of a Sart dwelling. (The lines in the sketch ind canals.)

183 by the glance of a stranger. In 1886 in Baysun when I had to carry out astronomical observations from the roof of my dwelling, because there was no other suitable place, all the surrounding houses were emptied of their occupants for the night in question.

342 Each of these two parts is divided again into two or perhaps three subdivisions, depending on the circumstances: the living quarters, the courtyard and the garden, the last of which is usually lacking among the poorer people. Especially in arid regions and in towns densely built up, the inhabitants must content themselves with a simple court, while the gardens are relegated to a place outside the town walls. Where there is a garden, it is usually divided from the court and dwelling houses by a wide partition wall. As a rule, the general arrangement of the dwelling houses, sheds, courts, and gardens is that indicated in the two sketches above (Figures 82, p. 63a and 83, p. 229), of which the first shows the vertical cross section, and the second the ground plan of an average dwelling.

The dwelling houses, which consist of one or more rooms situated next to each other, the number depending upon the financial means of the owner, are built along the outer wall in such a way that this wall always forms the rear wall of the dwelling. The dwellings are almost exclusively one-story houses, which is partly due to the building material used, and partly to the frequent earthquakes. (2)

731 2. The frequency of earthquakes differs widely in different parts of Turkestan. While rare in many regions, as in Samarkand, for example, other places are often visited by earthquakes. The town of Vernoye /Alma Ata/, for example, was almost completely destroyed by one on June 9th, 1887, and since then it has felt earth tremors of greater or lesser intensity almost every day. Also in Osh, at the eastern end of the Fergana valley, there were almost daily earthquakes for a period several years ago. In Tashkent there are on the average about a dozen earthquakes in the course of a year. On the whole in Turkestan the earthquakes are light and rarely result in the caving in of houses and the loss of human life. In Tashkent I experienced only two such earthquakes in fifteen years, of which the one of November 29, 1886 was the strongest and caused considerable damage. The greatest earthquake in Turkestan of recent times was the

731 one already mentioned in Vernoye /Alma Ata/, which was felt all over Turkestan.

342 The walls of the dwelling houses are made of the same material as the town, court and garden walls, and erected in practically the same manner. In the court a large pit is dug, and the earth from it is kneaded with water and chopped straw into a sticky paste. From this large balls are formed, and these are piled up on each other and stamped down with the feet. Like the town and garden walls the house walls too are erected by layers, for the lower layer must always be allowed to dry first /231/ before a further layer can be placed on top. The straw which is mixed with the clay gives the walls great solidity, especially since the seeds remaining with the straw turn into buds under the great heat of the sun and grow through the walls in all directions, so that on the outside of newly built houses countless barley and wheat stalks are sprouting forth. Such a wall holds up much better in an earthquake than one built, no matter how solidly, of firebricks. Firebricks are not used for the building of private houses and are employed only for the larger public buildings like mosques, medreses, caravansaries, and baths, where their use is unavoidable since clay walls naturally cannot hold up under the heavier weight. In the rare cases when a dwelling house has an upper story superimposed, the walls of the second story are produced in a special manner with a combination of wood and clay. First a wooden frame of medium heavy beams is joined together and a large number of short thin wooden sticks are set in between the beams in a completely irregular fashion, usually fanwise. The spaces between the main beams and the wooden sticks are then filled in with balls of clay, and finally the whole is plastered over, inside and out, with a thick layer of clay so that nothing remains visible of the wooden framework except, at most, the ends of the main beams (cf. Figure 158). This upper story, which is not used for living quarters but only for storage, bears the Persian name bala-khana, from bala (upper) and khana (room), from which the Russian balagan (fair-booth) has obviously been derived, and probably also our "balcony".

The dwelling houses have no foundation, and they would be quite superfluous anyway because the ground, consisting of loess, has the same solidity as the walls themselves, which are constructed of the same material. The absence of foundations has the dis-

342 advantage, however, that during the rainy season the lower part of the walls absorbes moisture from the ground, which is soaked through, and the solidity of the walls suffers thereby. Some of the richer people, who usually place their dwelling places on a higher level than is usual among the huts of the poor, have the foresight to build the lowest part of the walls of firebricks for this reason, or at least to place their houses on a terrace which has been artificially raised.

The inner and outer walls of the houses remain just as they are, as a rule, and consequently they have the yellow grey color of the street floors. Whitewash of slaked lime was not formerly in use in [363] Turkestan and was introduced only by the Russians. On the other hand the rich people cover the inner walls of their dwellings with stucco work of alabaster, /232/ in the Arabic style. One finds wall frescoes only rarely. These consist of arabesques in the brightest and most vivid colors possible, or else of stylized flowers which always remind me strongly of a story in the Münchner Fliegende Blätter /Munich Broadsides (?)/ according to which a house painter who had been advanced to a room painter put the flowers and leaves on the walls to be decorated by dipping his hands alternately in red and green paint, then pressing them to the wall with outspread fingers and finally adding the stems to the flowers and leaves with a stroke of a brush.

The roofs of the dwellings are erected as simply as the walls. The roof beams, which are usually untrimmed, with only the branches and bark removed, are placed horizontally across two facing walls at a distance from each other of about 70 centimeters, and are fixed in the walls in this position. A layer of brushwood is used which is about twenty centimeters thick. This forms the ceiling of the room, just as it is. The richer people use decorative carved roof beams, and instead of the reeds, short round willow sticks about five centimeters thick, which are laid right next to each other, between one beam and the next, as is shown in Figure 84, p. 66a.

/Figure 84. Caption: Sart Room Ceilings/

In those rare cases when the ceilings of the rooms are made of short boards which are laid perpendicularly across the roof beams, these boards are cut in such a way as to give the impression of being not boards but round sticks of wood. This proves that the original way of construction of the ceilings was of sticks of wood, and therefore it is still considered the norm.

342 Among the rich the ceilings of the rooms are painted, often
363 very artistically, with very intricate and highly complicated arabesques,

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342



Fig. 84. Sart Room Ceilings.

342 [353] which are composed of the brightest possible blue, red, green and yellow colors; and sometimes gold is also used.

The ceilings which are made, as described above, of beams and reeds, brushwood, wooden sticks or boards, are now covered again with a layer of clay about a foot thick, which likewise consists of loess earth and straw. The clay intended to cover the roofs is prepared with special care, for the horizontal roofs suffer much more from rain and snow than the walls, which are affected by the downpours only /233/ /Figure 85, p. 67a. Caption: A View of Hissar in East Bukhara. (After a photograph by Willy R. Rickmers.)./ /234/ from the side, and in any case dry out again quickly. The clay intended to cover the roofs is mixed with a large quantity of straw, up to fifty per cent, moistened with much water, and then it is left to ferment for about a week, and is stirred frequently. When the material is properly prepared it is put on top of the roof in layers, and each layer is flattened down with the greatest care with bare feet. Those who are flattening down the roofs, usually half-naked workers, move in their work with a dance step which gives them a very comical appearance.

During the rainy season these clay roofs are always covered with a luxurious growth of grass and in early spring with a mass of wild tulips.

Since these flat roofs are exposed in winter to the direct effects of rain and snow, they always develop defects in a relatively short time, and cracks appear, through which water from the rain and snow leaks into the houses. The dogs are particularly hard on these roofs and are always running about on them and harming them with their scratching. For these reasons the layers of clay must be repaired every fall before the rainy season begins, and must be completely replaced from time to time.

The flat houseroofs are a favorite place of abode of the natives: during the hot season people sleep on them, and they are a place where the morning and evening prayers are performed, while on sunny winter days the women perform their domestic tasks there. (Figure 62, p. 20a, p. 173; Figure 85, p. 67a, p. 233; Figure 86, p. 68a.).

The dwelling houses of the natives, which are built in the manner described above, are absolutely fireproof, and during the entire fifteen years of my stay in Central Asia there was never a fire to my knowledge. When the agent of a fire insurance company appeared in Tashkent several years ago, he was greeted with the same kind of hilarity by the people of Tashkent as someone would be among us if he wanted

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

Fig. 8. A View of Hissar in East Bukhara. (After a photograph by Willy R. Rickmers.)

342 to insure our houses against some sort of damage from aerolites.

The manner of building used today in Turkestan obviously dates back to very ancient times, and one can assume, with certainty, that the houses here have never been built in any other way than they are at present. The loess earth which is available in abundance at every building site is such a tractable and useful material, and the buildings constructed with it are so solid and relatively long lasting thanks to the extraordinary dryness of the climate, that the inhabitants have never had occasion to look around for another material. The lack of firewood does not permit the use of firebricks for the building of private houses, for /235/ Figure 86. Caption: A View of Khiva from the West. / /236/ there are no woods in the oases of Turkestan and only reeds and the wood of garden trees can be used for burning material. Two important circumstances stand in the way of using stones for house construction. First of all, walls erected from unhewn stones can withstand earthquakes much less successfully than clay walls; secondly, there are no stones at all in loess regions, and they would have to be collected from the mountains, hundreds of kilometers away, which in the absence of highways and bridges is absolutely unthinkable. It can be clearly concluded from the history of Alexander the Great, that already in his time the houses and town walls were erected in the same way as today. Arrian writes that the town walls of Ghaz (probably the modern Nau, as I have deduced in my monograph Alexanders des grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/) were built of earth and were not high.

/He reports further that Alexander had the town of Alexandria on the Tanais, the present-day Khodzhent /Leninabad/ built in 20 days, with town walls and houses. Curtius has reduced this to 17 days. This would only have been possible if Alexander had built the town in the way that the Khodzhent of today and the other towns of Turkestan are still being built. --Translator/

342 It can be concluded, that the towns of Turkestan were built in
172 the manner still used today even during the periods of glory under the rule of the Arabs and the Timurides, from the fact that no remnants of masonry erected of stone or firebricks have been found in any great volume. All the town ruins still in existence prove that everywhere only public buildings were built of firebricks, and even this was only since the time of the Arabs; on the other hand, except for the splendid

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

Fig. 88. A View of Khiva from the West.

342 Tamerlane buildings in Samarkand, one finds not a trace of stone buildings
172 in the plains. These are found only in mountain regions, in the Darvaz and Badakhshan ranges and the like, where even today in some places the houses are erected of unhewn stones, for the simple reason that there is no loess there and the climate is damper than in the lowlands.

In prehistoric times the inhabitants of Turkestan must have lived in artificial underground caves and passages made in the loess ground; this is demonstrated among other things by the passages and holes found in Samarkand and lately also near Karti on the Amu-Darya. These are extensive and form unmistakable underground towns.

354 The interior arrangement of the dwellings is just as simple as the dwellings themselves. There are no stoves anywhere; instead, usually, I have found a 'kamin' /fire place/ in Afghan Turkestan and among the Taranchis of the Ili valley. /237/ which are completely similar to those used by us. Real heating of the living rooms would not be possible in any case even with a stove, because the doors close only very imperfectly, and are even completely lacking among the poorer people, and because the window openings, when there are any are either quite open or most often pasted over with thin paper. Glass windows are not used by the natives, and both the very rich people and the khans themselves pass the cold season of the year in unheated rooms into which the air enters freely. The felt yurts /tents/ of the nomads offer much better protection in winter against the cold and inclement weather than the dwellings of even the richest of the sedentary population. The Kazakhs are therefore perfectly right in preferring their yurts to the walled dwelling houses.

In order to keep warm during the bitterest cold the natives of Turkestan use wrought-iron braziers, resting on four legs, like those in use in ancient times in Greece and Rome. /Figure 87, p. 69a. Caption: Brazier of Turkestan./ This brazier, after it is filled with glowing embers, is placed under a small table, round or square, twenty to forty centimeters in height, which is then covered with a large quilted cotton coverlit. The members of the family now seat themselves on the floor around this little table and stretch their hands and feet out under the coverlet in the space warmed by the coals. In Figure 87 there is such a brazier drawn from life, shown with the tongs and coal shovel which belong to it.

For the poor people who cannot afford the luxury of a brazier, there is nothing left but to freeze and sometimes to freeze to death, par-

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

Fig. 5 Brazier of Turkestan.

354 ticularly if they lack an adequate supply of warm clothes and covers as well. Every great cold costs a number of lives in the towns of Turkestan and the natives judge the degree of cold, in the absence of meteorological instruments, by the number of persons frozen to death during the course of a night. In 1879, when the temperature once sank to 27° Centigrade below freezing in Tashkent, in the Sart section of [171] that town, 126 natives froze to death /238/ in one night. Here one can marvel at the stubborness with which the people hang on to what is traditional. Although the natives have the Russian household establishments before their eyes and are aware of their efficiency, it still does not occur to them to imitate the latter, even when they have the means to do so.

842 The doors which lead from the courts into the living rooms are usually very low, so that one can only pass through by stooping. In most cases, these doors take the place of the window as well, and therefore are present in large numbers in the larger rooms. The doors always consist of two parts which do not move on hinges but on two pegs fixed in the lintel and the threshold. They always push inward and are so small that each time one must open both parts in order to enter. [853] Among the rich the door wings are usually adorned with artistic intertwining arabesques carved in the wood, or at least painted with bright red, green or blue colors. Since in Turkestan poplar wood, which is not very solid, is used almost exclusively for building and wood carving and it is usually worked and finished before it has completely dried out, the door posts and door wings are always more or less warped as they dry out, and consequently they close either badly or not at all. The fastening of the door is peculiar: outside one part of the door is a short iron chain, and on the other part a peg is fastened ending in a ring. The last link of the chain, which has a slit through it, is hung over this ring. If such doors are to be locked, a padlock is hung on the ring mentioned above.

There are windows only in the houses of the richer people, while the poorer ones must be satisfied with the light entering through the doorway. The window opening in its dimension is always greater horizontally than vertically in private houses, is always found over the door, and therefore in every room there are as many windows as doors. The window opening is either left completely open or it is covered with a grating of wood or alabaster in order to prevent the entrance of swallows and sparrows, of which there is an enormous number here, as well as of other birds. The sticks of which the wooden

grating is put together, are not simply set in crosswise, but are inter- 342
twined in more or less complicated ways into arabesques. One of the
simplest forms of this window grating is that shown in Figure 88. The
basic form of the alabaster grating is often an imitation of the wooden
grating. During the winter these window gratings are often covered
with white cigarette paper or with writing paper treated with oil to
keep out the draughts of air. The interior of the dwellings is almost
always veiled in half darkness because of the lack of windows, and
the /239/ wide projecting roofs of the verandas; and when the door
wings are open one can read or do close work right next to the door
(cf. Figure 72, p. 201, and Figure 79, p. 223). /Figure 88. Caption:
Window Grating of Turkestan. /

Just inside the main entrance of the living quarters is a square
recess which serves as a washing and bathing place, a place where
one can pour water, and for the removal of overshoes.

The floor of the room consists simply of clay, and is always [352]
covered with a plain reed mat or felt covering, depending on the
financial means of the owner, or with a greater or smaller number
of costly carpets.

For ventilation there is an opening in the roof in which a short
cylindrical pipe of burned clay is placed. Since rain and snow can
enter unhindered through this opening, the ventilation openings are
often found also in the sides of the walls just under the roof.

Room furniture in the dwellings of the Central Asians is either 352
completely absent or is found in very small quantity. They have no 342
idea of tables, chairs, couches and our many cupboards and chests
of drawers. In place of our clothing and kitchen cupboards and
chests of drawers, in Turkestan various niches are fixed in the walls
for this purpose, occupying all four walls of the room as a rule. These
niches are either simple recesses in the walls, like our blind windows,
or they are partitions made artistically of alabaster, as can be seen
in Figure 123. These niches serve for the hanging up of clothes and
underwear and for the storage of dinner plates, wash basins, water
pitchers and teapots, water pipes, candlesticks, preserves and food,
occasional books, and the like. As for real furniture, the natives of
Turkestan are only acquainted with bedsteads, cradles, chests, and
the small low table already mentioned for the coal pan.

The poorer population and also a good part of the rich simply 513
sleep on the floor. A blanket serves as a bed, over which one or more
quilted cotton covers are spread, depending on what can be afforded.

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

Fig. 8. Window Grating of Turkestan.

513 A quilted cotton cover serves likewise as a top covering but it is of finer material than the one underneath. Quilted covers of silk and silk mixed with cotton are not rare. They are usually about two meters square, so that at times of extreme /240/ cold they can be wrapped all the way around. On my journeys I have camped in the open under such covers, sometimes in a cold of 20° to 30° centigrade, and have been quite comfortable. The natives do not know of sheets; as a result the bed covers, which cannot be washed because of their quilting, leave much to be desired as regards cleanliness after being used for some time. During the day the bed covers are rolled up together and stacked up along the walls with the pillows. For pillows they use cylinders stuffed with cotton and covered with silk or cotton material, similar to our window cushions, which are definitely preferable according to my experience to the feather head pillows used in Europe for they are not only more hygienic but also more comfortable. Only the very rich allow themselves the luxury of bedsteads.

[352] The bedsteads in Turkestan, the arrangement of which may be seen in Figure 89 (P.734), in spite of their simplicity are the most suitable I have ever seen, and no improvement of our bedsteads, no matter how refined, can compete with them. They combine the advantages of ordinary bedsteads with those of American hammocks and can satisfy the demands of the most pampered sybarite. I have grown so spoiled by using Turkestan bedsteads over many years, that even now I have not yet been able to reconcile myself to the European bed. The bedsteads of Turkestan consist of a wooden frame joined together from a rough beam about ten centimeters thick, resting on four turned legs eac about half a meter high, and this frame is covered by a net of thin strings made of horsehair. The bedsteads are something over two meters long and from one to one and a half meters wide. When such a framework is covered with a half dozen soft quilted cotton covers, it affords the greatest comfort imaginable. The body assumes its most comfortable position, thanks to the elasticity of the horsehair net, and one can stretch out on all sides without hindrance and without ever feeling the slightest pressure. If one is contented with a single cover during the hot season, one has a cool bed and need not suffer under the unbearable and unwholsome heat which the European featherbeds produce.

854 The cradles are portable, with a frame covered with a fly net of transparent gauze material, which serves as well for rocking as for carrying the infants. Their arrangement makes one think of a bird cage or of the frames used in Munich for the carrying of large numbers of beermugs (Figure 90 (P.734); cf. also Figure 157). The heads

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal
wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/
The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings.
The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as
we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient
for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of
the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the
branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling
beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead. / In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually
on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes
very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes
back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropo-
logical index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnogra-
phic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan. /

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use.
These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are
a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned
only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass
plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and
have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used dur-
ing mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate
quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus
of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from
China (Figure 123).
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots. /

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are
used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are,
as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise
made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with
a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber
pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

l: von Schwarz--73a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

352

Fig. Turkestan Bedstead.

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

Fig. Child's cradle in Turkestan.

k: von Schwarz--73b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

415

Fig. 11. Teapots.

415 with long pouring spouts are used to pour out the water for the washing. These washbasins with the water pitchers which accompany them are sometimes made very luxuriously, as show pieces; in Bukhara I was once offered a fine specimen which was gold plated, with beautiful chased work and set with many semi-precious stones, for which the maker asked 300 marks (Figure 92). p.75 &

Porcelain plates have come into use in Turkestan only in recent times through the Russians. Until that time the natives had only relatively large round plates, quite shallow, with small almost perpendicular rims, similar to our serving plates. These are made of brass or tin-plated copper, are sometimes nearly a meter in diameter and are used only for the serving of fruit, sweetmeats and the countless cups and basins which are carried in all at once for the accomodation of distinguished guests.

276 The (tobacco) waterpipes, which are inevitable in every Turkestan household are called chilim by the Sarts and Uzbeks, and kalyan by the Tajiks, and differ from the water pipes of Turkey. They consist of a hollowed-out gourd container in which reeds are placed at both the top and on one side. The reed at the side serves as the mouthpiece, and the vertical reed for the attachment of the bowl of the pipe, /243/ which consists of burnt clay either unglazed, or glazed in blue or green. In the upper part of the water pipe a small hole is bored on the side. This serves to blow out the smoke during the kindling of the coals which are laid on top of the tobacco, and it must be held shut with the finger during the actual smoking. The poor use the pipe in this simplest form; richer people, on the contrary, sheathe the brown-stained body of the pipe with bronze and decorate the mounting with chased work and mounted turquoises; then they provide the reeds with burnt-in decorations and cover the bowl of the pipe with strings of beads and semi-precious stones, so that this kind of apparatus finally acquires a pleasing appearance. In rare cases the body of the water pipe is made entirely of brass; but even in such cases the vessel always has the shape of a gourd container (cf. Figure 105, 118 and 123).

352 Finally, an article of furniture which is missing in only a few [523] households is the bird cage, for the natives are great bird lovers. The bird cages are made in the same artless fashion as almost all the products of native industry. They consist of a simple round wooden or cardboard box without a lid (discarded Russian hatboxes are often used for this purpose) on which a pointed dome-shaped net is placed made of many-colored cotton yarn. This is held tight by the weight of the box

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92. Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native. In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p. 165, and Figure 85, p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analysis]

l: von Schwarz--75a N-5 (c.1895) 1900 RLI Turkestan RLI

415

Fig. 22. Washing Utensils.

354 For the baking of bread a special baking oven of burnt clay is
252 used. It has the form of a large overturned water /245/ cask, with no floor and an opening in the side. This oven, which is made all in one piece and sold ready-made at the bazaar is either /Figure 93. P764/ Caption: Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place. / buried underground or walled into the court wall and surrounded with a thick layer of clay so that both openings /246/, the one on top and that on the side, remain open. When bread is baked in such an oven a strong fire is laid inside it; after this has gone out, the coals and ashes are removed and then the thin flakes of bread are pasted to the heated inner walls of the oven from above. In many places, especially in the colder mountainous regions like Badakhshan, these baking ovens are buried in the middle of the living rooms, in the floor, and thus they also serve for the heating of the living quarters (Figure 94). P765 /Figure 94. Caption: Baking Oven of Turkestan. /

343 The privies in the dwellings of the natives are arranged very suitably and in keeping with the local conditions. In a distant part of the court a separate large room is built. In the middle of this space there is a pit about 8 meters deep with a diameter of about 3 meters, which is covered over with heavy, well cut, wooden planks. In these planks a small bamboo-shaped slit is cut out. Naturally there are no seat boards since the natives are not accustomed to sitting on chairs. A hole is left in the roof just over the slit mentioned above, in which a short pipe of burnt clay is placed. The open door opening and this roof opening provide adequate ventilation and there is no sign of a bad-smell. When the sunken pit is finally almost full after many years it is then filled up with earth and the privy is moved to another place. Care is taken almost always to have a canal flowing by in which the residents may make their ablutions in the manner prescribed by the Koran.

Since in Turkestan every house owner is at the same time an owner of horses, the stables have a very important role in the dwellings of the natives. The stalls are always built next to the court wall, and are usually on the opposite sides of the court square from the dwelling quarters, sometimes even occupying three sides of the court. The stalls are little more than sheds and the supporting girders are fixed in the court wall on one side and are supported on the other by

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

Fig. 98. Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place.

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

Fig. 94. Baking Oven of Turkestan.

wooden posts, as can be seen in Figure 82, p. 229. Facing the court, 343
the stalls are as open as the verandas and therefore they provide shelter only against rain and snow, while the animals are exposed, without protection against the winter cold. Fodder troughs made of clay run the length of the walls of the stalls. /247/ Their borders are made of beams to prevent their crumbling away.

These stalls serve not only as shelter for the horses, donkeys and oxen of the owner but also for the riding animals and beasts of burden of the visitors and guests. Therefore they are always laid out on a much larger scale than would be necessary for the needs of the owner alone. In addition, the stalls are also used for the storage of grain, alfalfa, straw, etc. and for the night lodging of the boys and servants during the rain. The winter provisions are piled up on dry alfalfa on the roofs of the stables and are either exposed without protection to the rain and snow or in the best circumstances are covered on top with reed mats.

Threshed grain is stored in the same kind of underground pits as the nomads use. The historians of Alexander the Great already mention these underground storage granaries, which they called seir or sir, as a characteristic of the Bactrians and the Sogdians who were the inhabitants of Turkestan of that time. (1)

1. Curtius, for example, writes in Chapter 17 of Book VII concerning the presence of underground granaries in Bactria, the Afghan Turkestan of today: Siros vocabant barbari scrobes, quos ita sollerter abscondunt, ut, nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint: in his conditae fruges erant.

In the middle of the court there is a pond of a larger or smaller 312
size and its stagnant and usually incredibly dirty water is used not only for drinking water for cattle but also for humans, as well as being used for the preparation of tea and food and in the meantime for washing clothes as well.

From the court one enters the gardens by a small low door, and 351
this is the real dwelling place of the more prosperous Central Asians during the warm part of the year. The gardens are usually planted very densely with trees to provide as intense a shade as possible, and they are intersected by a countless number of small canals which serve

351 to water the trees, for, of course, nothing grows without artificial irrigation. What makes the Europeans uncomfortable in these otherwise splendid gardens is the complete absence of green grass. This is caused by the fact that the canals which serve only for the watering of the trees all cut deeply into the earth, and therefore cannot be used to water the surfaces. For this reason the earth floor in the gardens has the same monotonous yellow gray coloring as the courts, streets and garden walls, and in the best cases it is grown over with dry straw-yellow spear grass and other weeds which have grown up from the previous rainy season.

/248/ Somewhere in the middle of the garden a pool is dug out and along its edge a square terrace is built of clay, one to two meters high, depending on the circumstances, which serves as a place to stay during the warmer part of the year. These terraces, which one finds in the courts and gardens of the natives and also at every step in the open squares of the towns and villages, are necessary in order to escape from the dampness and the effluvia and fevers which announce themselves especially after sundown by a peculiar aroma.

The natives live on these terraces, which are shaded by tall
342 trees whenever possible. They live either under the open sky or set up so-called Bukharan tents on the terraces, if their means permit. The Russians also have a special fondness for these tents and use them on journeys and in their gardens because of their efficiency. The tents have the form of a cube and are covered with a pyramid-shaped roof. They are very light and convenient to carry, and never take more than a few minutes to set up. /Figure 95. Caption: Bukharan tent. /

The Bukharan tents are made of three parts: two folding screens, and an umbrella-like roof which is set up between them. The folding-screens, which are each 2 meters high and 6 meters wide, consist of strong doubled cotton material of a light green color, into which are sewn nine thick upright wooden poles at equal distances from each other. These screens are set up in such a way that the third and seventh upright posts form the corners and the rest of the posts form the sides. (Figure 95). The four edges of the pyramid-shaped roof are also formed by wooden poles sewn into the material. The roof is simply set on the ends of the vertical corner poles of the folding screens by means of special nooses made of cotton bands which are fastened around the poles. In addition, a number of small wooden pins are fastened around the edges of the roof, and over them are

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

Fig. 93. Bukharan tent.

342 hung the nooses which are sewn on the upper borders of the folding screens. /249/ This is done in order to make a tighter fit between the roof and the walls. White cotton cords are fastened to the upper ends of the four corner poles and their other ends tied as tightly as possible to four wooden tent-pins hammered into the earth or to nearby trees. This is done to give the tent the necessary stability and to protect it from being blown over by the wind. The roof is provided all the way around with an edging about the breadth of a hand, and this edging hangs outside the side walls and thus prevents rain from entering. The tent walls are lined on the inside with strips of silk and silk mixed with cotton which are tastefully cut and form a pleasing design as a whole, as well as increasing the thickness of the walls at the same time. The ends of the wooden poles which are sewn in, as well as the ends of the roof are covered over with strong yellow leather to prevent their being worn out easily. A tent of this kind has a total height of 3 meters, covers an area of about 9 square meters, and at the same time weighs only 36 kilograms. The Bukharan tents afford complete protection against rain and wind; when it is very hot, however, one uses only the front and rear wall, so that it is open where the two folding screens meet, in order to provide comfortable cross ventilation.

The form of the Bukharan tent just described is the usual one. There are in addition to these, however, tents of much larger dimensions but with the same arrangement, and these are used, especially in Bukhara, by personages of high rank for rooms of state and for the reception of important guests.

What has been said thus far about the living arrangements of the natives of Turkestan relates chiefly to the quarters intended for the men. The women's quarters differ from the men's chiefly in that the stables are naturally omitted, and therefore their quarters take up much less space than the men's. In other respects, however, the women's quarters also retain the division into living quarters, courtyards, and gardens, and also the living quarters and their arrangement do not differ essentially from that of the men's quarters.

116

116 TEXTS--a full set of pages from each processed source, arranged in page order, as a means of establishing the context for any particular slip. Sets are arranged in the numerical order of the sources. See also:

Literary texts 539

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Turkestan,

die Wiege der indogermanischen Völker.

Nach fünfzehnjährigem Aufenthalt in Turkestan

dargestellt von

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Mit einem Titelbild in Farbendruck, 178 Abbildungen und einer Karte.

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Herdersche Verlagshandlung.
1900.
Zweigniederlassungen in Wien, Straßburg, München und St. Louis, Mo.

Taschkent, die Hauptstadt des russischen Turkestan.

1. Allgemeines.

1. Geschichtliches. Taschkent spielte bis zur Einnahme durch die Russen, welche es sofort zur Hauptstadt ihrer zentralasiatischen Besitzungen machten, nur eine untergeordnete Rolle in der Geschichte Turkestans, obgleich es in Bezug auf Einwohnerzahl und Reichtum, dank seiner günstigen Lage in der Nähe des wasserreichen Flusses Tschirtschik, unter allen jetzigen turkestanischen Städten den ersten Rang einnimmt. Dies hatte seinen Grund in folgenden Umständen. Erstens ist Taschkent eine von allen Seiten völlig isolierte Oase. Nördlich von Taschkent liegen in einer Entfernung von 120, 284 und 308 km die drei vorgeschobenen unbedeutenden Städte Tschimkent, Turkestan und Aulie-Ata, deren Einwohnerzahl von jeher nur gering gewesen sein kann. Hinter diesen Städten beginnt sofort die ungeheure Kirgisensteppe. Im Osten von Taschkent liegen zwischen dieser Stadt und dem Alatangebirge nur vereinzelte, durch große Räume voneinander getrennte kleine Dörfer. Im Süden ist Taschkent durch unfruchtbares Steppenland sowie durch das völlig kahle Mogul-Tau-Gebirge und den Syr-Darja von der Stadt Chodschent und dem Ferganathal getrennt. Im Westen aber breitet sich zwischen dem Syr-Darja und der Taschkent nächstgelegenen, gleichfalls völlig isolierten Stadt Dschisak die 140 km breite, gänzlich wasserlose Hungersteppe aus. Obgleich also Taschkent, dank seiner großen Einwohnerzahl und seinem verhältnismäßigen Reichtum, unter allen jetzigen turkestanischen Städten am besten geeignet gewesen wäre, die übrigen Städte zu beherrschen, so mußte es doch auf eine herrschende Rolle verzichten, weil es infolge seiner isolierten Lage nur auf seine eigenen Kräfte angewiesen und nicht im stande war, die weit entlegenen Städte zu unterwerfen und mit Erfolg auf die Dauer zu behaupten. Ein zweiter wichtiger Umstand, der der Ausbreitung der Macht der Stadt Taschkent im Wege stand, war ihre exponierte Lage. Taschkent hatte immer den ersten Anprall aller aus der Dschungarei am Nordfuße des Tjanschangebirges entlang in Turkestan einbrechenden Horden: zuerst der Yuetschi, dann der Hiongnu oder Hunnen und der sonstigen türkischen Völker, endlich der Mongolen Dschingischans auszuhalten, wie ja auch von den Russen die Eroberung des eigentlichen Turkestan mit der Einnahme von Taschkent eröffnet wurde. Infolge dieses Umstandes hat Taschkent auch unter allen turkestanischen Städten die am meisten gemischte Bevölkerung, und diese bestand bis auf die letzte Zeit fast ausschließlich aus Sarten, dem Mischvolk par excellence.

Über die frühere Geschichte von Taschkent weiß man nur sehr wenig. Die Zeit seiner Entstehung ist unbekannt, reicht aber sicherlich ins höchste Alter-

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tum hinauf. Zur Zeit der Feldzüge Alexanders des Großen war die Gegend von Taschkent noch von den indogermanischen Skythen, den Vorfahren der heutigen Slaven, besetzt, da damals der Syr-Darja die Grenze zwischen dem Perserreiche und dem Lande der Skythen bildete. Wenn Taschkent, wie es auf Grund der örtlichen Verhältnisse fast mit Sicherheit anzunehmen ist, damals schon existierte, so war es jedenfalls der Sitz desjenigen skythischen Königs, mit dessen Unterthanen Alexander auf dem rechten Ufer des Syr-Darja gekämpft hatte, und der an Alexander nach der Schlacht bei Chodschent, dem damals von Alexander gegründeten Alexandria Eschate, eine Gesandtschaft schickte [1].

Zum erstenmal wird Taschkent von dem chinesischen Reisenden Hiuen-Tsang erwähnt, der es im 7. Jahrhundert n. Chr. auf seiner Pilgerfahrt nach Indien berührte. Seit der zweiten Hälfte desselben Jahrhunderts gehörte Taschkent zu dem von den Arabern in Zentralasien errichteten Reiche. Später kam es unter die Herrschaft der Seldschukken, welche von 1004 an Buchara beherrschten, sowie nacheinander noch verschiedener anderer türkischer Völkerschaften, die unablässig aus der Dschungarei hervordrangen. Um das Jahr 1220 wurde Taschkent von Dschingischan eingenommen und blieb dann unter seiner Herrschaft und der seiner Nachfolger, bis es von Tamerlan seinem großen Reich einverleibt wurde. Später ging es in den Besitz des berühmten Usbekenfürsten Scheibani-Chan über, der Buchara den letzten Nachfolgern Tamerlans entriß. Im Jahre 1598 wurde Taschkent von den Kirgis-Kaisaken erobert, deren Macht damals ihren Höhepunkt erreichte, und blieb in deren Besitz bis zum Jahre 1723. In diesem Jahre wurden die Kirgis-Kaisaken von den Dschungaren unter Anführung Galdan-Tsyrans überwältigt und nach Westen verdrängt, worauf Taschkent eine Zeitlang mit dem Reiche der Dschungaren vereinigt blieb. Als dieses im Jahre 1757 von den Chinesen vernichtet und bald darauf fast alle Dschungaren, über eine Million Menschen, aufgerieben wurden, blieb Taschkent eine Weile unabhängig und bildete mit den Städten Turkestan und Tschimkent eine Art Konföderation, wurde aber von Zeit zu Zeit gezwungen, die Oberhoheit des bucharischen Emirs anzuerkennen. Im Jahre 1814 wurde Taschkent vom Chan von Kokan erobert, und seitdem blieb es bei Kokan bis zur Einnahme durch die Russen. Nur vorübergehend geriet es nochmals in den Besitz des bucharischen Emirs Nasr-Ulla, als dieser 1840 Kokan eroberte und den damaligen Chan Mohammed Ali hinrichten ließ. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Kokan und Taschkent war aber immer ein sehr lockerer, und die Taschkenter revoltierten bei jeder passenden und unpassenden

[1] Vgl. meine Monographie: Alexanders des Großen Feldzüge in Turkestan. München, 1893.

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Gelegenheit. Taschkent wurde gewöhnlich von einem vom Chan eingesetzten Bek regiert, war aber zeitweilig auch die Residenz des Chans und dann als solche die Hauptstadt des Chanats Kokan.

Von den Russen wurde Taschkent im Jahre 1865 mit Sturm genommen. Es ist hier nicht der Platz, eine ausführliche Geschichte der Eroberung Turkestans durch die Russen zu geben; ich will nur den allgemeinen Gang der Ereignisse und die Umstände kurz auseinandersetzen, welche die Russen, eigentlich gegen ihren Willen, zum Vordringen nach Zentralasien und zur Unterwerfung dieser weiten Länder gezwungen haben.

Die Vorwärtsbewegung der Russen gegen Turkestan, welche dieselben schließlich in verhältnismäßig kurzer Zeit bis an die Grenzen Indiens geführt hat, war durch die Kirgisen herbeigeführt worden. Wie bereits erwähnt, hatten die Kirgis-Kaisaken der Mittleren Horde, nachdem sie sich schon früher der Städte Aulie-Ata, Turkestan und Tschimkent bemächtigt hatten, im Jahre 1598 auch die Stadt Taschkent eingenommen und dieselbe zum Hauptstützpunkt ihrer Macht erkoren. Im Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts wurden sie aber von den Dschungaren hart bedrängt, so daß sie sich gezwungen sahen, sich an Rußland um Hilfe zu wenden. Da bei der damaligen Lage Rußlands diese Hilfe nicht gewährt werden konnte, so unterlagen die Kirgisen den Dschungaren und wurden von denselben aus der Gegend von Taschkent nach Westen verdrängt. Durch dieses unfreiwillige Vordringen der Mittleren Horde nach Westen kam die dort nomadisierende Kleine Horde ins Gedränge. Diese suchte deshalb im Jahre 1732 um Aufnahme in den russischen Unterthanenverband nach, die ihr im folgenden Jahre gewährt wurde. Zwei Jahre später unterwarf sich auch die Mittlere Horde freiwillig der russischen Herrschaft. Im Jahre 1801 wanderte ein Teil der Kleinen Horde mit Erlaubnis der russischen Regierung in die von den Kalmücken verlassenen Gegenden zwischen Ural und Wolga ein, und seitdem führen diese Kirgisen den Namen Innere oder Bulejewsche Horde. Im Jahre 1847 unterwarf sich schließlich auch die Große Horde den Russen. Acht Jahre später folgte dem Beispiele der Kirgis-Kaisaken auch ein Teil der Kara-Kirgisen, indem der im Tjanschangebirge nomadisierende Teil derselben sich gleichfalls den Russen ergab.

Die Unterwerfung der Kirgisen unter die russische Herrschaft war aber eigentlich nur eine nominelle. Die Kirgisen faßten ihr Verhältnis zu den Russen so auf, daß diese verpflichtet seien, sie gegen die Angriffe ihrer Feinde zu schützen, während sie ihrerseits keinerlei Verpflichtungen gegen die Russen anerkannten und mit der größten Unparteilichkeit die russischen Karawanen und Ansiedler ebensogut ausplünderten wie ihre Nachbarn auf der turkestanischen Seite. Die russischen Behörden versuchten alles mögliche, um unter den Kirgisen einige Ordnung herzustellen und sie von räuberischen

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Überfällen auf die russischen Ansiedlungen und Karawanen abzuhalten. Zuerst versuchten sie dieses Ziel durch Einsetzung von ihnen treu ergebenen Chanen zu erreichen. Da diese aber, eben weil sie von den Russen eingesetzt waren, bei den Kirgisen keinen Einfluß und keine Achtung genossen, so wurde die Sache nur noch ärger und es herrschte beinahe vollständige Anarchie. Die Würde des Chans wurde deshalb im Jahre 1833 ganz aufgehoben und die Kirgisen in eine Anzahl von Wolosten und Auls mit selbstgewählten Ältesten eingeteilt, welche russischen Bezirksches untergeordnet wurden. Diese Maßregel, welche sich in der Folge als sehr zweckmäßig erwies, weil durch dieselbe die Macht der Sultane und der bisher erblichen Stammeshäupter für immer gebrochen wurde, rief aber unter den Kirgis-Kaisaken eine heftige Gärung hervor, welche von dem angesehenen Sultan Kasym und dessen Sohn Kenisar benützt wurde, um im Jahre 1838 einen allgemeinen Aufstand der Kirgisen gegen die russische Herrschaft hervorzurufen, der erst im Jahre 1844 vollständig unterdrückt werden konnte.

Ruhe und Ordnung in der Kirgisensteppe zu stiften gelang aber trotz alledem nicht, weil die Kirgisen beständig von ihren turkestanischen Nachbarn, den Kokanen, Bucharen und Chiwanern, gegen Rußland aufgehetzt wurden, und weil die kirgisischen Räuber nach vollbrachter That sich immer ohne Schwierigkeit nach den zentralasiatischen Chanaten flüchten konnten, da die Grenze gegen die chinesischen, kokanischen, bucharischen und chiwanischen Besitzungen nicht in den Händen der Russen war.

Die russische Regierung griff deshalb zu einem neuen Mittel, welches den beabsichtigten Zweck endlich vollständig erreichte, die Russen aber in neue und viel ernstere und folgenreichere Händel mit den zentralasiatischen Chanaten verwickelte. Dieses Mittel bestand darin, daß die ganze Kirgisensteppe auf der turkestanischen Seite allmählich mit einer ununterbrochenen Reihe von Befestigungswerken umgeben wurde, um einerseits den Kirgisen das Durchschlüpfen über die Grenze nach Verübung eines Angriffs auf die Russen zu erschweren und sie anderseits selbst gegen Überfälle von seiten der Chiwaner und Kokanen sicherzustellen. Diese befestigten Punkte wurden gleichzeitig von zwei Seiten, von Orenburg aus, welches im Jahre 1735 gegründet worden war, und von Sibirien aus ganz allmählich nach dem Syr-Darja einerseits und nach dem Tjanschan anderseits vorgeschoben. Nachdem die Russen den Syr-Darja in der Nähe des Aralsees erreicht hatten, rückten sie an diesem Flusse entlang nach Osten vor, während von Osten her eine Reihe von Festungen am Nordfuße des Alexandergebirges entlang angelegt wurde, bis diese beiden Festungslinien bei Tschimkent zusammenstießen. Von Orenburg aus wurden im Jahre 1839 die Forts Emba und Al-Bulak, 1845 Orenburgsk und Uralsk, 1847 Raim oder Aralsk und 1848 Koß-Aralsk und Kara-Butak angelegt. Von Sibirien aus wurden

im Jahre 1847 die Forts Kopal, Wernoe und Kastek angelegt. Sergiopol war bereits 1831 gegründet worden.

Bis hierher war die Anlegung der Befestigungswerke ohne besondere Schwierigkeiten vor sich gegangen, weil man sich auf russischem Gebiete bewegte. Beim Vordringen vom Aralsee aus nach Osten und von Wernoe aus nach Westen setzte es dagegen häufige Kämpfe mit den Kokanen ab, weil die weiteren Festungen alle auf kokanischem Gebiet erbaut werden mußten, da die Anlage von solchen in der Wüste natürlich unmöglich war.

Den Kampf eröffnete von Westen her der General Perowsky, der im Jahre 1853 die erste kokanische Festung am Syr-Darja, Al-Metschet, im Sturme nahm, trotz der tapfern Verteidigung durch den kokanischen Befehlshaber Jakub-Bek, der noch zu größeren Dingen bestimmt war, da er sich später zum unabhängigen Herrscher von Kaschgar aufschwang und als solcher sogar den Russen und Engländern Respekt einflößte. An der Stelle des zerstörten Al-Metschet wurde sofort eine russische Festung, Fort Perowsk, angelegt, und außerdem wurden noch im selben Jahre die Festungen Kasalinsk und Karmaktschi erbaut. Im Jahre 1861 kam dazu noch das Fort Dschulek. Von Wernoe aus, wo im Jahre 1854 eine russische Stadt gegründet worden war, wurden 1860 die kokanischen Festungen Tokmak und Pischpek und 1862 Merke erobert.

Während die Russen bisher im ganzen ziemlich planlos vorgegangen waren und die kommandierenden Generale am Syr-Darja und in Semiretschie voneinander unabhängig und nach eigenem Gutdünken operiert hatten, wurde jetzt endlich System in die Sache gebracht und im Jahre 1864 die Vereinigung der beiden festen Linien, die einerseits von Orenburg bis Dschulek, auf der andern Seite von Sibirien bis an den Nordfuß des Alexandergebirges reichte, ernstlich in Angriff genommen. Von Westen her rückte General Werjowkin am Syr-Darja entlang gegen die Stadt Turkestan vor und nahm sie mit Sturm am 23. Juni. In der Nähe dieser Stadt, bei dem Dorfe Ikan, spielte sich bei dieser Gelegenheit ein Vorgang ab, der der Heldenthat der 300 Spartaner des Leonidas in nichts nachgiebt, und den ich um so weniger mit Stillschweigen übergehen will, als er den Geist der russischen Truppen und die Art der russischen Kriegführung in Asien am besten illustriert. Der kokanische General und Regent Alim-Kul hatte nach der Einnahme von Turkestan eine Armee von etwa 15 000 Mann aufgestellt und marschierte mit derselben gegen Turkestan, um diese Stadt den Russen wieder zu entreißen. In der Nähe des Dorfes Ikan überfiel er am 16. Dezember mit seiner Übermacht den Jessaul (Rittmeister) Serow, der mit seiner aus uralischen Kosaken bestehenden Sotnja (Eskadron) den Einwohnern dieses Dorfes auf ihre Bitte hin zu Hilfe geschickt worden war, auf freiem Felde und schloß ihn von allen Seiten ein, so daß er weder

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

nach Ikan vorzudringen, noch nach Turkestan zurückzukehren im stande war. In dieser Stellung verteidigte sich Serow mit seiner Handvoll Kosaken drei Tage und drei Nächte gegen die achtzigfache Übermacht, und obgleich sie drei Tage ohne Lebensmittel, ohne Wasser und ohne Schlaf zugebracht hatten, und Alim-Kul, in Bewunderung ihrer beispiellosen Tapferkeit, ihnen eine ehrenvolle Kapitulation mit freiem Abzuge zur Hauptarmee anbot, schlugen sie sich doch am Ende des dritten Tages, als sie den Gestank der ringsum als Schutzwehr aufgestapelten Leichen nicht mehr ertragen konnten, und einsahen, daß sie auf keine Hilfe aus dem nahen Turkestan rechnen konnten, glücklich durch, wobei sie alle ihre Schwerverwundeten, 43 an der Zahl, mitnahmen, obwohl alle Überlebenden selbst mehr oder weniger schwer verwundet waren. Diese Heldenthat der Kosaken Serows machte auf die Kokanen einen solchen Eindruck, daß sie auf den geplanten Angriff auf Turkestan verzichteten, und trug nicht wenig bei zu den weiteren Erfolgen der Russen in Zentralasien[1].

Vergleicht man die Handlungsweise Serows und seiner Kosaken mit dem Verhalten der Engländer in Kabul während des ersten afghanischen Feldzugs, wo eine 18000 Mann starke englisch-indische Armee in einer uneinnehmbaren Position unter den schimpflichsten Bedingungen und unter Auslieferung der Waffen kapitulierte, was nachträglich den Untergang der ganzen Armee zur Folge hatte, so kann man wohl nicht darüber im unklaren sein, welches der Ausgang eines eventuellen Kampfes zwischen Russen und Engländern auf asiatischem Boden sein wird; besonders wenn man bedenkt, daß die Kosaken den minderwertigsten Bestandteil der russischen Armee repräsentieren, während in Kabul die besten englisch-indischen Truppen versammelt gewesen waren[2].

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[1] Sehr charakteristisch für den Geist, der unter den russischen Truppen herrscht, ist auch folgender (keineswegs vereinzelter) Fall, der sich während der Belagerung der turkmenischen Festung Heok-Tepe durch General Skobelew im Jahre 1880 abgespielt hat. Bei einem unerwarteten nächtlichen Ausfalle war es den belagerten Turkmenen gelungen, zwei russische Gebirgskanonen und einen Kanonier Namens Agafon Nikitin in ihre Gewalt zu bekommen. Da die Turkmenen mit den Kanonen nicht umzugehen verstanden, suchten sie durch Versprechungen und Drohungen Nikitin dahin zu bringen, die Kanonen zu bedienen. Dieser weigerte sich aber standhaft, die Kanonen auf seine Landsleute zu richten, und blieb seinem Vorsatze selbst dann noch getreu, als ihm die Turkmenen der Reihe nach sämtliche Finger und Zehen abschnitten, ihm bei lebendigem Leibe die Haut abzogen und ihn schließlich unter den gräßlichsten Foltern zu Tode marterten. Die Russen ehrten das Andenken dieses Helden nachträglich dadurch, daß sie in Kalvaria, dem Heimatsorte desselben, eine dem hl. Agafon geweihte Kirche erbauten, zu der auch der russische Kaiser eine namhafte Summe beisteuerte.

[2] Das Obige hatte ich bereits im Jahre 1890 geschrieben. Der gegenwärtige Krieg zwischen den Engländern und Buren in Südafrika hat mein bereits vor zehn Jahren abgegebenes Urteil über die Kriegstüchtigkeit der englischen Truppen aufs

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Gleichzeitig mit der Eroberung von Turkestan durch General Werjowkin war von General Tschernajew Aulie-Ata eingenommen worden, und am 4. Oktober desselben Jahres bemächtigte sich der letztere mittels eines Handstreiche auch noch der Stadt Tschimkent.

Damit war endlich die Verbindung zwischen der sibirischen und orenburgischen Festungslinie hergestellt und somit das ganze von den Kirgis-Kaisaken und dem russischen Teil der Kara-Kirgisen eingenommene Gebiet in der Gewalt der Russen. Weiter zu gehen lag nicht in der Absicht der russischen Regierung. Denn die Besetzung der zentralasiatischen Chanate mußte, abgesehen davon, daß dieselbe Rußland keinen materiellen Nutzen bringen, sondern im Gegenteil nur unnütze Ausgaben verursachen konnte, unfehlbar zu weiteren Verwicklungen führen und zugleich die Eifersucht der Engländer herausfordern, die ohnedies das Vordringen der Russen nach Zentralasien mit schelen Augen und mit nur zu berechtigtem Mißtrauen beobachteten. Für jeden aber, der die Sachlage kennt und mit dem Geiste der russischen Offiziere sowie mit dem Charakter der Eingeborenen Turkestans vertraut ist, ist es klar, daß das weitere Vordringen der Russen in Zentralasien nur eine Frage der Zeit sein konnte. Denn erstens war bei der allgemeinen Zerfahrenheit in allen zentralasiatischen Chanaten von denselben keine Ruhe zu erwarten, solange sie unabhängig blieben. Zweitens wäre die Verpflegung der russischen Truppen auf der ungeheuern, von Orenburg über Kasalinsk, Turkestan, Tschimkent, Wernoe und Sergiopol bis Sibirien reichenden Festungslinie äußerst schwierig gewesen, wenn, wie dies bis zur Einnahme von Taschkent der Fall war, fast alle Vorräte aus Rußland und Sibirien herbeigeschafft werden mußten. Vor der Besetzung Taschkents kostete z. B. in Kasalinsk den Staat jedes Pud (16 kg) Mehl 40—60 Mark. Den wichtigsten Faktor aber, welcher den Russen nicht erlaubte, sich mit dem bereits Erreichten zu begnügen, bildete der Geist der russischen Offiziere, welche in ihrem Leben keinen höheren Zweck kennen als Carriere, und die deshalb jede Gelegenheit, sich auszuzeichnen, begierig ergreifen. Zur Erreichung dieses ihres höchsten Zieles scheuen sie sich nicht, im Notfalle selbst die ausdrücklichen Befehle ihrer Vorgesetzten und der

glänzendste bestätigt. Am niedrigsten wurde seiner Zeit die englische Tapferkeit und Kriegstüchtigkeit von den Afghanen taxiert, welche schon wiederholt Gelegenheit gehabt haben, sich mit den Engländern zu messen. Auf meiner Reise nach Badachschan und Afghanistan im Jahre 1878 hatte ich Gelegenheit, verschiedene afghanische Offiziere zu sprechen. Diese sprachen alle ihre Ansicht dahin aus, daß die Engländer noch schlechtere Soldaten seien als die Bucharen. (Die Bucharen gelten nämlich in ganz Zentralasien als das Ideal eines Soldaten, wie er nicht sein soll.) Die Engländer verdankten ihre Erfolge nur ihren überlegenen Waffen. Hätten die Afghanen ebensolche Waffen, so wollten sie garantieren, daß kein Engländer lebend über ihre Grenze kommen sollte.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Regierung zu mißachten, weil sie im Falle des Gelingens sicher sind, nicht nur straflos zu bleiben, sondern auch noch eine entsprechende Belohnung zu erhalten. Denn in Rußland richtet man sich in solchen Fällen stets nach der von der Kaiserin Katharina II. aufgestellten Maxime, daß es für einen Sieger keinen Richter gebe: ein Grundsatz, dem Rußland die meisten seiner Erfolge verdankt.

General Tschernajew, der Urtypus eines russischen Offiziers und Soldaten, ließ sich nach der Einnahme von Tschimkent die günstige Gelegenheit nicht entgehen, sofort nach dem erwähnten Prinzipe zu handeln. Obgleich ihm durch ein spezielles Reskript des Kriegsministers strenge untersagt worden war, weiter nach Süden vorzudringen, und obwohl er nur etwa 2000 Mann Truppen und zehn alte Kanonen aus der Zeit der napoleonischen Kriege zur Verfügung hatte, machte er sich dennoch von Tschimkent aus sofort auf den Weg, um Taschkent, eine Stadt mit 90000 Einwohnern, die mit einer 25 km langen starken Mauer umgeben war und von einer aus 15000 Mann kokanischer Truppen und ebensovielen bewaffneten Bürgern bestehenden Besatzung verteidigt wurde, anzugreifen. Dieser tollkühne und ohne alle Vorbereitung unternommene Angriff fiel aber für Tschernajew sehr unglücklich aus. Er wurde am 15. Oktober mit großem Verluste zurückgeschlagen und verlor unter andern seinen Generalstabschef Obuchow, der beim persönlichen Angriff auf einen Turm, den er infolge seiner totalen Betrunkenheit für eine Bresche ansah, samt seiner ganzen Sturmkolonne aufgerieben wurde.

Die Lage Tschernajews, der sich nach dieser Schlappe wieder nach Tschimkent zurückzog, war eigentlich eine verzweifelte. Er war, wie fast immer, ohne Geld und ohne die Mittel, seine Soldaten ordentlich zu verpflegen, hatte von keiner Seite auf Sukkurs zu rechnen und konnte alle Augenblicke von den übermütig gewordenen Kokanen und Taschkentern mit Übermacht angegriffen werden. Er verzagte aber als echter Russe auch jetzt nicht. Um sich Geld zu verschaffen, stellte er am Syr-Darja Kosaken auf und ließ die russischen Posten abfangen und alle Geldsendungen in Beschlag nehmen. Die Hoffnung, sich der Stadt Taschkent zu bemächtigen, gab er trotz seiner kritischen Lage nicht auf. Er fing aber das zweite Mal die Sache vorsichtiger an. An eine regelrechte Belagerung der Stadt war in Anbetracht seiner geringen Streitkräfte und der großen Ausdehnung der Stadtmauern natürlich nicht zu denken. Tschernajew besetzte deshalb zuerst die kleine Feste Nias-Bek am Tschirtschik, welche die Wasserwerke beherrscht, durch welche die Stadt mit Wasser versorgt wird. Dadurch allein wäre es schon möglich gewesen, die Taschkenter zur Übergabe zu zwingen, weil es in der ganzen Stadt nur eine einzige Quelle und fast gar keine Brunnen gab, da in Taschkent das Grundwasser stark salzhaltig ist. Sodann nahm Tschernajew

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

die Festung Tschinas weg, welche die Fähre über den Syr-Darja auf dem Wege nach Samarkand beherrscht, um dem bucharischen Emir, der, von den Taschkentern zu Hilfe gerufen, bereits im Anmarsche war, den Weg nach Taschkent zu verlegen. Endlich setzte er sich mit der hauptsächlich aus Kaufleuten bestehenden Friedenspartei in Taschkent in Verbindung, welche weder von den Bucharen noch von den Kokanen etwas wissen wollte, und verabredete mit ihnen, daß sie zu einer bestimmten Zeit die Wachen überfallen und den Russen die Thore öffnen sollten. Dieser Plan wurde aber dadurch vereitelt, daß es dem kokanischen Regenten Alim-Kul gelang, sich mit 7000 Mann Truppen und 40 Kanonen in die bedrohte Stadt zu werfen. Nachdem aber Alim-Kul bei einem Angriff auf Tschernajews Lager im Osten von Taschkent, bei welcher Gelegenheit Tschernajew samt seiner Suite aus nächster Nähe von mehreren feindlichen Batterien beschossen wurde, gefallen war, unternahm Tschernajew am Morgen des 27. Juni 1865 einen zweiten Sturm auf die Stadt.

Um 3 Uhr morgens überrumpelte eine Sturmkolonne unter Anführung des Hauptmanns Abramow, des späteren Militärgouverneurs von Samarkand und Fergana, die Wache am Kamelanthor, sprengte das Thor und stürmte von da auf der Mauer entlang bis zum Kara-Sarai-Thor, in dessen Nähe sich die Wohnungen der russisch gesinnten Bürger befanden. Zur selben Zeit drang eine andere Sturmkolonne durch das Kokanische Thor ein und besetzte die Citadelle. Die Stadt ergab sich aber auch jetzt noch nicht. Jede Straße mußte mit Sturm genommen werden, und aus allen Häusern und Gärten wurde auf die Stürmenden gefeuert. Besonders heftig tobte der Kampf in den engen und winkeligen Straßen des Bazars, wo überall Barrikaden errichtet worden waren. Der Kampf dauerte ohne Unterbrechung den ganzen Tag fort, und erst mit Einbruch der Nacht wurde das Morden beiderseitig eingestellt. Am nächsten Morgen ging es aber von neuem los, und den ganzen Tag waren die Russen wieder damit beschäftigt, die von den Eingeborenen während der Nacht allenthalben aus Bäumen und Wagen errichteten Barrikaden zu stürmen und wegzuräumen. Erst am Abend erschien eine Deputation von seiten der Einwohner mit dem Angebote der Übergabe auf Gnade und Ungnade, und am nächsten Tage, den 29. Juni, wurde dann die Übergabe feierlich vollzogen. In die Hände der Sieger fielen unter anderem 63 Festungsgeschütze und 72 000 Pfund Pulver. Welchen Eindruck die Tollkühnheit und Tapferkeit der Russen bei der Einnahme von Taschkent auf die Eingeborenen machte, kann man daraus abnehmen, daß 5000 kokanische Reiter, welche während des Sturmes aus der Stadt entkommen waren, in ungestümer Flucht nach dem 11 km entfernten Tschirtschik eilten und sich in wilder Verzweiflung in den tiefen und reißenden Fluß stürzten, obwohl sie nur von ganzen 40 Kosaken verfolgt wurden.

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Bedeutung und Entstehung des Namens Taschkent.

Unmittelbar nach der Übergabe der Stadt beging Tschernajew einen Geniestreich, der ihm sofort die Achtung und die Herzen aller Taschkenter gewann. Während noch die Toten unbeerdigt in den Straßen lagen, begab sich Tschernajew allein, nur von einem einzigen Kosaken begleitet, der ihm ein Bündel Wäsche nachtrug, durch eine tausendköpfige Menge von Eingeborenen nach dem Bazar, um sich nach den Anstrengungen des zweitägigen Sturmes in der dortigen öffentlichen Badstube zu restaurieren, und als ihm nach Beendigung des Bades einer aus dem Publikum eine Schale Thee reichte, leerte er dieselbe sofort und ohne Zögern. Diese Einfachheit und Unerschrockenheit machte auf die Taschkenter einen solchen Eindruck, daß Tschernajew von nun an als Heros betrachtet wurde und völlige Legenden über ihn entstanden. Leider hatte Tschernajew später das Unglück, nach General Kauffmanns Tod zu dessen Nachfolger ernannt zu werden, und bei dieser Gelegenheit verstand er seine gänzliche Unfähigkeit als Administrator so glänzend zu beweisen und bei den Eingeborenen sowohl wie bei der russischen Bevölkerung Turkestans alle Achtung so gründlich einzubüßen, daß er bei seinem Scheiden von Taschkent nur mit Verwünschungen begleitet wurde und ihm keine Seele das Geleit gab.

Die Einnahme von Taschkent war zwar gegen den ausdrücklichen Willen der russischen Regierung erfolgt, und Tschernajew wurde nachträglich für seinen Ungehorsam seiner Stelle enthoben. Aber die Stadt wieder an Kokan zurückzugeben, war trotzdem nicht möglich, weil sonst die russisch gesinnte Partei unter den Taschkentern, welche die Einnahme der Stadt wesentlich erleichtert hatte, zu sehr kompromittiert und schutzlos der Rache ihrer fanatischen Gegner preisgegeben gewesen wäre, und weil dann Rußland das Zutrauen der Eingeborenen Turkestans für alle Folgezeit verloren haben würde. Taschkent wurde deshalb im Jahre 1866 mit den bereits früher eroberten Gebieten zu einem eigenen Gouvernement unter dem Namen Syr-Darja-Provinz vereinigt und dem Generalgouvernement Orenburg zugeteilt. Da aber mit dem Generalgouverneur Kryschanowsky kein Gouverneur auskommen konnte, so wurde im Jahre 1867 die Syr-Darja-Provinz wieder von Orenburg getrennt und mit der Provinz Semiretschie zu einem eigenen Generalgouvernement vereinigt, welches den Namen des turkestanischen erhielt. Zum ersten turkestanischen Generalgouverneur, mit seinem Sitz in Taschkent, wurde der Generaladjutant Konstantin Petrowitsch von Kauffmann ernannt, der später noch das Gebiet von Samarkand (1868), den Amu-Darja-Bezirk (1873), Fergana (1876) und zeitweilig auch noch das Gebiet von Kuldscha (1871 bis 1881) mit dem turkestanischen Generalgouvernement vereinigte.

2. Bedeutung und Entstehung des Namens „Taschkent". Über die Entstehung des Namens der Stadt Taschkent haben sich die Etymologen vielfach den Kopf zerbrochen, ohne zu einem befriedigenden Resultate

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

zu gelangen. Das Wort Taschkent bedeutet nämlich auf deutsch „Steinstadt" und ist aus zwei, verschiedenen Sprachen angehörenden Wörtern zusammengesetzt: dem türkischen tasch = Stein und dem persischen kent = Stadt. Nun ist aber Taschkent nicht aus Stein, sondern durchaus aus Lehm erbaut, und in weitem Umkreis um Taschkent giebt es überhaupt keine Steine, weil der Grund, auf dem die Stadt erbaut ist, aus einer ausgedehnten und mächtigen Lößschichte besteht. Man könnte deshalb allenfalls Taschkent nur nach der Theorie von lucus a non lucendo als eine Stadt erklären, in der es keine Steine giebt. Manche haben deshalb den Namen so gedeutet, daß damit eine Stadt bezeichnet wird, welche einen Durchmesser von einem Tasch hat, da der Tasch = 8 km die bei den Eingeborenen gebräuchliche Einheit zur Bestimmung von Weglängen ist. Ich glaube aber, daß die Entstehung des Namens Taschkent auf viel natürlichere Weise erklärt werden kann. Der chinesische Mönch Hiuen-Tsang, der auf seiner Pilgerfahrt nach Indien (629—645 n. Chr.) Taschkent berührte, nennt die Stadt in seinem Reisebericht in seiner chinesischen Schreibweise Tschatschkent; bei den späteren arabischen Schriftstellern erscheint es aber unter dem Namen Schaschkent[1], und dies ist offenbar der ursprüngliche indogermanische Name der Stadt; denn schasch bedeutet im Sanskrit „sechs", und Schaschkent hatte also dieselbe Bedeutung wie das griechische Hexapolis. Wahrscheinlich bildete Taschkent im Altertum mit den fünf übrigen in der skythischen Wüste rechts vom Syr-Darja gelegenen Städten, welche nachmals die Namen Turkestan, Aulie-Ata, Tschimkent, Otrar und Sauran führten, und von denen die beiden letzten schon lange in Trümmern liegen, einen Bund von sechs Städten und erhielt als die Hauptstadt des Bundes den Namen „Sechsstadt". Ähnliche Wortbildungen, welche bekanntlich bei den alten Griechen vielfach angewendet wurden, sind auch gegenwärtig in Turkestan noch in Gebrauch. So erhielt z. B. das von Jakub Bek im Tarymbecken gegründete Reich, welches ursprünglich als Alty-Schaar (Sechsstadt) bezeichnet worden war, den Namen Dschity-Schaar oder „Siebenstadt", nachdem Jakub Bek seiner Herrschaft noch eine siebente Stadt, nämlich Kara-Schaar, nebst deren Gebiet einverleibt hatte. Von den späteren türkischen Einwanderern, für welche das Wort Schaschkent als Fremdwort unverständlich war, wurde dasselbe des Gleichklanges wegen in Taschkent umgeändert, was nach ihrer Sprache Steinstadt bedeutet. In ganz ähnlicher Weise verwandelten sie auch den Namen Baktra in Balch oder „Hauptstadt", den Namen Tschaschmkent (Quellenstadt) in Tschimkent oder „Rasenstadt" u. dgl. m. Die zweite

[1] Sultan-Baber kennt Taschkent bereits unter dem Namen Taschkend; er bemerkt aber ausdrücklich, daß dasselbe bei den älteren Schriftstellern bald unter dem Namen Schasch, bald unter dem Namen Dschadsch erscheine.

Bild 48. Steppenlandschaft in der Umgebung von Taschkent. Brücke über den Tschirtschik zwischen Taschkent und Tschinaz. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

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Silbe „kent" wurde, obgleich sie indogermanisch war, von den türkischen Völkern unverändert beibehalten, weil sie sich an dieselbe bereits gewöhnt hatten; denn auch viele andere turkestanische Städtenamen weisen dieselbe Zusammensetzung auf wie Kokand, Samarkand, Tschimkent, Pskent, Jarkand ꝛc. Kand und kent hat dieselbe Bedeutung; die Form „kand" wird gebraucht, wenn die vorhergehende Silbe die Vokale a, o oder u enthält, sonst aber die Form „kent". Die richtige Schreibweise wäre also in unserem Fall Taschkand, wie es auch von den Eingeborenen ausgesprochen wird. Die Russen haben aber, nach dem Vorgange der ersten, mit der Linguistik wenig vertrauten Pioniere, von Anfang an die Form „Taschkent" adoptiert, und dies ist jetzt der offizielle Name der Stadt.

3. Lage der Stadt Taschkent. Taschkent liegt 4h 37m 11s östlich von Greenwich unter einer Polhöhe von 41° 19′ 32″; es liegt also ungefähr auf dem Parallel von Neapel; seine Meereshöhe beträgt 488 m. Die Koordinaten beziehen sich auf die Sternwarte von Taschkent, welche 1 km östlich von der ehemaligen Stadtmauer liegt.

Es giebt in ganz Turkestan nur wenige Orte, welche eine in jeder Beziehung so günstige Lage haben wie Taschkent. Es liegt in dem breiten, beiderseitig durch niedrige Ausläufer des Tschatkalgebirges begrenzten Thale, welches einerseits vom Tschirtschik, anderseits vom Keleß durchflossen wird. Der Grund, auf dem Taschkent erbaut ist, besteht, wie bereits erwähnt, aus einer mächtigen Lößschichte, die sich bis an das Ufer des 60 km abstehenden Syr-Darja fortsetzt. Das Terrain ist bei Taschkent wellenförmig und, wie alle Lößlandschaften, stellenweise von tiefen, durch die Wasserläufe eingegrabenen Einschnitten durchfurcht. In Bezug auf Wasserreichtum, wovon in den turkestanischen Ebenen alles Leben und Gedeihen abhängt, kann sich keine andere Stadt Zentralasiens mit Taschkent messen. In einer Entfernung von 10 km fließt südöstlich von Taschkent der wasserreiche Tschirtschik vorüber, der größte aller Nebenflüsse des Syr-Darja. Die Stadt selbst liegt an dem aus dem Tschirtschik abgeleiteten Salar, der durch seine zahlreichen Kanäle die im Osten der Stadt gelegenen Felder und Gärten und die russische Stadt mit Wasser versorgt. Die Eingeborenen-Stadt wird durch den tief eingeschnittenen Boß-su-Kanal durchströmt, der ebenfalls aus dem Tschirtschik abgeleitet ist (Bild 48, S. 151).

Taschkent ist eine rings von wellenförmigem Steppenland umgebene Oase. Die Steppe reicht vom Ufer des Syr-Darja bis an das etwa 80 km östlich von Taschkent sich erhebende Tschatkalgebirge, dessen Abhänge gleichfalls zum größten Teil aus Steppenboden bestehen. Diese Steppe bedeckt sich alljährlich während der Dauer der Frühjahrsregen mit verhältnismäßig üppigem Steppengrase, welches aber mit dem Aufhören der Regenzeit sofort austrocknet, worauf dann die Steppe bis ans Gebirge

hinan den ganzen Sommer über ein ungeheuer eintöniges, fahles Aussehen zeigt. Im Westen von Taschkent breitet sich eine ausgedehnte Sumpflandschaft aus, der die Stadt wohl zum guten Teil ihre Fiebermiasmen verdanken dürfte. Vom Syr-Darja bis ans Gebirge ist die Steppe mit einer Anzahl von Dörfern bedeckt, welche oasenartig und sehr weitschichtig an den Wasserläufen und in den Gebirgsthälern verstreut sind.

Von Taschkent aus eröffnet sich im Nordosten, Osten und Südosten eine hübsche Aussicht auf die ganze sich zwischen der Stadt und dem Gebirge ausbreitende Steppenlandschaft sowie auf das Tschatkalgebirge selbst, welches den größten Teil des Jahres über mit Schnee bedeckt ist. Nur während der heißesten Sommermonate verschwindet der Schnee auf den höchsten Spitzen. Infolge der außerordentlichen Reinheit der Luft scheinen die Gebirge viel näher zu sein, als sie wirklich sind. Nur während der trockenen Sommermonate, wenn lange Zeit kein Regen gefallen ist, wird die Aussicht einigermaßen getrübt durch den feinen, beständig in der Luft suspendierten Staub. Bei besonders reiner Luft kann man von Taschkent aus auch die 200 km entfernte turkestanische Gebirgskette, die Fortsetzung des Alaigebirges, erblicken, deren schneebedeckte, unter den Sonnenstrahlen silberglänzende Kämme einen prächtigen Anblick gewähren.

In klimatischer Beziehung hat Taschkent gleichfalls eine sehr vorteilhafte Lage. Durch die im Nordosten vorgelagerten hohen Gebirge wird die Stadt im Winter gegen die eisigen Nordostwinde geschützt, infolgedessen Taschkent während der kältesten Jahreszeit eine bedeutend höhere Temperatur aufweist als die weiter westlich in der offenen Steppe gelegenen Orte. Dank dem Umstande ferner, daß das Thal des Tschirtschik nach Südwest geöffnet ist, ist hier die Niederschlagsmenge eine verhältnismäßig große, und Taschkent hat deshalb auch bei der größten Dürre immer mehr als hinreichenden Wasserzufluß: ein Vorzug, dessen sich kaum noch eine zweite Stadt Turkestans zu erfreuen hat.

2. Beschreibung des sartischen Taschkent.

1. Anlage und Befestigungswerke der Stadt. Das heutige Taschkent zerfällt in zwei streng geschiedene und voneinander grundverschiedene Teile: die Stadt der Eingeborenen oder das sogen. sartische Taschkent und die erst seit der russischen Occupation entstandene russische Stadt. Die letztere liegt zwischen dem Boß-su-Kanal und dem Salar; das sartische Taschkent aber breitet sich hauptsächlich im Westen vom Boß-su-Kanal aus und hat im großen und ganzen heutzutage noch dieselbe Ausdehnung und dasselbe Aussehen wie vor der Eroberung durch die Russen.

Alle zentralasiatischen Städte und selbst die größeren Dörfer zerfallen in drei voneinander getrennte Teile: den Bazar, den wichtigsten Stadtteil;

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die rings um den Bazar herumliegenden Häuserviertel, und endlich die sich von außen an letztere anschließenden Gärten und Felder, welche die eigentliche Stadt von allen Seiten umgeben. In Bild 49 ist diese Einteilung der turkestanischen Städte schematisch dargestellt. Alle Städte nähern sich mehr oder weniger dem in der Zeichnung angegebenen Grundtypus und weichen von demselben nur insoweit ab, als es die betreffenden Terrain- und Bewässerungsverhältnisse erfordern. Im Zentrum der Stadt liegt der freie Bazarplatz, auf dem die wöchentlichen Bazare oder Jahrmärkte sowie



Bild 49. Schematischer Plan der turkestanischen Städte.

allenfallsige Volksversammlungen, Hinrichtungen u. dgl. abgehalten werden. An den Bazarplatz schließen sich, meist konzentrisch, die ständigen Kaufläden an, welche ihrerseits wieder von den aus einfachen Lehmhütten bestehenden Häuservierteln umgeben sind. Die bisher aufgezählten Teile, welche zusammen die eigentliche Stadt bilden, sind ringsum von einer ununterbrochenen Stadtmauer[1] umgeben, außerhalb deren sich die Gärten und Felder der Stadtbewohner ausbreiten. Auf einer natürlich oder künstlich

[1] Manche turkestanische Städte sind sogar mit doppelten Stadtmauern umgeben, wie z. B. Chiwa, Kokan, Chodschent und Uratübe.



Bild 50. Palast des Emirs von Buchara.

erhöhten Stelle innerhalb der Stadtmauer ist die noch von einer eigenen Ringmauer umgebene Urda oder Citadelle erbaut, welche nicht den Zweck hat, als Schutzwehr gegen einen äußeren Feind, sondern als Zwingburg zu dienen zum Schutze des Herrschers oder Befehlshabers gegen allenfallsige Aufstände der geknechteten Bürger. Der Herrscher oder Gouverneur wohnt deshalb stets in der Urda (vgl. Bild 50, S. 155 und Bild 51). Vom Bazarplatz aus führen mehr oder weniger radiale Straßen durch die Reihen der Verkaufsläden, der Häuser und weiterhin durch die Stadtthore und die anliegenden Gärten und Felder nach den benachbarten Ortschaften. Außerhalb der Gärten und Felder beginnt sofort die dürre Steppe oder ganz vegetationslose Sand- oder Kieswüste.

Auf Grund der schematischen Zeichnung (Bild 49, S. 154) und mit Berücksichtigung der Himmelsgegenden ist man im stande, sich in jeder turkestanischen Stadt, ohne Führer und ohne ein Wort von der Sprache der Eingeborenen zu verstehen, mit Leichtigkeit zu orientieren, wie ich selbst hundertmal erprobt habe.

Auch in Taschkent war früher, bis zur Einnahme durch die Russen, die eigentliche Stadt von einer hohen und sehr starken Mauer umgeben, welche, wie auch sonst überall in Turkestan, aus Lößerde aufgeführt war. Der Löß ist für die örtlichen Verhältnisse ein Baumaterial, wie man es sich nicht besser wünschen könnte. In trockenem Zustande ist derselbe steinhart und eignet sich deshalb bei der außerordentlichen Trockenheit der Luft und den geringen Niederschlägen sehr gut zur Herstellung von Mauerwerken. Mit Wasser angefeuchtet wird der Löß aber ganz weich und läßt sich ebenso leicht verarbeiten wie gewöhnlicher Thon. Alle Ringmauern, sowohl Stadt- wie Garten- und Hofmauern, werden in Turkestan auf folgende Weise hergestellt. Zuerst wird an der zu erbauenden Mauer entlang ein entsprechend breiter und tiefer Graben ausgehoben, in denselben Wasser eingeleitet und die beim Ausheben des Grabens gewonnene Erde, vermischt mit Stroh, durch Treten mit den bloßen Füßen zu einem zähen Teige geknetet. Nachdem diese Masse ordentlich durchgearbeitet ist, wird sie mittels der beim Feldbau gebräuchlichen schweren Hauen einfach und ohne irgend welches Fundament auf der Erde aufgeschichtet und mit den Füßen festgestampft. Zuerst wird nur eine Schichte von etwa 0,6 m Höhe aufgetragen und so lange stehen gelassen, bis sie soweit ausgetrocknet ist, daß sie die Last einer neuen Schichte aushalten kann, ohne einzusinken. Dann wird eine zweite, ebenso hohe Schichte aufgetragen, und so fährt man fort, bis die Mauer die beabsichtigte Höhe erreicht hat. Die bei einer solchen Bauart entstehenden Unebenheiten an den Seiten der Mauern werden gewöhnlich dadurch entfernt, daß die einzelnen Schichten vor dem Auftragen einer neuen Schichte mittels der erwähnten Hauen geglättet werden. Die Hiebe werden dabei bei einer Schichte schräg von links

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

nach rechts, bei der folgenden von rechts nach links geführt u. s. f., wodurch die Mauern das in Bild 52 (S. 158) angedeutete zickzackförmige Aussehen erhalten.



Bild 51. Palast des Chans von Chiwa.

In Anbetracht des verwendeten Materials müssen die Mauern natürlich unten dicker sein als oben. Der obere Rand der Mauern wird ausgezackt,

was teils zur Zierde dienen teils auch die Schießscharten ersetzen soll. Auf der Innenseite der Stadtmauern läuft eine Plattform entlang, auf welcher die Verteidiger, eventuell auch Kanonen aufgestellt werden können und auf



Bild 52. Turkestanische Stadtmauer.

der man ohne Unterbrechung um die ganze Stadt herumgehen kann (Bild 53). Denn die Mauern werden ohne irgend welche Unterbrechung über Flüsse, Kanäle und Schluchten hinübergeführt. Zu dem Ende werden die Wasserläufe mit dicken Balken überbrückt und auf diesen die Mauern genau in derselben Weise aufgebaut wie auf festem Boden. Die Höhe der Stadtmauern ist je nach den Terrainverhältnissen, der Bedeutung des Ortes und der mehr oder weniger gefährdeten Lage verschieden. Die Mauern von Taschkent, welche zu den stärksten gehörten und zur Zeit meiner Ankunft, im Jahre 1874, noch erhalten waren, hatten eine Höhe von 4,5—6 m. Ihr Umfang betrug ungefähr 25 km. Die Häuser waren nicht an die Stadtmauer angebaut, sondern rings um die ganze Stadt lief innen an der Mauer eine breite Straße entlang, offenbar zur Erleichterung der Verteidigung. Die Gärten und Felder lagen fast alle außerhalb der Stadtmauer, waren aber ebenfalls alle von eigenen, gleichfalls aus Lehm hergestellten Ringmauern umgeben. Aus der eigentlichen Stadt führten zwölf Thore nach den Gärten und den benachbarten Ortschaften, welche meistens nach denjenigen Städten



Bild 53. Turkestanische Stadtmauer, Durchschnitt.

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benannt waren, nach welchen sie führten, wie z. B. das Kokanische Thor, Samarkander Thor 2c. Die Einrichtung der Stadtthore ist in Turkestan eine ganz eigentümliche. In eine Lößmauer Bresche zu schießen ist sehr schwer, weil dünne Mauern von den Kugeln einfach durchschlagen werden, ohne weiteren Schaden zu nehmen, an dicken Mauern aber die Kugeln abprallen. Beim Angriff auf eine turkestanische Stadt müssen deshalb immer die Thore gestürmt werden. Diese werden darum stets möglichst fest gebaut. Zu beiden Seiten des Thores werden sehr solide, mehr oder weniger konische, runde Türme aufgeführt und darauf Plattformen zur Aufstellung von Festungsgeschützen hergestellt (Bild 52 u. 54). Das mit massiven Thorflügeln versehene Thor führt in eine große, viereckige, hohe Halle, deren Boden etwa 2 m über den Weg erhoben ist. In dieser Halle, welche

Bild 54. Stadtthor von Chiwa.

jeder passieren muß, der durch das Thor eingeht, reitet oder fährt, ist die Thorwache placiert. Tagsüber sind die Thore beständig offen, nach Eintritt der Dunkelheit aber werden dieselben geschlossen und die Schlüssel dem zuständigen Polizeichef abgeliefert, um allenfallsige Überraschungen infolge von Nachlässigkeit oder Treulosigkeit der Thorwächter unmöglich zu machen. In den erwähnten Thorhallen nehmen in den noch unabhängigen Gebieten an Bazartagen häufig die Richter Platz, um jedem, der irgend ein Anliegen hat, sofort Recht zu sprechen. Die zudiktierten Strafen werden auch gleich in diesem selben Lokale vollzogen und eventuell die zum Hängen verurteilten Verbrecher an den Deckbalken aufgehängt, so daß die Besucher des Bazars unter den Gehenkten durchpassieren müssen. Als General v. Kauffmann die aufständische Stadt Kokan, welche gleich nach seinem Abzuge den von ihm eingesetzten Chan wie einen Hammel auf dem Bazare abgestochen hatte, zum

zweitenmal in seine Gewalt brachte, ließ er ebenfalls zum abschreckenden Beispiel die Rädelsführer gruppenweise an allen Thoren der Stadt aufhängen.

Für die Sicherheit ihrer Stadt hatten die Taschkenter nicht bloß durch die Erbauung einer verhältnismäßig sehr starken und für turkestanische Verhältnisse beinahe uneinnehmbaren Stadtmauer, sondern außerdem auch noch durch die Anlage einer Anzahl von Beobachtungsstationen außerhalb der Stadt gesorgt. Da bei den Turkestanern Kriegserklärungen nicht in Gebrauch waren und die Hauptkunst der turkestanischen Feldherren gerade in der Ausführung von plötzlichen und unerwarteten Überfällen mitten im Frieden bestand, so hatten die Taschkenter in der Steppe eine Anzahl künstlicher konischer Hügel von 12—15 m Höhe errichtet, auf denen eigene Posten aufgestellt wurden, welche die Annäherung des Feindes zu melden hatten. Diese Beobachtungshügel sind gewöhnlich paarweise vorhanden, liegen meistens in der ebenen Steppe, wo keine passenden natürlichen Bodenerhebungen vorhanden sind, und reichen auf dem Wege nach Ferganа, von woher Taschkent am häufigsten unerwarteten Überfällen ausgesetzt war, bis zur jetzigen Poststation Uralskaja, 70 km von Taschkent.

Gegenwärtig ist die Stadtmauer von Taschkent, da sie weiter keinen Zweck mehr hat, ganz in Verfall geraten und auf der Ostseite, wo die sartische Stadt an die russische stößt, ganz abgetragen, indem das Material der Mauer von Russen und Eingeborenen zum Ziegelschlagen verwendet wurde.

Wie alle turkestanischen Städte hatte Taschkent früher auch eine von einer eigenen Mauer umgebene Urda[1] oder Citadelle, welche von den Russen gleich nach der Einnahme der Stadt in die Luft gesprengt wurde. Dieselbe lag auf dem hohen linken Ufer des Boß-su-Kanals, welche Stelle gegenwärtig zur russischen Stadt gezogen und mit einer Kaserne und verschiedenen Staats- und Privatgebäuden überbaut ist.

2. Bazar. Der Bazar hat für den Zentralasiaten eine Bedeutung, von der sich ein Europäer schwerlich einen rechten Begriff machen kann. Auf dem Bazar verbringt der Zentralasiate den größten Teil seines Lebens, und der Bazar ersetzt ihm unsere Zeitungen, Gasthäuser, Kaffeehäuser, Rathäuser, Vergnügungsplätze, Börsen, Gerichtskammern u. dgl. Auf dem Bazar vollzieht sich das gesamte öffentliche und zum guten Teil auch das Privatleben der männlichen Stadtbevölkerung, und tagsüber ist im Winter und Sommer fast die ganze Bevölkerung, soweit sie nicht durch Feldarbeiten verhindert ist, auf dem Bazar versammelt (Bild 55). Der Bazar ist die eigentliche Heimat des Städters; seine Privatwohnung, auf die er deshalb auch nur verhältnis-

[1] In den von Tadschiken bewohnten Städten, wie z. B. in Chodschent und Samarkand, werden die Burgen mit dem Namen „Ark" bezeichnet, offenbar derselbe Stamm wie im lateinischen arx.

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mäßig wenig Sorgfalt verwendet, dient ihm hauptsächlich bloß als Nachtlager und als Aufbewahrungsort für sein Eigentum und seine Weiber und Kinder.



Bild 55. Bazarszene in Taschkent: Ein Mullah predigt auf offenem Marktplatz.

Die Einrichtung der Bazare ist überall die gleiche, und die Bazare der verschiedenen Städte unterscheiden sich voneinander nur durch ihre ver-

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schiedene Größe. Der Bazar von Taschkent ist einer der größten von ganz Zentralasien und enthält an 4000 Verkaufsläden und Werkstätten. Die Bazarstraßen sind verhältnismäßig breit und meist mit Schilfmatten überdacht, die auf quer über die Straßen von einer Budenreihe zur andern gelegten Balken ausgebreitet werden. Dadurch entsteht ein angenehmes Halbdunkel und eine erfrischende Kühle, die durch fortwährendes Begießen der Bazarstraßen mit Wasser noch erhöht wird: ein höchst wohlthuender Kontrast gegen das grelle Sonnenlicht und die erdrückende Backofenhitze der angrenzenden, durch die Häuserviertel führenden Straßen (Bild 56).

Die Buden, welche zu beiden Seiten der Bazarstraßen hinlaufen und, mögen sie nun als Verkaufsläden oder als Werkstätten für die verschiedenen Handwerker dienen, alle einander gleich sehen, haben nicht die mindeste Ähnlichkeit mit europäischen Verkaufsläden. Sie bestehen aus 2,5—3 m hohen, 4,5—6 m langen und 2—2,5 m tiefen Räumen, die nach der Straße zu ganz offen sind. Die Wände sind aus Lehm oder auch nur aus beiderseitig mit Lehm bestrichenen Schilfwänden hergestellt. Auch das Dach besteht nur aus Dachbalken, Schilf und Lehm. Der Boden dieser Buden ist gewöhnlich einige Fuß über den Straßenkörper erhoben, ebenso wie die schmalen an den Buden entlang laufenden Fußwege. Die Buden dienen ohne Unterschied entweder als Verkaufsläden für alle möglichen Waren oder als Werkstätten für alle möglichen Handwerker, da fast sämtliche Gewerbe öffentlich auf dem Bazar betrieben werden. Fenster oder Thüren giebt es in den Bazarbuden nicht, und die Händler und Handwerker hantieren das ganze Jahr über und bei jeder Witterung in diesen nur von drei Seiten geschlossenen Lokalen. Zur Nachtzeit werden die Läden entweder durch einen Bretterverschlag oder durch spanische Wände aus Schilfrohr verschlossen. Diejenigen Händler, welche nicht im stande sind, alle ihre Waren jeden Abend mit nach Hause zu nehmen, übernachten auch Winter und Sommer in ihren Verkaufsläden.

Händler und Handwerker sitzen bei ihren Verrichtungen auf dem mit Schilfmatten oder Filzdecken belegten Boden mit untergeschlagenen Beinen, entweder innerhalb der Buden oder auf dem an den Läden hinführenden Fußwege (Bild 57, S. 165). Auch die Käufer nehmen neben dem Verkäufer auf dem Boden Platz, wenn sie nicht der größeren Bequemlichkeit wegen vorziehen, die Auswahl der Waren vom Pferde aus vorzunehmen, in welchem Fall ihnen die Waren der Reihe nach zur Besichtigung aufs Pferd gereicht werden. Da im Winter das Sitzen auf dem durchweichten Boden natürlich nicht besonders angenehm ist, so befinden sich zur größeren Bequemlichkeit des Publikums vor besseren Verkaufsbuden, besonders aber vor den Theebuden und Garküchen, eigene hölzerne, mit Filzdecken oder Teppichen bedeckte

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Plattformen (Bild 58, S. 165), auf denen man mit untergeschlagenen Beinen Platz nehmen und den Handel in aller Gemütlichkeit abschließen kann.



Bild 56. Gebeckte Bazarstraße.

Eine Eigentümlichkeit der zentralasiatischen Bazare ist die strenge Absonderung der verschiedenen Gewerbe und der verschiedenen Warenbranchen

l: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

voneinander, welche dem kauflustigen Publikum das Aufsuchen und die Auswahl der nötigen Waren außerordentlich erleichtert. Eine Budenreihe ist z. B. ausschließlich von Kleiderhändlern besetzt, die nächste von Baumwollstoffhändlern, die dritte von Seidenhändlern; Pelze, Wäsche, Stiefel, Sättel, Metallwaren, Töpferwaren, Obst, Gemüse, Fleisch, kurzum alles, was überhaupt zu verkaufen ist, wird ausschließlich nur in einer bestimmten Budenreihe verkauft. Ebenso sind auch die Garköche alle in eine eigene Reihe verwiesen, wo sie direkt auf der Straße und vor aller Augen ihre Nationalspeisen: Plow, Pelmene, Schaschlyk und Lepjoschki, bereiten und durch angebranntes Schaffett und Kunschutöl weithin die Luft verpesten. Ebenso wie die Waren sind auch die Handwerke alle streng nach Kategorien geordnet. In einer Straße verursachen die Kessel- und Theekannenschmiede einen ohrbetäubenden Lärm; in einer andern Straße hantieren die Huf- und Nagelschmiede; Gold- und Silberarbeiter, Schuhmacher, Schneider, Kerzengießer, Färber, Drechsler, Sattler (vgl. Bild 57), Seidensticker 2c. nehmen alle je eine bestimmte Straße ein. Die Teilung nach Branchen beschränkt sich aber nicht bloß auf die allgemeine Einteilung, sondern sogar auf die einzelnen Läden. Jeder Händler führt in der Regel nur einen einzigen Artikel. In einem Laden findet man z. B. nur Pferdesättel, in einem andern nur Pferdegeschirre, in einem dritten nur Pelzmützen, in einem vierten nur Pelzröcke, in einem fünften nur Chalate 2c. Von den Schuhmachern verkaufen die einen ausschließlich Reitstiefel, die andern Galoschen mit Lederstrümpfen, die dritten nur zugeschnittenes Stiefelleder u. s. f. Ja sogar die zur Herstellung des Plow nötigen fein-geschnittenen gelben Rüben werden nicht vom Koch selbst zubereitet, sondern schon ganz fertig von eigenen Händlern geliefert, welche sich ausschließlich mit dem Zerschneiden und dem Verkaufe gelber Rüben beschäftigen.

Unter allen Bazarbuden erfreuen sich die Theebuden oder Tschai-Chanes des größten Zuspruches, und diejenigen von den Eingeborenen, denen es ihre Mittel erlauben, verbringen den größten Teil des Tages in den Tschai-Chanes mit Plaudern, Theetrinken, Rauchen und Schachspielen. Die Mehrzahl der Theebuden befindet sich rings um den Bazarplatz, da wo sich die verschiedenen durch die Budenreihen führenden Straßen kreuzen. In der Nähe der Theebuden befinden sich auch die Läden der Barbiere, soweit dieselben überhaupt einen eigenen Laden besitzen; die meisten Barbiere sind ambulant und üben ihr Geschäft einfach auf der Straße oder in den Theebuden aus.

Die an verschiedenen Stellen des Bazars errichteten Karawansarais[1] ersetzen in Zentralasien den Reisenden unsere Gasthäuser, welche es daselbst

[1] Nicht Karawanserei, wie im Deutschen gewöhnlich geschrieben wird, denn es ist aus den zwei Wörtern karawan = Karawane und sarai = Scheune zusammengesetzt.

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

nicht giebt. Die Karawansarais sind öffentliche Gebäude, welche zur zeitweiligen Aufnahme der reisenden Kaufleute samt ihren Waren, Pferden und Kamelen dienen. Sie bestehen aus einem geräumigen viereckigen Hofe, der

Bild 57. Gartische Gatter auf dem Taschkenter Bazar.

rings von ein- oder zweistöckigen Gebäuden umgeben ist, in denen sich die zur Aufnahme der Reisenden und ihrer Waren bestimmten Zimmer befinden. Es sind dies einfache, fensterlose, rauchgeschwärzte Gemächer mit Lehmböden ohne irgend welche Einrichtungsgegenstände, da in Zentralasien jeder Reisende alles Nötige, wie Betten, Fußteppiche, Trink- und Kochgeschirr, Theekannen u. dgl., mit sich führt; Tische und Stühle aber überhaupt unbekannt sind. Die Lasttiere werden mitten auf dem Hofe angebunden, auf welchem sich jedesmal ein Wasserbassin befindet. Die Reisenden erhalten in den Karawansarais nur Wasser und gegen entsprechende Bezahlung Futter für ihre Lasttiere; für den Aufenthalt selbst wird nichts bezahlt. Speisen



Bild 58. Hölzerne Plattform.

L. von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

werden nicht verabfolgt, und die Reisenden müssen sich solche entweder selbst bereiten oder vom Bazar holen lassen (Bild 59).

Das, was einen Europäer auf einem zentralasiatischen Bazar am unangenehmsten berührt, ist der fabelhafte Schmutz und der unausstehliche Gestank, der überall die Luft verpestet. Das Wasser, welches in unzähligen offenen Kanälen fast durch alle Straßen geleitet wird, erreicht, bis es den Bazar wieder verläßt, einen unglaublichen Grad von Unreinheit, so daß es geradezu stinkend wird. Aller Unrat fließt von den Straßen in die Kanäle, die Einwohner verrichten in denselben ihre unablässigen, vom Koran vorgeschriebenen Waschungen, Pferde und räudige Hunde baden in ihnen, und das Wasser derselben Kanäle wird nicht nur zum Begießen der Straßen, sondern auch zum Trinken und zur Bereitung der Speisen und des Thees verwendet, ohne auch nur oberflächlich filtriert zu werden. Die Fleischer schlachten ihr Vieh mitten auf der Straße und hängen das Fleisch an der offenen Seite ihrer Buden ebenso zur Schau aus, wie in andern Buden Kleider, Seidenstoffe und Gold- und Silbergeschmeide ausgestellt werden. Da hier das Fleisch bei der großen Hitze schon in kurzer Zeit zu faulen beginnt, um so mehr als es beständig von Fliegen und andern Insekten vollständig bedeckt ist, so kann man sich denken, was die Fleischerbuden für ein Aroma verbreiten. Dazu kommt dann noch der Rauch und Gestank der zahlreichen Garküchen und die Ausdünstung des allenthalben in den Straßen herumliegenden Pferde- und Kamelmistes, da alle Bazarstraßen von morgens bis abends von Reitern und Karawanen bedeckt sind, der Unrat aber von den Straßen nie entfernt wird.

3. Straßen (Bild 60, S. 169, Bild 61, S. 171 und Bild 62, S. 173). Man darf nicht etwa glauben, daß ein Spaziergang durch die Straßen einer zentralasiatischen Stadt ebenso angenehm und unterhaltend sei wie z. B. hier in München ein Gang durch die Maximilianstraße. Von Damen, der Hauptzierde einer europäischen Straße, sieht man dort keine Spur. Nur ein Eingeweihter weiß, daß unter den hie und da verstohlen durch die Straßen huschenden unförmlichen Überwürfen, unter denen nichts als ein Paar in ebenso unförmliche Stiefel und Galoschen gekleideter Füße zum Vorschein kommt, weibliche Wesen versteckt sind; ob aber diese Füße einer 18jährigen Schönheit oder einer 80jährigen Megäre gehören, weiß nur Allah allein. Was die zweite Zierde (?) des europäischen Straßenlebens, die Gigerl, betrifft, so giebt es solche in den Städten Zentralasiens allerdings ebenso gut wie in Europa; sie treiben sich aber dort nicht auf den Straßen, sondern auf dem Bazare und besonders in den Theebuden herum. Die zentralasiatischen Gigerl unterscheiden sich, und zwar nicht zu ihrem Nachteil, in einigen wesentlichen Punkten von ihren europäischen Kollegen. Während sich die europäischen Gigerl durch große Stöcke, kurze

Bild 50. Karawansarai in Buchara. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

Hosen und Röcke, hohe Krägen, kleine Hüte, absatzlose Schnabelschuhe und eine orangutanähnliche Haltung auszeichnen, sind ihre zentralasiatischen Kollegen an ihrer stolzen und verwegenen Haltung, ihren langen Stiefeln mit fabelhaft hohen und nur fingerdicken Absätzen, kurzen Chalaten, schief gesetzten Turbanen oder Hauskäppchen und den hinter ihre langen Ohren gesteckten Blumen kenntlich.

Von einer Pflasterung oder Makadamisierung ist natürlich bei turkestanischen Straßen keine Rede. Der Straßenkörper besteht einfach aus dem allgegenwärtigen Löß und ist deshalb im Sommer mit halbfußtiefem Staub, im Winter aber mit fußtiefem Schlamme bedeckt, der sich an den tiefer gelegenen Stellen in solchen Massen ansammelt, daß die Pferde bis an den Bauch einsinken und von einem Durchpassieren zu Fuß keine Rede mehr sein kann. Da die Straßen hauptsächlich von Reit- und Wagenpferden und von Kamelen passiert werden, die alle die Gewohnheit haben, immer in die Fußstapfen ihrer Vorgänger zu treten, so haben sich in den Straßen förmliche, quer über den Weg laufende Staffeln gebildet, welche lebhaft an einen Kartoffelacker erinnern. Daß das Fahren in einer solchen Straße mit Federwagen sehr unangenehm und für die Equipage selbst lebensgefährlich ist, kann man sich leicht vorstellen. Nur die einheimischen breitspurigen, zweirädrigen Wagen mit ihren ungeheuern Rädern sind im stande, diese holperigen Wege gefahrlos zu passieren.

Brücken werden selbst in den Städten nur über diejenigen der zahlreichen Bäche und Kanäle gebaut, deren Ufer zu hoch und steil sind, um einfach durchfahren oder -reiten zu können. Sonst überläßt man es den Passanten, durchs Wasser zu kommen, so gut sie es verstehen. Dies hat seinen Grund darin, daß in Turkestan jeder halbwegs anständige Mensch, Männer sowohl wie Frauen und Kinder, beritten ist, und daß nur die allerärmsten Bettler und Stromer zu Fuß gehen, um die es nicht schade ist, wenn sie im Winter mit bloßen Füßen durch das eiskalte Wasser und den knietiefen Schlamm waten müssen.

In Taschkent sind die Straßen in der sartischen Stadt bedeutend besser als in vielen andern zentralasiatischen Städten, aber doch sind auch hier die Zustände derart, daß unter anderem einmal in der Hauptstraße elf Frauen ertranken infolge des unglücklichen Zufalls, daß gerade beim Durchfahren durch eine unergründliche Pfütze ihr Wagen zerbrach und sie nicht im stande waren, sich aus dem zähen Schlamme herauszuarbeiten. Mehr als einmal habe ich mitangesehen, wie Reiter bis an die Brust in dem aufgeweichten Boden versanken, und einmal habe ich selbst in der Nähe des Bazars einem Knaben das Leben gerettet, der infolge des Stolperns seines Pferdes kopfüber in den metertiefen Schmutz gefallen war, so daß nur noch seine Beine daraus hervorragten. In letzterer Zeit sind, dank dem Eingreifen der russischen

l: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Administration, die Straßenverhältnisse bedeutend besser geworden, lassen aber noch immer viel zu wünschen übrig. Eine gründliche Abhilfe ist auch



Bild 80. Hauptstraße von Taschkent.

ohne ganz unverhältnismäßige Kosten nicht möglich, weil der jeden Winter grundlos werdende Lößboden das Pflastern und Makadamisieren außerordent-

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

lich erschwert, wie die Russen bei der Anlage der Straßen in ihrer Stadt genugsam erfahren haben.

Ein Hauptfehler der turkestanischen Straßen ist der, daß sie, mit Ausnahme der wenigen Hauptstraßen, so enge sind, daß zwei Wagen einander nicht ausweichen können und jedesmal eines von zwei sich begegnenden Fuhrwerken umkehren muß, bis es ihm gelingt, in eine Seitengasse auszuweichen. An Bazartagen entstehen aus dieser Veranlassung oft stundenlange allgemeine Verkehrsstockungen. Vierrädrige Wagen sind in solchen engen Gassen überhaupt nicht zu brauchen, weil man mit denselben nicht einmal umkehren kann. Dieser Mißstand hat offenbar seinen Grund darin, daß man mit dem Platz innerhalb der Stadtmauern sparsam umgehen mußte, um den Umfang der Stadtmauern nicht allzusehr vergrößern zu müssen. Denn die zentralasiatischen Städte haben ohnedies eine unverhältnismäßig große Ausdehnung infolge des Umstandes, daß alle Häuser nur aus Erdgeschossen bestehen und stets von mehr oder weniger geräumigen Höfen und selbst Gärten umgeben sind.

Sind die Straßen in den zentralasiatischen Städten schon infolge der angeführten Umstände trostlos genug, so wird das unvorteilhafte Aussehen derselben überdies noch dadurch wesentlich vermehrt, daß es an den Straßen keine Häuser, sondern nur einförmige, aus gelbem Lehm hergestellte Hofmauern giebt, deren endlose Eintönigkeit nur hie und da durch eine kleine Pforte unterbrochen wird, welche man eher für den Eingang in einen Schweinestall als in eine menschliche Wohnung halten möchte. Denn die Wohngebäude befinden sich alle auf den Höfen, und selbst der Einblick auf die Höfe beim Öffnen der auf die Straße führenden Thüren ist dadurch unmöglich gemacht, daß hinter jeder Thür eine eigene Vormauer angebracht ist. Die Höhe der Hofmauern, welche von beiden Seiten die Straßen einfassen, ist so berechnet, daß man auch beim Reiten auf Pferden oder Kamelen nicht darüber hinwegsehen kann; sie haben deshalb gewöhnlich eine Höhe von 3—3,5 m. Die Straßen, welche durch die Häuserviertel innerhalb der Stadtmauern führen, unterscheiden sich in nichts von den Straßen, welche sich zwischen den außerhalb der Ringmauern gelegenen Gärten und Feldern hinziehen, da diese von ganz gleichen Mauern eingefaßt sind wie die Wohnungen in der Stadt. Man kann deshalb bei der Ankunft in einer fremden Stadt nur aus dem Umstand, ob man das Stadtthor bereits passiert hat oder nicht, darauf schließen, ob man sich noch zwischen den Feldern und Gärten oder bereits zwischen den Häuserreihen befindet. In allen zentralasiatischen Städten sind die Straßen krumm und gehen fortwährend im Zickzack, da die Eingeborenen von einer regelrechten Anlage von Straßenzügen und einer vorläufigen Herstellung von Plänen bei der Aufführung von Häusern keine Idee haben. Nur die Hauptstraßen von Taschkent, welche

vom Bazar aus nach der Umgebung führen, zeigen einen Anflug von Regelmäßigkeit, wiewohl auch sie vielfache Ecken und Krümmungen aufweisen.

Die ungeheure Monotonie der Straßen des sartischen Taschkent wird nur hie und da unterbrochen durch eine Moschee oder Medresse, durch vereinzelte Grabmäler, welche sich mitten in der Stadt neben dem Wege befinden, durch die Hebungen und Senkungen des Bodens und durch die vielen, teilweise in tiefen Schluchten dahinfließenden Wasserläufe, von denen die ganze Stadt nach allen Richtungen durchschnitten wird. In dieser Beziehung macht Taschkent trotz allem einen viel besseren Eindruck als die

Bild 61. Straßenbild in Buchara. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

meisten übrigen Städte Turkestans, welche meistens in mehr oder weniger ebenem Terrain angelegt sind.

Was den Verkehr in den Straßen von Taschkent betrifft, so ist derselbe in den verschiedenen Stadtteilen sehr verschieden; während man in den Seitenstraßen nur hie und da einen vereinzelten Reiter oder Wanderer erblickt, sind die nach dem Bazar führenden Hauptstraßen, besonders an Bazartagen, den ganzen Tag über von endlosen Reihen von Kamel-, Pferde- und Eselkarawanen, von Wagen und von Reitern auf Pferden, Eseln und Kamelen besetzt, durch die es oft schwer ist sich mittels fleißiger Anwendung der Reitpeitsche hindurchzuarbeiten. Dieses Mittel wird nicht etwa bloß von den Russen, sondern in einem noch ausgedehnteren Maße von den Ein-

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

geborenen selbst zur Anwendung gebracht; denn in Turkestan hält sich jeder durch Rang oder Reichtum Hervorragende für berechtigt, sich den Vortritt vor weniger Begünstigten durch die ultima ratio der Nagaika zu erzwingen, was von den also Gemaßregelten ganz in der Ordnung gefunden und auch ihrerseits wieder gegen noch tiefer Stehende angewendet wird. Nachgiebigkeit gilt bei den Zentralasiaten für ein Zeichen der Schwäche, und man kann sich ihre Achtung durch nichts besser erwerben als durch Arroganz und brutale Anwendung der rohen Gewalt. Die Russen sind deshalb zur Beherrschung der Zentralasiaten wie geschaffen.

Zur Nachtzeit steht im sartischen Taschkent, wie auch in allen andern von Eingeborenen bewohnten Städten Turkestans, jeglicher Verkehr vollständig still. Die einheimische Polizei, welche für die Städte der Eingeborenen auch unter russischer Herrschaft beibehalten worden ist, hat zur größeren Erleichterung der Ausübung ihres Berufes ein für allemal die praktische Verfügung getroffen, daß ohne Ansehung der Person jeder, der nach Einbruch der Dunkelheit auf der Straße betroffen wird, als Übelthäter anzusehen und unnachsichtlich in Polizeigewahrsam zu bringen ist. Diese Einrichtung hat außerdem noch den wichtigen Vorzug, daß sie alle Auslagen für Straßenbeleuchtung überflüssig macht. Die Nachtruhe wird aber dadurch keineswegs wesentlich gefördert. Denn die zahlreichen Nachtwächter verursachen durch ihre Tamtams und hölzernen Klappern, zu deren unablässiger Handhabung sie zum Beweise der gewissenhaften Ausübung ihres Berufes dienstlich verpflichtet sind, in Verbindung mit dem ununterbrochenen Gekläffe der zahllosen herrenlosen Hunde, welche zur Nachtzeit allein die Straßen bevölkern und sich untereinander förmliche Schlachten liefern, einen solchen heillosen Lärm und Spektakel, daß ein Neuling ganze Nächte nicht im stande ist, ein Auge zuzumachen, besonders während der warmen Jahreszeit, wo man wegen der großen Hitze gezwungen ist, im Freien oder wenigstens bei offenen Fenstern zu schlafen.

4. Bevölkerung des sartischen Taschkent. Trotz der bedeutenden Ausdehnung der Stadt, welche mit Einschluß der Gärten ein ebenso großes Areal umfaßt wie Paris, beträgt die Einwohnerzahl des sartischen Taschkent doch nur ca. 125000. Die genauere Ziffer anzugeben ist nicht möglich, weil das Eindringen in die Familien behufs einer regelrechten Volkszählung durch die mohammedanischen Vorurteile der Einwohner unmöglich gemacht ist. Die russische Administration mußte sich darauf beschränken, die Anzahl der einzelnen Höfe zu konstatieren, welche von je einer Familie bewohnt werden und bei der Verteilung der Abgaben als Grundeinheit angenommen werden. Für jede Familie rechnet man gewöhnlich fünf Individuen, was der Wahrheit ziemlich nahe kommen dürfte.

Bild 62. Ansicht von Aulbiche. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Taschkent hat unter allen turkestanischen Städten die am meisten gemischte Bevölkerung, was in Anbetracht der Lage und der Geschichte der Stadt auch nicht anders zu erwarten ist. Denn alle mongolischen Völkerstämme, welche sich im Laufe der Zeiten aus der Dschungarei nach Turkestan ergossen haben, mußten die Gegend von Taschkent passieren und konnten erst nach Überwältigung dieser mächtigen Stadt weiter vordringen. In Taschkent haben sich deshalb die indogermanischen Ureinwohner fortwährend mit den Niederschlägen aller späteren Einwanderungen gemischt. Infolgedessen trifft man auch unter den Taschkentern alle möglichen Typen an.

Die Taschkenter bestehen zum weitaus größten Teil aus türkisch sprechenden Sarten, welche im großen Ganzen alle die früher auseinandergesetzten, den Sarten eigentümlichen physischen und moralischen Merkmale in hervorragendem Maße aufweisen, da Taschkent das eigentliche Zentrum des Verbreitungsgebietes der Sarten ist. Tadschiken giebt es nur wenige; diese sind meistens aus Chodschent und Fergana eingewandert und halten sich gewöhnlich in Taschkent nur zeitweilig als Händler oder Arbeiter auf. Außer den Sarten und Tadschiken giebt es in Taschkent auch noch je einige Hundert Tataren, Kirgisen und bucharische Juden, sowie vereinzelte Hindus, Afghanen, Perser, Chinesen ꝛc.

Das männliche Geschlecht überwiegt in Taschkent beträchtlich über das weibliche, offenbar eine Folge der Polygamie.

5. Politische und soziale Verhältnisse sonst und jetzt. Wie bereits früher erwähnt worden ist, gehörte Taschkent zur Zeit der Einnahme durch die Russen zum Chanat Kokan. Von den verschiedenen seit dem Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts entstandenen Usbeken-Chanaten hatten sich bis auf die neueste Zeit nur drei erhalten: Chiwa, Buchara und Kokan. Von diesen haben gegenwärtig nur noch die beiden ersten eine nominelle Selbständigkeit bewahrt, während das letztere seit 1876 Rußland einverleibt ist.

Die staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen waren in allen Usbeken-Chanaten die gleichen[1]. Die herrschende Klasse bildeten die Usbeken, aus denen die Herrscher hervorgegangen waren. Einen eigentlichen Adel gab und giebt es aber nicht. Nur die Brüder und Söhne des jeweiligen Chans erfreuen sich einer bevorzugten Stellung und führen den Titel Tjura oder „Herr", welcher von den Eingeborenen auch den russischen Beamten und Offizieren beigelegt wird. Dieser Titel wird, ebenso wie das kirgisische „Sultan", dem Personennamen nachgesetzt. Außerdem stehen nur noch die

[1] Auch das ephemere, von dem Sarten Jakub Bek im Tarymbecken errichtete Reich war in ganz ähnlicher Weise organisiert gewesen wie die Usbekenstaaten Buchara, Kokan, Chiwa, Kunduz ꝛc.

Mullas oder Gelehrten in Ansehen; diese verdanken aber ihre bevorzugte Stellung nur ihrer Gelehrsamkeit und nicht etwa ihrer Abstammung, da der Zutritt zu den Schulen jedermann ohne Rücksicht auf Herkunft offen steht. Alle andern Unterthanen, ganz gleich, ob Usbeken, Sarten oder Tadschiken, sind rechtlose Sklaven ihres Chans, der sie gewöhnlich alle mit der größten Willkür behandelt und heute einen Bettler und selbst einen ehemaligen Sklaven zur ersten Würde erheben und morgen wieder zum Bettler machen oder selbst ohne allen Grund hinrichten lassen kann. Die einflußreichen Persönlichkeiten und die hohen Würdenträger an den Höfen der Chane machen deshalb meistens im Laufe ihrer Carriere vielfache Wandlungen durch, von denen übrigens auch die Chane selbst nicht immer verschont bleiben. Der frühere kokanische Gesandte Mirsa-Hakim, der für den Verrat seines Vaterlandes und seines Chans später den Titel eines russischen Staatsrates erhielt, war früher Kleinkrämer gewesen. Der Chan von Chiwa, Kulman, war infolge einer Verschwörung vom Taglöhner zum Chan avanciert. Der frühere Beherrscher von Kaschgar, Jakub Bek, war aus der Hefe des Volkes hervorgegangen und war in seiner Jugend Batscha, d. i. öffentlicher Tänzer, gewesen. Der letzte Chan von Kokan, Chudojar, hatte sich nach seiner ersten Entthronung in Dschisak als Krämer etabliert und dabei so viel Geschmack am Handel gefunden, daß er denselben auch später, als er wieder auf den Thron gelangte, fortsetzte und einen großen Teil der Verkaufsbuden auf dem Bazar von Kokan sein eigen nannte, ja sogar es nicht unter seiner Würde erachtete, Musikbanden sowie Affen- und Bärenführer zu halten, die er für seine Rechnung auf den Jahrmärkten herumziehen und unaufgefordert in Privathäusern Vorstellungen geben ließ.

Da die Würde des Vaters, deren Verleihung lediglich von der Laune des Herrschers abhängt, nur in seltenen Fällen auf den Sohn übergeht, so genießen die Kinder der höchstgestellten Beamten häufig keine andere Erziehung als die Kinder der gewöhnlichen Bürger und laufen wie diese mit bloßen Füßen und halbnackt auf den Straßen herum. Während meines mehrwöchentlichen Aufenthaltes in Baisun im Jahre 1886, wo ich Gast des dortigen Beks oder Gouverneurs war, kamen jeden Tag die Söhne des Beks auf meinen Hof, um in Gesellschaft meiner Diener und Kosaken die Überreste von meiner Mahlzeit zu verzehren. Einen ehemaligen Bek oder Hofbeamten oder die Söhne von solchen als Trödler, Fuhrknecht und selbst als Taglöhner hantieren zu sehen, ist gar nichts Außergewöhnliches.

Wie unsicher und unbeständig die Gunst der Chane ist, kann man aus folgendem Fall ersehen. Bei dem vorigen Emir von Buchara, Mossafar-Eddin, der ein ebenso leidenschaftlicher wie mittelmäßiger Schachspieler war, stand zur Zeit meiner ersten Reise nach Buchara ein Bucharе, der als der beste Schachspieler galt, in großem Ansehen und wurde von demselben mit

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Ehren und Reichtümern überhäuft. Auf einer späteren Reise traf ich den erwähnten Günstling unter der Schar zerlumpten Gesindels, welches unser Quartier umdrängte, um vielleicht etwas von den uns aufgetischten Leckerbissen abzubekommen, wie es bei der Bewirtung von Gästen Usus ist. Als ich mich erkundigte, auf welche Weise er so tief gefallen sei, wurde mir folgendes mitgeteilt. Der Emir spielte einmal in seinem Beisein Schach mit einem seiner Beke und wandte sich, nachdem er in einer kritischen Lage nach langer Überlegung einen entscheidenden Zug gemacht hatte, selbstgefällig an ihn mit der Frage, ob er seinen Zug für einen guten halte. Er antwortete der Wahrheit gemäß, daß er den Zug für einen unglücklichen halten müsse, und daß er sich nicht getäuscht hatte, zeigte der Erfolg sofort, denn der Emir verlor das Spiel schon nach ein paar weiteren Zügen. Über diesen Freimut seines Schachbeirates sowie über den Verlust des Spieles war der Emir so erbittert, daß er ihn, wie er ging und stand, davonjagte und sein ganzes Vermögen einzog. Da dem vom Emir aufgegebenen Günstling natürlich auch alle jene den Rücken kehrten, welche bisher um seine Gunst gebuhlt hatten, so blieb dem unglücklichen Schach-Meister nichts übrig, als sich sein Brot zu erbetteln.

Die Willkür, mit welcher die zentralasiatischen Chane von jeher alle ihre Unterthanen ohne Ansehung der Person behandelten, wurde nur einigermaßen gemildert durch die beständige Furcht vor Empörungen und vor Meuchelmord. Der letzte Chan von Kokan, Chudojar, war von seinen Unterthanen dreimal aus dem Lande gejagt worden. Der Großvater des gegenwärtigen Emirs von Buchara, Nassr-Ulla, der auch schließlich durch seine Lieblingsfrau aus dem Wege geräumt wurde, lebte, nachdem er selbst alle seine Brüder ums Leben gebracht hatte, in beständiger Todesangst und ergriff umfangreiche Vorsichtsmaßregeln, um sich vor Giftmischern sicher zu stellen. Sein Trinkwasser mußte stets unter Aufsicht und unter Siegel von zwei Hofbeamten direkt aus dem Sarawschan geholt werden und mußte jedesmal erst vom Kuschbegi und dessen Bediensteten verkostet werden, ehe sich der Emir entschloß, dasselbe zu trinken. Die für den Emir bestimmten Speisen wurden nicht in seinem eigenen Harem, sondern im Harem und unter Aufsicht desselben Beamten bereitet. Von den fertigen Gerichten aß immer zuerst der Kuschbegi mit seinen Leuten, und erst wenn sich bei ihnen im Laufe einer Stunde keine Vergiftungssymptome einstellten, wurden die Speisen in einer verschlossenen und versiegelten Kiste an den Emir übersandt. Ebenso wurde mit den zum Tische des Emirs gelieferten Früchten verfahren. Seinen eigenen Söhnen traute Nassr-Ulla so wenig, daß er sie jedesmal zwang, die Hauptstadt zu verlassen, so oft er für den Sommer nach Samarkand übersiedelte, damit sie in seiner Abwesenheit nicht etwa einen Aufstand ins Werk setzen könnten.

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Politische und soziale Verhältnisse sonst und jetzt.

Was die Staatseinrichtungen in den zentralasiatischen Chanaten betrifft, so zeichnen sich dieselben durch eine weitgehende Dezentralisation aus. Verwaltungsbehörden, deren Wirkungskreis sich auf den ganzen Staat erstreckt, giebt es überhaupt nicht. Der Chan regiert direkt nur diejenige Stadt, in welcher er residiert; in dieser erhebt er die Steuern, ernennt die Verwaltungsbeamten und die Richter und entscheidet persönlich in den wichtigeren Streit- und Kriminalsachen. Die Verwaltung der übrigen zu dem betreffenden Chanate gehörigen Städte wird vom Chane Gouverneuren übertragen, die den Titel Bek führen und ihren Bezirk fast ganz selbständig verwalten. Die Beks ernennen in ihrem Rayon nach eigenem Gutdünken die Beamten und Richter, meistens aus der Zahl ihrer Verwandten, sammeln die Steuern ein und haben nur für ihren Bezirk an den Chan jährlich eine bestimmte Summe zu entrichten und im Falle eines Krieges mit der waffenfähigen Mannschaft ihres Bezirkes Heeresfolge zu leisten. Die Chanate bestehen also eigentlich aus einem losen Konglomerate von kleinen Staaten, die je aus einer größeren Stadt und den umliegenden Dörfern bestehen.

Diese Einrichtung hat ihren Grund in den örtlichen Verhältnissen. In Turkestan bestehen die einzelnen Staaten nicht aus einem zusammenhängenden Gebiete, sondern nur aus vereinzelten Oasen, die, oft Hunderte von Kilometern voneinander entfernt, über die endlosen Sandwüsten und Hungersteppen inselartig verstreut sind. Infolge der großen Entfernungen, der erschwerten Verbindung und der allgemeinen Unsicherheit in diesen schwach bevölkerten Gegenden ist es unmöglich, die weit entlegenen Oasen von einem Zentrum aus gehörig in Kontrolle zu halten, und es war deshalb notwendig, die Gouverneure mit größeren Machtbefugnissen für alle Fälle auszurüsten und ihnen alle Verantwortlichkeit für ihre Oase zu überlassen.

Die Stellung der Beks war in den zentralasiatischen Chanaten früher eine ganz ähnliche wie die der Satrapen im alten Perserreiche. Wie die Satrapen empörten sich die Beks häufig gegen ihren Herrn und oft mit Erfolg, und führten Kriege mit ihren Nachbarbeks, ohne sich um den Chan zu kümmern. Erst in neuester Zeit ist infolge des Einflusses der Russen in den noch bestehenden Chanaten die Macht der Chane gegenüber ihren Beks so gestiegen, daß diese ihre frühere Unabhängigkeit zum größten Teil eingebüßt haben und zu bloßen Beamten herabgesunken sind. Besonders hat das Beispiel der zwei Städte Schaar und Kitab zur Herbeiführung dieser Veränderung im Verhältnis der Beks zu den Chanen beigetragen. Die Beks dieser Städte hatten sich ebenfalls gemeinsam gegen den bucharischen Emir empört und ihre Unabhängigkeit jahrelang gegen alle Anfechtungen von seiten des Emirs behauptet, waren aber zuletzt von den Russen zu Gunsten des Emirs besiegt und gefangen genommen und auf russischem Gebiet interniert worden, und seitdem denkt kein Bek mehr daran, sich gegen seinen Herrn aufzulehnen.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Aus den oben angeführten Gründen giebt es in Turkestan auch keine eigentlichen Ländernamen, und jeder Staat führt den Namen nach der wichtigsten aller zu einem politischen Ganzen vereinigten Oasen. So war Kokan derjenige Staat, in dem die Oase Kokan die wichtigste und deshalb der Sitz des Chans war. Buchara hat seinen Namen von der Residenzstadt Buchara und Chiwa von der Stadt Chiwa. Der Name Turkestan selbst war ursprünglich nur ein Städtenamen und ist von der unbedeutenden Stadt Turkestan auf das ganze, hauptsächlich von türkischen Völkern bewohnte, Gebiet von Zentralasien übertragen worden[1]. Die Staatennamen Buchara, Chiwa und Kokan, sowie der Ländername Turkestan, werden aber wohlgemerkt nur von den Europäern gebraucht; die Eingeborenen Turkestans verstehen unter den erwähnten Namen auch heutzutage noch nur die betreffenden Städte.

Dasselbe Verhältnis bestand aus den gleichen Gründen auch schon im Altertum, weshalb auch die Geschichtschreiber der Feldzüge Alexanders die Städtenamen Baktra und Sogdiana zugleich auch zur Bezeichnung der betreffenden Landschaften benützten: ein Umstand, der später mannigfache Irrtümer in Bezug auf die Geographie des Altertums zur Folge hatte. (Vgl. meine Monographie „Alexanders d. Gr. Feldzüge in Turkestan", München 1893.)

Was die Hofhaltung der zentralasiatischen Chane betrifft, so war dieselbe ebenfalls in allen Chanaten auf ganz gleiche Weise eingerichtet. Der Hofstaat des Chans von Kokan bestand, ähnlich wie dies in Buchara (Bild 63) und Chiwa noch gegenwärtig der Fall ist, aus folgenden Würdenträgern:

I. Hofbeamte.

1. Kusch-Begi oder Großfalkonier, der Stellvertreter des Chans für den Fall seiner Abwesenheit aus der Hauptstadt,
2. Diwan-Begi oder Kanzler,
3. Taksaba oder Mundschenk,
4. Mirachur oder Stallmeister,
5. Karaul-Begi oder Chef der Leibwache,
6. Mirsa-Baschi oder Oberschreiber.

II. Militärchargen.

1. Atalyk oder Höchstkommandierender,
2. Parmanatschi oder General,
3. Datcha oder Oberst,
4. Min-Baschi oder Chef von 1000 Mann,
5. Pansat-Baschi oder Chef von 500 Mann,
6. Yus-Baschi oder Hauptmann.

[1] Auf ganz ähnliche Weise hat auch das heutige Sibirien seinen Namen erhalten, indem die Russen den Namen der Hauptstadt der sibirischen Tataren, Sibir, auf das damals wahrscheinlich namenlose Land übertrugen.

L. von Schwarz RLI Soviet Central Asia

Bild 68. Die höchsten bucharischen Würdenträger; rechts unten der Höchstkommandierende der Truppen.
(Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Außer diesen höchsten Rangklassen gab es noch eine zahllose Menge von niedern Hofbeamten: Astrologen, Schreiber, Polizisten, Köche, Pferdeknechte, Gaukler, Komödianten 2c., deren Hauptaufgabe darin bestand, den ganzen Tag auf dem Hofe der Residenz herumzulungern und im Falle eines feierlichen Empfanges in Goldbrokat gekleidet und mit Amtsstäben in den Händen Spalier zu bilden, und so durch ihre Anzahl und den Reichtum ihrer Kleidung das Ansehen ihres Herrn zu erhöhen. Denn in Turkestan wird der Rang und das Ansehen eines Mannes nur nach der Zahl seiner Diener bemessen. Es giebt deshalb in Turkestan niemand, der, mag er in der Gesellschaft auch einen noch so tiefen Rang einnehmen, nicht für nötig hielte, sich mit einer aus noch tiefer stehenden Individuen bestehenden Suite zu umgeben. Ich hatte einmal in Taschkent als Pferdejungen einen zehnjährigen Sartenknaben gemietet, den ich zerlumpt und halb verhungert auf der Straße aufgelesen hatte. Als ich denselben einst auf den Bazar schickte, um fünf Pfund Zucker zu holen, erschien er in Begleitung von zwei andern Gassenjungen, die ihm je ein Paket Zucker nachtragen mußten, da er als Bediensteter eines „Tjura" es unter seiner Würde hielt, die Pakete selbst zu tragen.

Aus den angegebenen Gründen ist es in Turkestan für einen Höhergestellten unmöglich, ohne einen unverhältnismäßig großen Schwarm von Begleitern zu reisen. Denn die Dolmetscher, Bedienten, Führer und Pferdeknechte, welche man selbst mietet, halten es für unumgänglich notwendig, ihrerseits zu ihrer eigenen Bedienung und Bequemlichkeit und zur Erhöhung ihres Ansehens eigene Reitknechte mitzunehmen, die wo möglich ihrerseits wieder Pferdejungen engagieren, nur um möglichst viel Staat zu machen, so daß man schließlich einen Troß von fünfzig und mehr Menschen mit noch mehr Pferden mitzuschleppen und zu beköstigen hat.

Die Höfe der verschiedenen Beks (Bild 64) sind im kleinen dasselbe, was der Hof des Chans im großen ist, und es findet sich an denselben eine ähnliche, wenn auch entsprechend weniger zahlreiche Beamtenhierarchie, wie am Hofe des Chans. Der wichtigste Mann am Hofe eines Beks ist stets der Diwan-Begi, welcher während der Abwesenheit seines Herrn als dessen Stellvertreter fungiert und auch sonst die meisten Obliegenheiten des Beks versieht. Denn die Beks, die meistens Usbeken sind und sich aus den Verwandten und Günstlingen des Chans rekrutieren, sind in der Regel Leute ohne alle Kenntnisse und ohne irgend welche wissenschaftliche Vorbildung, und sie verwalten ihre Bezirke ungefähr in derselben Weise, wie seinerzeit Sancho Pansa seine Insel zu „regieren" gedachte. In denjenigen Bekschaften, welche, wie besonders in den schwach bevölkerten Gebirgsgegenden, ein ausgedehnteres Gebiet umfassen, bestellt der Bek für die einzelnen von ihm abhängigen auswärtigen Städte und Dörfer wieder eigene Chefs.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

meistens aus der Zahl seiner Verwandten, welche nur ihm verantwortlich sind und den Titel Amlsjakdar führen.

Die Verwaltung der Beks beschränkt sich hauptsächlich auf die Gerichtsbarkeit und das Eintreiben der Steuern. Die gewöhnlichen Streitsachen werden von den von den Beks ernannten Kasis geschlichtet. Wichtigere Angelegenheiten dagegen sowie Kriminalfälle werden vom Bek selbst oder von dessen Diwan-Begi abgeurteilt.

Bild 64. Chiwanische Beks. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

An Steuern wurden im Chanat Kokan vor der russischen Herrschaft folgende erhoben:

1. Cheradsch oder Feldsteuer; diese wurde in natura erhoben.

2. Tanapna, eine in Geld erhobene Abgabe von den Frucht- und Gemüsegärten.

3. Sjaket, eine Handelssteuer, welche von den verkauften Waren oder von dem auf dem Bazare verkauften Vieh erhoben wurde.

4. Bazarsteuer für das Recht, auf dem Bazar Handel zu treiben.

5. Wagesteuer, eine Abgabe, welche die Pächter der Stadtwagen zu entrichten hatten.

6. Salzsteuer.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Eigentümlich ist in Turkestan die Art und Weise, wie die Beks ihren Tribut an den Chan zu entrichten haben. Derselbe wird nämlich nicht in Geld, sondern in Gestalt von Geschenken dargebracht. In Buchara ist z. B. dafür folgender Modus im Gebrauche. Zweimal im Jahre, im Frühjahr und im Herbst, müssen sich alle Beks mit einem ihrem Range entsprechenden Gefolge beim Hoflager des Emirs einfinden und demselben Geschenke bringen, deren Art und Zahl durch das Hofzeremoniell genau vorgeschrieben ist, deren Wert aber den Einkünften ihres Bezirkes zu entsprechen hat. Diese Geschenke bestehen aus folgenden Gegenständen:

1. Aus 86 Pferden mit seidenen und samtenen, gold- und silbergestickten Schabracken und mit silberbeschlagenem, mit Türkisen und andern Halbedelsteinen besetzten Geschirre.

2. Aus ebenso vielen Chalaten oder Feierkleidern, von denen je eine bestimmte Anzahl aus Kaschmirstoff, Goldbrokat, Samt, Atlas, Tuch, Seide und Halbseide zu bestehen hat.

3. Aus einer Anzahl unverarbeiteter Seidenstoffe.

4. Aus einigen türkisbesetzten Gürteln.

5. Aus einer bestimmten Geldsumme in Gold- und Silbermünzen.

Bei ihrem Erscheinen bei Hofe, sowie bei ihrem Abgange von dort, erhalten aber auch die Beks vom Emir Gegengeschenke, die gleichfalls aus Geld, Seidenstoffen, Gürteln, Feierkleidern und prachtvoll aufgezäumten Pferden bestehen, und deren Wert und Zahl nach dem Rang des Empfängers, sowie nach dem größeren oder geringeren Wohlwollen des Emirs berechnet ist.

Außer diesen regelmäßigen Leistungen haben die Beks im Falle der Durchreise oder des zeitweiligen Aufenthaltes des Emirs in ihrem Bezirke denselben samt seiner Suite und der ihn stets begleitenden Armee für die ganze Zeit seiner Anwesenheit zu verpflegen und ihm sowohl wie seinen Hofbeamten bei seiner Ankunft und abermals bei seiner Abreise die üblichen Geschenke darzubringen. Der bucharische Emir verbringt den ganzen Sommer mit seinem gesamten Hofstaat und seiner Leibgarde jedesmal in den drei Städten Karschi, Schaar und Kitab, und lebt diese ganze Zeit auf Kosten der betreffenden Beks, wobei er die Dauer seines Aufenthaltes in jeder der drei Städte genau nach dem Reichtum und der Leistungsfähigkeit der einzelnen Städte berechnet. Diese Wanderungen unternimmt der Emir teils der Gesundheit wegen, weil in Buchara während der warmen Jahreszeit infolge des Wassermangels der Aufenthalt sehr gesundheitsschädlich ist, teils auch zur Entlastung seiner Hauptstadt, welche ihn während der Wintermonate verpflegen muß. Vor der Eroberung Samarkands durch die Russen war diese Stadt die Sommerresidenz des Emirs gewesen. Ein ganz ähnliches Verhältnis hatte bekanntlich auch schon im alten Perserreiche zwischen dem König und den Satrapen bestanden. Daraus geht hervor, daß die gegen-

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

wärtig in Turkestan herrschenden Verhältnisse nicht von den mongolischen Usbeken eingeführt worden sind, sondern noch aus den Zeiten der alten Baktrier und Sogdianer oder aus der indogermanischen Urzeit stammen, wo Turkestan noch ausschließlich von Indogermanen bewohnt war.

In denjenigen Städten, wo sich beständige Besatzungen von Truppen des Chans befinden, hat dieselben ebenfalls der betreffende Bek zu verpflegen.

Die erwähnten, jährlich zweimal sich wiederholenden Fahrten an das Hoflager des Emirs oder Chans sind die einzige Schattenseite in dem sonst beneidenswerten Dasein der Beks. Denn kein Bek weiß, wenn er sich auf den Weg macht, ob er seine Stadt und die Seinen wieder sehen wird. Da seine ganze Macht und Existenz nur von der häufig wechselnden Laune des Chans, dieser aber von den Einflüsterungen seiner Günstlinge abhängig ist, so kostet es einen solchen Günstling oft nur ein Wort, um den mächtigsten Bek zu stürzen, und die Verhältnisse sind an den Höfen der zentralasiatischen Chane ganz genau dieselben, wie sie in der Bibel in der Geschichte Davids und im Buche Esther so wahr und anschaulich geschildert werden. Während meiner ersten Reise nach Hissar im Jahre 1875 waren in dem Dorfe Derbent keine Vorbereitungen für unsern Empfang getroffen worden — wie sich später herausstellte, infolge des Umstandes, daß der Bek von Baisun, zu dessen Bezirk Derbent gehörte, die betreffende Mitteilung nicht rechtzeitig erhalten hatte, weil er eben verreist war. Als der Hofbeamte, der uns vom Emir als Reisemarschall beigegeben worden war, dies brieflich dem Emir mitteilte und dieser deshalb auf den betreffenden Bek erbittert war, benützte einer der Hofbeamten diese günstige Gelegenheit, um die Stelle des Beks einem seiner Verwandten zu verschaffen, und teilte dem Emir mit, daß der Bek von Baisun überhaupt ein schlechter Kerl sei, denn unter den Geschenken, die er dem Emir dargebracht hätte, hätte sich ein zerrissener Chalat befunden. Darüber war der Emir so empört, daß er, ohne die Sache näher zu untersuchen und dem wahrscheinlich unschuldigen Angeklagten Gelegenheit zur Verteidigung zu geben, den Bek sofort seines Amtes enthob und mehrere Tage unschlüssig war, ob er denselben nicht auch noch aufhängen lassen sollte. Die Beks sind deshalb gezwungen, den Hofbeamten und Günstlingen des Chans fortwährend reiche Geschenke zu machen und zu dem Ende ihre Unterthanen bis aufs Blut auszusaugen, um im Falle der Not beim Chan Fürsprecher zu haben. Daß beim Tode eines Chans jedesmal ein allgemeiner Wechsel in der gesamten Verwaltung eintritt, ist unter den angedeuteten Verhältnissen selbstverständlich. Während meiner letzten Dienstreise im Jahre 1886 fand ich in ganz Buchara, mit alleiniger Ausnahme der von den Brüdern des Emirs besetzten Stellen, durchaus ganz neue Persönlichkeiten in Amt und Würden. Alle Beks aus der Zeit des erst kurz vorher verstorbenen Emirs Mossafar-Eddin waren

samt ihren zahlreichen Beamten und Günstlingen spurlos verschwunden, indem sie von Massafars Sohn und Nachfolger zum Teil einfach entlassen, zum Teil auch hingerichtet worden waren.

Wie die Steuern zum größten Teil in natura erhoben werden, so erhalten auch die Beamten, sowohl die vom Emir als die von den Beks eingesetzten, und die sonstigen Bediensteten bis herab zum letzten Stalljungen, ihren Gehalt in natura ausbezahlt. Derselbe besteht in einer bestimmten Anzahl von Kleidern und einem festgesetzten Quantum Gerste und Weizen, welches ihnen jedesmal zur Erntezeit zugeteilt wird. Diese Gehälter sind im allgemeinen sehr gering und bilden nur einen minimalen Teil des wirklichen Einkommens der Beamten und des Dienstpersonals. Die Haupteinkünfte derselben bestehen in zufälligen Geschenken und in dem, was sie vom Volke auf Grund ihres größeren oder geringeren Einflusses beim Emir, beim Bek und den höheren Beamten zu erpressen verstehen. Denn das gesamte Verwaltungssystem beruht in den turkestanischen Chanaten ausschließlich auf Bestechung und Günstlingswirtschaft, und die Köche und Wasserpfeifenträger haben deshalb oft mehr Einfluß und folglich auch mehr Einkünfte als die Beamten.

Die Macht der Chane beruhte in den Usbekenchanaten hauptsächlich auf Mietstruppen, die sich aus allen möglichen Völkerschaften und Volksklassen rekrutierten. Besonders waren bis zur Aufhebung der Sklaverei durch die Russen die von den Turkmenen eingehandelten persischen Sklaven als Soldaten beliebt, welche, dank ihrer natürlichen Begabung, meistens die höchsten Offiziersstellen einnahmen. Auch durchgebrannte russische Kosaken verirrten sich zuweilen unter die Truppen der zentralasiatischen Chane und spielten dann dort eine hervorragende Rolle. So war der Höchstkommandierende der bucharischen Armee zur Zeit der Eroberung Samarkands durch die Russen ein aus Sibirien entflohener Kosaken-Urjadnik (Unteroffizier), der die regulären Truppen des Emirs einexerziert und bei denselben das russische Kommando eingeführt hatte, welches bei den Bucharen auch jetzt noch in Gebrauch ist. Dieser ehemalige Kosak führte in Buchara ein höchst wechselvolles Leben und machte fast jede Woche seine Carriere von neuem durch. Gewöhnlich betrank er sich am Sonntag und verübte dann irgend einen großartigen Exzeß, wofür er am Montag zum Gemeinen degradiert wurde. Am Dienstag avancierte er dann wieder zum Offizier und brachte es bis zum Freitag oder Samstag gewöhnlich wieder bis zum Höchstkommandierenden, um dann in der nächsten Woche seine Carriere abermals von neuem zu beginnen. Als er nach seiner Niederlage bei Samarkand dem Emir begreiflich machen wollte, daß es unmöglich sei, den Kampf gegen die weit überlegenen Russen fortzusetzen, ließ ihm dieser für seinen Mangel an Patriotismus den Hals abschneiden und übernahm das Kommando in eigener Person, ohne aber bekanntlich mehr Glück zu haben.

l: von Schwarz RLJ Soviet Central Asia

Die erwähnten Mietstruppen, welche als Sarbasen bezeichnet werden, bestanden und bestehen in Buchara noch jetzt aus Infanterie und Artillerie



Bild 65. Die ehemalige reguläre Armee von Kokan.

(Bild 65, Bild 66 S. 187, u. 67 S. 189). Die Uniform der Sarbasen besteht aus schwarzen, hohen Schaffellmützen, ähnlich den turkmenischen, aus

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schwerfälligen Lederstiefeln, roten Chalaten oder Jacken mit stehendem Kragen und aus gelben weiten Lederhosen, die über Chalat und Stiefel angezogen werden. Auf Grazie können derartig uniformierte Soldaten keinen Anspruch machen; denn durch die in die Hosen zusammengebauschten Chalate wird ihr Leibesumfang, besonders aber an der Rückseite, derartig vergrößert, daß sie lebhaft an die kirgisischen Fettschwanzschafe erinnern. Die Artilleristen haben blaue Röcke mit roten Kragen. Offiziere und Unteroffiziere tragen außerdem noch lange Tuchkaftane von roter, blauer oder grüner Farbe, je nach der Waffengattung, und lange, krumme Säbel, und schmücken sich außerdem mit allen möglichen Arten von ausrangierten russischen Offiziersepauletten und Beamtenachselklappen, die sie von russischen Offizieren und Beamten als Geschenk erhalten oder von jüdischen Trödlern einhandeln. Die Bewaffnung der Infanterie besteht in Gewehren von allen möglichen Formen und Kalibern, angefangen von den kurzen, massiven und sich an der Mündung des Laufes erweiternden Feuerrohren aus der Zeit der Entdeckung Amerikas bis herab auf die doppelläufigen Jagdgewehre unserer Tage. Seit neuester Zeit besitzt die bucharische Armee auch eine Anzahl Berdangewehre, die dem Emir vom Kaiser von Rußland gelegentlich der Kaiserkrönung zum Geschenk gemacht worden waren. Die Kanonen sind größtenteils Vorderlader eigenen Fabrikats. Auf dem Marsche werden die Sarbasen, da die Zentralasiaten alle nur schlechte Fußgänger sind, auf den gewöhnlichen einheimischen, zweirädrigen Wagen transportiert. Die Sarbasen, Infanterie sowohl wie Artillerie, haben nur im Kampfe mit den Eingeborenen einigen Wert, sind aber gegenüber europäischen Truppen ohne alle Bedeutung.

Im Fall eines Krieges wurde in Kokan und Buchara außer den Sarbasen meistens auch noch die ganze übrige waffenfähige Mannschaft aufgeboten. Diese ganz ungeübte und undisziplinierte Miliz bestand ausschließlich aus Reiterei und war in der mannigfaltigsten Weise mit Lanzen, mit schwerfälligen Säbeln, mit Flintstein- und Luntengewehren, mit messingbeschlagenen Stöcken, mit Schleudern und Bogen oder auch nur mit Nagaiken bewaffnet[1] und hatte ungefähr denselben taktischen Wert wie seiner Zeit die ungeheuern Heere des Darius im Kampfe mit der makedonischen Phalanx Alexanders (Bild 68, S. 191; vgl. auch Bild 152). Ein ehemaliger kokanischer Offizier erzählte mir, daß in den Kämpfen zwischen Kokan und Buchara die beiderseitigen Armeen mitunter über 100 000 Mann stark waren. Die Schlachten, welche sich diese formidabeln Heere gegenseitig lieferten, verliefen aber immer ziemlich unblutig. Nachdem beiderseitig auf große Distanzen die ersten Schüsse gewechselt waren, wandte sich immer die eine der streitenden Parteien sofort

[1] Im letzten kokanischen Kriege (1876) traten den Russen noch Kämpfer mit Visierhelmen und mit eisernen Panzerhemden entgegen.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Bild 66. Bucharische Infanterie. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

l: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

zur Flucht, ohne daß jemand im stande gewesen wäre, zu ergründen, warum gerade diese und nicht die andere Partei davonlief [1]. Es war also von seiten der Russen ganz rationell, daß sie bei ihren Kämpfen in Zentralasien sich nur auf ihre eigenen, wenn auch noch so diminutiven Kräfte verließen und auf die ihnen wiederholt angebotene Unterstützung durch bucharische, kirgisische und anderweitige einheimische Hilfstruppen großmütig verzichteten.

Daß derartige Armeen nicht im stande sind, eine wenn auch noch so oberflächlich befestigte Stadt im Sturm zu nehmen, brauche ich wohl nicht erst ausdrücklich hervorzuheben. Daher kommt es, daß in Turkestan nicht nur die größeren Städte, sondern selbst Dörfer und einzelnstehende Gehöfte befestigt sind. Der bucharische Emir führte seiner Zeit mit seiner ganzen Heeresmacht jahrelang erfolglos Krieg gegen die beiden aufständischen Städte Schaar und Kitab und konnte denselben weiter nichts anhaben, als daß er Jahr für Jahr durch seine Reiterei die außerhalb der Mauern liegenden Getreidefelder seiner Feinde niederreiten ließ, während die Russen, die damals unter Tschernajews Führung selbst in einer keineswegs musterhaften Verfassung waren, Taschkent, die größte und am stärksten befestigte Stadt von ganz Zentralasien, mit nur zwei Bataillonen eroberten.

Wer die Schilderungen Homers über die Kämpfe der Griechen und Trojaner verstehen will, braucht nur das Kriegswesen der heutigen Bewohner Turkestans zu studieren, denn dort ist die Kriegführung unter den Eingeborenen noch genau dieselbe, wie sie Homer schildert. Wie bei Homer findet sich auch in den Armeen der heutigen Zentralasiaten nur der eine oder

[1] Sehr bezeichnend für den Grad der Tapferkeit der eingeborenen turkestanischen Krieger ist folgender Fall. Zur Zeit als die Russen mit dem bucharischen Emir im Kriege lagen und der am weitesten vorgeschobene Posten der Russen noch die Stadt Dschisak war, reiste ein russischer Artillerieoffizier ganz allein von Taschkent nach Dschisak, wohin er soeben versetzt worden war. Als er bei mondheller Nacht in einer gewöhnlichen Posttarantasse über die Wüste von Dschisak fuhr, wurde er plötzlich von einer Abteilung bucharischer Kavallerie umzingelt, die eine wütende Jagd auf ihn eröffnete. Da an Widerstand natürlich nicht zu denken war, so verfiel der Offizier auf folgende Kriegslist. Er band seine große russische Theemaschine, die er zufällig bei sich hatte, oben auf die Tarantasse, und als die Verfolger schon ganz nahe waren, ließ er plötzlich die Pferde anhalten und erteilte mit weithin vernehmlicher Stimme den Befehl, das Geschütz zum Feuern fertig zu machen. Die Bucharen, welche die Kommandoworte wohl verstanden, da in der von russischen Flüchtlingen organisierten bucharischen Armee das Kommando russisch war und noch ist, und deshalb das im Mondschein weithin blinkende Ding auf dem Wagen für nichts anderes als ein Kanonenrohr halten konnten, stoben nach allen Seiten auseinander, und der Offizier benützte diesen Moment, um sofort seine Flucht mit erneuten Kräften fortzusetzen. Als sich seine Verfolger von ihrem Schrecken erholt hatten und sich wieder an die Jagd machten, wiederholte er von Zeit zu Zeit das gleiche Manöver, immer mit gleichem Erfolge, und gelangte so, dank seiner improvisierten Kanone, wohlbehalten nach Dschisak.

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

andere Tapfere à la Achilles, Hektor, Ajax ꝛc., welche den Kampf eigentlich allein ausfechten, während die übrigen Krieger bei der ganzen Affaire nur unthätige Zuschauer bleiben und nur im Falle der Niederlage ihrer Vorkämpfer die Flucht ergreifen und sich ruhig abschlachten lassen wie eine Herde Schafe. Auch die langen Zwiegespräche der homerischen Helden, bevor sie sich gegenseitig den Hals brachen, sind gar nicht so unwahrscheinlich, wie man gewöhnlich annimmt, weil eben die homerischen Kämpfe keine allgemeinen Schlachten, sondern nur Einzelkämpfe der Vorkämpfer waren[1].

Bild 67. Bucharische Artillerie. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

Für die Aufrechthaltung der Ruhe und Ordnung in den Städten Turkestans sorgt eine eigene Polizei, welche aus einem Polizeimeister oder

[1] Echt homerische Scenen spielten sich auch noch in den Kämpfen der Russen gegen die Eingeborenen ab. Ich will statt vieler nur einen Fall erzählen, der mir von verschiedenen Augenzeugen mitgeteilt worden ist. Während der Eroberung des Chanats Kokan wurde einmal eine russische Heeresabteilung von einer Übermacht von Kiptschaken umringt und von der in unmittelbarer Nähe stehenden Hauptmacht vollständig abgeschnitten. Da die Lage der Eingeschlossenen sehr kritisch war, so erklärte der kommandierende General, daß der Überbringer einer Depesche an die Hauptarmee den Georgsorden und eine hohe Geldbelohnung erhalten würde; es fand

Kur-Baschi und einer Anzahl Polizeidiener oder Mirschabs besteht. Trotz der primitiven Einrichtung der Polizei und des gänzlichen Mangels einer Straßenbeleuchtung ist in den von den Eingeborenen bewohnten Städten Turkestans die Sicherheit eine viel größere als in den russischen Städten, trotzdem in diesen Straßenbeleuchtung eingeführt, die Polizei auf europäische Weise organisiert und außerdem noch durch ein zahlloses Heer von Nachtwächtern verstärkt ist. Dies hat seinen Grund in dem summarischen und rücksichtslosen Vorgehen der einheimischen Polizisten und in der bereits erwähnten eigentümlichen Einrichtung, daß für die ganze Zeit vom Abend- bis zum Morgengebet aller Verkehr auf den Straßen verboten ist und jeder, der sich nach Einbruch der Dunkelheit aus irgend einem Grunde auf der Straße blicken läßt, arretiert wird. Liebhaber von nächtlichen Abenteuern, Diebe und sonstige Malefikanten haben deshalb einen schweren Stand. Die Ausführung ihrer bösen Absichten wird diesen Leuten nur dadurch einigermaßen erleichtert, daß die Polizisten und Nachtwächter verpflichtet sind, die ganze Nacht über in kurzen Zwischenräumen Tamtams, Trommeln und eigene hölzerne Klappern zu handhaben, einesteils um den Übelthätern Furcht einzujagen, anderenteils um zu beweisen, daß sie sich auf ihrem Posten befinden und nicht etwa eingeschlafen sind, da man sich auf die Ehrlichkeit und Gewissenhaftigkeit der Polizisten und Nachtwächter ebensowenig verlassen kann wie auf die anderer Leute. Diejenigen, welche nächtlicherweile auf verbotenen Wegen wandeln, können sich deshalb in den meisten Fällen ziemlich genau über den jeweiligen Aufenthaltsort der Sicherheitsorgane orientieren und danach ihre Maßregeln treffen. Bei der Sternwarte in Taschkent, welche

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sich aber unter den offiziellen Meldereitern, obwohl es lauter verwegene Kerle waren, keiner, der Lust gehabt hätte, das augenscheinlich Unmögliche zu wagen und den verlockenden Preis zu verdienen. Da erbot sich der russische Kaufmann Gromow, ein Mann von riesiger Körperkraft, der die Truppen als Volontär begleitete, die Depesche zu überbringen. Er nahm in jede Hand einen geladenen Revolver und sprengte, den blanken Säbel zwischen den Zähnen, mit verhängtem Zügel direkt auf den dichtgedrängten Haufen der Kiptschaken los, indem er ununterbrochen aus seinen beiden Revolvern nach rechts und links in die Reiterscharen hineinfeuerte. Die Kiptschaken, obwohl viel tapferer als die Sarten und Tadschiken, wurden über diesen unerwarteten Angriff eines einzigen Mannes gegen eine ganze Armee so perplex, daß sie ihre Reihen öffneten und Gromow passieren ließen. Nur einer suchte ihm den Weg zu verlegen und warf sich mit hochgeschwungenem Säbel auf ihn. Gromow, der bereits alle seine Patronen verschossen hatte, parierte den Säbelhieb mit seiner wuchtigen karatagischen Klinge und führte dann einen solchen Streich nach dem Kopfe seines Gegners, daß er ihm den Turban entzwei hieb und die ganze vordere Hälfte des Kopfes samt Gesicht und prächtigem Vollbart so glatt wegrasierte, daß sie weithin in den Sand flog. Auf dies hin stoben alle auseinander, und Gromow erreichte ungefährdet die Hauptarmee, zur größten Verwunderung der eingeschlossenen Russen, vor deren Augen sich die ganze Scene abgespielt hatte.

l: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

ringsum von einer hohen Mauer umgeben und bei der außerdem noch für jedes einzelne Gebäude ein eigener Nachtwächter aufgestellt ist, kam deshalb einmal das Kuriosum vor, daß einem der Nachtwächter selbst, während er in Ausübung seines Berufes lustig darauf los klapperte, seine eigene Wohnung, die innerhalb des von ihm bewachten Rayons lag, vollständig ausgeräumt wurde.

Als Vertreter der Bevölkerung der Städte und Dörfer gegenüber den Regierungsbehörden fungieren eigene, von der Bevölkerung selbst gewählte Älteste, welche als Aksakale oder „Graubärte" bezeichnet werden und eine



Bild 68. Zentralasiatische Waffen.
(Nach H. Moser, Durch Zentral-Asien. Leipzig 1886, F. A. Brockhaus.)

ganz ähnliche Rolle spielen wie in Europa die Bürgermeister. Das sartische Taschkent zerfällt in vier Bezirke oder Jurten, in deren jedem ein eigener Aksakal aufgestellt ist. Diese Bezirke, welche die Namen Scha-i-chan-taur, Bisch-Agatsch, Sibsor und Koktschi führen, zerfallen wieder in eine größere Anzahl Viertel oder Mahalas, von denen jedes wieder seinen eigenen Namen hat. Der Bezirk Scha-i-chan-taur, der den nordöstlichen Stadtteil umfaßt, zerfällt in 48 Viertel; der Bezirk Bisch-Agatsch, der an die russische Stadt grenzende Stadtteil, in 32 Viertel; der nordwestliche Stadtteil bildet den Sibsor-Bezirk mit 38 Vierteln, und der südwestliche den Koktschi-Bezirk mit 31 Vierteln. Seit der Unterwerfung unter die russische Herrschaft bildet

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

die Stadt Taschkent in administrativer Beziehung einen selbständigen Bestandteil der Syr-Darja-Provinz, welche außerdem noch die Bezirke von Kasalinsk, Perowsk, Amu-Darja, Aulie-Ata, Tschimkent und den Kurama- oder Landbezirk von Taschkent umfaßt. Taschkent steht gegenwärtig unter einem russischen Stadthauptmann mit Oberstenrang, dem zwei Gehilfen beigegeben sind: einer für den russischen Stadtteil, der andere, der aus der Zahl der Eingeborenen ernannt wird, für die asiatische Stadt. In Bezug auf die innere Einrichtung des sartischen Taschkent haben die Russen fast gar nichts geändert. Wie früher wählen die Eingeborenen ihre Aksakale und Kasis selbst, zahlen dieselben Abgaben wie früher, nur in bedeutend vermindertem Maßstabe, und auch ihre polizeilichen Einrichtungen bestehen unverändert fort: nur mit der Beschränkung, daß Russen, welche nächtlicherweile die Straßen der sartischen Stadt passieren, nicht festgenommen werden dürfen. Durch dieses Entgegenkommen erreichten die Russen einen doppelten Vorteil. Erstens fühlen sich die Eingeborenen dadurch geschmeichelt, daß man ihre althergebrachten Einrichtungen nicht angetastet hat; zweitens ersparen die Russen die Ausgaben für Straßenbeleuchtung, für Polizei, für eigene Gerichtskammern u. dgl.; zugleich erreichten sie dadurch auch eine viel größere Sicherheit, als wenn sie die Sache selbst in die Hand genommen hätten, weil die Eingeborenen sich natürlich alle Mühe geben, das in sie gesetzte Vertrauen zu rechtfertigen, um nicht etwa infolge eines Mißbrauches die ihnen bisher gewährten Vorrechte einzubüßen.

Wie die übrigen Eingeborenen Turkestans werden auch die Taschkenter zum Militärdienste nicht herangezogen, gemäß einer eigenen Stipulation gelegentlich der Übergabe der Stadt. Übrigens würden die Russen auch ohne eine solche Abmachung wahrscheinlich auf die Kriegsdienste derselben verzichtet haben, weil die ansässige Bevölkerung Turkestans doch nur Soldaten von sehr zweifelhaftem Werte abgeben würde und zu Fußtruppen überhaupt nicht zu brauchen wäre.

6. Familienverhältnisse. Die Familienverhältnisse sind bei der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans, wenigstens nach unsern Begriffen, äußerst traurige, und ein Familienleben in unserem Sinn ist ganz undenkbar. Die Sarten, Tadschiken und ansässigen Usbeken leben als Mohammedaner in Polygamie, ebenso wie die mohammedanischen Nomaden. Den Luxus von mehreren Frauen können sich aber nur die Reicheren erlauben, weil auch bei ihnen an die Eltern der Braut ein Kalym zu entrichten ist, der in der Regel in einer bestimmten Summe Geldes besteht. Ärmere begnügen sich gewöhnlich mit einer oder, wenn's hoch kommt, mit zwei Frauen. Viele sind überhaupt nicht im stande, sich eine Frau anzuschaffen, weil, abgesehen von der Vielweiberei der Reicheren, die Anzahl der weiblichen Individuen

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

schon an und für sich bedeutend geringer ist als die der Männer. Es giebt deshalb in Turkestan keine alten Jungfern, dafür aber desto mehr unfreiwillige Hagestolze.

Die Mädchen, welche sich nicht etwa nach ihrem eigenen Gutdünken verheiraten dürfen, sondern von den Eltern ohne Rücksicht auf ihre persönlichen Neigungen vergeben werden, heiraten schon sehr früh, mitunter schon mit zehn Jahren, gehören aber dafür mit zwanzig Jahren meistens auch schon zu den alten Weibern. Die Frau ist vollständig die Sklavin ihres Mannes, der sie je nach Laune gut oder schlecht kleidet und nährt, und ohne Rücksicht auf seine Vermögensverhältnisse und seine bürgerliche Stellung die eine seiner Frauen in Lumpen gehen läßt und sie zu den niedrigsten Arbeiten verwendet, während er die andere in Gold und Seide kleidet. Ist die Lage einer derartig zurückgesetzten Frau schon an und für sich keine beneidenswerte, so wird dieselbe noch dadurch verschlimmert, daß sie mitansehen muß, wie ihre Kinder den Kindern der Lieblingsfrau in allem nachstehen und sich von denselben jedwede Behandlung gefallen lassen müssen. Nur diejenigen Frauen, welche aus besseren Familien stammen, können sich durch ihre Familienverbindungen eine bessere Behandlung von seiten ihres Mannes erzwingen und im Falle von Mißhandlung ihren Mann durch Richterspruch veranlassen, sich von ihnen zu scheiden. Alle andern Frauen sind dagegen schutzlos der Willkür ihres Mannes preisgegeben, der sich jederzeit ohne Angabe der Gründe und aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit von ihnen scheiden oder sich neben ihnen jüngere Frauen nehmen kann, wenn ihm die älteren nicht mehr gefallen.

Der wichtigste Umstand, der in den turkestanischen Städten das gesamte öffentliche Leben zu einem unerträglich eintönigen und langweiligen macht und auch ein eigentliches Gesellschafts- und Familienleben nicht aufkommen läßt, ist die vollständige, mehr als klösterliche Abschließung der Frauen von der Männerwelt. Auf der Straße dürfen die Frauen entweder gar nicht oder nur so tief verschleiert erscheinen, daß von ihrer Figur überhaupt nichts zu sehen ist. Zu Hause aber müssen sie eine eigene Abteilung bewohnen, welche außer ihren Männern und Kindern nie ein männliches Wesen betreten darf. Ja nicht einmal der Bräutigam darf seine Braut vor der Hochzeit sehen, und selbst noch während der Trauung befinden sich Braut und Bräutigam in zwei verschiedenen Lokalen, so daß sich die Männer bei der Wahl ihrer Frauen lediglich auf die Berichte ihrer weiblichen Verwandten oder gewerbsmäßiger Heiratsvermittlerinnen verlassen müssen. Quiproquos, wie sie seiner Zeit dem Patriarchen Jakob von seinem Schwiegervater Laban gespielt wurden, sind deshalb leicht möglich. Die Frauen können ihr ganzes Leben lang außer ihren Männern höchstens noch mit ihren Brüdern und Eltern verkehren, alle andern Männer sind für sie so

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

gut wie gar nicht vorhanden. An keiner öffentlichen Festlichkeit, ja nicht einmal an Familienfesten oder am Empfange von Gästen in ihrem eigenen Hause können die Frauen teilnehmen. Ein freudloseres Dasein als das Leben der einheimischen Frauen in den Städten Zentralasiens kann man sich deshalb schwerlich vorstellen [1].

Aber auch das Leben der Männer ist im allgemeinen, dank der strengen Trennung der beiden Geschlechter, ein keineswegs beneidenswertes. Ein Mann ohne Familie bekommt überhaupt in seinem Leben nie ein weibliches Wesen zu Gesicht und ist ausschließlich auf den Umgang mit Männern angewiesen. Die Folge dieser unnatürlichen Verhältnisse ist eine unglaubliche moralische Verkommenheit und ein geradezu schreckenerregendes Überhandnehmen aller möglichen unnatürlichen Laster.

Auch die verheirateten Männer verkehren verhältnismäßig nur wenig mit ihren Frauen und ziehen es vor, ihre Zeit im Umgang mit Männern totzuschlagen und den ganzen Tag auf dem Bazar herumzulungern, soweit sie nicht durch Feldarbeit, Handelsgeschäfte oder irgend ein Handwerk in Anspruch genommen sind. Dies hat seinen Grund in dem gänzlichen Mangel an Bildung bei allen Frauen, selbst der bestgestellten Familien: gleichfalls eine Folge der Abschließung des weiblichen Geschlechts, welche die Erlangung einer höheren Bildung auf Schulen für Frauen unmöglich macht. Die Frauen sind deshalb nicht im stande, Gefährtinnen und Gesellschafterinnen ihrer Männer im besseren Sinne zu sein.

Wie langweilig, ja geradezu unerträglich sich infolge der geschilderten Verhältnisse das gesamte Leben in den nur von Eingeborenen bewohnten Städten gestaltet, davon kann sich nur derjenige einen Begriff machen, der einmal durch sein Unglück auf längere oder kürzere Zeit in eine solche Stadt verschlagen worden ist. Besonders deprimierend wirkt ein solches Leben, wie ich aus eigener Erfahrung bestätigen kann, auf Europäer, welche an weiblichen Umgang und an europäische Gesellschaftsformen gewöhnt sind. Für Europäer kann ein längerer Aufenthalt in rein mohammedanischen Städten geradezu verhängnisvoll werden, und mir sind wiederholt Fälle bekannt geworden, daß ein mehrjähriges Leben in einer ausschließlich mohammedanischen Umgebung die Betreffenden zu Selbstmord oder Wahnsinn geführt hat.

Ein Gutes hat für die Frauen in den Städten und Dörfern Turkestans ihre strenge Absonderung und Klausur zur Folge: daß sie weniger zu schweren Arbeiten herangezogen werden, als dies bei den Kirgisen der Fall ist, und daß sie mit Feld- und Gartenarbeiten und mit schwereren Handwerksarbeiten verschont bleiben. Die Hauptaufgabe der Sarten- und

[1] Ich will hier bemerken, daß in Turkestan das Institut von Eunuchen unbekannt ist. Auch bei den Harems der Chane giebt es keine Eunuchen.

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Tadschikenfrauen besteht in der Pflege und Erziehung ihrer Kinder, dem Bereiten der Speisen, dem Anfertigen und Waschen der Kleider, dem Spinnen von Garn und Weben von Kleiderstoffen für den Hausgebrauch u. dgl.; besonders die Seidenzucht liegt ganz in den Händen der Frauen. Alle Arbeiten, welche öffentlich und im Freien zu verrichten sind, wie Feld- und Gartenbau, Handwerke, Handelsgeschäfte, Viehzucht, werden ausschließlich von Männern besorgt, ganz anders, als dies bei den Nomaden der Brauch ist. Alle häuslichen Arbeiten aber werden selbst bei den höchstgestellten Würdenträgern und den Chanen von den Frauen verrichtet, da es weibliche Dienstboten nicht giebt, wohl aber männliche. Es ist gar nichts Außergewöhnliches, daß die Frauen der höchsten Beamten, ja selbst der Chane, die Produkte ihrer Hausindustrie, wie gestickte Hauskäppchen, Gürtel, Täschchen u. dgl., auf den Bazar zum Verkauf schicken, um sich so eine kleine Nebeneinnahme zu verschaffen.

7. Religion. Die ansässige Bevölkerung Turkestans bekennt sich, ebenso wie die Kirgisen, zum sunnitischen Mohammedanismus. Aber während die Kirgisen eigentlich nur dem Namen nach Mohammedaner sind, zeichneten sich die Ansässigen, besonders die ansässigen Usbeken, von jeher durch großen Fanatismus aus, und sie dürften in dieser Beziehung wohl unter allen Bekennern des Islam den ersten Rang einnehmen. Dieser Fanatismus wurde hauptsächlich von den sogen. Reis, Duwanas und Ischanen genährt, von denen die ersteren gegenwärtig in den russischen Besitzungen abgeschafft sind. Die Reis waren von der Regierung aufgestellte Beamte, deren Hauptaufgabe darin bestand, über die strenge Erfüllung der Vorschriften des Koran zu wachen und die Lauen und Gleichgültigen zu bestrafen. Sie waren zu dem Ende mit einer riesigen, aus einem breiten, dicken Lederstreifen und einer hölzernen Handhabe bestehenden Peitsche ausgerüstet, mit der sie diejenigen, die sich systematisch dem Besuche der Moscheen entzogen, zum Gebete zusammentrieben und nebenbei auch die Kaufleute auf den Bazaren, welche sich Übervorteilungen des Publikums durch falsches Maß oder Gewicht zu Schulden kommen ließen, unbarmherzig durchpeitschten. Auch die Handhabung der Sittenpolizei war den Reis übertragen, und die in flagranti ertappten Übelthäter wurden von ihnen in einer wirklich barbarischen Weise abgestraft. Da die Reis ebenso bestechlich waren wie alle andern Beamten, so wurden von denselben in der Regel nur diejenigen zur Verantwortung gezogen, welche nicht die Mittel besaßen, sich loszukaufen, und die Amtsthätigkeit der Reis stellte sich deshalb eher als ein wohlorganisiertes Erpressungssystem dar. Weil nun die Russen natürlich kein besonderes Interesse daran hatten, den gegen alle Andersgläubigen gerichteten Fanatismus der Bevölkerung ihrer zentralasiatischen Besitzungen zu nähren, so hoben sie in den ihrer Herrschaft unterworfenen Gebieten das Amt der Reis auf, und dieses besteht gegenwärtig nur noch in den unabhängigen Chanaten fort.

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Die Duwanas sind in Turkestan dasselbe, was in andern mohammedanischen Ländern die Derwische oder Kalentars sind. Die Duwanas leben gewöhnlich in klösterlicher Gemeinschaft und im Cölibat, es giebt aber auch verheiratete Duwanas. Ihre Zahl ist ziemlich groß; auf jedem Bazar und jedem Jahrmarkte trifft man ganze Scharen von singenden und schreienden Duwanas, welche das Publikum förmlich brandschatzen. Der Einfluß und das Ansehen derselben beim Volk ist sehr groß, was für mich stets ein Rätsel geblieben ist, denn ein gemeineres, unverschämteres und widerlicheres Pack als die Duwanas kann man sich schwerlich vorstellen. Die Duwanas rekrutieren sich hauptsächlich aus arbeitsscheuem Gesindel, welches vorzieht, auf Kosten des dummgläubigen Volkes zu leben, statt sich seinen Lebensunterhalt durch ehrliche Arbeit zu verdienen. Sie sind deshalb auch in Bezug auf Lebenswandel keineswegs Muster für das gewöhnliche Volk, sondern nehmen im Gegenteil so ziemlich die tiefste Stufe ein, welche ein Mensch in Bezug auf moralische Verkommenheit überhaupt erreichen kann. Sie sind dem Genusse von Opium, Nascha oder Haschisch und allen möglichen unnatürlichen Lastern so sehr ergeben, daß sich die Folgen ihrer Ausschweifungen in der Regel schon in ihrem vertierten und idiotischen Gesichtsausdruck ausprägen, weshalb auch das Wort Duwana in Turkestan gleichbedeutend ist mit Idiot. Dabei sind sie, natürlich nur aus Spekulation, große Fanatiker und entflammen durch ihre öffentlich

Bild 43. Duwanas (mohammedanische Bettelmönche).

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auf den Straßen und Bazaren abgehaltenen Brandreden das gemeine Volk zu gleichem Fanatismus und zum blinden Hasse gegen alle Andersgläubigen. In den russischen Besitzungen ist deshalb auch den Duwanas das Halten von öffentlichen Predigten verboten worden. Die Duwanas befassen sich weder mit wissenschaftlichen noch mit irgendwelchen sonstigen Arbeiten und leben ausschließlich von Almosen, die sie in marktschreierischer Weise und mit der größten Unverschämtheit einsammeln oder vielmehr eintreiben. Von Dankbarkeit für eine empfangene Gabe ist bei ihnen keine Rede, da sie im Gegenteil dem Geber eine Wohlthat zu erweisen glauben, [illegible] sie von ihm ein Almosen annehmen und ihm so Gelegenheit geben, ein Gott wohlgefä[illegible]es Werk zu verrichten.

Von der äußeren Erscheinung der Duwanas kann man sich nach Bild [illegible]9, auf dem zwei typische Exemplare dieser würdigen Sippschaft dargestellt [illegible]d, einen ungefähren Begriff machen. Das Charakteristischeste an dem Kostüm eines Duwana ist die unverhältnismäßig große, hohe, konische Mütze aus Teppichstoff, welche sie Winter und Sommer tragen und welche die eigentliche Uniform der Duwanas bildet, da solche Mützen sonst von niemand getragen werden. Zum Einsammeln von Almosen tragen sie am Arm oder Gürtel einen hohlen, horizontal entzwei geschnittenen Mantelsack-Kürbis. Der obere Teil des Kürbis, der mit dem größeren unteren Teil mittels eines Strickes ganz in derselben Weise verbunden ist wie die Deckel an den Weihrauchfässern in den katholischen und orthodoxen Kirchen, bildet den Deckel dieser eigentümlichen Almosenbüchse. In der linken Hand tragen die Duwanas zwei kurze, gedrechselte, mittels eines eisernen Ringes verbundene Stäbe, durch deren Gerassel sie die Aufmerksamkeit des Publikums auf sich zu lenken suchen. Ihre Ausrüstung vervollständigt ein langer, massiver Stock, der oft mit verschiedenen, gleichfalls zum Rasseln bestimmten Metallstücken behangen ist. Das ganze übrige Kostüm der Duwanas besteht aus einem mittels eines Strickes zusammengehaltenen Chalat, der mit Hunderten von Flicken aller möglichen Farben, Formen und Größen besetzt ist, von dem unzählige, oft künstlich angesetzte Fetzen und Teile des Unterfutters herunterhängen und durch dessen handgroße Löcher stellenweise der bloße Körper zu sehen ist, so daß im Vergleich mit einem zentralasiatischen Duwana Antisthenes und sein Schüler Diogenes als die reinsten Gigerl erschienen wären. Diese bis zur Indecenz [illegible] und zerfetzten Chalats gehören gleichfalls zur Uniform der Duwanas; denn ich habe bei näherem Zusehen öfters bemerkt, daß auch in den Fällen, wenn ein Duwana einen neuen Chalat trug, derselbe über und über mit absichtlich angenähten Fetzen behangen war, damit er den Schein der Schadhaftigkeit erwecken sollte. Hemden und sonstige Wäsche fehlen bei den Duwanas meistens ganz. [illegible]e Füße bleiben Winter und Sommer entweder ganz bloß oder sie tragen

ungeheuer schwerfällige Pantoffel von der Art der berühmten Pantoffel des Bagdader Kaufmanns Kasem, die seiner Zeit ihrem Herrn so viele Prügel und sonstiges Ungemach eintrugen.

Eine ganz andere Rolle als die Duwanas spielen die Ischane, deren Zahl viel geringer ist als die der Duwanas, und welche von manchen Reisenden irrtümlicherweise für mohammedanische Geistliche gehalten worden sind. Eigentliche Geistliche, in der Art der christlichen, giebt es bekanntlich bei den Mohammedanern überhaupt nicht. Die Mullas sind nichts weiter als Schriftgelehrte und Vorbeter in den Moscheen, welche Funktion jeder beliebige Mohammedaner ausüben kann, ohne dazu einer höheren Autorisation zu bedürfen. Die Ischane sind Leute, welche, ebenso wie die Duwanas, ein Parasitenleben auf Kosten der Gläubigen ehrlicher Arbeit vorziehen, dabei aber zu stolz und vornehm sind, um sich den Duwanas anzuschließen. Es sind meistens Leute, welche einst bessere Tage gesehen, ihr Vermögen aber auf diese oder jene Weise durchgebracht haben. Sie nehmen für sich das Monopol besonderer Frömmigkeit und Heiligkeit in Anspruch, etablieren sich bei irgend einer Moschee oder dem Grabmal eines angeblichen Heiligen und verbringen ihre freie Zeit, eine Art Rosenkranz in der Hand, in äußerlichem Gebete, wobei sie mit Vorliebe ihren Standpunkt so wählen, daß sie von jedermann gesehen werden können. Da die Ischane vor lauter Beten natürlich keine Zeit zur Erwerbung ihres Lebensunterhaltes finden, so tragen ihre Glaubensgenossen dafür Sorge, daß es ihnen an nichts gebricht, weil sie sich durch die Unterstützung solcher gotterleuchteter Männer eine Staffel in den Himmel zu bauen glauben. Die Ischane führen deshalb ein angenehmes und sorgloses Leben, kleiden sich in die feinsten Stoffe von irgend einer auffallenden, besonders roten oder weißen Farbe, und halten sich Diener und Pferde. Bei allen Festlichkeiten und Schmausereien wird ihnen der erste Platz angewiesen, und bei den gemeinsamen Gebeten wird ihnen das Ehrenamt des Vorbeters eingeräumt.

Einer bevorzugten Stellung erfreuen sich bei den Mohammedanern Zentralasiens auch noch alle diejenigen, welche eine Wallfahrt zum Grabe des Propheten nach Mekka gemacht haben. Dieselben führen auch hier den Titel Hadschi und haben das Vorrecht, weiße Chalate tragen zu dürfen. Die Zahl der Mekkapilger ist in Turkestan verhältnismäßig gering infolge der großen Entfernung und der Schwierigkeit der Kommunikation. Gewöhnlich nehmen die Mekkapilger ihren Weg über Afghanistan und Indien, und sie brauchen zu dieser Reise, auf der durch Cholera und andere Krankheiten sowie infolge der Beschwerden und Entbehrungen und räuberischer Überfälle stets ein großer Teil umkommt, meistens ein bis zwei Jahre. Seit neuerer Zeit wählen die Bemittelteren den bequemeren Weg über Rußland und durch das Schwarze und Mittelländische Meer.

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Die angeblichen Nachkommen Mohammeds, die gleichfalls eine bevorzugte Stellung genießen, werden in Turkestan als Chodschas bezeichnet.

Bild 70. Die Gur-Emir-Moschee mit dem Grabe Tamerlans zu Samarkand.

Diese sind ziemlich zahlreich, verheiraten sich wo möglich nur untereinander und bilden so eine Art geistlicher Aristokratie. Man trifft die Chodschas in

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

allen möglichen Lebensstellungen, als Mullas (Bild 81, S. 225), Kaufleute, Handwerker und Bauern. Sie dürften wohl in Wirklichkeit die Nachkommen der arabischen Eroberer sein.

Außer den zufälligen Gaben, welche den Duwanas, Ischanen und sonstigen religiösen Parasiten von den Gläubigen zufließen, ist für den Unterhalt derselben auch noch durch eine große Anzahl von frommen Stiftungen gesorgt, welche als Wakuf bezeichnet werden. Unter Wakuf versteht man in den mohammedanischen Ländern alles Eigentum der toten Hand, welches teils von gottesfürchtigen Fürsten, teils von reichen Privatpersonen zum



Bild 71. Hazret-Moschee in der Stadt Turkestan.

Unterhalte von [illegible]en, Medresses, Klöstern, Bädern, Aussätzigenhäusern, Brunnen und von armen Gelehrten und Studenten u. dgl. gestiftet worden ist. Das Wakuf-Vermögen besteht teils in Ländereien, teils in Gebäuden, Bazarbuden, Karawansarais, Mühlen 2c., und wird von eigenen Beamten, den Mutewals, verwaltet, welche auch für die Verwendung der Einkünfte der verschiedenen Stiftungen, entsprechend den Intentionen der Stifter, zu sorgen haben. Die Wakuf-Stiftungen sind von allen Steuern und Abgaben befreit. Wenn man bedenkt, daß in Turkestan, abgesehen von den fortwährenden zufälligen Leistungen an die Duwanas, Ischane und Mullas in Gestalt von Almosen und Geschenken, ein Dritteil des gesamten Grundbesitzes und sonstigen Nationalvermögens dem Wakuf verfallen ist, so kann

man sich leicht ausrechnen, ein wie großer Prozentsatz der ganzen Bevölkerung aus Mullas, Duwanas und Ischanen besteht, welche ausschließlich auf Kosten der arbeitenden Klassen leben, die auch noch alle Staatsausgaben allein zu bestreiten haben. In den russischen Besitzungen Zentralasiens haben die Verwaltung der Wakuf-Güter die russischen Behörden in die Hand genommen, verwenden aber die Einkünfte in der hergebrachten Weise zu Kultuszwecken.

Trotz der Opferfreudigkeit für religiöse Zwecke, welche die zentralasiatischen Mohammedaner allenthalben an den Tag legen, besteht die Religio-



Bild 72. Maxim-Moschee zu Taschkent.

sität derselben eigentlich nur in Äußerlichkeiten, in Almosengeben und in der möglichst strikten Befolgung aller sonstigen vom Koran vorgeschriebenen äußerlichen Religionsübungen, gerade wie seiner Zeit bei den jüdischen Pharisäern. Pünktlich verrichten sie ihre unablässigen Waschungen vor jedem Gebete, vor und nach jeder Mahlzeit, nach jeder Verrichtung eines natürlichen Bedürfnisses, wenn nötig selbst mitten auf der Straße, und nie habe ich gesehen, daß ein Mohammedaner sein Morgen- oder Abendgebet versäumt hätte. Selbst auf der Reise, im ärgsten Unwetter und im größten Schmutze knieen sie mitten auf dem Wege nieder und verrichten zur Zeit des Sonnen-

aufgangs und Sonnenuntergangs ihr Gebet, ohne sich um irgend jemand zu kümmern. Selbst wenn sie eben im hitzigsten Streite begriffen sind, stellen sie bei Verkündigung der Gebetstunde ihre Feindseligkeiten sofort ein, um dieselben nach beendigtem Gebete wieder mit erneuten Kräften aufzunehmen. Das ist aber auch alles. Daß sie sich nebenbei jeden Betrug und jede Übervorteilung ihrer Nebenmenschen erlauben, besonders wenn dies ein Andersgläubiger oder Kafir ist, und daß sie sich insgeheim den ärgsten Lastern und Ausschweifungen hingeben, halten sie für völlig irrelevant, wenn nur das Dekorum gewahrt bleibt und nichts an die Öffentlichkeit dringt.

Regelmäßig wiederkehrende Feiertage in der Art unserer Sonntage giebt es bei den Mohammedanern nicht. Sie haben nur drei große Feste im Jahre, die jedesmal mehrere Tage hintereinander gefeiert werden; sonst aber ist bei ihnen ein Tag wie der andere. Nur an den Freitagen versammeln sich die Männer am Morgen in der Moschee zum gemeinsamen Gebet, gehen aber nachher wie jeden andern Wochentag ihrer Arbeit und ihren Geschäften nach.

Die Moscheen gelten nicht als Gotteshäuser wie bei den Christen, sondern sind nichts weiter als Versammlungsorte. Die Mohammedaner finden deshalb gar nichts Besonderes darin, wenn ihre Moscheen von Ungläubigen betreten werden. Auf meinen Reisen in dem strenggläubigen Buchara wurden mir gerade mit Vorliebe Moscheen als Wohnung für die Dauer meines Aufenthaltes angewiesen, wenn keine besseren Lokalitäten vorhanden waren. Auch der Umstand, daß die Mohammedaner vor dem Eintritt in eine Moschee ihre Schuhe abnehmen, hat keinen religiösen Grund, sondern beruht auf der allgemeinen, durch Reinlichkeitsrücksichten bedingten Gewohnheit, vor dem Eintritt in eine Wohnung die obere, durch den Kot der ungepflasterten Straßen beschmutzte Fußbekleidung abzulegen, weil man in den Wohnungen der Eingeborenen, wie auch in den Moscheen, nicht auf Stühlen, sondern einfach auf dem Boden Platz nimmt. Sie verlangen deshalb auch von den Europäern nicht, daß sie vor dem Eintritt in eine Moschee die Stiefel ausziehen sollen.

Von Moscheen giebt es in Turkestan zweierlei Arten: große Kuppelgebäude aus gebrannten Ziegeln mit hohen Fassaden und weiten Thorbogen, welche größtenteils noch aus Tamerlans Zeit stammen (Bild 70 S. 199 u. Bild 71 S. 200), und die modernen Moscheen, welche aus einfachen, einem gewöhnlichen Wohnhaus ähnlichen Gebäuden mit anstoßenden Säulenhallen bestehen, wie deren eine auf Bild 72 (S. 201) dargestellt ist. In Taschkent giebt es nur zwei größere Moscheen der ersteren Art: die alte, halbverfallene Moschee Chodscha-Achrar, deren noch stellenweise erhaltene Mosaikarbeiten beweisen, daß sie in demselben Stil erbaut gewesen war wie die Tamerlanschen Moscheen in Samarkand, und die aus neuerer Zeit

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Bild 73. Inneres einer Moschee zu Buchara.

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stammende Bekljar-Bek-Moschee, welche den Bazar beherrscht. Alle übrigen Taschkenter Moscheen, deren Zahl sich auf 255 beläuft, gleichen mehr oder weniger der auf Bild 72 (S. 201) abgebildeten Maxim-Moschee. Sie bestehen in der Regel aus einem größeren oder kleineren rechteckigen Gemache, welches aus gebrannten Ziegeln oder auch einfach aus Lehm erbaut ist, und einer daranstoßenden Säulenhalle mit geschnitzten hölzernen Säulen und ebenem hölzernen Dache. Der Boden der Säulenhallen ist stets einige Fuß über den umgebenden Hof erhoben. Mitunter fehlt der geschlossene Raum ganz, und die Moschee besteht dann lediglich aus einem vorne offenen, aus Lehmmauern aufgeführten Schuppen. Das Innere der Moscheen (Bild 73, S. 203) weist in der Regel keinerlei Verzierungen oder Einrichtungsgegenstände auf, und die Wände sind sogar meistens nicht einmal getüncht. Eine aus einigen Stufen bestehende, aus Ziegeln oder Lehm aufgeführte Erhöhung dient als Kanzel für den vortragenden Mulla. Die Moscheen sind immer so orientiert, daß die dem Eingange gegenüberstehende Wand, welcher sich die Besucher beim Gebete zuwenden, möglichst senkrecht zur Richtung nach Mekka steht. Auch bei ihren Gebeten außerhalb der Moschee suchen die Mohammedaner jederzeit die Richtung nach Mekka einzunehmen, und sie nehmen die Sache in dieser Beziehung so genau, daß ich in allen Städten, welche ich auf meinen Reisen berührte, von den Einwohnern ersucht wurde, ihnen mittels meiner astronomischen Instrumente möglichst genau die Richtung nach Mekka anzugeben. Bei jeder Moschee befindet sich ein größerer oder kleinerer Hof oder Garten mit einem Teich in der Mitte, an welchem die Besucher der Moschee vor dem Gebete die vorgeschriebenen Waschungen vornehmen, wenn sie dies nicht schon zu Hause gethan haben. Diese Moscheehöfe bilden einen Lieblingsversammlungsort für alle diejenigen von den Bewohnern, deren einzige Lebensaufgabe in einem ununterbrochenen dolce far niente besteht, die es aber unter ihrer Würde erachten, sich mit den jüngeren Leuten auf dem Bazar und in den Theebuden herumzutreiben. Bei jeder Moschee befindet sich ein Imam oder ständiger Vorbeter mit einem Gehilfen, der den Titel Suphi führt, sowie ein mit kräftiger Stimme begabter Ausrufer, der vom Minaret der Moschee aus (Bild 74) die Zeit des Morgen- und Abendgebetes und damit zugleich die Polizeistunde zu verkünden hat. Alle diese beziehen durchweg keinen regelmäßigen Gehalt, sondern erhalten nur zur Zeit der hohen Feste freiwillige Geschenke von den Besuchern der betreffenden Moschee und zur Erntezeit einen bestimmten Anteil an dem Ertrage des Bodens.

Beim gemeinsamen Gebete, in der Moschee sowohl wie außerhalb derselben, ordnen sich alle Teilnehmer in Reih und Glied wie eine Abteilung Soldaten, wobei der Vorbeter (Imam) sich vor der Front befindet, um allen sichtbar zu sein. Beim Gebete wird in schneller Aufeinanderfolge

abwechselnd gestanden und gekniet und von Zeit zu Zeit mit der Stirne der Boden berührt; alle diese Bewegungen, zu denen noch verschiedene Manipulationen mit den Händen kommen, werden von dem Vorbeter vorgemacht und von der ganzen Versammlung, wie auf Kommando, nachgeahmt. Dies macht auf Unbeteiligte einen äußerst komischen Eindruck, weil das Ganze mehr einer Freiturnübung als einer religiösen Handlung gleichsieht, um so mehr, als alles mit lautloser Stille vor sich geht, da die Gebete nicht laut gesprochen werden. Frauen dürfen sich an solchen gemeinsamen Gebeten nicht beteiligen und auch die Moscheen nicht besuchen.



Bild 74. Minaret Madamin-Chana in Chiwa.

Die Fasten der Mohammedaner, welche den ganzen Monat Ramasan dauern und als Urasa bezeichnet werden, sind von den Fasten der Christen vollständig verschieden. Sie bestehen nicht in der Enthaltung von Fleischspeisen oder in der Mäßigkeit im Essen, sondern darin, daß man von Sonnenaufgang bis Sonnenuntergang keinerlei Speisen und Getränke zu sich nehmen darf, selbst nicht einmal Wasser. Die Mohammedaner sind in dieser Beziehung so streng, daß sie sich nicht einmal baden dürfen, weil dabei unversehens durch die Nase oder durch die Ohren Wasser in den Körper eindringen könnte. Daß die Einhaltung so strenger Fasten, besonders unter der Glühhitze Turkestans, keine Kleinigkeit ist, kann man sich leicht vorstellen. Kaum ist aber die Sonne untergegangen und das Abendgebet absolviert, so beginnt, als Entschädigung für die tagsüber ausgestandenen

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Entbehrungen, sofort eine solenne Schmauserei mit Gesang und Tanz, die mitunter bis an den Morgen währt und bei der in Bezug auf Völlerei das Menschenmöglichste geleistet wird. Auf der Reise brachten mich diese Fasten der Mohammedaner oft der Verzweiflung nahe. Tagsüber waren die Leute zu nichts zu brauchen infolge von Schlaflosigkeit, Hunger und Durst, und zur Nachtzeit, wenn man von den Anstrengungen der Reise erschöpft war, hatte man keinen Augenblick Ruhe, weil die ganze Nacht über das Geschrei und Gejohle und der Lärm der Trommeln, Tamtams und aller möglichen Musikinstrumente kein Ende nahm. Und solche gesundheitswidrige, Nacht für Nacht mit Orgien abwechselnde Fasten halten die Leute für ein Gott wohlgefälliges Werk.

In Bezug auf Aberglauben stehen die zentralasiatischen Mohammedaner keiner andern Glaubensgesellschaft nach. Die Gräber, die angeblichen Kleider und Reliquien ihrer unzähligen Heiligen, deren Anspruch auf diesen Rang meistens sehr problematisch ist, spielen bei ihnen eine große Rolle. Es giebt in Zentralasien viele apokryphe Heiligengräber, wie z. B. die Gräber Alis, des Schwiegersohnes des Propheten, in Masar-i-Scherif und in Schach-i-Mardan, das Grabmal Alexanders des Großen in Margelan, das Grab Daniels in Samarkand und viele andere. Aus der Geschichte wissen wir, daß Alexander immer nach der Ehre geizte, noch bei Lebzeiten unter die Zahl der Götter aufgenommen zu werden, ohne daß sein Ehrgeiz befriedigt worden wäre; dafür ist ihm aber nachträglich eine Ehre zu teil geworden, auf die er nicht gerechnet hatte, nämlich nach 2000 Jahren noch als mohammedanischer Heiliger und als Verbreiter des Islams in Zentralasien verehrt zu werden. Unerschütterlich ist der Glaube der Mohammedaner Turkestans an die Heilkraft von Reliquien und Amuletten. Splitter vom Grabstein[1] Tamerlans gelten als ein unfehlbares Mittel gegen alle möglichen inneren Krankheiten, was einen ausgedehnten Handel mit imitierten Partikeln von Tamerlans Grab zur Folge hat. Auf welche Weise Tamerlan in den Geruch der Heiligkeit gekommen ist, dürfte für Abendländer einigermaßen schwer verständlich sein. Einen gleich einträglichen Handel treiben die Mullas mit selbstverfertigten Amuletten, welche angeblich wunderthätige Gebetsformeln und Zaubersprüche enthalten, deren Inhalt aber oft Ähnlichkeit hat mit den bekannten Passauer Zetteln, die den Besitzer unverwundbar machen sollten, in Wirklichkeit jedoch nichts weiter enthielten als die Sentenz: „Hallunke, wehre dich!" Diese Amulette werden für teures

[1] Dieser Grabstein ist aus einem einzigen Block von dunkelgrünem Nephrit gemeißelt und von unberechenbarem Werte. Von unbekannter Hand ist der Stein in der Mitte entzweigeschlagen worden, und an dieser Bruchstelle sind von abergläubischen Mohammedanern und russischen Sammlern einzelne Stücke abgeschlagen worden, wie aus dem Bild 75 zu ersehen ist.

L: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Geld meistens von den Apothekern und den in solchen Dingen besonders kompetenten Juden eingehandelt und gewöhnlich in einem dreieckigen Täschchen



Bild 75. Grabmal Tamerlans und seiner Verwandten in Samarkand.
(Der kuppelförmige Bau in der Mitte befindet sich in Tamerlans Grabstein.)

oder in einem Cylinder aus Silberblech, Karton u. dgl. (Bild 76, S. 208) an einer Schnur um den Hals oder über die Schulter getragen. Selbst

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

den Haustieren, besonders den Pferden, werden Amulette angehängt, um sie vor Unglück und Krankheit zu bewahren. Die turkestanischen Mohammedaner, vorzüglich die Tadschiken, erweisen auch gewissen heiligen Bäumen eine besondere Verehrung. Es sind dies in der Regel uralte, einzeln stehende Bäume, die angeblich von irgend einem Heiligen gepflanzt sind und deren Schatten den erschöpften Wanderern natürlich sehr erwünscht ist. Die Reisenden bethätigen ihre Verehrung gegen die erwähnten heiligen Bäume dadurch, daß sie von ihren Kleidern Fetzen abreißen und an die Zweige binden. Das Aussehen derartig dekorierter Bäume läßt natürlich viel zu wünschen übrig, besonders wenn die angehängten Fetzen, wie es häufig der Fall ist, ebenso



Bild 76. Amulettbehälter.

zahlreich sind wie die Blätter. Dieser Baumkultus ist offenbar noch ein Überrest aus der indogermanischen Urzeit. Bekanntlich beschenkte Xerxes auf seinem Zuge nach Griechenland einen Baum, unter dessen Schatten er ausgeruht hatte, und ließ an dessen Zweigen goldene Ketten und Spangen aufhängen. Ebenso ist bekannt, welche Verehrung die alten Germanen ihren heiligen Bäumen erwiesen, so zwar, daß die christlichen Missionäre sich veranlaßt sahen, diese Bäume umzuhauen, um die Bekehrung der Germanen zu beschleunigen. Die bei den Deutschen jetzt noch üblichen Maibäume und Weihnachtsbäume dürften wohl ebenfalls auf den früheren Baumkultus zurückzuführen sein.

Die zentralasiatischen Mohammedaner waren, wie bereits erwähnt, vor der russischen Herrschaft ungemein fanatisch, und man hatte von seiten der

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Russen anfangs große Besorgnisse gehegt, wie mit solchen Fanatikern auszukommen sein würde. Wie sich aber nachträglich herausstellte, war dieser Fanatismus nur das Werk weniger interessierter Kreise, der Reis, Duwanas, Ischane und Mullas, die das gemeine Volk in ihrem Banne hielten. Seitdem in den russischen Besitzungen die Macht dieser Geschäftsfanatiker dadurch gebrochen ist, daß sie von oben nicht mehr unterstützt werden, und das Volk sich selbst überlassen bleibt, hat sich herausgestellt, daß es mit dem Fanatismus desselben gar nicht so weit her ist, und daß ihm sein Vorteil und seine Vergnügungen weit mehr am Herzen liegen als der Zelotismus seiner Mullas. Die russische Regierung gewährt den Mohammedanern vollständige Religionsfreiheit, und General v. Kauffmann hat mit Rücksicht auf die Verhältnisse von Anfang an jedwede Missionsthätigkeit und alle Bekehrungsversuche von seiten der orthodoxen Popen sowohl wie der Missionäre der übrigen christlichen Bekenntnisse verpönt. Ja er verhinderte sogar, um möglichst alle Reibereien zwischen Mohammedanern und Christen hintanzuhalten, daß Taschkent zum Sitze des turkestanischen Bischofs gewählt wurde, und verwies denselben nach Wernoe, der Hauptstadt der Provinz Semiretschie, welche von einer fast ausschließlich russischen und orthodoxen Bevölkerung bewohnt wird. Dies alles wurde natürlich General v. Kauffmann von der orthodoxen Geistlichkeit sehr verübelt; der Erfolg zeigte aber, wie richtig er gerechnet hatte. Die von den Russen gegen die Mohammedaner geübte Toleranz hatte in den russischen Besitzungen Zentralasiens nicht nur keine Erstarkung des Mohammedanismus, sondern im Gegenteil einen auffallenden Indifferentismus seiner Bekenner zur Folge, den man bei Mohammedanern für unmöglich gehalten hätte. Mir ist die ganzen 15 Jahre meines Aufenthaltes in Turkestan kein einziger Konflikt zwischen Mohammedanern und Christen bekannt geworden, wie deren in dem von englischen Missionären unsicher gemachten Indien häufig vorkommen, und Mohammedaner und Christen vertragen sich gegenwärtig in Turkestan so gut miteinander, wie es den verschiedenen christlichen Konfessionen untereinander nur zu wünschen wäre. Die mohammedanischen Würdenträger und Honoratioren beteiligen sich unaufgefordert an kirchlichen Begräbnissen hochstehender russischer Beamter, und zur Zeit der letzten Krankheit des von den Eingeborenen allgemein verehrten Generals v. Kauffmann erbaten sich die mohammedanischen Mullas die Erlaubnis, im Palais des Generalgouverneurs in Gemeinschaft mit den russischen Popen für die Wiedergenesung desselben beten zu dürfen.

8. Rechtspflege. Die Rechtsanschauungen der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans sind von denen der Kirgisen und sonstigen Nomaden himmelweit verschieden und nähern sich viel mehr unsern Begriffen von Recht und Unrecht. Während die Kirgisen, wie wir oben gesehen haben, in Bezug auf Mein und Dein ähnliche Ansichten haben wie die alten Spartaner und

Germanen, und keinen Unterschied kennen zwischen zivilrechtlicher und kriminneller Natur der Verbrechen, wird bei den Ansässigen Diebstahl sehr strenge bestraft und zwischen den Vergehen, welche nur eine Schädigung des Nebenmenschen involvieren, und denen, welche gegen die gesellschaftliche Ordnung gerichtet sind, genau unterschieden. Eigentliche geschriebene Gesetze giebt es in den zentralasiatischen Chanaten nicht. Als Grundlage bei allen Rechtsprechungen gilt das Schariat, das ist der Koran, die Tradition und die Entscheidungen der ersten Kalifen, welche nebst ihren Kommentaren und einer großen Anzahl von Präcedenzfällen in einer Unzahl von Werken niedergelegt sind. Richter können deshalb nur diejenigen sein, welche sich das Studium dieser Werke zur Lebensaufgabe gemacht haben, d. h. die Mullas, die daher auch zu gleicher Zeit die Rolle von Theologen und Juristen spielen. In den mohammedanischen Staaten Zentralasiens giebt es in allen Rechtssachen zwei Instanzen, den Kasi (dasselbe, was bei den Türken der Kadi ist) und den Bek oder Chan. Die Kasis entscheiden in allen zivilrechtlichen Streitsachen und können auch geringere Vergehen aburteilen. Zu gleicher Zeit fungieren sie auch als Notare und Zivilstandesbeamte, indem ihnen die Anfertigung von Urkunden bei Kauf und Verkauf, bei Kontrahierung von Anlehen, bei Eheschließungen und Ehescheidungen u. dgl. obliegt. Die Kasis werden von den Beks oder dem Chane selbst auf Lebenszeit ernannt, nachdem sie eine eingehende Prüfung aus dem Schariat bestanden haben. Die Zahl der Kasis ist unbeschränkt und denselben ist kein besonderer Amtskreis zugewiesen. Jeder wendet sich mit seinem Anliegen an denjenigen Kasi, zu dem er am meisten Zutrauen hat. Besondere Gerichtskammern giebt es nicht. Jeder Kasi übt sein Amt in seiner Wohnung oder auch auf dem Markte und in den Thorhallen aus. Die Kasis haben als Gehilfen nur einen Schreiber (Mirsa), von dem weiter keine Kenntnisse verlangt werden als eine gute Handschrift. Alle Verhandlungen sind mündlich. Die Entscheidungen werden aber von dem Mirsa in ein eigenes Buch eingetragen und dann vom Kasi durch Anlegung seines Siegels bekräftigt. Bei den Zentralasiaten ist es überhaupt nicht Brauch, ein Dokument oder auch nur einen Brief zu unterschreiben, wozu auch die wenigsten fähig wären; sie drucken statt ihrer Unterschrift jedesmal mit Tuschfarbe ihr Siegel auf. Einen regelrechten Gehalt beziehen die Kasis nicht; ihre Einkünfte bestehen in den Taxen, welche sie bei Ausübung ihres Amtes erheben, sowie in den zufälligen Geschenken, welche sie bei Hochzeiten u. dgl. erhalten. Diejenigen, welche mit der Entscheidung des Kasi nicht zufrieden sind, können an den Bek, oder in den Hauptstädten an den Chan oder dessen Stellvertreter appellieren.

Der Bek trifft die oberinstanzliche Entscheidung entweder selbst oder überweist in besonders wichtigen und schwierigen Fällen die Angelegenheit einer Versammlung von Kasis, welche unter dem Vorsitze des obersten Kasi

oder Kasi-Kalsan ihre Entscheidung trifft, die vom Bek bestätigt oder auch umgestoßen werden kann. In allen wichtigeren Fällen, besonders Kriminalfällen, entscheidet der Bek selbst, der allein das Recht hat, schwerere Körperstrafen oder die Todesstrafe zu verhängen, sofern sich der Chan nicht die Bestätigung der Todesurteile vorbehalten hat. Die Gerichtsverhandlungen beim Bek oder Chan sind sehr summarisch und nehmen nur wenig Zeit in Anspruch. Während meiner Reise im Jahre 1886 durch Buchara hatte ich einmal Gelegenheit, dieses Gerichtsverfahren eingehend zu studieren. In der Stadt Kitab, wo ich zwei Tage Gast des Beks war, war ich in der Citadelle auf demselben Hofe einquartiert, den der Bek selbst bewohnte, und zwar befand sich meine Wohnung gerade der Wohnung des Beks gegenüber. Der zweite Tag meines Aufenthaltes war gerade ein wöchentlicher Bazartag, und die Bazartage sind bei den Eingeborenen, zur größeren Bequemlichkeit der Landbewohner, welche an solchen Tagen von allen Seiten in die Stadt kommen, zugleich auch Gerichtstage. Der Bek hatte schon von frühem Morgen an seinen Platz an einem offenen, bis auf den Boden reichenden Fenster eingenommen und harrte, in einem Buche lesend, der Ankunft der Parteien. Die Kläger und Beklagten, welche der Reihe nach von einem Diener paarweise hereingeführt wurden, verneigten sich, sobald sie des Beks ansichtig wurden, bis zur Erde und näherten sich unter fortwährenden Bücklingen und offenbar unter großen Schwulitäten dem offenen Fenster, an welchem der Bek auf der Erde kauerte. Auf ein gegebenes Zeichen begann der Kläger seine Rede, die in einem ein bis zwei Minuten dauernden, unglaublich schnell und geläufig vorgebrachten Wortschwall bestand. Nachdem sodann der Angeklagte in ähnlicher Weise geantwortet hatte, erteilte der Bek, ohne von seinem Buche aufzusehen und die Parteien oft nicht eines Blickes würdigend, sofort und ohne lange Überlegung seinen nur in ein paar Worten bestehenden Urteilsspruch, gegen den es keine weitere Appellation gab. Die Parteien bezeugten sodann durch abermaliges wiederholtes Verbeugen bis zur Erde ihre Dankbarkeit für den erhaltenen Richterspruch und entfernten sich scheinbar in größter Eintracht. Kaum waren sie aber unter den Thorbogen gekommen, wo sie den Augen des Beks entrückt waren, ich sie aber von meinem Zimmer aus noch sehen konnte, so gerieten sie sich meistens sofort wieder in die Haare, bis sie von dem diensthuenden Trabanten des Beks beide beim Kragen gepackt und an die Luft befördert wurden, um den folgenden Parteien Platz zu machen. Wurde ein Angeklagter zu einer körperlichen Strafe verurteilt, so wurde dieselbe auf der Stelle vollzogen. Ein Tischler war angeklagt worden, daß er eine Arbeit, für die er das Geld vorausgenommen hatte, nicht rechtzeitig abgeliefert habe. Der Bek verurteilte ihn hierfür zu 40 Peitschenhieben. Der kontraktbrüchige Tischler wurde sofort gepackt, vor das Thor geschleppt und zum großen

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Gaudium des Bazarpublikums mit der zudiktierten Tracht regaliert. Der betreffende Bek von Kitab, der an dem erwähnten Vormittag auf die angegebene Weise an die fünfzig Rechtsfälle erledigte, ohne sich besonders anzustrengen, war ausnahmsweise selbst Mulla und ein sehr aufgeklärter Mann, weshalb er auch alle Streitsachen in eigener Person entschied. Meistens sind aber die Beks ganz ungelehrte Persönlichkeiten, die weder vom Schariat noch vom Lesen und Schreiben einen Begriff haben. In solchen Fällen liegt die Entscheidung in den Händen ihrer Diwan-Begis, die mit dem Rechte häufig förmlich Handel treiben. In welcher Weise von diesen Diwan-Begis in der Regel die Justiz gehandhabt wird, darüber erzählte mir einmal der Diwan-Begi des Beks von Baisun, der zu mir eine große Zuneigung gefaßt hatte, ganz offenherzig folgendes: Hat jemand eine Streitsache, die er vom Bek schlichten lassen will, so kommt er zum Diwan-Begi, trägt ihm die Angelegenheit vor und überreicht ihm dabei für ihn selbst, sowie für den Bek entsprechende Geschenke, je nach der Wichtigkeit des Falles: Früchte, Seidenstoffe, Chalate oder auch ein aufgezäumtes Pferd. Der Diwan-Begi macht von der eingelaufenen Klage Mitteilung an den Beklagten, der sich nun ebenfalls mit entsprechenden Geschenken einfinden muß, um die Angelegenheit seinerseits aufzuklären. Nachdem der Diwan-Begi die beiderseitigen Argumente angehört und die Geschenke für sich und den Bek in Empfang genommen hat, macht er diesem darüber Mitteilung, wobei er zugleich seine unmaßgebliche Meinung dahin ausspricht, daß, je nachdem, dem Kläger oder dem Beklagten Recht zu geben sei, denn der andere habe schlechtere Geschenke gebracht und dadurch seine schlechte Gesinnung an den Tag gelegt. Dabei hat es dann auch in der Regel sein Bewenden. Daß unter solchen Umständen ein Armer keine Möglichkeit hat, zu seinem Rechte zu kommen, und sich deshalb von seiten der Reicheren jeglichen Übergriff gefallen lassen muß, ist einleuchtend.

In den Residenzstädten, welche vom Chan oder Emir selbst verwaltet werden, übt der Herrscher die oberste Gerichtsbarkeit in eigener Person aus, und jeder Unterthan hat das Recht, sich an den Chan direkt zu wenden, notabene, wenn er von den Höflingen vorgelassen wird.

Die Strafen, welche in den zentralasiatischen Chanaten vor der russischen Herrschaft über die Verbrecher verhängt wurden und in den unabhängigen Staaten zum Teil noch werden, zeichneten sich durch große Strenge und Grausamkeit aus. Für leichtere Vergehen wurden Bastonnade, Arrest, Gefängnis und Verstümmelung, für schwerere die Todesstrafe verhängt, für welche es in den verschiedenen Staaten sechs verschiedene Arten gab.

Die Bastonnade wird in der Weise angewendet, daß ein Gerichtsdiener sich rücklings vor den Delinquenten stellt, sich dessen Arme über die Schulter legt und ihn an beiden Händen festhält, während ein zweiter Gerichtsdiener demselben mit einem etwa 1,5 m langen und armdicken Prügel

den entblößten Rücken bearbeitet. Auch Peitschenhiebe werden statt der Stockprügel oft angewendet. Diese werden mit den gewöhnlichen Reitpeitschen oder Nagaiken erteilt, wobei der Delinquent die eine Hälfte der zudiktierten Streiche auf den Rücken, die andere auf den Bauch erhält. Diese Art der Bestrafung ist besonders grausam, weil der Bestrafte dabei oft so zugerichtet wird, daß ihm die Eingeweide heraushängen.

Eigentümlich ist die Art und Weise, wie die zu einem längeren oder kürzeren Arrest Verurteilten ihre Strafe abzubüßen haben. In Baisun traf ich im Jahre 1886, gelegentlich eines dem Bek abgestatteten Besuches, auf einer Terrasse innerhalb des Festungthores sechs Individuen, welche tags vorher auf dem Bazare die Bastonnade erhalten hatten. Dieselben waren des Diebstahls angeklagt und vom Bek zur Bastonnade und zu sechsmonatlicher Haft verurteilt worden. Die Verurteilten mußten ihre ganze Haftzeit hier auf der Terrasse unter freiem Himmel zubringen, wobei sich der Bek weder um die Verpflegung noch um die Bewachung derselben kümmerte. Die Verköstigung und Überwachung der Arrestanten war den nächsten Verwandten derselben überlassen, welche mit ihrer Person und ihrem Vermögen dafür hafteten, daß die Gefangenen keinen Fluchtversuch machten. Dieselben waren deshalb gezwungen, Tag und Nacht neben ihren gefangenen Verwandten zuzubringen, um sie am Entweichen zu verhindern. Jedenfalls das einfachste, billigste und sicherste Mittel für den Staat, seine Strafgefangenen unterzubringen.

Schrecklich ist das Los derjenigen, welche zu längerer oder kürzerer oder auch zu lebenslänglicher Kerkerstrafe verurteilt werden. Die einheimischen Gefängnisse, Sindane genannt, sind einfache, dunkle, unterirdische Erdlöcher von 6—12 m Tiefe, welche sich nach oben flaschenartig verengen und mit einem hölzernen Deckel verschlossen werden. Diese Gefängnisse machen jeden Fluchtversuch unmöglich und mithin die Unterhaltung von zahlreichen Aufsichtsorganen überflüssig. Die Gefangenen werden in diese Gefängnisse an Stricken hinabgelassen, ebenso wie das Trinkwasser und die Speisen, welche denselben von mitleidigen Seelen dargebracht werden. Es sind dies ganz genau solche Gruben, wie sie zum Aufbewahren von Getreide verwendet werden, und oft werden ohne weiteres leer stehende, unterirdische Getreidekammern und selbst ausgetrocknete, tiefe Brunnen als Gefängnisse benützt. Etwas Furchtbareres als den Aufenthalt in solchen Kerkern kann man sich schwerlich vorstellen, und jede beliebige Todesart ist eine Wohlthat im Vergleich mit dem Leben solcher Gefangenen. Dieselben werden vom Staate weder mit Speise noch mit Trank versehen, und wenn sie nicht etwa Verwandte haben, die sie füttern, so sind sie lediglich auf die Mildthätigkeit des Publikums angewiesen, welches aber aus leicht begreiflichen Gründen solche Orte des Schreckens nach Möglichkeit vermeidet. Daß die

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Gefangenen aus Hunger die Leichen ihrer verstorbenen Leidensgenossen aufzehrten, soll in früheren Zeiten gar nichts Außergewöhnliches gewesen sein. Da die Gefängnisse keinerlei Ventilation haben und die Dejekte der Gefangenen und selbst die Leichen der Verstorbenen nie entfernt werden, so kann man sich vorstellen, was für Miasmen sich an solchen Orten ansammeln müssen, wo mitunter Dutzende von Menschen zusammengepfercht sind, deren Ausdünstung bei der großen Hitze allein schon unerträglich ist. Zum Überflusse werden die Unglücklichen von einer Unmasse von Wanzen, Zecken, Läusen, Ratten und allem möglichen sonstigen Ungeziefer gequält, welches sich auf einem so günstigen Nährboden bis ins Unglaubliche vermehrt. Die Insassen dieser schauerlichen Martterkammern sind nicht immer wirkliche Verbrecher, sondern sogar der Mehrzahl nach ganz Unschuldige, welche die Laune des Herrschers und die Intriguen ihrer politischen Gegner dahingebracht haben, wo sie oft ganz vergessen werden und dann ihr Leben unter einer solch scheußlichen Umgebung aushauchen müssen. Die zwei englischen Reisenden Stoddard und Konolly, welche der Emir Nassr-Ulla im Jahre 1842 hinrichten ließ, sollen vor ihrer Hinrichtung in der Stadt Buchara in solchen Gefängnissen geschmachtet haben. Die Russen haben natürlich in ihren Besitzungen mit diesen Scheußlichkeiten aufgeräumt und verwenden allen ihren Einfluß, um auch in den noch unabhängigen Staaten Zentralasiens die Verhältnisse etwas menschlicher zu gestalten; ob aber mit Erfolg, ist niemand in der Lage zu kontrollieren.

Verstümmelungen als gesetzliche Strafe müssen früher in Turkestan ziemlich häufig angewendet worden sein, nach der großen Zahl derjenigen zu urteilen, welche man noch zu meiner Zeit ohne Nase oder ohne Hände, mitunter selbst ohne Füße als Bettler herumziehen sah. Gewöhnlich wurden diese Strafen über Diebe verhängt, die man auf solche Weise unschädlich machen oder wenigstens zeichnen wollte. Deshalb sind auch die meisten der also Zugerichteten Kirgisen, die im Diebstahl nichts Unrechtes, sondern im Gegenteil einen ehrenvollen Sport erblicken, während die Ansässigen in dieser Beziehung keinen Spaß verstehen. Die Hände wurden den Dieben am Gelenke, die Füße am Knöchel abgeschnitten, die Nasen aber so glatt wegrasiert, als wenn sie nie eine solche gehabt hätten. Auch die Ohren wurden denjenigen, welche schon einmal oder mehrmals gerichtlich bestraft waren, je nach Umständen aufgeschlitzt oder abgeschnitten, und diese Art der Verstümmelung bildete für die Betreffenden eine Art Strafliste bei etwaigen späteren Konflikten mit dem Gesetze.

Die Todesstrafe wurde in den zentralasiatischen Staaten sehr häufig angewendet, wie denn in Buchara sogar Diebstahl, Ehebruch, Prostitution, ja selbst schon der Genuß von Wein bis in die neueste Zeit mit Tod bestraft wurde. Die meisten Opfer forderte aber stets die Laune und das

Mißtrauen der Herrscher, welche ihren Thron nur durch Grausamkeit und die Vernichtung aller irgendwie verdächtigen Individuen befestigen zu können glaubten. Wie arg es in dieser Beziehung manche Chane trieben, kann man aus dem Beispiele des letzten Chans von Kokan ersehen, der einmal 20000 Kiptschaken hinrichten ließ, bloß aus Ärger darüber, daß er bis dahin von einem Kiptschaken in unbequemer Weise bevormundet worden war. Der größte Wüterich war aber unstreitig der bucharische Emir Nasr-Ulla gewesen, der nicht nur die beiden erwähnten Engländer und den kokanischen Chan Mohammed Ali, sondern selbst seine eigenen Frauen und nächsten Verwandten hinrichten ließ und die Gefängnisse mit in Ungnade gefallenen Günstlingen und mit den höchsten Würdenträgern anfüllte.



Bild 77. Minarat Mir-Arab in Buchara. Hinrichtungsplatz für schwere Verbrecher.

Die gewöhnlichste Hinrichtungsart besteht in Turkestan im Halsabschneiden; das Köpfen dagegen ist nicht gebräuchlich. Der Henker setzt den Delinquenten mit gebundenen Händen vor sich auf den Boden, faßt ihn mit der linken Hand beim Kinn und schneidet ihm mit einem gewöhnlichen Tischmesser die Gurgel entzwei. Gewöhnliche Verbrecher werden auf diese Weise in der Regel öffentlich auf dem Bazare hingerichtet, wobei nicht viel Zeremonien gemacht werden. Der Henker führt die ihm überlieferten Verbrecher an Markttagen ohne weitere Eskorte und Vorbereitungen auf den

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Bazar, wählt sich dort einen möglichst belebten Punkt aus und schlachtet seine Opfer der Reihe nach genau ebenso ab, wie die Schafe abgestochen werden.

Neben dem Halsabschneiden ist auch das Hängen im allgemeinen Gebrauche, welches, wie auch bei uns, als die schimpflichste Todesart gilt. Die zum Tode durch den Strang Verurteilten werden entweder über den Thorwegen aufgehängt, was besonders bei Aufrührern und politischen Verbrechern als abschreckendes Beispiel angewendet wird, oder sie werden an Galgen aufgeknüpft, die in jeder Stadt ein für allemal auf den Bazarplätzen aufgerichtet sind. Dem Verurteilten wird ein Strick um den Hals gelegt, mittels dessen er in die Höhe gezogen und etwa einen Meter über dem Boden festgebunden wird. Auch die einheimischen zweiräderigen Wagen werden oft, wenn gerade kein Galgen in der Nähe ist, zum Aufhängen benützt. Der Hinzurichtende wird mittels einer Schlinge an einem Arme der Gabel befestigt und dann das Hinterteil des Wagens zu Boden gesenkt, wodurch die Gabel mit dem zu Hängenden emporgeschnellt wird. Diese Hinrichtungsart wurde z. B. gegen diejenigen Russen angewandt, welche das Unglück hatten, während des kokanischen Krieges im Jahre 1876 den Kokanen in die Hände zu fallen, und sich weigerten, zum Mohammedanismus überzutreten.

In Buchara gilt als höchste Strafe das Herabstürzen von dem Minaret Mir-Arab, welches auf Bild 77 (S. 215) dargestellt ist. Dieses Minaret, welches auf einem freien Platz im Zentrum der Stadt Buchara steht, ist aus gebrannten Ziegeln erbaut und ist mit einer Höhe von 52 m der höchste Turm von ganz Zentralasien. Die schwersten Verbrecher werden von der Plattform dieses Minarets auf das Pflaster herabgeschleudert, wo sie natürlich nur als unförmliche Masse ankommen. Während des Aufenthaltes des russischen Generals Matwejew in Buchara im Jahre 1884 wurde auf diese Weise ein Verbrecher hingerichtet, dessen Geschichte ich hier anführen will, weil sie für die bucharischen Verhältnisse charakteristisch ist. Der Betreffende hatte einem reichen Kaufmann eine Summe von etwa 100 000 Mark gestohlen und war mit seiner Beute nach Afghanistan, dem Amerika aller Zentralasiaten, durchgebrannt. Da der Emir deshalb keine Möglichkeit hatte, den Verbrecher in Haft nehmen zu lassen, so berief er zwei seiner Geheimpolizisten und erteilte ihnen den Auftrag, ihm den Dieb lebendig oder tot einzuliefern; wo nicht, würde er ihnen den Hals abschneiden lassen: die gewöhnliche Perspektive aller derer, welchen es nicht gelingt, die oft rein unmöglichen Befehle des Emirs auszuführen. Die zwei unglücklichen Detektives machten sich als Arbeiter verkleidet auf den Weg, holten den Dieb, der sich für das gestohlene Geld bereits Waren und eine Karawane angeschafft hatte, ein und verdingten sich demselben als Kameltreiber. Mehrere Wochen mußten sie so zu Fuß hinter ihrem Opfer hertraben, bis sie endlich

eine günstige Gelegenheit zur Ausführung ihres Planes erlangten. Sie überfielen den Dieb während der Nacht im Schlafe mitten unter seinen bewaffneten Begleitern, knebelten ihn und trugen ihn auf ihren Schultern bis an den Amu-Darja, natürlich unter beständiger Lebensgefahr, weil sie sich von den Afghanen nicht betreten lassen durften, die sie ohne weiteres aufgeknüpft haben würden. Sie konnten deshalb mit ihrer gefährlichen Bürde nur zur Nachtzeit und auf Umwegen marschieren, brachten aber schließlich ihr Opfer glücklich bis Buchara. Der Emir verurteilte den Eingelieferten zum Tode durch Halsabschneiden. Da demselben aber diese Todesart nicht gefiel, so bekannte er, was übrigens nur erdichtet war, daß er sich auch noch an Wakuf-Gütern vergriffen hätte, und dafür wurde er dann zu der höchsten Strafe, zum Herabstürzen vom Minaret, verurteilt, was er auch nur gewollt hatte.

Das Erschießen ist nur wenig im Gebrauche und wird sonderbarerweise nur gegen Frauen angewendet, welche sich des Ehebruchs, der Prostitution u. dgl. schuldig gemacht haben, oder die der Chan aus irgend welchen Gründen bestrafen oder einfach beseitigen will. Dieselben werden mit Pistolen erschossen. Diejenigen Frauen, deren die Chane überdrüssig geworden sind, werden nicht getötet, sondern von denselben an ihre Günstlinge verschenkt, wie denn z. B. der depossedierte Chan von Kokan vor seiner Überführung nach Orenburg in Taschkent seinen zahlreichen Harem unter seine Bekannten verteilte. Ehebrecherinnen wurden früher mitunter auch gesteinigt. Sie wurden zu dem Ende bis an die Brust in die Erde vergraben und dann vom Publikum mit Steinen oder Erdschollen totgeworfen.

In Kokan war bis zur Einführung der russischen Herrschaft auch das Pfählen in Gebrauch, welches in zweierlei Weise angewendet wurde. Entweder wurde der Verurteilte einfach auf einen zugespitzten Pfahl gesetzt, wie dies früher auch in der Türkei üblich war, oder er wurde an einen zweiräderigen Wagen gebunden, wobei seine Beine an die Gabel geschlossen wurden, der Pfahl auf einem zweiten Wagen befestigt und dann durch Gegeneinanderrennen der beiden Wagen dem Verurteilten mit aller Gewalt in den Leib gestoßen. Zuletzt wurde der Pfahl samt dem aufgespießten Verbrecher in den Boden gepflanzt.

Die Russen haben in ihren zentralasiatischen Besitzungen von den früheren Rechtsinstitutionen nur das Amt des Kasi, und zwar mit einigen Modifikationen, beibehalten. Sie waren dazu durch den Umstand veranlaßt worden, daß es unmöglich gewesen wäre, die eingeborenen Mohammedaner in allem den ordentlichen russischen Gerichten zu unterwerfen, ohne ihre religiösen Anschauungen aufs tiefste zu verletzen, da sie gewohnt waren, alle ihre Privatstreitigkeiten und ihre Familienangelegenheiten auf Grund des Schariats geschlichtet zu sehen, dessen Kenntnis natürlich russischen Richtern nicht zu-

gemutet werden konnte. Die russische Regierung hat aber auf die Nominierung der Kasis, welche früher von den Vertretern der Staatsgewalt aufgestellt wurden, verzichtet und die Wahl derselben den Gemeinden überlassen. Die russische Administration verlangt nur, daß zu Kasis unbescholtene, noch unbestrafte und über 25 Jahre alte Persönlichkeiten gewählt werden sollen. Ein besonderer Befähigungsnachweis, wie dies früher der Fall war, wird von den Kasis nicht mehr verlangt. Wie die Aksakale werden auch die Kasis jetzt immer auf eine bestimmte Reihe von Jahren gewählt. Das Amt des Kasi-Kaljan oder Oberrichters wurde aufgehoben, die Kasis alle einander gleichgestellt und jedem ein besonderer Amtskreis angewiesen, innerhalb dessen nur der zuständige Kasi das Recht hat, richterliche und notarielle Funktionen auszuüben. In der Stadt Taschkent ist die Zahl der Kasis, entsprechend den alten vier Stadtbezirken, auf vier festgesetzt. Die Feststellung des Gehaltes oder sonstigen Diensteinkommens der Kasis in Gestalt von Sporteln oder Taxen hat die Regierung gleichfalls den Gemeinden selbst anheimgegeben. Die Kasis entscheiden nach wie vor alle Streitigkeiten der Eingeborenen untereinander, deren Wert 200 Mark nicht übersteigt, und können auch geringere Vergehen aburteilen; sie haben also als Richter einen ähnlichen Wirkungskreis wie die russischen Friedensrichter. Wichtigere Streitsachen werden von einer Versammlung aller Kasis eines Bezirkes geschlichtet. Kriminalfälle werden von den ordentlichen russischen Gerichten nach gemeinem russischen Recht abgeurteilt, ebenso wie alle Streitigkeiten zwischen Russen und Eingeborenen. Auch den Eingeborenen ist es übrigens anheimgestellt, sich, wenn sie dies vorziehen, in allen ihren Angelegenheiten direkt an die russischen Gerichte zu wenden.

Die Todesstrafe ist in Rußland seit der Regierung der Kaiserin Elisabeth aufgehoben, und alle, selbst die schwersten Verbrecher, Hochverräter allein ausgenommen, werden zur Deportation nach Sibirien (seit neuester Zeit nach der Insel Sachalin) und zur Zwangsarbeit daselbst verurteilt. Dieses Gesetz gilt auch für die zentralasiatischen Besitzungen Rußlands. Nur solche Eingeborene, welche sich einer Empörung oder des Mordes von russischen Beamten und Offizieren schuldig machen, können von den jedesmal ad hoc eingesetzten Feldgerichten zum Tode durch den Strang oder durch Erschießen verurteilt werden. Die Urteile dieser Feldgerichte, welche jedesmal aus fünf Armeeoffizieren und einem Auditor bestehen, unterliegen noch der Bestätigung durch den Generalgouverneur. Während meines 15jährigen Aufenthaltes in Taschkent sind nur drei solche Fälle vorgekommen, wovon die zwei ersten sich während des kokanischen Aufstandes im Jahre 1876 ereigneten, was sowohl für die Russen wie für die Eingeborenen ein gleich ehrenvolles Zeugnis ablegt.

9. Unterrichtswesen. Das Unterrichtswesen ist bei der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans sehr ausgebildet und die Anzahl der Schulen sehr

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groß, obwohl der Unterricht Privatsache ist und die einheimischen Regierungen sich weder um die Errichtung von Lehranstalten noch um die Besoldung der Lehrer kümmern. Es giebt in Turkestan zwei Klassen von Lehranstalten, Elementarschulen oder Mechtebs und Hochschulen oder Medresses.

Die Lehrer an den Elementarschulen sind Mullas, ebenso wie an den Hochschulen. In jeder Elementarschule giebt es nur einen einzigen Lehrer, der die Schüler aller Jahrgänge gleichzeitig in ein und demselben Lokal unterrichtet. Einen bestimmten Gehalt beziehen diese Lehrer nicht. Ihr ganzes Einkommen besteht in dem von den Schülern freiwillig entrichteten Schulgelde, welches aber im besten Falle eine Mark jährlich nicht überschreitet, sowie in gelegentlichen Geschenken an Lebensmitteln, welche sie jeden Donnerstag, und an Feierkleidern, welche sie zur Zeit der hohen mohammedanischen Feste von den Eltern ihrer Schüler erhalten. Besonders ist es Brauch, daß der Vater eines Knaben dem Lehrer einen Chalat präsentiert, wenn der Knabe so weit fortgeschritten ist, daß er zum Lesen des Koran übergehen kann.

Eigentliche Schulhäuser giebt es nicht. Der Unterricht wird im Winter entweder in der Wohnung des Lehrers, in einem gewöhnlichen, ungeheizten, fensterlosen und nur durch die Thüröffnung erleuchteten Gemach, oder, wenn der Lehrer kein hinreichend großes Lokal zur Verfügung hat, in der zuständigen Moschee abgehalten.

Im Sommer dagegen wird der Unterricht meistens im Freien, auf einer Veranda, in einem schattigen Hofe oder in einem Garten erteilt. Der Schulbesuch ist nicht obligatorisch, weshalb auch die Schulen hauptsächlich nur von den Kindern der Reicheren frequentiert werden. Die weitaus größte Mehrzahl der Schüler besteht aus Knaben, wiewohl mitunter auch Mädchen, besonders aus den besseren Ständen, Elementarunterricht erhalten. Mädchen und Knaben werden meistens zusammen unterrichtet; es giebt jedoch auch eigentliche Mädchenschulen, an denen aber den Unterricht ebenfalls ein Mulla erteilt. Der Elementarunterricht beginnt, wie bei uns, in der Regel im Alter von 5—6 Jahren und dauert für Knaben gewöhnlich sieben Jahre. Viele Eltern nehmen aber ihre Knaben schon früher aus der Schule, wenn sie dieselben in ihrem Geschäfte oder zur Arbeit verwenden können. Den ganzen Kursus machen gewöhnlich nur diejenigen durch, welche später in eine Medresse einzutreten beabsichtigen. Der Schulbesuch der Mädchen endet meistens schon mit dem achten oder neunten Lebensjahre, da dieselben mit zehn Jahren schon ins heiratsfähige Alter treten und vorher noch Unterricht im Nähen, Sticken, Weben und andern häuslichen Arbeiten erhalten müssen.

Der Unterricht ist für Lehrer und Schüler gleich anstrengend, denn er dauert täglich 9 Stunden, von 6 Uhr morgens bis 5 Uhr nachmittags, mit nur wenigen Freistunden zur Erholung und zum Einnehmen der bescheidenen,

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nur aus Brot und Früchten bestehenden Mahlzeiten, die von den Kindern in ihren Schultaschen mitgebracht werden. Die Schüler haben wöchentlich nur einen Tag frei, nämlich den Freitag. Außerdem haben sie wenig Ferien, immer je eine Woche zur Zeit der drei hohen mohammedanischen Feste.

Der Unterricht in den turkestanischen Elementarschulen beschränkt sich hauptsächlich auf die Erlernung von Lesen und Schreiben. Eigentliche Kurse wie bei uns giebt es nicht. Die Schüler erlernen zunächst das Alphabet und beginnen dann das Lesen und Kopieren von ausgewählten Teilen des Koran, worauf sie zur Lektüre verschiedener anderer Bücher übergehen. Das Studium eines Buches gilt für beendet, wenn der Schüler im stande ist, dasselbe ohne Schwierigkeit zu lesen und abzuschreiben. Wer auf diese Weise ein halbes Dutzend Bücher absolviert hat, hat den Kursus beendigt und kann zum Studium an einer Hochschule übergehen, wenn er Lust und Befähigung dazu in sich verspürt. Außer Lesen und Schreiben erlernen die Kinder in den Elementarschulen auch noch die wichtigsten Gebete und Vorschriften des Koran und die komplizierten, beim Gebete und den vom Koran vorgeschriebenen Waschungen zu beobachtenden Zeremonien.

Eigentümlich und von unsern Bräuchen völlig abweichend ist die von den Lehrern in den turkestanischen Elementarschulen gehandhabte Unterrichtsmethode, welche es erklärlich macht, warum die in diesen Schulen erzielten Erfolge der von Lehrern und Schülern aufgewendeten Zeit und Arbeit so wenig entsprechen. Ist der Unterricht schon dadurch sehr erschwert, daß die Schüler aller Jahrgänge von ein und demselben Lehrer gleichzeitig unterrichtet werden müssen, so wird derselbe außerdem noch ganz unnötigerweise dadurch beeinträchtigt, daß die verschiedenen Schüler zu einer gegebenen Zeit sich nicht mit ein und demselben Gegenstande, wie Lesen oder Schreiben, beschäftigen, sondern daß jeder irgend etwas anderes treibt, wodurch es, sollte man meinen, für den Lehrer ganz unmöglich wird, jedem einzelnen zu folgen. Während der eine das ABC, der andere den Koran, der dritte irgend ein anderes Buch abschreibt, buchstabiert ein vierter im ABC, ein fünfter im Koran, ein sechster in irgend einem Dichter u. s. w. Da alle zu gleicher Zeit und mit möglichst lauter Stimme lesen und jeder etwas anderes, so entsteht ein solches Durcheinander und ein solcher Höllenspektakel, daß sich derartige Schulen schon von weitem unliebsam bemerkbar machen und einem in der Nähe Hören und Sehen vergeht. Der Lehrer sitzt inmitten dieser lärmenden Menge wie die Schüler auf dem Boden, mit einer langen Rute bewaffnet, mit der er von seinem Standpunkt aus auch noch die an der äußersten Peripherie Sitzenden erreichen und diejenigen, welche nicht den nötigen Eifer an den Tag legen, sofort zur Ordnung rufen kann. Die Schüler strengen deshalb die äußersten Kräfte ihrer Lungen an und schreien, daß sie krebsrot werden, daß ihnen die Stirnadern anschwellen und

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ie Augen aus dem Kopfe treten; jeder sucht seinen Nachbar zu überhreien, um sich so das Wohlgefallen des Lehrers zu verdienen.



BILD 72. Elementarschule in Usbekistan.

Die Schüler kauern sowohl beim Lesen wie beim Schreiben mit untergeschlagenen Beinen und nach vorn übergebeugtem Körper auf dem mit

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einer Filzdecke oder einfachen Schilfmatte bedeckten Boden. Die Bücher haben sie beim Lesen und Abschreiben vor sich auf dem Boden liegen — ein gutes Präservationsmittel gegen Kurzsichtigkeit. Zum Schreiben verwenden sie statt unserer Schiefertafeln spatenförmige, hölzerne Brettchen, welche sie mit der linken Hand beim Griffe festhalten, während sie mit der Rechten mittels eines zugespitzten Schilfrohrs und gewöhnlicher Tusche ihre kalligraphischen Versuche darauf malen. Beim Schreiben auf Papier halten sie das zu beschreibende Blatt auf ihrer flachen linken Hand. Auch hierbei werden Schilfrohr und Tusche verwendet. Die Eingeborenen Turkestans beschreiben das Papier immer nur auf einer Seite, welche schon bei der Herstellung mit einem eigenen Firnis überzogen wird, während man die Kehrseite rauh läßt.

Die Behandlung, welche den Schülern der Elementarschulen von den Lehrern zu teil wird, ist sehr streng, und wegen jeder Kleinigkeit wird die Rutenstrafe angewendet. Ein eigentümliches, aber in pädagogischer Hinsicht ziemlich fragwürdiges Verfahren besteht hierbei darin, daß derjenige von den Schülern, der einen andern wegen eines Vergehens zur Anzeige bringt, als Belohnung für seine Denunziation das Recht erhält, dem Delinquenten bei der auf seine Anzeige hin erfolgenden Bestrafung den ersten Streich mit der Rute zu geben.

Die eben geschilderten Elementarschulen können der Natur der Sache nach nur eine beschränkte Zahl von Schülern, etwa 20—30, unterbringen; die Anzahl der Schulen ist deshalb eine sehr große. In Taschkent giebt es solche in den meisten der 149 Viertel, in welche die sartische Stadt zerfällt. Im Jahre 1879 zählte Taschkent 119 Elementarschulen, die von den Russen errichteten Schulen nicht mitgerechnet.

Die zentralasiatischen Hochschulen oder Medresses haben mit unsern Universitäten nur eine sehr entfernte Ähnlichkeit; eher wären sie mit den in manchen katholischen Ländern zur Heranbildung von Theologen errichteten Klerikalseminarien zu vergleichen. Es sind Pensionate, in welchen die Lehrer und Schüler zusammenwohnen und auf Kosten der Anstalt vollständig unterhalten werden. Die Medresses erhalten keinerlei Subventionen vom Staate, sondern werden ausschließlich aus den Einkünften der Wakuf-Stiftungen unterhalten, welche vom Gründer der betreffenden Medresse errichtet worden sind.

Die Medressegebäude (Bild 78, S. 221, Bild 79 und Bild 80, S. 224) sind alle nach ein und demselben Stil erbaut. Es sind dies in der Regel zweistöckige[1] Gebäude aus gebrannten Ziegeln mit quadratischem

[1] Ich gebrauche hier wie überall den Ausdruck zweistöckig in dem in Rußland gebräuchlichen Sinne, wo ein nur aus dem Erdgeschosse bestehendes Haus als einstöckig bezeichnet wird, weil ich die russische Ausdrucksweise für korrekter und praktischer halte als die in den meisten Gegenden Deutschlands gebräuchliche.

1: von Schwarz RLL Soviet Central Asia



Bild 79. Die große Medresse in Buchara. (Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

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Grundriß. Im Innern befindet sich ein geräumiger, meistens mit gebrannten Ziegeln gepflasterter Hof, an den sich von allen Seiten die Wohnungen der Studenten und Gelehrten anschließen. Stallungen, Küchen und sonstige Wirtschaftsgebäude giebt es in diesen Anstalten nicht. Auf den Hof gelangt man durch ein Thor in der Mitte der Hauptfassade, das von einem unverhältnismäßig hohen Thorbogen überspannt ist. Die Wohnräume bestehen aus zwei übereinander liegenden Reihen von Zellen, welche an Größe alle einander gleich sind. Vor jeder Zelle befindet sich eine hohe, nischenartige Vorhalle, welche vorn offen ist. Die Zellen sind ziemlich dunkel, da sie



Bild 80. Omar-Medresse in Kokan.

nur durch ein einziges, über der Thür angebrachtes Fenster erleuchtet werden, das aus einem mit dünnem Papier überklebten Holzgitter besteht. Die Lehrer und Studenten halten sich deshalb in ihren Zellen hauptsächlich nur zur Nachtzeit und während der kalten Jahreszeit auf, obliegen aber ihren Studien während der wärmeren Jahreszeit in den offenen Vorhallen. Geheizt werden die Zellen nicht. Ihre ganze Einrichtung, für die Gelehrten sowohl wie für die Studenten, besteht aus einer Schilfmatte, einigen Decken und Kissen, die tagsüber zusammengerollt in einer Ecke liegen, nachts aber einfach auf dem Boden ausgebreitet werden; ferner aus einem Kerzenleuchter oder einer Öllampe, einer messingenen Waschschüssel und Wasserkanne und endlich noch aus ein paar Büchern, mit deren Studium sich die Insassen

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

Bild 81. Junus-Chodscha, Mulla aus Taschkent.
(Nach einer Aufnahme von G. Merzbacher.)

gerade beschäftigen. Die Gelehrten haben gewöhnlich jeder eine Zelle für sich, die Studenten dagegen wohnen zu zwei in einer Zelle. Bei den Medresses befindet sich in der Regel auch eine Moschee für die religiösen Bedürfnisse der Medresse-Angehörigen.

Den Wirtschaftsangelegenheiten jeder Medresse steht ein Mutewal vor, dem, wie bereits früher erwähnt, die Verwaltung und Nutzbarmachung des der Medresse vermachten, in Ländereien, Karawansarais, Verkaufsbuden, Mühlen ꝛc. bestehenden Vermögens und die Ausbezahlung der Gehälter und Stipendien an die Lehrer und Schüler obliegt.

Die Zahl der Lehrer und Studenten einer Medresse hängt natürlich von den Einkünften derselben ab und ist deshalb für jede Medresse eine beschränkte. In Taschkent ist die größte und reichste die Bekljar-Bek-Medresse, welche etwa 250 Schüler unterhält.

Dank der Bedürfnislosigkeit und einfachen Lebensweise der Eingeborenen sind die Unterhaltungskosten einer Medresse nach unsern Begriffen äußerst gering, und mancher europäische Professor bezieht mehr Gehalt als das ganze Professorenkollegium und die sämtliche Studentenschaft einer turkestanischen Hochschule ersten Ranges miteinander. Die Anzahl der Medresses ist deshalb eine verhältnismäßig große, und die Stadt Taschkent allein zählt deren im ganzen 17, darunter 6 durch Reichtum und Studentenzahl hervorragende. Einige von diesen Medresses bestehen schon seit 400—500 Jahren. Die meisten Gelehrtenschulen giebt es in der Stadt Buchara, dem Rom der zentralasiatischen Mohammedaner.

Die Lehrer an den Medresses sind äußerst ehrwürdige Männer, welche die Achtung, die ihnen von der Bevölkerung gezollt wird, wirklich redlich verdienen. Sie haben auf alle Freuden der Welt verzichtet und leben nur ihrer Wissenschaft. Mein ehemaliger Lehrer Lamont, der frühere Direktor der Münchener Sternwarte, war in Gesinnung und Lebensweise das getreue Abbild eines turkestanischen Medresse-Professors. Dieselben er-

1: von Schwarz RL1 Soviet Central Asia

halten kein Honorar von ihren Schülern und sind lediglich auf die bescheidenen Mittel angewiesen, welche ihnen die Medresse gewährt und welche nur für die Beschaffung der einfachsten Nahrung und Kleidung ausreichen. Die Medresse-Lehrer sind Mullas, welche ihre Studien meistens an derselben Medresse absolviert haben. Sie verwenden ihre ganze Zeit teils auf eigene Studien, teils auf den Unterricht ihrer Schüler. In ihrer äußeren Erscheinung zeichnen sie sich durch ihr würdevolles Auftreten, ihre einfache, aber ausnehmend reinliche Kleidung und den kolossalen Umfang ihrer blendend weißen, aus indischem Gazestoff aufgebauten Turbane aus (Bild 81, S. 225).

Zur Aufnahme unter die Medresse-Schüler ist, soweit die Mittel reichen, ohne Ansehung der Herkunft und Nationalität, jeder berechtigt, der mohammedanischen Glaubens ist und in den Elementarschulen die nötige Vorbildung erhalten hat. Die Schüler der turkestanischen Hochschulen zeichnen sich vor ihren europäischen Kommilitonen sehr vorteilhaft aus durch ihr eingezogenes und bedürfnisloses Leben, worin sie ihren Lehrern nachzueifern streben, und durch ihre große Bescheidenheit im Umgange. Von Burschenschaften, Kommersen, Paukereien, nächtlichen Skandalen und Konflikten mit der Polizei haben sie auch keine blasse Ahnung. Sie kleiden sich genau ebenso wie ihr Lehrer, nur weisen ihre Turbane, entsprechend ihren geringeren Kenntnissen, geringere Dimensionen auf als die Turbane ihrer weisheiterfüllten Lehrer. Die wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten der Medresse-Studenten nehmen fast den ganzen Tag in Anspruch; dabei sind ihre Ferien sehr karg bemessen und beschränken sich, wie an den Volksschulen, auf je eine Woche zur Zeit der drei mohammedanischen Hauptfeste.

Eigentliche Kurse giebt es an den zentralasiatischen Hochschulen nicht, wie es auch nichts unsern Doktorpromotionen, Staatsprüfungen und Staatskonkursen Ähnliches giebt. Die Schüler haben nur eine bestimmte Anzahl von Büchern, je nach Umständen 30—140, durchzustudieren, nach deren Absolvierung sie Anspruch auf den Titel Mulla haben. Je mehr Bücher einer durchstudiert hat, desto größer ist sein Ansehen als Gelehrter, und desto mehr Anspruch hat er auf die höchsten geistlichen und richterlichen Würden.

Von Sprachen werden in den turkestanischen Medresses außer Türkisch noch Persisch und Arabisch gelehrt. Persisch ist bei den Eingeborenen Turkestans die Sprache der Gebildeten und der Diplomaten, wie in Europa Französisch. Arabisch aber, als die Sprache des Koran, spielt bei ihnen dieselbe Rolle wie das Hebräische bei unsern Theologen.

Das ganze Studium beschränkt sich in den zentralasiatischen Hochschulen hauptsächlich auf die Auslegung des Koran und das Studium der Schriften der hervorragendsten Koranausleger und mohammedanischen Rechtslehrer und steht heutzutage noch so ziemlich auf derselben Stufe wie zur Zeit der Einführung des Islam in Turkestan. Von Naturwissenschaften wird nur soviel

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

mitgenommen, als den mohammedanischen Gelehrten bereits vor tausend Jahren bekannt war; alle neueren Errungenschaften in Astronomie, Physik, Medizin, Chemie, Geographie ꝛc. werden vollständig ignoriert. Als oberstes Prinzip gilt noch immer der dem Kalifen Omar imputierte Grundsatz, daß der Inhalt aller neueren Werke entweder bereits im Koran enthalten und folglich überflüssig, oder nicht im Koran enthalten und folglich häretisch sei.

Die Studienzeit ist an den Medresses, je nach den Fähigkeiten der einzelnen Schüler und dem größeren oder geringeren Grade von Gelehrsamkeit, den der einzelne erreichen will, sehr verschieden und beträgt zwischen 15 und 30 Jahren. Gewöhnlich bleibt ein Schüler so lange an der Medresse, bis er eine Anstellung als Professor, Richter, Imam u. dgl. erhält, und kehrt im Falle des Verlustes seiner Stelle wieder dahin zurück.

Die Lehrmethode der Medresse-Professoren hat viele Ähnlichkeit mit der von manchem unserer Philologen bei der Erklärung der alten Klassiker adoptierten Methode. Sie erklären die Werke, welche sie mit ihren Schülern durchgehen, sprachlich und sachlich mit einer Gründlichkeit, die der Silbenstecherei solcher Philologen in nichts nachgiebt, so daß sie oft zur Exponierung eines einzigen Werkes ein ganzes Jahr brauchen. Gelingt es einem solchen Pedanten, in eine völlig unsinnige Stelle des Koran, die früher schon auf hundert verschiedene Arten ausgelegt worden war, einen neuen Sinn hinein zu interpretieren, so ist er ein gemachter Mann, und er wird von seinen Schülern und Kollegen ebenso bewundert, wie bei uns allenfalls die Entdecker des Gravitationsgesetzes, der Cholerabacillen u. s. f., und aus weiter Ferne kommen Schüler und Gelehrte herbei, um ein solches Kirchenlicht anzustaunen und wo möglich dessen Unterricht zu genießen. Man kann nur aufs höchste bedauern, daß so viel Zeit und Arbeit und so viel redliches Bemühen so wenig fruchtbringend auf das ewige Wiederkäuen der Leistungen längst vergangener Zeiten und Geschlechter verwendet wird, wodurch die Menschheit und die Wissenschaft auch nicht um einen Schritt vorwärts gebracht wird.

Unter allen zentralasiatischen Gelehrtenschulen genießen das höchste Ansehen die Medresses der Stadt Buchara, welche die ersten Koryphäen der mohammedanischen Gelehrsamkeit zu ihren Lehrern zählen.

Außer den Medresses, welche die allgemeine Bildung und die Heranziehung von Gelehrten bezwecken, giebt es in Taschkent wie auch in andern Städten Turkestans noch verschiedene Spezialschulen, welche für einen ganz bestimmten Zweck errichtet sind; so die Medresses: Karich-Chana, in welcher sich die Schüler ausschließlich mit dem Auswendiglernen des Koran befassen; Salwat-Chana, in welcher nur Gebete gelehrt werden; Masnawi-Chana, in welcher die Werke des Dichters Masnawi studiert werden, u. dgl.

Die Russen haben in ihren zentralasiatischen Besitzungen in Bezug auf das Unterrichtswesen an den alten Institutionen nichts geändert. Sie haben

L: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

zwar auf ihre Kosten eine Anzahl von russischen Volksschulen und Gymnasien errichtet; diese sind aber hauptsächlich für die Kinder der russischen Ansiedler, Soldaten, Beamten und Offiziere bestimmt. Die verhältnismäßig wenigen russischen Schulen, welche von den Eingeborenen, besonders von den Kirgisen, besucht werden, dienen in erster Linie zur Heranbildung von Dolmetschern für die verschiedenen Behörden, da von den in Turkestan dienenden russischen Beamten nur sehr wenige mit den Sprachen der Eingeborenen vertraut sind. Sehr verdienstvoll war die Errichtung von russischen Aul-Schulen für die Nomaden, welche bei ihrer unsteten Lebensweise früher nicht im stande gewesen waren, ihren Kindern Schulunterricht erteilen zu lassen. Die Lehrer für die Aul-Schulen werden für ihren Beruf im Taschkenter Lehrerseminar ausgebildet, müssen der russischen und der einheimischen Sprachen mächtig sein und werden den verschiedenen Nomaden-Auls zugeteilt, um sie auf ihren Wanderungen zu begleiten und dabei die Kinder der Aul-Angehörigen in den Anfangsgründen und in der russischen Sprache zu unterrichten. Daß das Leben eines solchen nomadischen Schulmeisters, besonders wenn er europäischer Abstammung ist, nicht gerade beneidenswert ist, wird nach dem, was ich oben über die Lebensweise der Nomaden mitgeteilt habe, einleuchten, besonders wenn man bedenkt, daß der Gehalt eines Aul-Schullehrers nur 50—70 Mark monatlich beträgt.

10. Wohnungen. Die eigentümlichen Familienverhältnisse und die gänzliche Abschließung der Frauen von der Männerwelt erfordern eine eigene, von der unserigen völlig abweichende Bauart und Einrichtung der Wohnhäuser. In Turkestan ist jedes Haus nur für eine einzige Familie eingerichtet und das Institut von Zinshäusern oder gar von möblierten Zimmern gänzlich unbekannt. Kommt zu einem Hausbesitzer ein fremder Gast, so überläßt er demselben für die Dauer seines Aufenthaltes sein ganzes Haus samt Einrichtung und Dienerschaft, und sucht inzwischen mit seiner Familie Unterkunft bei irgend einem seiner Verwandten, wenn er für solche Fälle nicht noch ein zweites Haus in Reserve hat.

Die Häuser sind alle nach ein und demselben Stil erbaut, und die Wohnungen der Reichen unterscheiden sich von denen der Armen nur durch die geräumigeren Höfe und Gärten, die größere Höhe der Mauern, die größere Anzahl von Gemächern, die kunstvollere Ausführung und das bessere Baumaterial. Die Hauptsache in der Wohnung jedes ansässigen Zentralasiaten ist die hohe Umfassungsmauer, welche die Wohngebäude samt zugehörigen Gärten und Hofräumen allseitig begrenzt und von der Außenwelt vollständig abschließt. Diese Umfassungsmauer, welche nur auf der Straßenseite von einer einzigen Pforte durchbrochen wird, hinter der eine eigene Vormauer angebracht ist, um den Einblick auf den Hof von der Straße aus zu verhindern, bildet gleichsam die Burg jedes Haus-

besitzers, in die kein Unbefugter einzudringen das Recht hat. Innerhalb seiner Mauern ist der Zentralasiate sein eigener Herr, und nicht einmal die Behörden wagen es, die Heiligkeit der Privatwohnungen, besonders



Bild 62. Querschnitt einer sartischen Wohnung.

1. Veranda.
2. Verandafläche.
3. Zimmerthür.
4. Fensteröffnung.
5. Vertiefung für die Türschwelle.
6. Wandnische.
7. Rauchloch.
8. Teich.
9. Fundament.
10. Sommerdach für den Winter.
11. Terrasse.
12. Umfassungsmauer.

der Frauenabteilungen, anzutasten, was bisher die Ausführung von genaueren Volkszählungen unmöglich gemacht hat. Denn nach zentralasiatischer Sitte gälte es schon für eine Impertinenz, wenn man einen Hausvater auch nur nach der Zahl seiner Frauen und Kinder oder nach den Vorgängen innerhalb seiner vier Wände fragen wollte.



Bild 63. Grundriß einer sartischen Wohnung.
Legende. 1. Wohnzimmer. 2. Veranda. 3. Eingänge. 4. Ofenloch. 5. Teich. 6. Terrasse.

Der von der erwähnten Umfassungsmauer umschlossene Raum zerfällt in zwei voneinander durch eine Zwischenmauer streng geschiedene und nur durch eine enge und niedrige Gartenthüre verbundene Teile. Der größere, nach der Straße zu liegende Teil bildet die Männerabteilung, in welcher der Hausvater mit seinen erwachsenen Söhnen und allenfalls bei ihm wohnenden männlichen Verwandten und Dienern wohnt, seinen Geschäften obliegt und die Besucher und Fremden empfängt. Der andere Teil ist ausschließlich für den Aufenthalt der Frauen und Kinder bestimmt, und denselben dürfen nur Frauen, von Männern aber nur der Hausvater allein

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

betreten[1]. Die erwähnten beiden Abteilungen zerfallen wieder in je zwei oder nach Umständen je drei Unterabteilungen: die Wohngebäude, den Hofraum und den Garten, welch letzterer gewöhnlich bei Ärmeren fehlt. Besonders in wasserarmen Gegenden und in eng gebauten Städten müssen sich die Bewohner mit einem einfachen Hofe begnügen, während die Gärten vor die Stadtmauern verwiesen sind. Wo ein Garten vorhanden ist, ist derselbe in der Regel wieder durch eine weitere Zwischenmauer von dem Hof und den Wohngebäuden getrennt. Die allgemeine Anordnung der Wohngebäude, Stallungen, Höfe und Gärten ist in der Regel die in obigen zwei Zeichnungen (Bild 82 u. 83, S. 229) angedeutete, von denen die erste den Aufriß, die zweite den Grundriß einer Durchschnittswohnung darstellt.

Das Wohngebäude, welches je nach den Vermögensverhältnissen des Besitzers aus einem oder mehreren nebeneinander liegenden Gemächern besteht, ist in der Weise an die Umfassungsmauer angebaut, daß die letztere zugleich die hintere Wand des Wohnhauses bildet. Die Wohngebäude sind fast ausschließlich einstöckig, was seinen Grund teils in dem verwendeten Baumaterial, teils in den häufigen Erdbeben hat[2]. Die Mauern der Wohngebäude werden aus demselben Material hergestellt wie die Stadt-, Hof- und Gartenmauern und in ganz ähnlicher Weise aufgeführt wie diese. Auf dem Hofe wird eine große Grube ausgegraben, die dabei gewonnene Erde mit Wasser und Häckseln zu einem zähen Teige geknetet, daraus große Kugeln geformt und diese aufeinander geschichtet und mit den Füßen festgestampft. Wie die Stadt- und Gartenmauern werden auch die Häusermauern schichtenweise aufgeführt, weil man immer die untere Schichte erst trocken

[1] Die Heiligkeit der Frauenabteilungen ist in den Augen der Zentralasiaten so groß, daß dieselbe schon durch den Blick eines Fremden entweiht werden kann. Als ich im Jahre 1886 in Baisun, da kein anderer passender Platz aufzutreiben war, die astronomischen Beobachtungen auf dem Dache meiner Wohnung ausführen mußte, wurden für die betreffende Nacht alle umliegenden Häuser von ihren Besitzern geräumt.

[2] Die Häufigkeit der Erdbeben ist an den verschiedenen Orten Turkestans sehr verschieden. Während in manchen Gegenden, wie z. B. in Samarkand, solche sehr selten sind, werden andere Orte häufig von Erdbeben heimgesucht, wie z. B. die Stadt Wernoe, welche am 9. Juni 1887 durch ein Erdbeben beinahe gänzlich zerstört wurde und in der seitdem fast täglich einige leichtere oder heftigere Erdstöße erfolgen. Auch in Osch, am Ostende des Ferganathales, kamen vor mehreren Jahren eine Zeitlang fast täglich Erdbeben vor. In Taschkent zählt man im Durchschnitt etwa ein halbes Dutzend Erdbeben im Laufe eines Jahres. Im allgemeinen sind in Turkestan die Erdbeben leicht und führen nur in seltenen Fällen zum Einsturz von Gebäuden und zum Verlust von Menschenleben. In Taschkent habe ich in 15 Jahren nur zwei derartige Erdbeben erlebt, von denen das vom 29. November 1886 das stärkste war und erheblichen Schaden anrichtete. Das heftigste in neuerer Zeit in Turkestan vorgekommene Erdbeben war das bereits erwähnte von Wernoe, welches in ganz Turkestan verspürt wurde.

werden lassen muß, ehe man eine weitere Schichte darauflegt. Das unter den Lehm gemischte Stroh verleiht den Mauern eine große Festigkeit, um so mehr, als die unter dem Stroh zurückgebliebenen Samenkörner durch die große Sonnenwärme zum Keimen gebracht werden und die ganze Mauer nach allen Richtungen durchwachsen, so daß an neugebauten Häusern außen zahlreiche Gersten- und Weizenhalme hervorsprossen. Eine solche Mauer hält den Erdbeben viel besser stand als eine wenn auch noch so solide aus gebrannten Ziegeln aufgeführte. Gebrannte Ziegel werden zum Bau von Privathäusern nicht verwendet und kommen nur bei größeren öffentlichen Gebäuden wie Moscheen, Medresses, Karawansarais und Bädern zur Verwendung, bei denen ihr Gebrauch nicht zu umgehen ist, weil Lehmmauern den starken Druck natürlich nicht aushalten würden. In den seltenen Fällen, wo auf ein Wohnhaus ein oberes Stockwerk aufgesetzt wird, werden die Wände des zweiten Stockes auf eine eigentümliche Weise durch Verbindung von Holz und Lehm hergestellt. Es wird zuerst aus mittelstarken Balken eine Holzbaracke gezimmert und zwischen die Balken in ganz unregelmäßiger Weise, meistens fächerartig, eine große Menge kurzer, dünner Holzstäbe eingesetzt. Die Zwischenräume zwischen den Hauptbalken und den Holzstäben werden dann mit Lehmkugeln ausgefüllt, und schließlich wird das Ganze von innen und außen mit einer dicken Lehmschichte überkleistert, so daß vom Holzgerippe nichts mehr zu sehen ist als höchstens die Enden der Hauptbalken (vgl. Bild 158). Diese oberen Stockwerke, welche nicht als Wohnräume, sondern nur als Speicher verwendet werden, führen den persischen Namen Bala-Chana, von bala = oberes und chana = Zimmer, aus dem offenbar das russische balagan = Jahrmarkt-Schaubude und wahrscheinlich auch unser „Balkon" abgeleitet ist.

Fundamente haben die Wohngebäude nicht, was auch ganz überflüssig wäre, weil der aus Löß bestehende Boden dieselbe Festigkeit besitzt wie die Mauern selbst, die ja aus demselben Material hergestellt sind. Nur hat der Mangel eines Fundamentes den Nachteil, daß während der Regenzeit der untere Teil der Mauern aus dem durchweichten Boden die Feuchtigkeit anzieht, wodurch die Festigkeit derselben beeinträchtigt wird. Die Reicheren, welche ihren Wohnhäusern eine größere Höhe zu geben pflegen, als dies bei den Hütten der Ärmeren üblich ist, gebrauchen deshalb mitunter die Vorsicht, die unterste Lage der Mauern aus gebrannten Ziegeln herzustellen oder wenigstens ihre Häuser auf eine künstlich aufgeschüttete Terrasse zu stellen.

Die Innen- und Außenwände der Häuser bleiben in der Regel so wie sie sind und haben folglich die gelblichgraue Farbe des Straßenbodens. Das Tünchen mit gelöschtem Kalke war früher in Turkestan nicht in Brauch und ist erst durch die Russen eingeführt worden. Dagegen bedecken die Reichen die Innenwände ihrer Wohnungen mit Stukkaturarbeiten aus Ala-

baster in arabischem Stile. Wandmalereien trifft man nur selten. Dieselben bestehen gewöhnlich aus Arabesken in möglichst bunten und grellen Farben, oder auch aus stilisierten Blumen, die mich immer lebhaft an eine Erzählung in den „Münchner Fliegenden Blättern" erinnerten, laut welcher ein zum Zimmermaler avancierter Anstreicher die Blumen und Blätter auf den zu dekorierenden Wänden auf die Weise herstellte, daß er seine Hände abwechselnd in rote und grüne Farbe tauchte, dieselben mit gespreizten Fingern an die Wand drückte und schließlich an die so hergestellten Blumen und Blätter durch einen Pinselstrich noch den Stiel ansetzte.

Ebenso einfach wie die Mauern werden auch die Dächer der Wohnhäuser hergestellt. Die gewöhnlich unbehauenen, nur von Ästen und Rinde entblößten Dachballen werden in einem gegenseitigen Abstande von etwa 70 cm horizontal auf zwei gegenüberstehende Mauern gelegt und in dieser Lage eingemauert. Quer über diese Balken wird eine ungefähr 20 cm dicke Schichte von Schilfrohr oder, wo Schilfrohr nicht vorhanden ist, von Reisig gebreitet, welche direkt die Zimmerdecke bildet. Die Reicheren verwenden zierlich geschnitzte Deckbalken und statt des Schilfes kurze runde Stäbe aus Weidenholz von etwa 5 cm Dicke, die dicht aneinander von einem Balken zum andern gelegt werden, wie nebenstehendes Bild 84 zeigt.



Bild 84. Sartische Zimmerdecke.

In den seltenen Fällen, wo die Zimmerdecken aus kurzen, quer über die Dachballen gelegten Brettern hergestellt werden, sind diese Bretter in der Art geschnitzt, daß sie den Anschein erwecken, als wären es keine Bretter, sondern runde Holzstäbe: ein Beweis, daß die Herstellung der Zimmerdecken aus Holzstäben die ursprüngliche war und deshalb noch immer als Norm gilt.

Bei den Reichen werden die Zimmerdecken oft sehr kunstvoll mit vielverschlungenen und äußerst komplizierten Arabesken bemalt, die aus möglichst grellen, blauen, roten, grünen und gelben Farben zusammengesetzt werden; auch Goldfarbe kommt mitunter zur Verwendung.

Die auf die angegebene Weise aus Ballen und Schilf, Reisig, Holzstäben oder auch Brettern hergestellten Decken werden nun noch mit einer etwa fußdicken Lehmschichte bedeckt, die ebenfalls aus Lößerde und Stroh besteht. Der zum Eindecken der Dächer bestimmte Lehm wird mit besonderer Sorgfalt präpariert, weil die horizontalen Dächer von Regen und Schnee viel mehr zu leiden haben als die Mauern, die von den Niederschlägen nur



Bild 83. Kaufleute von Qyllas in Ojh-Bodjara. (Nach einer Aufnahme von Eduard M. Rikmann)

R von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

seitwärts getroffen werden und jedesmal schnell wieder austrocknen. Der zum Eindecken der Dächer bestimmte Lehm wird mit sehr viel Stroh, bis zu 50 Prozent, vermengt, mit viel Wasser angefeuchtet und dann, unter öfterem Umrühren, etwa eine Woche lang der Gärung überlassen. Ist das Material gehörig vorbereitet, so wird dasselbe schichtenweise auf das Dach aufgetragen und jede Schichte möglichst sorgfältig mit den bloßen Füßen festgestampft. Die mit dem Feststampfen der Dächer beschäftigten, gewöhnlich halbnackten Arbeiter bewegen sich bei ihrer Arbeit im Tanzschritt, was einen hochkomischen Anblick gewährt.

Während der Regenzeit bedecken sich diese Lehmdächer jedesmal mit einer üppigen Grasvegetation und im Frühjahre mit einer Unmasse von wilden Tulpen.

Da die ebenen Dächer im Winter der unmittelbaren Einwirkung von Regen und Schnee ausgesetzt sind, so werden sie immer schon in verhältnismäßig kurzer Zeit defekt, und es bilden sich Risse, durch die das Regen- und Schneewasser in die Wohnungen eindringt. Besonders gefährlich sind diesen Dächern die Hunde, die sich beständig auf ihnen herumtreiben und durch Scharren deren Solidität beeinträchtigen. Die Lehmschichte muß deshalb jeden Herbst vor Eintritt der Regenzeit ausgebessert und von Zeit zu Zeit ganz erneuert werden.

Die ebenen Hausdächer sind bei den Eingeborenen ein beliebter Aufenthaltsort; während der warmen Jahreszeit dienen sie als Schlafstellen und als Ort zur Verrichtung des Morgen- und Abendgebetes, und an sonnigen Wintertagen obliegen hier die Frauen ihren häuslichen Arbeiten (Bild 62, S. 173; Bild 85, S. 233, und Bild 86).

Die auf die angeführte Weise erbauten Wohnhäuser der Eingeborenen sind absolut feuersicher, und während der ganzen 15 Jahre meines Aufenthaltes in Zentralasien ist nie eine Feuersbrunst zu meiner Kenntnis gelangt. Als daher vor einigen Jahren in Taschkent der Agent einer Feuerversicherungsgesellschaft erschien, erregte derselbe bei den Taschkentern ein ebensolches Gaudium, als wenn allenfalls bei uns jemand die Häuser gegen etwaige Beschädigungen durch Aerolithen versichern wollte.

Die gegenwärtig in Turkestan gebräuchliche Bauart stammt offenbar noch aus den ältesten Zeiten, und man kann mit Sicherheit annehmen, daß hier die Häuser nie anders gebaut worden sind als in der Gegenwart. Die an jeder Baustelle in Überfluß vorhandene Lößerde ist ein so handliches und brauchbares Material, und die daraus aufgeführten Bauten haben, dank der außerordentlichen Trockenheit des Klimas, eine solche Festigkeit und verhältnismäßige Dauerhaftigkeit, daß die Bewohner keine Veranlassung hatten, sich nach einem andern Material umzusehen. Gebrannte Ziegel zum Bau von Privathäusern zu verwenden, erlaubte der Mangel an Brennholz nicht, da

Bild 86. Ansicht von Chiwa von Westen.

L: von Schwarz RLJ Soviet Central Asia

es in den turkestanischen Oasen keine Wälder giebt und als Brennmaterial nur Schilf und das Holz der Gartenbäume verwendet werden kann. Der Benützung von Steinen zum Häuserbau standen zwei wichtige Umstände im Wege. Erstens hätten aus unbehauenen Steinen aufgeführte Mauern den Erdbeben viel weniger widerstehen können als Lehmmauern; zweitens giebt es in Lößgegenden überhaupt keine Steine, und dieselben hätten also aus den Gebirgen, Hunderte von Kilometern weit, herbeigeschafft werden müssen, woran bei dem Mangel von Kunststraßen und Brücken gar nicht zu denken war. Daß auch schon zu Alexanders Zeiten die Häuser und Stadtmauern in derselben Weise aufgeführt wurden wie heutzutage, geht aus Alexanders Geschichte deutlich hervor. Arrian erzählt, daß die Stadtmauern von Gaza (wie ich in meiner Monographie „Alexanders d. Gr. Feldzüge in Turkestan" auseinandergesetzt habe, wahrscheinlich das heutige Nau) aus Erde aufgeführt und nicht hoch waren. Ferner berichtet Arrian, daß Alexander die Stadt Alexandria am Tanais, das heutige Chodschent, mit Stadtmauern und Häusern in 20 Tagen erbaut habe, welche Curtius sogar auf 17 Tage reduziert. Dies war aber nur möglich, wenn Alexander die Stadt in der nämlichen Weise erbaute, wie auch noch das heutige Chodschent und die übrigen turkestanischen Städte erbaut sind.

Daß in Turkestan die Städte auch während der Glanzperioden, unter der Herrschaft der Araber und der Timuriden, in dem gegenwärtig noch gebräuchlichen Stil erbaut wurden, geht daraus hervor, daß sich nirgends Überreste von steinernen oder aus gebrannten Ziegeln aufgeführten Mauerwerken in größerem Umfange erhalten haben. Alle noch vorhandenen Städteruinen beweisen, daß überall nur die öffentlichen Gebäude aus gebrannten Ziegeln erbaut waren, und zwar erst seit der Zeit der Araber; von Steinbauten dagegen findet man, abgesehen von den Tamerlanschen Prachtbauten in Samarkand, in den Ebenen nirgends eine Spur. Man trifft solche nur in Gebirgsgegenden, in Darwas, Badachschan 2c., wo auch gegenwärtig noch die Häuser stellenweise aus unbehauenen Steinen aufgeführt werden, aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil es dort keinen Löß giebt und das Klima feuchter ist als im Tieflande.

In der vorhistorischen Zeit müssen die Bewohner Turkestans in künstlichen unterirdischen Höhlen und Gängen gewohnt haben, die in den Lößboden eingetrieben wurden; dies beweisen unter anderem die in Samarkand und neuerdings auch bei Karki, am Amu-Darja aufgefundenen Gänge und Höhlen, welche eine sehr große Ausdehnung haben und förmliche unterirdische Städte bilden.

Die innere Einrichtung der Wohnungen ist ebenso einfach wie die Wohngebäude selbst. Öfen giebt es nirgends; dagegen traf ich im afghanischen Turkestan und bei den Tarantschis des Ilithals Kamine,

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

welche ganz den bei uns gebräuchlichen glichen. Eine eigentliche Heizung der Wohnräume wäre übrigens auch bei dem Vorhandensein der Öfen nicht möglich, weil die Thüren nur sehr unvollkommen schließen, bei den Ärmeren wohl ganz fehlen, und weil die Fensteröffnungen, wo welche vorhanden sind, entweder ganz offen oder höchstens mit dünnem Papier verklebt sind. Glasfenster verwenden die Eingeborenen nicht, und auch die Reichsten und selbst die Chane verbringen die kalte Jahreszeit in ungeheizten Gemächern, in denen die Luft freien Zutritt hat. Die Filzjurten der Nomaden bieten im Winter einen viel besseren Schutz gegen die Kälte und die Unbilden der Witterung als die Wohnungen selbst der Reichsten unter der ansässigen Bevölkerung. Die Kirgisen haben deshalb vollkommen recht, daß sie ihre Jurten gemauerten Wohnhäusern vorziehen.



Bild 87. Turkestanisches Kohlenbecken.

Um sich während der grimmigsten Kälte zu erwärmen, gebrauchen die Eingeborenen Turkestans schmiedeiserne, auf vier Füßen ruhende Kohlenbecken, wie sie im Altertum in Griechenland und Rom in Gebrauch waren. Diese Kohlenbecken werden, nachdem sie mit glühenden Kohlen gefüllt worden sind, unter ein rundes oder viereckiges Tischchen von 20—40 cm Höhe gestellt, das dann mit einer großen, abgenähten Baumwolldecke zugedeckt wird. Die Familienglieder setzen sich nun rings um diesen Tisch auf den Boden und strecken Hände und Füße unter die Decke in den durch die Kohlen erwärmten Raum. In Bild 87 ist ein solches nach der Natur gezeichnetes Kohlenbecken nebst zugehöriger Zange und Kohlenschaufel dargestellt.

Den Armen, welche sich den Luxus eines Kohlenbeckens nicht gestatten können, bleibt nichts übrig als zu frieren und nach Umständen zu erfrieren, besonders wenn sie auch keinen hinreichenden Vorrat von warmen Kleidern und Decken besitzen. Jede große Kälte fordert in den turkestanischen Städten zahlreiche Opfer an Menschenleben, und die Eingeborenen beurteilen, in Ermangelung von meteorologischen Instrumenten, den jeweiligen Kältegrad nach der Zahl der im Laufe einer Nacht erfrorenen Individuen. Im Jahre 1879, wo in Taschkent die Temperatur einmal auf 27° C unter dem Gefrierpunkte sank, erfroren in dem sartischen Stadtteile von Taschkent

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

in einer Nacht 126 Eingeborene. Hierbei kann man die Hartnäckigkeit bewundern, mit der die Menschen am Althergebrachten hängen. Obwohl die Eingeborenen die russischen Wohnungseinrichtungen vor Augen haben und deren Zweckmäßigkeit anerkennen, fällt es ihnen doch nicht ein, dieselben nachzuahmen, auch wenn ihnen ihre Mittel dies erlaubten.

Die vom Hofe in die Wohnräume führenden Thüren, welche meistens auch zugleich die Stelle der Fenster vertreten und deshalb bei größeren Gemächern in größerer Anzahl vorhanden sind, sind gewöhnlich sehr niedrig, so daß man nur gebückt passieren kann. Die Thüren bestehen stets aus zwei Flügeln, die sich nicht um Thürangeln, sondern um zwei in den Sturz und die Schwelle eingelassene Zapfen bewegen, stets nach innen aufgehen und so schmal sind, daß man jedesmal beide Flügel öffnen muß, um eintreten zu können. Bei den Reichen sind die Thürflügel gewöhnlich mit kunstvollen, vielverschlungenen Arabesken in Schnitzarbeit verziert oder wenigstens mit grellen, roten, grünen oder blauen Farben angestrichen. Da in Turkestan als Bau- und Werkholz fast ausschließlich das wenig solide Pappelholz verwendet wird, welches zudem meistens schon verarbeitet wird, ehe es noch ganz ausgetrocknet ist, so werden die Thürstöcke und Thürflügel beim weiteren Austrocknen immer mehr oder weniger verzogen und schließen deshalb nur sehr mangelhaft oder auch gar nicht. Eigentümlich ist der Verschluß der Thüren; an dem einen Thürflügel ist von außen eine kurze eiserne Kette, an dem andern ein in einen Ring endigender Stift befestigt, an welchen das letzte, mit einem Schlitze versehene Glied der Kette angelegt wird. Soll eine solche Thüre abgesperrt werden, so wird an den erwähnten Ring ein Vorhängeschloß gelegt.

Fenster giebt es nur in den Häusern der Reicheren, während sich die Ärmeren mit dem durch die Thüröffnung einfallenden Lichte begnügen. Die Fensteröffnung, deren horizontaler Durchmesser bei Privatgebäuden stets größer ist als der vertikale, befindet sich jedesmal über der Thüre, und es giebt deshalb in jedem Gemache ebenso viele Fenster als Thüren. Die Fensteröffnung wird entweder ganz offen gelassen oder mit einem Gitter aus Holz oder Alabaster verschlossen, um das Eindringen von Schwalben und Spatzen, deren es hier ungeheuer viele giebt, sowie anderer Vögel zu verhindern. Die Stäbe, aus welchen sich die Holzgitter zusammensetzen, werden nicht einfach kreuzweise zusammengefügt, sondern in mehr oder minder komplizierter Weise zu Arabesken verschlungen. Eine der einfachsten Formen dieser Fenstergitter ist die auf Bild 88 angedeutete. Die Grundform der aus Alabaster hergestellten Gitter ist häufig den Holzgittern nachgebildet. Während des Winters werden diese Fenstergitter zur Abhaltung des Zugwindes häufig mit weißem Zigarettenpapier oder auch mit ölgetränktem Schreibpapier überklebt. Das Innere der Wohnungen ist wegen der mangelhaften Fenstervorrichtungen und der

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia



Bild 80. Turkestanisches Fenstergitter.

breiten Vordächer der Veranden fast stets in Halbdunkel gehüllt, und nur wenn die Thürflügel geöffnet sind, ist man im stande, in unmittelbarer Nähe der Thüren zu lesen oder feinere Arbeiten zu verrichten (vgl. Bild 72, S. 201, und Bild 79, S. 223).

Gleich innerhalb des Haupteinganges befindet sich in den Wohnzimmern eine viereckige Vertiefung, welche als Wasch- und Badeplatz, zum Übergießen mit Wasser und zum Ablegen der Überschuhe dient.

Der Zimmerboden besteht vollständig aus Lehm und wird stets, je nach den Vermögensverhältnissen des Besitzers, entweder mit einfachen Schilfmatten oder Filzdecken oder auch mit mehr oder weniger kostbaren Teppichen belegt.

Zur Ventilation dient eine Öffnung im Dache, in welche ein kurzes cylindrisches Rohr aus gebranntem Thon eingesetzt ist. Da durch diese Öffnung Regen und Schnee ungehindert eindringen können, so werden die Ventilationsöffnungen häufig auch seitwärts in den Wänden, gleich unterhalb des Daches, angebracht.

Zimmermöbel giebt es in den Wohnungen der Zentralasiaten entweder gar nicht oder nur in sehr geringer Zahl. Von Tischen, Stühlen, Diwanen und unsern mannigfachen Schränken und Kommoden hat man keine Idee. Statt unserer Kleider- und Küchenschränke und Kommoden dienen in Turkestan eigene in die Wände eingelassene Nischen, welche in der Regel alle vier Wände der Wohnzimmer einnehmen. Diese Nischen sind entweder einfache Vertiefungen in den Wänden, ähnlich unsern Blendfenstern, oder es sind kunstvoll aus Alabaster hergestellte Fächer, wie aus Bild 123 zu ersehen ist. Diese Nischen dienen zum Aufhängen von Kleidern und Wäsche und zur Aufbewahrung von Tafelgeschirr, Waschschüsseln, Wasser- und Theekannen, Wasserpfeifen, Kerzenleuchtern, Früchten und Eßwaren, allenfallsigen Büchern u. dgl. Von eigentlichen Möbeln kennen die Eingeborenen Turkestans nur Bettstellen, Kinderwiegen, Koffer und die bereits erwähnten niedrigen Tischchen für die Kohlenbecken.

Die ärmere Bevölkerung und auch ein guter Teil der Reichen schläft einfach auf dem Boden. Als Unterlage dient eine Filzdecke, über welche eine oder, je nachdem es die Mittel erlauben, auch mehrere abgenähte Baumwolldecken gebreitet werden. Zum Zudecken dient gleichfalls eine abgenähte Baumwolldecke, aber von feinerem Stoffe als die Unterlage. Auch seidene und halbseidene, wattierte Decken sind nicht selten. Diese Decken haben gewöhnlich ca. 2 m im Geviert und erlauben deshalb bei großer

L. von Schwarz RLI Soviet Central Asia

Kälte ein vollständiges Einwickeln. Auf meinen Reisen habe ich unter solchen Decken mitunter bei einer Kälte von 20—30 Graden im Freien kampiert und mich dabei ganz wohl befunden. Von Betttüchern wissen die Eingeborenen nichts; die Bettdecken lassen deshalb, da sie wegen ihrer Wattierung nicht gewaschen werden können, nach längerem Gebrauche in Bezug auf Reinlichkeit viel zu wünschen übrig. Tagsüber werden die Bettdecken zusammengerollt und mit den Kopfkissen an den Wänden aufgestapelt. Als Kopfkissen benützt man mit Baumwolle ausgestopfte und mit Baumwollstoff oder Seide überzogene Cylinder, ähnlich unsern Fensterkissen, welche nach meinen Erfahrungen den in Europa gebräuchlichen Federkopfkissen entschieden vorzuziehen sind; denn sie sind nicht nur hygienischer, sondern auch bequemer. Den Luxus von Bettstellen erlauben sich nur die Reichsten. Die turkestanischen Bettstellen, deren Einrichtung aus Bild 89 zu ersehen ist, sind trotz ihrer Einfachheit das zweckmäßigste, was ich je gesehen habe, und keine noch so raffinierte Verbesserung unserer Bettstellen kann mit denselben konkurrieren. Sie vereinigen die Vorzüge der gewöhnlichen Bettstellen mit denen der amerikanischen Hängematten und sind im stande, den Ansprüchen des verwöhntesten Sybariten zu genügen. Ich bin durch langjährigen Gebrauch der turkestanischen Bettstellen so verwöhnt worden, daß ich mich bis jetzt mit den europäischen Betten nicht wieder befreunden konnte. Die turkestanischen Bettstellen bestehen aus einem roh aus etwa 10 cm dicken Balken gezimmerten, auf vier je einen halben Meter hohen gedrechselten Füßen ruhenden Holzrahmen, der mit einem Netz aus dünnen Roßhaarschnüren überspannt ist. Die Länge der Bettstellen beträgt etwas über 2 m, die Breite 1 bis 1,5 m. Wird ein solches Gestell mit einem halben Dutzend weicher, abgenähter Baumwolldecken bedeckt, so bietet es den größten Komfort, den man sich denken kann. Der Körper nimmt, dank der Elastizität des Roßhaarnetzes, die bequemste Stellung an, man kann sich nach allen Seiten ungehindert ausstrecken, und nirgends spürt man auch nur den leisesten Druck. Begnügt man sich während der heißen Jahreszeit mit einer einzigen Decke als Unterlage, so ist man kühl gebettet und hat nicht unter der unerträglichen und ungesunden Hitze zu leiden, welche die europäischen Federbetten verursachen.

Die Wiegen sind transportable, mit einem Fliegennetz aus durchsichtigem Gazestoff überspannte Gestelle, welche sowohl zum Schaukeln wie zum Tragen der Säuglinge dienen. Die Einrichtung derselben erinnert einigermaßen an einen Vogelkäfig oder auch an die in München zum Tragen einer größeren Anzahl von Bierkrügen dienenden Gestelle (Bild 90; vgl. auch Bild 157). Das Kopf- und Fußende dieser Wiegen wird gebildet durch zwei halbkreisförmig gebogene Holzreifen, die untereinander durch eine Anzahl horizontaler, gewöhnlich gedrechselter und bunt bemalter Holzleisten verbunden

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

sind. Der Boden und die niedrigen Seitenwände werden aus dünnen Brettchen oder Holzspänen hergestellt. Die Mütter tragen ihre Säuglinge nicht wie bei uns in Windeln gewickelt auf den Armen, sondern in den erwähnten Tragwiegen, was nicht nur für die Mütter bequemer, sondern auch für die Entwicklung der Kleinen entschieden vorteilhafter ist als unsere Methode. Zum Schaukeln werden die Wiegen mittels eines in der Mitte der oberen Querleiste befestigten Strickes im Freien an einen Baumast, im Zimmer oder auf der Veranda aber an einem Deckbalken aufgehängt. In dieser Wiege, welche bei allen Zentralasiaten im Gebrauche ist, liegen die Kinder beständig auf dem Rücken, was zur Folge hat, daß sich der Hinterkopf derselben mit der Zeit stark abplattet. Auf diesen Umstand ist die ausgesprochene Kurzköpfigkeit aller Zentralasiaten, Kirgisen, Usbeken, Sarten, Tadschiken, Galtschas ꝛc. zurückzuführen. Der Schädelindex bildet also nicht, wie die Anthropologen annehmen, ein anthropologisches, sondern lediglich ein ethnographisches Kriterium.



Bild 89. Turkestanische Bettstelle.

Zur Aufbewahrung ihrer Kostbarkeiten benützen die Stadtbewohner Turkestans dieselben aus Rußland importierten hölzernen, mit Eisenblech beschlagenen und grün oder rot bemalten Koffer wie die Nomaden, und diese Koffer bilden stets einen Hauptschmuck der Wohnzimmer.



Bild 90. Turkestanische Kinderwiege.

Von sonstigen Einrichtungsgegenständen, welche man außer den bereits erwähnten noch in den Wohnungen der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans antrifft, sind nur noch ihre eigentümlichen Theekannen und Tassen, Waschschüsseln, Messingteller, Wasserpfeifen und Vogelkäfige zu erwähnen.

Die Theekannen (Bild 91, S. 242) sind entweder aus Messing oder aus verzinntem Kupfer angefertigt, sind stets mehr oder weniger kunstvoll ziseliert und haben dieselbe Form wie die Wasser- und Weinkannen, welche in den katholischen Kirchen bei der Messe verwendet werden. Diese Theekannen werden mit Wasser gefüllt ans Feuer gestellt, und nachdem das Wasser zum Kochen gebracht ist, wird ein entsprechendes Quantum Thee eingeworfen. Die Theetassen sind entweder aus Thon und dann einheimisches Fabrikat, oder aus chinesischem echten oder imitierten Porzellan (Bild 123).

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Bild 91. Theekannen.

Eigentümlich ist die Form der einheimischen Waschschüsseln, welche vor und nach jeder Mahlzeit und auch sonst tagsüber häufig gebraucht werden und in der Regel von guter und zierlicher Arbeit sind. Dieselben werden ebenfalls aus Messing oder verzinntem Kupfer hergestellt und bestehen aus einer flachen Schüssel mit siebartig durchlöchertem Boden, an welche sich unten ein nachttopfartiges Gefäß anschließt, das zum Auffangen des schmutzigen Waschwassers bestimmt ist. Zum Aufgießen des Wassers beim Waschen werden Messingkannen mit langem Ausflußrohre benützt. Diese Waschschüsseln nebst zugehörigen Wasserkannen werden, als Repräsentationsstücke, mitunter mit großem Luxus hergestellt; in Buchara wurde mir einmal ein Prachtexemplar zum Kaufe angeboten, welches goldplattiert, ausgezeichnet ziseliert und mit einer Menge von Halbedelsteinen besetzt war und für welches der Verfertiger 300 Mark verlangte (Bild 92).

Porzellanteller sind in Turkestan erst in der letzten Zeit durch die Russen in Aufnahme gekommen. Bis dahin hatten die Eingeborenen nur ganz flache, mit einem schmalen, fast senkrechten Rande versehene runde Teller von verschiedener Größe, ähnlich unsern Serviertellern. Dieselben werden aus Messing oder verzinntem Kupfer hergestellt, haben mitunter einen Durchmesser von nahezu einem Meter und werden nur zum Servieren von Früchten, Süßigkeiten und den unzähligen Tassen und Schüsseln benützt, welche zur Bewirtung von vornehmen Gästen alle auf einmal aufgetragen werden.

Die Wasserpfeifen, bei den Sarten und Usbeken Tschilim, bei den Tadschiken Kaljan genannt, welche in Turkestan in keinem Haushalte fehlen dürfen, sind von den türkischen Wasserpfeifen verschieden. Sie bestehen aus einem ausgehöhlten Mantelsack-Kürbis, in welchen von oben und von der Seite je ein Schilfrohr gesteckt wird. Das seitliche Rohr dient als Mundstück, das vertikale Rohr dagegen zum Aufsetzen des Pfeifenkopfes,

1: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

der aus gebranntem, unglasiertem oder auch blau oder grün glasiertem Thone besteht. Seitwärts wird im oberen Teil der Wasserpfeife ein kleines Loch gebohrt, das zum Ausblasen des Rauches beim Anfachen der auf den Tabak gelegten Kohlen dient und beim Rauchen selbst mit dem Finger zugehalten werden muß. Die Armen gebrauchen die Wasserpfeife in dieser einfachsten Form; die Reicheren dagegen beschlagen den braun gebeizten Körper der Pfeife mit Messing und verzieren die Beschläge mit Ziselierungen und eingesetzten Türkisen; ferner versehen sie die Schilfrohre mit eingebrannten Zieraten und behängen den Pfeifenkopf mit Schnüren von Glasperlen und Halbedelsteinen, so daß ein solcher Apparat schließlich ein sehr gefälliges Aussehen erhält. In seltenen Fällen wird der Körper der Wasserpfeife auch ganz aus Messing hergestellt; aber auch in diesen Fällen wird dem Gefäße stets die Form eines Mantelsack-Kürbis gegeben (vgl. Bild 106, 118 u. 123).

Ein nur in wenigen Haushaltungen fehlender Einrichtungsgegenstand sind endlich noch die Vogelbauer, da die Eingeborenen große Freunde von Vögeln sind. Die Vogelbauer werden auf ebenso kunstlose Weise hergestellt wie fast alle Produkte der einheimischen Industrie. Sie bestehen aus einer einfachen runden Holz- oder Kartonschachtel ohne Deckel (häufig werden ausrangierte russische Hutschachteln dazu verwendet), an welche oben ein zipfelhaubenförmiges Netz aus buntfarbigem Baumwollgarn befestigt wird, das beim Aufhängen an der Zimmer- oder Verandadecke oder an einem Baumaste durch die Schwere der Schachtel gespannt gehalten wird.

Bild 92. Waschgeschirr.

III. Lebensweise, Sitten und Gebräuche der ansässigen Bevölkerung Turkestans.

Fügen wir zu dem bereits Erwähnten noch eine Anzahl Tamburine und diverse Saiteninstrumente, so haben wir so ziemlich alles aufgezählt, was an Einrichtungsgegenständen in der Wohnung eines wohlhabenden Eingeborenen zu finden ist. In den Wohnungen der Armen fehlen die meisten der erwähnten Gegenstände, und das ganze Ameublement reduziert sich bei ihnen auf eine Wasserkanne, eine Wasserpfeife der einfachsten Art, einige irdene Schüsseln und Schilfmatten und einige vielfach durchlöcherte, reichlich geflickte und von Schmutz glänzende Bettdecken.

Diese verhältnismäßig einfache Einrichtung und Ausstattung der Wohnungen ist hauptsächlich dadurch bedingt, daß dieselben nur während des kurzen Winters zum Aufenthalte für die Bewohner bestimmt sind, sonst aber nur als Aufbewahrungsort für das bewegliche Eigentum des Besitzers zu dienen haben, da den größten Teil des Jahres über alles auf den Höfen oder in den Gärten wohnt und auch im Freien schläft. Viel wichtiger als das Wohnzimmer ist für den Zentralasiaten die Veranda, auf der er im Winter und Sommer seinen häuslichen Arbeiten obliegt, wenn er welche hat, sich mit seinen Nachbarn und Bekannten unterhält, seine Mahlzeiten einnimmt u. dgl. Die Veranda darf deshalb auch in der Wohnung des Ärmsten nicht fehlen. Dieselbe ist ein mehr oder weniger über das Niveau des Hofes erhobener, an die Wohngebäude anstoßender, gedeckter Säulengang (Bild 93). Das Dach der Veranda bildet die Fortsetzung des Daches des Wohngebäudes und wird auf der Außenseite durch eine Reihe von hölzernen Säulen gestützt, die entweder aus ganz rohen und unbehauenen Balken bestehen oder auch mehr oder weniger kunstvoll geschnitzt sind. Bei den Reicheren wird der Boden dieser Säulengänge mit Filzdecken oder Teppichen, bei den Ärmeren mit Schilfmatten bedeckt (vgl. auch Bild 57, S. 165, und Bild 85, S. 233).

Eigentliche Küchen giebt es in den Häusern der Eingeborenen nicht. Der Feuerherd wird im Sommer einfach auf dem Hofe, im Winter aber mitten im Wohnzimmer aufgeschlagen. Das einzige Kochgeschirr, in dem fast alle einheimischen Gerichte bereitet werden, besteht wie bei den Nomaden in einem größeren oder kleineren, aus Rußland importierten, gußeisernen Kessel, wie sie von unsern Wäscherinnen gebraucht werden. Dieser Kessel wird entweder über einer in die Erde gegrabenen Grube oder auf einer aus Lehm aufgeführten halbkreisförmigen Erhöhung aufgestellt. Zum Braten von kleinen Fleischstücken, Schaschlyk genannt, bedient man sich eines hölzernen Bratspießes, der mit freier Hand über das auf der Erde angefachte Feuer gehalten wird. Weitere Küchenrequisiten giebt es in einem turkestanischen Haushalte nicht.

Zum Brotbacken bedient man sich eines eigenen Backofens aus gebranntem Thone. Derselbe hat die Form einer großen, umgestürzten Wasser-

L: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

tonne ohne Boden und mit einer Seitenöffnung. Diese Öfen, welche aus einem Stücke bestehen und fertig auf dem Bazare verkauft werden, werden



Bild 86. Hof mit Veranda in der Festung zu Samarkand. Im Hintergrund der Stein, auf welchem früher die Ehrenbestrafung der Dschartschen Emire vorgenommen wurde.

entweder unterirdisch eingegraben oder an die Hofmauer angemauert und mit einer dicken Lehmschichte umgeben in der Weise, daß die beiden Öff-

L: von Schwarz RLI Soviet Central Asia

nungen oben und an der Seite frei bleiben. Soll in einem solchen Ofen Brot gebacken werden, so wird in demselben ein starkes Feuer angefacht; nachdem dasselbe ausgegangen ist, werden Kohlen und Asche entfernt und dann von oben her die dünnen Brotfladen an die erhitzten Innenwände des Ofens geklebt. An manchen Orten, besonders in den kälteren Gebirgsgegenden wie Badachschan, werden diese Backöfen mitten in den Wohnzimmern in den Fußboden vergraben und dienen dann zugleich zur Erwärmung der Wohnräume (Bild 94).



Bild 94. Turkestanischer Backofen.

Sehr zweckmäßig und den örtlichen Verhältnissen angemessen sind in den Wohnungen der Eingeborenen die Aborte eingerichtet. An einer abgelegenen Stelle des Hofes ist ein abgesondertes, geräumiges Gemach erbaut. Mitten in diesem Raume befindet sich eine etwa 8 m tiefe Grube von ca. 3 m Durchmesser, die mit starken, gut schließenden hölzernen Bohlen überdeckt ist. In den erwähnten Planken ist ein schmaler, bambusförmiger Spalt ausgeschnitten. Sitzbretter sind natürlich nicht vorhanden, da ja die Eingeborenen ans Sitzen auf Stühlen nicht gewohnt sind. Im Dache ist gerade über dem erwähnten Spalte eine Öffnung gelassen, in die eine kurze Röhre aus gebranntem Thon eingesetzt ist. Durch die unverschlossene Thüröffnung und diese Dachöffnung wird eine so gute Ventilation hergestellt, daß von einem üblen Geruche nichts zu merken ist. Wird die Versenkgrube im Laufe vieler Jahre endlich einmal nahezu voll, so wird sie mit Erde aufgefüllt und der Abort an eine andere Stelle verlegt. Fast stets ist Sorge getragen, daß ein Kanal vorbeifließt, in dem die Bewohner die vom Koran vorgeschriebenen Waschungen vornehmen können.

Da in Turkestan jeder Hausbesitzer zugleich auch Pferdebesitzer ist, so spielen die Stallungen in den Wohnungen der Eingeborenen eine hervorragende Rolle. Die Ställe sind stets an die Hofmauer angebaut und nehmen gewöhnlich die den Wohngebäuden gegenüberliegende Seite des Hofmauervierecks, mitunter aber auch drei Seiten desselben ein. Diese Ställe sind weiter nichts als Schirmdächer, deren Tragbalken auf einer Seite in die Hofmauer eingelassen sind, auf der andern aber durch hölzerne Pfosten gestützt werden, wie aus Bild 82, S. 229 zu ersehen ist. Die Ställe sind nach dem Hofe zu vollständig offen wie die Veranden und gewähren deshalb nur Schutz gegen Regen und Schnee, während die Tiere der Kälte des Winters schutzlos preisgegeben sind. An den Wänden der Ställe laufen

aus Lehm aufgeführte Futtertröge entlang, deren Ränder aus Balken bestehen, um das Abbröckeln zu verhindern.

Diese Ställe dienen nicht nur zur Unterbringung der Pferde, Esel und Rinder des Besitzers, sondern auch der Reit- und Lasttiere der Besucher und Gäste, und sind deshalb immer in einem viel größeren Maßstabe angelegt, als es für die Bedürfnisse des Besitzers allein nötig wäre. Außerdem werden die Ställe auch noch als Speicherräume zur Unterbringung von Luzerne, Stroh 2c. und als Nachtlager für die Knechte und Diener während der Regenzeit benützt. Die Wintervorräte an getrockneter Luzerne werden auf dem Dache der Stallungen aufgeschichtet und entweder ganz schutzlos dem Regen und Schnee preisgegeben oder im besten Falle von oben mit Schilfmatten bedeckt.

Das ausgedroschene Getreide wird in ebensolchen unterirdischen Gruben aufbewahrt wie bei den Nomaden. Schon die Geschichtschreiber Alexanders d. Gr. erwähnen diese unterirdischen Getreidespeicher, die sie Seiren oder Siren nennen, als eine Eigentümlichkeit der damaligen Bewohner Turkestans, der Baktrier und Sogdianer[1].

In der Mitte des Hofes befindet sich ein kleinerer oder größerer Teich, dessen stagnierendes und meistens unglaublich schmutziges Wasser nicht nur zum Tränken des Viehes, sondern auch als Trinkwasser für die Menschen und zur Bereitung von Thee und Speisen und zwischenhinein auch zum Reinigen der Wäsche benützt wird.

Vom Hofe aus gelangt man durch eine schmale, niedrige Thür in den anstoßenden Garten, der während der warmen Jahreszeit die eigentliche Wohnstätte der vermöglicheren Zentralasiaten bildet. Die Gärten sind in der Regel sehr dicht mit Bäumen bepflanzt, um einen möglichst intensiven Schatten gewähren zu können, und werden von einer Unmasse kleiner Kanäle durchschnitten, die zur Bewässerung dieser Bäume dienen, da ohne künstliche Bewässerung natürlich nichts wächst. Das, was in diesen sonst prächtigen Gärten den Europäer unangenehm berührt, ist das gänzliche Fehlen von Rasen, was darin seinen Grund hat, daß die nur zum Bewässern der Bäume dienenden Kanäle alle tief eingeschnitten sind und deshalb zur Bewässerung der Oberfläche nicht verwendet werden können. Der Erdboden hat daher in den Gärten dieselbe eintönige, gelblichgraue Färbung wie die Höfe, Straßen und Gartenmauern und ist im besten Falle nur mit trockenem, strohgelbem, noch aus der vorausgegangenen Regenzeit stammendem Stechgras und sonstigem Unkraut bewachsen.

---

[1] Curtius z. B. schreibt im 17. Kap. des VII. Buches über das Vorkommen unterirdischer Getreidespeicher in Baktrien, dem heutigen afghanischen Turkestan: Siros vocabant barbari scrobes, quos ita sollerter abscondunt, ut, nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint: in his conditae fruges erant.

Etwa in der Mitte des Gartens ist ein Teich eingegraben, an dessen Rand eine quadratische, je nach Umständen 1 bis 2 m hohe Terrasse aus Lehm aufgeführt ist, die zum Aufenthalte während der warmen Jahreszeit dient. Diese Terrassen, denen man in den Höfen und Gärten der Eingeborenen und auch auf den freien Plätzen der Städte und Dörfer auf Tritt und Schritt begegnet, sind notwendig, um der Feuchtigkeit und den auf der Erde lagernden Ausdünstungen und Fiebermiasmen zu entgehen, die sich, besonders nach Sonnenuntergang, schon durch den eigentümlichen Geruch ankündigen.

Auf diesen wo möglich von hohen Bäumen beschatteten Terrassen wohnen die Eingeborenen entweder ganz unter freiem Himmel, oder sie stellen auf denselben, wenn es ihre Mittel erlauben, sogen. bucharische Zelte auf. Diese Zelte, welche wegen ihrer zweckmäßigen Einrichtung auch von den Russen auf Reisen und in Gärten mit Vorliebe verwendet werden, haben die Form eines Kubus, der mit einem pyramidenförmigen Dache bedeckt ist. Sie sind sehr leicht und äußerst bequem zu transportieren, und ihre Aufstellung erfordert immer nur wenige Minuten.



Bild 95. Bucharisches Zelt.

Die bucharischen Zelte bestehen aus drei Teilen: aus zwei spanischen Wänden und dem regenschirmartig zusammenlegbaren Dache. Die je 2 m hohen und 6 m breiten spanischen Wände bestehen aus starkem, doppeltem Baumwollstoffe von hellgrüner Farbe, in den in gleichen Abständen neun vertikale, mäßig dicke Holzstangen eingenäht sind. Diese Wände werden so aufgestellt, daß die dritte und siebente Vertikalstange an den Ecken, die äußersten Stangen aber in der Mitte der zwei entgegengesetzten Seiten des Zeltes zu stehen kommen (Bild 95). Das pyramidenförmige Dach, dessen vier Kanten ebenfalls durch eingenähte Holzstangen gebildet werden, wird einfach mittels eigener an diese Stangen befestigter Schlingen aus Baumwollschnüren auf die Spitzen der vertikalen Eckstangen der spanischen Wände aufgesetzt. Außerdem ist rings an die Ränder des Daches eine Anzahl kleiner hölzerner Pflöcke befestigt, an welche korrespondierende, an die oberen Ränder der spanischen Wände angenähte Schlingen gelegt werden,

l: von Schwarz RLl Soviet Central Asia

um einen besseren Verschluß zwischen Dach und Wänden herzustellen. Um dem Zelte die nötige Stabilität zu geben und dasselbe gegen das Umwerfen durch Windstöße zu schützen, werden an die oberen Enden der vier Eckstangen weiße Baumwollstricke befestigt, deren Enden möglichst straff an vier in die Erde geschlagene Holzpflöcke oder auch an die umstehenden Bäume festgebunden werden. Das Dach ist ringsum mit einem handbreiten Saume versehen, der außen über die Seitenwände herabhängt und so das Eindringen des Regenwassers verhindert. Im Innern sind die Zeltwände mit geschmackvoll ausgeschnittenen Streifen von Seide und Halbseide ausgefüttert, welche in ihrer Gesamtheit eine gefällige Zeichnung bilden und nebenbei die Dichtigkeit der Wände erhöhen. Um das schnelle Abnützen zu verhindern, sind die Enden der eingenähten Holzstangen sowie die Spitze des Daches mit starkem gelben Leder überzogen. Ein solches Zelt hat eine Gesamthöhe von 3 m, umspannt einen Flächenraum von etwa 9 qm und wiegt dabei nur 36 kg. Die bucharischen Zelte gewähren vollständigen Schutz gegen Regen und Wind; zur Zeit großer Hitze aber braucht man nur die hintere und vordere Wand, da wo die zwei spanischen Wände zusammenstoßen, zu öffnen, um eine angenehme Zugluft herzustellen.

Die soeben beschriebene Form des bucharischen Zeltes ist die gewöhnliche. Es giebt jedoch außerdem auch noch Zelte von viel größeren Dimensionen, aber sonst gleicher Einrichtung, welche, besonders in Buchara, von hochstehenden Persönlichkeiten als Staatszimmer und zur Aufnahme vornehmer Gäste benützt werden.

Das bisher über die Wohnungseinrichtungen der Eingeborenen Turkestans Gesagte bezog sich zunächst auf die für die Männer bestimmte Abteilung. Die Frauenabteilung unterscheidet sich von der Männerabteilung hauptsächlich dadurch, daß in derselben natürlich die Stallungen in Wegfall kommen, und daß sie deshalb einen bedeutend kleineren Raum einnehmen kann als die Männerabteilung. Im übrigen ist auch in den Frauenabteilungen die Einteilung in Wohngebäude, Hofräume und Gärten eingehalten, und auch die Wohnräume und deren Einrichtung unterscheiden sich nicht wesentlich von denen der Männerabteilung.

Eine wahre Geißel, welche das Leben in den zentralasiatischen Städten besonders für Neulinge am meisten verbittert, sind die Unmassen von Ungeziefer, welche Gärten, Höfe und Wohnräume unsicher machen. Dieses Ungeziefer rekrutiert sich nicht etwa bloß aus unsern unschuldigen Wanzen, Schaben, Flöhen und sogen. „Russen" (Blatta germanica Fab.), die in Rußland zur Revanche den Namen „Preußen" führen, sondern außerdem auch noch aus viel sicherheitsgefährlicheren Elementen. Das unappetitlichste, zugleich aber auch im großen und ganzen unschuldigste Ungeziefer sind die Schlangen, deren es eine ziemlich große Anzahl von Arten giebt, von

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

SOVIET EMPIRE

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133

OLAF CAROE SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

-11-(A)

133
102

60°
66°
72°
78°
Ural Mts.
Northern Steppe
Irtysh R.
Ob R.
Yenisei R.
Turgay Gap
Turgai R.
BETPAK DALA
(Hungry Steppe)
Chu R.
ARAL SEA
160'
Syr Darya (Jaxartes) or Sihon
Kara Tau
Tal
Syr Darya (old bed)
KIZIL KUM
Mirza Chöl
Amu Darya (Oxus) or Jaihun
Zeravshan
Kashka D.
Murghab R.
Tejen R.
L. BALKH
60°
66° East of Greenwich
72°

133
102

SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA
Physical
Miles
0 100 200 300 400
International boundary
Mountains, over 2000 metres
Mountains, 500 to 2000 metres
Sea level to 100 metres
Below sea level
78°
84°
36°

-22(2)

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SOVIET EMPIRE

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THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND STALINISM

BY

OLAF CAROE

Surely it is within the Central Asian regions of Russia, and the Central Asian borders of Russia, that the real problems of the immediate future are going to develop.

CHESTER WILMOT, 1952

LONDON
MACMILLAN & CO LTD
NEW YORK · ST MARTIN'S PRESS
1953

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PREFACE

ABOUT the middle of the XIXth century the shadow of Russia in Central Asia began to fall across the vision of a Britain which had just succeeded to the Sikhs in the Panjab and was occupied in the consolidation of territories which became known as the North-West Frontier. From that date the external policy of the British government in India was directed mainly to the stabilization of Middle Eastern frontiers and to safeguarding the continued existence of Persia and Afghanistan against the forces of Russian expansion. As a result of that policy the Russian advance was halted, where it still stands, on the Oxus and along the fringe of the Turkmen mountains.

In due course the Soviets succeeded the Tsars in the Turkish lands of Central Asia, and Britain withdrew her forces from a partitioned Indian continent. In Southern and South-Western Asia the bonds of the Commonwealth are now loosened. In Central Asia Soviet Russia remains in control of many million Muslims of Turco-Iranian stock. These territories, once known as Turkistan, are in fact an overlap between the Islamic and the Soviet world. It is the purpose of this book at a moment of solvency brought on by Stalin's death to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist world and the West.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least fifty years. It is extremely hard today to uncover modern sources of real value in a field of peculiar importance and little known outside Soviet Russia. The gap has to be filled mainly from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period in particular — the uneasy interregnum between the October Revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power — I have

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia [RL]

000 drawn, among others, on the writings of Professor Togan of Istanbul University, himself a chief actor in the field and the author of a notable book in Turkish entitled *Bugünkü Türkili* (Turkistan today). Page references to this book would not help the English reader and I have therefore been compelled, with the author's ready permission, to include a number of translated passages. I am also greatly in the debt of Mr. W. E. D. Allen, who has given ungrudgingly of the great store of his own knowledge in this field of orientalia, and of Dr. Stefan Wurm of Vienna University, whose knowledge of Turkic linguistics is unrivalled in any country. The linguistic map is his work. No Turcologist myself, I can plead that a lifetime spent among the neighbouring Muslim peoples of the Afghan borderland provides some of the conditions in which insight can do something to fill the gaps in knowledge. Russia in Transoxiana was never far from the thought of those who looked outward towards the Oxus from Peshawar. To English readers the Oxus is so much more familiar than the Amu Darya that I have been tempted to use the names indiscriminately, as the context suggests.

101 128 The accepted linguistic and ethnic classifications of the Turks are somewhat more complex than those adopted in this book, which does not aim at the precise resolution of such problems. The connotation of *Turkey* is clear enough; where distinction is necessary, I have included the Turks of Turkey in the definition *Western Turks*, which also covers the *Azeris* of Azerbaijan and (linguistically though not geographically) the *Turkmens*. On the Volga, in the Urals and in part of the Crimea (before the deportations) the term *Tatar*, or *Turco-Tatar*, has the sanction of usage. In those parts of Central Asia formerly known as *Turkistan* — the real hub of this book — I have avoided the doubtful appellation *Turkistani*, replacing it by *Eastern* or *Central Asian Turk*, and confining the word *Türki* to those Eastern Turks who live in Sinkiang under Chinese dominion. Where more precision is needed in references to the Turks of Russian Central Asia, I have particularized them as *Uzbeks*, *Kazaks*, and so on. Except in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia R1.7

a few cases, clear from the context, my choice between *Turkish* 101
and *Turkic* is determined by a convention whereby scholars 128
seek to allot the one to peoples and the other to languages.

The transliteration of names in a Turkic tongue is not to be simply resolved by reference to the canons of Arabists or the Hunterian system. An explanation of the method adopted in the text will be found in an appendix.[1]

In quoting from the great Russian historian Barthold I have used a French translation, which he authorized. It will be stronger thus, without further distillation. If what follows fails to give the picture, it is because (as Barthold truly wrote) —

> L'histoire turque exige des connaissances qui ne se trouvent que rarement réunies chez une seule personne. Il ne suffit donc point d'être turcologue pour écrire l'histoire des peuples turcs. Suivant l'époque qu'on étudie, il faut être également ou bien sinologue, ou bien arabisant, ou bien iranisant.

For the Western writer even that is not enough, for he should be able to go through the Russian medium also. In this region many studies meet and cross.

O. C.

March 1953

The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edgar Newgass for help in the compilation of the index.

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 269-272 -- Analyst]

[p. viii is blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

CONTENTS

000

		PAGE
	PREFACE	v
I.	INTRODUCTORY	1
	PART I	
	THE MUSLIM PERIOD AND THE TSARS	
II.	THE TURANIAN BASIN	13
III.	PATTERN OF PEOPLES	29
IV.	CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRES	48
V.	TSARIST CONQUEST	70
	PART II	
	THE TRANSITION	
VI.	THE 1917 REVOLUTIONS	95
VII.	ENVER AND THE BASMACHIS	114
	PART III	
	SOVIET PRESSURES	
VIII.	NEW APPROACH	133
IX.	NATIONALISM AND THE SOVIET COLONIAL EMPIRE	139
X.	RUSSIANIZATION	162
XI.	COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE SUPPRESSION OF NOMADISM	173
XII.	INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS	189
XIII.	HERITAGE OF CHAGHATAI	215
XIV.	DEVIATIONISM	230

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

00

PAGE

XV. World War II 243

XVI. Conclusion 257

Appendix on Transliteration 269

Bibliography 273

Index 283

MAPS

I. Soviet Central Asia — Physical *frontispiece*

II. Russian advance in Central Asia *page* 73

III. The Railway network in Soviet Central Asia *facing page* 192

IV. Linguistic Map of Soviet Central Asia and Borderlands *facing page* 272

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

I

INTRODUCTORY

ALMOST in the centre of Asia, and far removed from the oceans, are two great natural basins of continental land, known until quite recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkistan. Much of the perimeter of both these territories is ringed round by some of the highest mountains in the world, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by peoples in whom a Turkish strain (though overlaying and overlaid by others) may still be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them as the Eastern or Central Asian Turks.

The two parts of this Turkistan are divided from one another by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring all the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-parting, linking the Tienshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkistan and the Chinese Turki dominion now known as Sinkiang.

Of Sinkiang much is known and much has been written. In earlier centuries there was a parallel movement in the history of the Central Asian Turks in the oasis civilizations both west and east of the Pamirs. Certain dynasties held sway on both sides of the mountains, while, farther north, the Ili gap supplied a route for migration, conquest and trade. More recently Sinkiang opened its gates more widely to the West. For the half-century before 1947 the government in India maintained a consulate in Kashghar on behalf of the British government, and until the other day there were British

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

000 and American representatives in the capital, Urumchi. In the sands of Khotan in the Tarim basin the great archaeologist, Aurel Stein, discovered the lost cities that made his name. Since his time a succession of travellers have made it their business to describe what they were able to learn of the tangled politics of the Tarim and Jungarian oases from the time of the fall of the Manchus up to the rise to power of Communism in China. Only then, some three years back, did Sinkiang become inaccessible to the West. Before then it shared with the more remote parts of the Himalayas the distinction of being the favourite goal of the more enterprising travellers in Asiatic lands. Some may think that for that reason it has attained a quite spurious importance.

131 142 With Russian Turkistan — now become the five Socialist Soviet Republics of Central Asia — the case is otherwise. The Eastern Turks of the Oxus region have always dwelt in a strange isolation, and the Russians have only drawn closer the veils which for centuries shrouded a forbidden land. Relatively to the size of the country and the antiquity of its history, it is true to say that the West knows less of Soviet Central Asia than of any part of the civilized world. In extent alone it is impressive. Including the steppe up to the northern limits of modern Kazakistan, the aggregate territory is larger in area than India before partition[1] and more than half the size of the United States; and, although in a land of which much is desert the population in 1939 was under seventeen million,[1]

1

	Area	Population (last census)	
		Total	'Native'
	(sq. miles)		
Kazakistan	1,073,000	6,146,000	3,090,000
Uzbekistan	158,000	6,282,000	4,980,000
Tajikistan	56,000	1,485,000	1,220,000
Kirghizia	77,000	1,459,000	880,000
Turkmenia	189,000	1,254,000	830,000
Total	1,553,000	16,626,000	11,000,000

Note that the 'Native' population figures given are the figures of Kazaks, Uzbeks etc., *for the whole USSR*. The 1939 census, unlike that for 1926, did not give figures by nationality separately for each republic. But, although there is some inter-

2: Carce 8-4 (no date) 1958 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as 131
Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized popula- 162
tion in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is 000
strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge of these peoples with that which has been gathered about Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is immediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India the comparison is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the 101
Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, 000
Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

2: Carce S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No 177
wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity 175
of the Western world. 114

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among 114
these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in 177
the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 railways, regarded as strategic, did not become the highways of international commerce, and permits to travel were notoriously difficult to obtain. During the first part of World War I the seclusion became even more rigorous; the government first used the country as a convenient prison-house for Austro-Hungarians captured on the front in Europe, and later became involved in the bloody suppression of a bitter rebellion leading to famine and pestilence on a vast scale. It took the two revolutions of 1917 to raise the curtain high enough to reveal to the outside world a confused scene fitfully illumined by the torches of many factions, each struggling against a dark background of terror to plant its own light on the ramparts and herald a new dawn. A brief glimpse only, and the curtain fell again.

It is the Soviet habit to allude angrily to the years 1918 to 1920 as the Period of Intervention, meaning it to be inferred that the chaos of these years of transition was brought about by British machiavellian intrigue in a colonial sphere which should have concerned the Russians only. That period in due course I shall consider: here it is enough to say that the limit of British penetration into Turkistan reached no farther than Merv, while the time was far too short to afford any real insight into, much less any control over, the forces then
114 striving for mastery in Russia's Asiatic Empire. It is rather to the men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a period of intense struggle, during which they themselves for a short time figured as founders or upholders of independent national States. These are they who not only knew the inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern. The fact that this fresh inspiration was quickly followed by the bitterest disillusion over the failure of Bolshevik practice to live up to early promises, does not mean that the positive

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reality of the one is necessarily to be measured by the negations 114
of the other. The new thought had come to stay. But at that time events were too strong for native reformers who were unable to turn their opportunities to lasting account. Fortunately some of those men have left memorials in writing, most revealing of their earlier hopes and endurances, and suggestive of what their peoples may yet achieve, should history once more turn in their favour. Among these are Mustafa Chokai and Zeki Velidi Togan (known to the Russians as Chokaiev and Velidov), leaders of the Eastern Turks during the interregnum period, who, first in attempted understanding with the Soviets, and later in conflict with them, strove to win political freedom for the peoples of Turkistan.

For a short time in 1917–18 Chokai presided over an independent government at Kokand in the Farghana Valley, now part of Uzbekistan. In the period between the Wars he wrote and lectured effectively in Western Europe, and was the author of a short book in Russian [1] describing his country's reactions to Soviet domination. I shall return to the story of his death in Germany in 1941: here it need be said only that he is less likely to be remembered for his writings than for having founded and inspired a national operation which later in World War II in other hands attained a considerable momentum.

Togan is that rare product, the professional historian who has been able to record a series of dramatic events in which he had his own, not negligible, part. Not directly from Turkistan himself but a Bashkir (in Turkish, Bashkurd), he came first to prominence as the mainstay of the short-lived republic of Little Bashkiria in the Urals. In the early years of the Revolution he was admitted to the confidences of the high priests of Soviet colonialism, Lenin and Stalin. Turning from them in disillusion in 1920, he spent the next three years behind the scenes in and around Bukhara in an attempt to organize resistance to the re-establishment of Russian rule in its Soviet guise. During that time he saw much of Enver Pasha. After

[1] Bib. III, 9.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

114 Enver's death he withdrew to Afghanistan to find his way ultimately to Turkey, where, after some vicissitudes, he attained academic distinction as a professor at the Istanbul University. There he now is. In 1929 he published in modern (Western) Turkish his story of the Eastern Turks,[1] entitled *Bugünkü Türkili*, or *Turkistan today*, adding a fascicule in 1940.

This work is a serious history of the peoples of Turkish stock east of the Caspian, written by a Central Asian Turk with a wide historical sweep and with practical experience gained in the service of these people. It contains long-term reflections based on a study of the traditions of a land little known to Western historians, reflections from the mind of a scholar in Turkic comparative history and literatures. Of the cause and inspirations of the struggles of that time the author has much that is new to relate. His story ranges from intimate discussions with Lenin and Stalin themselves to the epic of Enver Pasha, and from the tribal organizations of the Eastern Turks to the programme of social democratic reform which, like the Young Turks a decade earlier in Istanbul, he and coadjutors drew up for their compatriots. And through it all there runs a flame of ardent patriotism, a spirit that moves upon the waters. The question he poses is whether there are those remaining who can still hear that voice and respond to that spirit. Many of those who might have heard have been crushed beneath the heel of an iron tyranny.

I had thought originally that Togan's book might be brought to English readers by means of a simple translation. But the book is a formidable one, and much of it deals with details of old tradition and tribal organization which would have no meaning for the general reader. Moreover, one of its merits as a scholarly thesis is a certain diffuseness, which, however valuable to the Turkish student, would fail to attract the outside reader, interested in the background and prospects of an almost legendary land. Its message can best be brought to the West by means of a new interpretation, using the

[1] *Bugünkü Türkili* (Istanbul, 1942–7). *Türkili* (Turkic word *il* = tribe or country) is the equivalent of the Persian *Turkistan*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

author's ideas but compressing and sorting them out and, 114
where necessary, relating them to other material. Such a treatment involves a number of changes of presentation and emphasis, which may not represent the views of the original. Yet, just as this treatment enables the interpreter to be more objective, it also gives him the right to be generous in reference to his source. On balance, for readers outside Turkey, the gain may outweigh the loss.

Other guides indeed there are. Some of these are refugees, 000
both of the older emigration who fled the land shortly after the establishment of Soviet rule, and of younger groups whom the conditions of World War II enabled to escape the prison-house. Their names will appear as the story unfolds. There are, too, fitful gleams from behind the curtain. The most rigid frontier defences cannot prevent news filtering through to neighbouring countries whose affinities beget a natural sympathy, welcoming a steady stream of refugees. All these have light to shed. Sometimes too an even brighter illumination proceeds from the statements and admissions of the Kremlin, and particularly of Stalin himself. There is also Soviet publicity, always so sedulous to replace the old with new that it gives prominence to the old things which it would uproot. From time to time informed men [1] from the West [114]
have seized an unexpected chance to traverse Turkistan and been able to record what they have understood. But it still remains for someone to gather up the old with the new, and strike a balance which shall determine how far the process of continental assimilation has gone, and to what degree it has altered out of recognition an identity which was the child of a Turco-Iranian history of over one thousand years. In terms of ultimate ideologies, the question is one of the faith which shall prevail in the end, Communism or Islam; or, perhaps more subtly, there is need of a forecast of the several positions, gradations or compromises which may be expected to result from the interaction of the two extremes.

A word of caution will not be amiss. The refugees' books 114

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 5, 40 and 65 — Bailey, Goldman, Fitzroy Maclean.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

114 are patriots' visions of the land and peoples of their origin and their dreams, seen by them as suffering under a yoke cruel and intolerable. A writer approaching his subject in this spirit will underrate the material progress and prosperity attained under the foreign dominion, setting the profits low in the scale against the loss of freedom. He is likely to belittle the material achievement of the Russians, whether Tsarist or Soviet. Nor will he adequately appraise the work of the many Russian scholars and historians of distinction who have made the study of Central Asian peoples and problems a field peculiarly their own. An attempt has here been made to correct this perspective. But, where Togan or others are cited, the reader should remember that a seer does not rate at their worldly value the achievements, or even the power, of the kings whom he denounces. He counts on greater than worldly values. Other nations, resting on their prophets, have preserved a tradition, spiritual and political, against all oppressions. Then why not the Eastern Turks?

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

PART I

THE MUSLIM PERIOD AND THE TSARS

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

II

THE TURANIAN BASIN

Something too of marvel, if not much of beauty, must there be in a country which presents to the eye a succession of bewildering contrasts; where the scarp of precipitous mountains frowns over an unending plain; where spots of verdure lie strewn like islets amid shoreless seas of sand; where mighty rivers perish in marsh and swamp; where populous cities are succeeded as a site of residence by tents of felt, and sedentary toil as a mode of life by the vagrant freedom of the desert.

CURZON

THERE is no State or Republic of Turkistan on modern maps of the world. Even on maps of the Victorian era Turkistan was divided into its Russian, Chinese and Afghan components, and of the Russian territories a large part east of the Caspian Sea was then known as Transcaspia. The Chinese name of Sinkiang — the New Dominion — came to be applied even in European parlance to the Tarim basin and Jungaria. In Russia, the name of Turkistan during the Basmachi rebellion of the early Soviet days had become a watchword of a larger Turkish nationalism and, with the Kremlin's establishment of what are ostensibly tribal Republics in Central Asia, Russian Turkistan as the name of a region finally disappeared from the atlases. In the USSR the name is now confined to the town near the Sir Darya (Jaxartes) in ancient times known as Yese or Yassi, the home of the celebrated saint Ahmed Yesevi, who lived there in the XIIth century. Thus there remains no territory of Turkistan on the map of today except the relatively small Afghan districts sandwiched between the Amu Darya (Oxus) and the mountains of the Hindu Kush. It is to take the place of the outmoded term that local pride has suggested a

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

101 substitute, Türkili, the Turkish homeland.

In a sense this new habit is a return to the geographical thought which obtained in the early XVIth century, when Babur left his home in the vale of Farghana to become by conquest the ruler of Kabul and later the first Mughul Emperor of Hindustan. In the whole of his Memoirs Babur speaks [1] of Turkistan only three times and that in the connotation of the town of Yese. To him the territories now collectively known as Russian Central Asia were centred on Maveraunnehr, an Arabic term meaning the land beyond the river. This is the *duab* or mesopotamia bounded by the rivers called by the Greeks Oxus and Jaxartes, known to Arab geographers as the Jaihun and Saihun, and to Persians as the Amu and the Sir Darya. European writers conveniently translate Maveraunnahr as Transoxiana.[2]

The lands south of the Amu Darya up to the Hindu Kush Babur knew as Balkh or (farther east) as Badakhshan, while those north of the Sir Darya were roughly divided into Chach or Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughulistan (the Ili valley and Jungaria). Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau then, as now, were known as Khorasan, the eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. The upper valley of the Sir Darya (known to Babur as the Saihun) then, as now, was called Farghana, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers, then possibly connected in one network of waterways, made up the famous delta country of Khorezm, with its capital at Urgench. These old names are woven into the history and aptitudes of the land and its peoples; without them there can be no understanding of the reactions which followed the Tsarist conquest or of the later development under the pressures of the Soviet system.

133 Just as Tigris and Euphrates give life and meaning to the riverain basin of Irak, so do the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya to the much greater Turanian basin. There are other

[1] Bib. I, 12 and 61.

[2] Scholars seem unable to decide between Transoxiana and Transoxania. Barthold and G. Kirk use the former, Arnold Toynbee and M. Czaplicka the latter, Schuyler and Mrs. Beveridge both!

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

analogies. Like Irak, Turan is ringed round with great 133
mountains on much of its circumference, and away from the rivers the flat lands tail off into inhospitable desert — the Karakum or Black Sands between the Amu and the Caspian, the Kizilkum or Red Sands in the *duab* between the rivers and the Aral sea, and, north of the Sir, the half-desert steppe known as the Betpak[1] Dala, or Plain of Misfortune.

This is a land buttressed by immense mountains. The cathedral nave of the Tienshan, with its southern aisles the Alai and Transalai, is a system of high alpine structures, running parallel in a general direction from east to west. It is joined with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram by the Sarikol transept, which runs tranversely north and south. West of the Sarikol is the well-known upland of the Pamirs. There are peaks in the north around Khan Tenri, and southward in the Pamir-Sarikol region, some 24,000 feet in height.[2] These ranges are on a scale only surpassed by the Himalaya and Karakoram, and they contain some of the biggest glaciers in the world outside the Arctic circle. They form the watershed between Western and Eastern Turkistan, the Russian and the Chinese dominions. Both the great rivers watering Russian Central Asia rise west of that watershed, the Sir Darya in various gorges of the Alai south of the lake Issik Köl, and the Amu Darya in Karategin and the Pamirs.

The upper waters of the Amu proper are known to the Tajiks of that region as the Ab-i-Panja or Pianj. It is joined from the north by four large tributaries, the Aksu, the Vakhsh (Turkic Oghush) running out of Karategin, the Kafirnihan and the Surkhan. The Sir Darya is made up of three main streams, the muddy and turbulent Narin from south of Issik Köl, the clear Karasu with its affluents the Tar and Kara Kulja from the east, and the Sukh from the south, all joining in the Vale of Farghana.

[1] A corruption of the Persian word *badbakht*.

[2] Khan Tenri, just under 24,000 ft., is right on the frontier of Chinese and of Russian Turkistan. The Russians claim to have discovered another peak close to it, and within their territory, of greater height. Two peaks in the Pamir region, now named after Lenin and Stalin, are of some 24,000 ft.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

133

Turkistan is also a land of vast stretching plains and deserts, with a very gentle decline from the mountain-skirts to the Aral and the Caspian Seas. The fall from the point where the two great rivers issue from the mountains, the Amu near Kelif and the Sir at Begovat, a new town just west of Khojent,[1] is not more than a few hundred feet in many hundreds of miles. The flatness of the plain causes the lower courses of the rivers to be much beset by reedy marshes, which split up their channels and render them difficult for navigation. Towards the Caspian the Turanian basin sinks to nearly 100 feet below sea-level. The Sarikamish depression between the two seas is another earth-hole deeper than the Caspian, and there is a point on the Mangishlak Peninsula on the north-eastern shore of the Caspian over 400 feet below the sea.

The southern mountain-rim of this great basin is formed by the Kopet Dagh barrier, a westward continuation to the Caspian of those Paropamisus outliers of the Hindu Kush which form a shield in front of the Afghan city of Herat. The Kopet Dagh is the traditional limit between Iran and Turan, and its crest still roughly defines the frontier between the USSR and Persia. Its highest point is not much more than 8000 feet and in itself, seen from the plain, it is a range of barren spires, reminiscent of a lunar landscape. But to one who approaches the Turanian basin from the Iranian plateau this escarpment offers a prospect wonderful and revealing. The edge of the plateau is like the shore of a land facing a limitless sea. The mountains form the rim of a vast bowl, a rim on which the traveller stands gazing over undulations of sand to a horizon without more feature than the ocean. His eye wanders farther, until in imagination he can discern across the Black Sands the low cliffs of the Ust Yurt plateau, lying between Caspian and Aral, and one of the most desolate regions on earth. In one or two favoured spots a stream descends from the plateau to form a string of green oases

[1] The Soviets have renamed the ancient city of Khojent as Leninabad. It is amusing to think how Babur, who wrote of Khojent and its virtues about the year 1500, would have smiled at the idea of this new prophet and his name.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

across a plain which finally engulfs it. But at most places, as the caravan reaches the top, men and animals find themselves on the extreme edge of one world, looking into the void of another. This rim was always the natural dividing-line between two geographical regions and two climates: from time to time, it has been a boundary between two ways of life. Across it certainly in history Arab, Turk, Mongol and Persian have carried their several ways of life in pursuit of conquest and trade, and there has been wide action and reaction on both sides of the line. Indeed the Persian poet Firdausi, writing at the end of the Xth century, was able to claim the Amu Darya rather than the mountain-rim as the limit between the two lands and civilizations that he was the first to name Iran and Turan,[1] and since then the tides of conquest and assimilation have ebbed and flowed many times over these mountains. Even so, it is like a cliff, opening on the land-ocean of the desert, and it remains the geographical symbol of a barrier far older than the frontier defences set up by the Soviet Empire.

The two great rivers are not the only waterways of the Turanian basin. At the point on the Afghan frontier where the Kopet Dagh joins the outliers of the Hindu Kush, the Tejen (the Hari Rud of Khorasan) and the Murghab spill out to the desert to irrigate the lands around Merv and to be lost in the sand. In Transoxiana, between the two great rivers are two streams as famous as they — the Kashka Darya, on the banks of which Tamerlane (Timur) [2] was born, and the even better known Kohik or Zarafshan, the Gold-Scatterer which waters the rich lands of Samarkand and Bukhara. The name Zarafshan is by some attributed to the richness of the cultivation; others point to the gold-washings to be had from the river's sand. One of the river's sources is a large glacier, another the Iskandar Köl Lake, nearly 7000 feet above the sea, and there is a legend that the lake was formed by Alexander, who set across the valley a golden dam to form a reservoir and regulate the

[1] This distinction appears in the Avesta, but Firdausi gave it popular expression for the first time.

[2] Tamerlane = Timur Lang = Timur the lame = (in Turkish) Aksak Temür.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 river's flow. Both Kashka and Zarafshan sink into the sand before reaching the Amu Darya. North of the Sir Darya and the Kara Tav prolongation of the Tienshan comes the real steppe, much of it half-desert and known as the Betpak Dala (Plain of Misfortune) but part of it watered by yet other rivers, the Talash and the Chu. The Chu possibly at one time drained Lake Issik Köl, but now it passes some miles from it and down the Bum gorge into the plain. Like the Zarafshan, both these northern rivers sink into the sand.

133 Up to this point, going northward and eastward, the
131 watershed has been broadly coincident with the frontier between China and the Russian Empire, and the basins of the two great rivers lie wholly in Russian territory. But to the north-east of the Betpak Dala lies Lake Balkhash with Yedisu (in Russian, Semirechye, the Land of the Seven Rivers) to the east of it. The main affluent to this basin is the River Ili, flowing past Kulja out of Sinkiang. Occupied by the Tsar's forces in 1876 during Yakub Beg's period of rule in Kashgharia, Kulja was surrendered to the Manchu Empire on the resumption of Chinese control a few years later, and since then has been beyond the formal frontier of Russia.[1] As things are, this part of the Russian frontier has no mountain-screen. It lies open not only to an approach down the Ili Valley, but through the gaps in the lower hills which connect the Tienshan with the Altai farther north. These are the passages leading to Jungaria, along which the tides of conquest, and later the trade-routes, moved westward and eastward under Chingiz and Timur. They are known as the gap of Chuguchak, the Jungarian Gate and the Iron Gate (or Talki Pass), and the Ili River Valley itself. Together they offer an easier entrance than the passes farther south from Kashghar into Farghana by Irkishtam, the most practicable of which, the Terek Davan, rises to 13,000 feet.

000 It is in the mountains above the Ili Valley that we find

[1] For the reality as between Russian and Chinese control on this frontier, even in the period between the Great Wars, see Fitzroy Maclean, *op. cit.* Since then the advent to power of the Mao régime in China, for the time at least, has further deprived this frontier of its meaning.

2: Canoe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

It is in the mountains above the Ili valley that we find 173
the legendary springboard of the Turkish races. 'God has chosen the Turks as his own army, and settled them in the highest parts of the earth with the best air, that he may send them at his chosen time against any nation in the world.'[1] These are the words of Mahmud Kashghari, a native of the Issik Köl country, writing in Baghdad in the XIth century. They suggest not only the early movements of the Turkish clans, issuing from the highlands of the great mountain systems of the Tienshan and the Altai, but the disasters of the more terrible Mongol flood which was to succeed the Turks. The Turkic name for the Tienshan is the Tenri Taghi,[2] with its central peak the Khan Tenri, marking the boundary with Chinese Turkistan. This was the land sanctified by the epics, the Askar mountain beyond Issik Köl and the pastures of Yulduz, used by Timur as a summer retreat between campaigns. Here he summoned the clans to celebrate his victories. Even today the Osmanlis sing, 'I mounted my horse and rode to Askar, the most beautiful, for I loved it, the shining one'.[3] The Khans from the east and the Khans from the west would gather in summer on these highlands, the central position from which government and conquest, east and west, were planned. For these reasons the epics spoke reverently of the high mountains, giving them names after Afrasiab or Kök Türk, or the divine attributes of a Turkish Olympus, Khan Tenri or Muztagh Ata. The idea of a nation riding out of the dawn, and moving in cavalcade towards the sunset, is familiar in Turkish poetry and legend. Later, when the conquering hordes had gone by, these passages became the main caravan routes for trade; the Silk Road of Marco Polo went this way, passing across Turkistan. In a sense Turkish Central Asia, then on the highway of commerce, had become the centre of the world. It was soon to decline.

West of Balkhash, and as far as Aral, lie hundreds of miles 133
of open steppe, stretching down from the Siberian flatlands

[1] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 13.

[2] Tenri = Tanri = God. Tagh (alternative Tav) = dagh = mountain.

[3] *Atima bindim de gittim Askara çok güzel sevdim de aydin askara.* Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 in the north, and becoming more and more barren with the southern latitude until it merges with the Betpak Dala. But, as the caravan goes north, the traveller reaches first the low hills of the Ulu Tav and Orta Tav, excellent seasonal pasturage when the snows melt, and the favourite summer resort of the Kipchak clans, from whom many of the true Uzbeks, Kazaks and Bashkurds trace descent. As he goes north, the pastures in spring become greener and are starred with flowers, the north of Kazakistan being in the temperate zone, and enjoying a precipitation sufficient to support agriculture and tree-growth. Almost all the well-known specie tulips of our gardens have their home on these steppe-lands. The best recent description in English of this land comes from the American pen of Littlepage: [1]

> We pushed along day after day through some of the finest pasture land I have ever seen, all well-watered, with rivers and lakes enough to support herds which probably could feed the whole of Europe . . . plateaus brilliant with green grass and sprinkled with multicolored wild flowers. The weather was warm and the skies cloudless and the only drawback the clouds of mosquitoes which gave us little peace.

There is a geographical feature of this steppe which at some future time may be of great account. Round about latitude 51 degrees there is an imperceptible west to east watershed, north of which all the waters flow towards the Arctic Ocean. From west to east the rivers are Tobol, Ishim and Irtish, all headwaters of the great Arctic river Ob. There are those who think in terms of a possible diversion of water running to waste in the Arctic Ocean to fertilize the arid deserts of Turkistan.

133 311 Another fact of geography looming large in the thought of all who write of Turkistan is the broad Vale of Farghana or Kokand, the heart of the scanty oasis country of Transoxiana. Schuyler [2] in 1876 described in vivid language the contrast between the desert and the sown, saying that even in Zarafshan

[1] Bib. I, 62, p. 185.

[2] *Op. cit.* I, 284.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and Farghana, the most fertile regions, it was possible then to ride long distances without so much as seeing a blade of verdure, so small was the extent of country irrigated by the rivers. Since then much has been achieved, but even now it would be instructive and curious to see a map of these regions on which the arable lands were carefully marked, so narrow would be the strips along the rivers and at the foot of the mountains. In Farghana the irrigated areas, and even the *lalmi* [1] lands dependent on rainfall, cover broader acres than elsewhere in Turkistan. Its predominance as the agricultural, and now one of the industrial, centres of this country has a certain inevitability. The surrounding mountains with their fertilizing streams give it a climate relatively mild in summer and winter, and an alluvial soil on the deposits which fan out from the river mouths. In these oases intensive cultivation by a large population has always been possible — the cluster of townships is apparent from any map. The lie of the land has favoured the construction of many ancient irrigation channels, now supplemented by great modern works. Climate, latitude and water provide exactly the right environment for the cultivation of cotton and of the mulberry-trees on which the silk-worm thrives. The rapid transition from high mountain valley to open plain offers many natural sites for the harnessing of water-power for the production of electricity. The more recent discovery of oil and coal and quantities of valuable non-ferrous and other mineral resources in and around the valley, combined with the Soviet policy of moving textile factories to the site of production of raw material, has given it a new industrial significance not lost upon any who contemplate this land. Kokand, its old capital, and the hills around the valley were the main focus of the Basmachi movement of 1918–24 for the independence of Turkistan.

In its way the natural beauty of the oasis country is greater and certainly more intense than that of the steppe

[1] It is interesting to note that the Eastern Turks use here the same word as the Pathans of Peshawar for unirrigated cropped land. They also use *kashar*, a helping party of friends at harvest-time, and *karamta*, a raid and seizure of an enemy's flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong; both words in common use in Pashtu.

2: Canoe 3-4 (no date) 1963 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

meadows in springtime. The fields are well watered, the water-courses well planted with mulberry, poplar and willow against a drop-scene of violet-coloured hills rising to spires of ever-[137] lasting snow. From the mountain-skirts descend many clear streams, and springs well out shadowed by immemorial *chenars*.[1] Often, sheltering in a well-planted grove and watered by a rivulet, there stands a mosque antiquely carved in commemoration of the shrine of some local saint. Schuyler describes with delight the beauties of a refuge of this kind, reached after a thirsty march across a desolate valley strewn with gravel. He writes with understanding of the sense of refreshment to be gained from repose on ground so hallowed, whose beauty is the greater set against what Curzon describes as the wide and doleful plain, the sorrowful waste of a desert once at the bottom of a larger Caspian Sea. But there are none to tell us now whether the people can still find rest from the stridencies of Soviet life in garden cloisters such as this, holy places long before the advent of Islam. According to the Soviet press, the beauties of nature are banned as a subject for discourse or poetry.

132 There are other aspects of physical geography not without interest to the life of modern Turkistan. One of these is the influence on the movements of man of changes of climate that in this region took place either just before or after the opening of history. The clearest illustration is to be found in the discoveries of Aurel Stein in the archaeological field in Sinkiang. The remains of the cities he found buried in the Taklamakan sands prove that the water supply of the Tarim basin, when those cities flourished, was far more plentiful than it is today. There has in fact been a process of desiccation which, developing after the time when civilized man dwelt in cities, has led to mass migration out of Central Asia to more favourable

[1] The *platanus orientalis*, the eastern plane, possibly the finest of all deciduous trees. At its best in Kashmir, it flourishes from northern India in the east right across the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux as far as the Balkans in the west.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

climes. Because of the distance from the sea, precipitation even 132
on the mountains around the Tarim basin is low, and there is ground for the belief that the glaciers are still shrinking, with a resultant steady diminution of the fertilizing water. In other words, the recession of the ice-age is to this extent and in this area linked with history.[1] A process which is working in Sinkiang has its application also to the very similar conditions of soil and climate obtaining in Russian Central Asia.

Another change, in this case historical, is that in the 133
courses of the two great rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, and possibly even of other waters which empty into the Turanian basin. The records state that more than once in historical times the Oxus[2] (Amu Darya) at least has changed its course as between the Caspian and the Aral Sea. This is an aspect of physical geography at which all who write of Transoxiana glance again and again, with never-failing fascination. The idea runs like a thread through the literature of the region. The general thesis has the support of the Russian historian Barthold, who explains the decline of Khorezm by the shifting of the rivers' course in the XVIth century. He and others write as if they saw the Oxus with the eyes of Matthew Arnold — the great river moving mysteriously across the plain, seeming now to be lost and broken up in little channels 'a foiled circuitous wanderer', yet in the end flowing inevitably forward to release in the Aral Sea — a symbol of the history of the land.

According to Togan,[3] at the time of the Arab conquest the main waters of the Amu Darya (Oxus) flowed not to the Aral but to the now dry Özboy bed, after filling up the Sarikamish depression in the north of the Karakum desert and just below the Ust Yurt escarpment. At that time only one arm reached the Aral Sea, which was a great reed-swamp much smaller than

[1] Bib. I, 87, Sir C. Skrine.

[2] The name Oxus can be variously derived from Ak-su, the White Water, a tributary; or from Oghush (Arabic Vakhsh), the main tributary from the Terskey Alai and Karategin. In its upper course the Oghush is called the Surkhab or Kizilsu — Persian and Turkish for Red River — by the Tajiks and Turks respectively who live on its banks. [103]

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 108 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 it is at present. After the Arab conquest, the Amu Darya changed its course to carry all its water as at present into the Aral Sea, where previously only one arm had debouched. The Özboy Channel dried up, and the waters that had once filled Sarikamish were diverted into the Aral. But in 1221, when the Mongols captured Urgench, then capital of Khorezm, the Amu Darya had reverted to its old course, and once more flowed to the Caspian by the Özboy as its main branch, thus opening up a very important channel of trade from east to west. The Sir Darya (Jaxartes), or more probably a large arm of it, flowed through the now dried up Yeni Darya, which began above Ak Mechit (Kizil Orda) and, moving to the south-west past the Aral Sea, debouched into the Amu Darya to swell its waters on their way through the Özboy to the Caspian. Muslim authority is quoted to establish that it was only in exceptional years of flood that the combined Oxus and Jaxartes — a sort of 'Shatt-al-Turk' — reached the Caspian, flowing through the Balkhan gap to the gulf by what is now Krasnovodsk. The river usually sank into the Karakum at a point known to Arab geographers as Kalat-us-sin (in Mongol times Rebat Tamgach) near the present Kurtish and over 100 miles east of the Balkhan hills. At this point there is a fault in the desert, with a declivity a few feet high, over which the combined river flowed whenever its volume sufficed to take it on to reach the Caspian.

133 This continued until 1573, when the Amu Darya and
175 the Sir Darya settled into their present courses to the Aral Sea, and trade on the Özboy and Yeni Darya came to an end. The alteration in the course of the rivers Togan counts as the great catastrophe of the XVIth century affecting Turkistan.

He continues:

Before 1573 goods could be shipped direct by boat from Azerbaijan and from the Volga by the Özboy to the waterfalls near Rebat Tamgach, and trans-shipped thence to Urgench. As long as the route by Urgench on the Özboy and Yeni Darya remained open, the towns on the rivers Talash, Chu and Ili grew immensely

alternate changes in river beds -- see pp 23-24 ct 116 -- Anal

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, 133
and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of 176
many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu 185
Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts 133
of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages [1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler [2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Köl greatly reduced
183 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

convenient to refer to them at this point. 175

In the XIIIth century the Mongol Chingiz Khan conquered China, Turkistan and Persia. The Empire of Chingiz was divided between his four sons: here it will suffice to say that the Ilkhan dynasty which established itself in Persia and Irak on the ruins of the Caliphate and the Seljuks was founded by Hulagu, who belonged to the same branch of Chingiz' family as Kublai the Great Khan of China, both being sons of Chingiz' fourth son Tului.

It was therefore in the interests of Kublai to conclude, if possible, with his brother Hulagu an arrangement for the transport of goods between the Tului family dominions in the east and in the west, and this in fact is what was done as soon as Kublai Khan was able to seize the ports in southern China. Trade entered the Persian Gulf. This led to the enrichment of Hormuz as the port on the Gulf, and to the rise of the great and prosperous city at Herat. For a time Herat became the principal clearing centre for the trade of Central and Western Asia and a distinguished culture flourished there under the later Timurid princes. The countries to the north of the Oxus, allotted without any very clear definition to the elder branches of Chingiz' family (the Golden Horde and the Chaghatai Horde), were left in the cold. This process had been accelerated by the utter destruction of Khorezm itself at the hands of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son. The products of the Far East now came up to the Oxus by way of Baluchistan and Hormuz. The Far Eastern traffic had thus been diverted from the caravan to the sea, and in so far as caravan routes in Turkistan were needed to serve it these ran from north to south, and not through the mountain passes. But still some trade with Europe and the West remained.

With the rounding of the Cape by the Portuguese at the end of the XVth century, and the formation of British, Dutch and French companies a century later, the trade by caravan through Turkistan to Europe also died. Except for local commerce, even the Persian Gulf became a backwater, and Herat lost its pre-eminence. The economic axis had swung

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 from a latitudinal to a longitudinal direction. The maritime age had succeeded that of the caravan, and Turkistan was no longer a centre of power or commerce. In a seaman's age its place had been taken by Western Europe.

Once the through routes were empty of traffic, the only remaining attraction keeping Turkistan within a southern orbit was the gravitational pull of a common Islamic tradition. Even this began to weaken as communications broke down. Religious and cultural bonds began to snap, and local religions to spring up. Shiah votaries will dispute Togan's conclusion, given as an instance of this tendency, that the spectacular rise of the Shiahs of Persia in Safavid times from being mainly a mountain sect to the position of a State religion was due to this cause. Small principalities began to arise in Turkistan. The process was hastened by the internecine wars between the two Turkish houses, the Ottomans in Istanbul and the Safavids in Isfahan — also Turks from Erdebil in Azerbaijan. The Turkish world was disintegrating, and the way was open for European pressure from the south and Russian pressure from the north.

000 Some of these ideas are curiously like the theme developed in one of the essays of Arnold Toynbee.[1] He too sees the world in terms of a caravan age succeeded by a maritime age, and to him also Farghana in the caravan age appears as a central point of the world. Can it be, Toynbee asks, that in an air age it may once more become so? This, he judges, may come about for the reason that in an air age a world centre of gravity is likely to be determined not by physical but by human geography, and to be situated at a point equidistant from two main poles of world population. If so, it will not be because Farghana is a void. Like Kashmir and Peshawar farther south, it is itself a jewel of fertility, ringed round by the world's greatest mountains and deserts. It is remarkable that one of the greatest of contemporary historians has seen the same light, spreading from the past and casting a beam into the future.

[1] Bk. I, 93.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

III

PATTERN OF PEOPLES

Few cases, perhaps, in romance or history, can sustain a close collation with this as to the complexity *of its separate interests.*

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

WE see a land wide and open like the ocean, closed in by the barriers of high mountain on one side and the unharvested desert or inhospitable inland waters on the other. Before the railways were built, in one quarter only, the north-east, was there comparatively easy passage from outside. And in restricted regions only, along the foothills of these mountains, and within their glens, or farther along the rivers which issue from them, is there a certain livelihood to be won through a settled agriculture. Elsewhere the steppe and the hillside offer a life only to the nomad, equipped to move his flocks and herds in pursuit of a precarious rainfall and an uncertain season. We shall expect then to find two forms of subsistence, the intensive cultivation of the oasis by the farmer bound to traditional uses, and the wandering life of the stockbreeder on the Alpine pasture or the steppe.

Many of the flatlands of what is now Russian Central Asia are farther from the sea than any part of the world land-mass save Sinkiang alone. Hence the uncertain precipitation in all but the mountain regions, and the need for the herdsman to wander far afield in search of pasture for his flocks. There are recurrent years of famine without winter snow or spring rain, years which are really reminders of the peril of desiccation hanging over these countries. It is this that has driven the pastoralist in history to become a nomad, wandering over the steppe almost as urgently as the tribes of Arabia in their

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

deserts. And this without doubt is the predisposing cause of the migrations over Central Asia from the dawn of history.

114 The history of what I have called the Turanian basin up to the time of the Russian conquest is extraordinarily confusing. Even the Russian orientalist, V. V. Barthold, who made this field peculiarly his own, was driven to exclaim: 'L'historien qui cherche à l'expliquer se trouve fort embarrassé de distinguer entre les causes et les effets'.[1] It is indeed a pitfall for the unwary, even for one who has spent many months in the country itself. An instance of this is to be found in the heroic journey of the Hungarian Vambéry, who penetrated to Transoxiana in 1863 in the guise of a dervish. When, after his return, he published, among other works, a *History of Bokhara* without adequate knowledge of the labours of Russian scholars in this field, he was mercilessly assailed by a company of *critici furiosi*, among others the Russian orientalist Grigoriev. That the criticism was influenced by professional and national jealousies is indicated by the verdicts of Curzon and the American diplomat Schuyler, the former speaking of the profound sensation caused by Vambéry's voyage and works, and the latter confessing to having indulged in harsh criticism. But Vambéry had in the end to admit that his local knowledge did not equip him to pose as an historian. Like Burton, he was a traveller first.

An immense amount of learning and research has gone into these subjects from the Russian side, both in Tsarist and in Soviet times. The names of Radloff, Barthold and Samoylovich are particularly remarkable in the Central Asian field.[2] Yet it remains true that a popular and comprehensible analysis of the story of these lands in English does not exist. What follows cannot claim to be more than an essay in history: the most that can be done within the narrow limits of a contemporary book is to sketch in historical background enough to enable any who now approach these peoples and problems for the first time to understand something of the forces that have

[1] Bib. I, 7, p. 189.
[2] The reader is referred to the Bibliography at the end of this book.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

gone before. For it would be a profound mistake to imagine that the Sovietization of Central Asia and its populations has wiped clean the earlier drawings on the slate. The Soviet press itself shows otherwise.

The investigator of Turkish and Mongol history in this part of the world is like a man standing on an upper floor, watching the unpredictable and disordered movement of a crowd gathered on some great occasion. Groups meet and coalesce, groups melt and dissolve; a sudden interest draws a mass in one direction, only to split up again; a bidder or leader may for some moments gather a knot of adherents; political or personal causes lead to rioting; a regiment goes past and there is slaughter and destruction, or even for a time a sense of purpose and direction of effort. To use another metaphor, the succession of rulers and tribes, with their gatherings, their severances and their overlap, resembles the raindrops on a moving window-pane, meeting but to dissolve and fade away, and streaming together across the glass only when a storm of rain blows up and carries all before it. In such a picture it is hard to trace the beginnings or the purposes of the forces that move across the vision, the more so in a land whose terrain has until recently imposed nomadic habits on its populations, so that the forces themselves have been perpetually on the move. For an example of this we may look to the last great Timurid, Babur. He succeeds to his hereditary kingdom of Farghana, moves on to capture Samarkand, only to lose it again more than once in a short decade. There follows the astonishing contrast of his conquest of Hindustan, where he is able to found an Empire and become the first in a succession in the direct line lasting for over three centuries. During the first two of these, his successors were among the most firmly established rulers in the world. In his Turkish home a wandering soldier of fortune, here one year and gone the next; in Hind the first of a mighty line of kings, the shadow of whose name and policies can be seen in the Indian field of administration to this very day.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

The central points in the earlier history of Turkistan are two. The first is the Mongol deluge which, under Chingiz Khan, swept over the land in the years 1219–24; the second the thunderbolt launched by Timur nearly two centuries later (1379–1405). Timur, though of Mongol antecedents, used Chaghatai Turkish as his mother tongue and belonged to what Barthold [1] called *la tribu mongole turquisée* of the Barlas, established at the ancient twin city of Kesh [2] where the Kashka Darya issues from the mountains.

It will be found that the human material, and the forces applied to it, will fall into a more comprehensible order if viewed in periods divided by these two outstanding events in the history of Central Asia. But, before embarking on any analysis of these periods, there are a number of general distinctions and definitions that I must make, if there is to be any understanding of the people mixed together in the crucible which is Central Asia.

A reference to the map at the end of this book will show the reader the disposition of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, arranged as it stands today in accordance with the various languages, Turkic and Iranian, spoken by the agglomerations known loosely as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Turkmens (all Turkish) and the Tajiks (Iranians). It will be seen that in more than one case the speakers of these languages overlap across the international frontiers into China, Afghanistan and Persia. There are also areas within the country in which Uzbek mingles with Tajik, Turkmen or Karakalpak, Kirghiz with Uzbek, and so on. Bilingualism in Uzbek and Tajik is common in areas of overlap, especially so in the towns from Khojent to Bukhara. Turkic Uzbek in the towns has lost its vowel harmony under Iranian influence, but has preserved it in the north of the Uzbek linguistic territory, where there was no such influence. On the other hand, the juxta-

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 168.

[2] The modern name of these cities is Shahr-i-Sabz and Kitab. They are separated from Samarkand by the Takhta Karacha pass over a spur of the Hissar mountains.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak 197
in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange, but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not [563]
blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings, they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours, so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of 000
cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or completely losing their own in the process. The language of a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care. Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the population in this part of the world, language does in fact give some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor, namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it 174
can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

After the Turks came flooding in the Mongols. Much ink has been spilt by the learned in discussing the relationship between Mongol and Turk in Central Asian history. Confusion reigns in the use of such terms as Mongol, Tatar, Turk, Sart, Kazak and Uzbek, and there is a tendency to complicate the discussion still further by an approach through linguistics. For instance, Chuvash, a Turkic language spoken on the Volga, has a distinct admixture of Bulgar terms, and it is sometimes sought therefore to distinguish its speakers as the true representatives of the Golden Horde, who mingled with the Bulgars — an earlier-than-Mongol stock — upon the Volga. But even if the armies of Chingiz were themselves pure Mongols (and there is reason to believe they were not), the ultimate truth is that at that date this was a Turkish sea into which the Mongol rivers flowed. The Mongol civilization was absorbed by the Turkish civilization in Transoxiana, just as it was absorbed by the higher culture of China and Russia. The name of Chaghatai, the second son of the Mongol Chingiz, even became that of the literary Turkic language of the Eastern Turks, and, less than two centuries later, Timur himself, belonging to a tribe of Mongol origin, had become in all essentials a Turk. Perhaps the best way of setting this question in its true light is again to point to the last great Timurid, the Emperor Babur. Himself described on his father's side as descended in the fifth generation from Timur, and on his mother's side in the thirteenth generation from Chaghatai the second son of Chingiz — and so of Mongol ancestry on both sides — he writes in Turkish, and in his Memoirs [1] speaks with disdain of the Mughul (Mongol) race: 'Of all others', he says, 'the wretches of Mughuls were most active in unhorsing and stripping the stragglers'. And later in verse: [2]

Were the Mughuls angels, they would be bad,
Written in gold, evil would be the name Mughul.

[1] Bib. I, 61, p. 150.

[2] The verse may be an interpolation by Babur's son, the Emperor Humayun. But the argument stands.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr
101 and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar,
[197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain-
369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik

The man of the oasis is often small-
boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142]
the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369
beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman; the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly 101
called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appellation Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan, the old North-West Frontier. There too the town populations, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the *indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as 'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word *Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation (as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tajiks
Kent Turks

101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, 186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description[1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] 101 Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan[2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — [617] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is 000 replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kipchak
Uzbek
Nogai

The Kent-Turks may even grasp that they are one nation with other Turks. . . . Seen from this point of view the extended use of the name Uzbek may be a stepping stone to the use of the name Turk to describe the national unity of Turkistan. 000

The Turkmen with his Oghuz ancestry I have already noted. He is rather to be grouped with the Western Turks. As for the Eastern Turks, I have put forward the tribal name Kipchak as typical of the Turkish stock of the steppe, upon which the Mongol deluge descended. After the Mongol conquest Kipchak disappears as the name of an *ulus*[1] from the pages of the Muslim chronicles. But the Kipchaks, with others like them, supplied the fundamental Turkish element which, overlaid by the Mongol invasion and having joined the Mongols in the wanderings of the Golden Horde, produced in time a mingled Turco-Mongol agglomeration of tribes. From this rough fashioning the Uzbek and the Nogai — also known as the Mangit — issued as pre-eminent. The process worked itself out over the whole range of country from Maveraunnahr, over the Urals, and down to the Volga and the Don, and it is on this ground some of the emigration claim that the cause of the Kazan Tatars of the Volga, and of the Bashkurds[2] in the Urals is one with that of the peoples who were later to be known as the Uzbeks and the Kazaks in Turkistan. 101

It is interesting, and typical of the Mongol-Turk confusion, that the Uzbek and the Nogai, Turkish tribes, took their name from eponymous Mongol princes of the house of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son and father of the Golden Horde. The imaginative have given the name Uzbek an alternative derivation from the words *öz*, essence, spirit, self, and *beg*, a master — one who is captain of his soul. To each his choice, but Uzbek Khan (1312–40) was an historical prince of the line of Juchi. The picture emerging, which in the main conforms

[1] A Mongol or Turkish nation or tribe. The Pathans too use the word.

[2] The ethnologists set the Bashkurds in the Finno-Ugrian group. But the Bashkurd language belongs to the Turkic, not the Finno-Ugrian, branch of the Altaic system, and their country lay across the way of the Turco-Mongol migrations of the Golden Horde. [197]

R. Caine 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Uzbek
Nogai
Kazak

101 with Barthold's views, in that it was these Uzbek and Nogai clans, and others of their kind, who became the forerunners of the true (*ulugh*) Uzbeks, of the Tatars of Idel-Ural, and of the Kazaks alike. Those of them that became masters of the cities in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses naturally assimilated some degree of the Persianized manner and habit of mind, body and speech prevailing among the sedentary population, until in the end the Turkic-speaking Sarts
181 claimed enlistment under the Uzbek banner. But, as the Basmachi troubles showed as late as 1920, there were many Uzbeks left in the villages and hill-country who retained all their ancient prowess as warriors up to the time of the coming of the Soviets to Turkistan.

Of the Uzbeks proper Togan writes:[1]

> They do not display that Muslim fanaticism and pride in an effete civilisation which is almost a disease among the Kent-Turks. Although today the Uzbeks live a settled life, their tribal divisions have not entirely lost their political and social importance. They are serious, peaceable and honest, but in war they are as courageous and pitiless as ever they were. They love hard exercise and games on horseback called Kökbori. They have retained their aptitude for war, as they shewed in the Basmachi rebellion, and it is surely they who will one day play the chief part in the political life of Turkistan.

101 Those who remained on the steppe took to themselves in time the generic name of Kazak. As stated, the word Kazak means a vagabond or outlaw — one beyond the pale; it is not a tribal name. The process is not unlike that whereby the branches of the great Ghilzai clans, which cross the North-West Frontier in annual migration from homes in the Afghan highlands to the softer climate of the Indus Valley, are known not by the tribal name of Ghilzais but as Powindahs or graziers. Just as the word *Sart* was used to designate a cultivator or townsman, so Kazak was applied without tribal significance to the nomads of the steppe. In such a country with such a history the ancestry of the Kazaks has been tangled

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 46-7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kazak

beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique 101
suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the 000
languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle 619
against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, 181
> courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirats*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, op. cit. p. 81.

[3] Togan, op. cit. p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 89.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

181 combined region of Kitab and Shahr-i-Sabz before the Russians came. He found him a man whose word he could implicitly trust, possessed of much delicacy of mind and feeling, with an appreciation of what is due to himself and of an aristocratic bearing in every look and movement. In appearance Jūre Beg was tall and handsome, simply dressed but exquisitely neat, with a thin beard, pleasant dark eyes, and a serious face — a strict Muslim, but altogether without fanaticism — an excellent judge of character, with the politeness of Asia at his finger's end, yet with dignity to act as he thought right. He conformed indeed, says Schuyler, to his notion of perfect breeding. Togan, writing sixty years later of the same man, speaks of the great respect in which Jūre was held by his own people and Russians alike. He came of a nomad Uzbek tribe, like the Kazaks not greatly influenced by Persian manners, but he had a fine library which he was proud to show to Barthold, whom he allowed to catalogue it. To the Russian Barthold, he said, 'The Russian administration in Turkistan is very like that of the Mongols; they choose the worst men from among us and use them against their fellow countrymen'.

186 No writer on the Turks of Central Asia can avoid a reference to the slogans under which various forces interested in this region have from time to time sought to enlist the interest of the Eastern Turks in a larger political union. Different banners have been unfurled, beneath which a Turkic renascence should take place. The following definition [1] is that given in Togan's work, with a conclusion that no one creed offers, as it stands, a worthy or practicable goal for the Turks.

The three terms, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, are first stated. The first, the religious appeal, which would draw in other peoples of the Muslim world, is seen as a strand only of a more real and deep Turkish patriotism. Generally, pan-Islamism is dismissed as a political force, partly because most of these writers and thinkers themselves started

[1] Op. cit. pp. 360 et seqq.

[i.e. by Togan, see cat 116. pp. 7-9 .. Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

very much to the left, and partly no doubt in deference to the 186
inspirations of modern Turkey. While therefore it is possible to speak in moving terms of Islam in the hearts of the people, far beyond the confines of the mosque or the conceptions of the *ulema*, as a political watchword it is regarded by the new nationalism as a mirage of imperialists.

The pan-Turanian idea is defined as a Hungarian proposal for a league of all Turkish, Mongol, Hungarian and Finno-Ugrian stocks — a sort of political Altaics. This has only to be stated to be dismissed as theory empty of political content, because it lacks the necessary social and geographical nexus.

Lastly, pan-Turkism is defined as originally the product of the mind of the Hungarian Vambéry. As a political force it is discounted, but the new nationalism finds attractions in the idea of an entente of races of strictly Turkish stock. There is a search for a cultural and social image of a sort to appeal to those lost in the desert, who need a well whereby to quench their thirst and recover their bearings. Togan himself by no means envisages a unified Turkic State, federal or otherwise, under the hegemony of Turkey; indeed he quotes sayings of that protagonist of such impulses, Enver Pasha, recognizing that, although there should be a common inspiration for peoples of Turkish stock, and all Turks, west and east, should be free of foreign domination, it is no use to look forward to a formal unity, even of language. He does not say it, but he seems to look forward to a loose gathering of the clans not unlike the modern conception of the Commonwealth, in cultural harmony, a group of adults, acting together in danger but under no formal obligations. The inspiration of his thought is best imparted in his own words.[1]

The movement for Turkish unity [he writes], is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit. In Turkey, as in Turkistan, there was research into Turkish history, national literature and custom. It aroused intense interest not only in Turcological publications by

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 558.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 European scholars, but also among Europeans generally as giving an increased insight into the Turkish world. The question of the historical unity of Turkish culture is being more and more explained. The two mystics, Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century in Yese [the town now itself called Turkistan near the Sir Darya] and Yunus Emre 150 years later in Anatolia, represented one and the same school and culture. The ancient enmity typified by the war between Bayezid and Timur, the respective national heroes of the Western and Eastern Turks, began to lose its force. The national literature of Azerbaijan shows how Chingiz and Timur are becoming the greatest heroes of a national consciousness common to all Turks. There is no doubt that Ismail Gaspirali's [1] work had an influence in Turkey, and was the first sign of the reforms which took shape 50 years later under Atatürk.

The Yesevite School of Ahmed Yesevi in the realm of religion; the epics of Oghuz Khan, Dede Korkut and Köroghlu [2] in the domain of literature; the works of art and monuments of the East Turks and the West Turks; all these are a pledge of th. universal significance of Turkish civilization. Until recently [346] historians of the art of the Osmanli period held the Green Mosque at Bursa to be purely an Osmanli work; it now transpires that it is ornamented by Tabriz tile-artists who knew the art of the Ilkhans, and by a Bursa decorator who had learned his craft in the time of Timur at Samarkand. The monuments of the Ilkhan period at Tabriz, the mosques of the Timurids at Meshed and Herat, the glorious *medreses* at Samarkand, Yese and Urgench are of one and the same Turkish civilization.

000 In the Caucasus a pan-Turkish ideal arouses jealousies among those who are not Turks, or even Muslims. But that is another story; here in Turkistan emphasis on this ideal need not weaken the national resistance from Europe against the Great Russians, nor should Georgians and Armenians suspect motives which inspire those who seek the independence of the homelands of the Turks.

On the narrower stage of Turkistan east of the Caspian,

[1] Crimean writer, XIXth century. See Chapter XIII, p. 226.

[2] Old epics of the Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen tribes handed down by word of mouth. Soviet scholars have done much to reduce them to writing, but usually to Russian and not in the original. The latest Ukase is that this is the literature of a bygone feudal age, teaching a false bourgeois nationalism and must be shunned.

On this subject see Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

there are the contrasts between tent-dweller and settled cultivator, townsman and mountaineer, Turkish tribal custom (the *Yasa* or *Yasak*) and the Islamic *Sheriat*, between the Khorasani culture of the south and the legends of the Turkish horsemen of the north, even between the pure Turkic languages of the steppe and the Persianized speech of Maveraunnahr. It is necessary to distinguish Kazaks, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Turkmens and Town-Turks. But the constant effort of writers like Togan is to work towards a common nationality for all the people of Turkistan. To some extent this is special pleading with a political motive, and they display a clear tendency to overstress the theme that the Town-Turks are of pure Turkish stock. They criticize too the artificial division of Turkistan by the boundaries drawn under the Soviet settlement of 1924, and indeed there is reason to hold — to this I shall return — that Soviet policy has been directed to breaking down the country into linguistic units with one object at least of countering any tendency towards a wider nationalism which should embrace all Turkistan. But there remains an impression, confirmed by the writings of some groups of a younger emigration which have fled from the Russians, that, in seeking to establish a single tradition, refugees have overdone the stress on unity and underrated the diversities. It is as if Panjabis, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Marathas, Pathans had been lumped together in the Army of the old India. It may not be impossible to seek unity through diversity, and to work towards institutions which recognize these differences.

But it is not yet time to see the picture whole. The attempt up to this point has been to sort out and set in order against a physical background the various strains and layers of humanity which have gone to make up this amalgam, observing that, in spite of a natural diversity, there have not been lacking certain forces making for coalescence. Nevertheless, in passing to review some of the events of a tangled past, it will be well to bear in mind how enduring is the influence of the two environments, one of the desert and the other of the sown.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

IV

CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRES

000

We are dead but our living was great : we are dumb, but
a song of our State
Will roam in the desert and wait with its burden of long,
long ago. . . .

FLECKER

175

I HAVE remarked that the history of the Eastern Turks after the Arab conquest falls into clearer relief if it is grouped round the two violent upheavals caused by the invasion of the Mongols under Chingiz Khan early in the XIIIth century and the conquests of Timur issuing from his base at Kesh, near Samarkand, at the end of the XIVth century. The periods before the Russian pressure began early in the XVIIIth century then become :

(i) The pre-Mongol era, 700–1200.
(ii) Chingiz Khan and his successors, 1200–1350.
(iii) Timur and the Timurids, 1350–1500.
(iv) The Uzbek conquest under the Shaibanids, with the period of growing disorder and dissolution into the three petty States of Khiva (Khorezm), Bukhara and Kokand, 1500–1750.

(i) *Pre-Mongol Era*

Transoxiana as far as the Saihun (Sir Darya) was conquered by the Arabs during the reign of the *Umayyid* Caliph Abdul Malik in the last decade of the VIIth century. The conquest was the natural extension to the north of the overrunning of Sassanian Persia and was achieved by the Emir Kotaiba ibn Muslim with armies of which Arabs formed the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central AsiaRL1

spearhead only, reinforced by many thousands of troops from almost every part of Persia. 175

Not more than fifty years later grave disaffection broke out among the virile peoples of this north-eastern part of the Arab dominion, stirred by an oppressive Umayyid policy which refused to accord equal rights even to Muslim converts who were not Arabs. The estrangement of Khorasan and Transoxiana was adroitly used by the *Abbasids* of Baghdad, who with aid from Persia succeeded round about 750 in supplanting the Damascus house of the Umayyids. It was during the Abbasid period that a second centre of urban civilization was firmly planted in Transoxiana under Muslim auspices. Abbasid rule was largely in the hands of Khorasanis, so that Persian influences, as representing the new faith, became dominant in the oasis-cities along and between the Jaihun and the Saihun. What had taken place in fact under the impact of the faith was a Persian invasion and consolidation of the settled Turkish lands in the Turanian basin. Indeed Barthold holds that Persian population and influence in and over this region predated Islam and were evident under the Sassanian dynasty, during which Turkish tribes near the rim of the bowl had adopted Zoroastrianism.[1]

When towards the end of the IXth century the *Samanids* (874–999) succeeded to the Abbasid heritage in the frontier provinces of Khorasan and Transoxiana, the result was to clamp down the Persian yoke and influence even more tightly on the homelands of the Turks. Until the Turkish tribes adopted Islam they were in no position to aspire to rule, and up to this time Islam had had no success with them. There was indeed a period of about 300 years (last decade of VIIth to last decade of Xth century) between the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana and the first certain testimony to the adoption of Islam by Turks of any marked political influence. Up to that time Arab writers consistently number the Turkish tribes as enemies of the faith.

The Samanids came from Balkh and enforced a rigorous

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 33.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 form of Hanafi Sunniism,[1] perhaps stimulated by the struggle which Islam had had to conduct with Buddhism for the mastery of that region. In the Hindu Kush, not far south of the rim, the great idols of Bamian, hewn in the rock, still stand to attest the strength which Buddhism once had on the southern fringe of Turan, and it has been suggested that the prevalence of theological schools (*medreses*) in Bukhara and other Turkish cities is to be explained as a relic of Buddhist [103] influence. The Sanskrit word *vihara* means a monastery, and the name Bukhara is probably derived from it.

The first Turkish house to embrace Islam was that of the *Karakhanids*, in the somewhat legendary person of Bughra Khan of Kashghar (d. *circa* A.D. 960). They are known to some historians as the *Ilak Khans*. The domains of this house extended to the north over Yedi Su, and its capital came later to be at a place named Balasagun, now unknown but probably on the Chu River. Bughra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in the year 999 in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from the Samanids, thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries. Flushed with success the Karakhanids tried to carry their conquests farther south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni,[2] with the result that the Amu became the dividing-line between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realms. Early in the XIth century and not long after the establishment of Turkish rule in Transoxiana by the Karakhanids began the famous thrust of the *Ghuzz* or *Oghuz* Turks from the regions north of the Saihun (Sir Darya).

It was this great agglomeration of Turkish tribes, divided into twenty-four clans, which was destined to produce three of the most famous peoples in Islamic history. The first of

[1] The *Hanafi* is regarded as the school of the Sunnat, as opposed to the Shiah, in the most orthodox descent. There are three other Sunni schools, the Hanbali, the Shafii and Maliki. The Hanafi doctrine was that professed by the Ottomans, by the Turks of Transoxiana and by the great majority of Indian and Afghan Muslims.

[2] The first Ghaznavid with his seat at Ghazni between Kabul and Kandahar, the patron of the Persian poet Firdausi and the curse of India in the XIth century.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

these was the *Khalij* or *Khalji*,[1] the forerunners of the great 175
Ghilzai tribe of eastern Afghanistan who gave a dynasty to Delhi and, centuries later, having adopted the Afghan language and custom, crushed the Safavid dynasty of Persia and disputed with the Durranis the mastery of Afghanistan. The second was the *Seljuks* (1038–1150), who pressed down into Khorasan from across the Oxus with armies whose discipline astonished the Muslim world, becoming converted to Sunni Islam as they did so. Having conquered Persia, they entered Baghdad to release the degenerate Abbasid caliphs from tutelage to Turkish mercenary bodyguards, and went on into Syria and Armenia. In 1071, Alp Arslan, their chief, defeated the Byzantines at Melasgird and for a few years their rulers controlled an Empire which was bounded by the Oxus and the Persian Gulf to north and south and by the Indus and the Mediterranean to east and west. The *Turkmens* of the lower Oxus and Turkmen steppe are their descendants. Great Seljuk rulers were Tugrul Bey, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. They succeeded to the Samanid heritage of strictly orthodox Hanafi Sunniism, and persecuted not only Shiahs but the devotees of all other Sunni schools. Like other hordes which poured off the steppes of Central Asia, the Seljuk Empire could not survive the death of one or two great war-leaders and started to break up by A.D. 1100. It left as its most important segment in the west the Konia sultanate in Anatolia, and in the east the hereditary governorate of Khorezm (Khiva) under a line which came to be known as the Shahs of Khorezm. The Mongol invasion of the XIIIth century gave both of these their death-blow, the Anatolian kingdom yielding place to a third offshoot of the Oghuz tribal confederacy.

In Anatolia these were the *Ottomans*. A small border Khan Othman, acting as Khan of a fief of Turkdom on the Byzantine frontier, in 1326 obtained control of Bursa and founded the Ottoman Empire. His exploits and those of his

[1] For a very clear exposition of the identification of the Khalij with the Ghilzai see Fraser-Tytler, Bib. I, 36. His argument is strengthened by the fact that in the Pashtu language these tribes are not called *Ghilzai*, a Persianized form, but *Ghalji* or *Kholji*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 immediate successors fall in a period more than a century after the Mongol invasions of Turkistan and are not directly related to the pattern of events in Central Asia. But it is necessary to mention them in order to indicate the stages in the spread of Turkish influence. More important for our purposes is the fact that, however far the Anatolian Turks (including in this context Osmanlis and Turks of the Caucasus) [1] may have diverged from those of Transcaspia, in the Turkmens, also descendants of the Oghuz, may be found a connecting link between Eastern and Western Turk.

There remains yet another ruling house which held sway in parts of Transoxiana before the Mongol deluge. This is the *Kara Kitai* (*circa* 1137–1200). On their passage through Transoxiana the Seljuks had given but passing attention to affairs nearer home, bent on conquest far afield. But the tumult of their going had weakened the Karakhanids of Samarkand, exposing them to attack from powerful forces from the east. These new arrivals were the Kitai, who, issuing from North China (where their dynasty had been known as the Leao), established themselves in Mongolia and, passing on thence by the usual Ili Valley route, succeeded early in the XIIth century in defeating the Karakhanids (with whom they are not to be confused), and established themselves both in Transoxiana and in Kashghar. The Kara Kitai were Chinese in appearance, tradition and culture, and they never embraced Islam. Their chief claim to remembrance is that, although their dominion lasted less than a century, they gave a name to China, which many Muslims and all Russians to this day know as Kitai.

After Chingiz Khan the Kitai disappear from history, and the survival of their memorial in the name they gave to China is therefore the more extraordinary. It can only be explained by saying that, being the only conquering people reaching

[1] The Azerbaijanis are the most important Caucasian Turks. Having been subjected for many years to the Safavid dynasty of Persia, they, along with their brethren in what is still Persian Azerbaijan, have been induced, alone among Turks, officially to embrace Shiism.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175

as far as Maveraunnahr out of China proper, they deeply impressed their Turkish subjects with the Chinese culture of which they were representative. So, when thinking of China, the thoughts of an Eastern Turk would turn to the Kitai.

Making their capital at Balasagun, the forgotten site in the Chu region, they defeated the Karakhanids at Khojent in 1137, and even at one time carried their arms successfully against Sanjar, the last great Sultan of the Seljuks, who by that time had attained to a vague overlordship over the Karakhanid chiefs. The Kitai prince took the title of Gurkhan, and at the height of their power this dynasty controlled the country as far as Khorezm. Their administration was Chinese in fashion, and they permitted the local chiefs, including the Karakhanids, a limited authority subject to payment of tribute. The district of Khorezm became a border battleground between the Muslim Seljuk rulers, who maintained there an important governorship, and the 'infidel' Kitai. It was the importance of Khorezm as the Muslim outpost that led to this appointment becoming hereditary in the line of the Seljuk governors known as the Shahs of Khorezm, who in the years immediately preceding the Mongol deluge maintained a fruitless and inconclusive struggle against the Kitai masters of the upper rivers.

Some of the Kitai professed Christianity in the Nestorian tradition. Many scholars have identified them with the legends of Prester John, but in the event it is the name of this dynasty, and not its faith, which constitutes its right to remembrance. The poetry of our own tongue still knows the name Cathay.

The *Shahs of Khorezm* (1097–1220) by the beginning of the XIIIth century had attained a considerable magnificence. As the Russians found later, the oasis of Khiva on the lower Oxus (which was once Khorezm) is ringed round on all sides by deserts and sea, the passage of which is rendered harder by the winter blizzards and the intolerable summer heats. We have seen[1] that at about this time (1220) there is some reason to think that the Amu may have reverted to its old course to the Caspian, and a branch of the Sir may have reached across towards the Khorezm capital Urgench, making of the 'hushed

1 [See cat. 116 p.23-24 -- Analyst]

173

THE DYNASTIES DESCENDED FROM CHINGIZ KHAN

173



Those underlined became Khakan

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p. 54

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Chorasmian waste' a fertile network of canals. Entrenched in this fertility, and protected by the sands, had arisen an intellectual and Islamic life of a high order. Here was laid the foundation of that Eastern Turkic literature in a language which later took the Mongol name of Chaghatai. The Khorezm eastern frontier reached across the Kizilkum as far as the town of Otrar on the Sir Darya, and it was near here in the town of Yese that the mystic Ahmed was born and flourished (d. 1167).[1] Muhammad, the last Shah of Khorezm, became wealthy and powerful, and succeeded in obtaining a somewhat uncertain control over Bukhara and Samarkand, having defeated the Kitai on the Talash in 1210. This victory encouraged the Shah to a show of self-esteem; he posed as Caliph and Protector of the Faith, arrogating to himself the name and titles of the last Seljuk and even of Alexander the Great. When, a few years later, the challenge came from Chingiz Khan, he fancied himself strong enough not only to defy it but to take the initiative against the Mongols. But his kingdom was like that of the Chaldees.

(ii) *Chingiz*[1] *and the Mongols*

Chingiz Khan rose to power in Mongolia in the year 1205 after defeating his rival Jamuga, who had tried to unite the popular party against him. According to Soviet historians,[2] Chingiz, like others after him, decided on war to distract attention from civil strife between contending Mongol factions at home. His first assault was directed on Turkish tribes, the Kirghiz of the Yenisei, the Merkit and the Naiman, whom by 1269 he had subdued. The remnants fled westward, the Merkit towards the Kipchak country, the Kirghiz to the Tienshan and the Alai, where they now are, and the Naiman farther south into the kingdom of the Kitai, then, as we have seen, engaged in a struggle with the Shah of Khorezm for predominance in Maveraunnahr. Chingiz then turned his

[cat. 116, pp. 272 -- Analyst]

[1] For spelling see Appendix, final paragraph.

[2] The official theory is crystallized in a Soviet novel which won the Stalin prize, *Jenghiz Khan*, by V. Yan. Bib. I, 106.

1 [for the importance of Ahmed Yesevi, see cat. 116, pp. 45-46 -- Analy

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 arms eastward, overran China and in 1215 took Peking. While he was doing this he left his eldest son, Juchi, in command on the western frontier, and it was when Juchi was in pursuit of the fleeing Merkit on the Kipchak steppe that his troops first clashed with the borderguards of the Khorezm Shah. At this time Muhammad, the last Shah, had reached the peak of his arrogance and, seeing himself as the champion of Islam and encouraged by his victory over the Kitai, he dreamed of the conquest of China, and held the intervening Mongols in contempt. Embassies of merchants passed between Chingiz and Muhammad; finally, with a total disregard of good faith or the consequences, a caravan sent by Chingiz was treacherously slaughtered by Muhammad's order at the frontier town of Otrar (close to the modern Aris) in 1218.

This brought the Mongol down on Khorezm in the following year. Leaving a column under his son Juchi to storm Otrar, he himself took Bukhara and Samarkand and other of the oasis-cities, sacked and burned them, and slaughtered the populations. The Shah Muhammad fled to a Caspian island, where he died; his son Jalaluddin, after putting up a gallant fight, was forced to flee by way of Ghazni into India, and after a last desperate battle barely escaped his pursuers by swimming the Indus into safety. Meanwhile Chingiz had carried his arms far and wide to the Caucasus, the Don, and Kiev, slaughtering and burning all the way. Juchi meanwhile had sacked all the cities of Khorezm. In 1225 the tale of destruction was complete and Chingiz returned to Mongolia to die two years later at the age of 65.[1] He was predeceased by a few months by his eldest son Juchi, the father of the Golden Horde.

The dominions of the great Mongol descended to the branches of his four sons, Juchi, Chaghatai, Ogodai and Tului. Each area was known as the *ulus* or tribe, and, as is natural with a nomadic organization, the allotment was tribal rather than territorial. For this reason the limits of each are difficult to

[1] Some historians give Chingiz' age at death as 72. I follow Howorth, Bib. I, 44

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

trace and there was much merging at the margins. But the general pattern is clear enough [1] if only because the allotment from west to east happened in this case to follow the order of seniority of the conqueror's sons. Thus Juchi's patrimony, which owing to his death descended direct from Chingiz to Juchi's sons Orda and Batu, was dominion over all the country farthest to the west, from the Sir Darya over the Urals to the valleys of the Volga and Don. This was the Golden Horde. 175

The domain of Chaghatai embraced most of Turkistan, that is to say, Maveraunnahr, Farghana and Yedisu, but it included also what is now Sinkiang and, to the south, a large part of Khorasan. It thus comprised most of the settled populations of the agricultural districts, and all the most flourishing cities of Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khojent, Kashghar, Herat and Ghazni. Chaghatai's *ordu* or capital was at Almalik, a lost encampment in the valley of the Ili, probably near the site of the present Kulja but placed by some at the modern Alma Ata.

Ogodai, the third son, succeeded to the country of the original Mongols, where he established his *ordu* at Karakoram, near the present Ulan Bator, and held at first the supreme authority, or Khakanate, of the Mongol Empire. The limits between the dominions of Chaghatai and Ogodai were ill-defined as all boundaries between nomadic hordes must be, but the subsequent struggle for power indicates a shifting frontier somewhere in the Jungarian region on the Ili. As the house of Ogodai declined, most of this region was merged with the territories of the Chaghatai Khans.

The descendants of Tului, the fourth and youngest son, inherited the Far-East conquests of Chingiz in China, with capital at Peking. It was not long before the Khakanate was usurped by this branch, which developed into the famous Yüan dynasty of China.

Chaghatai and Ogodai both died in 1241, depriving two of the four *ulus* of leadership and setting the brood at one

[1] See Genealogical Table with this chapter. [cat. 116, p.54-Indexed]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 another's throats. Although Ogodai's son Kuyuk maintained a precarious position as Khakan for a few years, and his nephew Kaidu was later to come near to retrieving the position, in the end the chief power fell in 1251 into the hands of Mangu, the eldest son of Tului, from him descending to his brother Kublai — Marco Polo's Great Khan and Emperor of China — in 1257. Tului had three famous sons, Mangu, Kublai and Hulagu, and it was the third of these, the notorious Hulagu, who was sent by Mangu to the south-west. He it was who captured and sacked Baghdad in 1258, finally destroying the shadow of the Abbasid Caliphate and setting up the Il Khan dynasty of Persia to dispute with Chaghatai's descendants the dominion of Turkistan. In the meantime Mangu, succeeded by Kublai, had established himself in the supreme Khakanate, with its base now in China and not on the Mongol steppe. We have seen how communication between the eastern and western branches of the Tului *ulus* was opened by sea to the detriment of the Chaghatai *ulus* which, after a number of vicissitudes, at this period had contrived to retain the major control over Transoxiana and the caravan routes.

The position reached in Turkistan at the close of the XIIIth century must be viewed in two aspects, that of the *ulus* of the steppe, and that of the *ulus* of the settled country. On the steppe the descendants of Juchi and Batu, the Golden Horde, were still in control of all the country right into the heart of Russia. In 1236–40 Batu had extended his grandfather's conquests even farther: passing over a prostrate Russia he pillaged Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, and the terror of his banners was spread as far as the gates of Udine near Venice. Owing to their distance from the Mongol homelands, the Golden Horde, at the western limits of the Empire, were able to develop their own policies untouched by the struggles of the other branches of the Mongol house. Since they controlled only a small part of the settled area — Khorezm for a while was subject to their Khans — and severed, as they were, by the interposing steppe from the troubles of High Asia, they were free to cope with the Russian princes and to

[See c.1 116 p 27R - Prolyot]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

establish a power in the west as far as the Crimea.[1] They 175
became indeed the ancestors of the Turco-Tatar tribes of the Eurasian steppe on both sides of the Caspian and in the Urals. Although the Mongol element no doubt transfused and enriched the original Turkish stock, it was gradually absorbed in it, until the name Tatar as distinct from Turk remains one of the few reminders of the mingled heritage. This process was aided and accelerated by the gradual adoption of Islam as the faith of these peoples. Berke (1257–66) was the first prince of the Golden Horde to embrace Islam, but a century had elapsed from Chingiz' death before Islam became universally acknowledged by the Mongol hordes. Shaiban, Batu's and Berke's brother, and Uzbek, a descendant of this branch, appear in the genealogies as the eponymous ancestors of the Shaibanids and the Uzbek tribes, thus further demonstrating what Barthold calls the *turquisation* of the descendants of Chingiz. It was indeed the Golden Horde which, after Timur's Empire had failed, was destined to supply the Uzbek chieftains who restored Turkish power in Transoxiana.

In the settled areas of the two rivers the position was not so simple.

It is hard to devastate the steppe, nor was it the Mongol way, for they needed flocks and herds for the subsistence of their terrible armies. With the oases it was otherwise. The sack of cities and mass slaughter of the inhabitants is one aspect and the better known. But there is another. The flocks were let loose on the rich irrigated lands as pasturage, after a tradition not yet entirely dead, that of the outspoken contempt of the herdsman for the cultivator. Clavijo, ambassador from the Spanish Court to Timur in 1404, has left a vivid description of this nomadic spirit, each band following its own fancy, pasturing its herds where crops were finest, so that Timur in his time had to intervene to protect the sedentary population.

[1] In 1475, shortly after their capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans occupied the Crimea. Thus the two horns of the advancing Turks, western and eastern, had joined.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLL

175

The factional struggles between the rival *ulus* led to the sacking of cities not only once but again and again. Thus Khorezm passed from the Golden Horde to the Chaghatai Horde, and back again. Urgench and Otrar were subject to constant pillage and the canals decayed. The irruption of Hulagu into Khorasan led to internecine strife between the Ilkhans (his dynasty) and the Chaghatai, with one result that Bukhara, destroyed by Chingiz in 1220 and rebuilt, was again razed to the foundations in 1272 and lay for ten years a ruin. Other cities suffered a like fate, the situation in Turkistan being rendered more confused owing to the uncertain power of the Chaghatai and Ogodai domains squeezed between the stronger forces on the flanks, that of the Golden Horde in the north-west and that of the sons of Tului exercised both from China in the north-east and from Persia under Hulagu's descendants in the south. Commerce too suffered terribly, one insane Mongol method of warfare being for each prince to murder the traders from his rival's domain who happened to be within his power. Thus in 1262 Hulagu decreed the slaughter of every merchant from Berke's territory, and Berke retaliated by executing Hulagu's merchants.

Yet all the time behind the carnage a slow process of *turquisation*, accompanied or perhaps caused by the conversion to Islam, was being worked out in the naturally wealthy areas which formed the heart of the Chaghatai domain. There were Muslim Governors commanding Mongol respect such as Mahmud Yalavash and his son Masud Beg who were able in the cities of the plains to ensure for themselves a position which confounded their savage masters, and to preserve the essence of an Islamic civilization, already in Transoxiana six centuries old.

The first Muslim Khan of the Chaghatai was Borak, and he and his successor Dava are in the direct Chaghatai line, from which was descended Kutluk Nigar, the mother of Babur. After Dava's death the situation became more and more confused, the nominal power passing rapidly down a line of shadow-princes, of whom the last of any note was Kazan

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L1

(d. 1347). The real power fell into the hands of Turkish governors, wielding authority in the Chaghatai name. The distinction between princes and vezirs was marked by title, the Chaghatai prince being known as *Khan*, and the vezir as *Beg*. Like Timur himself, and Babur after him, there is no doubt that many of these *Begs* were of an ancestry inextricably mixed, but by Timur's time, in Western Turkistan at least, their *turquisation* had become complete. Thus they began to take the name of Chaghatai to distinguish themselves and their country from Jungaria and Eastern Turkistan, which came to be known to Babur and others as Mughulistan. There is of course what may be called a Tamerlane legend, written up by a group of chroniclers at the direct orders of Timur himself, and sycophancy has obscured the facts by glorifying the ancestry of Timur and identifying him with the Mongol princes who had gone before. In practice, what had happened was that there remained a pride in Mongol antecedents as shown by the retention of the name Chaghatai itself, but that by the end of the XIVth century the atmosphere had become definitely both Muslim and Turkish.

The Mongol dominion in its prime achieved a staggering immensity. Indeed Chingiz and his four sons, in an age of horse transport, had established across Asia and Europe the vastest continental empire ever known until it was rivalled by the empire of the Russias and their satellites seven centuries later. Like Russia, the Mongol power stretched from China to the Black Sea; the Mongol threat, like Russia today, overhung both Western Europe and the Indian peninsula. To us, and viewed in the perspective of time, the Mongols seem to have come and gone in a fleeting moment, so that historians are accustomed to speak of their rule as a passing phenomenon. But in their passing they threw on the screen a shadow premonitory of a dominion which was to be as extensive in bounds and as lacking in mercy as their own. So too the new Eurasian empire, as dependent as that of the Mongols on the life of one man and on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace circle, may prove to be as ephemeral as theirs.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(iii) *Timur and the Timurids*

175 Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh on the Kashka Darya south of Samarkand. The fact that he came from an irrigated and settled part of the country is significant: while he maintained the tradition of close relations with the nomads who, with their horses and arms, provided the sinews of war, he was attracted by the garden pleasances and the flavour of the already hoary civilization whose cities were grouped along the mountain-skirts where the fertilizing waters spring. In the matter of martial tradition, Timur may have felt himself closer to the men of the steppe than to the people of the towns and villages, but, as Barthold says, he had recourse to a procedure gravely suspect in Chaghatai and Mongol eyes, for he chose a great city to serve as his dwelling-place, and he began to
346 construct in it great buildings. Nor was it only in Samarkand
175 that Timur is remembered for the splendid architecture that bears his name. At Yese too he built a magnificent shrine over the grave of the mystic Ahmed, and at Shahr-i-Sabz, his native place, there still stand the immense piers of the Ak Serai, the white palace of his dreams. Though after the manner of his kind Timur carried fire and terror across all Western Asia, his memorials attest not only a passion to build grandiosely, as have many conquerors before and after him, but something more intimate. He had a feeling for the setting of a shrine — at Yese in the plain beneath the Kara Tav not far from the flowing Sir Darya, at Samarkand the jewels in a green garden against a mountain background. Man of violence himself, his grandsons, and their grandsons, had that peculiar touch and feeling after beautiful things, the work of nature, the product of man's artistry, that we associate with the Muslim spirit at its best. Most famous is the Registan in Samarkand with its three *medreses*, the oldest built by Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg. Of it Curzon said he found it still in his time, even in ruin, the noblest public square in the world, a triumph of massive simplicity and grandeur with which nothing in Europe, save

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86. Op. cit. p. 326.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 clash between Eastern and Western Turk at Ankara, where Timur defeated the Ottoman Bayezid in 1402, had small significance. He returned to die three years later at Otrar on the Sir Darya, while the Ottomans, girding up their loins, half a century later finally shattered the Byzantines by storming Constantinople, and went on to thunder at the gates of Vienna. Yet it is rightly said that Timur left a heritage, greater than that of a warrior. It is enough to name his grandson Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer; the [538] Timurid the Sultan Hussain Baikara (1438–1506), with his splendid city at Herat and the great literature fostered there by the poet Alishir Nevai; Hussain's cousin that other Timurid, Babur (1482–1530), author of the Memoirs and founder of the Chaghatai Empire in Hindustan. All these men were Turks self-confessed, they thought and spoke and wrote in the Eastern Turkic language called by the Mongol name Chaghatai. The annals of this house were rendered illustrious by the names of poets, philosophers and theologians, still household words throughout the East.[1]

000 It was a glorious flowering. There is need to live in Muslim lands in order to understand how close are the deeds and words of the men of the classic age to the minds of men today, closer in some strange way than are the Elizabethans to us. The reason for this nearness may be found perhaps in the fact that deeds and words in the East have been handed on so much by word of mouth, and a man will speak of forebears who lived centuries ago as if he had known them as a child. Thus the flowering of the Timurid age is to the Eastern Turks what the Elizabethans are to us, and more: it was a positive achievement for all time which cannot be annulled, a guarantee which later men may strive to redeem. To those who are lost it still provides a rallying-point.

(iv) *Period of Dissolution*

175 Much of the first part of Babur's Memoirs is occupied with stirring accounts of his struggles against Shaibak or Shaibani

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 88, p. 180.

2: Canoe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Khan for the mastery of Samarkand, and indeed of the whole of Transoxiana. He was Babur's enemy, and Babur came off second-best. But, although Babur thought Shaibani a barbarian, condemning him for his rough and rude ways of dealing with the women-folk of those he defeated, he was too great a man to blacken an opponent. Shaibani appears in his story as a prince of great valour and of no mean military talent, whose defeat and death at Merv at Persian hands Babur is inclined to deplore. Shaibani traced his descent through his grandfather Abul Khair back to Juchi, the Mongol father of the Golden Horde, and was in the same line as Uzbek Khan. His ancestry may have been direct from Chingiz, but he was in fact an Uzbek and a Turk and was so regarded by Babur. His Uzbeks formed, as it were, a backwash from the Golden Horde, who during 300 years of mastery in Eastern Europe since Chingiz had not succeeded either in subduing the Russians or in assimilating themselves with them. The Uzbeks were a returning wave; they had gone out under Mongol leadership, they returned as Turks. It was this prince who after many struggles defeated Babur and Hussain Baikara and took from them the whole of Transoxiana, Balkh and that part of Khorasan dependent on Herat. His successes encouraged him to challenge Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia (1502–1736), and he was defeated and killed at the battle of Merv in 1510, some years before Babur entered India. The result was the loss of Khorasan and all the land south of the Amu to the Safavids, and the relegation of the newly arisen Uzbek power to the country north of that river. It was at this time that the pattern of the present frontier was laid down. Shah Ismail took Bukhara and Samarkand, but later negotiated with the next Shaibanid a frontier along the Amu and the mountains not very different from that now existing between the USSR and the Middle East. Herat and Balkh went to Persia, eventually to be incorporated in the Durrani Afghan Kingdom, the Amu and the Kopet Dagh becoming the limit of Uzbek rule to the south. Moreover, the growth of Shiism in Safavid Persia set up a theological barrier

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

between the orthodox of Bukhara and the Shiahs whom they regarded as Isfahani heretics, thus for the first time since the Arab conquest severing Transoxiana in the realm of thought from the south.

It is seldom realized how great has been the difference in outlook and ideology between Sunni and Shiah. Vambéry in 1863, on his way from Turkey through Persia in the garb of an Istanbul dervish, found himself spat upon as a supposed Sunni by Shiah wayfarers, while ten years later Schuyler in Turkistan was surprised to find that the orthodox pilgrim from Bukhara travelled to Mecca always by Istanbul or India rather than expose himself to Shiah taunts on the direct road through Persia. Thus even in Muslim times a curtain had begun to drop along the Oxus.

The Shaibanids ruled for a century from Bukhara, their greatest Khan being Abdullah, who before his death in 1598 succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana. Like Akbar and Elizabeth of England, his contemporaries, Abdullah ruled for nearly half a century. He conquered Meshed, Herat and Badakhshan, and at the height of his power even had designs on Akbar's India. After his death began a period of anarchy, confused by fighting with the Persian Safavids for the possession of Khorezm, which in the end became independent under another line of Uzbek Shaibanids, of whom the best known was the historian Abulghazi (d. 1663). He and his successors reversed the tables, making Khorezm for a time the overlord of Bukhara. But, as we have seen, its prosperity had been undermined before this time — according to some in 1573 — by a change in the course of the river, a disaster which led to the abandonment of the old capital at Urgench and the rise of a new city at Khiva. By this name the Khanate was thereafter known.

At Bukhara, after Abdullah's death, the power of the Shaibanids rapidly waned. It gave way first to the Janids, and then to the Mangits, both Uzbek houses tracing descent from Shaibani on the distaff side. Two centuries of nonentities are lit by a single high-light, the invasion in 1740 of the great

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Persian usurper Nadir Shah, himself of Turkmen blood of the 175
Afshar clan, but Persianized. Nadir had just returned from his sack of Delhi and, having found the Ottoman Turks too hard a nut to crack, formed the ambition of carrying his arms to the north to the farthest point reached by Darius' Persia, beyond the Sir Darya. This he did unchecked by any serious reverse, but, except for building a gateway to the Bukhara citadel and (as legend tells) attempting the violation of Timur's tomb at Samarkand, he left no memorial other than an increased dislike for the Persian invader from the south. He himself was murdered by his Kizilbash troops in 1747, and his empire over Turkistan did not pass to the Kajars who succeeded him. But he left in Turkistan what he had left in India, native dynasties in slow decay, and a determination now stronger than ever to seal off Transoxiana from contact with the heretics of Khorasan. The curtain had already begun to fall.

A temporary revival after a period of disorder led to the rise of the last dynasty, the Mangit Emirs, in the person of the Emir Masum in 1784. This dynasty lasted until 1921. These nominally Uzbek chieftains of Bukhara had to face a threefold danger, the first from various tribal confederacies of the north which had never entered the oases and by then were called Kazaks, the second from rebellious Tajik subjects in the more hilly regions to the east, the third a continuous threat, both to Khiva and Bukhara, from the Turkmens dwelling in the Merv, Tejen and Akhal oases south of the Karakum. These sometimes raided in their own interest, at others they were enlisted as mercenaries by contending Khans. Though of the race from which came the founders of the most powerful Turkish Empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, in their own country the Turkmens never succeeded in establishing anything more than the loosest of tribal organizations. But, as the Russians found later at Gök Tepe, they were no mean warriors, and they kept the sedentary people of city and oasis in continual alarm. This state of things gave birth to a sort of feudal system very like that of the Khans and Begs before the rise of Timur, the Bukhara Emir relying increasingly on local chiefs,

2: Caroe 4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 his own writ being circumscribed by the edges of the cultivation around the city. The cities became more and more Tajik in character, and the Emirs themselves, as their portraits show, took on the appearance of Tajiks, losing their Turkish ruggedness. Within the city a fanatical priesthood fulminated from three hundred mosques and *medreses*, and the methods of government, jealous of all foreign influence, were scarcely even medieval. The condemned were torn to pieces or hurled to death from the Great Minar, and torture was the indispensable accompaniment of justice. The Emir Nasrullah (1826–60) is remembered chiefly for his vermin-chamber, the bug-pit to which in 1842 he condemned the two Englishmen, Stoddart and Conolly, to suffer in agony for months before beheading them. Under such a government Bukhara was soon unable to control even the Farghana Valley, in which a hereditary line of Khans, known as the Min, was established at Kokand about the year 1700 and became independent before the century had passed.

At the opening of the XVIIIth century the country under some form of Eastern Turkish domination still extended from the Caspian in the west almost to the Gobi in the east, and from the Hindu Kush and Kuenlun in the south to the Russian frontiers in Siberia in the north. Over against this the Russian outposts had stretched out right across Siberia early in the XVIIth century, and reached the Pacific almost simultaneously with the rise to power of the Manchu or Ching dynasty in China in 1643. (The actual year in which a Russian Cortez first stared at the Pacific is variously given; 1638 seems the best authenticated.) But all this great territory of the Eastern Turks was in a state of cultural decadence and military confusion. In the Turanian basin itself the control over the sedentary population was in the hands of the three petty rulers, the Emir of Bukhara and Khans of Khiva and Kokand; on the Kazak and Turkmen steppe companies of armed graziers wandered without much cohesion, sometimes banded together to meet emergencies under Khans who were able to impose a loose authority by force of character or temporary

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R12

175

wealth. I have tried to show how the decline of Turkistan had begun with the substitution of sea-routes for caravan-roads by the Il Khans after the Mongol invasion; this process was carried further by the European discovery of the maritime route to India round the Cape and the establishment of the Dutch, French and English Companies in the XVIIth century. Even so the land-routes across Asia might have retained a limited importance. But the Silk Road received its death-blow when the Russians pushed their power eastward to China and the Pacific. Russian domination in Siberia had now provided a new land-route from west to east passing north of Turkistan. The old caravan routes on which prosperity had depended were almost forgotten, the petty wars between the little States and the raids from the steppe scarcely permitting of their use even for local commerce. Turkistan was in eclipse and seclusion. There remained on the steppe incomparable human material, but no adequate equation had been worked out between that rough material and the culture, most rich in its way, of the cities at the steppe's edge. Here was a political vacuum which would in the end be filled from without.

Meanwhile, unconscious of the fate impending and closely walled from the steppe, there remained only the shell of past glories, a string of flat-roofed cities, fed by a rich but scanty cultivation, the haunt of a narrow bigotry, and dominated by minarets which served for the execution of criminals and the call to prayer alike.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R11

V

TSARIST CONQUEST

The circumstances of their hard and trying position under the jealous surveillance of an irresistible lord paramount, in the person of the Russian Czar, gave a fiercer edge to the natural unamiableness of their disposition, and irritated its gloomier qualities into action under the restless impulses of suspicion and permanent distrust.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

TAKING a stand on the foothills that run down to what is now the Kazak steppe, we have watched the Mongol flood out of Asia rolling westward beyond the Caspian into the heart of southern Russia until it reached the Black Sea. After three centuries we can see the return-wash of the same flood slowly seeping back, a Turkish flood now, until it has submerged the sources on the mountain-skirts whence it originally flowed. That is a greatly simplified picture of the story of the Golden Horde, the sons of Juchi who, returning as Uzbeks and Nogai, succeeded to the heritage of the Chaghatai in the settled cities of the oases. The nomads of the tent had thus assumed the wardenship of a civilization which, in Muslim terms alone, was a thousand years old by the end of the XVIIth century. But it was a civilization of which the arteries had become hardened. For some reason, perhaps the isolation of the country from fresh influences, the nomadic virtues, great as they were, proved at that time unable to give fresh life to a tired body. The country was severed into two parts. There was the steppe-ocean over which virile and pastoral people still roamed, in years of scant rainfall preying on neighbouring tribes and on cities alike; and there was the sedentary population along the rivers where the rulers, though of pastoral stock, had succumbed to the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India; and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

175 as a pawn in the struggle for position between China and Russia which followed the Russian advance to the Pacific. Unlike their Mongol predecessors under Chingiz, they were never absorbed in Turkdom nor did they embrace Islam; they took title and inspiration from the Dalai Lama of Tibet and remained Buddhists of the Greater Way. But although they maintained their High Asian tradition and their identity, their story provides yet another instance of those raindrops on the window which separate only to meet. The bitter slaughter which went on between Kalmuck and Kazak weakened both and opened the steppe to penetration. But there was also an element of attraction, for at the same time Kazaks constantly married Kalmuck women abducted from Jungaria or the Volga steppe, and their sturdy Mongol physique and appearance is to be attributed to this coalescence.[1]

Throughout the XVIIIth century the Russians, moving in where all was disorder on the steppe, were busily engaged in strengthening the right flank of their long line of communication through Siberia (they had reached the Pacific in the XVIIth century). They had only to carry into Asia the tactics so well proved against the Golden Horde during the conflicts of five centuries on the Volga steppe. In 1716 they built Omsk in the Irtish basin, in 1718 Semipalatinsk, in 1724 Orenburg (now Chkalov), in 1734 Orsk, in 1753 Petropavlosk[2]. These places are situated roughly on, or along the southern flank of, the subsequent alignment of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and for many years the advance was confined to this west-east line. But, as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia moved gradually farther south, until in 1842 the frontier had reached the northern coasts of the Aral Sea and in 1847 had been pushed forward to command the lower reaches of the Sir Darya. In 1853 control was assumed of the waterway of the Sir Darya for a distance of 280 miles

[1] Cf. Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 34-5. (Where he speaks of Kirghiz he uses the old Tsarist nomenclature, meaning Kazak.)

[2] See Railway map on p. 192.

175
102



Adapted from Fraser-Tytler's *Afghanistan*

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Page 73

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains
538 had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous
829 resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R1

175 assumption of authority on the Sir Darya and the capture of Chimkent. The nomads, he said, were now surrounded and the Russians 'found themselves confronted by a solid and compact social organization, offering conditions favourable to colonization and the supply of their garrison'.

Thus far, according to Gorchakov, and no farther. But the very next year saw the capture of Tashkent. Samarkand, forcibly detached from Bukhara, followed three years later. Bukhara itself at the time of Schuyler's visit in 1873 had been reduced to vassalage, and there followed in that same year the conquest of Khiva. Russian power was now on the Oxus and up against the Afghan frontier. Except for the Pamir region, too remote for penetration by the now satellite Bukharan State — a frontier settlement was made there between Russia and the Afghans under British auspices in 1895–6 — there remained only the Merv and Tejen oases on the Turkmen steppe between the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. The absorption of these was delayed a few years by Russia's war with Turkey, and to some extent by the British advance into Afghanistan in the Second Afghan War. But during the decade that followed the Afghan War the Russians once more pressed forward to crush a spirited Turkmen resistance, until, after the conquest of Penjdeh in 1885, 'the only thing which could stop this expansion — the upward thrust of some equally powerful empire — challenged and arrested the mighty steam roller of Russia'.[1]

The play and counterplay of Russian and British forces in this region is more properly a part of the history of Persia and Afghanistan. Although Gorchakov failed to press his own argument to its conclusion, he was right in claiming a certain inevitability for the absorption by Russia of Central Asia up to the limit where some counter-force of stabilization should be encountered. The points at which the two forces did in fact meet are sufficiently demonstrated by the map, both on the southern and the eastern sides. It is now more profitable to consider how far the withdrawal of British power from

[1] Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.* p. 129, likely to become the *locus classicus* on this subject.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

India has made to quiver once more a balance that had come to rest. For the moment it is enough to observe that of all her land frontiers this, with that of Transcaucasia, is the only one on which Soviet Russia has not, whether by annexation or by means of satellites, advanced her outposts beyond the line established by the Tsars.

The campaigns in Khiva, Kokand (Farghana) and on the Turkmen steppe were conducted with much ferocity on both sides.[1] The capture of Khiva in 1873 was scarcely opposed by the people of the oasis; the difficulties were due to the great ring of desert surrounding it, and the fierce Turkmen raiders who roamed upon the desert. Up to 1717 there had already been three Cossack expeditions which fared disastrously. On one of these the Cossacks, laden with spoils and a thousand women, were cut off from water and perished to a man; on another the Cossacks lost the road and were reduced by hunger to kill and eat each other. In 1717 Prince Bekovich succeeded in reaching and occupying the city for Peter the Great, only to have his troops set upon and exterminated after peace was made. The Prince's head was cut off and sent as a present to the Bukhara Emir, who refused to accept it! This disaster deterred the Russians for over 100 years: in 1839 an expedition under Perovsky, thinking Russian soldiers could endure the cold, advanced in midwinter but had to return, its goal unreached, after losing the whole of its camel transport and more than half its men. Throughout the next thirty years the Khivans showed their defiance by making captive and enslaving all the Russians who came into their hands. In 1873 Kaufmann, the Governor-General and after Chernaiev[2] the father of Russian Central Asia,

[1] There are good accounts in Schuyler of the Kokand and Khiva campaigns, and in Curzon of the Turkmen campaign. Barbarities on the Russian side are vouched for by the chief Russian actors themselves. Schuyler gives the Perovsky expedition the date 1829, ten years too early.

[2] *Chernaiev*, the first Governor-General (1865, and again in 1882–4), a gallant and chivalrous soldier whom all admired. The Uzbeks spoke of him familiarly by the nickname *Shernaib*, the Lion Viceroy. *Kaufmann*, Governor-General 1867–82, cold, calculating, ruthless, vastly ambitious, a very able consolidator. His name stinks in Central Asia to this day. The last Governor-General was *Kuropatkin* (1914–17), the Varus of the Russo-Japanese war.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 determined on the *coup de grâce*. Four separate columns were to converge on Khiva, from Chekishler on the Caspian near the Persian frontier, from the Mangishlak Peninsula farther north, from Orenburg and, under Kaufmann himself, from Tashkent. The command of the whole was under Kaufmann, who gave strict orders that any other column reaching its goal before he himself arrived was to defer its assault.

Of these only the Orenburg column, better provided and marching down the west coast of the Aral Sea, succeeded in arriving at its destination without terrible losses from heat and thirst. On the way its commander managed to pick up the Mangishlak column, and on reaching Khiva found himself compelled to attack the city before the Tashkent column could arrive. It was only by a happy chance and not good management that Kaufmann reached Khiva at all, his troops decimated by hardships encountered in the Kizilkum on the way. The Chekishler column had to turn back, harried by Turkmen horsemen and stricken by sunstroke, the troops having thrown away their arms and abandoned their camels in the Karakum desert. The expedition was not the first to establish the incapacity of Russians to provide for campaigning under a pitiless sun. But the success of the Orenburg column, for which Kaufmann himself could claim no credit, enabled him to obtain the surrender of the Khan and the reduction of Khiva to Russian vassalage.

The campaign was marred by the subsequent measures taken by Kaufmann to subdue what he called the pride and license of the Turkmens who had hovered on the flanks of his columns and caused them many losses. He first imposed on them a fine in cash which he knew the Turkmens, whose property was in kind, could not pay. Then, by a breach of faith, he directed his forces to attack them before the date given for payment of the fine had run out. Worst of all, he issued orders, in writing as all his campaign orders were [1]—

[1] Schuyler explains how the excessive Russian habit of writing formal orders on campaigns compelled every commander to carry a large secretariat in the field. He saw masses of great volumes comprising the orders for this campaign. Cf. *op. cit.* ii, 357.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and there is therefore no escape — 'to give over the Yomud [Turkmen] settlements, and their families, to complete destruction'. He followed this up by orders for extermination in case of the least resistance. The execution of this order resulted in a slaughter by the Cossacks, sparing neither age nor sex. MacGahan, the American freelance and hero of the *Ride to Khiva*, who was present on the occasion, describes how the subordinate commanders in the field proceeded to an indiscriminate butchery, and how he saw women and children go down before the Cossacks who rushed about like madmen. 175

Savagery of this order lives in the memory of later generations.

The most distinguished Russian officer in the Turkistan wars was undoubtedly Skobelev. He was present at Khiva, and took a leading part in the later Kokand campaign, where he brought resistance to an end by a ruthless bombardment of the cities and bazaars. The new Russian city in the Farghana Valley, founded near Margilan after the Kokand campaign, was named Skobelev after him (the Soviets changed it first to New Margilan, and later to Farghana). It was Skobelev too who in January 1881, after Lomakin had failed, finally overcame Turkmen resistance at Gök Tepe, the famous Tekke fortress. The curious reader will find the full details given in Curzon's work,[1] much of it reproduced from Skobelev's own words. When the fortress was stormed in the face of the utmost gallantry on the part of ill-armed defenders, the order was given to pursue the retreating enemy and give no quarter, an order pursued with savage precision over eleven miles until darkness fell. The morning found 8000 persons of both sexes and all ages cut down in rows like fresh-mown hay. Within the fort too all who did not escape were slaughtered to a man.

Skobelev himself explained his policy by saying:

I hold it a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy.

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 78 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Strike hard, and keep on striking till resistance fails; then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.

Curzon remarks that no greater contrast could be imagined to the British method, which is to strike a series of taps, to prohibit slaughter, and to abstain no less wholly from subsequent fraternization. Much could be written on the practical and moral issues involved in this debate, but one thing must surely be clear. The memory of deliberate cruelty does not fade.

Skobelev was a character whom Gibbon would have delighted to portray. He rode to battle clad in white, scented and curled as a bridegroom to a wedding, his voice tremulous, his eyes gleaming so that the Turkmens knew him as Göz Kanli — Bloody-eyes. His white uniform he matched against his horse, always a grey, and mounted he seemed magnificent. Boulangier, a French engineer, writing of him at the crisis of the siege of Gök Tepe, says that at that solemn moment Skobelev shone so splendidly in the eyes of his men that he seemed to their imagination to be the god of war. After Gök Tepe, like Alexander, he exclaimed against boredom, protesting there was nothing left for him to do. His exploits in the field attest his personal courage and his contempt for danger, and, like Napoleon, he exercised a magnetic influence over his troops by his mere presence. His friends he treated with alternate affection and contempt, the transition being reflected in his countenance, which was now beautiful, now ugly, and in his physical condition, which oscillated between masculine vigour and nervous exhaustion. He was for years the darling of the army and a political idol whom to criticize was blasphemy. Yet, a general at 30, he died in a low haunt and discreditably at the age of 38.

In a prophetic passage written more than sixty years ago, Curzon claims Skobelev as typical of the Russian nation, with one foot planted in a barbarian past, the past of Chingiz Khan, while the other is advancing into a new world of ideas and action. And, surely, this extraordinary man was not only a

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

meteor; he was the lodestar of a creed destined to sway many worshippers. It is not visionary to suggest that those who made him their idol must even then have been troubled by a sense of strain mingling with their hero-worship, not unlike that atmosphere of anxious adoration which was to surround a later figure, in the Kremlin.

But here too, even beside the blood and horror of Gök Tepe, there appears a worthier record of the essential kindliness of the Russian common man. After the butchery soldiers were to be seen patting and comforting the few children surviving after their parents had been slaughtered, and there is evidence that the Russian fighting man's spirit of comradeship after the war won affection and respect from the very tribesmen who, a few years before, had most stoutly contested his advance. Even from the ranks of Tartary there comes an unwilling tribute[1]— The Russian himself is not really such a bad fellow: what makes him a nightmare to his neighbours is his notion of imperialism which for four centuries has preached to him the possibility of growth and expansion.

The defeat of the Turkmens at Gök Tepe in 1881 was the first thrust of the final Russian deployment which was to round off the occupation of the entire Turanian basin up to the point where the advance came face to face with the protective shield held out by the British from India. It was followed by two small advance-guard actions only, designed to test the firmness of British resistance, that to Merv in 1884, and the defeat of the Afghan force by Komarov at Penjdeh on the road to Herat on 30th March 1885. This famous incident almost brought Russia and Britain into war, but in the event wisdom on both sides prevailed. The Russians had reached the outer fringes of the mountain barrier south of Turkistan and had subdued their most doughty opponents, the Tekke Turkmens; the British were still able to support an Afghan kingdom behind the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, which should

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 592.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 be free of Russian interference and so act as an effective buffer to their empire in India. A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh, inhabited by people of Turkish stock, and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan.

175 There now remained only a small mountain area never 121 penetrated by Turkish peoples. This was the high table-land of the Pamirs east of the Bukhara mountain country, hitherto a no-man's-land too distant for effective management by the Mangit Emirs of Bukhara and beyond the limits attained either by the Manchus working from Sinkiang or by the British from the Panjab. This remote region also finally fell to Russia, a narrow tongue of Afghanistan known as Wakhan being left as a cartographical buffer — it is little else — between the limits of British expansion in Gilgit and Chitral and Russian expansion on the Pamirs. Many writers have left the impression that there exists a point in this region where met 'the frontiers of three empires', namely, Russia, China, India[1] and indeed a fourth, Afghanistan. This was never the case. The Russian and Indian empires were parted by the finger of Wakhan, the Russian frontier having been so demarcated by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in the summer of 1895, rounding off the Russian dominion towards India but in this sector as elsewhere leaving Afghan territory in between. At one point the Wakhan tongue is only eight miles wide. Here, however, it is buttressed on the Pakistan side by the massive chain of the Hindu Kush, which in Tirich Mir rises to 25,000 ft. At another point farther east is an easy 12,000 ft. pass, the Baroghil, leading from northern Chitral into Wakhan, whence it is possible to look straight across on to Russian territory on the Pamirs. The Russian territory north of Wakhan is now known as Gorno-Badakhshan, or Hill Badakhshan, and is inhabited by Tajiks and pockets of odd mountain peoples, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, but of Turkish stock and often Ismaili followers of the Aga Khan.

[1] Now Pakistan, which succeeded to the hegemony of Chitral and controls the Gilgit passes north of Kashmir.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of 175
the Agha Khan.

We see then that the whole process of the Russian occupation of the Turanian basin occupied nearly 200 years from the early XVIIIth century, when the posts were established east of the Urals along the direct road through Siberia, to the occupation of the line of the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. It took place in two stages. The first part of the process, in its beginning, was nothing but an eastward expansion over the same Eurasian continent of the gradual Russification of the Tatar steppe, which had already taken place west of the Urals. In the second and subsequent movement there was something new, for the Russians, having conquered the Kazak steppe, moved on into Transoxiana and Farghana, and brought the sedentary populations also under their control. One result of the earlier pressures on the Kazaks was to force the nomads southward into the irrigated areas, so increasing the sedentary population, and leaving vacant spaces on the northern steppes. And there is an important distinction between north and south, to be constantly borne in mind. The Kazaks on the steppe have now been mingled with Russians for over two hundred years, while the conquest of the south was achieved only in 1865–86 and is therefore less than a hundred years old even today. Indeed the actual annexation of Khiva and Bukhara to the Russian Empire did not take place until after the Soviet reconquest of these States during the period 1918–24. We may therefore affirm that the final consolidation of Turkistan under Russian rule is barely thirty years old, and had to wait for the fall of Tsardom to be achieved.

But that is to anticipate. The effect of the Russian impetus under the Tsars was to bring the whole of the Turanian basin, except Balkh and the Bukhara and Khiva satellites, under direct Russian administration from a capital at Tashkent. The Kokand State in Farghana had been destroyed, and Samarkand had been wrenched from Bukhara, both Samarkand and Farghana therefore being Russian territory. Bukhara and Khiva survived as vassal States under close Russian control in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 their external relations, but without much interference at that time with the anachronistic orientalism of their governments in the administration of justice within the limits of each State. Indeed it has been held that, while the Russians under the Tsars posed as protectors of the Muhammadan law, the Sheriat, there is reason for attributing to them a real policy of maintaining the conditions of the Middle Ages in a city such as Bukhara, a hotbed of clerical reaction. The object of such a policy would be to encourage societies of this kind to rot internally and finally to break up of themselves under a new impact, like a mummy exposed to the air. It is not without interest to observe that a visit to Bukhara just before World War II led Fitzroy Maclean[1] to ascribe the same continuing motive to the Soviets in that city.

175 166 The distinction noted between the steppe and the oases was carried through into Russian policy. The Kazak nomads of the vast northern *dala*, already disorganized by the Kalmuck invasions and lacking the stability afforded by a settled cultivation with its attendant towns and forts, fell easy prey to the invaders. Many of them were forced south, and their places were taken by Russian and Ukrainian colonists, the settlement of whom became the fixed policy of Petersburg and proceeded steadily up to 1914. Towards the close of the XIXth century a scientific investigation was made of the availability of Kazak land for purposes of European colonization, ostensibly not without regard to the then existing population of Kazaks (these were wrongly known to the Russians of that time as Kirghiz). This subject formed the terms of reference of two weighty commissions of enquiry under two investigators named Shcherbina and Kuznetzev. These commissioners produced monumental reports in the best Germanic manner, complete with maps and extending to many volumes. But, says the commentator, though these claim to be highly scientific, they are thoroughly tendentious, and from beginning to end are written from the executioner's point of view. The authors set out to prove that the Kazaks are not the original

[1] Bib. I, 65, p. 149.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

owners of the land, and their needs for a minimum subsistence are reckoned with a view to getting rid of them. On this basis 14 million hectares on the steppe were confiscated by decree, and two million Russian immigrants brought in. A more humane, and less scientific, Russian named Zwilling in 1911 compared these methods to that of the Jew who tried to accustom his ass to lower standards of nourishment by giving it a lower and lower ration, and eventually nothing at all. When the ass got used to eating nothing, it died.[1]

The real policy comes out in the outburst of Kriukov,[2] President of the Agricultural Administration in 1907, in which he accused the Kazaks of being the descendants of Chingiz and Timur and therefore deserving only of destruction. When in 1916 the Kirghiz rose against the Tsar's conscription order, and their old leader, Kanat son of Ayuke, was captured on the Chu River and brought to trial, he accused his Russian judges of leaving him and his people no place to lay their heads, and later in despair committed suicide by dashing himself against the prison wall.

When in the period 1865–86 Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe in their turn fell to the Russians, the government at first compromised with tradition by leaving Bukhara (with its mountainous extension to the east) and Khiva as 'native states' under their princes. The rest of the oasis country was brought under direct administration but there was not at that time a serious attempt to do much here in the way of Russian colonization. Indeed, as is usual in the oases of Asia, the already existing sedentary population was thick on the ground, and was engaged in an intensive system of agriculture little above subsistence level. But, just as Tsarist pressure on the steppe had taken the form of infiltration, so in the southern and submontane regions it was exercised by means of a turnover from grain to cotton cultivation, particularly in the rich Farghana Vale with its suitable climate and the natural irrigation brought from the rivers issuing from the surrounding mountains. Already emerging into leadership under the Min

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 301-3. [2] *Ibid.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Khans, Farghana in the Russian era has achieved first place in the economic life of Turkistan, agricultural and more recently industrial also. In many respects, ringed round by protecting hills and watered by streams from every quarter, it is like a larger and even more fertile edition of the vale of Peshawar farther south, even to the narrow exit for the waters at Khojent (Leninabad) — a northern Attock — and its central desert only waiting for the water that gives life — another Yusufzai *maira*.[1]

There was much behind this policy. It was not only cotton that the Russians needed; they sought to impose a measure of economic dependence. The cultivation of cotton was pressed by the appeal of higher prices and the fact that it requires less water and less labour than that of grain — much less water than rice. The consequent diminution in the area under grain entailed the import of corn from Russia to meet a marginal deficiency which was high enough at the time of the Revolution to bring famine to the country when grain imports failed owing to breakdown in communications. This policy could not fail to set Turkistan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary matter of the basic food supply.

175 496 If it was to become the main source of the all-important raw material of cotton, Turkistan required above all a means of rapid transport to Europe. We have seen how the Russian advance came from the north along the line of the Sir Darya, and pre-dated by some decades the conquest of the Turkmen steppe. At first the plan was to use the Sir Darya, and after the conquest of Khiva and the practical absorption of Bukhara in 1873 the streams of the Amu Darya, as channels of river navigation, both fed by a flotilla on the Aral Sea. But the Sir Darya was so beset with shoals that even today the difficulty of navigating it has not been properly surmounted and, although the Amu Darya is rather more satisfactory as a waterway, it too did not then provide the solution that was needed, nor indeed is the Aral Sea ideally situated as an

[1] Pashtu word for a barren rolling plain or steppe, equivalent to Persian *dasht* Kazak *dala*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

entrepôt of commerce. It followed that the practical problems 175 of railway construction had to be faced, and were indeed met, 496 by Tsarist Russia in Turkistan before they had presented themselves in the other parts of her Asiatic Empire. It is interesting that the Trans-Siberian Railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Trans-Caspian line, on the other hand, was begun in 1880 from an original terminus at Uzun Ada (later extended to Krasnovodsk), and reached Samarkand in 1888, whence it was extended subsequently both to Tashkent, the capital, and up the Farghana Valley to Andijan.

Thus railway construction in Russian Central Asia was carried out in inverse order to the initial penetration by force of arms. The Turkmen country, which was the last to be subdued, was the first to enjoy rail communications with the west, and that in spite of the interruption caused by the need to break the journey for the Caspian crossing from Baku. It was not until the end of 1905 that uninterrupted communication with the Russian railway network was achieved by means of a line skirting the Aral Sea and traversing the original road of the Russian advance up the Sir Darya and past the town of Turkistan to Tashkent.

The Russians had at first envisaged the initial approach as leading up the Sir Darya from the north, and did not commit themselves to the Trans-Caspian line without much thought and in the face of strong opposition from Chernaiev[1] and others. The Trans-Caspian project was largely tactical at the outset: it was put forward by their engineer Annenkov as a means of supplying the forces engaged against the Turkmens which had failed disastrously under Lomakin. When Skobelev took over in 1880, he lent his powerful support to the idea, not so much because he needed it to win his campaign — indeed he boasted, and fulfilled the boast, that he would subdue the Turkmens without such adventitious aids — as that his eyes had been opened to what seemed to him its strategic possibilities. It would afford a rapid means of consolidating and

1 [first Governor-General of Turkistan (1865, 1882-84) -- Ed.]

2: Camoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 496

advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

175 669

It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293. [2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

175 669

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for non-combatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed
669 by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service
669 was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[1] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[1] 1905, of 1898 and 1911; see cat. 116, pp 88-90 — Analyst

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the 829
Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a 669
reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by 175
widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the 000
Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

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PART II

THE TRANSITION

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

VI

THE 1917 REVOLUTIONS

The sands of an expiring epoch are fast running out; and the hour-glass of destiny is once again turned on its base.

CURZON

WE now approach the six years of confusion which intervened between the downfall of the Tsars and the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia up to, and indeed in a sense beyond, the farthest limits reached by pre-revolutionary Russia. For, when the dust settled, the local autonomy of the old Uzbek States of Khiva and Bukhara had disappeared and all Turkistan was found to be subjected to the ecumenical régime of the new Soviet imperium. This period of turmoil is one in which the writer of *Turkistan today* took a leading part, first under his Russian cognomen of Velidov, when, in attempted understanding with the Soviets, he worked for the realization of an autonomous and a national Bashkiria,[1] and later when as Ahmed Zeki Bey, in conflict with the Soviets and in sympathy with Enver Pasha, he and others strove from a base in Bukhara to bring together the various elements of Eastern Turkish nationalism in a united effort for the independence of Turkistan. Chaotic conditions always follow a sudden change of government over various and loosely knit populations. The gloom which descended on Central Asia during these years is particularly hard to pierce; a landmark appears for a moment only to be shrouded in swirling mists, and the lanterns which Soviet propaganda provided shed only a dazzling light which is thrown back and makes no sense. But there were a few men, a very few

[1] Togan refers to his people by the Turkish name of Bashkurd, in Russian Bashkir. I have compromised, using Bashkiria for the country and Bashkurd for the people.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 men, among the Eastern Turks of a perception fine enough to be able to look through that fog and knowing the landmarks to perceive a way that might have led them to safety. At that time the vision failed, but they have been able to give an account of wrong turnings taken which may avail their successors in some future time. In their company we begin to get a glimmering of what happened and to understand some of the reasons for the ultimate triumph of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia.

It is important to grasp the essentials of the very inauspicious circumstances existing in Turkistan when Tsardom was overthrown. The very fact that these conditions were so difficult renders the Soviet success the more remarkable, and one cannot deny a tribute to that astonishing combination of diplomatic ability and ruthlessness in action which in the end ensured their victory. Here was a land which had only been finally conquered by the Tsars a little more than thirty years before; conquest over tribal populations had been achieved at the cost of bitter and bloody clashes. The urban centres were traditionally the home of an ancient fanaticism of the more extreme kind. Much of the terrain was either desert or mountain and therefore hard for organized armed forces to
175 control. Only a year before the country had been swept by the storm of a bloody revolt, mercilessly crushed. Scarcely was the flame of revolt extinguished when railway communications, in themselves scant enough, broke down, and a severe famine swept a land whose most fertile areas had been given over to the production of a cash-crop, cotton. The situation was the more complex in that the Tsar's government had used Turkistan as the place of internment for thousands of prisoners of war, mainly Austrians, taken on the Western front and released shortly after the revolution in November 1917. During one of the most critical periods of the War (late 1917 and early 1918) and just when Russia was tottering out of it, these released prisoners provided a focus of intrigue for the agents of the Central Powers, Germany and Turkey, in their strenuous endeavours to create diversions on a territory

[1916 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

leading to the Indian frontier. British anxiety on that score 175
led to what Russians have called the 'Intervention Period'. Lastly, Turkistan was to a great extent isolated from the effective deployment of Bolshevik force by the armies of White Russians and Cossacks operating under Denikin and Wrangel from north of the Black Sea and under Kolchak from Siberia. All these factors were unfavourable to the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, and some of them might have been expected to encourage separatism.

There were, however, other factors. These are little 000
known and in the end they told decisively in favour of the determination of the Kremlin, as we now know, to retain for the Revolution in spite of all professions every vestige of the imperial power to which they had succeeded. In the sphere of power, as in that of prophecy, the Soviets were to play the part of a more specious Elisha to the ruder Tsarist Elijah who had vanished from the earth.

In the Bolsheviks' favour was, first, the fact that Tsarist 175
education had produced few among the Turkish or Tajik population who were able to give effect to any modern conception of the organization of a State. There were plenty of pious doctors in the Muslim law, learned in the old ways, but there was no local or even municipal autonomy, no press and, among the Turks, very little higher education on Western lines. The number of 'intellectuals' among the indigenous people could be numbered on the fingers, while that other more ancient cement, the system of tribal authority, was disintegrating under the impact of the Russian wars and governments. In any case the tribal Khan did not count for much in the urban centres. There was consequently a real absence of experience in all that pertains to political architecture in a modern world. In the words of Mustafa Chokai, the leader of the Kokand government, the efforts of the men capable of thought or action at this level had to be directed entirely to the hurried creation of some sort of centre, to bringing together a group capable of uniting people unaccustomed to a political idea. At the moment when these leaders ought to have been

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

175 engaged on construction, they were not only without architects, they had to wear themselves out in hunting for masons and building materials.[1]

Secondly, although the military tradition of the Eastern Turks was a celebrated one, they had been excluded from Russian military service and they therefore had no cadres with modern military knowledge. Nor had they any share even in the subordinate grades in the working of the communications services, whether railway, telegraph or telephone: all these were by deliberate policy in Russian hands. Nor had they even been admitted to such few industrial organizations as existed, except as labourers under rigid subordination to Russian foremen. The Russian finger was on every control, whether civil, military, municipal or the communications machine.

Thirdly, there existed, outside the towns and away from the railways, a condition which was perhaps even more radical and decisive in the struggle which lay ahead. This sprang from the widespread colonization of the land by Russians under the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and previous agrarian settlements. It is true that Russians were thicker and longer established on the land upon the northern steppe and in the Ili Valley than in Transoxiana or Farghana, but even there in the oases, and in the glens around Farghana, the Russian population by the time of the Revolution was rapidly increasing. Although it suffered severe casualties in the 1916 rising, it had been compelled by those very dangers and difficulties to organize in opposition to the indigenous peoples. There was thus a fundamental difference of interest between the indigenous and the Russian populations in any colonized area. The Russians, moreover, had settled down as peasants, while the people of the soil tended more and more to be nomadic, some of them expropriated, others maintaining a traditional contempt for agriculture.

The result was that in the period of chaos following the Revolution the Russians in Turkistan looked for support to

[1] Bib. II, 7, Tcholkieff.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

any authority offering them protection against the indigenous population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 667

Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

The fourth force should have been these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L1

Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine.

175 669

At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

(Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

[198]

[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central AsiaRL1

tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also. 175 669

The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:

(1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
(2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states. . . .*

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of
their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] Cat. 116 p105 - Analyst Bib. II, 2, R. E. Pipes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
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> The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

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In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

2; Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669
563

was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

2: Carre S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

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In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

VII

ENVER AND THE BASMACHIS

O, young Lochinvar is come out of the west . . .

000 IT is now time to turn from events in the north, which had worked themselves to a standstill in so far as the redemption of Central Asian freedom was concerned, and to examine what had been happening along the courses of the rivers and in the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva. I have shown that very soon after the Revolution the Bolsheviks had captured and held the key to Turkistan at Tashkent, and from that centre had succeeded in crushing the short-lived Kokand government early in 1918. From that point we have followed a circle against the clock, starting from Kokand, proceeding over the Kazak steppe to its fringe in Bashkiria in the Urals, and thence by way of Moscow and the Crimea
175 to Baku. By the end of 1920, disillusioned but not despondent, Togan has left Baku and, travelling incognito to escape the attention of the Soviets whom he had defied, crossed the Caspian back into Turkistan to arrive in Bukhara in January 1921. Here he soon found himself dealing with the very tribal forces whose movement, touched off by the train lit at Kokand three years earlier, was due for a big explosion in a few months' time.

The difficulties of the Bolsheviks in the south of Turkistan had been greater than any they were called on to meet on the northern steppe, where they were contending only with disorganized Cossacks or the Whites under Kolchak. In the south these difficulties sprang partly from the internal political situation bequeathed to them by the continued existence of quasi-independent 'Native States', much of whose territory was either in the mountains or behind the desert (for Khiva

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

had no railway). Partly they arose from the fact that Bukhara 175
at least was a frontier territory bordering on Afghanistan, a country which their predecessors had acknowledged was beyond the sphere of Russian influence. The southern frontier with Afghanistan stood on that general line against which the Russian tide had washed and found itself unable to advance farther against British resistance organized in the defence of India. Both politically and geographically it had seemed that on this line a stable international balance had at last been attained. But the stability of a frontier depends on the continued existence of steady conditions on each side of it; disturbance on either side is likely to upset the balance.

The six months or so following the October Revolution in Russia were coincident in time with a most critical period of World War I. The weight of America had not had time to affect the issue, Russia had fallen in the race, and the possibility of a German victory could not yet be ruled out. Turkey, though hard hit in Irak and Syria, was still formidable. In 1918 the Turks under Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver, began a thrust forward to the Caucasus and succeeded in capturing Baku. A German mission under von Hentig and von Niedermeyer had been in Kabul in an endeavour to persuade the Afghan Emir Habibullah to denounce his undertakings to the British in India and in the name of Islam to raise the North-West Frontier in revolt.[1] Meanwhile in Turkistan all was turmoil and it remained uncertain in 1918 which side would prevail in the civil war then raging. Thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war, interned in and around Tashkent and elsewhere, had been released and were at large. It is not surprising that Britain thought it necessary to look to the defences of India.

This it was always the British way to achieve by the use of the smallest possible force at the farthest accessible point on the glacis of the Indian fort, not waiting for the turmoil

[1] This German effort failed to affect the outcome of the war, but it left its seed. In 1919 Habibullah was murdered, and there followed Amanullah's assault on India and the Afghan war — events as it happened beyond the present story. Had this plot gone off a year earlier, events would have merged.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 outside to spread to the buffer States along the marches and expose India's own frontiers to direct attack. And this, in accordance with a well-tried principle, is what was done in the present case, and carried through successfully.

The object of the government in India at that time was to prevent a German-Turkish thrust being launched from the Caucasus by way of northern Persia or Turkistan into Afghanistan and so against India. A serious invasion of this kind in 1918 would have tied down many troops in India and borne hardly on the conduct of the war in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, a small force of less than brigade strength, under General Dunsterville and known later as Dunsterforce, was sent to Baku; and another even smaller force under General Malleson, known as the North Persian cordon, stood on guard at Meshed and pushed forward outposts in the direction of Merv in Turkistan. At about the same time a diplomatic mission was sent to Tashkent from India via Kashghar, where the government of India maintained a Consulate on behalf of His Majesty's government. This mission was under the direction of Colonel Bailey, of the Indian Political Department,[1] who was ordered to open negotiations with whatever authority should be found to be in power in Turkistan. The situation was kaleidoscopic and the future unguessed, but the main object was to induce any authority capable of implementing an agreement to neutralize the dangers which were expected to arise from the release of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners, and their possible junction with any Turkish or German force which might advance from the west.

Dunsterville succeeded in occupying Baku for a few days, but was driven out. His advance did, however, result in securing for the Royal Navy the vital command over the waters of the Caspian Sea which was needed to anticipate any attempt to extend the Turco-German thrust in the direction of India. And Malleson was in position in reserve on the

[1] This service was not concerned with politics but was in effect the government's diplomatic corps. For an account see Bib. I, 18.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Meshed–Merv line as an outpost in the second line to deal/75 with any advance attempted by the land-route through Persia or Turkistan. On reaching Merv he was attacked by Bolshevik forces, which he drove off. He then opened negotiations with a group of Mensheviks, who had succeeded in obtaining temporary control of Ashkabad and agreed that they would aid him in opposing any enemy advance from the west. (It has to be remembered that the Mensheviks were for continued prosecution of the war against Germany and Turkey, while the Bolsheviks had made peace.) This group, supported by Malleson, was for some time in control of the Trans-Caspian Railway, so blocking communications by that route to the Bolsheviks in Tashkent. It was during this time that these Mensheviks caught and murdered twenty-six Red Commissars trying to make their way through from Baku (which had again changed hands) to Tashkent — an incident which Soviet propaganda still bitterly attributes to British influence, unknowing that it is not our way to murder captives in cold blood, or if we can prevent it, permit others to do so.[1] Meanwhile Bailey, arriving with difficulty at Tashkent and having presented his credentials, was threatened with arrest and even with execution, and had to go to ground. After more than a year of hide-and-seek he managed to elude capture by the delightful ruse of going to the Bolsheviks in disguise and offering to pursue and catch himself. His offer was accepted and he chased himself with alacrity into Persia early in 1920 under a hail of bullets to the last. It is pleasant to believe that even the Soviets enjoyed the jest, for to save face they announced sadly a little later that Bailey had died, they were sorry, for they had never borne him any malice and had given him a military funeral. He lives to tell the tale.[2]

By this time World War I was safely over and British forces could be withdrawn from the glacis of India. But it has been necessary to digress in order to explain how it came about that British intervention in the south of Turkistan,

[1] For details of this incident see Bib. I, 51, pp. 144-6, and II, 7, Malleson.
[2] Bib. I, 5.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

6168 It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political repre-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sentative in each capital. In the case of Bukhara there was a 668
Russian resident at Kaghan (the new city on the main line eight miles from old Bukhara), working through a Russian commission of two which closely controlled the Bukharan ministers. The reality is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the Bukhara government had no army and only a rudimentary police force. It suited Russia to proceed gradually in the absorption of two States which stood for a centuries-old tradition of Muslim independence under Uzbek rulers.

Behind this façade there was much activity. Among the local nationals there were really three Parties,[1] the Conservatives, the Innovators (who were not Socialists) and the Socialists. The Conservatives the younger Parties despised — they included the *ulema* and many of the adherents of the ex-Amir whom the new idea disliked — but in the event, as all accounts of the Basmachi struggle show, it was they who had most influence with the tribes and their strength was underrated. The most distinguished of the Innovators was Mustafa Chokai, who had headed the ill-starred Kokand government and was chosen later as the man best suited to represent the new idea of Young Turkistan before the Peace Conference in Paris. Later he settled in France and we shall hear of him again. The Socialists were much farther to the Left but they were sincere Turkish patriots. Togan,[2] himself a man of the Left, showed breadth of mind in devoting time and thought to clandestine negotiations for the establishment of what would now be called a Popular Front with a common programme on which the two progressive groups, Socialist and non-Socialist, could unite. These Parties succeeded in the end in forming a coalition to which was given the name of National Union. Originally, on the wave of new-found 'democratic' enthusiasm which followed the Emir's fall, the Young Bukharans had felt themselves to be in tune with their Soviet Russian mentors. But with the arrival of Togan and his friends hot with news of the Baku Congress and Soviet perfidy in Bashkiria and elsewhere,[3] their enthusiasm for things

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 103-104 — Analyst] Togan, op. cit. p. 407.

2 [See cat. 116, pp. 7-8 — Analyst]

3 [See cat. 116, pp. 114-12 — Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 Russian waned, and they planned an active deviation. It is a good early instance of a tendency which has since become well known, what the Soviets call the deviation of the bourgeois-nationalist. They soon turned their thoughts to setting up a common front with the Basmachi rebels in the mountains against their Russian masters.

As might have been expected, these young intellectuals did not understand the tribes, who for their part ridiculed and distrusted the new-fangled antics and professions of city politicians. There were many comings and goings, but little real comprehension was achieved between elements so diverse. Togan understood the point of view of both sides and has much to say of the details of the negotiations. He puts the following words [1] in the mouth of a courier sent to Jemal Pasha, but it is just this sort of thing that the tribes heard and disliked :

> Our aim is to find means to force the Russians to accept our proposals, to strengthen the National Union, inspire a modern, national, political spirit into the organizations that are prepared to fight, to get rid of the shameful and disturbing activities of the Emir's adherents, to clear out fanatics and replace them by people faithful and useful to the League, and to convert the whole revolt into a military organization of young and educated revolutionaries which can become a partisan movement.

000 It is easy to imagine the reaction of Muslim tribal leaders to a manifesto of this sort issued by youths who themselves often sickened at the mere sight of blood (there were instances of craven conduct by young revolutionaries). They would look the schoolmen askance from under beetling brows, resent their disloyalty to the Emir and mock their orations to scorn as silly romance. There was a revealing and barbaric example. A young delegate was trying to win over to the cause a fierce old chieftain of the Basmachis, Toghay Sari of the Lakai tribe of Uzbeks. Toghay, a formidable grey-beard of 75 years, heard the envoy out, then turned on him and wrenched out from beneath his coat a bunch of human ears. With a sardonic

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 430.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

grin he announced they were cut from the heads of Reformers who listened to falsehoods about the Emir. Toghay and Ibrahim Lakai are charged with having been cunning, cruel and fanatical, as indeed they were. It was even said that Ibrahim and his like worked not so much against the Russians as against the young native revolutionaries. But there were of course failures on the side of the intellectuals also in dealing with the tribes. I am reminded of the scene on the North-West Frontier in 1946 when Mr. Nehru tried, and failed utterly, to impress his personality on the rough men of the Khyber and Waziristan. Nehru had courage and to spare, but the tribesmen laughed rudely at his ways and made him lose his temper and his dignity. So it was with the young Bukharans and the Basmachis. But, when all is said, it was Ibrahim, the Basmachi, who saw the light when later he came face to face with a man he called a man. It was he and no other who maintained resistance in the mountains against all the forces the Soviets could bring to bear for years after the politicians had fallen or fled the land. It was the tragedy of the time that among the people of Turkistan no figure arose like Babur,[1] big enough to be scholar, poet, founder of states and man-at-arms, all rolled into one.

This then was a movement with a double inspiration. It was on the one hand a revulsion on the part of the supporters of the old governments of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and on the other a more idealistic struggle for national freedom, giving expression to the aspirations of the educated and ignited by conditions of famine and horror which threatened to deprive all of everything they knew, material and spiritual. The first stream won the support of independent-minded hillmen not unlike the North-West Frontier Pathans; these, moreover, were all too ready to turn to opportunities for loot. The second was the current which carried the social democrats along. The Eastern Turks themselves never succeeded in finding a leader who could mingle these two tributaries in a flood strong enough to sweep all before it. Mutual jealousies

[1] In thinking of Babur, it is hard not to be reminded of Wavell.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 and multiplicity of aims and counsels forbade cohesion. But there was a man from outside who went near to command success when native talent failed.

669 An interesting and obscure part of the history of the Turkistan interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the establishment of Soviet power is to be found in the dramatic intervention of the Western Turkish Pashas, Jemal and Enver. These were two of the Istanbul triumvirate which brought Turkey into her declaration of war on Germany's side in 1914 and thereafter led her through the bad years to the final defeat of 1918. Enver's exploits in the field had been gallant though of a somewhat Pyrrhic nature. On the Caucasus front, and particularly at Sarikamish, he won personal renown but lost an army. Jemal is well known for his ruthless direction of the war against the Arabs on the southern front. With Turkey's defeat at the end of 1918 neither man felt he had much to look for in his own country, and both gravitated towards the Bolsheviks who, as we know, were playing up a sympathy with 'down-trodden Muslim peoples'. And both Jemal and Enver probably felt that an alliance of this sort offered them the best hope of revenge on a Britain whose conquering arms had finally succeeded in breaking Turkey after so long a fight.

Jemal reached Tashkent from Moscow in August 1920, a few months before Togan's arrival. Both he and his successor Enver were sponsored by the Bolsheviks, who wished to use the war-born resentment of these Turkish leaders against the British conqueror of Turkey to stir up further trouble for Britain in Afghanistan and so keep her anxious for her own possessions in India. It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on the barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

British in India across the mountains. But, as the event 669 showed, the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself.

Jemal, committed and with passion to this objective, went on to the Afghan capital, Kabul, to start what he called an Islamic Revolutionary League, whose object was to be the freeing of India from British domination. He talked at first of organizing armies in Afghanistan to seize the Panjab. (The short-lived Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 was just over, and difficult negotiations were in train for a peace settlement.) Later the Kremlin, who had agreed to his opening negotiations with the Basmachis, suspected him of a too effective organization of the rebels as a fighting force with the help of Turkish officers. What they wanted was to get the Basmachis into their bag. Jemal also negotiated ineffectively with the Bukhara National Union, but the negotiations broke on the latter's demand that he renounce all idea of using Turkistan as a base for freeing India, and concentrate on strengthening their organizations to enable them to bargain effectively with the Russians for their freedom. Jemal would not go so far, but Lenin suspected him of playing a double game and recalled him in October 1921. He was a bitter, cruel man who had failed in all he sought to do, and what he did he did without a generous gesture. He was murdered at Tiflis on 21st July 1922, probably at Bolshevik instigation.

Enver arrived at Bukhara on Jemal's heels in the same month of October. He too came under Russian auspices. His aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach — alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called Imperialism. But his own real object, confided to the National Union shortly after his arrival, was to mobilize Eastern Turkish resistance, and particularly the Basmachis, against the Soviets, and so set up an independent State in Central Asia. At first the National Union leaders strenuously endeavoured to dissuade him, pointing to the famine conditions still ruling, but at heart swayed by their belief that the time was inopportune for

2¢ Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

669 anything but conspiratorial measures.

After some hesitation, Enver decided that his Turkish patriotism demanded of him a bold move in an endeavour to do just what the Bukhara leaders could not do — unite the Union Party, the intelligentsia, with the partisans, the Basmachis. Togan gives a moving description of Enver's last night in Bukhara, sitting cross-legged on the floor in his uncomfortable Turkish uniform, and making his decision as a *mūjahit*,[1] with tears in his eyes, feeling he was in the cradle of the Turkish race. Next morning Enver rode off with twenty-four companions, saying:

> I have decided I must go to eastern Bukhara. If we succeed we shall be *ghazis* [victors for the faith]; otherwise we fall *shehits* [martyrs] on the battle-field. We must fight for Turkistan. Did we fear death ordained by fate, and choose the life of a dog, we should merit the curse of our ancestors and our descendants. But if we can bear to die for freedom, we shall have ensured the freedom and happiness of those who follow us.[2]

He rode first to Ibrahim Beg Lakai, of the Emir's party of Basmachis. Ibrahim, loyal to his Emir, held Enver captive as the man who had broken the power of the Ottoman Sultan and started the Young Turk movement. After many vicissitudes Enver succeeded in capturing the tribal imagination and, having secured his freedom, united a large number of tribesmen around him, under the leadership of Devletmand, the most chivalrous of the hill chiefs. He had also some notable Afghan adherents and a devoted Russian Cossack aide named Rayev. His forces, and he himself, gave an excellent account of themselves for some months, and caused the Soviet commanders much disquiet. He had achieved for the moment the impossible, infusing the new ideas and the old with a common enthusiasm. But it was not to last. After some successes, in August 1922 he was forced to retire on Beljuvan in the Tajik hills supported only by the faithful Devletmand and his partisans.

On 8th August Enver died gloriously. Early in the

[1] Islamic equivalent of a Crusader.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 437 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

morning he had heard that a detachment of 300 Russians was approaching a hill above Beljuvan. Without waiting for the rest of his soldiers to collect, he rode against the enemy with 25 men, reaching the top of the hill at the same moment as the Russians mounted it on the other side. Taking advantage of surprise, he succeeded in disarming a body 75 strong, and again advanced with drawn sword against the remainder, thrown into confusion by his onslaught. With him were 5 men only, the Turk Cherkes Hussein, the Kazanli Kerim, Enver's Afghan groom, the Cossack Rayev and the Kazak Ishmurad. The other soldiers under Devletmand were now coming on the scene, but fortune was against a reckless man, as it had been earlier on the Caucasian front by Sarikamish. A Russian machine-gun opened up from a flank and shot the Pasha through the heart. The gallant Devletmand, coming up in support, was killed a minute later. The Russians retired not realizing their triumph.[1]

Twenty thousand of the tribesmen around gathered weeping to Enver's funeral; many kissed the dead man's hands and feet, and took hairs from his beard in memory. A lament ran through the land, and his death was celebrated in a famous poem of the Uzbeks. In calmer moments Togan says that he was not Enver's man, and their views on political means and ends were widely different. He condemns Enver too for posing as a redeemer with a mission beyond his strength to unite the resistance movement. But the contemplation of a warrior who of his own will has made the final sacrifice moves the historian beyond measure, and he ends by acclaiming him as the hero of an epic which will resound so long as Turks are Turks. He calls him a great idealist, who ignored daily life and facts.

He had little knowledge of the geography or the statistics of Turkistan. In Bismarck's words, politics is the art of the possible. Yet by his death Enver redeemed all; he has become a legend and

[1] The account of Enver's death largely follows *Bugünkü Türkili*, pp. 451-60. It is drawn partly from the memoirs of one Mustafa Shahbal, one of Enver's advisers in Bukhara.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

669 a memory, even among the very men who would have fought against him in his time. All who knew him acclaim him a great man, a pure man, a man beyond the common measure.

He appears indeed in the story as a sort of Young Pretender, a hero for Turkistan to acclaim as was Shamil for the Caucasus, the embodied pattern in these latter days of Turkish heroism and ideals.

Among the tribes support for Enver came from the recognition that he stood for that ancient ideal of Turkish chivalry, and the intellectuals believed in him because, with all this, he had proved himself an innovator.[1]

The chronicle proceeds:

Enver was before his time, yet his death sowed a seed. I said to him at Bukhara 'we are not ready for it yet'. Enver replied: 'And it will be some time before you are ready for it'. And he was right. Many years have now gone by since we first laid the charge that is to explode when Russia's internal and external situation becomes difficult, and we see it is not yet ready to go off. If Enver Pasha had taken no part in developments in Turkistan, the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance.

Nor did he really dream of pan-Islamism or even of pan-Turanism. He considered indeed that the interests of the Turks in western and central Asia were identical, and that it was the duty of clear-thinking men to make known in Turkistan the reality of such interests. But he said to me at Bukhara: 'Osmanli will never become the common language of Turkistan: a native Chaghatai must be invented. This has become obvious to me since, having been in Russia, I have come to Turkistan.' He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword — Victory or death in the field. By his death on Turkistan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks.

000 In Britain, the exploits of Enver Pasha have won no renown: he was our bitter enemy in World War I, and he met his death far away, in a period of confusion which we have never tried to understand. So far as there existed knowledge at that time, his exploits beyond the Oxus caused anxiety in India, and there was a tendency to echo the Soviets and cry

1 [See pp. 101, 119 cf. 116 -- Anekdot]

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

him down as a mere adventurer. But it is not the habit of Englishmen to withhold honour from a gallant foe. Enver was a good loser. And to many Turks, it seems, he remains a national hero, who brought about the revolution in Turkey and played a noble part in Central Asia. A Turkish historian of today has compared him with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan, who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul — the epic heroes — of the Turks.

The Basmachi rebellion was officially stated to have ended in 1924, but it did not die with Enver. In fact his death supplied just the impulse needed to bring the varied elements of the resistance together. The embers of the revolt smouldered on, supported from across the border in Afghan Turkistan, until the Afghan revolution in 1928[1] gave the Soviets a chance of intervention across the border during the interregnum. It was not until 1931 that Ibrahim Beg was finally captured, and there was evidence which filtered through of rebel movements in Soviet Turkistan much later than this.

The spirit which animated this struggle comes out in the story of Khan Junaid of Khiva, a gallant old man, who had fought the Russians steadily since 1873, when they captured that city. Ever since then he had refused to take Russian citizenship, and had been the Khan's chief minister more than once. In 1920, disgusted with the failure of the Bolsheviks to live up to their professions, he took up arms again, and continued to raid lines of communication until 1927, when he concluded peace on the terms that he would be left alone to farm his land near Urgench. Finding the Soviets were still after him, he withdrew once more into outlawry and fought on until 1929, when he was forced across the frontier into Afghanistan. It is now high treason for any admirer even to refer to Khan Junaid. Or there is Haji Sami, the Turk on whom Enver's mantle fell, a hard determined man who, unlike

[1] The abdication of Amanullah and accession of Nadir Shah after a short usurpation by Bacha Sakao.

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

669 Enver, hanged traitors. He took Ibrahim Beg prisoner and compelled him to serve the cause, and found a way to make the intellectuals and the tribal fighters join together in the campaign. For many months he carried on with the utmost resolution in Karategin and around Farghana. When at last he was driven across the frontier into Afghanistan, Togan reproached him, saying he had been too confident when Enver was still alive, and had now lost heart. The answer was full of dignity: 'My heart is with me, but I am wounded and cannot ride'.

000 Togan has much to say of the crowded and confused events in Central Asia that followed the Russian revolution, but the proudest and the newest message he has to offer is to be found in his assessment of the historic significance of the Basmachi movement. In his account of it he rises from the ranks of the chroniclers to become the writer of a drama, almost a prophet; the style of his narration changes like that of Thucydides when he puts speeches into the mouths of his statesmen and generals, and he seems inspired. If this Basmachi struggle was indeed a real epic, it will still stir the hearts of the descendants of those who took part in it just as it moves him. It is represented as a great national impulse, which for years
669 absorbed all the forces capable of playing an active part. It was joined not only by men who had taken part in the Merdikar rising of 1916, but by those who had been with Dükchi Ishan in 1898 and old men who had fought against the Chinese in Kashghar. It mobilized the tribes, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazak, the young intellectuals of the cities, West Turk officers, many Afghans and Enver Pasha. Since the days of Shaibani Khan in the XVIth century there had been no national movement in Turkistan to compare with it. The movement had of course its negative side, for the need to meet the rebels on their own ground had forced the Russians to penetrate far into the mountains of eastern Bukhara and along the Chinese and Afghan frontiers, but this would have followed in time without any struggle. The Russian press professed to lament the losses caused to the rebels in battle, which they said had led

Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to a large diminution in the population. But such losses were 6669 as nothing to the systematic mass-murder which inevitably followed if a revolting population was forced to throw itself on Soviet mercy. Only a few thousands fell in battle in Farghana, and only a few hundred in Bashkiria, but when the Bashkurds submitted in 1921 they were subjected to artificial famine and disease, their lands were handed to Russians and they themselves were forced into the mountains or the steppe after seizure of their flocks, with the result that they died in hundreds upon hundreds of thousands. The Soviets in fact adopted the Roman process; it was their peace which made a solitude and was more deadly than their war.

Of his own part, and the emotions to which the struggle 000 gave rise, he speaks feelingly. In 1923 the hope of organized resistance was over and with a few friends he was crossing the Hindu Kush on his way to Kabul. As the little party mounted the foothills of the great rampart, they looked back sadly to the vast plains of the Turanian land stretched out beneath them and thought of the last six years since the Kerensky revolution, of all the effort which had been expended, and of the lives lost and the dreariness of the opening prospect. For six years they had ridden up and down that great land and calculated they had put perhaps 7000 miles behind them. But was all that endeavour in vain? Let him speak for himself.[1]

It is my delight that I was privileged to share in the severest struggles of my people in real earnest and not as a looker-on, even if that part had no historic significance. Everywhere we went we had seen the untold misery, the great-hearted uprightness, the saintliness of soul of our people. With our own eyes we beheld the things that travellers write about, and we exposed the lies told of the morale and character of the Turks. We observed the characteristics described as pacifist and cowardly, and knew these to be really the expression of the cool blood of a thoughtful, enduring and incredibly patient people, and also of a kind of wonder when face to face with the strange civilization the Russians had brought with them. Among the nomad and tribal Uzbeks and Kirghiz the old spirit of leadership, the master-soul, the true

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 472-4.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

heroism, is alive today. They sang us old songs which they preserved in their memories, and recited old stories and ballads. We observed moreover that the stories about the religious fanaticism of the Uzbek peasantry were mere idle tales. There is perhaps among them more tolerance than in any eastern territory. We were never asked by any Uzbek — why don't you pray? Why don't you keep the fasts? It was enough for them that we really loved the people and were trying to help them by our wisdom and knowledge.

The events of 1918–1924 were greater than anything I hoped for. The educated, intellectuals and others, along with the peasantry and tribesmen, showed such a spirit of self-sacrifice as to throw themselves into a forlorn hope in the firing-line and die a hero's death. The Basmachis who hitherto, if they fought at all, would only fight for their own district, and knew no fatherland beyond the limits of their own homes, were led to fight for all Turkistan. New popular ballads arose.

The Basmachi movement showed that the Turks of Central Asia were not a dead corrupt nation as had been written; it was the best training-ground for them, the start of a new period in the life of Turkistan; a period in which they began to fight for their existence, weapons in hand. Finally the dispersal which followed it caused the Turkistan people abroad, as in every modern land which fights for freedom, to combine in groups of political emigrants and to gain contact with other nations. In future Turkistan will never again be a mere looker-on at world events; it will play the part proper to it.

PART III

SOVIET PRESSURES

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

VIII

NEW APPROACH

The time was now rapidly approaching for the mighty experiment.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

THE story has now reached the point in 1922 or so, when, with the weakening of nationalist resistance, it became possible for the Kremlin to take stock of the position in Central Asia and to decide how far, if at all, they would implement their own high-sounding Declaration of Rights of Independence of November 1917, or alternatively go forward to the creation of a centralized Russia. Before proceeding to examine these questions, it may be of some assistance to stand back and indulge in some more general reflections on the new forces about to be applied, and on the best approaches open to us for an understanding of the clash and merging of two ways of life which could scarcely have been more opposed.

The first of these reflections may well be the undoubted fact that from the very beginning the chief figures in the Kremlin have placed the affairs of Central Asia very high in their list of priority. Lenin himself, though in remote control, saw to it that a most challenging announcement to the borderlands should be one of the first actions of the Bolsheviks when they come to power. His personal interventions, so clear from Togan's story, rather suggest that at the beginning he may have thought more of this approach as a vital contribution to world revolution in all dependent territories than as a means of stabilizing the Revolution in Russia itself. One gets sometimes a sense that Lenin in some queer way really believed

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia L1

in autonomy for Asiatic nations. But at the time we have reached he had only two more years to live. Then there was Stalin. It was on this horse that he rode to the head of the race. What people like Togan felt about the honesty of his thought as far back as 1920 must be clear from what has already been related. But the fact remains that Stalin gave every aspect of this great problem continuous and unremitting attention, holding it in a grip that he never relaxed. There was also Kuibishev, the leading figure on the Commission sent to Turkistan, and Lazar Kaganovich, the Jew, related to Stalin by marriage and still at the present time (1953) a member of the Kremlin hierarchy. It was largely on his advice that Soviet policy in Central Asia was later steered. There was also Frunze, the Red general, who finally overcame the Basmachi rebels and gave his name to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia. A fine bevy of Soviet heroes who staked reputations on the policies they had devised for the Soviet borderlands and, in the case of Stalin and Kaganovich at least, must have derived a grim satisfaction from the way in which those policies have worked out.

I have had reason to point more than once to a sort of fate that seems to hang over Turkistan. Ever since the maritime age opened, this has not only been the continental territory most distant from the oceans, but the most secluded by the deliberate policy of man. This seclusion, well known in Uzbek times and continued by the Tsars, is still the destiny of Central Asia in the Soviet era, in so many ways a mere extension of the Tsarist decades which had gone before. Soviet publicity tends often towards hyperbole in expression, with one object presumably of suggesting that under the Soviet régime Turkistan has arrived at the millennium. If this were so, it would suit those who make the claim to admit visitors without distinction of sympathy to see and approve the new age. But Soviet Central Asia is guarded by an angel with a flaming sword — a paradise only to be entered by the very privileged along the narrowest of paths. In recent years, for instance, British visitors have been confined to a small

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Parliamentary delegation shepherded along main lines, a few Embassy officials (notably Fitzroy Maclean) overlooked by secret police in their every movement, a rare single traveller of enterprise, and finally one couple for whom special air transport was provided.[1] Others are told there is no hotel, or no train, or, if there is a train, that their papers are deficient, or, should their papers pass muster, that they are booked for the wrong day, or anything to prevent them travelling. Even those who have reached the goal have seldom been able to get beyond Tashkent, and Farghana retains its mystery. It can only be that there is much that the authorities have to conceal, for the curtain is drawn even closer here than elsewhere in the Union.

It follows therefore that any conclusions on the feelings and thoughts of the people in Central Asia subject to the Soviet régime have to be intuitive to a very large extent. There is a good deal of rather dry research, so-called, and a series of unrelated statistics backed by much panegyric in Soviet publications and press, but little other foundation on which to build a real understanding of the souls of the people today. This process of intuition is aided if the case can be approached by or through those who have some knowledge of the kind of people with whom the Russians are dealing and the probable reactions of such people to the pressures applied upon them. Writers like Togan — one of the last in time to see and feel with their hearts the glory and the tragedy of what was going on, and still able to communicate with us — have a message worth hearing. They are able to reveal with a flash something of the inner thoughts that move a people, and details can then be filled in by studying even the negations of Soviet attitudes. One such negative attitude is the notable jealousy displayed in the matter of visitors. Another is the stream of vituperation which never ceases, addressed from the Soviet press and platform to the national or religious 'deviationists' who, remaining true to their prejudices, have not even yet bowed the knee to Baal. The mere reading of it induces in

[1] Bib. I, 23, Coates.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the most rational mind a sense of spiritual starvation.

Mention of statistics leads to another thought. It may not be impertinent to suggest that much of the current study devoted to what goes on within the USSR is rendered almost unreadable by the mere fact that it rests so largely on blue-books and statistics, sometimes unrelated and more often than not over-burdened to support some economic theory or practice. There is indeed an obsession with economics, and it is hard to see beyond the figures to the men and women for whose benefit presumably the figures are marshalled. In any case Soviet statistics are apt to be in percentages without a starting-point: a common shape for instance, is the triumphant announcement that coal, oil, cotton or silk production, say, in 1937 was several hundreds per cent higher than it was in 1913. If after a search more painstaking than usual we succeed in extracting the absolute 1913 figure, it is generally a very small one — a few tons or metres was all the poor Tsars could manage — and the astronomical percentage then ceases to impress. We shall do better to turn to human beings, for it is probably true that the most valuable statistics for the study of man are those which are embodied in census results and reports. Births and deaths, increases and decreases in population, or in classes of population, approach near to the life of man himself. For what does it profit, in the scale of ultimate values, if cotton production rise fourfold but the weaker workers perish in the factory; or if a canal embankment rivalling the Pyramids be built, but the forced labour that builds it die of pestilence or famine in the wilderness? Here then, in so far as we deal in figures at all, I propose to look mainly to the trends of populations and to treat even that question within the limits of one chapter. Other figures there may be, but they will be few.

It is not only statistical trends that empty so much writing on Soviet Russia of life; there is also the blast and counter-blast of jargon, that highly specialized vocabulary of factitive or causative abstractions all strung together, which the Soviets seem to have taken over as part of their Germanic inheritance

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

from the original prophets of Communism.[1] Responses to Soviet challenges of this nature are sometimes as involved as the sentences and sentiments which provoke them. With both sides, as it were, throwing words into a machine, it seems all too likely that it is not in human nature to listen, and that the propagandists are wasting their time. Unless one can shut down, even for a moment, all the surface clatter of these well-worn abstractions, it is impossible to hear the rhythm of the life behind. Yet, though for a time it may seem to be drowned in the noise of the machines, that music can still echo faintly for him who has ears to hear.

A final thought of a general kind is this. So far, I have tried to depict the influences which shaped the lives of the people of Central Asia in the sequence of some sort of chronological order. This way of looking at things has even served to some extent when we came to examine the confused conflicts between Communism and Turkish nationalism during the interregnum period. There is of course also a chronology in the thirty years of the Soviet era which followed the first consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia in 1922. As, for instance, the period from 1922 to 1928 was occupied mainly with the territorial establishment of new republics, the 'rooting' of the Party, and the nationalization of land and water; the periods 1928–32 and 1933–7 were those of the first and second Five-Year Plans, with collectivization of agriculture and suppression of nomadism in the countryside and the rapid creation of an urban proletariat by means of redeployment of population to serve industry; the periods 1938–41 and 1941–5 represented the third Five-Year Plan (broken off by the War) and the War period, and saw a large increase in production of coal, oil and heavy industry generally under the spur of war needs and evacuation of industry from Europe; lastly, the period 1946–50 is that of the fourth Five-Year Plan, which set targets for the over-all increase of industrial output in Central Asia by 80 per cent.[1]

[1] A good example: 'It is the establishment, by means of the collectivization of the rural proletariat, of the forms of practical application of a complete and good measure directly answering the requirements of today which is at stake'.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Asia by 80 per cent.[1] But to examine the workings of the administrative machine in this fashion would not get us much farther than the blueprints; what is needed is an attempt to isolate the pressures and tendencies and see how each bore upon the population. Only so shall we be able to divine how far the eleven million[2] or so people of indigenous stock that have survived are in a position to remain the masters of their fate or to work out a new soul which they can call their own.

From this point on, then, I shall try to see each picture whole in such compartments of Central Asian life as have been chiefly affected by the newer dispensations of the Russian imperial rule.

[1] A fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–5) has recently (1952) been announced. It sets ambitious over-all targets, but is notable for lack of detail in the breakdown of figures.

[2] Of the total population of nearly seventeen million in 1939 only some eleven million were of Asiatic stock. See footnote to page 2.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

IX

NATIONALISM AND THE SOVIET COLONIAL EMPIRE

His dark intellectual qualities of machiavelian dissimulation, profound hypocrisy, and perfidy which knew no touch of remorse, were admirably calculated to sustain any ground which he might win from the simple-hearted people with whom he had to deal.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

THE Declaration[1] of 15th November 1917, and the manifesto[1] which followed it, sounded like a clarion call to the peoples of Central Asia. If any words could pronounce a complete right to independence, these surely did so. At that time there was even an emotional appeal to them as Muslims. 'Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are free and inviolable. Build up your national life: this is your right.' The national leaders themselves soon developed their own views as to what value to attach to these early professions; they were convinced they had seen through them and they denounced them as a cynical appeal to nationalist feeling, never meant as more than a temporizing device to gain time for the deployment of other forces. But the world outside knew little about the sealed-off countries from which they came, and the Turkish leaders were voices crying in the wilderness. The same doctrine of liberty, with right of secession, is proclaimed as the Soviet gospel today, and is still broadcast to other peoples *outside the Soviet world* as the fundamental doctrine upon which the multiple Soviet society has been successfully reared. Let the nations but rise and embrace liberty and they will soon enter the haven in which the Soviet ships of many

[1] See Chapter VI, p. 105.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

nationalities are already safely moored. So runs the argument,[1] still in 1953 unshaken by exposures such as the words written in 1920 to Stalin.

In spite of all that has happened in the colonial areas *within the USSR*, in spite of rebellions, suppressions, mass movement of populations, decimation of peoples, purges, the phrase 'freedom for colonial peoples' remains on Communist lips as the open sesame giving access to that new Soviet world where the lion and the lamb lie down together.

COLONIZATION

How has this come about? The answer begins to appear when we turn to examine certain particulars distinguishing Soviet Central Asia entirely from other parts of the world which from time to time have been regarded as dependencies.

The first distinction is that the people of what may be called the metropolitan race in the USSR — the Great Russians — have an absolute majority over all other races in the Union, and constitute over 58 per cent of the total population.[2] The Great Russians and Ukrainians together make up exactly three-quarters of the total. There is thus a very large preponderance of Europeans over Asian races in the Union as a whole, while the two most important Asian races, the Uzbeks and Kazaks, together make up less than 5 per cent of the population. It follows that in areas suitable for European colonization there are no such problems as beset the Commonwealth in countries

[1] The following are typical passages. 'The Bolsheviks had one exceptionally effective reply — *i.e.* the Soviet decrees on the right to secede if the native peoples so desired.' Coates, *op. cit.* (1951). 'The kernel of the answer is contained in the Party's proclaimed policy . . . every national has the right to self-determination, including the right to secession . . .' *Soviet Studies* (Jan. 1952), M. Holdsworth. For the exposure see pp. 112-13 *supra*.

[2] 1939 census. After the Great Russians come Ukrainians, 16·5 per cent; White Russians, 3·1 per cent; Uzbeks, 2·8 per cent; Tatars (*i.e.* Volga and Idel-Ural Turks), 2·5 per cent; Kazaks, 1·8 per cent; Jews, 1·8 per cent; Azeris, 1·3 per cent. Georgians, 1·3 per cent; Armenians, 1·3 per cent. Since that census the addition to the Russian Empire after the war of the Baltic States, and large parts of Poland and Rumania, may have increased the non-Russian population of the USSR by some 20 million, reducing the percentage of Great Russians to about 50 per cent, or even less, of the total population. But even this does not substantially affect the argument.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

like South Africa, Rhodesia or Kenya, and France in Algeria, Morocco or Tunis. And, although the native population is thick on the ground in certain limited parts of Transoxiana where there is intensive cultivation on irrigated land, it cannot be said that there is any part of Soviet Asia where a few Russian administrators lead isolated lives amid teeming masses of indigenous people, as was formerly the case with the British in India and is still their lot in Malaya. Where there is no question of Russians being left as a small minority, it is easy for the Kremlin to assert that all men have equal rights in every respect.

There is another distinction to be drawn. This is that Central Asia is a part of the same continent with European Russia; one passes into the other with easy gradations of climate, soil and population. Indeed the Russians are only doing today in Central Asia what they did from the XVth to the XVIIth centuries on the Volga steppe and in the Urals; just as then they flooded over and mingled with the Tatar population in Europe, so now they gradually pervade and submerge the Turkish population of the Kazak steppe and Transoxiana. The process is the same, the interaction farther to the east — that is all. The process is rendered easier, in that, broadly speaking, the whole of the inhabited portion of Central Asia outside the deserts is a possible terrain for European colonization. There are portions such as the Turkmen steppe with its extremes of heat and cold that may be uncomfortable for Russians,[1] but none of it is impossible. Indeed much of Turkistan, and particularly Tashkent, Alma Ata and the Farghana Valley, have a more clement climate than any part of Russia proper, the Crimea perhaps excepted. There is thus no question, in any part of Turkistan, of the Russian being a sojourner only, as is the British administrator in Nigeria or the Sudan. He is included in the settled population and, as we shall shortly see, on the Kazak steppe at

[1] Russian colonization in Turkmenistan accounts only for about 200,000 out of a total population of about 1,250,000. In Kazakistan Russians make up about half the population of over 6,000,000. For details see Chapter X.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

least he makes up much more than a fraction of the population.

The third distinction to remember is that at the time of the Revolution and for some time later, there was in Central Asia no organized indigenous urban proletariat. There was of course a large city population of merchants, traders, craftsmen and *religieux*, but it was the usual medley, without order or arrangement, at best following the medieval guild system to be found in the bazaar quarters of all eastern towns. Such factories as existed — mostly for cotton-ginning and carding — were staffed by Russians, and Russians alone were to be found on the railways and telegraphs. Industry and communications were in Russian hands, and, to cite Stalin himself, the only proletariat of consequence was Russian.

[563] The fact of the matter is that a number of peoples, mainly Turkic peoples — about thirty million in all — have not had time to pass through the period of industrial capitalism and consequently have no industrial proletariat [1].

He followed this up two years later with a conclusion which it might have been inopportune to state on the first occasion.

The conditions now exist enabling these republics which . . . possess no proletariat to establish *with the aid of the Russian proletariat* their own centres of industry in order to create in these centres groups of local proletarians who will serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and the toilers of these republics. In this sphere serious work is required; and talk of schools and language alone is not enough.[1]

This interpenetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the countryside, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along the lines of communications, supplies perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia. It is seldom mentioned; indeed Stalin's reference to the bridge-like task of the Russian proletariat is perhaps the nearest we have to an admis-

[1] Stalin speaking on 10th Mar. 1921 and 23rd Apr. 1923 to the Tenth and Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party. Bib. I, 90, pp. 104 and 156.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sion of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration, and ensured for Russians a dominating position in Turkistan not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers with the main stakes in their hand. In parts of Turkistan we shall even see that with the years the Russians ousted the native population and attained an actual numerical preponderance.

THE FIVE REPUBLICS

With this clue in hand it is time to take up the tale from the point when the Soviets, having destroyed the national governments of Kokand, Alash Orda and Bashkiria, and having come to grips with the Basmachis, were free to devote serious attention to the execution of a firm colonial policy. The picture will be clearer if we pass in quick review the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of the five Soviet republics in the Central Asia of today.

The Kremlin inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia four units—(i) the Stepnoi Krai or Steppe Territory, roughly coincident with the northern steppe (northern Kazakistan of today); (ii) the Turkistan province with the Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, covering most of Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe; (iii) and (iv) the quasi-independent States of Bukhara and Khiva. (i) and (ii) had been directly administered under the Tsars, (iii) and (iv), as we know, were left in internal matters to their own Khans and during the interregnum had been the chief seat of the Basmachi troubles. As soon as the able Red General, Frunze, was in a position to report that conquest was secure and resistance only sporadic, Stalin announced[1] a territorial division which did not at first break entirely new ground.

The directly administered Tsarist provinces of the Steppe Territory and Turkistan had already been included in the

[1] Stalin, speaking on 26th Dec. 1922 to All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *op. cit.* pp. [illegible].

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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RSFSR[1] as Autonomous Republics (ASSRs); thus they had not attained a nominally equal status with the RSFSR, under whose wing they remained. Khiva and Bukhara were now declared to be *Peoples* Soviet Republics, the word 'Socialist' being omitted for the reason given by Stalin himself that they were not socialist.

> But [he added] I do not doubt, comrades, and I hope you do not doubt also, that these republics, as they internally develop towards Socialism, will also form part of the confederate State which is now being constituted.

The grim irony behind the words is clear enough.

By 1924 the way had been prepared for a further rationalization of the constitution of the Central Asian provinces. In September of that year, Bukhara and Khiva took Stalin's hint and declared their adherence to Soviet Socialism, and steps were taken to redistribute the territories on what was described as the national principle. By May 1925 these two, together with most of the old Turkistan province, had become the two full constituent SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (Tajikistan was at that time given the rank of an ASSR within Uzbekistan). Thus the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. There was at least one Russian to regret it.

> Le Kherezm fut complètement éliminé comme état. . . . Jusqu'à quel point une telle mesure, qui s'inspirait du principe des nationalités, était-elle souhaitable? On peut en discuter . . . en ce qui concerne ses traditions historiques il restait un organisme visible et original, et l'anéantissement de cet organisme . . . n'aura peut-être pas été effectué sans conséquences.[2]

There remained a fringe of the old Turkistan province. By 1926 this had been united with the old Steppe Territory

[1] In what follows:

USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the whole Russian Empire.

RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic — *i.e.* Russia proper, much the largest of the 16 constituent SSRs which make up the USSR.

SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* one of the other 15 of the 16 constituent Republics, *e.g.* Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

ASSR = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* a territory with limited 'autonomy' within an SSR, *e.g.* Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistan.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. 642
Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR 631
within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is 131
now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice 631
of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

131 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihila-
631 tion of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map[2] reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these
312 administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like
[162] the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[2 [see cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were nothing short of national frontiers between independent units of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that the irrigation systems have been kept within single administrative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across ooo
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who possesses experience, for there is no administrative question which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assuming for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy. Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential matters would be in central hands. In either case their only meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

131 Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks
361 Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

OOO I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing
[101] linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

has lost its focus. The Russian policy is in fact describable as cantonization, conceived with the object of working against any conception of the unity of the Eastern Turks and bringing the *disjecta membra* under the influence of overwhelming forces of assimilation from without.

DOCTRINE OF THE PROLETARIAT

So much for the outward forms of the five republics. There were other weapons in the Soviet armoury more powerful than these, and we have to see how the directors of policy even in their own minds were able to reconcile their 1917 professions of 'freedom for all' with the developments that actually took place. For the result has been not a loosely knit federation of self-governing units on national lines, but the most centralized human organism in the modern world. In examining this question we shall have to look first for some statement of the principles that were supposed to regulate policy and then for the agency responsible for execution of the policy itself. As the examination proceeds, the case will be clearer if we bear in mind Stalin's own statement that the indigenous peoples of Central Asia possessed no proletariat.

The right of a constituent republic to secede is not only contained in the 1917 Declaration, but appears in every pronouncement since then and is enshrined in Article 17 of the latest 1936 constitution. Let it pass for a pious aspiration. The right has never been exercised, and attempts to foster local nationalisms have been crushed by force more decisive than that used to defeat the attempt of America's southern States to secede in the middle of last century. It has never been suggested that any SSR in the Union really possesses the sovereign power which would entitle it even to be neutral in a war, as was Ireland in World War II. There are the facts, but again the question must be asked how the fact can be reconciled with the platitude of the theory.

The most satisfactory method of arriving at the answer must be to go to the Russian sources. In *Marxism and the*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

National and Colonial Question[1] there exists a collection of Stalin's speeches and essays dating from a time before the Revolution to 1934. In these he sets forth a tortuous argument, reasoning from first principles and without concrete references and seeking to justify Soviet practice by reference to the prophets of Communism. In his thought national movements are identified with the bourgeoisie, and are outmoded when the bourgeoisie gives way to Communism. Thus a basis of autonomy, and the right to secede, can only be a temporary concession to the transient ambitions of an immature class, and although for the sake of argument it may be granted that a nation has a right to return to this outmoded idea, it is the duty of the Communist Party to work against it. Nationalism is only really useful as a slogan for getting rid of external imperialism; once that is done, it is the task of Communism to get rid of the nationalist leaders. And this is best done by the Party, which will drive a wedge between the indigenous workers, namely the proletariat and peasants, on the one hand, and their own nationalist leaders on the other. These are represented as feudal, religious or bourgeois, but in every case a privileged minority unrepresentative of the toiling masses.

In case this account should appear partial, here is a selection of sayings. The first is from Lenin's writings quoted by Stalin, the others are all from Stalin's essays and speeches.

Lenin. Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the labour question.[2]

Stalin. There are instances when the right of self-determination comes into conflict with the other, the higher right — the right of the working-class. . . . In such cases, this must be said bluntly, the right to self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working-class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter.[3]

Nations have the right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or pernicious . . . but that does not

[1] Bib. I, 90. I am indebted to the analysis in Mrs. Stahl's book, Bib. 1, 89.
[2] From Lenin's *Right of Nations to Self-determination*, see Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 168.
[3] Stalin, *op. cit.* pp. 168-9.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mean that Social Democrats (*i.e.* the Party) will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations, and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[1]

It is not the national but the agrarian question that will decide the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate question.[2]

Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching.[3]

I am referring to the deviation towards local native nationalism which is at times to be observed in the ranks of native Communists and which in the East expresses itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan Turkism.[4]

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right of self-determination, and applied to 'native nationalists', who *ex hypothesi* have no proletariat of their own, by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. Leaving aside the instruments of enforcement lurking at every corner, it is hard to think of a series of pronouncements which could be more discouraging to a Central Asian patriot, or less in tune with the proud declaration of the liberty of the colonial peoples to decide on their own future.

THE PARTY

The period from 1918 to 1929 was spent in the integration of these colonial areas with Great Russia, using as instrument the Party. Collectivization had not yet been launched; up to 1929 the aim was to cut off the smaller landholders from their national leaders. Here again it is to be remembered that the Russian peasantry in the countryside and the Russian proletariat on the communications and in the towns were ready to hand to implement a policy. Whatever the theory, the Party has always been in fact a single unified structure bound by the tightest possible discipline. To parody Stalin,

[1] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 53. [2] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 25. [3] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 110.
[4] Stalin, report to Communist Party, 10th Mar. 1921, *op. cit.* p. 104.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

it is unitary in content, federal only in form, a solid structure working like an army from the central command. Affairs throughout the Union are controlled from one apex at Moscow. The Party has often been called a monolith; it is perhaps more like a banyan tree, whose branches spread from the central trunk and return to earth sending up fresh trunks all of the same species as the central tree, still nourished from the centre and killing all other growths in the surrounding lands. Party missionaries from this central stem went out to spread the gospel and fight nationalism as Stalin had instructed. The central tree killed any local shrub that tried to root itself on ground which the banyan could reach. In such a conflict the local nationalists had little chance. The wonder is that their resistance was so prolonged.

471 In the cities the authority of the clergy was shaken by the confiscation of religious endowments (*evkaf*). In the settled countryside the land was nationalized, all holdings over a certain area being seized and redistributed, including cattle and agricultural implements considered surplus to the maximum allotment. At the outset a show was made of racial impartiality by confiscating Cossack lands, the Cossacks in the main having been the only Russians who resisted the new régime and the largest Russian landholders on the steppe. (Incidentally, they were the Russians on the best terms with the indigenous population.)

It remained to secure control of the water which is the life-blood of all intensive cultivation in sub-tropical continental tracts. It is broadly true to say that the people of the soil in all lands enjoying an indigenous irrigation system in the Muslim East had worked out over the centuries elaborate systems apportioning responsibilities (for channel maintenance) and rights (to turns of water), usually based on ancient tribal records of the account of profit and loss within a tribe. When older tribal theories of common lands had given way to individual user, the water continued to be regarded as a common possession to be distributed in accordance with a well-known roster, disputes being settled by the chief. For

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail.

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes,

[1] Bib. I, 62.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

642 631 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a centralizing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

dominion is proverbially associated with the encouragement of artificial local divisions. We have already noted the cleavage of class which it was the Party's task to bring about between the local peoples and their natural leaders, and the queer boundaries which at best can only have been laid down with tongue in cheek. But a policy first of division, and later of absorption, can be promoted as well by a system of education as by the drawing of frontiers. And, as Macaulay knew, the language in which education is to be conducted is a most vital factor for consideration in a dependent territory. In their turn applied linguistics begin with alphabets.

Different methods of transcribing Turkic languages may appear at first sight to be a subject of academic interest only, but between 1920 and 1940 the controversy in various aspects was a major issue in Turkey herself and among the Turkish peoples both in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The case is known as the alphabet controversy, and relates to the adoption first of a Roman script in place of the Arabic traditional to all Muslims, and later (in the areas of Russian dominion) of a Cyrillic in place of the Roman script. The first steps to the adoption of the Roman script were taken in 1921–2 in the Turkic-speaking parts of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan and parts of the North Caucasus). On 1st May 1925 this change was consolidated by decree of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and Party, ratifying a Roman alphabet as the official script. On that day all papers appeared in the new garb, to the dismay of Arabic literates who could not follow a word of it. During the following three years rather different Roman scripts, varying *inter se*, were introduced into Central Asia also.

One effect was to insulate the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the cultural influences of Turkey herself, who was then still using the Arabic script. Soviet preference at that time for a Roman rather than a Cyrillic script is partly attributable to the fact that in Azerbaijan there was already a native movement in favour of Roman, and partly no doubt to a sound calculation that immediate insistence on the Cyrillic would give too much away. Any script other than Arabic

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

212 would isolate the Turkic-speaking peoples in the USSR from the natural cultural influences brought to bear from outside, and that for the moment was sufficient.

Meanwhile a number of prominent Azeri exiles in Turkey, of whom Ahmet Aghaiev and Yusuf Akchura were the best known, were actively pursuing with the Kemalist government a project for the introduction of a Roman script into Turkey also. In 1928, as is well known, this movement was successful. It was then necessary for the Soviets to think again, for Turkey's action had re-established a basis for the cultural unity of all Turkic-speaking peoples. But time was needed to prepare the ground, and ten years went by before the plunge was taken, and Cyrillic alphabets, again varying somewhat, were introduced one by one into all the Soviet republics inhabited by peoples of Turkish and Iranian stock.[1]

This second change was uneconomic, for millions of textbooks had been issued for the schools in Roman, all the new teachers knew the Roman alphabet, and before they could teach they had to learn again. It was as if everybody in Britain had been ordered overnight to read and write in Greek letters. There has been much speculation as to the causes for the change, but, given the Soviet mentality, one answer is clear enough. Ankara had compelled the ship to go about on a new tack, a tack which incidentally should lead more directly to the home harbour. If linguistic unity were the aim, it had better be not a unity of the Turkic languages themselves but a shaping at least of their alphabets into a Russian mould.[2] Apart from that was the reasonable point that the adoption of the Cyrillic script for the local tongues would make it easier to

[1] Georgia and Armenia were exempted from this *ukase*; it is not difficult to see why.

[2] *E.g.* the Soviet press, speaking of a linguistics conference assembled at Baku in Jan. 1951, wrote: 'The duty of linguists is to write really scientific works on the origin and history of the [Azeri] language, in doing which they must fully show the favourable influence of the Russian language on it, and establish the identical elements in the two languages. The [Azeri] language must be enriched with words employed in the Russian language which are the possession of all the peoples of the USSR.'

It is hardly necessary to add that Azeri, a form of Western Turkish, has no identical elements with Russian.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

teach Russian as a second language. But there was surely 212
a motive of a more subtle kind — the realization that change upon change in the medium of education would tend to sever the generations one from another and help to usher in the new age. It is indeed through the new education that the Soviets strive unceasingly to draw a line between the historical past and the world into which, as they see it, man is inevitably moving. This is a fundamental of their thought.

There remains one theme, connected with languages. Of 000
late much has been made of Stalin's 1950 pronouncements on what has come to be known as the 'Marr controversy'. This hinges on the interpretation of a philological doctrine, taught by Professor N. Ya. Marr (d. 1934), that language is a superstructural phenomenon which changes as the basis of society changes. In his day Marr was reputed a great and scholarly philologist and not only in the Soviet Union, but the inclination now is to condemn him for having later prostituted his science to meet the demands of Marxist theory. The best illustration of the later jargon of the Marr school is perhaps the saying that personal pronouns were invented when private property was first instituted. It needs a philologist to unravel the technical complexities of this controversy; but as Stalin (who opened the ball by exclaiming 'I am no philologist') attempted it, it may not be impertinent to join in. References to such abstractions as globogenic process, Japhetic theory or morphological structure at the best probably meant no more to Stalin than to the general reader; at the worst as ground for a political argument they read like charlatanism. What is interesting is that on so strange a peg Stalin himself should have chosen to hang a long series of articles in *Pravda* and *Bolshevik*, reaching the conclusion that every dogma in Marxism, and no doubt in Marrism too, is to be understood relatively to the conditions in which it is sought to apply it. That this is sophistry as a contribution to scholarship is clear from the accompaniment of a mocking challenge to the scholars and the inclusion of more than one platitude. For not only was Stalin 'no philologist', he proceeded to instruct us

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

in the commonplace with comments such as 'language is a social phenomenon', and 'language is an instrument by which one person communicates with another'. Meanwhile heads were rolling, and the academic slaughter of the Marrists had begun.

On the way to his conclusion about the relativity of dogma Stalin incidentally refuted the doctrine of Marr and his disciples that language is a superstructure. He accused Marr of extreme and narrow errors; and, although *more Sovietico* he left his formulas open to adaptation whatever may happen, he pronounced that there is a constant element in language which possesses a vitality of its own.

What was the significance of this intervention in an abstruse question of scholastics by Stalin himself, and how, if at all, does it bear on the 'colonial' languages? It does at least demonstrate a conviction in Stalin's mind that language policy, and its manipulation, goes to the root of social and political questions, and for this reason has a practical bearing on larger policy. But, reading between the lines, the immediate object may have been to discredit, and even liquidate, a band of language scientists whom the Kremlin thought had gathered overmuch power and prestige and who needed to be disillusioned and dispersed. A longer-term end in Stalin's mind may have been to shake himself free of the trammels of all and every dogma, even the commandments of the prophets; and clear the way for the simple opportunism of the master mind. His last word is 'Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism'. It may be this is the gospel that, so near the end of his life, he wished to leave behind — his final testament and contribution to the history of Marxist thought. But, even so, the elaborate façade of a free discussion in the columns of the Soviet press reads like mockery, the more so because Stalin was so jocular at the outset and in the end so dogmatic in his conclusions against dogma. One final suggestion may be hazarded. Marr's Japhetic theory, proceeding as it did from Caucasian and Georgian archetypes, had postulated a multi-national basis for world culture, a postulate which in the strictly

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

limited cultural field was acceptable to Soviet historians and scientists down to 1937. But the Great Russian revival set on foot at the time of the 1937 purges, and developed during and after the War, destroyed such multi-national concepts, and led to the abandonment of theories like that of Marr which drew inspiration from a colonial source. Great Russian chauvinism had won the day.

MISCEGENATION

There is another influence which goes deep. Unlike the English, says Togan,[1] the Russian pursues tactics — to him second nature — of pretending to be the friend of the people among whom he comes. He presents himself as their brother, tries to combine his blood with theirs in marriage, and creeps into intimacy with them. He knows how to suit his language, literature, music and architecture to the native taste. Himself half-Asian, he seeks to deal with the people of Asia as Asians, and in his letters and even in the appearance of his envoys, adopts the mannerisms of Asia. This elastic character and tact is the most menacing side of Russia's domination of Turkistan. He goes on:

> As regards family life the men who mix with Russians often marry Russian women. It is true that mixed marriages between nationals of different countries with common civilization strengthen their cultural inter-connection. But this is a menace to the Turkish idea in Turkistan. If one partner comes from the ruling nation and the other from one inferior politically and economically, it hastens the process of assimilation. Russian women like most Russians are fanatical, nationalistic and despotic. Not only by their caresses, but by their continual nagging at the quality of self-respect which they despise, they reduce their husbands to submission.

A recent account[2] tends to confirm this picture. As sympathizers these visitors took a different view when they met Satpaiev, the Kazak President of the Alma Ata Academy of Sciences, with his Russian wife. Nominally at least this

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 536 and 586. The author at the moment is speaking of Tsarist times. But a Commissar is as good as a Count.

[2] Coates, *op. cit.* p. 141.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

663 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 More recently there has been no pretence of the respect-
186 ability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

[See cat. 116 pp. 104-05 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to overcome any centrifugal impulse in the colonial territories of the Soviet Empire. First in order was the power derived from the presence of a Russian population, infusing into a plural society an outside element as strong as are the Chinese in Malaya. The monolithic Constitution, the rooting of the Party sprung from its parent stem, the artificial division of natural local unities, applied education and linguistics — all these pressures have been steadily brought to bear against the realization of national or industrial particularism over a period of some thirty years. And in the background, always present, is the secret police and military force at the disposal of the Union.

The flood is the same flood as that which swept over Turkistan in Tsarist days. Like the waters of the Oxus after storms in the mountains, it may be turgid, but it is the same river, unpredictable in the direction of its attack, but submerging the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance is overcome.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan R92

X

RUSSIANIZATION

000 *For now began to unroll the most awful series of calamities, and the most extensive, which is anywhere recorded to have visited the sons and daughters of men.*

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

THIS chapter is statistical but the statistics are revealing and not so cold as might be thought. They are all drawn from official Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, and it would be difficult for a Russian to deny them or gainsay the deductions which are to be drawn from a study of them. The particular story which they tell concerns Kazakistan, much the largest and the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics with an indigenous Turkish or Iranian stock and that into which Russian immigration has been the heaviest. Similar, though less drastic, processes have been going on in the other four republics.

101 Present-day Kazakistan is made up of the old Steppe Territory (Stepnoi Krai), which forms its northern half, and a part of the old Turkistan, which forms its southern half. As originally constituted in 1926, Kazakistan was an Associated SSR, and one corner of it included most of the old Khiva State (the Karakalpak country). When after eleven years it was raised to the status of a full SSR — one of the sixteen republics which make up the USSR — the Karakalpak oblast was taken away from it and joined to Uzbekistan. The changes of area make statistical comparisons difficult, but with some application and common sense they are not impossible.

162 The figures which follow illustrate in statistical form what has to be said about the Russian pressures on the land and indigenous population. This pressure in the early stages took the form of Russian peasant colonization, and later of a large-scale urbanization, which followed in the train of the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RG1

drive for industrialization. This urbanization was carried out 162
partly by means of further Russian immigration, and partly by the forcible shifting of country Kazaks into the towns to form an indigenous proletariat by the side of the Russian proletariat. Finally, the figures show how the so-called collectivization of agriculture and stock-breeding has gone far to exterminate the indigenous population.

For simplicity's sake no attempt is here made to distinguish Great Russian from Ukrainian and White Russian immigrants. The expression 'Russians' therefore covers all three. Actually the Great Russians exceed the others, *e.g.* in 1926 1·28 million or 19·8 per cent of the Kazakistan population were Russians and 0·86 million or 13·2 per cent were Ukrainians.

The figures given treat of four periods: 101
162

(i) 1897–1911, being the period of immigration from the Tsarist census nearly down to the opening of World War I.

(ii) 1911–26, being the period of World War I, the Revolution and the opening of the Soviet era down to the first Soviet census.

(iii) 1926–39, being the period from the first Soviet census to the second Soviet census, including the first two Five-Year Plans.

(iv) 1939–50, being the period from the second Soviet census to the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, and including World War II.

(i) 1897–1911 162

1897 is the year of the only complete census under the Tsars, but migration figures were carefully recorded. The Russianization of the population of the old Steppe Territory during this period is shown by the following table (numbers in thousands):

	1897	1911	Increase
Total population	2465	3835	1370
Russians	493	1544	1051
Russian percentage	20	40	77

[See cat. 16, pp. 163 - 172 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RG1

162 Hence the Russian numbers between these years increased by more than one million and were more than trebled, the Russian percentage of the total population being doubled.

The distribution of Russians in towns and country was as follows:

	Towns		Country		Total	
	(1000s)	%	(1000s)	%	(1000s)	%
1897	144	29	349	71	493	100
1911	282	18	1262	82	1544	100
Increase	138	13	913	87	1051	—

From the above it is clear that the Russian population of the countryside increased much more rapidly than that of the towns. The Russianization of the Steppe Territory before the Revolution was mainly in the form of agricultural settlement under the Stolypin reforms of 1906. On the other hand, by 1911 the greater part of the town people had become Russian, the proportion of Russians in the total urban population being 76 per cent (15 per cent in 1897).

During the same period, the Kazak population developed as follows:

	(1000s)	%
1897	1973	80 of the whole
1911	2291	60 "

Thus, although the absolute number of the indigenous population rose by 14 per cent, the percentage which this number bore to the whole fell by 20 per cent. The increase of 14 per cent equals about 1 per cent per annum, to be compared with the Russian increase of 213 per cent or 14 per cent per annum.

The Russian population consisted of peasants, Cossacks, merchants, officials and soldiers, with peasants in the majority. Industrial workers constituted only 0·2 per cent of the Russian population. The Kazaks were hostile to the immigrants. Often they were expropriated, often they left the districts colonized.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

(ii) 1911–26

1926 is the year of the first Soviet census. Russian colonization continued until 1914, when it was halted by World War I, followed by the Merdikar revolt of 1916, the Revolution and famine of 1917–18, the civil war of 1918–20, renewed famine, epidemics and rebellion in 1921–4. 162

The area of the Steppe Territory was 1·85 m. sq. km., whereas that of the new Kazak ASSR was 2·74 m. sq. km. Exact comparisons between the two are therefore impossible. But, taking that part of the Kazak territory which had previously been the Steppe, the Russian increase between 1911 and 1926 was only 255,000 or some 17 per cent – about 1 per cent per annum. This is less than the annual increase of the *resident* Russian population in the same area just before 1911. It is therefore reasonable to deduce that less concerted Russian immigration took place during this period than before the Revolution into this area. [131]

The population of the Kazak ASSR (less the Karakalpak oblast) in 1926 was 6,198,000, of whom 2,164,000 or 35 per cent were Russian. The absolute number of Russians was thus greater than in 1911, but the ratio is 5 per cent less than that of 40 per cent in the old Steppe. This is explained by the fact that the new republic included much territory to the south where the ratio of Russians to the total was lower than in the north.

Of the 2,164,000 Russians, 1,845,000 or 85 per cent lived in the country and 319,000 or 15 per cent in towns, not a great shift from the 87 per cent and 13 per cent of 1911. This shows that up to 1926 no great structural alteration in the population had appeared. But despite the low absolute and proportional figures of Russians in the towns as compared with Russians in the country, Russians formed 61 per cent, or nearly two-thirds, of the total urban population. This establishes that the indigenous population up to that date continued to be tied to the countryside. The Russians on the other hand, being the urban majority, were in a position to dominate

1 [see cat. 116, p. 89 ff. — Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RG1

162 Kazakistan. In the rural districts at that date they constituted 32·5 per cent of the population. Figures of urban population show the interesting fact that the only Kazak town with an overwhelming indigenous population was Turkistan (Yese), the seat of the shrine of the mystic Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century. Here the percentages were: Kazaks 79·8 per cent, Russians 20·2 per cent. Where saints are remembered, the Russian of today does not go.

The following table gives a summary of the 1926 census figures for the whole republic by nationality.

		%
Russians	2,164,582	34·9
Kazaks	3,627,612	58·5
Uzbeks	129,429	2·0
Miscellaneous	274,733	4·6
	6,196,356	100·0

The number of non-Russians in the new republic was 1,455,000 greater, and their proportion of the total population 2 per cent more, than in the former Steppe Territory. This increase is attributable to the incorporation of new territories.

In sum, no important quantitative or qualitative changes occurred in Russianization during this period.

(iii) 1926–39

1939 is the year of the second Soviet census. This took place after the purges and after the official policy had turned away from the ostensible encouragement of local nationalism. This census, therefore, as might be expected, gives no figures breaking down the peoples of the various republics by nationalities, but only the total population of each republic, with its distribution between town and country. It does, however, give the total number of each 'race' in the USSR as a whole.

The following comparison between the two censuses is of interest:

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

	1926 (1000s)	1939 (1000s)
Kazakistan		
Total population	6198	6146
Urban	522	1706
Rural	5676	4440
Whole USSR		
Total Kazaks	3968*	3099 = −21·9% (decrease)

* Note that this figure is higher than that for Kazaks in Kazakistan in 1926 (3,628,000) since some Kazaks lived in other republics.

These figures show that in this thirteen-year period decisive changes had occurred. These are:

(*a*) a small decrease in the total population of Kazakistan;
(*b*) a large decrease in the rural population;
(*c*) a very large increase in the urban population, which was more than trebled;
(*d*) a very large decrease in the total number of Kazaks.

These changes were the result of collectivization and industrialization during the first two Five-Year Plans.

The degree of Russianization of the population during this period can be deduced as follows.

The percentage decrease of Kazaks in the whole USSR is 21·9. Apply this to the 3,628,000 1926 figure of Kazaks in Kazakistan and we get a 1939 figure of 2,833,000 for the Kazaks in Kazakistan. By a similar method, but in this case applying a percentage increase, the number of other non-Russians in Kazakistan can be estimated at 436,000 in 1939 compared with 406,000 in 1926. Kazaks and other non-Russians together thus total 3,269,000. Subtract this total from 6,146,000 and the result is 2,877,000 Russians.

This is an increase of more than 700,000 Russians over this period, giving a 1939 percentage of 47 per cent as against 35 per cent of the total population in 1926.

The rate of increase in the number of Russians in Kazakistan over this period is much greater than that of the total

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

162 USSR population (33 per cent against 15·9 per cent). This difference of 17 per cent between the two percentages is therefore reasonably attributable to new immigration, *i.e.*, say, 370,000 out of 700,000.

The urban population increased by about 1,200,000. Allowing, say, 100,000 (20 per cent of the 1926 urban figure of 520,000) for the natural increase, this implies new arrivals in the towns of 1,100,000. Of these, not more than 370,000 (see last paragraph) could have come from outside Kazakistan. It follows that some 730,000 must have moved from the country into the town.

From this point it is not difficult, by a series of deductions and applications of all-over percentages (of which it would be tedious to give the somewhat Euclidean details), to arrive at the conclusion that in 1939 the distribution of the Russian urban and rural population was:

Urban	Rural
970,000 or 35%	1,900,000 or 65%
(against 15% in 1926)	(against 85% in 1926)

While, therefore, there still remained two country Russians for each townee, the population as between the two had moved heavily in favour of the towns.

During the same period, the non-Russian population decreased as follows:

	Kazaks	Others	Total
1926	3628	406	4034
1939	2833	436	3269
Decrease or increase	−795	+30	−765 net

Or 765,000, a decrease of nearly 20 per cent. On all-Russia figures an increase of 15·9 per cent would have been expected, giving a much larger real decrease against normal expectations.

In sum, in this period:

(*a*) the Russian immigration proceeded at a considerable rate;

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

(*b*) there was the normal Russian increase in the resident population; /162

(*c*) the number of country Russians remained steady, while the number of Russian townees was trebled;

(*d*) there was a very large decrease in the non-Russian population, which could only have been brought about by war, famine, pestilence, mass emigration or disaster brought about by deliberate policy. The period was one of peace. There was no general famine or pestilence, as the increase in the Russian figures shows. There was no mass emigration. The period was that of the forcible introduction of collective farming and suppression of nomadism. The result must be attributed therefore to the methods of collectivization adopted;

(*e*) the decrease in the non-Russian population put Russians first among the peoples of Kazakistan with 47 per cent of the total population, Kazaks holding second place, with a small percentage of others.

(iv) 1939–50

There have been no further censuses since 1939. There were, however, general elections in 1946 and 1950, at which all over 19 years old were entitled to vote. Numbers entitled in 1946 were 3,302,000 and in 1950 3,860,000. The percentage of persons under 19 years on census averages may be taken as 44 per cent, making the above figures 56 per cent of the total population. It follows that an approximate population figure is:

1946	5,900,000
1950	6,900,000

The 1946 figure shows an actual decrease of about 250,000 on the 1939 figure. On census averages of increase for the whole USSR there should have been an increase to some 6,700,000 showing a real decrease of some 800,000. The figure is even higher, for, from statistics for transfer of industrial undertakings to Asia, it is known that a further 200,000 immigrants entered the country, making the real decrease up to 1,000,000.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan Rai

162 The deficit must be attributed to World War II and its effects, whether by way of actual call-up or high mortality owing to shortages and distress.

The 1950 figure shows a large restoration of the balance, with an all-over increase of 1,000,000 from 1946, and a net increase of 750,000 from 1939. There is indeed here a surplus over natural increase among residents, which must be attributed to return of troops demobilized and probably to increased Russian immigration to provide the sinews of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50).

Applying general trends, the composition of Kazakistan in 1950 may be estimated as follows:

Total	6,900,000
Russians	3,400,000
Non-Russians	3,500,000
(Kazaks	3,000,000)

The Russians therefore are the most numerous single people in Kazakistan, and have nearly achieved an all-over majority.

The elections provide no data for a reliable estimate of distribution between urban and rural populations, but on previous estimates it would be conservative to assume that, as in 1939, at least 35 per cent Russians or 1,200,000 live in towns, and a maximum of 65 per cent or 2,200,000 in the country. Similar deductions can be made for non-Russians.

SUMMARY

The following table shows the progress of Russianization since 1897 (populations in thousands):

	Steppe				Kazakistan					
	1897	%	1911	%	1926	%	1939	%	1950	%
Russians	493	20	1544	40	2164	35	2877	47	3400	49
Non-Russians	1972	80	2291	60	4034	65	3269	53	3500	51
Total	2465	100	3835	100	6198	100	6146	100	6900	100

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

Up to the Revolution Russian and Ukrainian peasants passed into Kazakistan, dispossessing the indigenous population both of pasture and arable land. Towns were created of which the population was predominantly Russian. 162

Thereafter there was a pause, until the Five-Year Plans. Russian immigration was then resumed, not mainly to the countryside but to industrial centres. The very large increase in the Russian population was accompanied by an even larger decrease in the Kazaks. These were 21·9 per cent in deficiency, when on normal expectations for the USSR on a whole they should have been 15·9 per cent in excess. In short, one Kazak out of three perished during this period. Reduced by hunger and terrorism, large numbers of the indigenous population remaining were forced into towns, where they became a new proletariat. In the Soviet jargon this was a period of proletarianization. The degree of Russian infiltration already achieved should suffice to paralyse any Kazak nationalist or separatist movement originating in Kazakistan. On the other hand, Kazaks still form about half the population, and could make themselves felt under any system of democratic government in the Western sense.

There is one further comparison worth making. The figures of the 1939 census, as compared with the 1926 census, show that in the other four Central Asian republics, viz., Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, there was a considerable increase in the absolute figures of population over this period, in contrast to the decrease in Kazakistan. It may then be argued that the heavy decrease of the Kazak population in Kazakistan was due to emigration of Kazaks into the other four republics in pursuit of the industrialization there being pursued. But the argument holds no water. For the statistics of *all* the Kazaks in the USSR in 1939 show a figure of 3,099,000 only, which (to say nothing of the comparison with the analogous figure for 1926) is much less than the 1926 figure for the Kazaks in Kazakistan only, viz. 3,628,000.

I affirm, then, that the dry facts of Soviet statistics display

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia
Kazakhstan RQ1

162 a picture of something which can only be described by the new term, genocide. In Turkistan it is known as *Katl-i-aam*, meaning a general massacre.

Sources: Tsarist census, 1897; Soviet census, 1926 and 1939; Lorimer, F., *The Population of the Soviet Union*, League of Nations, 1946, pp. 120-21, 133-40, 161-3.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

XI

COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE SUPPRESSION OF NOMADISM

They were told of the oppressions of Russia, of her pride and haughty disdain evidenced towards them by a thousand acts; of her contempt for their religion; of her determination to reduce them to absolute slavery; of the preliminary measures she had already taken by erecting forts upon many of the great rivers in their neighbourhood; of the ulterior intentions she thus announced to circumscribe their pastoral lands, until they would all be obliged to renounce their flocks and to collect in towns like Sarepta, there to pursue mechanical and servile trades of shoemaker, tailor, and weaver, such as the free-born Tartar had always disdained.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

VERY unlike De Quincey, but typical of the research discussions conducted nowadays on Soviet policies towards the 'Tartars' is the following apologia:[1]

The collectivization of agriculture was primarily due to the need to industrialize Soviet Russia: this entailed the transfer of a part of the peasantry to industry, and the production by the rest of a surplus sufficient to feed the increased industrial population. If it is assumed . . . that large-scale enterprise in agriculture cannot be technically superior to the small or medium one (or not sufficiently superior to compensate for the possible shortcomings of bureaucratic organization), it necessarily follows that the Russian peasants who remained on the land had to work harder or eat less, or both. In this case some amount of compulsion was needed not only in order to establish the *Kolkhozy*[2] (in general revolutions do not happen to be the heydays of argument by mere persuasion), but it is also continuously needed in order to keep the *Kolkhozy* in being against the obvious economic interests of their members.

[1] Bib. II, 9. Schlesinger.

[2] KOLKHOZ. Abbreviative for the collective farm. Dealers in these phrases like to use a Russian plural (*Kolkhozy*).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

> If, on the other hand, it is admitted that large-scale enterprise in agriculture as well as in industry may carry technical and organizational benefits inaccessible to small or even medium enterprise (a problem on which the record of the Soviet *Kolkhoz* experiment is making a fundamental contribution), it is possible that a reduced number of agricultural producers are supplying an increased surplus to the towns and at the same time improving their own standards of life. In this case, the economic success may comprehensibly command the agreement of those concerned even after the initial motives (a mixture of enthusiasm and coercion for different groups of the population) have become less important.

Making allowances for the involutions of the brackets, this passage conveys an impression that the writer is not really dealing with human beings at all but indulging in a logistical speculation as to the most effective means of fighting a war on the interrelated agricultural and industrial fronts. Whatever your opinion (he says in effect) on the point whether a collective agriculture is or is not more efficient than individual enterprise — and I myself think there is a good case for holding it is more efficient —, naturally some degree of compulsion was needed to put it in force. At least some part of the population had of course to be coerced.

In the last chapter we have seen the bare bones of a skeleton, as yet unclothed with the sentient flesh — a set of figures fairly deducible from Russian publications, which lead to a terrible conclusion. Those figures deal with human developments in Kazakistan, mainly a country of herdsmen. It is indeed on the nomads that the pressure of the collective system has weighed most heavily, and it is from among them that most of the human fodder was extracted to feed the new factories and work the mines. Nevertheless, the peasant on his homestead was shaken by the same relentless blast of new doctrine as was the herdsman on his pasture.

Both were torn violently from their accustomed moorings to be driven hither and thither, storm-tossed, on a cruel sea. The herdsmen, more inured to hardship, resisted more strongly and suffered more. A pale shadow of the pain and injury inflicted appears in the fact that it took the Soviets themselves

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

nearly a decade from the time of introduction of their collective drive in 1929 to wear down the free Kazaks and Kirghiz, the nomads of the steppe and the mountain, to the point at which in 1936 they thought it safe to treat them on an equal footing with the settled Uzbeks in the south. Yet academic argument continues on questions such as that posed above, research bodies quote blueprints, and argue like Stalin from first principles. The more involved and philosophic the discussion, the less account it seems to take of the concrete case, the actual cost in human suffering. And even those who enter the lists against the Soviet apologist are apt to speak in terms of thousands or millions of human lives from the standpoint of recorders of casualties in some phantom war. The spirit and the dignity of man is given no place in all these bickerings.

Let us try to see what really befell the men and women of Kazakistan of 1929. By that year a centralized control had been imposed in the areas of settled cultivation in Soviet Central Asia; hereditary leaders of the people had been pulled down by confiscations from their position in city and field and, less certainly, from their paramountcy on the steppe also; land and water had been nationalized and, after taking a large share for the *Sovkhozes* or state farms, redistributed in an arbitrary fashion. But here more than elsewhere in the USSR up to 1928 Lenin's New Economic Policy had given some freedom at least to the small man; small-holders still worked on lands they counted their own, yoking their own oxen to the plough, milking their own cattle, riding their own horses; herdsmen roamed the steppe or hillside tending their own flocks and herds of camels, cattle, horses, sheep and goats; both brought their produce to market in cart or on hoof — grain, vegetables, fruit, eggs and chickens, milk, cheese and meat — and sold it in shops at reasonable prices. Except that the chiefs and big men had been removed, the social and economic system of agricultural production and distribution remained much as it had been before the Revolution. On the steppe and in the mountains there even remained vestiges of

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

lands their families had occupied for generations, and put at 474 unfamiliar work in unfamiliar surroundings. Fewer still made 661 any effort to escape, their experiences seemed to have broken up any spirit of defiance they may have had before. He explains how the numbers of peasants available made the federal police the largest single employers in Russia, and gave them a reputation for getting things done. They could always count on a steady supply of labour, that great forced-labour army which started from the days of the so-called liquidation of the Kulaks. In this way the double end was served, opposition to collective farming stifled and the sinews of industry provided.

The policy of collectivization was directed both at the settled farmers and at the nomads, but with the former was easier to achieve. In Central Asia the peasants do not usually live in scattered farms on their lands but congregate in villages huddled together for protection and defence and enjoying from ancient times some degree of communal life based on their tribal past. Each cultivator goes out daily, and sometimes nightly, from the village to his fields which are often in several parts of the village lands. One man, for instance, will cultivate his ancestral share of the best irrigated land, a similar share of land not so good, perhaps dependent on rainfall, and a share in the village common or waste where the herds pasture. The water-rights will be held in theory in common, and approportioned by ancestral shares according to traditional needs. This system was not without a collective tribal background and with sympathy and vision it might not have been impossible to have introduced reforms gradually leading to a commonalty which, taking account of tradition, should have combined the incentive of individual user with the needs of the whole village community. That, however, is what Communists would nowadays call a feudal survivalist deviation, and it is not what happened. As we have seen, the Communists aimed not at a form of collectivism which should be the most efficient consistent with its acceptability by the people, but at very greatly reducing the number of workers in the fields in order to supply industry. Redeployment in industry was

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 661 perhaps the most important part of the plan — proletarianization as they called it.[1] They did not therefore try for a revivified tribal system, but aimed at a complete reorganization of village life, by means of a consolidation of small-holdings into large fields to be worked by a mechanized agriculture. In practice, this meant not only the dispossession of the more efficient and more prosperous farmers, but such an amalgamation of lands as to produce complete confusion of the identities of possession and user.

Essential grazing-lands came under the plough. All incentive was at least temporarily removed, and the Party slave-driver could not be everywhere at once. Thousands of cattle died of starvation or were deliberately slaughtered by the peasants in protest. The initial disasters caused even the Soviet planners to modify original plans and eventually to allow homestead holdings of a limited acreage for the individual peasant to cultivate outside the commonalty. Togan describes the position in Farghana, the richest part of Turkistan. The people were starving, and half the people landless. Draught oxen had perished in thousands. The people were exposed to every form of official tyranny and persecution — imprisonment, plunder, deportation, execution for those that stood out. Draught cattle that remained were seized and tractors brought in and shown to the farmers on condition that they should be used for cotton cultivation only and by those only who would join the *Kolkhoz*. The peasants, robbed of their horses and oxen, found their fate depending on machinery from Russia, using oil which then had also to be imported, and mechanics then also Russian. They were helpless.

Another American, John Scott,[2] has a vivid description of the methods adopted for the 'dekulakization' of a village.

'How did they decide who was to be dekulakized ?' 'Ah, that's a hell of a question to ask a guy that's trying to expiate his crimes in

[1] During the second Five-Year Plan directions were issued to release 1,500,000 workers *annually* from agriculture to industry. This was for the whole Union.

[2] Bib. I, 85. A sincere admirer of the indomitable determination shown by Stalin and others in pushing through industrialization beyond the Urals, Scott also underlines the cost in blood and tears. He worked for five years at Magnitogorsk.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor 474
peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: 661
"So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.'

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since 433
then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds [474]
of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the [562]
Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they

1 [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

subsequent rainfall may be precarious and the owners of flocks 233
and herds often have to move many miles in pursuit of grass. Except about latitude 50 degrees, where the steppe reaches the zone where crops can be grown without irrigation, much of it is bare but for seasonal grazing. Before the Soviet cataclysm the various tribes had recognized ranges which in bad seasons would overlap and lead them into tribal warfare. Or a stronger tribal combination might oust a weaker. The form of life was not unlike that of the sailor in a primitive age, when each ship had to fend for itself and be on watch for enemies or pirates. Endurance, courage, a free and adventurous spirit, counted high in the scale of human values, but, as at sea, there had to be leadership, for without discipline all might perish. It was the same tradition that produced the Khans of the Golden Horde, and later, when the Russians came, gave birth to men such as Abilay and his grandson Kine Sari Khan. The tradition of reverence for the Khan died hard. It is not dead yet.

The tribal background was the same for the mountains as for the steppe, but the hill Uzbeks and Kirghiz, the peoples of mountain Turkdom, had to face climatic conditions of a different order to those upon the steppe. As we know, a large part of Turkistan consists of very high mountains standing over deep valleys, and it is possible for a man to change his climate in a few hours, or at most in a day or two. In Farghana and the Tajik valleys, for instance, the heat in summer is fierce and the lower-lying land, unless irrigated (and that is needed for cropping), burnt brown. But a short journey leads the shepherd to flowery Alpine meadows (*Yaylaks*), where his flocks can pasture at their ease. In the same country in winter the *yaylaks* will be deep under snow, but at that season the skirts of the hills afford a comparatively clement refuge and a good pasture. So the shepherd would move up and down with the seasons. And because the land is so free and large, and not over-crowded, he would have little need to store up winter food; some part of his accustomed range would suffice for his animals right through the year.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries free-born and untrammelled, meeting only with rivalry from their own kind if they should overstep their limits. Their flocks were part of their family and they lived by and on them. For houses they had only tents (*yurts*) and wooden or adobe huts. For their Khans they had a real veneration recorded in epic poetry handed down by minstrels by word of mouth. The way of their life implied that they would be here today and gone tomorrow, and it had always been difficult for authority to control or tax them. If the seasons were kind, a tribe was self-contained and asked little of any man. In bad seasons there might be raiding and local forays. By 1929 the Soviets had not fully succeeded in driving a satisfactory wedge between the Khans and the other tribesmen on the steppe. In the settled areas it had been possible to appeal to the cupidity of the lesser men by redistributing the land of the richer; but on the steppe the redistribution of pasture lands was a most difficult operation, and that of flocks and herds almost impossible. In either case the bond between Khan and free tribesman was too close and intimate to brook official interference of that kind. It was for this reason, that, when Littlepage arrived on the steppe in 1928, he was able to record that the old life and manners of the tribes up to that time remained unchanged. Some of the old loyalties to the chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula or prohibition, the old laws of hospitality, were still in force. At that time the tribal herds were increasing every year and the tribes supplied meat and dairy products ample for themselves and for the dwellers in cities alike. It was this system that the Soviets had to break up, if they needed these men for industry. It was a tough job.

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In a pregnant passage Littlepage[1] states both points of view:

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> The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the Second Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 185-6.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking up their old forms of life and persuading them, even by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more civilized and sensible. On this trip, however (undertaken in 1934), as we pushed along day after day through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. . . . I could see how the life might appeal to them. . . . I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

The job[4] was done not by redistribution, but by the indiscriminate rounding-up of the nomads with their animals. Nearly half those who did not die, men and women, went off to slavery. Three-quarters of the flocks and herds were slaughtered or perished uncared-for in the wilderness. When all was over, nothing remained to be seen on the steppe but once in a while a small village of Russian settlers whose ancestors had pushed into the Kazak country half a century earlier and, very occasionally, a small group of felt huts occupied by miserable-looking down-at-heel Kazaks who had been induced to settle down in cattle-breeding farms.

Lest it be thought that this picture is too highly coloured, let us turn to Soviet sources. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, a cautiously written compilation, relates[1] that, in spite of preventive measures taken by the Central Committee, most serious deviations from the Party line took place in Kazakistan, making it easier for the beys, the Kulaks and the Alash-Orda elements to carry out anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary activity. 'But', it concludes, 'with the help of the Central Committee of the Communist Party these mistakes in the set-up of the *Kolkhoz* system were put right.' We need only turn to the census returns to see how matters were put right, by measures leading to the death of one in three of the Kazak population, whether by mass starvation or by violence. That is the true picture of Soviet colonial imperialism. To allow of due completion of this process it was necessary for the

[1] *G. S. Encycl.* vol. 30, p. 398. Bib. III, 10.

4 [i.e. collectivization -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 661 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233 [VII] The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

research work — all are lagging. In Turkmenia nearly half the *Kolkhozes* at the beginning of 1951 had not the minimum number of sheep, and things were even worse for horned cattle. A search for scapegoats has begun. Bagirov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in Azerbaijan and heresy-hunter of the deviationists who praised the North Caucasian XIXth-century patriot Shamil, entered the lists with an attack on the Minister of Agriculture, Abdullaev. Abdullaev and his deputies Nagyzade and Barbaev — all, by the way, of Azerbaijani stock — are accused by him of nepotism and corrupt practices. The widespread nature of the complaints, extending as they do from the Tienshan to the Black Sea, suggests that the malady is attributable to deeper causes. What can those causes be?

The first and obvious reason is that the policy of destruction of nomadism was unsuited to the climatic conditions of Central Asia and to the aptitudes of the people. In the semi-desert of the steppe, or in the sharp contrasts of mountainside and glen, with all the variations brought about by season and altitude, there exists a stage on which it is difficult, if not impossible, for men or animals to survive unless they adapt themselves to a migratory life. The Soviet agronomists talk of winter storage. But the production of fodder-crops or winter-feed cannot easily replace these rotational pastures. Mountain and steppe pastures do not produce long grass very suitable for hay or silage, even if it could be transported with the seasons, and the irrigated fields, on which it could be produced, are all required for cash or grain crops. In other words, the right economic system for stock-raising, imposed by this climate and its contrasts, is a form of nomadism and nothing else.

All dictators, of course, dislike nomads, so hard to reach and tax, or in any way to discipline or organize. It was so with Reza Shah of Persia, also a dictator, whose main and unfulfilled ambition was to settle all the nomadic tribes of Persia. And inevitably it has been so with the Soviets. It is because autocracy has given way to this irrational dislike and

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 tried to substitute a social and economic organization which defies nature and defeats the tried and tested initiative of the local stock-breeders, that this experiment has been such a ghastly failure. There is need of another Lenin, courageous enough to admit defeat and inaugurate a New Economic Policy for the animals.

233 Of all this there is no mention in the stream of invective that pours from Soviet publicists on this subject. The Party line is quite otherwise. Defects are due, they cry, to insufficient Party-political and educational work among the stock-breeders. Leading workers do not concern themselves with the matter, but leave it to subordinates. The managers of stock *Kolkhozes* do not understand the importance of mechanization. Fodder supplies are not made available — here there is a shadow of the truth; irrigation works have not been reorganized. Winter pasturing is insufficient and badly arranged; the local Soviets in many districts fail to assume responsibility. And hear Bagirov. Great harm had been done, he said, by over-concentration on cotton-growing, and neglect of stock. The total of stock was still below the figure of 1940, and there was negligence in the provision of fodder. Blame was due not only to the Minister and his deputies but to all Party officials. They had themselves neglected the interests of stock-breeders, and had allowed embezzlement. People of doubtful honesty were kept as officials. The Ministry did not check them but actually defended them. The *Sovkhozes* — State farms — were almost as bad as the *Kolkhozes*. And so on — without a hint of the essentials of the art of animal management.

000 In all this there is yet another and more subtle failure. It has been remarked that the beginnings of Soviet stock-rearing in Asiatic Russia were not encouraging, for an iron system failed to allow for that elasticity of adjustment which alone can secure a satisfactory return to the stock-farm. But it is impossible to read these diatribes without concluding that the failure goes deeper even than that. The bond between herdsman and herd, between man and the animal which serves him and which he serves, is in essence a close and individual

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

bond. To get the best out of a dairy the feed for each individual cow must be apportioned and changed in accordance with many varying factors of pasture, season, milk-yield and individual habit. However scientific may be the system of mechanized milking, each animal requires its own treatment at milking time. It is the same with sheep and goats — and even more with horses. No cast-iron rigid rules apply: all animals have their idiosyncrasies. And whatever Marxism-Leninism may decree in the matter of environment as the determinant in human affairs, the world of animals cannot be regulated out of a reliance on heredity. And, we may ask, how can collectivism understand that close bond which unites the Arab with his mare, the Englishman with his dog, the Irishman with his blood-stock, the mahout with his elephant, the Brahmin with the quiet and bountiful cattle which his faith has taught him to adore? How can a mechanized system, which condemns a poet for portraying ideals and even for writing verses containing 'individualistic descriptions of the beauties of nature',[1] grasp the thought of that shepherd who leaves the ninety-and-nine sheep in the wilderness to search for the one sheep that is lost, and, when he has found it, brings it home on his shoulders, rejoicing? The animal is an individualist and gives of its best in response to gentleness and care.

It has been truly said that in the Soviet Union all verbs are conjugated in the future and the millennium is always round the corner; meanwhile for those not of the Party there is toil and trouble, and even for the Party an anxious unrest and never a fulfilment. But, if the human machine at least creaks and groans along somehow, it is because breakdown, complete and utter, is prevented by kindness. Even in a materialistic world, and not least in Russia, there is that undercurrent of kindness between man and man, between woman and child, which smoothes the harsh edges of regulation. In the sphere of animal management, however, there seems no question even

[1] The Tajik poet, Dekhoti, condemned by the Tajik Union of Soviet writers, in their congress in July 1951.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of future tenses; the Soviets themselves admit an utter failure. The animal, mistreated, will not toe the line: it just dies off. And the margin of human kindness that can survive regulation does not suffice to save the animals. It is exhausted on human beings already.

It is hardly fanciful to picture the ideological herdsman in his collective dairy, faced with a cow whose milk-yield is falling off. 'The idiosyncratic beast,' he might say, 'shirking the output which our great Stalin once decreed. Kick her in the udder, or, better still, as punishment reverse the journeys she went on her nomadic days. Let her die of cold on the uplands in winter, or of thirst in the Karakum in the summer heats. That will teach the other cattle, and be a good lesson for the nomads too!'

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

XII

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

I shall follow the arduous trail blazed by the surveyors, who are charting the course of irrigation systems, by the botanists and forestry experts, who are determining the future flora of the desert, and by the zoologists and ornithologists, who are to populate the new forests and gardens with beasts and birds. I shall meet the soil scientists and agronomists engaged in selecting the crops to be grown on the fields and plantations that will alter the face of the desert. My path will be the path of the archaeologists, who are doing their share to help the canal builders by unearthing the secrets of ancient cultures buried for centuries in the sands. . . .

BORIS KRINITSKY, on Turkmenian Canal [1]

816

THE main objective of the two first Five-Year Plans was to create a centre of heavy and light industry in the Urals [2] and beyond, which should be out of reach of any invader, whether Germans coming from the west or Japanese from the east. At an immense cost in human lives and suffering, through scenes of welter and confusion, often sadly lagging but always driven on by a grim determination from above, the great programme staggered through fantastic difficulties during construction until it reached the serious production stage, round about 1935. It was an immense mechanical achievement, and there can be no doubt that it is mainly to Stalin's foresight in building this stronghold that Russia in 1941–2 owed her capacity to stand fast against the German onslaught long enough to receive that unacknowledged margin of assistance from the West which enabled her to survive.

[1] Bib. II, 5. Anthropologists escape notice.

[2] The Urals themselves are just outside Kazakistan, and coincident in the main with Bashkiria, in which is situated Ishimbay. Magnitogorsk is in a narrow strip of RSFSR territory between Kazakistan and Bashkiria. In the industrial picture all this region must be viewed as part of the Central Asian complex.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

464 The sites of heavy industry are, however, in the Urals and in the Kuznetz basin in Central Siberia, both outside the five republics of Turkistan. This great combine, with its iron-ore at Magnitogorsk, and very rich coal deposits in the Kuznetz, supplied the metallurgical foundation of the heavy industry base which was to supplement, and if necessary replace, the old industrial areas of the Ukraine. At Magnitogorsk, next door to the iron-ore mines, were sited the steel-foundries. Also in Bashkiria, not far away, is Ishimbay, the [315] focal point of the region now known as the Second Baku,[1] the wells of which may now be yielding as much as 19 million tons of oil a year. All these, although beyond the northern limit of Kazakistan, are situated in what was once a country of Turkish nomads, and their development was made possible largely by the use of Kazak unskilled labour. As John Scott wrote:[2]

His ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the flat plains of Kazakistan. They had been dimly conscious of the Czarist government; they had had to pay taxes. Reports of the Kirghiz insurrection in 1916 had reached them. They had heard stories of the October Revolution; they even saw the Red Army come and drive out a few rich landlords. They had attended meetings of the Soviet without understanding very clearly what it was all about. Now he was building a blast furnace bigger than any in Europe. He had learned to speak Russian, he read newspapers. His life had changed more in a year than that of his antecedents since the time of Tamerlane.

Some fifty thousand Magnitogorsk workers were directly under GPU supervision. About eighteen thousand de-Kulakized well-to-do farmers, and from twenty to thirty-five thousand criminals — thieves, prostitutes, embezzlers who performed unskilled labour usually under guard — these formed the reservoir of labour power needed to dig foundations — and do other heavy work.

[1] 'The Second Baku' is the propaganda name attached to a vast region stretching from the Volga to the Urals, producing over 11 m. tons of oil in 1950 and expected to reach an output of some 19 m. tons in 1952. Ishimbay is the centre of the most productive wells. Others are at Tuimazi, also in Bashkiria, at Syzran and Buguruslan, near Kuibishev, on the Volga bend, and at Krasnokamsk on the Kama farther north. Most of this was once Golden Horde territory.

[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 16 and 70.

[see cat. 11c, pp. 89-90 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Scott, who shared these labours and saw the heroism and misery of the workers, speaks with understanding of the passionate idealism that sustained the Russians who made the sacrifice. He and they thought of it all as a war, in which the soldiers must be prepared to die. It was, he felt, a society for which it was worth while to shed blood and tears. The expropriated peasants, the political exiles, were a lost tribe, sacrificed on the altar of progress. They would die off, but by their death Socialism would win through to a time when it could function without scrapping blocks of its population every decade. A cruel concept, but there it was.

There was most certainly a great Russian idealism, even a grandeur in this plan and its achievement. But, like the valour of Sparta, it was a heroism that depended for survival on the labour of countless slaves and helots, pitilessly ground down and made to work at menial tasks without thought of human dignity. The helots of Turkish stock had not been born into the ranks of citizens, but they were set in the forefront of the battle to fight a cause that was not theirs. Most of them were inarticulate at the time, but later events were to demonstrate clearly enough that the iron had entered into their souls. Unlike the Russians, these did not believe the papers which told them daily they were the luckiest people in the world. The vast metallurgical combine of the Urals, the centre of the heavy industry of Soviet Asia, was set up just beyond and on the fringe of the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics. Their part in it was only to sweat and groan and die in mine or mill, to be frozen stiff on a scaffold at construction work or burned at a furnace mouth. In their own homeland they did not fare much better.

Beyond the Urals and within the political boundaries of the five republics the industrial lay-out was not quite so intensive and was certainly more varied. There are indeed non-ferrous metals in Turkistan of great importance. North of Balkhash at Kunrad, and in the Jezkazgan area of the northern steppe,

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are situated the largest copper-workings and smelting plants
328 in the Union, and there is another at Almalik close to Tashkent and therefore better placed for transport than the larger mines farther north. At Chimkent is the largest lead centre in the Union, working ore from many quarters, including the Tajik hills. And there are important minerals, said to include mercury, radium and uranium, in the mountains surrounding
433 the Farghana Valley. But, apart from the man-power they can supply to feed the industrial Moloch, the main importance of the five republics in this field is to be found in the production of the raw material for textiles — cotton and silk — and the availability of supplementary sources of power, which include oil, coal and water-generated electricity. The production of the last, hydro-electric power, is tied up in the minds of Soviet engineers with large-scale irrigation, and this in turn with transport, both by waterway and railway. In all these spheres there has been ambitious planning, and forecasts are often extravagant and even grandiose. In almost all cases it is hard to disentangle prospective targets from actual results, publicity media being regularly used to give an impression that projects which have not in fact left the draughtsman's table are on the point of realization in the field. Indeed it can fairly be said that almost any account of planned development in Soviet Russia, industrial or agricultural, calls for question on this ground. Usually the more poetic the vision of the publicist, the less advanced will be found to be the execution of the work. Another tendency is to claim as the triumph of the Soviet genius works which were in fact conceived and carried to an advanced stage by Tsarist engineers. This is particularly apparent in the field of railway works.

185 It is convenient to view industrial development in this region under four main heads:

(*a*) power, including oil, coal and hydro-electric;
(*b*) light industry, mainly cotton and silk textiles;
(*c*) irrigation;
(*d*) transport, railway and waterway.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Railway Network 1952
Broad Gauge 5′ 0″

From Soviet sources (very contradictory)

Working line with centre or junction

In final stages of construction

International frontier

Boundaries of Republics

N.B. Trans-Siberian, Central Asian, Trans-Aral, and most of Farghana network, constructed by Tsars; and Turk-Siberian, planned and surveyed by Tsars.

OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MAC)

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496



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496

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 These four overlap, as for instance in the case of irrigation and hydro-electric works, or irrigation and navigation canals, both of which Russian engineers like to set side by side. They do not by any means give an exhaustive analysis — the copper and lead mines and works above mentioned are instances of this — and at many points they have to be considered in relation to agricultural development also. But they do provide some general idea of the all-over Soviet plan for the development of Turkistan. In broad terms this may be said to be to continue the Tsarist policy of using Central Asian products to make Russia self-sufficient in the raw materials of the finer textiles (cotton and silk); to improve on that by bringing the mills to the fields in order to manufacture on the spot; largely to increase the area under cash-crops by irrigation; to use the irrigation canals to aid in the supply of power; to increase also to the limit the fuel sources of power available within these territories; and finally to provide the rail transportation necessary for bringing the whole agricultural and industrial complex within the all-Union economic system.[1]

496 I mention transportation by rail last because the Soviet record in the matter of railway construction has been remarkably unimpressive, and one has the impression that the provision of enough and efficient transportation links does not precede or synchronize with, but follows, developments in other fields, seriously handicapping the prospect of a balanced economy. Only one really important trunk railway is known to have been fully completed in Turkistan during the thirty-five years of the Soviet era, and that is the Turk-Sib. Even that was planned and surveyed under the Tsars, and but for the Revolution would almost certainly have been put through much earlier than 1930, which was the year in which the Soviets with a great fanfare announced its eventual completion. The Tsarist engineers completed the Trans-Caspian (or Central Asian) Railway in the eighties of last century and the

[1] A table of a few targets set under the fourth Five-Year Plan which ended in 1950 follows this chapter. The targets for the most part are said to have been reached, and the Soviets have now moved on to a fifth Plan. For rail-network see map opposite.

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia R L7

496 Trans-Aral line up the Sir Darya by the end of 1905. They also laid down and completed the main network of the very important branches to Khojent, Kokand and Andijan in the Farghana Valley, and the line to the Afghan frontier at Kushk. Soviet propagandists, conscious of this damaging comparison, seek to disarm criticism by saying that only Soviet energy could fulfil the Tsarist plans; but in making this claim they overlook the fine pioneer work done by their predecessors. In a larger field it is remarkable that it was the Tsars, not the Soviets, who built railways to the Pacific. The Soviets frequently announce the construction of a second 'Relief' Siberian line farther to the south, but so far only bits of this exist on the ground. It is indeed remarkable how Soviet enterprise has been found wanting in this sphere.

There are two good examples of the other tendency to confuse prospect with performance. In April 1940[1] it was stated in the Soviet press that a new Oxus Valley line — this too, be it noted, a Tsarist scheme — was to have been completed northward from Charjui as far as Urgench in Khorezm some time in that year. But later notices establish that this important trunk (designed, it seems, eventually to link up with the main European system north of the Caspian) was only begun, much less completed, as lately as October 1947. In the words of the panegyrist:[2]

> One of the great railway-building feats of all time is being carried out in Soviet Asia. A few months ago the restless wind was the only intruder in this wilderness of shifting sands. Then one October day, an army of 70,000 people crossed the horizon, making for the Amu Darya River. They had come to carry out a task laid down in the Five-Year Plan — to build a railway from the Transcaspian Line to the Aral Sea, from Chardzhou to Kungrad. The idea of building a railway across the desert is not new. Attempts were made before the Revolution in 1899 and again in 1913 — to survey a route; but, like other great projects, the Karakum scheme was destined to be realized only in Soviet times. Soviet life in all its cheerful busy variety has invaded the desert. In the evening when the moon rises and the sandhills turn blue, cinema operators

[1] *Pravda* (3rd Apr. 1940).

[2] Bib. II, 10.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia R21

set up their portable projectors, professors give science lectures, hundreds of newspaper editors get busy in their offices among the dunes, and brilliant companies of musicians and singers entertain the multitude. . . . By 1950 the Amu Darya Valley will be transformed. 496

It is clear that an important railway of which the completion was forecast in 1940 was not even started until seven years later, and was due for completion on a rough estimate as much as ten years later. This line may not be finished even now (1953). A recent manual on Uzbekistan [1] includes it on sketch-maps as having been constructed as far as Kungrad in the Amu Darya delta, but a less convincing text suggests that the work is far from complete. This line will be of the greatest importance, if the Soviets mean to realize their vast project for a Turkmenian Canal with a headworks at Takhya Tash in the delta.

Another case in which promise and performance are not equated is that of the Mointy–Chu line. The most important new railways actually constructed by the Soviets in Turkistan during the Five-Year plans are those leading to Karaganda, their coal centre, with branches to their two main copper regions north of Balkhash and round Jezkazgan. These had to be constructed if the coal and copper were to be worked at all. (They include an important branch, destined in due course to become a link in a Relief Siberian Line, from Akmolinsk to Kartali, near Magnitogorsk.) In July 1946 Kovalev, the Central Minister of Railways, announced that the Balkhash line was being extended from Mointy to join up with the Turk-Sib line at Chu, so providing a fourth through-trunk connecting Tashkent with the outside world. But it was not until 1952 that news came through of a single special train passing over this line to mark the occasion of the Kazakistan Congress. The line has now gone back to the list of construction works for further attention to the permanent way. In the case of the Oxus Valley line the reasons for delay may be sought in the impact of the war, although this did

[1] Bib. III, 26. Vitkovich.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 not prevent large-scale construction in Turkistan in certain spheres. Delays over the Mointy–Chu line must be attributed to other causes. Whatever the actual cause in any given case, it is possible to affirm with certainty first that it has become a habit for engineers and announcers alike to make a point of confusing blueprints with actual construction, and secondly that Soviet railway construction in Turkistan up to the present time has not added very materially to the network which existed twenty years ago.

Shortcomings and delays of this kind are worth mentioning, for the picture must be seen in light and shade. But the general impression would be as true, namely, that the five republics have now become, for their population if not for their size, a highly industrialized area. Statistics, if nothing else, show something like one in three of the population as
316 living in towns and centres. Karaganda, the centre of the coal-
135 field in Kazakistan, has grown from nothing to 200,000. Like Magnitogorsk in earlier days, it is in fact a concentration camp of helot labour, producing over sixteen million tons of coal a year and qualifying as the third most productive coal-field in the Union, the next after the Don and Kuznetz basins. There are large coal deposits in the Angren Valley close to Tashkent, well sited to serve the industries of the capital and near the nodal point of the railway network. There is also
315 coal in the Tajik foothills. Ishimbay, the heart of the Second Baku in the Urals, already mentioned, is not far outside the five republics and within Bashkiria, while in the republics are three most important groups of oil-wells. The first is in the Emba area (in Kazakistan north-east of the Caspian), with the fields round Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, the third most productive field in the Union. Next is the Nebit Dagh field close to Krasnovodsk, followed by various smaller wells in the Farghana Valley at Kim-Shorsu, at Yarkurgan and Chimion and also near Andijan. Others find mention in enthusiastic articles in press and encyclopedia alike. Some 1950 targets of production — all realized — are given in the selective table appended to this chapter.

[See each vol, p213 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

As might be expected, cotton and silk production is the 231
peculiar pride of Turkistan. The Farghana Valley, we know, 248
has the ideal climate and the water both for cotton cultivation, and for the growth of mulberry-trees[1] for the silk-worm. The same is true of the other southern oases, watered by the Chirchik (Tashkent), Zarafshan and Kashka Darya, and also of the Vakhsh river irrigation in Tajikistan. In the early years cotton cultivation was in danger of becoming a monoculture, and more than once brought the country into terrible famine conditions. The figures of the fourth Five-Year Plan, if reliable, suggest that, even in Uzbekistan, there has now been a considerable reversion from commercial cropping to grain, and, if so, the rural economy is not so brittle as many have supposed. The great Soviet achievement has been to bring the mills into Turkistan and process the crops locally. The 288
largest cotton-processing establishment is the Stalin Textile Combine and Institute at Tashkent, while for silk there is a combine at Margilan, said to be the largest in the world, and integrating all processes from the unwinding of the cocoon to the weaving of the final material. Woven silk is in great demand for parachutes.

IRRIGATION

The aim to free Russia from all dependence on foreign 000
cotton and then to build heavy stock-piles is bound up with the Soviet policy of irrigation. Irrigation in its turn is linked both with waterways and (more important) with the production of hydro-electric power. In some respects, on the face of them, the Soviet plans for development under these heads are more imaginative even than the metallurgical projects realized in the Urals before the War. For the claim is that they will turn a great desert into a smiling countryside, and even divert waters destined by nature for the Arctic into the Turanian basin. But the science of the irrigation engineer

[1] *Morus alba*, known locally by the Persian word *tut*.

2: Carroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 is far from being a technical one to be applied successfully from a central draughtsman's office: it is a form of public works which to command success requires of its professor a sort of sixth sense, a feeling after the countryside, the climate, the lie of the land, the local native knowledge acquired by experience, the queer things water does both above and under the ground. The successful irrigator must be more than an expert scientist; his science has become an art. To see how and where he can give life to desert lands he needs some of those intuitive qualities of genius that distinguish the architect from the builder, the landscape-gardener from the tractor-driver. There have been men like this in the Panjab, Egypt, the Tennessee Valley; they have gained great experience which with wisdom could be turned to account by the Russians in Asia also. Such men treat water like a precious fluid that must be humoured. They know, for instance, that to preserve its power to grant fertility water must have its outlets as well as its infall.

312 The beginnings of Russian irrigation in Turkistan were not particularly auspicious. In all the piedmontane tracts there existed before the Russians came an indigenous system of irrigated channels, constructed with primitive tools and maintained by the joint labours of the village communities. The skill going to the construction and maintenance of such systems is well described in such books as Holdich's *Indian Borderland* and *Gates of India*; it was considerable. In all these countries water is more important than land, and whoever controls the water has power over the land. The method by which this power was acquired by the Russians has been described, and it constitutes one of the most definite steps taken to give effect to the new economic policy. In a land dependent on artificial watering the State thus secures a more absolute control over the peasant than can be the case where fertility depends on rainfall.

241 In such lands intensive cultivation of small-holdings is the
312 rule. (Incidentally, intensive cultivation is akin to gardening, and of all types of agriculture the least suited to collective

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mechanization.) The Russians, coming fresh to the science 241
of tropical agriculture, believed that the native use of wooden 312
ploughs and shares instead of the iron plough implied a primitive condition. They could not estimate the value of the intensive cultivation that had gone on for thousands of years in the country. Togan tells us[1] how they tried to teach the unirrigated system of agriculture, as if the Turkistan people in their ignorance were incapable of understanding what it meant. They aimed not at getting a good crop out of a small-holding, but at cultivating large areas in order to get a large crop. Even Nalivkin, a former Governor of Farghana, had to admit that the Russian conquest had brought with it the cessation of intensive cultivation.

There was a time when even the Orsk and Emba areas north of the Caspian used to be cultivated by irrigation. There is evidence that in 1920 irrigation in that area was still being maintained to some extent, though the tradition was even then disappearing as the nomad Kazak inhabitants were driven south and agriculture in the Sir Darya basin decayed. Two Russians, Asmolovsky and Yusuf Karamshev, observed that, although the Sir Darya Kazaks used old primitive ploughs, it was for that reason that the land ploughed up with them retained its moisture and was more productive than that worked with the Russian plough. But there was one useful [177] thing the people of Turkistan did learn from the Russians — how to mow with the scythe. Men like Barthold at that time issued warnings about the new methods and from the start were pessimistic about the attempt to cultivate the Mirza Chōl[2] (the desert near Jizak west of the point where the Sir Darya issues from the basin of Farghana). Never in history had these parts been farmed, although they were close to the river, and this was a case for learning from the experience of the native population, who must have had good reason for leaving these lands alone. Why not revive with the quickening

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 291-3. [see ad, 116, pp 7-8 -- Analyst]

[2] The *Mirza Chōl* is a name also applied to the Betpak Dala, north of the Chu-Talash area.

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

241 water the lands where there existed traces of former irrigation,
312 as, for instance, the disused canal system of Gavkhore on the right bank of the Amu Darya opposite Khorezm? But no: Barthold was a mere professor, who had made for himself a picture of the country from 'Sart' sources. The Russian engineers were convinced of their wisdom, and money was devoted to schemes which, far from turning the land into a garden, in a few years led to water-logging, no measures having been taken to prevent the land turning into a morass, a home of reeds and waterfowl and a source of malaria.

In September 1922 [says Togan], I passed by the lower side of the canals in Mirza Chōl, and a Kazak showed me how the poplars planted by the Russians were drying up, and the surface of the land, cultivated a few years before with care and trouble, was now covered with saltpetre.[1]

653 The Tsarist irrigation engineers seem to have had little
312 conception of the dangers of water-logging and saltpetre which arise in a flat riverain country under a tropical sun, when water is brought to it and the fall is insufficient for natural drainage. The remedy lies in the provision of artificial drainage by digging channels to lower the watertable, but this is not always easy and it is very expensive. Even in their weirs and dams the Russian engineers set their bricks much too loosely, as compared with the old brick walls of indigenous canals, which had held for centuries. An effort by the Grand Duke Nicholas at the end of the XIXth century to construct a perennial irrigation system on the Amu Darya in Khorezm resulted only in cutting across and destroying the old indigenous inundation channels. The project was conceived as one in line with British irrigation works in the Panjab and in Egypt, but it is evident that the Russian engineers of that time had much to learn both as regards original canal construction and the remodelling of old works.

The Soviets have given great attention to irrigation works in Central Asia, and have certainly profited from the mistakes of their predecessors. Although in this case also it is hard to

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 295.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

disentangle achievement from expansive visions existing only 653 in the planner's mind, there is no doubt that in Farghana, in 312 the Chu–Talash area, and also on the Zarafshan and the Vakhsh, much good work has been brought to a conclusion. The best-known completed works are:

(*a*) The Stalin Great Farghana Canal, 270 km. long.
(*b*) The Mikoyan, or Northern Farghana, Canal, 165 km. long.
(*c*) The Andreev, or Southern Farghana, Canal, 108 km. long.
(*d*) The Katta Kurgan and Verkhno-Bukhara Reservoirs on the Zarafshan.
(*e*) The Great Chu Canal, 270 km. long.
(*f*) The Vakhsh Canal.

The construction of the first was widely advertised, with due 653 praise allotted to the 160,000 *Kolkhoz* members who dug it 312 out, and completed it in forty-five days. The availability of 464 *corvée* labour of this kind, which can be used in the off-season for irrigation work, must greatly aid the authorities in their task, not only on construction but on maintenance and silt-clearance. The official case is that a considerable percentage of all *Kolkhoz* workers in canal areas is used for such duties, and the labourers while absent from their homes receive their fair share of *Kolkhoz* produce. That may work in the rich and smiling Farghana Valley. But how is the case with those transported to dig in the wastes of the deserts? The logistical effort alone needed to feed armies of workers in the Karakum must be colossal.

It has been suggested that construction of the Stalin-Farghana Canal called out nearly one million labourers and that there was suffering on a large scale. Yet, in the face of all criticism, there remains an impression that this in itself was a great work, which has added much to the fertility of an already productive region. Systems of government change, but an irrigation work remains.

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander 653 312

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Since the war there has been planning on a vast gander
653 scale. The first two schemes which follow may be called
812 'local' in the sense that, in appearance at least, they are not
185 part of a continental linked project dealing in the waters of more than one river. These two projects are:

(i) *The Karakum Canal*

The project was an old one, but it was revived in 1945, and ratified in 1947. The main channel is to be some 350 miles long and to irrigate nearly half a million acres. The headworks were to be somewhere near Kerki on the Oxus left bank, and the main objective is to increase the cultivated area watered by the Murghab and Tejen rivers in the Merv and Serakhs oases. Work was stated to have been started in 1949.

A work of this kind, skirting the Kopet Dagh line of mountains which forms the Persian frontier, must cross the natural drainage lines of the country, and involve heavy bridging or siphoning and much danger of being breached by floods, to say nothing of being choked by sand-drifts. Without any local knowledge it is possible to affirm that this canal must take time to construct and will be expensive to maintain. Confidence in the Soviet engineers is not increased by loose talk that the canal will be used for shipping. Navigation and irrigation are ill partners.

(ii) *The Uzbek, or Upper Oxus, Canal*

This project was planned by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in May 1947. It is a very large scheme for a canal 500 miles long to supplement the irrigation at the tail of the Kashka Darya and the Zarafshan systems — among the best cotton-lands in Central Asia — by water from the Oxus. The project was described at some length by a spokesman of the Central USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The plan envisages the construction of a headworks at Kelif on the Oxus right bank, where the river finally emerges from the hills into the plain. At this point the right bank rests on a spur of the Hissar Range, a rocky eminence which canalizes the channel

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

and prevents it from shifting as it is always doing in its course 653
through the plains lower down. On the face of it then the 185
site is well chosen for the headworks of a perennial canal. 312
At this point a dam described as 6 km. long and 20 metres high was to be constructed. For the next 100 km. the main canal would run along the skirt of the Hissar Range, passing on its way a point named Akyar where it would drop 34 metres, the fall being used to establish a hydro-electric power station. The canal would then swing northward to cross the Kaskha and Zarafshan rivers and augment the water-supply in both. The forecast spoke of opening up new irrigation to the extent of 1·2 million hectares, or nearly 3 million acres, and the estimated cost was 7000 million roubles. No date of completion was named.

This project, like the last, involves cutting across the natural drainage lines of the country, and the upper part of the main channel, skirting the great chain of the Hissar mountains (rising at one point to over 15,000 feet) will necessarily have to withstand occasional floods of extreme violence. Further, the crossing of the Kashka and Zarafshan basins at a point presumably not far distant from the debouchment of those rivers into the plains will demand engineering and constructional skill of no mean order.

The plan calls for the establishment on the falls of hydro-electric generating stations of an aggregate capacity of 1 million kilowatts, equal to about ten times that of the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon.

The spokesman said that these two canals together were expected to take nearly 2000 cubic metres per second [1] from the Amu Darya. On the assumption that each is designed to take 1000 cubic metres, each of these canals would be about twice as large as any of the great works constructed in the Panjab. This 2000 cubic metres volume is quoted as taking about half the total discharge of the river even in July and

[1] To convert cubic metres into the normal British engineer's standard of water-volume, viz., cubic feet per second, an adequate rule of thumb is to multiply by thirty. 1000 c.m.s. would therefore be equivalent to about 30,000 'cusecs'.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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August, the flood months owing to summer melting of snow in Oxus' 'high mountain cradle in Pamere'. A draught on the river of this order must of course put in jeopardy the irrigation down-stream in the Khorezm area, but the spokesman met this by explaining that three reservoirs were to be constructed to store 6000 million cubic metres in the seasons of low demand.

These two projects for irrigation from the Oxus, great as they are, pale into insignificance when set against an immense integrated plan, described as 300 times the size of the T.V.A.[1], for the application of the latest sciences to the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Amu Darya basins in the connected fields of irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power and afforestation. Here we are concerned with the Amu Darya only, but the plans announced cover much the same ground on the European rivers. Over the whole field the planners speak in terms of transforming an area of two million square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The rivers are to be dammed at a number of points, the dams forming reservoirs many miles across; power stations of great capacity are to be established at these barrages with irrigation canals taking off at the same points; ocean-going steamers are seen as penetrating to the lakes through locks; and finally belts of forest, three miles wide (quite modest this), are to be planted in the valleys 'to keep them damp and on the watersheds to let the run-off from melting snows down gently'. In the Karakum, an awkward place for labour, the forests are to be sown with seed broadcast from aircraft. Finally, the suggestion is that, to avoid a fall in the Caspian Sea following the diversion of rivers to irrigation, waters flowing to the Arctic are to be impounded to compensate the southern rivers. A presumably serious commentator[1A] has written that it is possible that ultimately no water from Siberia will go to the Arctic, and it has even been suggested that the consequent greater salinity of the Arctic Ocean may reduce the size of the Polar ice-cap.

[1] Tennessee Valley Authority.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning more particularly to that part of the scheme to be derived from the waters of the Amu Darya, to be called the Turkmenian Canal, the same commentator[1A] stated: 653 185 312

> The scientists told me a great deal about how they had planned the scheme for the Karakum desert. . . . They are chosen to cover the whole range of interests . . . there are hydrologists, navigation experts, electrical experts, every kind of engineer, soil scientists, zoologists, botanists, geologists, there are also geo-physicists and seismologists . . . besides all these there are the archaeologists, who are considered a very important part of the scheme.

In the presence of this battalion of experts from Academies of Sciences, with some conflict of interest (one would think) even in Russia, the genie of the scheme will surely sigh for one good practical engineer.

The Turkmenian Canal itself was announced in September 1950 in a decree of the Central Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is nothing short of an attempt to realize the old dream for the redirection of the Oxus back into its ancient course to the Caspian Sea by means of a canal 700 miles long starting from Takhya Tash on the left bank close to Nukus, skirting the Sarikamish depression (which, being even deeper than the Caspian, would take too long to fill up), and thence along the old bed of the Özboy across the middle Karakum and through the Balkhan gap into the sea near Krasnovodsk.[1] It is not unamusing to reflect that this also was an idea in the minds of Tsarist engineers more than fifty years ago. Curzon, writing in 1889, mentions that as a navigation project it had even occurred to the fertile mind of Peter the Great, and quotes the scornful saying of the German engineer Kiefert referring to the project, when at the height of its favour in the seventies of last century, as the great Central Asian sea-serpent. But it seems clear that a decision has now been taken for a canal to irrigate 1,300,000 hectares or about 3,000,000 acres, and to carry three hydro-electric generating stations, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts (each about equivalent to the Shannon Station in Ireland). Work was to begin in

[1A] Professor J. Bernal, F.R.S., Bib. II, 1.

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 23-26 -- Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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1951 and is scheduled for completion in 1957. The official spokesman[1] stated:

> The idea of bringing life to the desert by turning the course of the Amu Darya towards the Caspian Sea originated long ago. Yet Tsarist Russia was incapable of carrying it out. It was on the initiative of Stalin that the Government decision was taken to revive the desert and fulfil the age-old dreams of the people of Central Asia. The special characteristic of the present scheme is that the waters will be used in their entirety for irrigation and will not be discharged into the Caspian Sea as proposed in all preceding projects. All remaining canals of the world, including those of America, Egypt and India, are considerably shorter. . . . Krasnovodsk will receive an abundant supply of water [is this inconsistent with the special characteristic?]. The new irrigation construction is an important link in the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature. The Caspian desert plain will soon be converted into a marvellous flourishing land.

The project is linked with the railway constructional plan already mentioned for a line northward from Charjui to Kungrad along the Oxus left bank, that described as one of the great railway building feats of all time.[2]

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In face of the admissions of short supply in the river which will follow the completion of the first two Amu Darya projects above mentioned, it is not easy to see how the Takhya Tash headworks — down-stream of Kelif and Kerki — would find sufficient volume to irrigate the whole of the Karakum from Khorezm to the Caspian. Can it be that this grandiose project for restoring the prosperity of the days before 1573, the year when the Oxus turned to the Aral Sea, is alternative and not supplementary to the Karakum project? It is possible that the surveys may have convinced the Soviet engineers of the difficulties of constructing a canal along the skirts of the Kopet Dagh, with all the dangers of breaching by flood, and induced them to have second thoughts. It is not inconceivable that they, or their political superiors, may have been influenced by the romance which appeals so greatly to the local bourgeois patriots, that of turning the Oxus back

[1] Deputy Minister, Cotton Cultivation USSR.

[2] Bib. II, 10.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to the course it followed four centuries ago (or, as the Soviets have it, in the Tertiary Period). By so reversing history they might in a new age regain for this land its old prosperity.

There is the further possibility that the Soviet engineers really plan to compensate the Oxus by diversion of one or more of the Arctic rivers. Some years ago, publicity was given to a project[1] sponsored by the engineer J. Davidov, for no less than the re-routing to the Aral and the Caspian Seas of a great part of the waters now flowing to the Arctic in the Ob and Yenisei. The Tobol, Ishim and Irtish are confluents of the Ob, the first two having their source in northern Kazakistan and the last just across the frontier in Jungaria. Part I of Davidov's scheme was for the building of an immense barrage to dam these rivers close to their point of confluence with the Ob; and so impound them in a vast marshy lake, which would be drained by a canal passing through the Turgay gap into the Aral basin. As with the projected Turkmenian Canal, the water would be conveyed thence by the Özboy to the Caspian. Part II of Davidov's plan would consist in the extension of the barrage to impound the upper waters of the Yenisei also. The scale of this planning, and indeed its reality also, can be estimated from the fact that the author speaks, in terms of a barrage 80 metres high to impound a lake 250,000 sq. kilometres in area, to be drained by a canal which would pour 250 cubic *kilometres* of water annually from the Arctic rivers into the Oxus (the annual volume of the Oxus he estimates at 56 cubic *kilometres*). The commanded area for irrigation is given as an aggregate of 240,000 sq. kilometres, and the hydro-electric capacity as 24·5 milliards kilowatts. There is a further suggestion to use these canals for navigation. If the Turkmenian Canal is ever constructed, it must certainly be correlated with upstream demands on the Oxus, and it is probable that some compensatory project will have to be worked out. How far this would be possible by the diversion of waters from an Arctic destination is an interesting point, but scarcely likely to be resolved by planning or commentary such as that of

[1] Bib. I, 59, Leprince-Ringuet, pp. 117-20.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Davidov. Criticism may fairly be directed not only to the grandiose conception itself but to the point that an effort is being made to do too many things at once. Is the object navigation, or is it power, or is it irrigation? Practical engineers know that irrigation and navigation do not go easily as partners. Again, the plain of Turkistan has a declination as gradual as that of any plain in the world. Rivers are nature's drainage-lines, and their damming in flat country is apt to lead to serious water-logging, the more so perhaps when they drain to inland seas. The danger of saltpetre is great under a tropical sun. A great accession of water into the Turanian basin might make of the desert a saline marsh less favourable to agriculture and health than the present sands of the Karakum. It is not unfair to suggest that he would be an optimistic conservator of forests who relied on the establishment of *Saksaul*[1] plantations in the desert by means of seed scattered from the air. Again, what of the towns, villages and lands to be submerged under these man-made seas? And lastly, good sites for the production of hydro-electric power are hard to find in a vast plain, where volume may not altogether compensate for lack of fall.

Later evidence of progress must be awaited. Meanwhile, although fears may well be liars, the enthusiasm of Soviet spokesmen when looking to their targets provokes a questioning voice, and it is well to reflect that efficient canal construction calls for the balanced mind which will weigh profit with loss, advantage with danger. One of the perils has been indicated — that of water-logging. Another is inadequate provision for balancing the conflicting demands of the up-stream and the down-stream irrigator on one river-system.

In a thirsty land which is watered by artificial means the day-to-day anxiety of the peasant is bound up with the turn of the water which means life. With a system of individual holdings water disputes arouse passions leading inevitably to violence and bloodshed, and on the administration of the

[1] *Haloxylon ammodendron*, the most widely distributed of the Sand-flora of these deserts.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L1

water-turns, efficient or otherwise, depends the farmers' whole life, whether for good or ill. The collectivization of farming into *Kolkhozes* in hundreds may enlarge this anxiety by creating a new sort of tribalism to take the place of the older one, but it cannot remove it. And what has been described here as the cantonization of Turkistan has introduced a kind of administrative tribalism at an even higher level. As we have seen, the source of the Farghana irrigation, the Sir Darya, starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence into Tajikistan, thence again once more into another part of Uzbekistan, and finally out into Kazakistan.

On any canal the balancing against supply of the demand of the up-stream and the down-stream irrigator calls for careful and continuous adjustment. When the demands are voiced not by individuals or even by communities, but by separate, nominally sovereign, constituent republics in a federation, harmony could never be secured merely by consultation between equals. An over-riding authority would be essential. And, even then, decisions would have to be made on paper and on much too high a level to allow of the day-to-day adjustments needed to direct the living water — always a variant factor — to flow, where needed, on the thirsty crop — itself also a variant with the season and the type of land. It is not enough to say, as the Soviets do, that the republics operate their irrigation canals jointly, and the flow of the rivers is controlled mechanically on a proportional basis. It is the dead mechanism of a system claiming even to control the living waters in the streams which oppresses the spirit beyond endurance.

WATER-POWER

We have seen how all these irrigation plans go hand in hand with hydro-electric projects designed to supply an alternative source of power so that the fuel resources of Central Asia may be used elsewhere. The geographical formation of the country, with vast mountain systems set

against a low-lying plain, is favourable to the harnessing of a great reserve of water-power, draining from the everlasting snows and glaciers of the Tienshan and convertible into electricity.

Propagandists are apt to confuse figures of capacity of power stations (in kilowatts) with those of output (in kilowatt hours *per annum*), and there is a notable inclination to brandish the latter with the object presumably of impressing the reader with astronomical cyphers. It is easier to stick to capacity figures.

A useful yardstick in estimating hydro-electric development in Turkistan is available in the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon in Ireland. The capacity of this station, working with one turbine in reserve, is a little under 100,000 kilowatts on a fall of 28½ metres with a maximum volume discharge of 250 cubic metres a second. Although of course the Shannon is a very small stream in comparison with the great rivers of Turkistan, the Shannon hydro-electric station has several points of interest to the student of Central Asia. Central Ireland is a flat country, and it is not easy to secure sufficient fall for the efficient generation of hydro-electric power. The lack of fall must be made up by a greater volume, and that is not available on the small rivers of these islands. The result has been that the Shannon Station has by no means fulfilled the hopes of its German designers. It does not supply all Ireland with electric power, and it has been necessary to develop an additional station in Dublin, deriving power from steam, not water, with a capacity of 118,000 kilowatts to carry the present loads. In other words water-power in Ireland does not carry even half the load.

377 If we neglect Davidov's figures[1] and turn to a recent forecast of capacity to be reached by the stations in Soviet Central Asia at the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, we find an aggregate figure of 1,000,000 kilowatts or about ten times the capacity of the Irish station. The largest stations now working are at Farkhad at the approaches to the Hungry Steppe (Mirza Chöl) on the Sir Darya, where a 1148 foot-long dam

1 [See cat. 116, p. 207 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

has been erected and the longest derivation canal in the Union 377
has been excavated. Work was begun in 1943, and the station is supposed to have started to operate in 1948. The capacity is stated to be 200,000 kilowatts. The next largest is on the Chirchik and Boz-Sir, near Tashkent, where there is a series of linked stations, six of them finished in 1945 and four more in 1947. Others are planned. The capacity stated is 150,000 kilowatts. There is also planning for the construction of a [185] series of generating stations on canal falls on the Upper Oxus–Zarafshan project, to reach an aggregate capacity of 1,000,000 kilowatts, and for three similar stations of an aggregate capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, also on canal falls on the great project for a Turkmenian Canal along the old Amu-Darya bed of the Özboy. There are, moreover, numerous small power stations, listed in hundreds, on mountain torrents and streams, and also on canal falls in Farghana and elsewhere in the piedmontane area. The largest recently mentioned seem to be in Tajikistan on the Varzob and Vakhsh rivers, 13,000 and 10,000 kilowatts respectively.

The impression derived is that the Soviet engineers have two techniques: the first for the establishment of large stations at canal headworks or on canal falls, and the second for the dispersal of large numbers of small local plants on mountain torrents.

Now, on a general view, the terrain of Turkistan should be ooo
admirably suited for the harnessing of water-power in the east where the mountains merge into the plains. But it is unlikely to be so favourable well out in the plains, where the declivity is very small in the direction of the Caspian and Aral Seas. Canal falls do not normally provide good sites for large stations, the fall being insufficient except in favourable circumstances. The plains of Turkistan are flatter than central Ireland. It may be that the great volume of the Turkistan rivers will make up for any insufficient fall. The discharge of the Oxus in flood may be anything up to 10,000 cubic metres a second, but water for a generating plant must be canalized in a derivation channel. Some scepticism is

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 justifiable. Nor is it ordinarily economic to transmit power over very long distances by cable.

SUMMARY

311 The industrial picture of Turkistan emerging from all this has certain very distinguishable features and falls into clear geographical compartments.

(*a*) There is one area which industry, agriculture and population all mark out as the strategic heart of Turkistan. This is the relatively small ellipse centred on the Farghana basin, including its outlying glacis with Tashkent to the north-west, Samarkand to the west and the Vakhsh valley with Stalinabad to the south. This is the heart of the oasis country where the large towns are grouped, whence comes most of the cotton and the silk, and where also are found valuable deposits of oil and coal, many non-ferrous metals and rare minerals.

(*b*) The area in the middle of Kazakistan holds the third greatest coal-fields in the Union as well as the largest copper deposits and smelting works — Karaganda, Kunrad, Jezkazgan.

(*c*) The Emba area, north-east of the Caspian, with fields at Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, is the third most important oil producer in the Union. First of course is Baku, and second the Ural fields round Ishimbay, both in territory once inhabited by Turkish peoples, but outside the five Central Asian republics.

(*d*) The port at Krasnovodsk with the oilfields at Nebit Dagh.

(*e*) The string of extensive piedmontane oases north of the Tienshan, viz. Alma Ata, Frunze (Pishpek), Jambul (Aulie Ata) and Chimkent.

All these are situated on an exposed flank, in peripheral territories annexed to the Empire and relatively close to an international frontier. The impression is one of a country as large as the main block of Europe but with industry and agriculture concentrated into quite a few well-marked areas, defined either by the rivers or by discoveries of minerals.

1950 TARGETS[1]

	Population 1939		Heavy Industry (Millions of Tons)			Textiles (Millions of Metres)			Crops (Millions of Hectares *)	
	Total	'Native'	Coal	Oil	Steel	Cotton	Silk	Woollen	Cash	Grain
Kazakistan	6,146,000	3·09	16·4 (Karaganda)	1·2 † (Emba)	0·07	19·0	Nil	2·9	0·34	5·34
Kirghizia	1,459,000	0·88	1·6	0·08	Nil	0·7	0·92	0·5	0·11	0·7
Tajikistan	1,485,000	1·22	0·44	0·06	Nil	18·0	5·1	Nil	0·18	0·63
Turkmenia	1,254,000	0·83	0·06	1·1 (Nebit Dagh)	Nil	22·0	0·83	0·82	0·16	0·16
Uzbekistan	6,282,000	4·98	1·1 (Angren)	1·1	0·1	161·0	14·0 (Samarkand and Margilan)	Nil	1·13	1·38
Total	16,626,000	11·00	19·6 = 7·8% of USSR total of 250 m. tons	3·54 = 9·9% of USSR total of 35·4 m. tons	0·17 USSR total given as 25 m. tons	220·7 = 4·7% of USSR total of 4·686 m. metres	20·85 USSR total not ascertained	4·22 USSR total not ascertained	1·92 of which 1·35 m. is under cotton = 80·4% of USSR total	8·21 = 7·7% of USSR total of 105·8 m. hectares

* 1 hectare = 2·5 acres approx.

† Does not include Ural oilfields at Ishimbay, producing in 1950 at the rate of, say, 7 million tons a year.

1 [i.e. of Fourth Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R.L.2 [P.213]
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433

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

These processes have altered the complexion of all social questions, and gone far to bring the Uzbeks and Kazaks and the remaining peoples along the road laid down by Stalin in the early days. No Central Asian patriot can leave them out of his account.

There is now an urban proletariat, not organized on the ancient guild systems of Bukhara, but on a strict Soviet model. The change is in fact no less than that brought about in the fields by mechanical agriculture and the *Kolkhoz*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 2

XIII

HERITAGE OF CHAGHATAI

Now these, her princes, are come home again . . .

THERE is yet another unrelenting pressure to which, in Stalin's time, the peoples of Soviet Central Asia came to be increasingly exposed — that pressure on the spirit felt by those subjected to the assaults of the war on the ideological front. This is a pressure applied in greater or less degree wherever Soviet writ runs, but it naturally bears more heavily on the Muslim inheritors of a corpus of idea remote from the concepts of any European philosophy and alien even to the older traditions of Russia. For Marxism-Leninism, as it was worked out, was in no sense the child of a Russian and Turkish liaison conceived during the long period of contact on the Ural–Volga front: if there was any offspring of that meeting, it was to be found rather in the institution of the Cossacks, who adopted, with their own variations, something of the spirit and impulses that moved the Tatar tribesmen of the steppe. Marxism was the result of the impact of systematized western social philosophies, in the hands of very able and embittered men, on a double-storeyed ill-cemented Russian society whose Byzantine framework was outworn and outmoded, and whose trappings had begun to appear as tinsel to men who had lost their direction. The formulas of Marxism, deriving from the West and not from the East, were at all points at variance with an age-old tradition, a tradition resting in part on the faith of Islam, and in part and equally significantly on that sort of positive insouciance the hall-mark of the free-born horsemen of the steppe. However exoteric the faith of the nomad, it was a strong expression of a way of life instinct with self-respect and honouring that rigorous code which binds

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 men who live the open life of the wanderer in the desert. It is perhaps the very simplicity of this nomadic attitude which makes the nomad impervious to an indoctrination with ideas which easily permeate more recondite minds. Thus in part we can explain the original resistance of the Turk to the winds of new doctrine. On this showing there is little need for surprise that those two parts of Asia, China and Turkistan, should have reacted differently to the Marxist-Leninist appeal.

But before it is possible to arrive at any demonstrable conclusion on the strength of traditional belief and observance in the face of Communist indoctrination, it is necessary to see whether there exists in the minds and thoughts of the people of Soviet Central Asia any monument, *aere perennius*, strong enough to stand up to the corrosive influences of time and adverse weather. This monument must be looked for in the existence of a continuing literature, without which any civilization, however grand its arts or its architecture in the past, will be hard put to it to live on into the present. It must not only be built of durable material but must be developed and restored to meet the changes and chances of the age, and so buttressed as to resist successfully even the shock of an earthquake. Can such a literature be found in Turkistan? And, if so, in what does its strength consist, how far is it up to date and what is the quality of the forces which seek to overthrow it?

538 Leaving aside for the moment the sacred books of Islam — and let no man underrate the effect of these in bestowing on man a certain firmness of spirit possibly stronger than with other faiths — there is the limited but undoubtedly great literature of the Timurid age written in the Chaghatai language. Its great representatives are the Emperor Babur in prose, and Mir Ali Shir Nevayi in poetry. Babur is the prince of autobiographers. Boon companion, warrior in single combat and in command of armies, man of letters, lover of nature and all beautiful things, a sinner grand enough to confess and make good his repentance, free of all cant, bearing no malice, frank, honourable, born a prince and in the end

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the founder of an empire, he sets to the Eastern Turks, from whose ranks he came, a pattern of manhood and simplicity such as no one Elizabethan can show to us. Whether he deals in battle or statecraft, in the love of nature or the kindness of friends, in the good-fellowship of a carouse or in resolutions (which he kept) to break his goblets and abstain from wine, in wise and humorous counsel to a son or the mature appraisement of good verse, in the littleness of man or the supreme efficacy of prayer, in all things, Babur has a quite inimitable charm. Combining as he does in one person so great a versatility, and passing, as only he knows how, from the extremes of ill-fortune to the summit of glory, he keeps to the end and unspoiled his grand simplicity. He was a very king of men. 538

Among many treasures in the *Baburnama*[1] is one, seldom quoted, but in many ways revealing of the man he was. It is a letter to his son Humayun, written after long separation:

To Humayun, whom I remember with much longing to see again, health.

Thanks be to God, who has given you a child, a child to you and to me a comfort and an object to love. . . . You have called him Al Aman [mercy, peace]; may the Almighty prosper him.

This is the season for you to expose yourself to danger and hardship, to exert your prowess. Fail not to meet strenuously every situation as it arises; for indolence and ease go ill with kingship. . . . Remember too always to act handsomely by your brother. The great should exercise self-command; and I do hope that you will always keep good understanding with him. He on his part is a correct and worthy youth, and will be careful to maintain the fidelity due to you.

In many of your letters you complain of separation from your friends. It is wrong for a prince to indulge in such a complaint, for as Saadi says:

If thy foot be fettered, choose to ride resigned,
If thou ride alone, take the course of thine own fancy.

There is no greater bondage than that in which a king is placed,

[1] Babur's memoirs have been translated into English twice — (*a*) by Erskine and Leyden in 1826, (*b*) by Mrs. Beveridge in 1922 (Bib. I, 12 and 61).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 and it becomes him not to complain of partings.

As I bade, you have indeed written to me, but certainly never read your letters over before despatch. Had you done so, you would have put them by. I did indeed manage, though with much difficulty, to decipher the meaning of your last letter, but the style is crabbed and even the spelling is not right. . . . Letter-writing is not your strong point, and this because you are too anxious to show off your acquirements. Pray write unaffectedly, with clearness, using plain words, such as cost less trouble both to writer and reader.

Waste no time in private parties, but, if you desire my approbation, indulge in liberal talk and frank intercourse with all about you. Attempt always the utmost courtesy of manners. . . . Forget not to pay attention to the state and discipline of the army.

Once more I salute you and long to see you.

Of Babur's literary style Mrs. Beveridge, one of his translators, writes that it is terse, word-thrifty, restrained and lucid, and that it comes over neatly into English, perhaps through primal affinities. 'It is neither regal nor self-magnifying but co-operative, as beseems the chief whose volunteer and nomad following makes or unmakes his power, and who can lead and command only by remittent consent accorded to him.' And Erskine, his earlier translator, said of Babur that, if we change but the circumstances, we might imagine we were among the Knights of Froissart. This, and the simplicity of his language, he owed to his being a Turk. That style which wraps up worthless meaning in a mist of words, and the etiquette which annihilates the courtier in the presence of his prince, were still, fortunately for Babur, foreign to the Turkish race. He was a great exemplar, to be remembered by those who are today subjected to the turns and twists of the new jargon.

Babur died at Agra in 1530, aged only forty-eight. A generation older, Mir Ali Shir Nevayi, the master of Chaghatai verse as Babur was of narrative prose, was born in Herat in 1441 and died there in 1501. He was the most esteemed subject of Babur's Timurid cousin, Hussain Baikara, at whose court he is represented as not only a Maecenas of letters and

2: Cause S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLJ

the arts, but a great poet in his own name both in his native 538
Chaghatai and in Persian. Sometimes charged with being only a neat translator of Persian into Chaghatai, Nevayi has won the approbation of many recent critics as the creator of an original school of Eastern Turkish poetry instinct with its own peculiar inspirations and responsive to the tastes of the time.[1] Fuad Köprülü, now Foreign Minister of Turkey, has claimed greatness for Nevayi on the ground that his poetry was inspired not only by a real and tolerant faith but by an embracing patriotism. He was also the first among the Eastern Turks to crystallize a Turkic language and *esprit* in words which were not slavish copies of the Persian. But better than all of these is the testimony of Babur himself, Nevayi's junior by some forty years.

Ali Shir Beg [he writes] was celebrated for the elegance of his manners, and this elegance and polish were ascribed to the conscious pride of high fortune; but this was not the case — they were natural to him, and he had precisely the same manner when he was in misfortune in Samarkand. Indeed Ali Shir Beg was an incomparable person. From the time that poetry was first written in the Turkish[2] language, no man has written so much and so well. Some of his Persian verses are not bad, but the greater part are heavy and poor. He has also left excellent pieces of music, excellent both as to the airs themselves and as to the preludes. There is not upon record in history any man who was a greater patron and protector of men of talent than Ali Shir Beg. He had no son, nor daughter, nor wife, nor family. He passed through the world single and unencumbered, and in the end, victim of a sudden stroke, he departed to the Mercy of God.

Ali Shir adapted the *mesnevi* (rhymed couplet) to Turkic verse and, apart from his own poetry, he introduced to the Turks the *Tezkere*, or biography, in the form of a *Lives of the Poets* (*Mejalis-un-nefais*).[3] But, unlike Dr. Johnson, he was

[1] Cf. Haidar Bammate (Bib. I, 6), pp. 424-30. This writer also cites MM. Berthels and Barthold, Russian savants, in support of his views. Incidentally, at this moment Nevayi is enjoying a Soviet vogue, but Soviet approbation is fickle.

[2] *Turki* (ترکی) in the original, as then generally used for the language and other Turkish or Turkic attributes, without the circumscription of modern thought.

[3] The Arabic words literally convey the idea of a symposium of elegant people.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 at the centre of things and had no cause to be troubled or cast down. To him and to Jami, the illustrious Persian and Nevayi's colleague at the Herat court, Gibb [1] gives honour as the twin suns in the east, by whose warmth West-Turkish Ottoman poetry was kindled into light.

> By the middle of the XVth century [writes Gibb] there was nothing wanting but the man of destiny, the man who by stammering, if not by singing, was to inaugurate the literature of the Osmanic Empire and become the van-courier of Ottoman poets. The voice of the age cried aloud for a leader, and in response arose Ahmed Pasha. Vaguely conscious of an ideal which he could not clearly conceive, Ahmed was stumbling along his way when, lo, out of the East came light, the light for which he and all his fellows were straining with eager gaze. When the *ghazels* sent by Nevayi to Constantinople came into the hands of Ahmed, his eyes were opened; he saw before him embodied in a form, fairer than which he could not picture, these very moods and fantasies which he and his companions had been vainly striving to express.

Ali Shir Nevayi, like Babur, was an Eastern Turk of Turkistan, and Herat under the Timurids was a Turkish city where the Turkic and Persian cults met. It was Nevayi's poetry, which for a century and more after Ahmed, was the main source of inspiration of all the Ottoman lyric writers. In this way the Eastern Turks not only gave the ancestors of the men who carved out the Western Turkish empires, but added those currents of song and poesy which can be traced in Turkish poetry even today.

197 It was a bequest of which the Eastern Turks may well be
538 proud. But Chaghatai as a medium had its limitations. It was in essence a literary language of the court and, although many have claimed for it that at one time it had in the East the same currency as literary Osmanli had in the West, it was deeply impregnated with Arabic and Persian extravagances and therefore not well adapted to become the medium of business and cultural relations. Moreover, so strong was Persian influence in Transoxiana that it became the habit of the Khivan and Bukharan courts in the Uzbek period to use Persian as the official language for administration and the law.

[1] Bib. I, 38.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 7

Persian as the official language for administration and the law.[1] 000
Literary Chaghatai, written in the Persian *shikasta* form of 194
Arabic letters, has another and important liability, if regarded as a mode of transcription of a Turkic language. This is the relative weakness of the Arabic alphabet in vowel signs, and its consequent inability to express the very varied vowels of Turkic languages, and particularly the vowel qualities and harmonies. It is true that the form of Uzbek itself, as spoken at least in Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand, has become Persianized to the extent of losing its vowel quality and most of its vowel harmony. But, even so, Chaghatai Arabic expresses the vowel sounds inadequately, the more so because in the Farghana and Yese (Turkistan) forms of Uzbek the harmonies are still to be found. *A fortiori* Chaghatai, based 197
(as Babur tells us) on the purest Uzbek, spoken then as today in the Andijan district of Farghana, was not a medium easily adaptable to the languages spoken in Kirghizia or in the countries now known as the Kazak and Turkmen steppe. There is an elaborate system of comparative morphology to be acquired before it becomes possible for a student, even on paper, to relate the various Eastern Turkic languages, *e.g.* Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen, one to the other. In speech the difference is great enough to cause difficulty of understanding between even native speakers. The path of the reformer 000
seeking to establish one language as current coin for all Turkistan is therefore not so easy as has often been suggested.[2] As a long-term project, if circumstances were favourable, it should not be impossible. But, as we know, the Soviets are doing all they can to promote linguistic and other distinctions between the five republics, and it follows that any move towards assimilation runs counter to tendencies within modern Turkistan itself. None the less, as a social and political

[1] Exactly the same process can be seen at work today in Afghanistan. The Barakzai Sardars who rule the country, themselves of Afghan blood, often can not even talk Pashtu, the Afghan tongue. Persian is the official language.

[2] A group of émigrés in Germany, mainly Uzbek, issue a journal, *Milliy Türkistan*, in a language which they call *ortatili*, or the middle tongue. It is really Uzbek, with a few extraneous words, written in an alphabet adapted from the Turkish Roman. It is an interesting experiment.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

000 objective designed to promote a union of thought over a wider than parochial field, any effort of this kind deserves respect. If it is to have any prospect of success, it must be based on a living literature, good enough and strong enough to drive inferior coin out of currency. It may be that Babur and Nevayi supply the prose and verse foundations on which such literature can successfully be built up. Both stand for a period of splendour in the history of the Eastern Turks, both are widely read in all Turkish lands, and the renown of one, Babur, has spread far beyond the limits of Turkdom.

538 It is unfortunate that Chaghatai literature is of relatively narrow scope. One reason may well be sought in the lamentable destruction of the famous library burned by the Soviet armies at the taking of Bukhara in 1920. Apart from the contents of that library, now lost to us as irretrievably as Alexandria, there are probably many manuscripts collected in the libraries of Russian Academies of Sciences in the five republics, but, even if so, they are not much use to Western scholars. Moreover, although at one time the study of the literatures of the Eastern Turks was most diligently pursued under Soviet auspices, the tendency is now all the other way. It is even difficult now to obtain outside Russia the works of Eastern Turk poets in the original, and translations into Russian are the vogue. Almost one might be persuaded that these are Russian poets!

The Chaghatai literature was the sophisticated product of the settled oases of the south. Not unexpectedly we find the familiar distinction between the sedentary population of the cities and the men of the steppe carried through into their several literatures. The Kazak, Turkmen and Kirghiz traditions — the spirit of Abilay and Kine Sari Khan — were expressed in a fine literature of ballads (*dastan*) and epic minstrel poetry, handed down originally by word of mouth and later, often at the suggestion of earlier Russian admirers, reduced to writing. Such were the *Kōroghlu*, the *Dede Korkut*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

(or *Korkut Ata*) of the Turkmens and Azeris, the *Edige batir* 538
and the *Kublandi-batir* (*batir* means hero)[1] of the Kazaks, the *Alpamish* of the Uzbeks, the *Manas* epics of the Kirghiz.

But here again, with the exception of the Kirghiz Manas transcribed by Radloff,[2] these poems are for the most part inaccessible in the original tongue. Many examples of Central Asian verse will be found cited in a recent English book on the epos, but the distinguished author[3] has to confess having had to work entirely on Russian translations without access to any original texts. In fact, outside Soviet Academies, these texts are just not to be obtained, if only for the reason that the minstrels sang of heroes of the resistance, and their original work is therefore banned as tainted with 'survivalism'. On the other hand, versions of this literature, carefully edited and expurgated, are to be had in Russian translation, and must be read, even in Central Asia, in Russian.

The Russians perhaps forget that poetry of this kind is in the oral tradition, learned at the mother's knee or in the congregations of the young men. It does not depend on texts for its survival. One of the merits of Togan's writing is that he is able to hand on passages in the Turkic from some of these poems. The examples I quote are taken from his book, inadequately rendered into English.

In all these stories the hero stands four-square in the line of Eastern chivalry. He glories in his countryside and his tribe,[4] he venerates old age, he is a paragon of manly beauty and bravery, he is loyal in his love, above all his military honour is beyond reproach. The wife or beloved of the hero is endowed with equal womanly virtues: as courageous as her lover, she may surpass him in wit and intuition, and she is his equal. During the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries a more lyrical line of minstrelsy, originally handed down from bard to bard, was reduced to writing by such poets as Yirav, Nisembay Akin, Abay[5] and Maghjan Jumabay, and was expressed in a series

[1] Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener. [2] Bib. I, 78. [3] Bib. I, 14, Sir M. Bowra.
[4] Cf. the Pathan proverb: *Har cha tah khpal mulk Kashmir dai* — 'Unto every man his own land is Kashmir'. [5] Bib. III, 1.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 of national poems directed against the Russian expansion. This expression of a renewed nationalism grew directly out of the epic tradition, with its stress on the valour of the warriors who defended their people at all costs. In these epics and lyrics the horse and the herds form a part of the family life of the hero; indeed the horse himself, the hero's nearest companion, is as splendid as the horses in the Psalms. We are reminded of the horse Rakhsh, nuzzling the dying Sohrab in Matthew Arnold's classic poem.

The name of Kine Sari has been celebrated in Kazak poetry ever since he fell in fratricidal battle with the Kirghiz chiefs near Issik Köl. He became the symbol of Kazak national pride, and even the Kirghiz, who slew him, regard him as the hero of all Turkistan. His death is the subject of a poem by Nisembay:

He was a man, strong in heart and body,
As though he had been born in armour,
Fate, that favoured him,
Girt him about the loins with a sword;
When he saw the foe in battle, he shouted 'Abilay'
And chased them from the field;
He chose his horse from the wild horses,
And fed him, as he rode, from the bag,
Or gave him honey for fodder
And the milk of a barren mare. . . .

Togan has a moving account of some of the poetry and prose writers of the Eastern Turks since the Russian occupation. While he emphasizes the conflict of soul which gave them unrest, he is generous enough to recognize the debt they owed to the inspirations of Russian liberalism under the Tsars, and brings this out prominently in his accounts of Abay and Ismail Gaspirali. The following selections give an idea of the tradition of the more prominent writers since the Russian conquest.

Abay (1845–1906), Kazak poet

He was born in the Chingiz Tav in Yedisu. About 1880 he came into contact with Russian literature through a

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLI

Russian revolutionary named Mikhailis, who introduced him to the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and more particularly Lermontov 'with his model Byron'. He combined with this the Persian strain of the centenarian Saadi and the Turkic strain of Nevayi. 538

He was a poet of the steppe, describing nomadic life in a series of beautiful lyrics, written in such simple language that even the herdsmen could take in his philosophic ideas. Or so they thought: Abay himself in one of his best-known poems, grieved that the Kazaks could not follow him.

The footman is left behind, the horsemen ride on,
Who of them will turn aside to listen to my plaint?

Abay created a society for himself, described as an Islamic milieu, loving Russian literature, and knowing the intellectual life of Russia. His poems are current in the Russia of today, but in Russian translation, not in the original Kazak.

Chokan Velikhan

Chokan was born about 1837 and died of consumption in 1865.

He too was a Kazak and a descendant of Chingiz in the Kazak nomadic tradition. His career is described as a national tragedy in that he was a great admirer of Russian liberalism and Western inspirations, but in the end suffered grievous disillusionment. He started by trying to cleanse the Turkish tradition from its accretions, brought by the priesthood and feudalism, and to attune it to a new synthesis with what he saw to admire in Russia. He graduated at the Russian War Academy and was a friend of Dostoievsky. But he was betrayed and his ideals broken in pieces. Throughout his life he followed his star; as long as he believed in Russia, he spoke out in friendship. Later he expressed his hatred, having seen a Russian bayonet a Kazak woman on the march. Exclaiming 'This land is the land of my fathers: I cannot bear it', he threw off his uniform, and withdrew to the steppe, where he died.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL-1

538 For him the Turkish epics were a source of inspiration. He was the first to study the Kirghiz Manas epic, and to transcribe parts of it into literary Turkish. He believed that the nomad Turks, even if they sat lightly to Islam, had in them a civilization strong enough to prevent them being sacrificed to any foreign machinations whatever. Though he admired the new Russian XIXth-century humanism, he had no opinion of the political aims behind the Orthodox Church. His great contribution was to make known the ballads of the famous singers, as a possession for ever for those who loved the old Turkish nomadic tradition of the mountain and the steppe.

Ismail Gaspirali (1851–1914)

Gaspirali was a Crimean, and only a few years younger than Chokan. He was taken up as a promising young Turk, and went through the Russian War Academy, where he was influenced by the liberalism of the middle XIXth century. His life's work was to appeal to the Russians in a spirit of brotherly loving-kindness to forsake policies of assimilation, while attracting the Turks to what was good in Russian civilization. He also planned the creation of a literary language which should be common to all Turks. In him perhaps are to be found the first stirrings of the spirit which spread abroad, and became known to all the world, in the speeches and actions of Mustafa Kemal. Gaspirali's idea was that of the renewal and purification of the Ottoman language by means of currents from farther east. It is curious to note the emphasis which all these Turks, and Russians too, place on language as a social, cultural, economic and political counter, and to reflect how far removed is this attitude from that of the protagonists of a united Europe. Using language as a symbol, Gaspirali dreamed of a cultural Turkish unity which should transcend all differences and even lead to a larger association of idea.

The conflicts of soul that tore at patriots such as Gaspirali is described in a moving passage by Togan. He writes :

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

I came across Gaspirali's book in the home of Ebubekir Agha, 538
in Russian service. I remember saying to him that Ismail Bey (Gaspirali) had been too servile: the Russians had abolished slavery, but introduced a new slavery in its place. It was dangerous for us to encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a big brother, creep into our hearts, give us decorations and uniforms, make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. Ebubekir replied — 'The ideas of that period were rather different; moreover, had Ismail Bey said that, his book would never have passed the censorship. In the bad times he brought us at least some comfort,' and, smiling sweetly, he played on his harmonium some old Bashkurd melodies, more beautifully than I could have imagined. His own eyes, and the eyes of his wife, filled with tears.[1]

Maghjan Jumabay

He was a Kazak national poet, born in 1894 in Yedisu, east of Balkhash. His collected poems were published in Tashkent in 1923, but the collection is incomplete, for many were too patriotic to pass the censors. Here are some quotations; even a distillation through more than one language does not entirely destroy the inspiration of the original, and they have the stir of genuine poetry.

The Sacred Issik Kōl, on which the first Turk,
Born of the grey wolf, saw the light of the world;
The two rivers Jaihun and Saihun,
And between them the holy graves of thine ancestors;
The great mountains of Turan, Khan Tenri reaching to heaven —
Look now to the mountains and think how the Turks suffer in bondage!

And again:

Aksak [lame] Timur, who set the world afire,
Sent forth a beam like a lightning-flash.
Tanri, the God in heaven, has no descent,
But Timur's descendants, the Gods on earth,
Are the Turks, and their sign is fire.

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 556.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 And in a poem addressed to Turkey at the end of World War I:

My brother, far away, so greatly suffering,
My brother, like a tulip broken,
Is not Altai our common mother?
Have we not played on her slopes,
Did not the cool mountain springs
Splash for us, run for us through the rocks,
Were not our horses the wild steeds,
Running like the whirlwind?
In the golden days thou didst part from me
And go to the Middle and Black Seas.
But I remained like a bird,
Spreading not my wings,
And none was left to show me the way.
The enemy's bullet struck my heart and I sank down:
I was thrust into a dark prison and shut in.
And thou, O Master?
Have we Turks lost the heart of the lion,
Become cowards and weary of war?
Is the fire in our hearts put out?
And our fathers' blood dried up?
Oh brother, thou there, and I here,
Both in dire distress.
Come, let us go again to the Altai,
And mount the golden throne of our fathers.

And addressing God:

Thou gavest to every land, to the poor Arabia,
Nurse of camels,
A Prophet to show the way
And a holy Book,
But to us Turks this grace thou hast not vouchsafed.
We have followed prophets from divers lands,
And set our faith in holy words,
But the way has not been shown us.
Send us a prophet to show us that way.

The renascence of Turkey under Atatürk — has it been the answer to this prayer?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

Cholpan

He was an Uzbek, whose real name was Abdul Hamid Suleiman. He was born in 1897 in Andijan, where (as the Emperor Babur said more than 400 years ago) the literary language of Alishir Nevayi is at its best. He graduated in an Islamic school, learned Russian, and studied in Moscow. Until 1926 he wrote in the national spirit, choosing as his patterns the older poets, particularly Alishir Nevayi. He also translated from the Russian, and from the Indian poet Tagore. After 1926 he and Maghjan were exposed to much persecution and forced to write to order. They evolved a kind of poetic cypher system, Maghjan using the words *Kun men tun* (day and night) when referring to Turks and Russians, and Cholpan *east and west*, referring to the oppressed and the tyrants. Many of his earlier poems are now very difficult to come by, but the following are quotations:

He is the enemy who knows not
The limit of his going,
Who hides what lies
To his right and to his left.
It may be that all must bow before the tyrant,
But if the tyrant oversteps the mark,
It may be that the heavens will come down to earth.

Such poems as these are described by Russian commentators as works of the period when the poet was caught up in the stream of nationalism, and they have disappeared from print. But they are preserved like the ballads of old in the souls of Turks who were persecuted or forced to leave Russia.

The languages in which these poems are written, Uzbek and Kazak, are for all practical purposes a closed book to Western students, and, until such time as it becomes possible to read them in the original, it is not easy to appraise their value. But for us the question is this. How enduring is this literature, starting with Ali Shir Nevayi and ending with Cholpan? What does it represent? We shall be in a better position to answer after seeing what the Soviets think in the matter.

XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

000 IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

626
517
186

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186
626

The dogma of the Lesser Evil is briefly this. Oppressive though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil and oppressive than the alternative then open to non-Russian nationalities, namely, annexation by Turkey. (At this time the case of Armenia was chiefly in point.) And oppressive and evil though the Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led the annexed peoples away from Feudalism through Capitalism along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser evil than a continued independence. Thus this dogma was an extension backwards into Tsarist history of the sort of reasoning from first principles which enabled the Soviets by means of the Doctrine of the Proletariat to justify to their own minds the crushing in their time of the new nationalism that arose in the interregnum period. Both dogmas were shafts aimed at one target, the native nationalists who, if they believed in the dialectic of historical materialism, wished that it should develop within the framework of a national and not a Great Russian consciousness. The difference was that under the newest dogma — that of the Lesser Evil — it was no longer even respectable for a 'Colonial' nationalist to take pride in the prowess of his people even against the Tsarist conqueror. Great Russia in both her incarnations was henceforward to be regarded as unassailable, above criticism, the instrument by which the ultimate reality was inevitably to prevail.

The ground was prepared for the propagation of this doctrine in 1937, before World War II, at about the period of the greatest intensity of the purges. But other preoccupations, with the War itself, prevented active steps being taken for its enforcement until the post-War period. From 1945 onwards enforcement has taken the form of an all-out campaign against nationalism in any form. Such tendencies are compendiously described as bourgeois-nationalism, feudal survivalism or pan-Islamic pan-Turkic capitalist distortions or deviations, and are detected in every field of thought or cultural endeavour, social, literary and aesthetic. In their most secret thoughts all men, women and children must turn

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

to Moscow as their Mecca; language, literature and the arts must follow suit; the praise of past achievement is ruled out; and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said[1] that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct views on the history of their republic in relation to its association with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 230-33 -- Bib. II, 2 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various 186
versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not 538
been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not 626
people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmens persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846–1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 7

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens — and certainly not erotic poetry —, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone. [538]

This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

vituperation destroyed the old faith, the traditional way of life, in peoples who, for many hundreds of years, had their own pride, their own distinctive civilization, and their own foundations of belief?

The very tone of the Soviet propagandists is evidence of their anxious fear that all is not going as they wish in the garden of zoological nationalism [1] which the Kremlin is so sedulously cultivating in Central Asia. Names are given of men who stubbornly proclaim a faith that they are creative, free, artists who will not conform to the Party line, and of others who defend their own notion of the realities of their beliefs and history. The virulence of the inspired press demonstrates that there still exists in Turkistan a national pride in the identity and achievements of the Eastern Turks. There is thus evidence even in Soviet sources of a tradition linked to the heroes of national story, which refuses to be submerged. The old lore lingers on in the hearts of a people who have learned to transmit inspiration by means of minstrelsy and so by word of mouth. It has been said [2] that the Turk in history is like a piece of rubber, resilient when pressed down, but escaping from the hand that tries to hold it. But in the last resort resilience in the human spirit is to be expected only where there exists an inner spring of thought and belief strong enough to resist material pressures during the period of their application and ready to leap into action when the pressure is relaxed.

We have observed in Soviet propaganda a half-uneasy consciousness that the mainspring of what they call bourgeois-nationalism is an inward faith which they identify sometimes with their idea of pan-Turkism but more often with Islam. And during the course of this book we have been able, without the need for digression, to notice a number of indications of the reality of belief which inspired, and may still inspire, the Eastern Turks. What then are these fundamental inspirations, and what is their force?

[1] For this phrase acknowledgment is due to *The Caucasus* (Munich, Jan. 1952), p. 16.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 608.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

In so far as they are political and worldly we have already tried to study them, but in their deeper aspect they can only be spiritual. The leaders of the Eastern Turk nationalists were not priests' men, and were never tired of referring to the venality of the Bukharan clergy on the one hand and on the other to their fanatical devotion to an effete clericalism. A barren and rigid clericalism is indeed a phenomenon all too apparent on stages not far removed from Turkistan. Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul and Teheran can each supply recent examples. There too the fanatic has his day. But there too it is not he who best interprets the Kingdom of God on earth as seen in the light of the inspirations of Islam.

There are two strains in the spiritual inheritance of Turkistan, the first the *Yasa* or *Yasak*, the Turkish tribal tradition, and the second the *Sheriat*, the sacred law of Islam. The derivation of the first is traced in part to Shamanism and Manicheism, creeds which saw religion and the State as separate worlds, and this broadly is the nomad's faith. The second, the sacred law, inspired the ancient culture of Khorasan which overflowed into Transoxiana. It does not distinguish religion from politics and in practice, in its Sunni form, it exalts the priesthood. In the *medreses* of Samarkand, Bukhara and Balkh it prevailed, taking advantage of Turkish *laisser-faire*. But the torch of the older custom remained alight among the nomads.

While the modern nationalists[1] cannot sufficiently condemn the clerics — the picture is familiar — they are constrained to admit, with a deep sense of emotion, that Islam lives on in the hearts of the people, far beyond the precincts of the mosque. As a Kazak said in Mecca: 'Since we have no mosques, no official clergy, and no institution that the Communists can abuse, this means that they can do nothing with us'. It may be that the whole of Turkistan will come to Islam in this sense. Again, early in August 1922, the Bolsheviks commissioned a party of influential clergy to demand

[1] For Togan's exposition see *op. cit.* pp. 530-35, of which these paragraphs are in some sense a distillation.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

771 of the Basmachis that they submit to the Soviets. The Basmachi Achil Beg, addressing them, said: 'Let us leave the Bolsheviks on one side for the moment, and also those who speak for them. Come, tell me, on your conscience, whether God will be pleased by your attitude or no?' Said the priests, 'Sir, you know that better than we do.' Whereupon Achil Beg cried with a loud voice, 'You fools! If it is I that know God's will, why preach you in the name of God? Have you no shame to come to us today preaching for the Russians? I would kill you all, but that you are old and foolish and soon will die. Go, and God's curse be with you!' And the Basmachis applauded.

The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkistan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the clergy's authority undermined. 'Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples' clergy.' In fact, Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.

771 626 Current evidence from Russian sources goes to support the conclusion. The contemporary press harps on the defects of Islam, the prejudices of the clergy and the identification of Muslim ideas with a feudal patriarchal framework. Other themes constantly expressed are indignation over loss of time due to religious observances or prayer; persistence of religious influences even among Party members, preference for the Koran over medical attention or drugs; even the stupid story of the Comsomol member with his charm.

The spear-head of the Soviet drive against the faith of Muhammad is supposed to be the Comsomol organizations. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazak Com-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kirghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipation of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

[1] It is not easy to recognise in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination *-oglu*, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Russians who forced it on urban Muslim populations. Something in this matter may be learned from the political and educative part played by women who have become public figures in Kemalist Turkey.

Thus the impression we receive of the spiritual impact of Islam on the Turks of Central Asia owes nothing to the rigidity of doctrine. Clericalism those in the true line abhor. Yet here is an intimate sense of a real inspiration, owing much to the life of the tent and something to the pantheistic worship of Shamanist ancestors on the beautiful uplands of Central Asia, but infused with the mysticism of such men as the saint Ahmed of the XIIth century, whose tomb at Yese on the lower Sir Darya was once a great centre of pilgrimage. Ahmed himself stands in the line of Turkish mystics leading to Yunus Emre of Anatolia two centuries later. No amount of indoctrination in materialism will exorcise from the hearts of men and women a spirit which far transcends any doctrine.

There is a Western Turkish poet who has expressed in a few simple words that clear and shining faith in God which is here claimed as the peculiar inheritance of the sons of the steppe. Such men may see a holy book or a great mosque at journey's end, but their daily worship is attuned to the roving life, to infinite horizons beneath the sun, and at night to a multitude of stars:

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Ye read a book
And ask for the writer,
A glorious building have ye seen?
Ye seek for the builder.
Have the earth and skies then no master?
O man, think and understand!
Unto us all things prove
There is one God, the Great, the Almighty.[1]

Okursunuz bir Kitabi
Sahibini sorarsiniz
Gördünüz mü bir hosh yapi
Ustasini ararsiniz.

Sahipsiz mi yerler, gökler?
Düşününce insan anlar!
Herşey bize ispat eder
Büyük, Kadir bir Allah var.

İBRAHIM ALAEDDIN

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

[see pp. 230-242 — Analy]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

608 Mustafa Chokai was among the most eminent of the older emigration. A good French scholar, he was able to give voice to the aspirations of his countrymen in words which could reach the ears of Western Europe and America, and in turn to interpret Europe to his own people. 'We have to be', he said, 'at one and the same time the architects and masons of a healthy national structure in which we would wish to see harmonised our national liberation and our love and admiration for European culture.'[1] He started an organization named *Milliy Türkistan Birligi* (Unity of National Turkistan), and was indefatigable in preaching the possibility of a smaller unity within Turkistan itself, which should embrace the different races without distinction of Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen or Kirghiz, and including the Tajiks on the ground that they are intermingled with the Uzbeks and often bilingual, speaking both their own dialect of Persian and Uzbek. These ideas, taken over by Kayum, were a good deal less ambitious than a plan formulated independently in Istanbul for the creation of a Greater Turkistan which should include with Turkistan proper the Turco-Tatar peoples of the Volga and the Bashkurds of the Urals. This plan has received the name of Türkili, possibly inspired by Togan's book. Its sponsors seek to justify it on the ground that neither Turkistan proper, which has an open frontier in the north and a settlement area crowded with Russians, nor the Volga–Ural region, surrounded as it is by Russians on all sides, could by themselves be regarded as viable units for a State. If then they are to aspire to independence, they must unite. As is usual among émigrés, there are also other splinter groups.

All groups are agreed that they are set on an autonomous Turkistan, and they do not seek political association with Turkey. But while Chokai's successors aim at independence, others have in view some sort of union or federation with a new United States of Russia. There has been a difference in emphasis on the point whether Eastern Turk patriots would do well to stand in with Russian émigré organizations in

[1] Speech to Royal Central Asian Society, 29th March 1933.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

seeking the overthrow of Bolshevism — a debate hotly con- 668
tested.

There is support in America and elsewhere for this line of thought, so apparently consonant with democratic theory. The argument runs that all non-Slavs of the emigration, old and new, would do well to concentrate their hopes on the collapse of the Stalinist system, trusting that, when tyranny breaks, it will give way to a multi-national régime on a Western democratic model, to be set up in the whole of the Russian Empire. In this new house, it is suggested, all the 'minorities' would find it easy to meet and merge, just as the various stocks have been able to do in the United States.

The answer to this pleading is clear enough. In the first place, the term 'minority' is resented as a misconception, for each non-Slav people in its own land is the very people of that country, brought into subjection by conquest from without. Secondly, this attractive vision of a United States of Russia is seen by men who surely forget that immigrants entered America from the countries of Europe because they desired, often passionately, to lose their individual traditions and memories in the larger hospitality of the New World. In the Russian Empire, whether under Tsars or Soviets, the non-Slav peoples took no such initiative. They were twice conquered by Great Russians, whom they regard as their historical oppressors. Consequently, any Central Asian Turk of the emigration who may be persuaded to stand in with anti-Soviet Russians on a common platform against Stalinism tends to be spurned by the less equivocal group under Kayum Khan, which will have no dealings with any Russian who is not prepared to concede in advance the right of Turkistan to an existence as a free State bound in no way to any future Russia. This more rigorous view is founded on the belief that no Russian party with a programme confined to the overthrow of the existing régime can be trusted to give freedom to the national components of the present Russia. In such a succession State, they hold, the non-Slav peoples would only exchange one master for another, and in support of this view

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the
727 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] [For background, see cat. 116, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was 668
the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus 727
epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners 167
died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga–Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the
727 Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not
167 formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal com-
727 missioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining
167 seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *gök kanli* — bloody-eyes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

The national

668 committee under Kayum Khan's direction followed a middle course. They stood for a single united Turkistan, including the Persian-speaking Tajiks, roughly coincident with the limits of the five Soviet Central Asian republics, and they strove to inculcate the political idea of a common Turkistani nationality and allegiance. Unwilling to recognize that the several languages spoken in Turkistan are in fact languages and not mere dialects of one language, they tried to serve their end by inventing a middle-language — *ortazili* — which should become a lingua franca for all the country. They also did their best to encourage the German commanders to mix up the rank and file without regard to racial or linguistic affinities, making no distinction between an Uzbek or a Kazak, a Kirghiz or a Tajik. Their aim was a deliberate one, to counter the Russian policy of breaking down into small units and to re-create a common tradition for Turkistan. On the other hand they would have nothing to do with suggestions for a wider Turkish organism which should be shared with Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars or Bashkurds. They stood for a smaller unity, confined to Turkistan alone.

000 It is not easy to pronounce with confidence how far this policy is consonant with realities. On the one hand it was [727] noted that the Azeris, the only substantial people of Turkish stock in the Caucasus area, proved to be better combatant troops than any of the volunteers from Turkistan. This result may be partly attributable to the fact that, being alone, the Azeris were not mixed with other stocks and knew how they stood. The mingling of the five main stocks of Turkistan without any regard for origin or language must have produced a result not unlike what would follow if Pathans, Baluches, Panjabis and Awans were thrown together haphazard in the army of what is now Pakistan. It was a bold experiment and it can hardly have promoted efficiency, at least at the outset. On the other hand there is evidence that Uzbeks and Tajiks at any rate get on well together. (The Soviet attempt to play up the Persian character of the Tajik tradition is probably misconceived: Tajiks are often bilingual in any case.) As

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

was to be expected, there is testimony to a certain tension having existed between Uzbek and Kazak, heirs as they are to such very different traditions, but even here the forcing of the Kazaks into settled agriculture and the mines and factories may tend gradually towards assimilation.

Perhaps a fair conclusion would be this: there are, and always have been, very real distinctions of habit, language and bearing between the sedentary population of the towns and oases, who are now mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, and the men who come from the steppe and mountains, mainly Kazaks, Kirghiz and Turkmens. These differences have been accentuated by Russian policy. But it was proved in 1918–24, and has been proved again in 1941–5, that all these peoples are close enough to work together effectively in a close organism such as an army.[1] On this premise there is ground for supposing that, in spite of differences, trusted leaders may be able to exploit a common tradition to the degree of achieving political unity in action at least when the cry is liberation from a foreign yoke. It is even possible that Russianization may in the end assist this process, as did the introduction of the English language and administration into India. For it by no means follows that the higher Russian education, which provides a new level on which the more intellectual can communicate without regard of race, will cause Kazaks or Uzbeks to think or act as Russians. Judging from the history of World War II, they are more likely to act as Uzbeks and Kazaks, and to believe that freedom is just round the corner.

Finally there is this to be said. There are few emigration groups who have had so great a chance as this national committee to influence directly the hopes and thoughts of so many thousands of their fellow-countrymen over a period of three or four years. Conditions were difficult, the Germans lacked understanding, and after the first two years it was clear that the Eastern Turks had not backed a winning horse. If in spite of this they carried on, and the rank and file fought and died as they did, it proves at least they thought they had a cause to die for. In spiritual terms that cause was the redemption of

[1] [e.g. under the Nazis; see cat. 116, p. 246 ff. — analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia PL1

their way of life before God and man; in terms of politics it was the deliverance of a united Turkistan. In face of this it is hard for us, who look on, to conclude that a United Turkistan is an unrealizable dream not worth fighting for.

On a different stage, and under new leaders, they have enacted a new scene in the tragedy which began with the Merdikar and Basmachi movements more than thirty years ago. But the West lacks knowledge of their past achievements and their present predicament, and to put their case as it deserves they need a purpose to inform their eloquence. If their voice is to carry, the old idea and the new must forget differences of age and tactic, and combine in allegiance to a cause which, presented with one mind, should command the attention of the outer world.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 · Soviet Central Asia R L7

XVI

CONCLUSION

We rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, and hope does not disappoint us.[1]

IT is twelve hundred and fifty years since the armies of the Umayyids under Kotaiba ibn Muslim won Transoxiana for Islam. It is a bare two hundred years since the pressure of Russia was first felt on the northern steppe, less than a century since Russia conquered Transoxiana, and only a generation since the Soviet Empire was firmly clamped down on the whole land, rivers and steppe alike. The local nationalist sources, the events of World War II, the current Soviet press, all show plainly enough that the equation between Islam and Communism is not yet worked out. On the resolution of this question it may be that much more than the future of the Muslim world depends. For this land of Turkistan, once a planet of a Muslim Eastern constellation and now wrenched from its natural orbit to revolve uncertainly in another, has shown that past loyalties have not yet wholly failed. The older attractions still exert an influence not to be despised. Yet the assimilative forces of the new system, as exercised in this modern world, are so overpowering that it remains an open question how far the older tradition can hope to survive as anything more than a nostalgic memory destined to fade sorrowfully into history.

Here is Velidov, they might say, a man over 60 years old who thirty and more years ago led a tribal rebellion against his big Russian brother. Here is a man of the past who since that time has been living in foreign lands on scholarship,

[1] Romans, 5, 3. New American version.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

nourished only by old memories, driven from the country of his birth, unable to see with his own eyes the effects of the new Socialism, the new economy, on the risen generation of his countrymen. How can such a man estimate the forces and the currents of thought which have renovated an ancient land, introduced millions of Russians to cultivate where his ancestors roamed, built new towns on the steppe, changed the shape of old cities, now become hives of industry, once stagnant and answering only to the drone of the *Muezzin*? Even among the emigrant irreconcilables, to whom alone his message can go, there are divisions of thought, jealousies and lack of leadership. And from his countrymen in Farghana, Tashkent, Samarkand, Ishimbay, his message is shut out. Even if they could hear it, would they not laugh him to scorn as one who celebrates old victories and praises the past, one utterly severed from present realities? In any case, in his enthusiasm he forgets the power of an efficient State machinery, unbound by scruple and determined to mould men from childhood to one pattern. So they would argue, contemptuously.

The Soviet will and the power are there, and, if these tremendous forces do not even yet seem real, this book of mine has failed of its purpose. A universal Communist ideology, a regimented education, collectivization, centralized industrialization, ruthless suppression of deviations, mass movement and slaughter of populations, the mechanization of the inner springs of life, all these forces are to hand, and they are used. Apart from the break-up of tyranny itself, the only factor, surely, which can upset material calculations of this order is the existence, in the face of all power-influences and indoctrination, of an inner spirit which refuses the idea of the mechanization of man. More than one people in history have managed to keep a flame burning against mass slaughter, against oppression of body, mind and spirit, and even against generous treatment at the hands of those to whom they have been subject. The burning of a light at the heart of a people depends on qualities of spirit, either revealed or bequeathed to

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

them through heredity and upbringing, and a torch of that kind will be extinguished if there are not those who come to trim it or to supply fresh fuel to keep it alight. We have to determine from their history how far the inspirations of the Eastern Turks are strong enough to survive the immense pressures set in force to muffle them.

In the course of this survey we have noticed more than once the strength and weakness of the spiritual possessions of the various societies which have gone to make up the amalgam of peoples in Turkistan. We found two main strands of thought, that of the cities, and that of the steppe. After the impulses of expansion were spent with the end of the caravan age, the cities of Central Asia, cut off from any fertilizing stream, relapsed into a jealous medievalism, a bigotry proverbial even in an age and region where tolerance was not in fashion. Fertile enough to maintain themselves in self-sufficiency, with a respectable margin for these same leaders of bigotry, they refused or denied all outside influences which might have checked the negations of their narrow clericalism. The peculiar brand of scholastic religion associated with the [17] Central Asian *medreses* may have been as persistent as other Islamic manifestations, but it had become derelict and ossified. It was a strange mingling of the barren controversies of the schoolman with the emotional hysteria of the dervish, and it is not irreverent to find in the fanatical rigidity of the *emirs* and *ulema* of Bukhara and Khiva the very prototype of that Communist faith which in its turn was to admit no deviation and preach its own anathema. Even the religious mania of the dervish and the assassin has in it some quality which by a strange paradox is akin to the missionary endeavours of the high priests of Communism. Intolerance, bigotry, blood-purges, are common to all forms of fanaticism; they are the outward showing of the spiritual condition which prompts the fanatic — hatred and fear. All religions, Islam not excepted, have been guilty of aberrations such as these. It was this attitude more than anything else which, for the three centuries between the fall of the Timurids and the coming of

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the Russians, cut off Turkish Central Asia from the remainder of the civilized world. A renascence was long overdue.

The age of the Timurids, as we know, had produced remarkable men as well in the field of action as in that of letters. Nor had this spirit perished. When the Russians came, there were still to be found men of this type, half contemptuous of the townsmen and cultivators, still roaming upon the steppe or pasturing their flocks in the mountains, men of the same way of life and thought as had furnished the armies of Timur and Babur, but organized on a tribal model and lacking the focus of city, court or market-place, which a tribe needs if it is to grow into a nation. Their religious inspirations owed something to the Shamanism [1] of remote ancestors, and all accounts agree that their conversion to Islam left them free from bigotry. Their way of life as nomads inclined them to that sort of pantheism expressed in the Benedicite; they saw God rather under the canopy of heaven than within the mosque.

The pride of the height,
The clear firmament,
The beauty of heaven, with his glorious show;
The sun, when it appeareth,
Declaring at his rising a marvellous instrument,
The work of the most High. . . .
He made the moon also to serve in her season
For a declaration of times, and a sign of the World,
Increasing wonderfully in her changing,
Shining in the firmament of heaven;
The beauty of heaven, the glory of the stars,
An ornament giving light in the highest places of the Lord. . . .
Look upon the rainbow, and praise him that made it,
Very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof.
It compasseth the heaven about with a glorious circle,
And the hands of the most High have bended it.[2]

This vision of the splendour of nature and God's part in it had informed men like Babur, who succeeded in achieving

[1] For an interesting dissertation on Shamanist beliefs see Czaplicka, Bib. I, 28.
[2] Ecclesiasticus 43.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

in their persons a marriage of the spiritual inheritance of the pastoralist with the revelation of Islam, and so released a new creative energy in the human soul. But the vision faded. The essential Islamic element, the necessary accretion, had been corrupted in the mosques and *medreses* of the Central Asian cities; the Turks of Central Asia existed in isolation even from the rest of the Muslim world, and could hear no challenge from Christendom which might have awakened a response. It was as if the effort spent in furnishing the sinews of war which in former times carried the ancestors of these men to the banks of the Danube and the Ganges had emptied their successors of that *élan* which alone, united with the spiritual culture of the cities, might have enabled them to put up an effective resistance to the advancing Russians. Their civilization began to crumble, and they are now undergoing the painful process of forceful enrolment in the Russian proletariat.

In an interesting essay[1] Arnold Toynbee has discussed various encounters in history between Western society and Islam. After describing the successful Ottoman reaction to the first attempt by the West to exterminate Islam by means of the Crusades, he goes on to explain the renewal of the Western offensive on Islam as a concentric attack which control of the maritime routes and other methods of transportation enabled the West to launch during the last one hundred and fifty years. This he sees in terms of a Western movement to incorporate all mankind in a single cosmopolitan society, at a time when the modern West is superior to the Islamic world not only in arms but in the technique of economic life on which civilization increasingly depends. He goes on to illuminate his discourse by giving his account of two alternative methods of response by which one society attacked by another, whether in cold or hot war, may respond to the challenge. As protagonists among those challenged

[1] Bib. I, 93, Islam, the West and the future.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

there will arise a set of men whom he calls 'Zealots' and another set called 'Herodians'.

The Zealot is the man who in contest with an overbearing foreign enemy falls back on his traditional battle-cries. He is the puritan, the soldier for the faith, the *ghazi*. He stands on his archaic past. Examples are the Wahabis, the Afridis, the Basmachis. The Herodian is the man, like Mehmet Ali of Egypt or the founders of modern Japan, who, confronted with a better-armed and unfamiliar opponent, responds by discarding his traditional methods and learning to fight his enemy with the enemy's own tactics. The fastnesses of Zealotism are inaccessible like the desert of Nejd or the North-West Frontier; the centres of Herodianism are in places such as Cairo and Constantinople, the cross-ways of the high-roads of the nations. The Zealot acts by instinct, the Herodian by reason. The former, though he stands in the true line, takes no account of change and will fail in the end; the latter, though his resistance is cleverer and therefore more effective, is essentially an imitator and unable to create. If the former is a fossil, the latter, if he escapes submergence, is in danger of becoming a mimic only of the living civilization to which he is trying to conform. In taking on the forms he misses the spirit that lies behind.

How does this digression bear on the Eastern Turks? Although Communism is, as it were, a Western heresy, when turned against the West it is apt to be regarded as a sort of semi-oriental counter-attack against Western Christendom itself. But, turned against the Islamic world, I suggest it is to be seen as the sharp edge of a latter-day Western assault on the outposts of Asia. The response evolved by this challenge in the resistance of the Basmachis was undoubtedly of the Zealot variety; that of the young Bukharans was of the Herodian kind. Both failed. But it is worth noting that the most pronounced form of Zealotism in Turkistan was to be found not among the nomad tribesmen but among the *ulema* and the town populations — a curious reversal of the usual tendency. The nomads themselves were neither Herod-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

ians nor Zealots; they represented rather a positive and primitive way of life, which in a previous age had led them along paths of conquest but now awaited some fresh impact or infusion before it could release the energy that undoubtedly was theirs.

The conclusion is that neither Zealot nor Herodian will influence the outcome of the encounters between present-day Islam and the West, the former because he is a relic and therefore extinct as a living force, the latter because as an imitator he cannot himself create. The great majority of the Islamic society in contact with the West is made up not of protagonists, such as *ghazis* on the battlefields or mimetic statesmen, but of a mass of townsmen and peasants whose destiny in the USSR it is to be enrolled in a cosmopolitan proletariat. Of these what can be expected in the way of a creative contribution to the civilization of the future? Zealot and Herodian answer disdainfully — nothing! But Toynbee replies with another question, put in the mouth of a Roman of the Tiberian age: 'Can any good come out of Nazareth?' Should we then be foolish if we believe now that in Central Asia, under the impact of Russia, the underworld is once more stirring, and even that (as Toynbee says) 'we can discern certain spiritual movements which might conceivably become the embryo of new higher religions'?

At this point the contemporary student of Soviet thought and action in the colonial sphere will exclaim with impatient denial or with a shrug of despair, according to the promptings of his personal ideology. He may affirm that he can see no present sign of a positive and independent movement of the mind or soul of any Muslim people beneath the Stalinist sway. The waters under which they are submerged are too turgid, or the swirl of the current of conformity is too powerful, for anything to come to the surface and swim against it.

But there are two considerations which suggest that this judgment may be at fault. The first is that the very pressures of Soviet force and propaganda are apt, are indeed intended, to make us of the West blind and deaf to any spiritual visions or

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

undertones among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. We need to correct such defects of sight and hearing by acquiring a deeper knowledge of these peoples' real attitudes and history. I suggest that it is not necessary to go very far beneath the surface to become conscious of a stirring of the spirit that survives.

The second point is less obvious. If something new is indeed to emerge from the clash between Russian and Turk of Central Asia, it will not be just a resurrection of the unchanging and traditional bigotries of Bukhara, or even of the simple tribalism of the steppe. For much that is constructive and life-giving — for instance, a greater enlightenment among women — will have come in under cover of the new forces. Dead wood has been cut and new growth achieved. Persecution purifies. There will be memories of past inspirations, but the spark that is blown by that breath to flame will not illuminate the faces of a latter-day body of *ulema*, but of men and women who have been through Soviet schools. We need not expect the products of Soviet education superimposed on the Central Asian tradition to be of the stuff of a Gandhi or a Jinnah, for, paradoxically, such men are bred only in an English forcing-house. But they may be persons in their own way no less surprising. While tyranny is in full blast, they will bide their time; when it breaks, as break it must under stress of inner conflict, their opportunity will have come. When that time arrives, they will be well placed from their peripheral situation to make contact with the outer world.

In the more particular field of revealed religion we should not expect this encounter to give birth to some watered-down eclectic theosophy which seeks to assimilate the less challenging beliefs of Islam with those of other faiths. It is not for a Christian to foretell the emergence of a revivalist sect preaching some negative and syncretic philosophy, taken from the niches of an undefined and sentimental pantheon. We shall travel an austerer path. Christian and Muslim alike subscribe to the *Tauhid*[1] — I believe in one God; to appre-

[1] In Turkish *Tevhid*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

hend him both trust to the abandonment of prayer. Just as the encounter between East and West brought forth these revelations of the past, we may look for a strong and positive response from this new collision. And just because this collision of idea is so unequal and contrasted at the point where the proletarian system of Russia has met the old world of Islam, it is not impossible that men's minds will be opened to a new message vouchsafed from just this quarter, a revelation based on the older inspirations but under an original interpretation. Much as the Arabs in the VIIth century, following the lead of the Prophet of Islam, liberated the Middle East from the Graeco-Roman and Sassanian yokes, so may their Turkish successors free themselves from the Russian proletarian chains, marching under a new banner. And in these days it may even come to pass that this will be decided on what is now known as the cold war front. Looking forward into history, our successors could then say that the inert mass of stratified ritual and bigotry, which represented Islam as practised in Transoxiana before the Russians came, needed the violent impact of the encounter with Communism to reanimate it and rouse it to a new height of spiritual reaction. The resurrection could be won only at the cost of a descent into hell.

There is another point worth making. I have shown how Russian violence reached its peak in forcing the nomadic population off the steppe to be merged with the static sedentary population of the cities and oases. The consequences of such a displacement are not likely to evaporate in mere resentment: a new urban proletariat descended from the virile free-born pastoralists has been created, and the fresh mixture may supply the very element required to leaven the lump, the spark to set the whole fabric alight. Thus Russian violence would have been turned backward on itself, and a new revelation come to birth among the Eastern Turks.

Such a spiritual renascence might spring from within the body of the faith, as it has done before. One of the greatest and most original thinkers and theologians that Islam

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

has produced was Al-Ghazali,[1] like Firdausi a century earlier born at Tus just outside Meshed in the 450th Muhammadan year (A.D. 1058) and, after a life spent mostly in Baghdad or in retreat, dying at Tus where he was born in 505 (A.D. 1111). Al-Ghazali started as a highly orthodox theologian and exponent of the canon law. He then believed that the State should rigidly uphold the strictly orthodox faith and punish deviations. His subsequent reading of philosophy turned him to an absolute scepticism, and he became a declared unbeliever not only as to religion itself but as to the possibility of any certain knowledge. He laboured ineffectually to recover an intellectual and theological balance, and, in despair, turned finally to a Sufi mysticism. The exercise of the intellect had failed — what of direct revelation? After some years of discipline in mystic practice he returned to belief in God — or, as he put it, God restored to him his beliefs, but under the overwhelming influence of terror. His conversion was not unlike St. Paul's, but there is more emphasis on the anger of God which strikes down the obstinate and the unbeliever. In the throes of this conversion Al-Ghazali broke down both physically and mentally, and went into retreat.

When he emerged, he taught that a purely philosophical structure had no base. Philosophy was no more than mere 'thinking'; the philosophers could be understood by any intelligent man. There could be no metaphysics on a basis of pure thought. Even ultimate truths could not be founded on intellectual certainty, but only proved by the direct knowledge with which God floods the heart of the believer. The intellect could be used only to destroy trust in itself, and the only trustworthy knowledge was that gained through experience (*marifa*). By that experience the fact of prophetic revelation is established, and the truth of the theological structure assured. Only a great emotional experience could break the fetters of tradition and give the force needed to turn the current of the age.

[1] Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali al-Tusi. This account of his life is taken from the *Encyclopedia of Islam*. See also Bib. I, 6.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

Al-Ghazali's nervous prostration is believed to have been hastened by distress over tyranny, purges and assassinations at the Seljuk Court. As the years went on, he saw the fears which had caused his conversion as the reverse side only of the love of Allah, which he came to regard as the basis of the emotional life of the saints. His influence was exercised always for tolerance and charity, and he denounced all casuistry and every attempt to make the faith of the masses a structure of logically demonstrated articles (*akaid*). All who believed in the broad principles of Islam, he said, should be treated as believers. Many hold that indirectly Al-Ghazali's thought had an influence on the West, and flowed through Thomas Aquinas to affect Pascal.

For freedom of expression and a new interpretation, Al-Ghazali is remarkable among Muslim thinkers. He broke clean away from rigid formalism, he denounced tyranny, he preached charity and tolerance. Above all, he hated jargon. He brought the philosophers into the open and dissipated the glamour which then surrounded them, preaching that by philosophy the ultimate truth could not be reached. He showed that the basis of all religious certainty was ecstatic experience. His home was only a few miles from that frontier which divides Iran from Turan. After his death he was accepted as the great restorer of the faith. There were saints in Islam in those days. In this age of spiritual hunger, it may be that in the line of Al-Ghazali another inspired *mujaddid* (renewer) will arise, and point the way to all believers. Then will the meaning be clear of the shrine which Timur built over the grave of Ahmed Yesevi beneath the Kara Tav — the sacred place where Abilay also was laid to rest.

The great movements of history, which are in essence movements of the spirit, tend to have origin in regions where ideas and civilizations overlap. It was so with Judaism, and again with Christianity and Islam; Central Asia, like India, is a region of this kind, from which we may expect new forces to be set in motion in this age. There is good reason of recent showing for the belief that the older inspirations of the Central

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 Asian peoples have not yet failed; there are also grounds for supposing that the impact of the new has not been wholly destructive, but by a process of catalysis may even bring about some renewal of life. A re-birth of this sort is more likely in a society which has released women from subjection and cast off the outworn bigotry of mosque and school. From this meeting of old and new some offspring will surely be born. It is for the free world to forecast the delivery and nurse it when it comes.

181 The message sent out by those who would speak for the Eastern Turks is this:[1] In order to bring about the disappearance of the nations of Central Asia by complete assimilation, Russia will have to torture and oppress these millions for centuries. For even if the Russian domination were assured, the people of Turkistan will not forget their freedom so far as to renounce their languages and their faith. The dangers caused by the Soviet domination are indeed a reality on a scale never imagined, yet just as quickly and on just such a scale the day of the crack is approaching. The tide will turn and bring with it either liberation — or disappearance from the pages of history. Never has anyone been able to force a religion or course of action on the Turks. A nation has its own idealism — its own romance. Life moves forward and nothing can prevent a nation from developing.

Remembering how the Mongols came and conquered and passed away, Turkistan will struggle on, like the Oxus —

A foiled circuitous wanderer, till at last
The longed-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright
And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea.

[1] End of Togan, *op. cit.*

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

APPENDIX

TRANSLITERATION

A SYSTEM of transliteration of names should be consistent and broadly scholarly without being pedantic. It is particularly hard to observe this mean in the presentation of a Turkic nomenclature for English readers, and harder still when the theme is not Turkey but the Eastern Turks under Russian rule. The difficulty is still further increased by the fact that the Soviets have forced the Turkic and Iranian languages of Russian Central Asia into two distinct transcriptions, first a set of Roman letters, and then a set of Cyrillic letters. There have also been variants in the Roman and in the Cyrillic alphabets used to transcribe the various languages, *e.g.* a slightly different alphabet has been applied to Uzbek and Kazak. A final complication is introduced by my use of Togan's book in modern Western Turkish as one of the media through which these Trans-Caspian names are here presented for study. (It is consoling to observe that even Togan does not use an alphabet always consistent with that used in Turkey today, *e.g.* he introduces a '*q*' for Arabic ق, and a '*kh*' for Arabic خ, both unknown to the modern Turkish alphabet.) 197

2. Turkic nomenclature has often, by no means always, a Muslim background, but even then the value of the Arabic or Persian words is altered both in pronunciation and spelling, *e.g.* in the simplest case Mehmet for Muhammad. There are also the modifications (umlaut) on vowel sounds, and the vowel harmonies. In modern Turkish there is no '*kh*' (Russian *x*) for Arabic خ, its place being taken by a simple '*k*', but خ does exist in Eastern Turkic tongues. Finally, superimposed on the Persian and Arabic, one finds many names of pure Turkic origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174

3. For these reasons the accepted Western system of transliteration adopted by Arabists does not fit any Turkic tongue. For instance, 'Abdu'l Raḥman or Ḥafidh, apart from their pedantic look, do not represent the words as they are apprehended by a Turk's eye or ear, west or east of the Caspian. There is rather more to be said for the simpler Hunterian system as used for Muhammadan nomenclature in India, but that too misses the distinctive elaboration of vowel sounds to be found in Turkic languages. It has, however, the advantage of familiarity to an English eye, and some adaptation of it may be a possible solution.

4. Next to be considered is a system taken through the Russian. This has the advantage that it represents the written word within modern Turkistan, and is therefore familiar to the educated in the five Central Asian republics. It is, however, anathema to every Eastern Turk outside the USSR and, opposed as it deliberately is to the memories and traditions of a Muslim past, is probably to the distaste of many of the indigenous populations within the country. It is, moreover, clumsy, *e.g.* the use of *dʒh* for Arabic ج (jim) and the Russian patronymic *-ov* so strange to a Muslim ear. Why write *Tadʒhik* in English for *Tajik*, or *Shayakhmetov* for the son of *Shah Ahmed*?

5. There remains the modern Western Turkish Roman alphabet. In many ways this might be suitable, but it involves the use of the following:

c for English *j* (French *dj*, Russian *dʒh* дж)
ç for English *ch* (French *tch*)
ş for English *sh* (French *ch*)
h for Arabic and Persian خ (German or Scottish *ch*, Russian *x*).

N.B.—In English systems this is usually given as *kh*. In modern Western Turkish it has lost its original sound and is pronounced as an aspirated *h* only. But the original sound remains east of the Caspian. In any case, words such as

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Khiva, Bukhara, Khan look absurd in the dress *Hiva, Buhara, Han*.

ğ for Arabic and Persian غ (not unlike French *r*)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *gh*.

k for Arabic ك (not unlike *ck* in cock)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *q*.

ö as in German

ü as in German

ï (undotted) for Russian ы, something like English *u* in *hut* or *but*, or *y* in the adverbial termination *-ly*.

The use of all these in an English text would make it tiresome and unfamiliar to the general reader, and might introduce difficulty for the printer. All should be ruled out except ö and ü and possibly *k*.

6. It is easy to proceed so far negatively. As a positive contribution I suggest the following, which rejects the Russian and the scholarly Arabic, and represents a compromise between the modern Turkish and the Hunterian.

(*a*) *Vowels*. Adopt Western Turkish vowel signs except ï (undotted). (I have considered possibility of using *y* for ï, but this would be unsightly and unfamiliar, *e.g. Osmanly* for *Osmanlï*. On the whole it is probably better that ï (undotted) should appear without distinction from *i*.)

N.B.—I should modify this general principle in the case of names whose spelling has become standardized according to Hunterian values, *e.g.* write Samarkand, Farghana, Timur, Turk, not Semerkend, Ferghana, Temür, Türk.

(*b*) *Consonants*. Adopt Western Turkish consonants with following important exceptions:

(i) Turkish *c* to become *j*, *e.g.* Tajik, not Tacik, Tadzhik or Tadjik;

(ii) Turkish *ç* to become *ch*, *e.g.* Chaghatai, not Çaghatai or Tchaghatai;

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

194 (iii) Turkish *ş* to become *sh*, *e.g.* Shah, Sherif, not Şah, Şerif, Chah, Cherif;

(iv) Turkish *h*, when used for Persian or Arabic خ, to become *kh* (not *x*), *e.g.* Khan, Khiva, Sheikh, not Han, Hiva, Şeih;

(v) Turkish *ğ* to become *gh*, *e.g.* oghlu, not oğlu; Chağhatai, not Chagatai.

N.B.—I have considered what to do with Turkish *k* when used for ق. Scientific systems use *q*, but this would involve writing *e.g.* Qazaq, Qirghiz and Samarqand, all somewhat pedantic. Kazak and Kirghiz are probably better (Kazakh often used, following the Russian, is wrong in any case, the Arabic form being قزاق not قزاخ).

7. It is suggested that the text need not be complicated by using commas for *ain* and *hamza*. They are apt to give an air of dust, and are not very important for Turkic languages, for which is needed a system generally phonetic in intention and effect, yet conforming broadly with an educated approach to orientalia.

104 8. One name calls for comment. It may be said that Jengis, Jenghis, and Cheng(h)iz Khan are recognizable, but Chingiz is unfamiliar. On the system suggested Chingiz is a correct transliteration of the spelling adopted by Babur and others in Chaghatai. A correct transliteration from the original Mongolian would be Chingis, since there is no ڭ in the old Mongol writing.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953
RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197
162

REFERENCE

Kazak
Kirghiz
Turkmen
Uzbek
Taranchi, Turki
Karakalpak
Tajik

Broken lines:- Scattered and scarce population

No marks within U.S.S.R.:- Practically uninhabited, (deserts, high mountains, etc.)

To avoid complexity, areas of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the south have not all been marked

International frontier
Boundaries of Republics

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[facing page 272 - A]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197
162



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[facing page 272. - B]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197
162



[facing page 272: C]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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113

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[Page 282 = blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

INDEX

Abay, Ibrahim Kunanbay, Kazak poet (1845–1906), 223, 224-5, Bibliography
Abbasids, Caliphate (750–1258), 49, 51, 58
Abbott, Sir James, British Indian administrator (*fl.* 1846–60), 4
Abdul Ghaffar, Kazak Chief (*fl.* 1916), 90
Abdul Hamid Suleiman. *See* Cholpan
Abdullah, Shaibanid Emir of Bukhara (r. 1556–98), 66
Abdul Malik, Caliph (685–705), 48. *See* Umayyids
Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan. *See* Mir Alim
Abilay, Kazak Chief (d. 1781), 74, 181, 222, 224, 236, 267
Ab-i-Panja, 15. *See also* Amu Darya
Abul Ghazi, ruler of Khorezm (r. 1643–1663), 66, Bibliography
Achil Beg, Basmachi (*fl.* 1920–22), 240
Afghanistan, Afghan(s): neighbour to Russian Central Asia, v-vi, 3, 14, 76, 115; Turkistan, 13, 127; old name for, 14; physique of Town Turks compared to, 40; Powindahs, 42; war, 76, 123; defeat at Penjdeh, 81; Wakhan, 82; as buffer-state, 115-116, 122; support of Basmachis, 118, 124-5, 127, 241; revolution, 127 and n. *See also* Amanullah, Durranis, Ghazni, Habibullah, Kabul, Nadir Shah (ii)
Afridis, Pathan tribe, 100, 262. *See also* Khyber
Afshar, Turkmen tribe, 67. *See* Nadir Shah
Agha Khan, the, 39, 83
Agra, 218
Ahmed (Ahmet): (i) Yesevi, mystic (d. 1166), 13, 46, 55, 62, 166, 242, 267; (ii) Aghaiev, Azeri exile (*fl.* 1920–30), 156; (iii) Pasha, Ottoman poet (*circa* 1500), 220; (iv) *see* Togan
Akbar, Great Mughul (1542–1605), 34 n., 66
Akin (Kazak bard). *See* Nisembay
Ak Mechit. *See* Kizil Orda
Akmolinsk, town and rail junction, north Kazakistan, 195
Aksu, tributary of Amu Darya, 15, 23 n.
Alai, mountain range, 15, 55
Alash Orda, Kazak provisional government, 104, 107, 143, 183
Alexander the Great, 17, 55, 80
Alexandria, 222
Algeria, 141
Al-Ghazali, theologian and mystic (1058–1111), 266-7, Bibliography
Ali Khan Bukai Khan (*fl.* 1916–20), 101, 104
Ali Shir Nevayi, Eastern Turkish poet (1441–1501), 64, 216, 218-20, 225, 229
Allen, W. E. D., vi
Alma Ata, capital of Kazakistan, 57, 141, 148, 159, 212
Almalik: (i) Chaghatai capital, 57; (ii) copper site near Tashkent, 192
Alphabets, 155-7. *See also* Cyrillic, Roman
Alsace, 3
Altai, mountain system, 18, 228
Amanullah, King (r. 1919–28), 127 n.
Amin Hussaini, El-Hajj, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, 250
Amu Darya (Oxus, Jaihun), river: as Russo-Afghan frontier, vi, 12, 76, 81; defining region inhabited by Eastern Turks, 2, 5, 50; giving name to Transoxiana, 14; and Sir Darya, 14-16, 23-6, 49, 227; and Karakum, 15; and Kizilkum, 15; tributaries of, 15; issues from mountains, 16; as boundary between Turan and Iran, 17, 50, 65-6; and Matthew Arnold, 23, 268; old course of, 23-6; origin of name Oxus, 23 n.; and Turkmens, 51; as navigation channel, 86; and Khiva, 86, 200; in relation to internal boundaries, 145; as source of irrigation, 146-7, 202-9; floods from, 161; railway along, 194-5. *See also* Ab-i-Panja, Irrigation, Matthew Arnold, Sir Darya, Togan, Transoxiana

[Page 284 = blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

regret over elimination of Khorezm, 144, 145; warnings about waterlogging, 200. *See also* Bibliography
Bashkiria, Bashkir (Bashkurd), 7, 41, 95, 100, 104-9, 119, 143, 190, 244
Basmachi(s): collective name of Central Asian Turkish tribes, mainly Uzbek, resisting Soviet reconquest (1918–31), 13, 21, 34, 42, 100-101; lit fuse laid by Dükchi Ishan, 88-9, 128; connection of Togan with, 99; resemblance to Afridis, etc., 100; derivation of word, 100 n.; leaders, 101, 120, 124, 240; persistence, 101, 127-8; supporters of Bukhara Emir, 118, 121, 124; relations with intellectuals, 120-122; Jemal Pasha and, 123; Enver Pasha and, 123-4; significance of, 127-30; attitude to the clergy, 240; as Zealots, 262. *See also* Castagné, Devletmand, Ibrahim Lakai, Toghay Sari
Batu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 57, 58, 59. *See* Golden Horde
Bayezid, Ottoman Sultan (r. 1389–1402), 46, 64
Begovat, new Soviet town on Sir Darya, 16
Bekovich, Prince (d. 1717), 77
Beljuvan, town in Tajik country, 101, 124-5
Berke, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 59, 60. *See* Golden Horde
Bernal, Professor J. D., 205 n., Bibliography
Betpak Dala, Steppe of Misfortune, 15, 18, 20, 25. *See also* Mirza Chöl
Beveridge, Mrs., 14 n., 217 n., 218, Bibliography
Beymembet, Kazak envoy, 75
Bilingualism, 32-4
Birge, J. K., American Turcologist, 37 n., Bibliography
Bismarck, 125
Black Sea, 70, 97. *See also* Crimea
Bokhara, 30. *See* Bukhara
Bolshevik(s): distinction between practice and profession, 6, 97, 105-10, 127, 133, 140 n.; temporary alliance with Turkish intellectuals, 91, 95, 98, 102; difficulties in Central Asia, 96; and Mensheviks, 99, 103, 117; at Tashkent, 100, 102-3, 114, 117; at Kokand, 104; in Bashkiria, 105-9; and Malleson, 116; and twenty-six Commissars, 117; sponsorship of Jemal and Enver Pashas by, 122-3; comparison with Tsars in colonial field, 230; negotiations with Basmachis, 240; pressure on clergy, 240. *See also* Cantonization, Collectivization, Colonization, Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Deviationism, Dogmas, Kremlin, Lenin, Party, Secession, Stalin
Borak, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 60
Boulangier, French engineer, 80. *See* Skobelev
Bourgeois nationalism. *See* Nationalism
Bowra, Sir M., 223 n., Bibliography
Buddhist influences, 50, 72
Bughra Khan (XIth century), 50. *See* Karakhanids
Buguruslan, oilfield, 190 n.
Bukhara: Mangit Emirs of, 4, 67-8, 76, 82, 100, 118; centre of Independence Movement, 7, 95, 121; Vambéry's history of, 30; bilingualism in, 32, 34; captured by Karakhanids, 50; captured by Chingiz, 56; destroyed and rebuilt twice, 60; captured by Shah Ismail, 65; seat of Shaibanids and Mangits, 66-7, 148; captured by Nadir Shah, 67; seat of orthodoxy and fanaticism, 69, 70-71, 84, 97, 100, 179, 239; as Russian satellite, 76, 83, 85, 95, 100, 108, 114, 143; as Peoples' Soviet Republic, 118, 144; and young Bukharans, 118-21, 262; Enver Pasha in, 123, 126; absorbed in Uzbekistan, 144; dialect of Uzbek spoken in, 221; library of, 222. *See also* Bokhara
Bulgars, 36
Bum (Buam) gorge on River Chu, 18
Burnes, Sir Alexander, British Indian Envoy and explorer (*fl.* 1830–41), 4, Bibliography
Bursa (Brusa), 46, 51
Byron, 225
Byzantium, Byzantines, 64, 215. *See also* Constantinople, Istanbul

Cairo, 243, 262
Canada, 3, 13
Canals. *See* Irrigation and Waterways
Cantonization, 144-9
Cape of Good Hope, 27
Carroll, Lewis, 40

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Caspian Sea: as western limit of Central Asia, 3, 13, 46, 68, 112, 247; relationship to Karakum and Ust Yurt, 15-16; situated in depression, 16; remnant of larger sea, 22; one-time destination of Amu Darya, 23-6, 53; refuge of Shah of Khorezm, 56; in relation to irrigation and power projects, 204-7, 212. *See also* Trans-Caspia(n)
Castagné, French Turcologist, 88, Bibliography
Cathay. *See* Kitai
Caucasus, the: distinguished from Transcaspia and Central Asia, 1, 45; geological uplift of, 26; conquered by Chingiz, 56; struggle against Russian conquest, 74, 126, 185; temporarily overrun by Turkey (1918), 115; threat to India from, 116; military defeat of Enver in, 122; movement for revision of script in, 155; as origin of Marr's Japhetic theory, 158; name of modern journal, 238 n., Bibliography; German Turkish legionaries drawn from, 246-7, 251-3. *See also* Armenia, Azerbaijan, Baku, Georgia, Shamil, Transcaucasia
Caucasus, journal, 238 n., Bibliography
Census, Soviet, 2 n., 162-72
Central Asian Railway. *See* Trans-Caspian
Central Asian Turks. *See* Turks, Eastern
Chach (Shash), old name of region around Tashkent, 14
Chaghatai: (i) second son of Chingiz (XIIIth century), 36, 54, 56-8; (ii) dynasty and horde, 27, 54, 60-61, 70; (iii) literary language, 32, 43, 55, 64, 126, 216-22
Chaldees, the, 55
Charjui (Tchardzhou), town on Trans-Caspian line near Amu Darya crossing, 194, 206
Chekishler, town on Caspian near Persian frontier, 78
Cherkes Hussain, companion of Enver, 125
Chernaiev, Governor-General (*fl.* 1865-1884), 77
Chimion, oilfield in Farghana, 196
Chimkent, city in Uzbek part of Kazakistan, 76, 88, 192, 212
China, Chinese: and Communism, 2, 216; conquest by Mongols, 27, 54, 56, 61; conquers conquerors, 36; and Kitai, 52-3; and Cathay, 53; ruled by Yüan dynasty, 54, 57; Silk Road from, 69; as claimant to power in Central Asia, 71; and Kalmucks, 71-2; negotiations of Abilay with, 74. *See also* Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), Chingiz, Kublai Khan, Manchus, Marco Polo, Peking
Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang): contrasted with Russian Turkistan, vi, 1-2, 13, 15, 18; discoveries of Aurel Stein in, 2, 22; position of Khan Tenri in relation to, 15 n., 19; farthest in world from sea, 29; part of Chaghatai inheritance, 57; ruled by Manchus, 82. *See also* Kashghar, Khotan, Kulja, Taklamakan, Tarim, Yakub Beg
Ching. *See* Manchus
Chingiz (Jenghis) Khan (1162-1227): conquers China, Turkistan and Persia, 27; divides empire between four sons, 27, 56-7; and hordes, 27, 58-9, 65; invasion of Transoxiana, 32, 48; enemy to Islam, 35, 59; ancestor of Babur, 36; turcization of followers of, 36-7, 46, 59-60; dynasty of, 48, 54; and the Kitai, 52; and the Khorezm Shahs, 55-6; destroys Bukhara, 60; his empire compared with that of Russia, 61; contrasted with Timur, 63; ancestor of Shaibani Khan, 65; Skobelev spiritual descendant of, 80; and Kazaks, 85; ancestor of Chokan, 225; spelling of name, 272
Chirchik, river of Tashkent, 197, 211
Chitral, 39, 82. *See also* Gilgit, Ismailis
Chkalov. *See* Orenburg
Chokai (Chokaiev), Mustafa (d. 1941), Eastern Turkish leader, 7, 97, 101, 104, 119, 243-4, 247, 253, Bibliography
Chokan, Velikhan, Kazak writer (d. 1865), 225-6
Cholpan (Abdul Hamid Sulaiman), Uzbek poet (b. 1897), 229
Chu, river: once possibly draining Issik Köl, 18, 25-6; Balasagun on, 50, 53; scene of Kirghiz defeat by Russians, 85; railway junction, 195-6; irrigation from, 201
Chuguchak, frontier post with Sinkiang, 18
Chuvash, people and language, 36

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Clavijo, González de, Spanish Envoy to Timur (1403–6), 4, 59, Bibliography
Clergy, Clericalism, 35, 84, 96, 239-42, 250-51. *See also Ulema*
Coates, W. P. and Zelda, 135 n., 140 n., 180 n., Bibliography
Collectivization, 137, 173-88. *See also* Bolsheviks
Colonization, 84-5, 98, 140-43, 162-72. *See also* Bolsheviks
Conolly, British Envoy (d. 1841), 4, 68, Bibliography
Constantinople, 59 n., 64, 220, 262. *See also* Byzantium, Istanbul
Constitution, Soviet, 149, 154. *See also* Secession
Cordova, 3
Cortez, 68
Cossacks: derivation of word, 38 n.; invasion of Khiva, 77; savagery of, 79; opposed to Bolsheviks, 103-4, 114; companion of Enver, 125; friendly with tribes, 152, 215; confiscation of lands by Bolsheviks, 152
Cotton, 85-6, 96, 142, 179, 192-3, 197, 202, 212
Crimea(n): conquered by Turco-Mongols (XIIIth century), 59; conquered by Ottomans (1475), 59 n.; War (1854–6), 74; Soviet proclamation to, 105; meeting of Togan with Stalin near, 110; climate, 141; birthplace of Gaspirali, 226; refugees, 243. *See also* Jafar Krimer
Crusades, the, 261
Curzon, Lord: author of classic on Persia, 5; author of notable work on Central Asia, 5,13, 95, Bibliography; Gibbon his literary exemplar, 5; description of desert, 22; laudation of Samarkand architecture, 62-3; appraisal of Skobelev, 79-80, 88
Cyrillic script, 155-7, 253. *See also* Alphabets, Roman
Czaplicka, M., 14 n., Bibliography

Dalai Lama, 72
Damascus, 3, 49
Danube, 261
Darius, 67
Dava, Chingizid (XIVth century), 54, 60
Davidov, J., Soviet planner, 207-8
Declaration of Rights: made on 15th Nov. 1917, 105; providing for secession, 105; association of Lenin and Stalin with, 105, 133-4; set aside, 108; emotional appeal of, 139; belied in practice, 143, 149, 151, 160
Delhi, 67
Deniltin, General, 97
De Quincey, 28, 70, 71, 133, 139, 162, 173, Bibliography
Deviationism, 74, 230-38, 241. *See also* Bolsheviks
Devletmand, Basmachi leader, 101, 124-125
Dnieper, 204
Dogmas, Soviet. *See* Bolsheviks, Evil, Proletariat
Don, river, 41, 57, 204
Dresden, 250
Dükchi Ishan, village priest and rebel leader (d. 1898), 88-9, 128
Duma, 101
Dunsterville, British general, 116
Durranis, Afghan dynasty (1747 to present day), 51, 65, 71
Dutov, Cossack commander, 105-6

Education, 97, 154-7, 161, 255
Egypt, 200, 206, 262. *See also* Alexandria, Cairo
Elizabeth, Elizabethans, 64, 66, 217
Emancipation. *See* Women
Emba, river and oilfield, 196, 199, 212-213
Enver Pasha (d. 1922): association of Togan with, 7, 95, 99, 125; epic of, 8, 124; Tajiks and, 40; and pan-Islam, 45, 126; and Basmachis, 101, 124-5, 127-8; and brother Nuri, 115; successor, 118; defeat at Sarikamish, 122; sponsorship by Bolsheviks, 123; idealism, 124-5; death of, 124-125; views on language for Central Asian Turks, 126; reputation in Britain, 126; and pan-Turkism, 126-127; and intellectuals, 128. *See also* Basmachis, Haji Sami, Jemal Pasha
Epic. *See* Heroic poetry
Erdebil, town in Persian Azerbaijan, 28
Erskine, British Indian scholar (*fl.* 1816–1826), 217 n., 218, Bibliography
Ethnology, 32-5. *See also* Linguistics
Euphrates, 14
Evil, Conception of the Lesser, Soviet dogma, 91 n., 231-2
Evkaf, religious endowments, 152, 240

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL

Faizullah Khojaev, Uzbek Communist, 160
Farghana: Kokand, capital of, 7, 20, 68; the home of Babur, 14; name of upper Sir Darya basin, 14; importance during caravan age, 18, 28; description of, 20-21, 71, 85-6, 178; agricultural and industrial importance of, 21, 85-6, 212; centre of Basmachi movement, 21, 100, 128; compared with Kashmir and Peshawar, 28, 85-6; Kipchaks in, 37; mouth at Khojent, 39, 86; Russian conquest of, 77, 79, 83; the name of new Margilan, 79; rebellions in (1898 and 1916), 88-91; Russian colonization of, 98; part of Tsarist province of Turkistan, 143; division into three parts by Soviets, 146, 147; Uzbeks in, 148; climatic contrasts in, 181; mineral wealth of, 192, 196; cotton and silk cultivation in, 197, 212; irrigation in, 201; hydro-electric works in, 211; the heart of Central Asia, 212; seat of the best Uzbek, 221. *See also* Andijan, Khojent, Kirghiz, Kokand, Tajiks, Uzbeks
Farkhad, hydro-electric station named from legend, 210
Firdausi, Persian poet (Xth and XIth centuries), 17, 50 n., 266
Five-year plans, 88, 137-8, 213
Flecker, J. E., 48
Fraser-Tytler, Sir W. K., 51 n., 76 n., Bibliography
Frontiers, inter-republic, 143-9
Frunze: (i) General, 112, 134, 143; (ii) capital of Kirghizia (Pishpek), 112, 148, 212

Gandhi, Mahatma, 89, 264
Ganges, 261
Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, Crimean writer (1851–1914), 46, 226-7
Georgia, 46, 110, 156 n., 246
German dealings with Central Asian and Caucasian Turks, 246-53. *See also* Dresden, Göttingen, Himmler, Hitler, Rosenberg, Ostministerium
Ghazi, Islamic equivalent of a crusader, 124, 262-3
Ghazni, Ghaznavids (962–1160), 12, 50, 56. *See also* Mahmud (ii)
Ghilzai, Afghan tribe of Turkish origin, 42, 51. *See also* Khalij, Powindah
Ghulam Alim, Volunteer commander, 249
Ghuzz. *See* Oghuz
Gibb, E. J. W., 220, Bibliography
Gibb, Prof. H. A. R., Bibliography
Gibbon, 5, 80
Gilgit, 39, 82
Gobi, 68
Gök Tepe, scene of Turkmen defeat (1881), 67, 79-81
Golden Horde, the: name of followers of western Mongols under Juchi, 27, 41, 54, 57; distinction from Chaghatai horde, 27, 57; temporary control of Khorezm by, 27, 60; on the Volga, 36; *turquization* of, 41; limits of, 56-57; control of much of Russia by, 57; practical independence of, 58; ancestors of Tatars, 59; descent of Uzbeks from, 65, 70; nomadic tradition of, 181
Goldman, Bosworth, 9 n., Bibliography
Gorchakov, Prince and Chancellor, 75-76
Grigoriev, Tsarist Turcologist, 30
Gur Khan, title of Kara Kitai, 53
Gurkhas, 47
Guryev, Caspian port at mouth of Ural River, 196, 212

Habibullah, Durrani Emir (1901–19), 115. *See also* Afghanistan
Hafiz, Persian poet (1320–89), 40
Haji Sami, Enver's successor, 127-8
Hanafi, most orthodox of the four Sunni schools in Islam, 35, 50 and n.
Hari Rud. *See* Tejen
Harun. *See* Karakhanids
Henry III of Castile (XVth century), 4. *See* Clavijo
Hentig, von, German envoy, 115
Herat: city of, 16; importance under Timurids, 27, 64, 218-20; decay of, 27; monuments of, 46; included in Chaghatai area, 57; seat of literary culture, 64; inclusion in Persia, 65; inclusion in Durrani Kingdom, 65; and Penjdeh, 81; birthplace of Ali Shir Nevayi, 218. *See also* Hussain Baikara
Herodians, 262-3
Heroic poetry, 74, 222-9, 234-5
Himalayas, 2, 15
Himmler, 248

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Hindu Kush, mountains, 1, 13, 15-17, 50, 68, 71, 81, 82, 129
Hindustan, 14, 31, 64. *See also* India
Hissar (Russ.: Gissar), mountains, 32 n., 202
Hitler, 248
Holdich, Sir T., 198, Bibliography
Holdsworth, Mrs., 140 n., 184 n., Bibliography
Hormuz, old emporium on Persian Gulf, 27
Howorth, Sir H. H., 56 n., Bibliography
Hulagu, Chingizid (r. 1258–65), 27, 54, 58, 60. *See also* Ilkhans
Humayun, Mughul Emperor (1511–56), 36 n., 217
Hungary, Hungarians, 6, 30, 45, 58, 103, 116
Hunter, Sir W. W., Hunterian system, 270
Hussain Baikara, of Herat (1438–1505), 64, 65, 218. *See also* Ali Shir Nevayi
Hydro-electric power, 192-3, 197, 203, 205, 207, 209-12

Ibrahim Lakai, Basmachi chief (d. 1931), 101, 121, 124, 127-8
Ilak Khans. *See* Karakhanids
Ili, river: migration route, 1, 18; once known as Mughulistan, 14; ancient importance of, 24; Almalik situated near, 57; disputed between Chaghatai and Ogodai hordes, 57; arrival of Russians on, 74, 98
Ilkhans, Chingizid dynasty in Persia and Irak (XIIIth and XIVth centuries), 27, 46, 58, 69. *See also* Hulagu
Imams, 250-51. *See also Ulema*
India: compared with Turkistan, 2-3; Mughul dynasty in, 14, 31, 34 n., 37; derivation of word 'Sart' from, 39; army of, 47; refuge of Khorezm Shah, 56; as route to Mecca, 66; designs of Uzbeks on, 66; conquest by Nadir Shah, 67; maritime route to, 69; Hindu Kush and, 71; withdrawal of British from, 76-7; defence by buffer states, 82, 115-16; separated from Russia by Wakhan, 82; threat to, 115-16, 117-18; Jemal Pasha and, 122; Enver Pasha and, 123; British as sojourners, not settlers, in, 141; irrigation in, 200, 206. *See also* Hindustan
Indus, 42, 56. *See also* Attock
Inland waterways, 192-3, 202, 204, 207-8
Intervention, period of, 6, 97, 115-18, 234
Irak, 14, 27, 115. *See also* Baghdad
Iran. *See* Persia
Iranian influences, 32-5, 39-40, 40 n., 47, 49, 65-8. *See also* Linguistics, Nadir Shah, Safavids, Samanids, Tajiks
Irgesh, of Kokand, 104
Irkishtam, frontier post and pass between Farghana and Kashghar, 18
Irrigation, 20, 21, 25-6, 192-3, 197-209. *See also* Hydro-electric, Inland waterways
Irtish river, 20, 37, 207
Isfahan, 28, 66. *See also* Safavids
Ishan. *See* Dükchi Ishan
Ishim, river, 20, 207
Ishimbay, oilfield in Bashkiria, 189 n., 190 and n., 196, 212, 213
Ish Murad, Enver's companion, 125
Iskandar Köl, lake, 17
Ismail: (i) Gaspirali. *See* Gaspirali. (ii) Shah, founder of Safavid house, 35, 65
Ismailis, heretical sect of Shiahs, 39 and n., 83. *See also* Agha Khan
Issik Köl, lake, 15, 18, 19, 25-6, 74
Istanbul, 8, 25, 28, 66, 71, 118. *See also* Byzantium, Constantinople

Jafar Krimer, Crimean émigré leader, 243
Jaihun. *See* Amu Darya
Jalaluddin, last of royal house of Khorezm (r. 1220–31), 56
Jambul, Kazak bard (1846–1945), and city, 212, 235-6
Jami, Persian poet (XVth century), 220
Jamuga, rival of Chingiz Khan, 55
Janids, Bukhara dynasty (1599–1784), 54, 66
Japhetic theory, 157-8. *See also* Marr
Jaxartes. *See* Sir Darya
Jemal Pasha (d. 1922), 120, 122-3
Jenghis Khan. *See* Chingiz
Jezkazgan, copper site, 191, 195, 212
Jinnah, Kaid-i-Azam, 264
Jizak, Uzbek town, 199
Johnson, Dr., 219
Juchi, eldest son of Chingiz (d. 1227), 41, 54, 56-8, 65, 70. *See also* Golden Horde
Junaid Khan, Khivan leader, 127, 148

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 Jungaria (northern Sinkiang), 2, 13, 14, 18, 57, 61, 207
Jüre Beg, Uzbek notable, 43-4

Kabul, Afghan capital, 14, 71, 123, 129
Kafirnihan, Amu Darya tributary, 15
Kaganovich, Lazar, 134
Kaghan, new Bukhara, 119
Kaidu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 58
Kajars, Persian dynasty (1779–1922), 67
Kalat-us-sin. *See* Rebat Tamgach
Kalmucks, 43 and n., 71-2, 246
Kama, river, 190 n.
Kamenev, 109
Kanat, Kirghiz chief, 85
Kandahar, 14, 50 n.
Karaganda, coal centre in Kazakistan, 195, 196, 212, 213
Karakalpak, tribe, language and ASSR, 32-3, 145-6. *See also* Nukus
Karakhanids (Ilak Khans), Turkish dynasty (*circa* 999–1137), 50, 52-3
Kara Kitai, Chinese dynasty in Turkistan (*circa* 1137–1200), 52-3, 55, 56
Karakoram: (i) mountain system, 1, 15; (ii) Mongol capital, 57
Kara Kulja, tributary of Sir Darya, 15
Karakum, desert: the Black Sands, 15, 16; Sarikamish depression north of, 23-4; irrigation of, 26, 202, 204-8; oases in, 67; railway construction in, 194
Kara Su, tributary of Sir Darya, 15
Karatav, hill range, 18, 62, 74, 267
Karategin, district in Tajik country, 15, 23 n.
Kartali, railway junction on N. Kazak frontier, 195
Kashghar, 1, 18, 50, 52, 57, 116. *See also* Chinese Turkistan
Kashka Darya, river, 17, 62, 197, 202-3
Kashmir, 22 n., 27, 39 n., 223 n.
Kasim, father of Kine Sari, 75, 236
Kaufmann, Governor-General (1867–1882), 77 and n., 78-9
Kayum Khan, Veli: his lingua franca, 43, 221 n., 254; Editor of *Milliy Türkistan*, 221 n., Bibliography II, 4; of Uzbek origin, 243; leader of young emigration, 243, 252-6; his quality, 243, 252; on common Turkistani nationality, 244, 253-6; successor to Chokai, 244, 247; his emphasis on independence, 245, 254; dealings with Germans, 247-9; organiser of volunteers, 247-50; founder of NTUC, 248-9; distrust of older emigration, 256
Kazakistan, Kazak(s): defined as Eastern Turks, vi; inclusion in Russian Central Asia, 2; area and population, 2 n., 140 and n., 162-72, 213; climate in north, 20; linguistic distribution of, 32-3; distinction from Uzbeks, 33, 148, 254-5; descent from Kipchaks, 37-8; tribal organization, 37, 43; origin of name, 38 n.; not a tribal name, 42; essentially nomadic, 42-3, 83; attitude to the faith, 43, 239; character, 43; distinctions and affinities, 47, 148, 254-6; and Kalmucks, 71-2; confusion with Kirghiz, 72 n., 84, 105 n.; struggle against Russian conquest, 73-5, 89, 100; forced south, 84; Russian colonization, 84-5, 162-72; share in Merdikar rebellion, 90; expropriation, 100; in 1917, 102; Alash Orda, 103-4, 107; percentage of population in USSR, 140 n.; correspondence with Steppe Territory, 143, 162; in relation to other republics, 144-5; delay in grant of full status as SSR, 145, 162, 175-6; capital at Alma Ata, 147-8; Academy of Sciences, 159; Russianization, 162-72; conversion into proletarians, 163, 183; suppression of nomadism, 169, 175-6, 180-84; genocide, 172; as mechanics, 179; loss of herds, 184; relation to Urals, 190 and n.; industrialization, 190-91, 212-213; Mointy–Chu railroad, 195-6; Karaganda, 196, 212-13; irrigation, 199, 201, 207, 209; source of Siberian rivers, 207; coal and copper, 212; wool production, 213; 1950 targets, 213; epics, 222-4; poets, 224-6, 227-8, 235-6; deviationism among, 234-6; distinctions from other Turkish stocks, 255. *See also* Abay, Abilay, Chokan, Jambul, Kine Sari, Maghjan, Nomadism
Kazan, 102, 125
Kazemzadeh, 119 n., Bibliography
Kelif, town on Oxus, 16, 202, 206
Kemal (Mustafa), Kemalist. *See* Atatürk
Kent-Turks (Town-Turks), 40-41, 47. *See also* Sarts

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Kenya, 141
Kerensky, 99, 101
Kerim, Enver's companion, 125
Kerki, town on Oxus, 202, 206
Kesh, birthplace of Timur, 32 and n., 44, 48, 62
Khalij (Khalji), 51. *See also* Ghilzai
Khanikov, explorer, 4
Khan Junaid. *See* Junaid
Khan Tenri, mountain, 15 and n., 19 and n. *See* Tienshan
Khiva: early visits to, 4; slavery in, 4, 77; Russian conquest, 5, 76-9; old name, 51, 53; early impregnability, 53, 77; foundation, 66; Khans of, 66, 121, 222; Turkmen raids, 67; becomes satellite state, 83; disappearance, 95, 146, 162; young Khivans, 101, 118; as Peoples' republic, 118, 144; Junaid of, 127, 148; absorption in Karakalpakistan, 162. *See also* Khorezm
Khojent, city in lower Farghana, 16 and n., 32, 34, 39, 53, 57, 86, 146, 194. *See also* Leninabad
Khorasan, the plateau of West Persia and Afghanistan, 14, 49, 51, 57, 60, 65
Khorezm: geographical description, 14; old capital, Urgench, 14, 53, 66, 194; decline, 23-4; destruction by Mongols 27, 55-6; Shahs of (1097–1220), 53-56; as Muslim outpost, 53; 'the hushed Chorasmian waste', 53-5; frontier town, Otrar, 55-6; disputed between Golden and Chaghatai hordes, 58; disputed with Persia, 66; becomes State of Khiva, 66; final elimination by Soviets, 144; artificial division, 146; as one seat of Uzbeks, 148; irrigation in, 200, 206. *See also* Khiva, Muhammad Shah, Otrar, Urgench
Khotan, city in S. Sinkiang, 2
Khyber, 117
Kiefert, German engineer, 205
Kilich Arslan, Seljuk, 127
Kim, oilfield in Farghana, 196
Kine Sari (*fl.* 1837–46), Kazak chief, 74-5, 90, 181, 224, 236. *See also* Abilay, Deviationism, Kasim
Kipchak, name of tribe, 20, 33, 37-8, 41, 55
Kirghizia, Kirghiz: area and population, 2 n., 171, 213; linguistic location of, 32; distinctions and affinities, 47, 254-256; flight before Mongols, 55; location, 55; confusion with Kazaks, 72 n., 84, 105 n.; kill Kine Sari, 75, 224; share in 1916 rebellion, 85, 190; share in Merdikar rebellion, 89; share in Basmachi movement, 128; delay in attainment of SSR status, 145; overlap into Farghana, 146; capital, Frunze, 146; essentially nomadic, 175, 181; stock-raising, 184; epics, 223, 226. *See also* Frunze, Poetry
Kirk, G., 14 n., Bibliography
Kitab, town near Samarkand, 32 n., 44. *See* Kesh
Kitai, Russian name for China, 52-3. *See* Kara Kitai
Kizilkum (the Red Sands), desert, 15, 55, 78
Kizil Orda, town on Sir Darya, 24
Kohik, river. *See* Zarafshan
Kokand, city: capital of Farghana, 7, 20-21, 68; seat of 'independent' government, 7, 68, 97, 114, 121; conquered by Russia, 77, 79, 83; captured by Bolsheviks, 104, 143; connected by rail, 194
Kolchak, Admiral, 97, 106, 114
Kolkhoz, 173-4, 178-80, 186, 209, 214
Komarov, Tsarist commander, 81
Kopet Dagh, hill range dividing Iran from Turan, 16-17, 65, 83, 202, 206
Kotaiba-ibn-Muslim, Arab conqueror of Transoxiana (VIIth century), 48, 257
Kovalev, Communications Minister, 195
Krasnokamsk, oilfield, 190 n.
Krasnovodsk, Caspian port, 24, 87, 104, 205-6
Kremlin, the: as source, 9; establishes 'ethnic' republics in Central Asia, 13; Skobelev as lodestar of, 81; as Elisha to Tsarist Elijah, 97; partiality for glosses, 108; temporizing policies, 108, 118; and Jemal Pasha, 122; and Declaration of Rights, 133, 141; and administrative divisions of Central Asia, 143, 146; and local nationalists, 238. *See also* Bolsheviks, Kaganovich, Kuibishev, Lenin, Stalin
Krinitsky, Boris, publicist, 189
Krist, Gustav, Bibliography
Kriukov, land administrator, 85
Kublai, Great Khakan and Chingizid (r. 1257–94), 27, 54, 58

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Kuenlun, mountain system dividing Sinkiang from Tibet, 68
Kuibishev, the man, 110, 112, 134; the city, 190 n.
Kulaks, 176-7, 178-9, 183, 190
Kulja, city on Ili in N. Sinkiang, 18, 57
Kungrad, in Khorezm delta, 194-5
Kunrad, copper site near Balkhash, 191, 212
Kuropatkin, Governor-General (1914-1917), 77 n., 90, 252
Kurtish, location in Turkmenia, 24
Kushk, border-post towards Afghanistan, 194
Kutluk Nigar, mother of Babur (XVth century), 36, 54, 60
Kuyuk, Chingizid (d. 1248), 54, 58
Kuznetz, Central Siberia, 190
Kuznetzev, land administrator, 84

Lahore, 239
Languages, 32-4, 40 n., 43, 47, 221 and n., 254
Lattimore, Prof. O., Bibliography
Leao, Chinese dynasty, 52. *See* Kara Kitai
Lenin, V. I.: negotiates with Togan, 7-8, 99, 110-11; signs Declaration of Rights, 105; as realist, 111; views on 'colonial' nations, 111, 123, 133-4, 150; Togan addresses letter to, 112-113. *See also* Bolsheviks
Leninabad, city, 16 n., 146. *See* Khojent
Lermontov, 225
Lesser Evil, Soviet dogma, 91 and n., 231-2
Leyden, British Indian scholar, 217 n., Bibliography
Linguistics, 32-4, 154-7, 254-5. *See also* Iranian influences, Ethnology, *Ortatili*
Literature, Eastern Turkish, 36, 45-6, 55, 74, 216-29. *See also* Ali Shir Nevayi, Babur, Chaghatai (iii), Heroic poetry
Littlepage, American engineer, 20, 176, 182-3, Bibliography
Lomakin, Tsarist general, 79, 87
Lorimer, F., 172 n., Bibliography

MacGahan, American freelance, 79
Maclean, Fitzroy, 9 n., 84, 135, Bibliography
Maghjan Jumabay, Kazak poet (b. 1894), 223, 227-8
Magnitogorsk, 190, 196
Mahmud (i) of Kashghar (XIth century), 19; (ii) of Ghazni (r. 998-1030), 50 and n.; (iii) Yalavash, Vezir to Chingizids (XIIIth century), 60
Maillart, Ella, 160 n., Bibliography
Malaya, 141, 161
Malleson, Sir W., British General, 116, 117, Bibliography
Manas. *See* Heroic poetry
Manchus (Ching), Chinese dynasty (1643-1912), 2, 18, 68, 82
Mangishlak, peninsula on Caspian, 16, 78
Mangit, clan-name and name of last Bukharan dynasty (1785-1921), 41, 66-7, 82
Mangu, Chingizid (XIIIth century), 54, 58
Manicheism, 239
Mao Tse-Tung, Chinese Communist leader, 18 n.
Marathas, Indians of Bombay Deccan, 47
Marco Polo (1254-1324), 19, 58, Bibliography. *See also* Silk Road
Margilan, town in Farghana, 79, 104 n., 197
Marr, N. Ya., Russian linguist (d. 1934), 157-9
Marxism, 215-16, 234-5
Masud Beg, vezir to Chaghatais (XIIIth century), 60
Masum, Mangit Emir, 67
Matthew Arnold, 23, 224, 268
Mavera-un-nahr, 14. *See* Transoxiana
Mecca, 66, 239
Medreses, Muslim schools, 46, 62, 68, 118, 259, 261
Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt (XIXth century), 262
Melasgird, battlefield in Anatolia (1071), 51
Mensheviks, 99, 104, 117
Merdikar, revolt against Tsars (1916), 89, 128
Merkit, Turkish tribe, 55-6
Merv, city in Turkmenia, 4, 6, 17, 65, 67, 76, 81, 116-17
Meshed, capital of Persian Khorasan, 116-17, 266
Millij Türkistan, journal, 221 n., Bibliography
Min, Kokand dynasty (1700-1876), 68, 85
Minorsky, Prof. *See* Bibliography
Mir Alim Khan, Abdul Said, last Mangit Emir (fled to Afghanistan, 1921), 100, 118, 121, 124

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Mirza Chöl, steppe desert, 199 and n., 200, 210
Moisty-Chu, railway link, 195-6
Mongol(s), Mongolia: cross boundary between Turan and Iran, 17; inundate Turkistan, 19, 32, 36, 41, 51, 55-6, 59-61, 65, 70; and Turks, 31, 36-7, 38, 41-3, 59-61, 65; and Chinese and Russians, 36; descent of Timur and Babur from, 36, 62; relationship of Uzbeks to, 41-2; tribal divisions, 43 n.; Kalmuck section of, 43, 71-2; place in pan-Turanism, 45; under Chingiz Khan, 48; and Kitai, 52; dynasty, 54; sons of Chinghiz, 54, 56; origin of Chaghatai, 55, 64; Chingiz Khan and, 55, 61; capture of Khorezm, 55-6; capture of Bukhara and Samarkand, 56; invasion of Russia and Europe, 56-7, 58, 70; *ulus* and *orda*, 56-8, 60; extent of empire, 57, 61; become Yüan Emperors of China, 57; embrace Islam, 59-60; dislike of cities, 60, 62; compared with Russian Empire, 61. *See also* Babur, Chaghatai, Chingiz Khan, Golden Horde, Hulagu, Juchi, Kublai, Ogodai, Tsars, Timur, Tului
Morocco, 141
Moscow, 102, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 233. *See also* Kremlin
Mughals, Emperors of India (1525–1857), 36-7, 64, 71. *See also* Akbar, Babur, Humayun, Mongols
Muhammad, Shah of Khorezm (1199–1220), 53-5
Murghab, river, 17, 202
Mustafa: (i) Cholkai. *See* Cholkai; (ii) Kemal. *See* Atatürk

Nadir Shah (i) of Persia (r. 1736–47), 67; (ii) of Afghanistan (r. 1929–34), 127 n.
Napoleon, 72, 80
Narin, tributary of Sir Darya, 15, 89
Nasrullah, Mangit Emir of Bukhara (1827–60), 4, 68
Nationalism: among Eastern Turks, 7-8, 127-30, 137, 264, 268; a common, for Turkistan, 47, 128-30, 148-9, 237-238, 244-6, 253-6; pre-revolutionary, 74-5, 88-91, 230-31; Soviet lip service to, 74, 90, 102, 105, 108, 139-40, 146, 149-51, 230; bourgeois or local native, 74, 90-91, 151, 160-61, 229, 230-38; of intellectual 'young' parties 101-2, 103-4, 118-19, 120, 231; Stalin and, 105, 108, 109-10, 112-13, 134, 142, 146, 149-51; Lenin and, 105, 110-12, 133-4, 150; in conflict with Doctrine of the Proletariat, 108, 149-151, 230; Enver and, 123-7; among the emigration, 130, 243-6, 253-6; undermined by cantonization, 143-9, 221; declared a deviation, 151, 160-161, 230-38; crushed by the Party, 151-2; fostered by lingua franca, 221 and n., 222, 253-4; focused in literature, 222-9; and Pokrovsky, 231; in conflict with Doctrine of the Lesser Evil, 231-2; and Great Russia, 232-4, 237; identified with pan-Islam and pan-Turkism, 238; and the faith, 239-242; proved by World War II, 246-256. *See also* Deviationism
Nauruzbai, Kazak patriot, 236
Navigation. *See* Inland waterways
Nebit (Neft) Dagh, oilfield in Turkmenia, 196, 212, 213
Nehru, Mr., 121. *See* North-West Frontier
Nejd, Saudi Arabia, 262
Nicholas, Grand Duke (XXth century), 200
Niedermeyer, von, German general and orientalist, 115
Nigeria, 141
Nizambay, Kazak poet (XIXth century), 224
Nogai, clan-name, 37, 41
Nomadism, Nomads: associated with the steppe, 29, 34-5, 47; characteristic of genuine Turkish stock, 33; attitude to the faith, 35, 239, 259-61; the sinews of migration, 35; mixed Turco-Mongolian stock of, 36-8, 41; represented by Kazaks, 42-3; encroachment on cultivation, 59; dependence of Timur on, 62; return as shepherd-kings, 65, 70; oppose Tsarist advance, 74-5; as justification for Tsarist advance, 75; forced south by conquest, 83-4; one force behind local nationalism, 100; dislike of dictators for, 145, 153; suppressed, 145, 153, 180, 184-8; collectivization, 153, 169, 178, 174-6; as proletarians, 171, 175-6, 182-3, 265; used as fodder for factory labour, 171, 182-3; way

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of life on steppe, 180-82; way of life on mountain, 180-82; adherence to custom, 239; not Zealots, 262-3. *See also* Abilay, Collectivization, Kine Sari, Stock-breeding
North-West Frontier, of India (now Pakistan): consolidation of, v; a region of overlap, 3; scene of Ghilzai migrations, 42; tribes compared with Basmachis, 100, 121; German attempt to disorganize, 115; in 1946, 121; and Nehru, 121; fastness of Zealotism, 262. *See also* Abbott, Afridis, Pakistan, Peshawar, Waziris, Yusufzai
Nukus, capital of Karakalpakistan, 145, 205
Nuri, brother of Enver Pasha, 115

Ob, Siberian river, 20, 207
Obedullah Khoja, Uzbek intellectual, 101
Oghush, river. *See* Vakhsh
Oghuz, Turkish tribal confederacy, 37, 41, 50-51
Ogodai, third son and successor of Chingiz (XIIIth century), 54, 56-8
Oil, 21, 190, 192, 196, 212-13
Oirat, Mongol tribe, 71
Omsk, Siberian city, 72
Orenburg (Chkalov), 72, 78, 105-6
Orsk, city, 72, 196, 199, 212
Orta Tav, hills, 20
Orientii, lingua franca, 43, 221 n., 254. *See also* Languages
Osman (Othman): (i) founder of Ottoman dynasty (r. 1290–1326), 51; (ii) Khoja, Uzbek intellectual, 101, 118, 243
Osmanli, language, 126
Osmanlis, 19, 126. *See* Ottomans
Ossipov, Bolshevik renegade, 103-4
Ostministerium, 247, 249
Othman. *See* Osman
Otrar, ancient city of Khorezm, 55, 56, 60
Ottomans, the: war with Safavids, 28; descended from Oghuz, 37, 51; relationship with Eastern Turks in art, 45-6, 220; successors to Seljuks, 51; Othman, the eponym, 51; war with Nadir Shah, 67; kinship with Turkmens, 67; Enver and, 124; debt to Ali Shir Nevayi, 220; reaction to Crusades, 261. *See also* Osmanli(s), Turks (Western)
Oxus, vi, 14, 23 n. *See* Amu Darya
Özbek. *See* Uzbek
Özboy, dry river-bed, 23-6, 205, 207, 211. *See also* Amu Darya, Irrigation, Sir Darya

Pakistan, 3, 39 and n., 82 n., 254. *See also* N.-W. Frontier, Panjab, Peshawar
Pamirs, the, 1, 15, 39, 76, 82, 204. *See also* Amu Darya, Badakhshan, Sarikol
Pan-Islamism, 44, 126, 236
Panjab, Panjabis, 47, 82, 198, 200, 203, 254
Pan-Turanism, 44-5, 126
Pan-Turkism, 44-6, 236, 248
Paranja. *See* Veil
Paropamisus, mountains, 16
Party, the, 99, 151, 151-4, 238, 240. *See also* Bolsheviks, Dogmas
Pascal, 267
Pashtu, language of the Pathans, 21 n., 39, 86 n.
Pathans (Pashtuns, Pahktuns), 21 n., 39, 47, 121, 254
Paul, St., 89, 266
Peking, 56, 57
Penjdeh, district in Turkmenia, 76, 81
Perovsky, Russian general (1839), 77
Persia (Iran), Persian(s): neighbour to Russian Central Asia, v, 3, 116; Curzon's classic on, 5; name of north-eastern, 14; and Turan, 16-17; poets, 17, 40, 50 n., 220, 235; conquered by Mongols, 27; rise of Shiism in, 28, 35, 52 n., 65-6; influence on language and stock, 32-4, 40 and n., 49; rule in Transoxiana, 34, 49; attitude to the faith, 34-5, 39; Tajiks and, 39-40; conquered by Arabs, 48; place in Arab armies, 49; conquered by Seljuks, 51; Azerbaijan, 52 n.; war with Shaibani Khan, 65; Nadir Shah of, 67; Russian pressure on, 76; vestibule to India, 116; Bailey escapes to, 117. *See also* Iranian influences, Khorasan, Meshed, Persian Gulf
Persian dynasties. *See* Afshars, Ilkhans, Kajars, Reza Shah, Safavids, Samanids, Sassanians,
Persian Gulf, 27
Peshawar: outlook from, vi, 101; compared with Farghana, 28, 86, 89; trade with Bukhara, 71; news of Basmachis reaches, 101; fanaticism in, 239. *See also* North-West Frontier

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Peter the Great (1672–1725), 77, 205
Petroleum. *See* Oil
Petropavlosk, city and railway centre, 72
Pipes, R. E., American research scholar, 107-9, Bibliography
Pishpek, 112, 148. *See* Frunze (ii)
Poetry, Heroic, 74, 222-4; Kazak and Kirghiz, 222-4, 224-8; Uzbek, 223, 229; Ottoman, 220, 242. *See also* Abay, Ahmed (i), Alseddin, Alishir Nevayi, Cholpan, Maghjan
Pokrovsky, Russian historian (1868–1932), 231
Poland, 58
Political, British Indian Service, 116 and n.
Population, 2, 136, 138 and n., 162-72, 214
Portuguese, 27
Powindahs, 42. *See also* Ghilzai
Prester John, 53
Proletariat, Doctrine of the, 142-3, 149-151, 232
Punjab. *See* Panjab
Pushkin, 225

Q in transliteration, 269-72
Quincey. *See* De Quincey

Radek, Comintern leader, 113
Radloff, Russian scholar (1837–1918), 5, 30, Bibliography
Railways, 86-8, 192-6
Rayev, companion to Enver, 124-5
Rebat Tamgach, on Özboy, 24
Registan, central square at Samarkand, 62-3
Religion. *See* Ahmed Yesevi, Al-Ghazali, Clergy, Deviationism, Ismailis, Nationalism, Nomads, pan-Islam, *Sheriat*, Shiahs, Sunnis, Togan, *Ulema*, Yunus Emre, Zealotism
Reza Shah of Persia (r. 1925–41), 185
Rhodesia, 141
Roman script, 155-6, 253
Rosenberg, Nazi Minister, 247-8. *See* Ostministerium
RSFSR, definition of, 144 n.

Saadi, Persian poet (1184–1282 or 1291), 40, 225, 235
Safavids, Persian dynasty (1502–1736), 28, 35, 51, 65-6. *See* Erdebil
Said Mir Alim Khan. *See* Mir Alim
Saihun. *See* Sir Darya
Saksaul, desert flora, 208 and n.
Samanids, Persian dynasty (*circa* 872–999), 35, 49-50
Samarkand: mystery of, 4-5; unvisited from the West, 4-5; isolation of, 4-5, 258; conquered by Tsars, 5, 76, 83; taken and lost by Babur, 31; beauty of, 46, 62-3; under Karakhanids, 50; included in Chaghatai domain, 57; Timur and, 62-3; taken by Safavids, 65; violated by Nadir Shah, 67; connected by rail, 87; Uzbek spoken at, 221; clericalism at, 239
Sami. *See* Haji Sami
Samoylovich, Russian scholar, 30, 231, Bibliography
Sarikamish (i) in Turkmenia, 16, 23-4, 205; (ii) in Anatolia, 122, 125
Sarikol, mountain range and district, 15
Sarts, settled population in Transoxiana, 34, 39, 42, 105, 200
Sassanians, pre-Muslim Persian dynasty (overthrown in 642), 48
Satpaiev, Kazak scientist, 159-60
Schlesinger, R., publicist, 173 n., Bibliography
Schuyler, American Consul, 4-5, 20, 23, 43, 76, 77 n., 78 n., Bibliography
Scott, American mechanic, 190-91, Bibliography
Script. *See* Arabic, Cyrillic and Roman
Secession, right of, 105, 139, 149-51
'Second Baku', 190 and n., 196, 212
Seljuks, Turkish dynasty (*circa* 1037–1150 in Turkistan), 27, 37, 51, 55, 267. *See also* Turks, Seljuk
Semipalatinsk, 88, 104
Semirechye. *See* Yedisu
Serakhs, in Turkmenia, 202
Shahr-i-Sabz, 32 n., 44, 62. *See* Kesh
Shahzinda, shrine at Samarkand, 63
Shaibani Khan (d. 1510), Uzbek founder of Shaibanids (1500–99), 48, 64-6, 128
Shamanism, 242, 260
Shamil, Caucasian resistance leader (*fl.* 1820–60), 74, 126, 185
Shannon, river, 210
Shcherbina, Tsarist administrator, 84
Shehit, Islamic equivalent of a martyr (in battle), 124
Sheriat, the, 47, 84, 239
Shiahs, Shiism: in Persia, 28; becomes State religion under Safavids, 28, 35;

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 Ismaili sect of, 39 and n.; in Azerbaijan, 52 n., 251; antipathy between Sunnis and, 66, 71, 251. *See also* Sunnis
Shorsu, oilfield in S. Farghana, 196
Siberia, 19, 68, 69, 72, 83, 87, 190
Sikhs, 47
Silk Road, 19, 69
Sinkiang. *See* Chinese Turkistan
Sir Darya (Jaxartes, Saihun), river: and Amu Darya, 14-16, 23-6, 49, 227; and Kizilkum, 15; and Betpak Dala, 15; tributaries of, 15; issues from mountains, 16; old course of, 23-6, 53; Oghuz Turks cross the, 50; Russian conquest pushed up, 72, 86; as navigation channel, 86; railway up, 87; in relation to Soviet boundaries, 146-7, 209; as source of irrigation, 146-7, 201, 209; Kazaks on, 199; in poetry, 227. *See also* Farghana, Irrigation, Karakulja, Narin, Sukh
Skobelev, Tsarist commander: at Khiva and Kokand, 79; most distinguished Tsarist commander, 79; city named after him, 79, 104 and n.; victory at Gök Tepe, 79-81; butcheries, 79-80; tradition of ruthlessness, 79-80, 90, 252; character, 80-81; death, 80; lodestar of Stalin, 81; pushes Trans-Caspian railway, 87-8
Skrine, Sir C., Bibliography
South Africa, 141
Sparta, 191
SSR, definition of, 144 n.
Stalin, J. V.: negotiates with Togan, 7-8, 99, 109-10; high-priest of Soviet colonialism, 7, 134; as source, 9, 142, 144, 146, 149-51; temporizes with nationalist leaders, 105, 109-10; signs Declaration of Rights, 105; as Georgian understands nationalism, 110; Togan writes to, 112-13; related to Kaganovich, 134; real views on nationalism, 142, 150-51, 233-4; and Doctrine of Proletariat, 142, 149-51; attitude to Bukhara and Khiva, 144; justifies national frontiers in Central Asia, 146; professions and practice, 146, 149-51, 151-2; book on the National and Colonial question, 149-50, Bibliography; parodied, 151-152; action against nationalism by, 152-4; on linguistics, 157-9; and the cow, 188; foresight of, 189; as master-planner, 189, 206, 214; Farghana canal named after, 201; and conventional aesthetics, 237. *See also* Deviationism, Dogmas, Nationalism, Proletariat, Bibliography
Stalinabad (Dushembe), capital of Tajikistan, 118, 148
Statistics, 2 and n., 135-6, 162-72. *See* Census
Stein, Sir Aurel, archaeologist, 2, 22
Stepnoi Krai, Tsarist province, 143
Stock-breeding, 184-8
Stoddart, British envoy (d. 1841), 4, 68
Stolypin, Tsarist minister, 98, 164
Sudan, the, 141
Sukh, tributary of Sir Darya, 15
Sunnis, Sunniism: original identification of Persians with, 34-5; in most orthodox form, 35, 50 and n., 51; antipathy between Shiahs and, 66, 71, 251; exaltation of *ulema* by, 239; as creed of all Central Asian Turks, 251. *See also* Hanafi, Shiahs
Surkhab (Kizilsu), river, 23 n. *See* Vakhsh
Surkhan, tributary of Amu Darya, 15
Syzran, oilfield, 190 n.

Tagore, Rabindranath, 229
Tajikistan, Tajiks: area and population, 2, 171, 213; linguistic distribution of, 32-4, 146; bilingualism among Uzbeks and, 32, 34, 146, 244, 254; of Iranian stock, 32, 33, 34; overlap into Afghanistan, 32, 82; language uncertain criterion between Turks and, 34, 39; good cultivators and craftsmen, 39; distribution of Persian-speaking, 39; character of, 39-40; hill, 39, 67, 82; followers of Agha Khan, 39, 82-3; Persian poets as honorary, 40; Soviet characterization as focus of Persia, 40; influence in towns, 68; as refuge of Emir, 118; as ASSR, 144-5; as SSR, 145; adjustments of boundaries with Uzbekistan, 146; confused boundaries of, 146-8; in relation to rivers, 147, 209; irrigation in, 147, 209; Stalinabad capital of, 148; increase of population, 171; climate of, 181; stock-breeding in, 184; minerals in,

192, 196; cotton in, 197; hydro-electric stations in, 211; planning targets in, 213; distinctions and affinities, 254-5. *See also* Farghana, Pamirs, Stalinabad, Vakhsh
Takhya Tash, headworks of Turkmenian Canal, 195, 205, 206
Takhlamakan, central desert of Sinkiang, 22
Talash, river, 18, 24, 25, 55
Tamerlane. *See* Timur
Tarim, river, 2, 22-3
Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan: Tsarist conquest of, 5, 76; old name of, 14; Kaufmann starts from, 78; as capital of Tsarist Turkistan, 83, 87, 143; railway communications with, 87; approached from Transcaspia, 88; Bolshevik hold on, 102-3, 114, 117-118; Ossipov at, 103; Austrian prisoners at, 115; Bailey at, 116-17; capital of Uzbekistan, 148; still the focus of Central Asia, 148, 212; coal near, 196; irrigation round, 197; Stalin institute at, 197; hydro-electric stations near, 211
Ta(r)tar(s): definition of, vi; in De Quincey, 29, 70, 133, 139, 173; amalgam of Turk and Mongol, 38, 41, 42, 59; and Golden Horde, 59; on Russian steppe, 83, 105, 141, 215; Russian intermingling with, 83, 141
Tawhid, the, part of the Muslim creed, 264
Tchaikovsky, Tsarist officer, 25
Teheran, 239
Tejen (Hari Rud), river, 17, 67, 76, 202
Tennessee Valley, 198, 204
Terek Davan (pass), 18
Thomas Aquinas, 267
Thucydides, 128
Tienshan, mountains, 1, 3, 15, 18, 19, 74, 185, 210, 212
Tiflis (Tbilisi), capital of Georgia, 123
Tigris, river, 14
Timur (Tamerlane) (r. 1369–1404), Timurid: Clavijo's embassy to, 4, 59; birthplace of 17, 62; name, 17 n.; summer retreat, 19; Babur descendant of, 31, 36; conquests, 32, 37, 62-4; essentially a Turk, 36; dynasty, 48, 62-4; his capital, 62; his monuments, 62-3; tradition of, 63-4, 260, 267; violation of grave of, 67; mentioned, 85, 190, 227; literature, 216-22
Tirich Mir, summit of Hindu Kush, 82
Tito, Josef B., 105
Tobol, tributary of Ob, 20, 207
Togan, Prof. Ahmed Zeki Velidi (Velidov), author of *Turkistan today*, vi, 8-9, 95, 244; nationalist leader, 7, 128-30; as historian, 7, 128-30; relations with Lenin and Stalin, 7, 8, 99, 109-11, 112-113; a Bashkurd, 7, 95 n., 99, 104-112; admirer of Enver, 7, 95, 99, 124-7; quotes Mahmud Kashghari, 19; describes Turkish Olympus, 19; on courses of rivers, 23-5; marshals tribal detail, 37 n.; on Tajiks, 40; on Town-Turks, 40-41; on Uzbeks, 41-42, 44, 129-30; on Kazaks, 43; on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, 44-46; on religion, 44-5, 130, 239-42; on Timur, 63; on Kizil Sari, 74-5; on Russian imperialism, 81, 159; on Tsarist land policy, 84-5; on rebellion against Tsars, 88-91; in Bukhara, 95, 112, 124, 129-20; on Basmachis, 101, 124, 127-30; on intellectuals, 101, 120, 128, 130; letter to Lenin and Stalin, 112-13; on parties in Bukhara, 119-20; on Jemal Pasha, 122-3; on Junaid Khan and Haji Sami, 127-8; on centralization, 148; on miscegenation, 159; on irrigation, 199-200; as source for Eastern Turkish literature, 223-9; gives credit for Eberhard under Tsars, 224; his proverb on Turkish character, 238; professed Soviet contempt for, 257-8; his final message, 268
Toghay Sari, Basmachi leader, 120-21
Toksak, 25
Tolstoy, Leo, 225
Toynbee, Prof. Arnold, 28, 261-3, Bibliography
Transalai, mountains, 15
Trans-Aral, railway, 87-8, 194
Transcaspia, 1, 13, 88
Trans-Caspian, railway (Central Asian Railway), 87-8, 193
Transcaucasia, 77, 105
Transliteration, 269-72
Transoxiana (Mavera-un-nahr): overlap between Muslim world and Russia, 3; old name, Mavera-un-nahr, 14; or Transoxania, 14 n.; rivers of, 17; change of course of rivers in, 23; oases of, 34-5, 38; sedentary population of, 34, 38, 141; Turkish civilization of,

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

36; Persian influence in, 40-42, 48-9, 220-21; Mongol element in, 41; Arab conquest of (690), 48, 257; revolt against Umayyids, 49; Abbasids in, 49; Samanids in, 49; Islam in, 49, 62; Karakhanids in, 50, 52; Karakitai in, 52-3; Mongol conquest of (1220), 55-6; Turkish reconquest of, 60; Timur in, 62; isolated by sectarianism, 66; Shaibanids in, 66; isolated by steppe, 71; Russian advance into, 83, 85; Russian colonization of, 98, 241; intensive cultivation of, 141; *Sherist* in, 239; bigotry in, 265

Trans-Siberian railway, 72, 87-8, 194-5

Trotsky, Leo, 109-10, 112

Tsars, the: as forerunners of Soviets, 3-4, 161, 230-34, 252; isolate Turkistan, 5-6, 91, 134; oriental scholarship under, 5, 30, 222-3; material achievements, 10; Tsarist theories on river-courses, 25-6; dominion in Siberia, 69, 72; reach Aral Sea, 72; reach Sir Darya, 72; conquer Kazak steppe, 74; justify conquest, 75-6; conquer Tashkent, Samarkand, 76; conquer Bukhara, Khiva, 76-9; under Peter the Great, 77, 205; overcome Turkmens, 79-81; violently suppress rebellions, 79-81, 88-91, 96; take Merv and Penjdeh, 81; occupy Pamirs, 82; retain Bukhara and Khiva as satellites, 83-4, 85; colonize the steppe, 83-5, 98, 163-5; press cotton cultivation, 85-6, 193; pursue railway construction, 86-8, 193-4; collapse, 90, 95; Soviet attitude to, 91, 206, 230-32, 233; intern prisoners in Turkistan, 96; neglect education, 97; exclude Turks from army, 98; Dumas, 101; supported by clergy, 102; as producers, 136; their administrative organization in Turkistan, 143, 190; attitude to irrigation, 153, 198-200, 206; Tsarist statistics, 162-5, 170, 172 n.; attitude to agriculture, 198-200; liberalism under, 224-5

Tuimazi, oilfield, 190 n.

Tului, Chingkiz (XIIIth century), 27, 54, 56, 57

Tunis, 141

Turan, Turanian basin: definition of, 3, 14-15; rivers of, 14-15, 17-18, 20, 23-26; compared with Irak, 15; mountain-rims, 15-17, 227-8; partly below sea-level, 16; seen from South, 16-17, 129; and Iran, 17, 267; diversion of Arctic waters into, 20, 197, 204, 207; pre-Russian history, 30; pan-Turanism, 44-5; Persian influences in, 49; Buddhism in, 50; petty Emirs in, 68; Russian occupation of, 81-3

Turgay, river and town on Kazak steppe, 207

Turkey: focus of Western Turks, vi, 1; opposed to pan-Islamism, 45; and to political pan-Turkism, 45; Turcological research in, 45-6; and Turkish cultural bonds, 46, 155-6, 220, 228; Sunniism of, 50 n., 52 n., 66; rise of Ottomans in, 51-2; capture of Constantinople, 59 n., 64; captures Baku, 115; in World War I, 122; and Enver Pasha, 122, 127; and alphabets, 155-6; literary debt to Eastern Turks, 220; in Eastern Turkish poetry, 228. *See also* Atatürk, Ottomans

'Turkic', definition of, vii

Turkis, Turks of China, vi, 1, 219 n.

'Turkish', definition of, vii

Turkistan, Chinese, *q.v.*

Turkistan, Russian, 1-28 *et passim*

Turkistan (Yese), the town, 13, 46, 55, 62, 166, 242, 267. *See* Ahmed (i)

Turkmenia, Turkmen(s): really Western Turks, vi, 37, 42, 51, 148; area and population of, 2, 171, 213; linguistic distribution of, 32-3; overlap with Uzbeks in Khorezm, 32-3; distinctions and affinities, 47, 255; relations with Seljuks, 51, 67; and with Ottomans, 67; as tribal warriors, 67, 78-9; formidable resistance to Russian conquest, 67, 76, 78-9, 81, 85, 87; butchery by Kaufmann, 78-9; and by Skobelev, 79-80; scene of first railway in Central Asia, 87; climate of, 141; as part of Tsarist province, 143; as SSR, 144; in relation to other republics, 147; capital at Ashkabad, 148; stock-breeding in, 185; Canal, 189, 205-8, 211; oilfields in, 196, 212; Karakum Canal, 202; hydro-electric stations in, 211; cotton production in, 213; 1950 targets in, 213; epics, 223; deviationism among, 235. *See also* Gök Tepe, Irrigation, Kopet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Dagh, Krasnovodsk, Merv, Nebit Dagh, Tejen
Turks, Eastern (Central Asian): definition of, vi, 1; in Russian and Chinese Central Asia, 1; as field of Russian scholarship, 10, 30; confused origin of, 31, 33; subdivisions of, 32, 47, 143-9, 253-5; languages and stock-origin of, 32-4, 43, 47, 221 and n., 254; and Tajiks, 32, 34, 40, 254; antithesis of Cain and Abel, 34; Turkmens excluded except in geography, 37, 41, 51-2, 148; Kipchak ancestry, 37-8, 41; in political theory, 44-6; and Western Turks, 45-6, 52, 220; cultural links in Turkdom, 45-6; unified nationalism among, 47, 127-130, 148-9, 237-8, 244-6, 253-6; position early in XVIIIth century, 68-69; isolation and bigotry among, 68-9; and Golden Horde, 70; military tradition of, 98; exclusion from Tsarist service, 98; four forces among, 99-101; leaders of, 101, 113, 243; dilution by colonization, 140-43, 161, 162-71; possessed no proletariat, 142, 149-51; Soviet division of, 143-149, 221, 253; industrialization of, 166-71, 190-91, 192, 214; and emancipation of women, 179, 241-2, 264, 268; and nomadism, 180-84; and Ali Shir Nevayi, 220; their literature, 220, 222-9; attitude to the faith, 239-42, 250-51, 260-61; fight for Germany, 246-53; demand religious instruction, 250-51; Zealots and Herodians among, 262-3; new revelation among, 265; vision of future of, 267-8. *See also* Karakalpaks, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Turkis, Turkmens, Uzbeks
Turks, Oghuz, *q.v.*
Turks, Ottoman, *q.v.*
Turks, Seljuk: descended from Oghuz, 37, 51; conquests of, 51; defeat Byzantines, 51; kinship with Turkmens, 51; attitude to the faith, 51; collapse, 51; their successors, 51; struggle with Kitai, 52-3; their tyranny, 267
Turks, Town. *See* Kent-Turks and Sarts
Turks, Western: definition of, vi; descended from Oghuz, 37; kinship with Turkmens, 37, 51; links with Eastern Turks, 45-6, 52, 220, 241; move in Caucasus, 115; under Jemal and Enver, 122, 128; in literature, 220, 228, 242. *See also* Azeris, Enver, Ottomans, Turkey, Turkmens
Turk-Sib, railway, 88, 193
Tus, town in Persian Khorassan, 266

Ukraine, Ukrainians, 109, 140 and n., 163
Ulan Bator, capital of modern Mongolia, 57
Ulema, the: subjection to Persian influences, 40; bigotry of, 40, 45, 259; confined to cities, 40, 262; loyalty to Emir, 100, 102, 259; as conservatives, 119; as prototype of Communist rigidity, 259; no resurrection of, 264. *See also* Clergy, *Imams*
Ulu Tav, hills, 20, 74
Ulugh Beg, Timurid (d. 1449), 62, 64
Umayyids, Caliphate (661–750), 48-9, 257
'United States of Russia', 244-6
Ural, Urals, river, mountains: Bashkiria in, 7, 41, 106, 244; the Kipchak in, 37, 41; no dividing-line between Turkish tribes, 59; Kine Sari on, 74; Russianization both sides of, 83, 141, 215; mentioned, 99; Great Russians in, 107; outside Kazakistan, 189 n., 191; site of heavy industry, 190; focus of 'Second Baku', 190 n., 212-213; included in Greater Turkistan, 244; source of mercenaries under Germans, 246. *See also* Ishimbay, Magnitogorsk, Togan
Urgench, old capital of Khorezm, 14, 24-25, 53, 60, 66, 194
Urumchi, capital of Chinese Turkistan, 2
Ust Yurt, desert plateau, 16, 23
Uzbekistan, Uzbek(s): defined as Eastern Turks, vi; area and population of, 2, 171, 213; and Kipchaks, 20, 33, 37, 41; linguistic distribution of, 32-4; overlap into Afghanistan, 32; bilingualism with Tajiks, 32, 34, 146, 244, 254-5; mingling with Turkmens, Karakalpaks, and Kirghiz, 32-3; language, 32-4, 40 and n., 41, 221 and n., 254; and Kazaks, 33, 41, 145, 255; true, 33, 37, 42, 129-30; usurpation of name by Town-Turks, 40-41; Mangit and Nogai tribes of, 41; origin of name, 41; Uzbek

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Khan, 41, 54, 59, 65; character of, 42, 43-4, 129-30; Jüre Beg, 43-4; distinctions and affinities, 47, 146-8, 253-256; Shaibanids, 54, 65-6; Janids and Mangits, 54, 66, 67-8, 95, 100, 118; Mongol mingling with, 59, 70; and Golden Horde, 65, 70; of Khiva and Bukhara, 66, 67-8, 95; conflict with Durranis, 71; revolt in 1916, 89-90; of Tashkent, 102; Lakai tribe, 101, 120-21, 124; in Basmachi movement, 129-30; tolerance of true, 130; percentage of population in USSR, 140 n.; as SSR, 144-5; includes Karakalpakistan, 145; adjustments with Tajikistan, 146; confusion of boundaries, 146-7; capital at Tashkent, 148; deviationists, 160, 235; cropping in, 197; irrigation in, 201, 202, 209; planning targets in, 213; industrialization of, 214; epics, 223, 235; poetry, 229; bourgeois-nationalism among, 160, 235; feudalism among, 235; leaders, 243; common ground with Tajiks, 254-5. *See also* Basmachis, Bukhara, Chokai, Farghana, Kayum Khan, Khiva, Samarkand, Tashkent, Transoxiana

Uzun Ada, old port on Caspian, 87

Vakhsh (Oghush, Kizilsu, Surkhab), main tributary of Amu Darya, from which name Oxus is probably derived, 15, 23 n., 197, 201, 211

Vambéry, Arminius, Hungarian Jewish scholar, 4, 30, 45, Bibliography

Veil, discarding of, 179, 241-2, 268. *See also* Women

Velidov, 7, 257. *See* Togan

Venice, 58, 63

Vienna, 64

Vladivostok, 87

Vlassov, Russian émigré leader, 249

Vogüé, Vicomte de, 5

Volga: and Özboy, 24; Turks (Tatars) on, 36, 41, 105, 141, 244, 246; Mongols reach, 57; Kalmucks on, 71-2; 'Second Baku' on, 190 n.; irrigation, etc., on, 204

Wakhan, Afghan border district, 21

Waterlogging, 198, 200, 208

Waterways, Inland, 86, 202, 204-5, 207-208. *See also* Irrigation

Wavell, Lord, 121 n.

Waziristan, Waziris, 100, 121

Wiener (Winner), Dr., American Slavonic scholar, 46 n., Bibliography

Wilmot, Chester, title-page

Wolff, Dr., Anglican priest and explorer (early XIXth century), 4, Bibliography

Women, emancipation of, 179, 241-2, 264, 268

Wrangel, General, 97

Wurm, Dr. S., vi, Bibliography

Yakub Beg, Emir of Kashghar (*fl.* 1860-1880), 18

Yasa(k), the Turkish customary law, 47, 239

Yedisu (Semirechye), district of the seven rivers in N.E. Kazakistan, 18, 57, 103, 224, 227

Yeni Darya, former bed of Sir Darya, 24-5

Yenisei, Siberian river, 55, 207

Yese (Yassi), old name of town now known as Turkistan, *q.v.*

Yirav, minstrel poet, 223

Yüan, Mongol dynasty in China (1250-1367), 54, 57. *See* Kublai, Mongols

Yulduz, mountain pasture, 19

Yunus Emre, Anatolian mystic (d. 1308 ?), 46, 242

Yusuf Akchura, Azeri exile, 154

Yusufzai, tribe and district on N.-W. Frontier, 86

Zarafshan (Kohik), river, 17, 20, 71, 197, 201, 202-3

Zealots, 260-3

Zeki Velidi. *See* Togan

Zinoviev, 113

Zoroastrianism, 49

THE END

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113, 668 Bashkir RF3

[For information on the involvement of the Bashkirs in eastern Turkic nationalism during the Soviet period, see 2: Caroe, RL1 Soviet Central Asia, category 116, passim.]

4: Laix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Ciba Review 40

Basle . August 1941

Turkestan and Its Textile Crafts

Contents:

Turkestan
By A. Laix . . . . . page 1434

Costumes of the Settled Population of Turkestan
By A. Laix . . . . . „ 1441

The Nomads of Turkestan and their Dress
By A. Laix . . . . . „ 1450

Felted and Knotted Fabrics in Turkestan
By A. Laix . . . . . „ 1457

Embroidery in Turkestan
By A. Laix . . . . . „ 1464

Notes . . . . . „ 1466

Scientific Notes . . . . . „ 1468

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Turkestan

101 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and
131 Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts
[137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only $1^1/_2$ million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly populated countries in the world.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

492
484

A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.

101 pulated countries in the world. It is also known
133 as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of
492 this territory, along which the roads run. All
133 commerce goes by way of caravans which re-
484 quire months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

1 [Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]
2 [See cat. 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Sketch-map of Turkestan.

102

133

Ruins of Buddhist temples in Eastern Turkestan. Tajuk Mazar in the Oasis of Turfan.



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492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this water-
[132] less and treeless country. The temperature varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.[1]

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries
487 excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

[1] [In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

the trade-routes between China and the West. In ancient and medieval times they were numbered among the busiest caravan-routes in the world (see Ciba Review No. 10, page 316). Silks, brocades, precious stones, Chinese porcelain, metal and glass goods of enormous value were transported by these roads. Nevertheless Marco Polo's report shows that even in his day, that is to say towards the end of the thirteenth century, the population must have been very small, and that the water-works were falling into decay. It is very probable that the Mohammedan invasion which destroyed the Buddhist civilization of Eastern Turkestan was not entirely responsible for this decline; a general change of climatic conditions must be presumed to have taken place. In Marco Polo's

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

Anau in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

133 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

101 By comparison with this desert area West-
131 ern Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the
[631] present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province
000 of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

132 Western Turkestan, too, is a land of contrasts no less marked than those of Eastern Turkestan. Its climate is continental in the extreme and very dry. During the summer the temperature reaches more than 40° centigrade, and in the winter it falls to 25° below zero and even lower. Nine tenths of Western
133 Turkestan consist of barren desert. The desert of Kara Kum (Black Sand) to the South of the Aral Sea, the home of the wandering Turkoman tribes (see map on page 1434),[1] was named the Grave of the Caravans, and Kizil Kum (Red Sand), the desert situated North of Kara Kum, gives but meagre sustenance to the nomad Kirghiz tribes and their herds.

All the more fertile by contrast are the oases of Western Turkestan. The district is watered by no fewer than six large rivers, among which are the two historically important streams of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, known to the ancients as Oxus and Jaxartes. The valley of the upper Sir Darya is named Ferghana, a fertile area surrounded by mountains, which in the course of history has been coveted and conquered by many peoples, chiefly for the sake of its famous horses. In more recent times it has become known as one of the principal cotton and silk producing countries (see ill. page 1438).

More than once within human recollection the Amu Darya has changed its course; three hundred years ago it sent at least one arm into

1 [See cat 116, p 4 -- Analyst]
2 [See cat 116, pp 13, 16 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

312

An "arik" or irrigation ditch in the orchard zone round Samarkand. Large parts of Turkestan can only be kept fertile by artificial irrigation.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

532

Bokhara ruler of the 16th century cutting a melon. The features show a pronounced Turkic-Mongol cast. Contemporary miniature.

133 the Caspian Sea, and it is possible that at one time the entire river ran into that sea. Therefore, we find in the middle of the Kara Kum desert the ruins of large medieval towns marking the course which the water at one time took. At the present day both the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya run into the Aral Sea.

312 The four other rivers have no outlet, and would disappear in the desert, were it not for the fact that a system of irrigation which has been developed over a period of thousands of years serves to turn their waters to useful account. By means of this system the water is conducted through a net-work of canals which finally become mere ditches (ariks); thus it finds its way all over the country into every field, cotton-plantation, and orchard (see ill. page 1436). The distribution of the water is so well regulated that every peasant in Western Turkestan knows exactly on what day he can water his fields. Among these four rivers there are two particularly important ones, the Serafshan, the waters of which fill the ariks and mosque-ponds of Bokhara and Samarkand, and the Murghab, on which the prosperity of the oasis of Merv depends. In war-time the first thing to be destroyed was invariably the canal-system. The ancient city of Merv, at one

p. 12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

[p. 3 -- Analyst]

291
443

Cotton bazaar in Andizhan (Ferghana). The cotton is offered for sale by veiled peasant women.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

175 logical schools of Turkestan in its early Islamic period were famous throughout Asia. The physician Ibn Sina (980–1037), better known under the name of Avicenna, worked at Bokhara, and the famous geographer Jakut (1179–1229) took three years to exploit the works of the ten great libraries of Merv for his geographical studies. Early descriptions of the bazaars of Samarkand, such as that given

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

175 by Gonzales del Clavijo, who in 1403 travelled to the court of Timur (1370–1405) as an ambassador of Spain, confirmed the fact that it was a centre of international commerce, where the goods of all the countries of Asia, even those of the remotest, were to be found. Silks of Turkestan and horses from Ferghana were important articles of export, and reports on the arts at the court of the Indian Mogul em-

4: Leix U-8 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Interior view of a caravanserai in Samarkand. In the foreground some of the high two-wheeled carts which are the most important vehicles of transport in Western Turkestan.

16

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the best in the world for artistic purposes and for calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. To this day the town has remained an important centre of culture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see ill. page 1458) became not only wealthy towns, but places of extravagant luxury in the European sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of many wars in the course of its history, was from the middle of the eighteenth century onward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara; Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the Russian administration, in these towns the Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[439] in size and importance. At the present time the country's commerce with India and China is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[77] has greatly declined. Though Western civilization has made progress, modernization has not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely surprising in view of the extreme conservatism prevailing among the Islamic population of Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different tribes that are found both in town and country and whose manifold ethnological differences

1 [See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

2 [See cat 116 p 18--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

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find expression in habits and customs, dress and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page 1451). The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

175

[See cat. 116, p. 52 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R.1 Turkestan R.1

000 *Men of Turkestan paying tribute to the King of Persia. After an ancient Persian frieze at Persepolis.*

19

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

346

Tamerlane's tomb at Samarkand.

175 cient times it was the northermost part of Persia, closely united to that country by ties of religion and culture. Its inhabitants, even those of the extreme northern districts in the neighbourhood of the Aral Sea are frequently depicted on sculptures of the tombs of Persian kings, and are seen among the tribute bearers on the friezes of Persepolis (see ill. page 1439). * They are shown wearing caps that cover the entire head with the exception of the face; these caps are not unlike those worn by some Kirghiz tribes as a protection against sand and snow-storms. The figures depicted as subjects of Persia may have belonged to a nation which spoke one of the Indo-Germanic languages, and it is assumed that Turkestan was originally peopled by one of the many Indo-Germanic races. However that may be, large-scale migrations of tribes, the effects of which were felt throughout Asia and sometimes even in Europe, swept over the country, and changed the character of the population. In 329 B.C. Alexander the Great conquered Turkestan,

* [See cat. 116, p. 19 --Analyst]

175 and for a time took up residence at Samarkand. At a later period it became the subject of conflict between Persia and the Chinese. The ethnological fate of Turkestan was, however, finally decided by the Turks. It formed the Western part of the Great Empire which the Turks founded in the centre of Asia in the sixth century, and in the following period other Turkish tribes pressed after those who [162] had preceded them. To this day they form the major portion of the population of Eastern and Western Turkestan beside which the other components are comparatively insignificant. Even the conquest of the country by Islam, so decisive an event in the history of the peoples of other countries, such as North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, was in Turkestan of almost exclusively religious significance. Turkish predominance in Central Asia was in no way shaken by this new movement, the originators and pioneers of which were Arabs. On the contrary it was the Turks who after their conversion assumed the leadership in the Islamic world of Asia. They founded powerful dynasties in Afghanistan, India, and even in Egypt; Turkestan itself, geographically the extreme outpost of the Mohammedan world, was in political re-
361 spects very often its centre. That was particular-
175 ly the case under Timur (Tamerlane) (see ill. page 1437) who brought artists and craftsmen from all his conquering raids to Samarkand, which he made a city of marvels, far surpassing in its magnificence any other town within the world of Islam (see ill. on this page). Its superb buildings are entirely covered with coloured glaze that reflects the brilliant sun, producing an effect of beauty which would almost seem beyond anything in the nature of mere brick and stone. The tradition of this art outlived Timur's feeble successors; later Turkestan rulers like the Emirs of Bokhara continued to support the arts, though their standard had by then perceptibly declined. In ethnographic respects too, the inhabitants have changed but little, and the country has remained the centre of the Turkish world in Inner Asia.

[See p. 12--Analyst]

[See cat. 116, p. 20--Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

000 **Costumes of the Settled Population of Turkestan** *By A. Leix*

22

Costumes of the Settled Population of Turkestan

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The wealthier portion of the population of Turkestan, the merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and peasants, live in the towns and the villages of the fertile areas. They differ considerably in culture, dress, and customs from the nomads who range the deserts. It is usual to distinguish between three different domiciled groups, the Tajiks, Uzbegs, and the Sarts.

Of these three groups the Tajiks are the most interesting. They number about 1,200,000, and live in the southern part of the former emirate of Bokhara, which now forms an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union under the name of Tajikistan. They are above all a mountain people, and are at the same time skilled agriculturists. As their language has preserved Iranian elements, it may be assumed that they are a remnant of the original population of the country, which retreated before the invasion of the Turks.

The Uzbegs, about two-million souls, form the majority of the agricultural population. They live in the heart of the fertile areas round about Samarkand, Bokhara, and Khiva. They appear to have originated in an army formed by Uzbeg Khan in the 14th century, which was made up of men who were willing to renounce the shamanistic customs which persisted and still persist throughout the country,

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

View of the courtyards of Mohammedan houses in Samarkand. In the background the ruins of the great mosque built by Timur between 1398–1405.

162 and to profess a pure form of Islam. For that
619 reason the Uzbegs contain all the elements of
184 the Turkestan population, Arab, Turkish, and Tajik.

The two million Sarts who in the main make up the municipal population of Western Turkestan are even more of a racial mixture than the Uzbegs. That is not surprising considering the fact that the cities of Turkestan have always been great trading centres of international character. Nowadays, the differ-

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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The head of a wedding procession in Bokhara. Boys and workmen in typical dress.

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

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ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regarded as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

162 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other
619 side of the border. The domiciled population
184 there is made up of the so-called Turki people, more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

1 [See cat. 116, p 24.-- Analyst]
2 [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts --Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291
275

Men of Bokhara in a tea-house, wearing chalats and turbans.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 p. 29

Chalat of Bokhara with striped pattern.

cotton trousers (see ill. page 1441), the material of which is rather coarsely woven, and is neither bleached nor dyed. The name given to this material is "bes". The trousers are secured by an attractively worked band, which is drawn through the upper seam, and tied round the waist. The upper part of the body is covered with a blouse cut in the manner of a shirt. It is also of cotton, and is girded round the waist with a diagonally folded square of [294] cloth. This cloth is often prettily embroidered or decorated with regular ornaments in the block-printing style (see ill. page 1442). Before beginning his devotions the wearer unties it, and spreads it out before him, thus making it serve as a prayer-mat. These garments form the customary dress of the labourers, artisans, 554 and of the poorer classes generally. Merchants, 291 priests, and all men of wealth and rank wear as an additional item of dress the chalat, which is also put on by poorer people on festive occasions (see ill. page 1442).

The word "chalat" signifies a rich garment of honour of the kind traditionally bestowed by Oriental princes as a badge of distinction. Hermann Vámbéry, who in the second half of the nineteenth century travelled in Central Asia under the disguise of a dervish, reports that in Khiva he met a high official sorting chalats which were intended as rewards for soldiers, and the value of which was graded according to the number of enemies' heads

1 [See p 25 -- Analyst]
2 [See Cat. 116, p 28 -- Analyst]

291 which each man had brought home from the
[554] war. The chalat as the usual outer garment is known in the vernacular as "chapan". It is cut like an overcoat, reaches to the ankles, and has very long sleeves, into which the wearer
[834] can withdraw his hands in order to comply with the Mohammedan law that no part of the body should be uncovered (see ill. below).

It is the chalat which gives the crowds in the cities of Turkestan their colourful appearance. When on the great Mohammedan feast-days the crowds of the faithful in their many-coloured chalats stand in front of the glittering mosques, when they kneel or throw themselves on the ground to pray, the scene is one which can probably be parallelled nowhere in
291 Europe or in the East. The patterns and colours of the chalats are of an extraordinary
294 variety, and their edges are trimmed with narrow borders of embroidered or woven material from which small tassels are suspended at regular intervals. Though the materials of the costly gold-brocaded garments worn by the very rich and the cheap printed cottons common to the poorest classes were of Russian manufacture, the greater part of the chalat fabrics were and still are characteristic products of the weavers and dyers of Turkestan. These fabrics are gaily striped, pattern-

Men of Bokhara in striped chalats and white turbans.

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

Typical caps or tibetsikas of Turkestan. Left: Tibetsikas from the region of Bokhara worked in coloured embroidery. Right: A tibetsika or cap of Ferghana decorated with four white palmettes.

[294]
291

ed with large spots, or delicately flamed (see ill. page 1448). The material usually consists of a mixture of silk and cotton fibres. These beautiful, heavy, and very characteristic textiles owe their origin to Islamic religious laws. The wearing of garments made of pure silk is forbidden to the Mohammedan, no less than the use of pure gold and silver. Just as the latter decree led to the production of pottery of unsurpassable quality and beauty, the edict against the wearing of silk resulted in the manufacture of the mixed fabric known as "mesru" (= permitted), which satisfied the desire for luxury, and could at the same time

Women of Turkestan wearing long cloaks and veils.

*[See cat. 116, p. 45--Analyst]

291 be worn without infringing the Mohammedan laws.

The headgear of the townspeople in Turkestan as in other Mohammedan countries consists of a cap round which the turban-cloth is wound. The cap, usually known as "tibeteika" in Turkestan, is small and round, and covers only the crown of the head, which is shaven completely, with the exception of one
291 strand of hair. The decoration of the tibeteika varies with the district. In Bokhara it is worked
294 in coloured emboidery (see ill. above), in Tashkent it is black and decorated with coloured embroidery, in Ferghana it is also black, but is adorned with four white leaves (see ill. above). In the mountain districts the tibeteikas are also worked in coloured embroidery by the women. More frequently than in other Islamic countries the cap is worn in Turkestan without a turban. This is invariably the case when the wearer is working. The ordinary cotton turban-cloth is about ten or twelve feet long and roughly eight inches wide. It is of one colour, very often pale red. This cloth can be wound round the head four times. The end which hangs down over the neck is usually decorated with woven stripes.
291 Costly turban-cloths of thin material are generally longer, and are arranged in a more intricate manner. The wearer literally winds himself into the cloth, which is held by another man who twists it constantly. The name for these turbans is "chihil petch" which means forty, that is to say innumerable, windings.

The footwear commonly worn consists of a pair of light top-boots over which slipper-like shoes are worn which can easily be taken off when entering a house, as is demanded by custom. In the place of these slippers it has long been customary to wear rubber overshoes of Russian manufacture.

7 [see cat. 116, p. 31 - Analyst]

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The Uzbeg woman is beyond doubt more closely veiled than anyone else in the Orient. When she goes out (see ill. page 1444)[1] she wears a heavy cloak (faranji) which in Samarkand and in the Ferghana district is usually of blue material; in Bokhara the colours are sometimes brighter, for instance yellow and green. This cloak is drawn over the head, and hangs down to the ground in straight heavy folds. The long narrow sleeves are never used, but are allowed to hang down the wearer's back (see ill. adjoining). In the majority of cases they could not be used even if it were desired, being more like long narrow ribbons than sleeves; they are only retained because tradition demands it. In addition to this veiling of her figure, the Uzbeg woman does not even reveal a shadowy outline of her face. The narrow opening left by the cloak is covered with a close veil of black horse-hair (chashpent). If a woman carries a baby in her arms, which is frequently the case, it is also completely covered by the cloak. Thus the woman of Turkestan is completely enveloped in a tent of cloth; in this respect she differs very considerably from the lightly veiled Mohammedan women of Egypt. One of the first measures taken by the Soviet government in Turkestan was to forbid this method of veiling. However, this decree met with the stubborn resistance of the strictly orthodox Islamic population of Central Asia, a resistance offered both by men and women. As a result, the authorities were unable to enforce the decree even in Tashkent itself, the seat of the government.

[1] [See cat. 116 p. 32 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291

Women of Turkestan wearing veils and long robes, seen from behind. The woman on the right is carrying a burden on her head.

ment. In Eastern Turkestan by contrast, the veil worn by women is no more than a thin cloth drawn over the head.

Under the cloak and when indoors, the women wear a shirtlike garment over wide

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

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The cotton harvest in the district of Ferghane.

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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A fuller of Tashkent. The heavy wedge-like head of the mallet and the way in which the handle is mounted serve to increase its effect. Sepia drawing.

291 trousers. Unlike the corresponding garment in other Mohammedan countries, this smock reaches to the ground, thus also completely enveloping the wearer's body. Members of the wealthier classes frequently wear smocks made of silk, as this material is only forbidden to the men. The patterns are much the same as those

291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
[302] very much like that of the man, The manner of dressing their hair is very attractive. It is worn in innumerable plaits into which black ribbons are worked, from the ends of which small silver bells are suspended.

As in all other Islamic countries only the women of the towns strictly observe the custom of veiling. When working in the fields the peasant-woman wears neither long cloak nor veil. When she goes to town, however, to sell her cotton at the market, she dons cloak and veil.

286 Throughout the centuries of Turkestan's history the textile crafts have maintained a considerable standard. That is natural enough as the country produces all the more important
[236] textile fibres itself. Wool was indeed used but little in the manufacture of clothing, sheep being mainly bred for slaughter, as well as for the sake of their skin, which is known as "karakul". The best kind, the skin of unborn lambs, fetches a very high price, particularly in
248 certain colours. Silk and cotton growing have always been of great importance in Turkestan, and flourish to this day (see ill. page 1445).[1] The two principal kinds of cotton grown are Gossypium herbaceum and Gossypium hirsutum. In 1910 over 410,000 tons of cotton were grown on an area of about 940,000 acres. Silk growing was entirely in the hands of women. Its yields were always considerable, though no statistics are available.

[1] [See cat 116, p 36 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Weaver's workshop in Turkestan. The weaver is passing the shuttle through the shed which is formed on the farther side of the batten.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 R.1 Turkestan R.1

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statistics are available. The best silk came on to the market in Bokhara and the towns of Ferghana; Khokand and Khojent were the main trading centres for both silk and cotton. Another important cotton market was Andishan. At the present day the breeding of silkworms and to an even greater extent the growing of cotton in Western Turkestan are promoted by the government in every possible way.

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In Turkestan fabrics are woven in narrow pieces only about twenty inches wide; these are then sewn together to make garments. The type of loom generally used in Western Turkestan (see ill. page 1446) consists of a frame of four roughly hewn poles driven vertically into the ground. It is maintained in a state of equal tension by means of a rope fixed tightly above it. Breast-beam and warp-beam are slung in rollers at so short a distance from each other that very little of the fabric is visible. Unlike the weavers of other districts the craftsman of Turkestan passes the shuttle through the rear shed at the other side of the batten. In order to impart lustre, smoothness, and thickness to the fabric it is beaten on a wooden block with a heavy mallet (see ill. page 1446). The rhythmical beats of the fuller's mallet are heard everywhere in the bazaars of Turkestan. The mallet used for fulling is shaped like a blunt wooden wedge. It has a short handle which is not fixed to the centre of the head, but close to the narrower striking surface. This increases the efficacy of the instrument, but it requires great strength to wield it.

[See p. 39-- Analyst]

[See p. 39--Analyst]

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

Part of a patterned chalat of Turkestan. The patterns are produced by winding threads tightly round parts of the fabric before dyeing it.

In Eastern Turkestan the ethnologist and archaeologist Albert Le Coq found a much more primitive weaver's craft than in the western region. In the manner common in India the weaver sits in a pit across which the warp-threads are stretched horizontally. Le Coq also observed board-weaving, which is practised also in Western Turkestan in the making of tape-like fabrics (see ill. below). This technique was familiar to the Ancient Egyptians; as practised in Turkestan it is, however, simpler. The boards or cards which are used to form the shed are square, and have a hole in each corner, through which the thread is

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Board-weaving in Eastern Turkestan. Unlike the corresponding instruments used in Ancient Egypt, the boards or cards through which the weft is passed have only four corners. After Le Coq.

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286 passed. As the richness of the pattern depends on the combinations which result from turning the cards, the patterns or fabrics made in Turkestan show much less variety than those of Ancient Egypt.

286 From the earliest times dyeing in Turkestan
294 has not only been a craft, but a highly developed art. In that country, as everywhere in Asia, patterns and ornaments are to a large extent produced by dyeing rather than by weaving. It must, however, be said, that in Turkestan the dyer's art never reached the same high standard of excellence that is found in India or Indonesia.

The simplest technique is that adopted in dyeing textiles blue for women's clothes. For this purpose indigo is used. The material is tightly rolled into bundles, and at certain intervals is wound round with the threads which prevent the dye from penetrating the fibre in these places. It is a matter of course that the patterns produced by this technique are comparatively simple. The ornaments consist of large circles, stripes, and spots. In addition to blue a very delicate red and also yellow are popular colours (see ill. page 1447).* In the streets of towns and villages in Turkestan one often sees such bundles of cloth, usually "mesru" and silk, hung up between two trees to dry. More complicated patterns, which are made up of small individual elements and which make the fabric appear "flamed", are dyed according to the ikat method. As far as is known only the warp-ikat technique is employed. The ikat patterns of Turkestan are geometrical, and even the more complicated

* [Cat. 116, p. 41 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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Man from Bokhara wearing a chalat made according to the ikat technique. The threads are dyed before weaving.

286 ones which are made in Ferghana (see ill.
294 below) and the neighbouring districts of Eastern Turkestan are not nearly so rich and so vivid as Indian and Indonesian ikat patterns.
386 With the exception of indigo, which was imported from India, all the dyestuffs used in

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

Chalat pattern from the Ferghana district produced by the ikat method.

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

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386 Turkestan were of native origin. Madder (Rubia tinctorum) grew wild, and was also cultivated. The plants on which the kermes shield-louse feeds (see Ciba Review No. 7, page 206) also grow in many parts of the country as well as in neighbouring Persia. In the steppes the flowers of "esparuk" (Delphinium sulphureum), the infusion of which yields a strong yellow of sulphur shade, were gathered in large quantities. Another yellow dye was extracted from the blossoms of Sophora japonica (known to the natives as "tukmak"). Safflor (Carthamus tinctorius), "maksar" in the vernacular, a third plant for yellow dyes, also

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386 grows in Turkestan. Green was produced by mixing indigo with a yellow.

These dyes were the most important ones, being used almost exclusively in the dyeing of dress materials, and the people of Turkestan were fully aware of their economic significance for the textile crafts. It is, therefore, not impossible that the Khan of Khokand forbade imports of artificial dyestuffs because his revenues were directly or indirectly bound up with the production of native dyestuffs, a fact which gave him reason to fear that the introduction of the new dyes would bring about a decrease of his income.

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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The Nomads of Turkestan and their Dress

The Nomads of Turkestan and Their Dress

184 619 The picture presented by Turkestan and its peoples is very varied indeed; deserts, fertile country, and towns are areas clearly distinct from each other, each of which imposes different modes of life on its inhabitants. Such distinctions are found all over the world; they may be observed in Egypt, Arabia, and elsewhere. In Turkestan, however, they are the more striking as the inhabitants of these zones not only represent different stages of cultural advancement, but separate peoples and tribes, which differ markedly from each other in appearance, customs, and dress. Even nomad tribes, whose mode of life is essentially similar, have distinctive characteristics which vary with the nature of the districts which they range.

162 619 In Western Turkestan there are two principal nomad tribes, the Kirghiz and the Turkomans. The Kirghiz are made up of two main groups, the Kirghiz Kasaks and the Kara Kirghiz. The Kirghiz Kasaks are by far the more numerous of the two tribes; they number about 1,600,000 souls, and form four groups (orda, hord). They roam through the Kizil Kum Desert in Western Turkestan between Tashkent and Khiva; they are scattered over a wide area, and have even encroached on the lands of the Turkoman tribes. Isolated groups are found all over the country. The majority of the Kirghiz Kasaks wander through the so-called Kirghiz Steppes which extend north-

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ward from the border of Turkestan almost to the Volga. The Kara Kirghiz, who number about 540,000 in all, are native to Turkestan. Most of them live on the inclement slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains.

The differences in the character of these two Kirghiz tribes find expression in many details. The itinerant minstrels who wander from camp to camp of the Kara Kirghiz recite for the most part epic poems of heroic character, in which the glorious past and the great men of bygone days are praised. On the other hand the poetry of the Kirghiz Kasaks, who range the wide plains, consists mainly of romantic lays and love songs.

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In spite of these differences both are hardy nomad peoples, insensible to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They have retained the Turco-Mongol type comparatively purely, and are of sturdy build. Their obliquely set eyes, high cheek-bones, and sparse growth of beard proclaim them as genuine Mongols. The well-known Mongolian spot (a blue blotch on the skin of the lower part of the back) has been observed in their children up to the age of two years.

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The Turkomans number about 700,000 in all, they roam the western part of the country between the Persian frontier and the Aral Sea. The finest types are found among the Tekke Turkomans, a group comprising

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A road in Ferghana beside which a Kirghiz family has pitched its tents.

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Different types on a highroad of Turkestan. Between men of various races wearing the chalat and a turban or a tibetaika, women with black veils of horse-hair and a Kirghiz in a white felt hat are seen.

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162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Salors and Saryks extend their wanderings into Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the northermost of the Turkoman tribes, who number about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
[181] Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day knows how hospitable, frank, and trustworthy the people are. They are of a decidedly
567 warlike character. Until after the middle of
579 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put a stop to their activities, they were the most redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan, and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards kidnapping and the slave trade. They extended their raids far into Persia, seizing what prisoners they could. The wealthier of these were released after the extortion of as large a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be gathered from the fact that when the Russians conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000 slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and vigorous race with an abundant growth of beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow, skin. The women, too, are tall and slender; they are among the most beautiful in Asia. The tribe is much farther removed from the Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason for this may be that the Turkomans live so close to the Iranian frontier, and that they have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian Tribes.

000 have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian tribes.

361 Between the customs and mode of life of these two peoples there are many interesting distinctions. To neither of them does the soil afford the conditions necessary for permanent settlement. Wherever there is a well or a water-hole which provides the moisture necessary to vegetation, they pitch their tents at will, and allow their herds to graze. When the pastures are exhausted, the camp is transferred to a favourable spot elsewhere, and the [241] same process is repeated. Where the soil is suitable, the nomads of Turkestan grow grain and other food-plants, without, however, becoming permanently settled. Only in the oases have the Turkomans abandoned the nomad form of life, and have become domiciled.

231 The two nomad peoples of Turkestan, the Turkomans and the Kirghiz, breed livestock — horses for riding, sheep for food and for their skins, and camels as beasts of burden. In addition to the horse the Turkomans also breed donkeys for riding. The different domestic animals kept by the two tribes explains another characteristic distinction between 234 their otherwise very similar habits. Both are skilled in the preparation of a beverage of sour milk, which is particularly refreshing at the time of the burning summer heat. The Turkomans make yogurt of sheep's milk, whilst the Kirghiz ferment a similar drink known as kumyss from mare's milk. The reason for this is that the Turkomans, who

7 [The Kara Kirghiz and the Turkomian -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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A Kirghiz woman on horse-back. Her smock-like dress is lavishly patterned with flowers, and she is wearing a headdress made of narrow strips of cloth.

234 sometimes remain for considerable periods in one place, possess large flocks of sheep, whereas the Kirghiz, as the more pronounced nomads, use the milk of their horses.

291 In their dress, too, the Kirghiz have retained a more archaic stage of civilization than the Turkomans. According to the report of the scientist Peter Simon Pallas, who explored

291 the steppes of Central Asia at the command of the Empress Catherine of Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century, the nomad Turkic peoples at one time did not make their clothing of textile materials, but rather of leather prepared from horses' hides. This was the only material strong enough to withstand the ravages of the sandstorms and blizzards which sweep across the vast steppes. In the dress of the Kirghiz Kasaks this tradition still survives. Over their cotton trousers they wear others of leather, which are of very loose cut. The upper part of the body is covered with a coarse shirt, over which the wide, long-sleeved coat, known throughout Central Asia as the chalat, is worn. The chalats of the nomads are often thickly padded and quilted, and are, therefore, very warm. In former times they, too, were made of leather, and in very rare cases they still are. As a protection against cold winter weather coats of sheep or wolf skin are also worn.

Among the Kirghiz the types of headgear are particularly numerous, the traditional ones also being of leather. In the North a species of helmet is worn; it has four flaps which are let down in such a manner as to cover the face almost completely when a snowstorm is raging. Such helmets are made of strong leather, and are usually red in colour. The Kirghiz also wear high fur caps, with the hair to the inside. Only the turned-up flaps show a strip of fur.

[287] A textile material which is particularly characteristic of the Mongol tribes of Northern Asia is felt (see ill. page 1460). The Kirghiz,

[See cat. 116, p 75.. Analyst]

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4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

A bazaar in Turkmenistan. In the regions inhabited by nomads bazaars for the surrounding districts are held twice a week at certain places. The merchants are townsmen. On the right a Turkoman, in the background a Russian official.

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Kirghiz men and women in their characteristic dress. Note the padded clothing and felt hats.

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291 particularly those of Turkestan proper, wear conical felt hats, the slashed brims of which are turned up. This type of headgear is demonstrably of great age. Indian miniatures of the time of the first Mogul emperors, i. e. the sixteenth century, show that such conical hats were frequently worn by the soldiers of those rulers. As the Mogul dynasty, and a great proportion of the armies with whose help it was founded, came from Turkestan, it is probable that the type of hat described above also originated there.

291 Belts and bags are also of leather. In one of these bags, which are very strongly made,
281 the Kirghiz carries his tea-making utensils. The pouches are usually bound or studded with metal, not only by way of decoration, but also to increase their strength. R. Karutz, who lived for a long time among the Kirghiz of the Caspian Sea, and who wrote at the beginning of the present century, gave a brief description of the treatment of hides. When scraped for dressing as leather, they are treated with a paste consisting of the boiled ashes of grasses which grow on the steppes. Hides which are to retain their hair are covered for a week with a paste of flour and sour milk. Pallas, too, was familiar with this method of treatment. Vámbéry described how a skin which was to be used for carrying water was salted.

291 The dress of Kirghiz women differs from that of the men in so far as the usually patterned outer garment is smock-like in cut and reaches to the ground in accordance with the custom in many Islamic countries. In addition they wear trousers which, like those of the men

291 are thrust into long boots. Over the chalat-like coat another one of fur is worn during the cold season. The high white headdress characteristic of the Kirghiz women consists of narrow lengths of cloth which are wrapped round head and chin in such a manner as to leave only the face uncovered. Among the women of Eastern Turkestan this headdress is very bulky. Young girls wear headdresses of [302] red instead of white cloth. Their manner of arranging their hair is also different. Married women plait their hair into two thick braids, whereas girls wear theirs in innumerable small plaits. Both women and girls intertwine the strands with strips of leather to make the braids appear longer and thicker; the ends are decorated with silver coins. Like other nomad women in Central Asia the Kirghiz women go unveiled.

Unlike the dress of the Kirghiz, that of the Turkomans is of cloth, a fact which in itself shows that they belong to a different civilization. The principal items of men's dress are a cotton shirt, which in the East is worn like a blouse or smock, cotton trousers, and a chalat. Chalats are usually dark red, a colour for which the Turkoman shows great preference. Whereas in the southern Turkoman regions chalats reach almost to the ground, in the North they are scarcely longer than the beshmet of the Tartars. As leg-coverings the Turkomans wear woollen stockings and sometimes light boots, but always heelless shoes of slipper-like character, which can easily be removed before entering a tent. The use of this kind of footwear shows that the Turko-

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Tabda Turkomans with the knobbles caps which form their typical headdress.

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291 mans have had contact with municipal civilization. The most distinctive feature of their dress is the high lambskin cap, which is not even discarded when summer is at its hottest. It is usually worn over a kind of skull-cap. The high-crowned fur caps impart to the tall, well-built Turkomans a striking and exceedingly martial note. The tribes who roam the regions of Khiva wear caps which are lower and broader in shape than those of the others. Though both Turkomans and Kirghiz are Mohammedans, neither of the two tribes wear [793] turbans with the exception of the mollahs, teachers of law and religion, who, however, mainly occupy themselves with foretelling the future and writing amulets.

The dress of the Turkoman women, like that of the men, seems expressly designed to make their tall, slender figures appear even taller. They wear long, loose gowns of brilliant red, reaching to the ground, and a high head-band resembling a cap, from which a ribbon hangs down at the back over the wearer's 301 neck. The women are very fond of ornaments, particularly those of the wealthy Tekke Turkomans who inhabit the oasis of Merv. They wear bracelets and anklets, breast ornaments of silver coins, and each of their numerous plaits ends in a small silver tassel. Nose-rings are worn by the women of the Salor tribe only. Even the small helmet-like caps of the children end in a high silver point.

286 The most valuable textile material which the Turkomans and Kirghiz use, is that which their herds provide. A camel yields twenty or thirty pounds of wool, which is simply plucked out when the animals shed their winter coats; only neck, throat, and chin have to be shorn. Goats yield two to three pounds of wool once a year, sheep are shorn twice a year, the winter wool amounting to about 10 lbs, the summer crop to about 3 lbs.

286 Wool which is designed for weaving is first carded by the women by means of a comb-like instrument, and is then spun by hand, the spindle being rolled rapidly along the spinner's thigh, a method also common in India. The spindle used by the Turkoman women has a whorl attached to its upper end, that of the Kirghiz women has the whorl at the lower end. The spun thread is braided into cords, or woven into belts, ribbons or broad bands, and made into horses' harness. As everywhere in East and West Turkestan narrow, patterned ribbons are made by board-weaving. At this task two women work simultaneously, one of them turning the boards, the other passing the threads through the shed.

The two most interesting textile techniques of the nomads of Turkestan are without doubt the felting of unspun wool and the manufacture of textiles in the manner of carpet knotting. Both of these are discussed in the following article.[1]

1 [cat. 116, pp. 65-81--Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Felted and Knotted Fabrics in Turkestan

By A. Leix

Felted and Knotted Fabrics in Turkestan

287 Whereas settled peoples usually prefer stable and rigid materials for building their houses, nomads require a material which is light and unbreakable, which can easily be loaded on to the backs of their camels or other beasts of burden, and thus transported from place to place. For that reason nomads tend to develop textile techniques of distinctive character. It is in this respect that the fundamental difference between Kirghiz and Turkomans finds its most notable expression. The Kirghiz, who prefers stout, serviceable, and plain materials, makes use of felt manufactured by a most primitive method, whereas the Turkomans have adopted the same complicated technique of knotting which is used in the making of pile carpets, and which permits of such rich and varied effects.

In this respect as in many others the Kirghiz perpetuate an ancient technique of the Mongol nomads of Inner Asia. Fabrics of felt with elaborate appliqué patterns have been found in the tombs of Noin Ula in Mongolia, which date from about the beginning of the Christian era (see Ciba Review No. 37, p. 1322).

Felt is made of wool, usually of the summer wool of lambs born the same year. The process of converting loose wool into a thick, strong,

287 yet at the same time pliable material consists of several stages. First of all the wool is spread out on the ground in a thick layer, where it is vigorously beaten with rods, a task performed by women and girls. It is then placed on a straw mat, also in an even layer, and sprayed with hot water in order to make it pliable. After that the mass is rolled up in the mat, and this roll is moved to and fro for hours until the wool has become felted. In Eastern Turkestan the Kirghiz make their yak oxen drag the roll back and forward. The felt is of the same colour as the natural wool, that is to say, white, brown, or fawn. White felt is regarded as the [531] best of all. Patterned rugs are made by cutting out pieces of felt of contrasting colours, and arranging them on the layer of wool as desired. They are then stamped and pressed in until the whole mass becomes firmly felted together. In Western Turkestan the Kirghiz prefer angular geometrical patterns, in Eastern Turkestan undulating ribbon-like lines are more usual (see ill. p. 1460).

342 The felt made in the manner described above is so strong that the Kirghiz and other nomad peoples of Asia use it as a material for making tents; these are called alajak by the Kirghiz, kibitka in Russian, and yurt in Turk-

[See p. 75 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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Kirghiz tents. The tent on the right shows part of the wicker framework of the roof.

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

Section of a tent band (dawr-i-khirgah) which the Turkomans wrap round their tents. The pattern shows a caravan executed in the knot-technique.

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342 ish. The Kirghiz tent may be described as a portable house (see ill. p. 1457). The frame consists of three parts, the walls, which are made of trellissed laths that can easily be folded up, the roof-frame, and a ring to which wall-frame and roof-frame are secured. The whole structure can be taken to pieces in a very short time, transported by a camel to a fresh pasture, and re-erected without great difficulty. After the framework has been set up, it is first surrounded by mats made of reeds, which bear a pattern formed by wrapping coloured threads round the stalks. These bold patterns with their angular geometrical figures are visible from afar. According to the time of the year the roof or the whole kibitka is covered with felt, which is tied down by means of cords. Against the burning heat of summer as well as the icy winter blizzards the felt kibitka affords the best protection imaginable.

287 531 Tents of similar kind are used by the Turkoman nomads. Unlike those of the Kirghiz, where the materials consist mainly of felt and leather, the Turkoman tents are characterized by the predominance of fabrics worked according to the technique of carpet-knotting.

[184] The perfection of this technique and the great variety of articles produced demonstrate the advanced stage of Turkoman civilization as compared with that of the Kirghiz. The knot-technique gives to the tent as well as to articles of daily use an artistic character which in no way impairs the mobility of the household.

Most of the rectangular Turkoman rugs were hung in the opening of the tents, where they served as substitutes for doors. None of the older pieces are larger than the moderately wide tent-openings. Some Turkoman tribes fixed a specially decorative piece, also worked in the knot-technique, above the entrance. The

7 [See p 67 -- Analyst]

287 finest examples of this kind are those made by
531 the Yomuds; they are pentagonal in shape, and are ornamented with long black fringes. From the point of view of ethnology the most interesting fabric of this kind is a strip about forty or forty-five feet long and not more than about fourteen inches wide. Such strips are called daur-i-khirgah, and are passed right round the tent. They are covered with pictorial scenes or patterns made up of conventionalized landscapes or trees, all worked on a white ground according to the knot-technique. The figural scenes show caravans on the march, laden and grazing camels, horsemen, and other scenes from the daily life of the Turkomans. It is possible that certain events from the history of the tribe or clan are represented there. Religious or magic elements may also be discerned in these friezes. Essentially similar figures are found among primitive or semi-civilized peoples all over the world, executed in the style predominant in the respective areas.

531 In the tent of the Turkomans, as in the
352 dwellings of all Islamic peoples, the floor-carpet i. one of the most important items. It is very likely that the Turkomans made no distinction between ordinary rugs and prayer mats, as their carpets had no pictorial patterns, and did not, therefore, run counter to Islamic law. One very common type of rug, patterned, strangely enough, with almost cruciform figures and claw-shaped ornaments interspersed with them, certainly served both as a floor-covering and a prayer-mat. Pillows and cushions on which the Turkoman rests his arms when seated are never made in knot-technique, but always covered with cloth.

415 The fronts of the various bags and pouches which the Turkomans use as receptacles for everything, even for butter and cheese, are al-

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a 531 seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are 287 distinguished from all others by their simple 186 but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur. [352 The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

[cat. 116, p. 73 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

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

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.

287 plained by the strongly developed organiza-
531 tion of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on
186 a long tradition which is strictly observed. There are only a limited number of patterns for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

287 In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the
531 fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separately as rugs—usually go under the name of
352 Bokhara, though not one of them was ever knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

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[462]

in so far as the best known kinds are made by the women of the Tekke Turkomans, whose pastures are in the Merv area. Incidentally, all Turkoman carpets are made exclusively by women. Typical of the rugs of Merv is an octagonal star which is checkered red and white; the octagon is divided into four parts, each of which is in a colour contrasting to that of the adjacent part. The figures which fill the octagon are very simple and severely geometrical in style. The octagons are dispersed over the surface in even rows (see ill. p. 1459). The rugs of the Tekkes found their way to the West in large quantities; they are very popular, and have often been imitated.

The women of the Saryk tribe, which lives southward from Merv to the Afghan frontier, also use octagons as patterns, and arrange them in a manner similar to that of the Tekke rugs. There is, however, a difference in so far as the edges of these figures are not jagged. The rugs made in the southermost part of this area, known as Punjdeh (five towns), have a style of their own. They avoid red altogether, and are distinguished by a very finely graded scale of colours, in which brown and black predominate, yellow and white being used very sparingly. These dark colours form a marked contrast to the brilliant tints of all other Turkoman rugs. They correspond to the natural colour of the wool or hair used in making all Turkoman rugs. And even though these colours are often obtained artificially by dyeing, the origin of the colour scheme is doubt-

[See p. 72 -- Analyst]

73

287 less to be sought in the use of undyed wool.
531 The western neighbours of the Saryks are the
352 Salors. They, too, use the octagon as the sole ornament of their knotted rugs; it is filled with hook-shaped figures on an undivided ground of even red (see ill. page 1459). *

Of entirely different pattern are the rugs of the northermost Turkoman tribe, the Yomuds. They prefer scalloped figures and rows of hooks. Instead of octagons, lozenges form the ground of their rugs (see ill. page 1461).

In addition to these principal motives a number of minor ones are used, none of which are, however, of importance for the distinction of the various kinds of Turkoman rugs. Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to put some symbolic interpretation on these figures. That may be justified to a certain extent, but there can be no doubt that for some centuries at least the Turkomans have been as unconscious of the symbolic significance of these elements of designs as the Persian carpet-knotters are of that of the Buddhist symbols which they use as decorative elements. The intellectual and religious life of the early Turk peoples is far too little known to permit of anything more than surmise in this respect. Moreover, Turkestan has in the last few centuries been less accessible to foreigners that in Marco Polo's day.

287 The Turkoman rugs of the best period are so closely knotted that they must from a technical point of view be classed among the best Oriental carpets. Really good rugs

* [see cat. 116, p. 71 -- Analyst]
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2/* [see cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

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Felt rug from Eastern Turkestan with the rounded ornaments popular in that area.



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

A "torba" or small camel-bag as used by the Turkomans. An early example, the pattern of which is knotted. Privately owned. New York.

287 number from 420 to 450 knots to the square inch, and some times even more than that. The knot is usually the Persian Sennah knot; the Turkish Ghiordes knot occurs in exceptional cases only (cf. Ciba Review No. 15). The material used is the wool of camels, sheep, and goats. The strong knee-hair of the camel serves as material for the warp-threads. For the knot-thread the soft under-wool which goats and camels grow in the cold season is used. Unlike the camels of other Oriental countries the heavy beasts of burden in Turkestan, the so-called Bactrian camels, have an exceedingly thick coat of hair, which covers their bodies in thick tufts during the winter months. Cotton is never used in the making of Turkoman rugs, and silk only very rarely, usually in making small knotted bags from the region of Merv and Punjdeh, and then only for a few details of the pattern.

The treatment of the wool used in knotting rugs has been brought to great perfection in the course of a long tradition. Washing, which is done in running water, is of great importance. It is very difficult to remove all the grease from the fibre, and if that is not done there is danger of maggots finding their way into the pile and destroying it.

386 The same care and skill are devoted to the dyeing of the wool. As elsewhere in the East the important red dye was extracted from the root of the madder-plant (known in the vernacular as rujan) or from the kermes shield-louse. Madder grew wild throughout Turkestan, and

386 was also cultivated. Blue was achieved by means of indigo, which had to be brought from India, and for that reason it is rarely found in Turkoman rugs. Black was usually extracted from the gall-nuts of the pistachio (known as busgunch) and from pomegranate skins. Sometimes mate-

287 *Pattern in knot-technique as used by the Yomud Turkomans. Lozenges and rows of hooks are distributed over the background.*

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

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Selling cane for the manufacture of mats in a village near Bokhara. These mats form part of the tent walls.

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386 rials such as pyrites were used, which had the effect of corroding the wool, so that the black parts of many otherwise good rugs give the impression of having been eaten away. In spite of the limited selection of colours the shades and the number of combinations are surprisingly
287 varied. The Turkomans are good observers,
531 and were not slow in making use of the fact that the colours varied with the time of the year at which the plants were gathered, or with the length of time during which they were allowed to boil, to ferment, or to be exposed to the rays of the sun. For that reason the simplicity which characterizes these rugs is never monotonous. Both technically and artistically they are the perfect expression of that form of life which ethnologists describe as nomadic. They fulfil all the requirements of daily use, and the patterns are designed and perpetuated by skilled workers of a tribe, whose members all live under precisely the same geographical and social conditions.

287 These connections between the knotting technique and nomad life are so striking that
352 one feels tempted to regard the craft as an invention of wandering tribes. For the town-dwellers of Persia and India, of Egypt and Asia Minor, who developed the craft of carpet-knotting into an art, the necessity to use such light and easily transportable «textile furniture» is not nearly so great, and it is but natural that they should have adopted the

287 technique primarily for the making of floor-
352 coverings. The fact that Sir Aurel Stein discovered fragments of pile rugs during his excavations of the stations along the ancient silk road through Eastern Turkestan, distinctly points to the origin of the technique among the nomads of Central Asia. Apart from that, nothing certain is known of the origin and development of the different kinds of Turkoman rugs. Some examples may date back to the early eighteenth century. That is, however, no more than surmise, probable though
287 it may be. The one established fact is that all
178 the good examples of the craft now in existence must have been made before the seventies of the last century, that is to say, before the conquest of the country by the Russians. The reason for this is the complete transformation of the life of the Turkoman tribes under Russian rule. As the Russians put an end to the activities of the Turkomans as caravan robbers and slave traders, they were obliged to cast about for some other means of livelihood. From that time on the burden of providing a substitute for the gains formerly achieved by robbery fell to the women, whose skill in carpet-knotting was exploited. Carpets of huge size were made for the palaces of Russian nobles and generals. In time the desire to execute these profitable orders as speedily as possible led to a decline in the great care formerly exercised in the making of Turkoman rugs.

Embroidery in Turkestan

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In every moderately well-to-do house in Bokhara embroidered cloths serve as wall-coverings, the interesting patterns and brilliant colours of which immediately attract the visitor's eye. A good example of wall-coverings of this type is seen in the picture of a married couple of Bokhara, which was reproduced in Ciba Review No. 10, page 332. What makes them so attractive is the simplicity of the pattern, which, however, on closer inspection proves to be richer than at first supposed. It is embroidered on a background of unbleached cotton, which not only remains visible between the figures, but which is intended to heighten the effect of the whole.

The same artistic taste is revealed in the distribution of the pattern itself. The principal forms are usually large circular flowers dispersed over the surface of the cloth with unfailing sense of rhythm. Between them are smaller floral elements, conventionalized carnations, tulips, and irises, accompanied by twigs and garlands. In spite of its stylized character, the pattern is very vivid in its effect, an effect which owes a great deal to the brightness of the colours. The principal colour is a rich red, supplemented by many other shades of the same colour, and by green, purple, and black.

These susanis as they are called are not only made at Bokhara, but also at Samarkand, Karshi, and in other towns of Turkestan, though not always with the same discriminating artistic taste. They do not serve as wall-coverings only. Narrow strips are used to frame doorways, other pieces serve as prayer-mats, and it

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

Embroidered wall-hanging of the mountain Tajiks. The figures seen in the pattern are conventionalized peacocks, and probably continue an ancient Persian tradition.

is not regarded as improper to cover the biers on which the dead are borne to rest with these colourful textiles.

These embroideries form part of a larger group which has not yet received the study it deserves. In Western Turkestan alone there are two other kinds in addition to the susanis, each of these is the heritage of a different tribe. The Turkomans made ornaments for their tents in the same technique as that of the susanis. Pentagonal pieces were embroidered by the Salors as decorations for tent-openings,

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

Embroidered tent ornament of the Salors which is hung above the tent-opening. The figures of the pattern are stylized flowers.

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very much like those which they knotted. It is possible that they were used for the summer tents (see ill. page 1464).[2] As is the case with all nomad work of this kind, the patterns are severely stylized. There is, however, no doubt that they are derived from floral patterns, and that the embroideries of the Salors are to be regarded as a variety of the susanis.

Hangings in the houses of the Tajiks (see ill. page 1464),[3] who inhabit the mountainous regions to the south-east of Bokhara, show patterns of a very different character. Isolated as they are in a remote area, the Tajiks have retained many characteristics of an archaic civilization (confer page 1441).[3] Among these must be numbered the embroidered fabrics made public by Count Bobrinskoi forty years ago. The principal elements in their patterns are birds arranged in pairs and in rows. They are so severely stylized that only the tufts on their heads permit of them being identified as peacocks. They represent an ancient formal tradition of the Orient, which goes back to the pre-Islamic period, and which can be traced without interruption down to the present day. In

[2] [See p. 84-- Analyst]
[3] [See p. 83-- Analyst]
[3] [See p. 23-- Analyst]

531 the remote mountain districts of Central Asia
[353] the forms have been handed down so carefully that the figure of the bird has retained traces of medieval stylization.

Embroideries discovered by Le Coq in sparsely populated districts of Eastern Turkestan are in technique and design frequently almost identical with the susanis of Bokhara. They show the same stylized flower-patterns in the same combination of colours, usually as decorations of women's trousers (tambal). It may, therefore, be assumed that the style of the susanis is characteristic of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

More than twenty years ago Le Coq reported that such embroidery was no longer being made in Eastern Turkestan. The examples that he saw had been made by the mothers of
656 the generation then living. In Western Tur-
562 kestan the tradition not only exists to this day, but the government has set up special workshops where the women embroider susanis. This is part of the policy by means of which the state seeks to draw women out of the secluded life of the harem.

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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A summary of this article has been published for limited circulation by the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The present complete text is here presented with the Center's full permission.

127 The primary sources of information for this essay consisted of the
124 standard literature on Central Asia, pre-Revolutionary and Soviet, and of materials collected in the course of interviews conducted with 31 Muslim refugees from the Soviet Union, most of them from Central Asia.[2] These interviews concentrated on the personal experiences of the informants, and avoided, insofar as possible, references to politics, in order to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of deliberate concealment or lying. All the informants were male, and consisted, in their majority, of persons 30 to 50 years of age, with a high school or *tekhnikum* education, who had left the Soviet Union as laborers or prisoners of war in the course of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. They represented, in other words, largely the middle-aged Soviet "intelligentsia" (in the Communist sense of the word). The conclusions derived from the interviews were placed against the historical background of Central Asia for the purpose of separating the accidental from the essential, on the assumption that generalizations obtained from interviews were both more reliable and more significant in terms of the future when in agreement with pre-Soviet developments in Central Asia. The fact that in the main there is such agreement seems to the author an added reason for confidence in the correctness of the conclusions thus derived.

121 The main criteria used in investigating the cultural tendencies of Central Asian Muslim were five: religion, customs, language, ethnic identity, and the character and trends of the native intelligentsia. An attempt was made in each case to determine the extent and nature of the changes which had occurred under Soviet rule; to ascertain whether these changes agreed with or ran contrary to the spontaneous developments taking place prior to the 1917 Revolution; and finally, to evaluate their meaning in terms of the probable future.

RELIGION

000 The term "religion" comprises at least three distinct phenomena: a belief in the existence of one or more supreme beings; a set of rituals which gives this belief external expression; and a way of life based upon the principles explicitly and implicitly enunciated by the belief's founders. In analyzing the religious life of a community, these aspects must be clearly differentiated.

101 Russian Central Asia consists of two main parts, distinguished from each other by historic tradition, culture, and topography: the northern half, the steppe region (today's Kazakhstan), and the southern half, Turkestan (comprising the remaining four Central Asian republics). The

122 [2] These interviews were conducted in the summer of 1953 under the auspices and with the generous assistance of the Institute of Intercultural Studies and the Ford Foundation. I wish to express my particular gratitude to Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, who first suggested this task and was instrumental in enabling me to carry it out. I also would like to thank the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for its kind help in completing this inquiry.

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the
177 regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation. It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

faithfully observed by the Turkestan natives; those of the steppe region were less strict, prevented as they were by the exigencies of nomadic and seminomadic life. During Ramazan, Muslim communities in Central Asia customarily reversed their routine, resting daytimes, eating and entertaining at night. Shortly after the end of the fast there occurs a major holiday, *kurban bayram* (feast of sacrifice), attended by the slaughter of sheep and by festivities. 785

The difficulties of observing the Ramazan fast in the Soviet Union are obvious at first sight. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a period of a month is possible only for a people economically independent; it is inconceivable in a society in which virtually every breadwinner is an employee of the state, and the state drives relentlessly to increase production. Furthermore, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result, the Ramazan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. 785 177

Several of the refugees recalled instances of Communist Party officials subjecting Muslims suspected of fasting to "tests." Thus, for example, many Muslim employees of state institutions were called in for conferences with their superiors sometime during the month of Ramazan and there offered a drink or a cigarette; refusal to accept the offer was tantamount to an admission of fasting and could lead to expulsion from work. Similar "tests" were recalled by schoolteachers — during Ramazan teams of officials from neighboring towns often visited schools and checked on both the teachers and the students.

Nevertheless, the observance of the fast, although severely restricted, appears to have partly survived. Some Muslims, unable to fast for 28 consecutive days, compromise by abstaining for three days only: the 1st, 15th, and last days of Ramazan. Others, compelled to eat in order to have strength for work and to avoid the suspicion of authorities, eat and drink as little as possible. It is quite likely — although there is no direct evidence — that the fast may be observed more regularly among those who are not gainfully employed.

The *kurban bayram*, despite its originally religious significance, appears to have suffered the fate of most religious festivities in societies which are secularized or on their way to becoming so: the religious element has largely been forgotten, and the holiday has acquired a predominantly secular, national character. This, in part, may be one of the reasons for its survival. Almost all the informants agreed that the *kurban bayram* was widely observed at least until the outbreak of the war, even by members of the Communist Party. The main difficulty in observing this holiday is the shortage of sheep, which are essential for the ceremony. Not only are almost all the sheep in the hands of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and 782 796 177 233

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

782 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclo-
796 pedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all
177 number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in
233 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subterfuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving,
177 known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca,
177 the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union. 788 177

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed. 852 177

The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities. 793 661

As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate, after 177 584

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

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age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues
[353] sleeping on the floor."[8] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of whitewash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[8] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

[1] [i.e., the disrarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

LANGUAGE

With the exception of the Tajiks, virtually all the Muslims of Central Asia speak local dialects of one and the same Turki language group. Varying cultural influences to which the individual subgroups have been subjected in the course of history have led to a certain differentiation in the vocabulary and grammar of the principal dialects. Uzbek especially, having been exposed to strong Iranian and Arabic influences, has changed much, even to the extent of losing the vowel harmony common to the sound system of the Turki languages. By and large, however, it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turki literary language for Central Asia. The latter, however, had not yet been formed when the Communists conquered Central Asia in the 1920's and suppressed its further development. 197 177

The importance of language for national consciousness is self-evident: language represents the most ready means of national identification, available alike to the literate and illiterate. While not absolutely indispensable for nationality (witness the Jews), it is so intimately connected with it as to make it one of nationality's very best criteria.

Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia has two principal aspects, both of which follow closely the general lines of Soviet nationality policy. In the first place it strives at all costs to prevent the formation of a single Turki literary language in Central Asia on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. In the second place, it endeavors to promote the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups. The first goal is fostered by exploiting all, even the minutest, dialectical differences among the various Turkic subgroups, and by granting the status of full-fledged national-literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turki language. The second is fostered through the official change of Turki alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and, finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of Russian for all citizens, regardless of nationality, desirous of making any kind of a career. It is apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, such policies will make Russian the language of all the socially dynamic elements of the Muslim population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance. 177 197 668

000 and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.[8]

177 This policy of linguistic Russification is far more subtle than that prac-
197 ticed by the tsarist regime in some of its borderlands during the darkest days of modern Russian autocracy (1881–1903), and, if successful, could deal a very considerable blow to Muslim prospects in Central Asia. Thirty-five years is admittedly too short a time to judge the effects of a set of measures apparently designed to operate for several generations; but certain evidence permits us to draw some conclusions about its efficacy and prospects of success.

177 Soviet linguistic policies seem to have had very little effect on the speech
191 habits of the bulk of the Muslim *rural* population. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with Russians, the Muslim peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. They seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been. None of the peasants interviewed knew more than a few words of Russian; after ten years in Germany several could speak better German than they could Russian after several decades of residence in the Soviet Union. For most of the rural Muslims in the USSR, the first important contact with Russians and the Russian language comes with entrance into military service. After being drafted they are distributed among Russian soldiers and are expected to learn the language as best they can. For many of them, the military service is the first and most efficient school of Russian.

191 The situation is somewhat different in the cities and small towns, where
871 Muslims live side by side with Russians, and where a large proportion of Muslim youths attend high schools and institutions of higher learning. It
177 is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the linguistic training in Central Asia, because it varies from area to area and from time to time. If there is a general principle, it seems to consist in a direct correlation between level of education and Russian language instruction. In the elementary schools, the instruction is predominantly in the prevailing local language, either Turki or Russian, and in areas where both groups are numerous, in both. In the secondary schools Russian is either the principal language of instruction (in schools attended largely by Russian students) or else it is taught

191 [8] An alternate interpretation of Soviet linguistic policies in Central Asia is suggested by a
177 British authority, G. E. Wheeler: "[The Soviet authorities] evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the 'Arabization' of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics." G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 41 (July–Oct. 1954), p. 181.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[7]

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At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

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A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

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[7] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65–66.

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with each other in Russian, even on occasions when, because of diverse ethnic origins, communication in Turki presents considerable difficulties.

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It is as yet too early to estimate the effects of Soviet linguistic policy aimed at Russification through methods which are both negative (division of Muslim groups) and positive (the imposition of Russian through compulsion, linguistic infiltration, and career inducements). On the eve of World War II the Muslim rural masses seemed to have been quite unaffected by Soviet linguistic measures, and so were the poorer and less educated elements in the cities. These groups continued, as before, to communicate exclusively in their native dialects, being ignorant of Russian. Soviet policies did cause the numerous and growing Muslim intelligentsia to acquire a working knowledge of Russian; but instead of becoming Russified these groups became bilingual, using Russian for the purposes of work, and Turki or Persian, as the case may be, for all other purposes. Of linguistic assimilation there does not seem the slightest evidence; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong external pressures.

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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167 settling some of their excess population in the sparsely inhabited steppe regions of Central Asia. This colonizing enterprise brought to Central Asia about 1 million peasants, most of whom made their home in the eastern parts of the steppe region and in the Semirechensk province of Turkestan. The newcomers were provided by the government with generous land allotments (transferred from the Crown, which claimed as its property all the nomadic grazing lands) and inventory, and settled in compact villages, apart from the Kazakh-Kirghiz natives, most of whom continued their traditional nomadic or seminomadic habits. The colonization program had only a limited success, for after the outbreak of World War I the large-scale Russian influx into the steppe regions ceased; the Russians living in the Kazakh Republic in 1939 still consisted in their majority of the original
161 Stolypin colonists or their direct descendants. The proportion of Russians in the total population of the steppe region would not have grown appreciably, therefore, were it not for the fact that the upheavals which had occurred in that area during World War I and the Russian Revolution (the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt, and the famine of 1920–21) led to a considerable decrease in the native population. While the Kazakh-Kirghiz population remained virtually constant between 1911 and 1926, the local Russian population increased during the same period through natural growth by one-fourth. As a result of these demographic changes, Muslims constituted by 1926 only two-thirds of the population of the Kazakh Republic. (See Table II.)

167 Turkestan succeeded in maintaining its ethnic homogeneity somewhat
162 longer than the steppe region. The Russian influx into Turkestan prior to the Revolution was predominantly urban, consisting of officials, merchants, military personnel, and other groups connected with this area's administration and economic development. Thus, in 1926 the Russians still constituted merely 7.4 percent of the population of Turkestan.

The next important change in the demography of Central Asia occurred around 1930 as a consequence of Russian immigration and the further decrease of the native population. The Russians who migrated into Central Asia during this period were both victims of collectivization seeking to find refuge and to make a living on the Asiatic frontier, and settlers who followed in the wake of the newly constructed Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) railroad. These migrants — whose number may be tentatively esti-

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162 *Table II:* DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Steppe	500,000	1,600,000	2,100,000	c. 2,600,000
Turkestan	200,000	400,000	600,000	c. 1,900,000
Percent of Russians in total population of Central Asia	6.8	15.3	19.7	c. 27.1

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers: 167 162

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth. 161 661

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952. 162 162

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification, 167 177

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84. [162]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

167 177 which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

474 162 As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers.

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred.

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

563 186 177 Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

162 [11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy, tekhnikums,* and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

701 177 563 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 563 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 162 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 563 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

517 668 The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers, teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

517 661 Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

517 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universi- 517
ties, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves 517
superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling 461
with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which [668]
aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the charac- 517
teristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addi- 177
tion it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in 517
Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this 177
may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian 186
"Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

517 177 186

tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 175 177

For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the history of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 517 175

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats. 177 668

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 177 668

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

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177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

8: Kostenko G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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L.F. Kostenko

Turkestanskiy kray. Opyt voennno-statisticheskago obozreniia Turkestanskago voennago okruga.
(Turkestan Region: Military statistical survey of the Turkestan Military District.)

Volume I, parts 2 and 3
St. Petersburg, 1880 Publisher: A.Transhel'

[Title Page]

8:Kostenko —1-C-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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000 Part II. Population. Accounts of the Composition of the Military District.

I. Ethnographic Data. The national composition of the population of the district. The population figures by religious belief; by estates. Birth and mortality. Natural increase. The movement of populations. The relation of the nomadic to the sedentary population.

144 The population of the Turkestan district belong to two races: 1) the Caucasian (white) race, and 2) the Mongol (yellow) race.

The first of these races is divided into two branches: a) Aryan, or Indo-European, and b) Semitic, to which a small number of Jews and Arabs who live in this region belong. To the Aryans belong the Russians and Iranians; the Iranians can be divided into two branches: the Iranians of the upper Oxus /Amu-Darya/, i.e., the Tadzhiks, the descendants of the ancient populations of Bactria, Trans-Oxiana and Sogdiana, and the Iranians proper: Persians and Afghans. Then follow the Hindi and the Gypsies.

The Mongol race in its turn is divided into two branches: the Altai peoples (Turko-Tatar), and the true Mongol peoples. The Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Karakalpak, Kipchak people as well as the Turkmen and Tatars belong to the first branch. The Kalmuks, Chinese, Sibo, Solons and others, to the second. The Sarts, Taranchi, and Kurama represent a mixture of various peoples But while the Sarts and Taranchi are closest to the Uzbeks in physical type and language, /325/ and the Kurama are closest to the Kazakhs, one may still say without great inaccuracy

144 that the Sarts, Taranchi and Kurama belong among the Turko-Tatar peoples. As for the Dungans, it may be said that they form a link between the Turkic and Mongolian peoples. But although they are closer in type to the Turks, it is more accurate to place them among the Mongolian peoples.

162 The great majority of the population belongs to the Turko-Tatar branch. But even within this branch the Kazakhs have the numerical superiority, followed by the Sarts.

It has been impossible for us to determine with accuracy the statistics of the population according to peoples because of the variety of peoples and the complications of their origin. Therefore our data are only approximate. The Kazakhs and Sarts are the most numerous, then the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kurama, Kipchaks, Russians, Karakalpaks, Taranchi, Kalmuks, Mongol-Manchus, Tatars, Turkmen, Dungans, Persians, Indians, Jews and Gypsies.

The distribution of the population according to peoples is shown in the following table:

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Oblast's	Russians	Tatars	Sarts	Tadzhiks	Uzbeks	Karak-alpaks	Kip-chaks	Turk-men
Semirechie	44,585	2,978	3,365	-	-	-	-	-
Syr-Darya	8,477	4,321	210,774	57,841	25,771	-	-	-
Fergana	1,229	-	344,023	11,580	19,852	7,060	70,107	-
Zeravshan okrug	3,838	-	132,138	67,862	140,154	-	-	-
Amu-Darya division	1,184	10	5	110	16,195	51,710	-	5,860
Total	59,283	7,300	690,305	137,283	182,120	58,770	70,107	5,860

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Oblast's	Dungans	Taran-chi	Kazakhs	Kurama	Kalmuks	Manchus	Pers-ians	Indians
Semirechie	19,657	36,265	595,237	-	24,787	21,932	-	-
Syr-Darya	-	-	709,370	77,301	-	3	-	135
Fergana	343	-	126,006	-	-	182	-	370
Zeravshan okrug	-	-	695	-	-	-	2,211	352
Amu-Darya division	-	-	31,385	-	-	-	715	-
Total	20,000	36,265	1,462,693	77,301	24,787	22,117	2,926	857

162/327/1) The Russian population, not counting those in military service, constitutes about 1% of the entire population of the region. It is concentrated primarily in the Semirechie oblast' (44,089 persons, male and female), being mostly village people (Cossacks and peasants), with a small number of residents in the towns of the oblast'. Taken with the non-Russian population the Russian element constitutes over 7% here.

In the Syr-Darya oblast' the Russian population totals 8,447 persons (0.8% of the total population), and is concentrated primarily in the towns of Tashkent (up to 5,000 persons) and Kazalinsk (ca.1500), with a very limited number in other urban settlements of the oblast.

The Russian inhabitants in the towns of the Zeravshan okrug number about 4,000 (about 1% of the population of the okrug). In the Amu-Darya otdel the Russian element consists of 1,184 persons (1%) of whom the majority are Ural Cossack emigrants.

In the Fergana oblast' in 1876 there were 1,229 Russians.

101 162 2) The Tatars have migrated into this region at various time and have figured as traders, exploiting the nomads. Staying in the towns only temporarily, the Tatars have evaded the census, for which reason there must actually be more of them than is shown in the table.

3) The Sarts constitute about 22% of

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the total population of the region and up to 44% of all the sedentary natives. They spring from a mixture of various peoples and represent themselves as sedentary nomads, occupied in agriculture and trade. The Sarts constitute the nucleus of the native town and village population in the southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast and in all the Fergana oblast, and also in the Zeravshan okrug. In the Semirechie oblast there are no solid Sart settlements as yet. Here the Sarts live in small numbers, dispersed among the towns, are newcomers and are occupied in trade. The Sarts will be described in greater detail below.

4) The Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them, constitute numerically the predominant element in the population of the region, 48%. Nevertheless their distribution among the various oblast is by no means equal. /328/ Thus in the Semirechie oblast they are over 78% of the population, in the Syr-Darya oblast, 62%, in the Amu-Darya otdel they are only 29%, in the Fergana oblast not over 17%, and in the Zeravshan okrug barely o.2%.

The primary occupation of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz is cattle raising. Yet a part of these people, these who are poor and do not own cattle, work of necessity in cotton cultivation, or in sowing millet and barley. These poor nomads are called 'iginchi', and they make up the sedentary element of the Kazakh population. In the Syr-Darya oblast, of 124,325 tents over 50,000 households belong to such Kazakhs, who are agriculturalists. The total number of iginchi in the okrug comes to about 300,000 persons, male and female. (1)

1. The Cholo-Kazakhs are counted as

[See category 116, pp 46-70 - analyst]

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

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162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent
line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have
lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have
turned into a special family, so to speak, which
is known in Central Asia by the name of the
Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in
the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40%
of the total population. On the right bank of
the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks
constitute about 3% of the population and in
the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life,
and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans,
lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./
Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-
Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes,
a list of which was appended by him to his
well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva
(A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes.
Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that
the classification of Uzbek clans can probably
never be explained since the two essential
sources for this can never be thoroughly re-
conciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie
svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge
(Geographical and statistical inform-
ation on the Zeravshan okrug)
Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

S:Kostenko --9-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki (Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg. 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

162 [101] 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

162 [148] [423] Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive on the Amu- community composed of twelve separate clans. They use the land jointly according to common right.

162 101 9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now they have been put on a level with the other groups of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in regard to obligations, and must themselves maintain the irrigation required for their needs.

101 10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese, meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chinese government in the middle of the last century, just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettlement was undertaken as a form of punishment for these people for their participation in the revolt of 1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley, which was ruined and depopulated at that time. [162] There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local population. Their form of life is the same as that of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into their hands. They routed the Dungans (under Bayandai) and formed an independent state under the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

101 him in 1871 and annex his dominions to the Empire.

162 11) The Dungans. They are reckoned at about 20,000 persons in the okrug. In the Kuldja region before the last emigration of the Dungans from Kashgaria after its conquest by the Chinese, they totalled 4,030 persons. They lived then and live now in the towns of Suidun, /Sui-ting/ Chinchakhodzi /Ch'ing-shui-ho-tzu/ and Tardzhi /Hui-yuan?/. The Dungans who migrated settled in the Fergana and Semirechie oblast'v. The largest settlement of the Dungan emigrants is in the Tokmak uyezd, 7 versts north of Tokmak in the Karakunus valley, where about 4,000 of them now live. They came in 1878 and as a result of their industry have built up and established excellent farming land.

101 The origin of the Dungans is unclear. According to their own tradition their ancestors, who were moslems, conquered China by force of arms but gradually submitted to the conquered people, adopting their language, customs and costume. Although the Dungans also mixed considerably with the Chinese through intermarriage they still retained their tribal individualism and, most important, their religion. Their hatred for the Chinese is without limit.

141 The Dungans are of medium height and are notably corpulent. They have a high protuberant
142 forehead; their brows are thick and arched; the eyes are slightly raised in the corners; the cheekbones protrude very insignificantly; the face is oval; the mouth is of

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

162 in the Kuldja region and are the remnants of RL 1
101 military settlers once settled on the Ili river by the Chinese government.

16) The Tadzhiks constitute about 4.5% of the total population of the area. They are Aryans and are related to the Persians. These are the aborigines of the country, some of whom were forced out by the invasions of the Turko-Mongol peoples into the mountainous places, difficult of access. There are therefore two subdivisions of Tadzhiks: those who live in the valleys, and those in the mountains. These people are very intelligent; although oppressed by the Uzbeks, they have nevertheless had a good influence on their oppressors, with whom they have been mixing up to the present time. Within the okrug the largest number of Tadzhiks are in the Khodzhent uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast, where they constitute over 30% of the total population; then in the Zeravshan region they make up over 19% of the total, in the Kurama uyezd (in the mountains) they are 3% and in the Fergana oblast they are 1.6% of the total population. The mountain Tadzhiks in the Zeravshan okrug are called Galchas.

17) The Persians live in small numbers in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Amu-Darya otdel. They are former slaves who were freed when the Russians conquered this region. A large number of them were sent back to their
[795] country at the expense of the state. Being of the Shi'ite religious sect the Persians are in /333/ sharp opposition to all the other Moslem people of Turkestan, who belong to the ~~Sunnite~~ sect.

18) The Hindus are scattered all over the

162 region in commercial industrial centers, where
101 they are moneylenders. Their number is actually much higher than the official figure and they should be counted as at least 3,000 persons. Only Indian men live in Turkestan.

19) The Gypsies, called Liuli by the natives, live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug. Their number is no higher than 1,000 persons, male and female.

20) Jews also live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug where their number is as high asl,974 persons; their total in this area is up to 3,000 persons, male and female. Before the Russian occupation of the region they were terribly oppressed. As in Europe the Jews here are occupied in crafts and in trade.

21) The Arabs are descendants of the conquerors who entered Central Asia in the ninth century. They lead a semi-nomadic life in the environs of Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. They number 2,000 to 3,000 persons.

162 The Division of the Population by Religious Faith

The religious faith with the largest number of adherents among the population of Turkestan is the Sunnite sect of the Moslems. There is only a small number of Persians who are Shiites. The Christians form the next largest group, followed by the pagans and finally by the Jews.

Moslems	2,900,000
Orthodox Christian	57,000
Catholics	2,000

162 RL1

Protestants	1,000
Pagans	50,000
Jews	3,000

In relation to estates, of the 60,000 persons of Russian origin, not counting the military, the division is as follows:

Privileged estates	2,600
Merchants	920
/334/Propertied estate	10,076
Peasants	10,708
Cossacks, reserves and other lower ranks settled in the area	25,694
Russians of various estates, residing in the area temporarily and not counted in the local communities	10,000

The native population of the area constitutes the local part of the total non-Russian estate in the realm.

The population of the Turkestan region is remarkable in that there are more males than females there. In this regard the Turkestan area is unlike the European countries where there is a general rule confirmed by statistics, that the number of females is larger than the number of males. This predominance of females in Europe is reported to be from two to three percent.

The numerical predominance of men over women in the Turkestan region is increased by the presence of a considerable number of military personnel. Yet aside from the army, among the native population there is a noticeable preponderance of males over females.

000 preponderance of males over females.

161 In order to judge the growth of population we have data from three uyezds of the
163 Semirechie oblast which show
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1 birth for every 20 persons
1 death for every 21 persons
Natural increase: 0.3%

It is clear from this that the birth rate among the natives is very high, which is in agreement with the general rule: the more civilized a people is, the lower is its birth rate. On the other hand the death rate of the native population also is considerably higher than the death rate of other peoples. Thus the percent of natural increase is two-thirds below that of the population of European Russia, where the annual increase is up to 1%.

The birth rate and mortality and the natural increase of the Russian population living in the Turkestan region corresponds to the data for European Russia.

165 /335/ Among the Kazakhs and Sarts one observes a high female mortality, which results in a preponderance of males, as mentioned above. This predominance is reported to be as much
562 as 10%. The high female mortality among the Kazakhs and Sarts (and in general among our Moslem subjects in the Turkestan region) is due, apparently, to the more terrible and oppressed position which the woman occupies in the Mosler world here. Doomed to heavy labor, knowing no rest and peace, suffering various hardships, the Moslem woman ages early and dies before her time.

8: Kostenko--17 G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

161 If the percent of natural increase in the Turkestan region is not high, we will see something quite different if we examine the population increase which results from other causes. The annexation of new lands and the colonization of the region both by the Russians and by natives coming in from neighboring territories, has increased the population figure for the area threefold.

The table on the following page shows the population change in the region for the eleven years from 1867 through 1877.

/336/ From this table it is found that:

1) In general, the density of the population of the region almost tripled.

162 2) The newly occupied territories not only increased the actual population of the region by almost 60%, but what is more essential, with their annexation to the area, the earlier proportion of sedentary to nomadic population was changed favorably and decisively. The nomads, who constituted between 1867 and 1869 around 70 to 80% of the total population of the region, by 1876 had already lost the numerical superiority to the sedentary population. In 1877 the sedentary group numbered over 200,000 more than the nomads, and represented up to 53% of the total population.

3) The sedentary population in the region increases much faster than the nomadic population.

II

The significance of the local population in relation to the composition of the military district.

64 702 The native population of the Turkestan area is excused from the obligation of military recruitment. It is difficult to say whether this gift

Years	Population			of 1000 persons of the total population there are:		
	Sedentary		Nomadic	Russians	non-Russians	
	Russian	Non-Russian			Sedentary	Nomadizing
1867	24,689	146,650	887,975	23	138	839
1868	24,589	309,835	1,048,585	18	224	758
1869	31,956	482,630	1,014,975	21	316	663
1870	30,815	531,790	1,031,585	19	334	647
1871	37,743	623,290	1,087,880	21	356	623
1872	38,726	645,108	1,095,431	22	363	615
1873	40,334	769,208	1,171,041	20	388	592
1874	44,995	787,188	1,194,841	22	388	590
1875	51,414	907,262	1,276,730	23	406	571
1876	51,414	1,404,027	1,381,533	18	495	487
1877	59,273	1,561,262	1,417,584	19	514	467

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641 of grace will continue long. It would seem
702 that in the name of justice, the sooner these people participate in recruit duties the better. Entering into the body of the empire, being made members of the broad Russian family, enjoying the same rights, the population of Turkestan should also bear the same burdens. Unfortunately, in regard to recruitment, these newly annexed provinces are still in a special and unusual posi-
703 tion. The natives are not yet accustomed to Russian procedures, have not yet succeeded in acclimatizing themselves to Russian rule and to the demands of reasonable discipline. For them military service would be too sharp a transition from the kind of life they know, and there is no doubt that the new recruits would turn into /337/ very bad soldiers. The proximity of independent Central Asian khanates would contribute very much to desertions by our native soldiers. After our occupation of the Turkestan region desertions from the service by our soldiers occurred mostly among the lower ranks, among men of Tatar origin. They took refuge in countries related to them in religion, and found more attractive careers than in the Russian military service. This state of affairs led the administration of the Turkestan area to advocate not using Tatars in the lower ranks of the service in that region.

000 Thus, if the Volga Moslems have shown themselves unsuitable for Russian service in Turkestan, it is useless even to speak of the natives, who are even less consolidated with the

000 Russian Empire. Our entire aim should be to prepare the population for the acceptance of Russian principles and Russian civilization - for the assimilation, as rapid and as rational as possible, of the provinces which have been newly annexed. The Kazakh steppes, it is true, have long been considered part of the Empire, but their incorporation has been only nominal until this time. The proof that the government has regarded the Kazakhs only as a foreign people can be seen most clearly in the fact that until 1868 the Kazakh steppes were divided from the Empire by the Orenburg/Chkalov/ - Siberian customs line.

What measures must be taken in order to blend the native population of Turkestan with the Russian is a complex and broad question, and cannot be the object of our investigation. Here we will indicate only in general lines characteristics of the organization of life and the character of the natives of the Turkestan region. These can contribute in their turn to finding the necessary ways of inculcating the principles of Russian civilization among the natives.

121 In the preceding chapter we saw that numerically, the chief people of the Turkestan area are the nomads; that is, the Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them. After them come the Sarts, who before the coming of the Russians, held the rule of the natives in their hands. The remaining peoples are relatively few in number. For this reason in surveying the public and domestic way of life of the natives/338/ it is enough to describe the Kazakhs, representatives of a nomadic way of life, and the Sarts, representatives of the sedentary natives of the area.

8:Kostenko -21-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

The Kazakhs

142 Physical characteristics. The Kazakh type stands halfway between the Mongolian and the Caucasian. The face is swarthy for the most part, a result of being constantly in the open air - by the fire, in the wind and the frost. Some Kazakhs with pale faces are encountered, but only rarely. The face is broad and quite flat. The head is not especially large; the crown is rounded, more pointed than flat. The cheekbones protrude, but not as sharply as among the Kalmyks and as is general among the Mongols. The nape of the neck is short and the neck long. The eyes are narrow and slightly slanted. The nose is blunt and rounded; the forehead is flat; the mouth is wide and there are large jawbones. The chin is also wide. The beard consists of
141 a small wedge-shaped tuft on the chin. The Kazakhs are in general of medium stature, stooped, often have broad shoulders and are noticeably thickset. In general they are healthy and quite
147 strong, but clumsy. Their walk is slow, but on the other hand when mounted they are skilled horsemen, surpassed in this regard only by the Kalmyks.

141 The Kazakh women are all short in height in general. This shortness of the women is probably a consequence of the unusual physical labor which they must perform.

291 The clothing of the Kazakhs consists of long 'kaftans' (long-skirted coats) or 'khalats' (long wide cloaks) (chapan in Kazakh) of camel's hair, cotton or wool material, and sometimes of velvet, and wide trousers of the same material (shelbar in Kazakh), made sometimes also of plush or sheepskin. At the present time all

291 Kazakhs with any means at all wear shirts, but beggars even now wear a khalat over their naked bodies. In general several khalats are worn,
[302] one on top of another. They cover their shaved heads, first of all with a small cap (tubetei), then with a high sharp-pointed felt hat. In the winter over /339/ the small tubetei they wear a fur hat or 'papakha' /Caucasian fur hat/ or 'malakhai' (fur cap with lappets) which is three-cornered and worn with the fur in. On their feet are leather boots, sometimes with overshoes (ichigi). They wear a leather belt, on which hang small bags and pouches with powder and all this, together with bullets, a knife and flint (~~Russian~~ ognivo) is called 'kalta'. The clothing of the women is almost the same, though not split, and is somewhat similar to a narrow chemise; they also wear khalats on top. They cover their heads in the ugliest fashion in a white cloth, sometimes on top of
[302] a cap. They braid their hair in fine braids and adorn them with coins and rattles. In general the clothing of both sexes is extremely ungraceful, not to say ugly, although the rich have very costly khalats of velvet and silk embroidered in gold and silver.

411 The weapons of the Kazakhs at the present time, after contact with the Russians, have taken on a more and more European character. Their national weapon is the spear with a very long thin staff and the same kind of spearhead. Because of its length and brittleness this weapon is not very dangerous, however, the Kazakhs do not handle it badly. They have adopted curved swords (klych in Kazakh) from the other Central Asian peoples and do not make them themselves. Their guns (multyk) were activated by a fuse in the past. Now the

411 Kazakh scorns such a weapon, for he is receiving guns from the Russians which, though also unenviable, at least have percussion locks. Flintlocks were never used by the Kazakhs. Bows and arrows have been completely abandoned. One may add to the Kazakh weapons the whip (kamcha), which is sometimes as much as an inch in diameter. A blow on the head from this whip can kill a man or a beast.

492 The Kazakh saddle has a high front saddle bow, and in back is completely without a bow. It is quite high, light and very suitable for a good horseman. The kazakhs ride with short stirrups, as is the custom among all equastrian peoples.

221 Way of life. The form of life of the
361 Kazakhs is defined by their type of occupation. Cattle-raising inevitable demands constant moving at the rate that the cattle graze. This movement is called changing camp.

Changing camp among the Kazakhs is done in the following manner: /340/ an 'aul', that is, a group of a small number of tents, not more than fifteen or about that, are grazing their herds in the surrounding area. Usually before they decide to move, they send one or two young riders ahead to choose a suitable camping place, sometimes also to clean out the wells. The actual direction depends on the time of year. If this move occurs before the middle of the summer, they go in the opposite direction from the winter camp. If it occurs in the fall (dzhiliau in Kazakh) then the auls move in the direction of the winter camp. The length of stay in one place depends on the amount of

Kazak RQ2

221 grass for grazing, and they rarely stay any-
361 where longer than a month. Sometimes they stay
only several days. Meanwhile, however, it
[423] should be noted that according to a custom a-
dopted once and for all, auls are not allowed
to use grass for grazing around strange winter
[578] camps. When this custom is not observed it
leads to quarrels, sometimes to fights, and in
the past it led to cattle rustling because the
offended parties in such a case had difficulty
in feeding their herds in winter and attempted
to avenge themselves for the damage suffered.

[462] The actual order of changing camp is as
follows: the chief concern in gathering, storing
and loading of the tents and property falls
upon the women. The head of the household only
supervises the arrangements, and the other men
round up the cattle, and form herds from them,
each family separately. The departure is after
dark, and when everything is ready, the whole
caravan (kos in Kazakh) begins to move. The
housewife goes first, usually on horseback, and
the other women ride after her on camels or
horses, carrying the property. At this time
the Kazakhs usually put on their best clothes.
They place their most precious and costly things
(carpets, samovars, and so on) on the top, and
in general the whole procession has a festive
air. Since the cattle do not all move at the
same pace, the herd soon begins to separate.
As a result the aul sometimes spreads out over
several versts. The head of the household is
usually not with the moving aul; slow movement
is boring to him and he rides somewhere to the
side or hunts along the way. The march is
usually not longer than 20 or 25 versts and
then there is a halt and rest, which in summer
is quite lengthy, up to three or four hours at

8:Kostenko -25-G-4,5(1868-80/1880 RLl Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

221 noontime. Then another such march is taken, so
361 that on the average /341/ the nomads move about forty versts in 24 hours, if there is no reason to hurry or to slow down.

595 Among the Kazakhs, as Moslems, there is
592 polygamy, but since the support of the wives and the payment to their parents for their purchase is quite burdensome, Kazakhs only rarely have two or three wives, while many have four (sic). The poor, however, have only one wife for the most part. Usually the oldest brother in the family has several wives. He is also the head of the family while it is living together, and his first wife directs the entire household. This wife is called 'baibicae' and not only are the other wives of her husband subordinate to her, but also all the female members of the family. Often the head of the family sends off part of the herd under the leadership of this wife for several hundred versts, and remains himself around the plowed land and his young wives, or else leads a nomadic life with the other part of the herd separately. In the winter, however, they travel together.

428 Inheritance. Usually the Kazakhs divide the inheritance while still alive with their grown sons, either upon their marriage or shortly thereafter. In all cases the rule is observed that the children of each mother receive an inheritance only from the estate of their mother, and not from the dowries of the other wives of their father. Also, after the death of the husband the wife keeps exactly her part of the dowry. The daughters are given in marriage, and after that they have no right to inheritance from the father if there are sons.

428 For the most part the father gives his oldest son preference, but this depends on his good
[178] will. Divisions of families used to be encountered more rarely, for danger forced them to move as nomads with large auls. Now this reason for keeping together is considerably less urgent, and ties of kinship in general are beginning to lose their importance.

844 Birth. The Kazakh appears in the world without causing any particular worries to his relatives. Only when there is a difficult
[154] birth do they call in the assistance of their own doctors, that is, conjurers and sorcerers. It is self-evident that in most cases their devices are actually harmful. In fortunate cases they consist only of whisperings and grimaces, but in more decisive instances more
846 violent measures are taken. In most cases little peace is allowed the woman who has borne the child. Rest before and after delivery is
553 set at a very short period. The mother has /342/ only one right: to name her newborn child. She does this in a very original way, acting entirely upon inspiration, often naming the child after the first object she happens to look at after the birth. As a result names occur like It-Ayak, that is, dog's leg, and so forth. Sometimes, however, they name them for Moslem saints, adding to the name the word Ir (Man), thus- Ir Ali, Ir Mohammed, and so on.

852 Circumcision is performed according to Moslem law while the mullahs read prayers, and in general is circumcision inaugurated by festivities, but does not occur until after the third year.

000 Marriage. Usually the Kazakhs, especially

8:Kostenko -27-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RAI Turkestan Kazakhs 92.

Marriage. Usually the kazakhs especially the wealthy ones, betrothe their children when still very young, that is, not asking their consent, and for the most part they have in view equality of wealth and not equal age. In general, Kazakh marriage has much in common with a civil contract, of course within the crude concepts of this people; the religious element here is only very weakly developed. The most important stages of the marriage are the following ones. Whether the children were betrothed earlier or not, the match-making begins with gifts from the groom's side to the bride's father, and the latter on his part is obliged to reciprocate with gifts to the groom's kinsmen who have brought the gifts. These gifts are called 'kiet'. Meanwhile, if there has been no earlier agreement, the father of the bride, assembling his kinsmen, decides by general council the amount to be paid for the bride, called 'kalym', and the terms of its payment. The kalym may be 120,60 and 40 sheep, depending on the wealth of the families. In addition to the kalym, however, the groom must give 'bas' and ' ayak-yakhshi' (a good head and a good foot). These two gifts, depending on the amount of property owned, are usually 9 camels for the bas-yakhshi and one camel, a horse, a cow and a weapon for the ayak-yakhshi. Earlier the bas-yakhshi consisted of one or two slaves. If the people are poorer, then the bas-yakhshi is one or two camels and horses, and the ayak-yakhshi is a horse, a cow and khalats. Finally the usual bas-yakhshi is a horse and khalats, and the usual ayak-yakhshi is cows, sheep and goats. After this the father sends to the groom's aul for the kalym and receives it according to the following reckoning: for 120 sheep he gets 80, for 60 he gets 40, for 40 he gets 27, because a part is counted as future offspring. The groom first pays the

584 kalym or part of it and gives gifts /343/ to
583 the kinsmen, and pays one yakhshi, usually the ayak-yakhshi. Then he carries the remaining yakhshi himself when he rides for the first time to the bride's, and this yakhshi is called 'elu'. For this he receives the right to visit the bride at night, and spends about three days in the aul, secretly, as it were. He steals into the tent during this time and the parents of the bride act as though they knew nothing about it. In order to receive the right to visit the bride during the day the groom again gives gifts. To her father he gives the so-called 'tui-mal' and to her mother a payment for her milk, 'syut-ake'. The value of the tuimal, which depends entirely upon the wealth involved, and among the righ may be from 50 to 100 horses and one harness, is returned to the groom in the form of the bride's dowry if the marriage is broken off. The match-making sometimes lasts quite a long time, perhaps a year or more. During this time all the entertainment of guests is at the expense of the
[585] bride's father. Only after this period is over does the groom ride to fetch the bride. For this he puts on his best clothing, mounts his best horse and arrives at the aul of his future wife. Here a tent has already been prepared for him, and after a prayer by the mullah, which is actually the wedding, the bride and groom are led into the tent and left there alone. All these arrivals are of course accompanied by feasts and entertainments but the groom suffers especially during the last visit for the relatives of the bride take away everything, his horse, clothing, weapon, etc. In addition, all through the match-making the bride's brother has the right to steal anything he wants from the groom without paying any fine for it, and if he is caught he

584 is only given an ordinary beating. From all
583 this one can see that the marriage consists of a civil agreement under a show of gifts, and both sides have almost an equal interest in conforming to it. But the real advantage goes to the bride's kinsmen who receive gifts and return nothing. Sometimes the bride is not given so informally to the groom, and she must be taken by force, and yet certain customs are observed in this case as well. After the final cohabitation, the newly-weds return home and are accompanied triumphantly, and then the celebrations begin at the groom's father's and at his expense. It is self-evident that the number of gifts and the elaborateness of the feasts are always in proportion to the means of both sides.

764 /344/ Burial. According to Kazakh custom the deceased is washed and dressed in his best clothing, and sometimes he is wrapped in a khalat. If a man has died, his wives are required to set up a terrible wail of despair and repeat this ceremony mornings and evenings for a year. In these cases the neighboring women never lag in visiting the one in mourning in order to wail with her to satiety. At the funeral the mullah reads prayers twice; at home, before the body is carried out, and at the actual burial. They dig a pit with a wooden floor for the deceased, or they place him at the side of the main pit. Graves are usually on elevations, and over them they make memorials of wood, stone, clay or earth, sometimes in the form of buildings with a round cupola and turrets. It is remarkable that very often the Kazakhs depart in this case from the Moslem rules and make images of animals and people in
765 these tombs. Of course, at the burial there is usually a feast for the guests, but the

765 main banquets are given at the funeral feasts (ash) which are 40 days after the death and one year after it. At these funeral feasts they put on horse races and a feast, and as a result they are very expensive for the relatives.

527 [796] Holidays. The Kazakhs do not keep the Moslem holidays particularly, though they do observe certain fasts(uraza) and celebrate certain days, for example, Kurban-Bairam and others. Their chief celebrations, however, are of a family or folk character, that is, weddings, funeral feasts, or celebrations held on some kind of joyous occasion in the family of a rich and well-known man. Celebrations in such cases often take on a general character and acquaintances and strangers come together there. The celebration begins with a general feast and only then proceeds to the
526 games. The chief amusements are the horse races (baiga) with prizes which are often quite considerable. After this, contests between strong men are very popular, but they never involove fighting with the fists. Finally there is foot racing but the prizes for this
524 are quite insignificant. Games among the young people of both sexes are quite common. The most amusing is the one in which a girl is mounted on a horse and armed with a whip, and is followed by young men. Whoever overtakes her and catches her has the right to kiss her and is allowed other minor liberties, but the amazon is an expert with the /345/ whip and strikes down unwelcome suitors at full length with blows, to the great delight of the onlookers.

527 554 According to Kazakh custom an honored figure is chosen at the celebration to distribute prizes and direct the entertainment, a bey

527 or a sultan. Here the right to preeminance is
554 decided either by the seniority of the clan, or by the importance of the family if it is a sultan. The person who is given this position of seniority is treated with the greatest respect. This is expressed, among other ways, in the fact that during the feast the cup of meat which is brought to him contains the head of the slaughtered animal.

During these banquets the persons of honor as a sign of special graciousness, feed a younger brother with their own hands with pieces of meat and fat, placing the food unceremoniously in the mouth of the lucky fellow considered worthy of such an honor, while he usually crawls up to them on his knees. During this time beggars and servants usually wait for the end of the banquet, standing or sitting behind the feasters, and from time to time the honored guests throw them pieces of meat and bones. Afterwards the remains of the banquet belong to this hungry brotherhood and to the women.

855 The rearing of children among the Kazakhs is crude and perfunctory. Neither father nor mother bothers about them particularly. Usually the children up to the age of 12 or 13 run about in the summer naked or practically naked, in some kind of a rag. In the winter because of of the cold they often hide among the sheep, which are allowed into the tent, and there only their half-shaven, half-shorn heads pop up among the rams and gaze with wild, sharp eyes at the
578 newly arrived visitor. Like all primitive creatures, the Kazakhs do not hesitate to use expressions rising to the highest degree of cynicism when they quarrel. But the head of the family only rarely beats the other members.

674 Stealing among the Kazakhs is a rather
685 widespread crime. They steal horses, primarily. If the thief is caught there is the custom of taking the stolen animal away from him and adding to this a fine of twice its value. As the Kazakhs say - in such cases it is almost always a question of horses - ' on the neck an addition, to the tail a support ' (in Kazakh: muinena kossau, kutenia-terkiau). This punishment is
695 called 'aip' or 'aibana'. In case there are no witnesses, the oath of some outside person is needed /346/ who is known for his honesty and who knows the accused. If such a person is found and wishes to give his oath on the innocence of the accused, then the latter is definitely released from the charge. It must be said that this is a very reliable way in
[577] general of learning the truth. It costs the Kazakh nothing to lie himself, but for some reason he will not consent to take someone else's lie upon himself.

In general, the oath, as soon as it happen between Kazakhs and not to aid an infidel, that is, a Russian, has a very serious significance and is considered sacred. At the present time it is usually given with the kissing of the Koran in the presence of an honored person or mullah, but earlier, various rites were observed. For example, it was necessary to lick the fingernail, looking at the sun, or to say the oath with the muzzle of a loaded gun in the mouth. This has already gone out of use
[778] today. In important cases, however, even now, those who are to swear are invited to some holy sepulchre and it is suggested that as they say the oath they cut off the branch of a holy tree there. It is a rare Kazakh who will consent to this sacrilege if it is a false oath.

8:Kostenko -33-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

681 Among alomst all ancient peoples and among the Kazakhs there existed the law of retribution, that is, death for murder or rape - and mutilation for mutilation. But time and the prevalance of a new order have changed this custom. However, down to the Russian domination, ransom was permitted for murder. For the death of a man a thousand horses were usually paid, and half that for the murder of a woman. This ransom is called 'kun', and when the crime can be hidden from the Russian authorities this is done even today.

692 In general all legal judgments, civil and criminal, just as all public affairs, according to custom can never depend on the will of one person, but are always made with the agreement of several elders, beys or honored persons in general. These persons had and still have today the right to receive a tenth part of the property of the guilty person, or, if it is a civil matter, the same share from the payment
696 of retribution which they decide. The 'baranta'
628 is a completely unique crime among the Kazakhs. The beginning of these feuds was almost always legal, that is, they usually began from the unwillingness /347/ of one of the contesting parties to abide by the decision of the elders. In such a case the injured party had the legal right to obtain satisfaction by force, that is, to make raids, steal cattle and capture the people. It is self-evident that those who were plundered did the same in return, believing that more had been taken from them than should have been according to the legal judgment. Thus the stealing, robbery and murder committed by both sides confused the question more and more, and quarrels and feuds lasted in this way for decades, eventually even dividing clans.

8:Kostenko -34-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

628 At the present time these internal quarrels have almost all been ended, or, to be more precise, they cannot break out in the old form because the Russian forts and the Russian authorities prevent it. So the word baranta has gradually received a somewhat different meaning. Now it means either simply robbery, or else banditry, which is prosecuted very severely by the Russian authorities.

567 In earlier times the Kazakhs had slaves from all the surrounding nations of different religious faith. Even Moslems, - Shiites, e.g. Persians, who were considered heretics, were taken as slaves. Finally, since the religious principle is very weak among the Kazakhs, they took practically everyone who fell into their hands as slaves, without making a refined analysis of their trend of thinking. Now with the installation of Russian authority slavery on the steppe has gradually disappeared.

771 Religious instruction. The Kazakhs, as we know, are Moslems, and are usually considered Sunnites, although this is absolutely without foundation since, broadly speaking, these people are very undeveloped at the present time in regard to religion, and do not know themselves exactly to what religious sect they belong. Most Kazakhs have only a vague idea of the existence of two Moslem sects, Sunnite and Shiite. Not only that, the actual essence of the religion is completely unknown to them. This is probably explained partly by their nomadic form of life, and partly by the fact that they have lived and live still surrounded by peoples of various religions: Christian, Moslem and pagan, who are all equally antagonisti

8:Kostenko -35-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak R92

771 to them. Indifference toward religious questions
[186] will be retained by the Kazakh, however, only until /348/ he comes into contact with more highly developed people, that is, until external conditions affect him. In such cases, the Kazakh will become more exacting in regard to religious rites and questions, since, strictly speaking, this religiosity is nothing more than a previously hidden feeling of nationality expressing itself in this form.

769 Among the religious rites of the Kazakhs veneration at the tombs of famous ancestors and the custom of praying in the cemeteries are very remarkable. Earlier it was not difficult to create a Kazakh saint (aulye). It was only necessary to be a bold robber and to leave a fine estate so that the heirs might build a great tomb, or else to be killed in battle. At first the tombs of such persons were visited by descendants (rodovichami), then, in general, all those who came, looking at the others, also began to pray and to bring gifts. These presents are very unimaginative, consisting usually of many-colored rags torn from the clothing, or of bones, especially horns and heads. All this is thrown and spread out on the tomb and around it, constituting a kind of sacrificial offering reminiscent
[778] of paganism. If a tree or bush which is rare in the steppe grows in such a place then the holiness of the tomb is increased, and prayers said there are considered extremely efficacious and pious, just as oaths there are considered particularly binding.

659 At the present time our government does not attend to the appointment of mullahs nor to the building of mosques for the Kazakhs.

793 Any man who is the slightest bit literate can be a mullah. There are very few of them in the steppe, however. These are people for the most part who can scarcely read the Tatar language, and do not know a single word of Arabic, but have learned several prayers from the Koran by heart. These mullahs travel about among the auls, performing marriages and participating in funerals. But quite often weddings and funerals take place without them as well. In the Kazakh wedding, as has been said earlier, the civil part, that is, the property, plays the main role, while the funerals of the poor must perforce take place without mullahs, since there is no profit from the poor. There are among these mullahs some persons who have received some /349/ religious instruction in Samarkand and Bukhara and who are venerated by the people, but the majority are pitiful ignoramuses and parasites, extracting various advantages from a gullible people, resorting to sorcery for these ends and in general to rites and inventions out of their own imagination.

771 797 In spite of this weak development of religious ideas among the people and the complete absence of a Moslem ecclesiastical hierarchy, it may be said that there is very little Christianity among the Kazakhs. One obstacle to the dissemination of the Eastern Orthodox faith is the veneration of ikons, which is oriented too sharply against the first principle of Islam and is completely incomprehensible to people who have grown up under the influence of diametrically opposite views on this subject. A more important reason for the lack of dissemination of Christianity among

771 the Kazakhs is the form of action adopted by
797 the Russians themselves, who have long since been taking pains to make the nomads zealous Moslems, and have built mechets and established mullahs, etc. for this end.

771 But the suffocating atmosphere of the mosques can never be attractive to the nomads, who are accustomed to the open air of the steppes, and consequently none of the Kazakhs attend the mechets built by the Russians.

788 Although the Kazakhs are officially considered Moslems, the Moslem rites are only little known by them. Of the namaz /prayers/ performed five times, they observe only the
785 morning and evening prayers. The Kazakhs have a decided aversion to the fasts because of inherent gluttony and because of the impossibility of picking and choosing their food.

000 In summary, the religious indifference of the Kazakhs is very conducive to the introduction of a more civilized influence among them.

871 Education. In regard to education, the Kazakhs are at a very low stage of development, although their ability is quite good, as far as one may judge from those who received some education.

[212] At the present time there is, of course, very little literacy among the Tatar people. Only the mullahs and functionaries can read and write. Instead of signatures the people use the stamps of their clans. Usually, the instruction of the young is handled by the mullahs who move in winter for this purpose /350/

871 somewhere into the midst of the numerous winter camps, and collect the children, almost exclusively boys, for several hours every day. The little girls learn to read and write very rarely, and only at home with their parents.
[876] The instruction consists of learning verses by heart in chorus and in a singsong voice, supplemented by dictation of Tatar phrases. In the instruction there is no unity and no definite rules. As a result it often happens that the pupils of one mullah can make out only with difficulty what is written by the pupils of another, because they have learned ortography by different rules.

674 Moral training. The evidence from juridical statistics for the nomads is very incomplete, because most of the misdemeanors and crimes remain unknown to the authorities due to the extent of the territory and the mobility
[186] of nomadic life. In addition, many crimes are concealed consciously from the Russian administration by the nomad leaders because they consider it a sufficient accounting to settle them in the native manner. Furthermore it cannot be said that justice suffers particularly because of this. In any case the people are satisfied with it and prefer a judgment according to their ancient customs to our criminal or civil court practice, which is definitely inaccesible to their concepts.

181 The character of the Kazakhs has all the qualities of the character of young nations and those, so to speak, not yet formed. In its main features their character is similar to the common Asiatic one, that is, the Kazakh has a conditional honesty and bravery as long

181 as he sees a possibility of success or gain. Vindictiveness also constitutes one of his motives, when he is not inclined to stealing. Most Kazakhs are very cold-blooded in appearance and in general try to seem to be men in [158] control of their passions. Yet this is a mask for as soon as this false equilibrium is destroyed by something, they are seized by a terrible quick temper and fury sometimes leading to frenzy and raging which spares neither them- [147] selves nor others. The Kazakhs have a remarkable ability to bear physical pain. Probably this is a consequence of their rough upbringing, which to a still greater degree makes them insensitive to the sufferings of others. In this connection the women form a praiseworthy exception, and in the past more than one unhappy /351/ prisoner was indebted to them for the easing of his fate, and sometimes even for his freedom.

461 As a result of their limited desires the Kazakhs are lazy. The Kazakh works hard only from extreme need, and when his stomach is full and his body clothed, then for the most part he prefers the eastern keif (delightful idleness) to any work.

203 Idleness and boredom have aroused curio-
574 sity in him. The Kazakh not only loves to listen to news, but along with this he has a great inclination to tell about things. Every smallest event or incident, no matter how trifling, gives him an excellent occasion to ride to the nearest aul and relate in great detail his khabar or news. It is self-evident that during this the Kazakh is not averse to adorning it a little. To know some interesting

K 203 574 khabar is exactly the same as having an invitation ready in one's pocket to a filling dinner in any aul. As soon as the newcomer says that there is khabar, he is regaled at once and he eats and relates it to his hosts. Then at once one of his hosts uses this opportunity to get something to eat in the next aul, and hurries off there with the news. This explains the unusual speed with which rumors spread in the steppe.

K 177 Upon contact with advanced nations, the Kazakhs adopt their superficial gloss and their habits for themselves with remarkable K [811] rapidity, but without losing their own nationality or being contemptuous of it. The sciences are quite accessible to them and they understand especially easily an analytic type of exposition. K [609] They do the Russians full justice, recognizing in them a moral and physical advantage. Thus they have the saying: Sary-kazak kara-kalmak, sary-urus kara-kazak, which means, the Kazakh is as much whiter or brighter than the Kalmyk as the Russian is more than the Kazakh. This proverb applies just as much to moral qualities. Thus the Kazakhs often come to Russian functionaries to be tried.

/352/ The Sarts

S 101 The origin of the Sarts. There is no Sart people. But the Russians have followed the nomads in using this name for the sedentary population of Turkestan, the people who live in the towns and villages and work in agriculture, the crafts and in trade. The people who have been given this name differ greatly both in language and in origin, but possess

101 common spiritual and moral qualities, and also follow almost exactly the same way of life.

The word Sart is used to designate: 1) Tadzhiks, an Iranian people, the primordial inhabitants of Central Asia, who now live primarily within the Zeravshan okrug and partly in the Khodzhent (modern Leninabad) uyezd; (1)

1. Cf. p. 332.

2) the sedentary Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs and various peoples, stemming from a mixture of these. They populate the native towns of the Syr-Darya and Fergana oblast' and the Zeravshan okrug and live as tradesmen in the towns of the Semirechie oblast'; 3) the Taranchi, who are a sedentary Moslem people constituting the predominant population of the Kuldja region.

All these peoples, bearing the common name of Sarts, do not call themselves by this name, but are called by the names of the towns in which they live. Thus a resident of Tashkent calls himself a Tashkenlyk (a Tashkentian), a resident of Khodzhent a Khodzhenlyk and so forth.

183 Apart from the common name, the Sarts have also adopted a common manner of life and occupation. In this regard the people of Samarkand, Khodzhent, Tashkent and Kuldja are very similar to each other. Their social and civic life and even their character has been found formed under the influence of the
000 levelling Moslem codex, the 'shariat'. On the other hand the physical type and speech

8: Kostenko--42 G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
Sart RN4

144 On the other hand the physical type and speech of the Sarts shows extreme diversity according to the blood which predominates in this or that population. In this regard the residents of Samarkand and Khodzhent are a type closely approaching the basic Iranian or Tadzhik type, the true representatives of which /353/ are the mountains Tadzhiks or Galcha, the aborigenes of the country. These people were forced out by the conquerors into gorges difficult of access, and thus have been enabled to maintain their primitive purity. Those living in the valleys have always mixed with the various peoples coming in, so that a mixed type developed. This is why one can often see traces of the Turkic people in the Tadzhik valley Sart type and, on the other hand, the Uzbek Sart often bears in his face the stamp of the Iranian type. As a result a general Sart type is hard to define. One can only say that this type is quite handsome, that the facial features are regular and pleasant, the height is medium, the body build is delicate and not robust.

197 The language of the Sarts is also varied: in Samarkand and Khodzhent for example, they speak Tadzhik, while in Tashkent, Kokand and Kuldja they speak Turkic. But on the other hand, as was said earlier, the form of life, the morals and customs are almost the same.

291 Costume. The costume of the Sart is very monotonous. All of them, from the rich to the last beggar, old and young, wear clothing not only of one style, but almost of the same materials.

The most ordinary costume of the Sart

291 is the khalat (tun), which is bound at the waist with a belt or in most cases simply with a piece of material, on which a scarf is twisted. The breadth of this belt among the well-to-do Sarts can be up to half an arshin or more. The upper part of the khalat among the more wealthy Sarts is covered by another which they do not belt. On the head, in addition to a flat cap, 'tuppe', most of them wear a turban, which is usually of white muslin. There are towns, however, where they also wear red, grey, green and in general colored turbans. On their feet the Sarts wear soft boots without heels (masy), over which they put on 'kavsh' (overshoes), usually green, which are pieced together of horse hide (saur) which has been dressed in a special way. The kaush are made with heels and sharp-pointed toes, somewhat turned up, [576] ending in a small strap. The Sarts always remove these kaush before entering a mosque or a room.

The Sarts do not wear shirts, except for the mullahs, who have them with clasps at the shoulders. All other Sarts wear /354/ white khalats in place of them, which extend somewhat below the knees and have one tie under the pit of the stomach.

In summer the Sarts change this khalat for a tun, and then put a belt around it on which they hang flint for fire, a purse, a knife in a leather sheath, a whetstone and a copper case for wooden toothpicks.

252 Food. The food of the Sarts consists
262 of 'shurpy' (a lamb bouillon, prepared with cayenne pepper and sour milk), 'kaurdak'

8:Kostenko -44-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Sart RN4

252 (lamb cut in small pieces and fried in lard of
262 the fat-tail sheep together with pieces of flat cake and fried eggs), 'mante' or 'pilmene' (similar to ravioli, with meat filling), 'samsa' and 'gosh-kuldy' or patties. These last are round in the form of buns. There is also 'kebaba' or shashlik and finally 'palau' or 'pilaf'. The last dish is particularly widespread in Central Asia. The native likes it very much and calls it alone 'ash' (food). Pilaf is prepared in the following way. Lamb cut into small pieces, together with finely shredded carrots (sabza) and onion (piaz) is cooked in a kettle in melted fat-tail lard. Then rice (grunch) which has been washed and drained is put into the kettle, salted, sprinkled with pepper, and some also put in raisins, then water is poured in on top and it cooks until the rice appears above the water. After flattening it out with something bitter, and adding onion in the spaces between, they cover the kettle with some sort of clay cup around which they put a towel so that the steam will not escape and make the rice tough, and then they decrease the fire and let it stew practically on top of a few hot coals. Rice should not stick together in the kettle like groats, but every grain should be separated. The Sarts eat their pilaf with finely shredded black radishes, and sometimes they add pomegranate or cherry juice to this. However, not all the Sarts live on the food described above. Only the wealthy cook pilaf or some other dish at home every day. The majority are satisfied with flat cakes (nan), which serve as bread, and in the summer with melons, dried apricots and other fruit. Only on Fridays and on annual or family celebrations do they cook Kaurdak, pilaf or other dishes at home.

000 kaurdak, pilaf or other dishes at home.

784 Sometimes the Sarts suspect that the food has been desecrated /355/ by something unclean, and are not sure it is fit to eat. This problem is settled by a 'mufti' (1).

693 1. A mufti is a kind of secretary to the 'kazi' (judge). In earlier times he drew up agreements and pleas, and recorded the decisions of the kazi. All pleas, decisions and acts are countersigned by the seal of the mufti. When a plaintiff comes to him, the mufti must interrogate him in detail, and then if no contradictions or lies appear in the words of the plaintiff, he makes out the plea in writing. If the contrary is the case he refuses to write the plea.

272 The most common and favorite drink of the Sarts is green tea. It is the indispensable component of every banquet. Among the
273 intoxicating beverages the Sarts drink 'buza'. To make this, first they soak millet in hot water for three days, then they pour out the water and put the millet into a kettle, adding sheep fat, and stew it until it has the form of a thick mass. When it has cooled they put this mass into large clay pots, pouring in meal from fermented millet and in the morning when the buza begins to froth they knead it with their hands, add a double quantity of water, and the buza is ready to drink. A second heavy drink is 'koknar', made from the heads of poppies. This drink is especially bad for the health, and a Sart who is partial to koknar will already be pale and trembling

273 at the end of a year and a person incapable of anything. Koknar addicts usually drink it by the glass three times a day: early in the morning, at noon, and in the evening. In this passion for heavy drinks the true believers show a desire to pass by the Koran, but in such a way that the wolves will be satiated and the lambs whole.

276 The Sarts use tobacco in two ways. They smoke it in a local narghile (chilim) made of a pear-shaped gourd into which they pour water. In the upper narrow part of the gourd they place a pipe, and at the bottom a short mouthpiece is attached. The Sarts also chew tobacco which has been ground. When smoking the natives sometimes mix 'nashi' (hashish) with the tobacco. This is prepared from the remains of the husks of hemp seeds obtained during the threshing of the hemp (bang). This is rubbed and sifted through a fine sieve, and the meal produced from this is placed in a kettle and put on the fire to roast for /356/ an hour, and during this time it is stirred from time to time with a wooden stick. When the meal has become oily, they pour it into a small wooden mortar and begin to pound it. Three or four persons take turns pounding it and after two hours of constant pounding the meal is transformed into a sticky yellowish mass. Then they pour 'zygir' oil (1) or sesame oil into it, after which they pound again until the meal is changed into a dark green dough, and then the nashi is ready.

1. Zygir is flax. Since one seed of hemp yields little oil, the natives add a flax seed to it, and therefore this oil is called "of zygir".

8:Kostenko -47-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Sart RNY

252 The Sarts have delicacies, in addition to fruit, which may be pieces of sugar, added unfailingly to every entertainment (dostorkhan), of egg whites beaten with sugar, or halva, sugared pistachios (rusta), small sugar rings (parvarda), fine pellets (bogarsak) baked of dough mixed with cracklings left from the fat after pilaf, or sugar candy and so forth.

527 Holidays. There are three major holidays among the Sarts: New Year's (arsol), Ruza-Khait or Ruza-Sail, and Kurban-Khait. In addition to this the Sarts celebrate every Friday (dzhuma). These holidays, except for dzhuma are movable. Few as the Sarts' holidays are, the entertainment they perform for them is still less. On these occasions they have dancing by bachas /dancers/, fights between quail, or partridges, racing (baiga) and racing with a kid (kok-bari - grey wolf). In this last amusement the riders try to snatch a kid from each other, a kid which has been butchered and thrown over the saddle.

Customs during birth, matchmaking, mar-
553 riage and burial. After the birth of a son
851 the father of the baby says a prayer and names him. As soon as the news has spread about, the neighbors come to congratulate him and a
852 feast is prepared for them. When the boy has turned 9 or 10, the ceremony of circumcision is performed, at which time a celebration (toi) lasting three days is held for relatives and friends. Every guest brings a dish of something to eat to such a celebration, and the host serves them these dishes. Then as they depart, /357/ the guests receive the same food and the same quantity of it which they

852 brought. The men invited to such a celebration do not give food but something more substantial, as for example, a sheep, a horse, and the like. The host then returns the gift when a similar celebration takes place at their houses. After the three days have passed the circumcision takes place, during which the mullah reads a prayer.

584 Matchmaking among the Sarts usually takes place with the help of matchmakers, and if the parents agree to give their daughter in marriage the matchmakers even make the agreement as to the amount and kind of kalym which the groom must pay for the bride. In addition to money the kalym also includes various toilet articles, necessary to the bride, as for example, khalats, 'beshmets' /long Caucasian coats/, oils, earrings, rings, shawls, etc., and also sheep, rice, carrots, grapes and so on, which are necessary for the wedding feast. They do not make the agreement as to the dowry which the bride brings to the house of her future husband, and the groom ascertains this only after the wedding.

585 Although according to custom the groom must not even see his bride before the wedding, the Sarts often bribe a woman they know to conceal the groom in her quarters and invite the bride for a visit, thus giving the groom an opportunity to see his intended. The actual wedding ritual takes place in the following
585 way. When the kalym has been paid and the day of the wedding
586 settled, then they agree upon the forfeit for breach of contract which the groom must pay his wife in case of a divorce. The amount of this forfeit is determined by

[586] the mother and the female relatives of the bride as well as those invited as witnesses
585 to the wedding rite. After this the mullah reads a prayer and asks the bride, through a door, whether she will marry this man. Having received her consent he turns to the groom with the same question and after an affirmative answer the mullah gives him a glass of water. The groom drinks from it, then returns it to the mullah who sends it to the bride. After that, those present drink the rest of the glass of water. After the rite the women lead the groom into the sleeping quarters, after which the bride is led in.

The first three days the groom lives at his wife's house, for she is still at her parents', and when he is returning to her from somewhere /358/ he avoids meeting passers-by. After three days the bride moves to the home of her husband and the routine secluded life begins for her.

764 The funerals of the Sarts are also not distinguished by particular solemnity. As soon as someone dies in a house, at once the women there gather somewhere in a corner and begin to wail and to tear at their faces. The neighboring women drop in and join them and set up a moan over the house of the deceased. The relatives and friends of the deceased who are informed of the event come to visit on the first day. On the second day the body, wrapped in sackcloth, is taken to the mosque and after the Koran has been read over him he is buried in the cemetery, or where he asked to be buried.
765 The shroud which has covered the body is divided among the relatives and friends. After the

765 burial those who attended gather at the home of the deceased where they listen to reading from the Koran. The reading from the Koran is repeated there on the second day, attended by the same persons. On the third day, after the morning namaz /prayer/, they go directly from the mosque to the funeral feast. Once more they listen to the Koran and after eating they disperse. The funeral feasts are repeated after seven and after ten days. In addition, on the annual holidays the women gather in the cemeteries and wail in remembrance of their dead, after which alms are distributed among the beggars and imbeciles who have gathered at the memorial.

671 The civil organization. The civil organization of the life of the Sarts, the marriage laws, the laws of inheritance and the like, are defined with great precision in the Moslem code (shariat).

871 Religious and intellectual training. The religious and intellectual training of the Sarts, as well as for all Moslems, are indivisible. Both are received in the schools, which are divided into two levels: the lower schools (makhtab), and the higher schools (medresse).

Both kinds of schools are located by the mosques for the most part and are maintained at the expense of the 'wakf', that is, estates bequeathed by pious people for the support of charitable work. The institution or the person who receives wakf uses only the income from the property bequeathed and has no right to appropriate it.

871 /359/ The lower schools are almost always paid for by the group of parishioners, if not maintained at the expense of a wakf, so that every ward (mahala) in a town or village has its school. In general, in the Moslem world instruction is the affair of the community and of private persons, and the state has nothing to do with it.

872 Here we will examine the teaching in the lower schools first, and then proceed to the higher ones, using in our account the very detailed articles of Mr. Kun appearing in the Turkestanskie vedomosti (Turkestan journal) of 1876, Numbers 37, 47, and 48.

872 875 Primary schools (makhtab). The elementary school teacher is chosen primarily from the residents of the district in which the school is located. His salary is paid by the residents of the district, from one to two 'tengas' /20 or 40 kopecks/per house. If the teacher is invited from a distant district, he and his family are alloted special lodging near the school in addition.

There are no special requirements to receive the post of a schoolteacher. Beyond the salary from the community and the attending pupils, and sometimes, as was said, the furnishing of lodging, the teacher receives nothing.

872 346 All the pupils at the schools are day pupils. The interior of the school is extremely plain and simple. It consists of one room with several doors, substituting for windows. In the summer all the doors are open all day and in winter, all except the entrance doors

872 are blocked off with frames covered over with
paper. Sometimes small windows are made over
346 the doors. In the walls there are usually
niches for overshoes, clothes and such things.
A small square hole in the ceiling called a
'tabudan', open in the summer and closed in
winter, with a lamp made of small wooden planks
covered with paper is used to light the room.
Schools of this kind which have no special
housing near the mechet, are set up in the
'mikhman-khane', the vestibule of the teacher's
house, and must be satisfied with such an
arrangement.

On the floor is placed a framework of
beams about 5 inches thick, parallel to the
walls and a foot away from them, and these
are joined together and cut off at the corners.
This framework takes the place of tables for
the pupils, who sit on the floor with crossed
legs, and it serves as a kind of special school
desk. The pupils /360/ sit on top of this
framework, facing the inside of the room, and
the teacher sits in their midst behind the
beams forming the school desk. The class-
room floor is covered with woven mats of reeds
with felting, or simply with straw.

According to the existing custom, a
872 father who has settled in advance with the
875 teacher in regard to pay, usually between ½
to 2 tengas (1) monthly, depending on his
means, brings his 6 to 8 year old son to
school, and at the same time brings the teacher
a 'dostarkhan', or gift of food, consisting
of flatcakes and raisins.

[436] 1. A tenga is 20 kopecks.

872 The teacher accepts the raisins and the flat-
875 cakes which are usually nine in number or a multiple of nine, and treats the future comrades of the new pupil with them. Then, seating the new boy beside him the teacher gives him the first lesson, to start to repeat the following verses:

Merciful God, enlighten the heart of
Thy servant.
This Moslem servant,
Thirsting to read the Koran.
He seeks Thy protection
For he has sinned much.

Having blessed the pupil, so to speak, with the above verses, the teacher writes the Arabic alphabet, which consists of twenty-eight letters, on a board. The teacher explains the pronunciation of each letter to the pupil, then gives him the board and orders one of his neighbors to help him. In some schools when the teacher has given the new pupil a lesson he entrusts him to his 'khalife'.

The assistants to the teacher are called khalifes. Since the teacher cannot always spend the entire days in school, each has one or two khalifes. These are senior pupils, in relation to their time of entrance to the school. In the majority of cases they are chosen from the pupils who have already finished the course but have stayed in the school to perfect their calligraphy. In the absence of the teacher the khalifes work with the pupils, listening to the lessons they have prepared, assigning them new ones, and in general seeing that the pupils have something to do. The khalifes

872 receive no renumeration for this aid to the
875 teacher. According to the present system, when the pupil himself declares that he knows the lesson, the teacher assigns him a new one.

872 /361/ Having learned the alphabet thoroughly, the pupils proceeds to the 'abdzhad'. The abdzhad is an exercise for memorization in which consonants are combined into words having no lexical meaning, but only numerical sense. All the arithmetic the pupils are taught in elementary school is comprised in memorizing combinations.

This mechanical learning of the cabalistic words of the abdzhad takes up from one to two weeks. Having learned the abdzhad, the [875] pupil proceeds to the study of the Koran. At this time the teacher excuses the pupil for one day from his studies, and the grateful parents send the teacher one or two tengas as a gift for the progress made by their son.

When the pupil has learned the Alyamnasher, a chapter of the Koran, which concludes the third series (21 chapters altogether), there is a special celebration of the progress of the pupil, which also bears the name of 'nashran'. This celebration usually takes place in the following manner. The pupil's wrists are bound together with the hands turned up, and the teacher places in them an empty pencil case or box for an inkstand (kalyamdan). Then the pupil, accompanied by a senior student from the school and other school comrades, leaves the school and goes with his suite first to his parents and then to his relatives. Each of them is obliged

872 to put some coins in the box, which are for the teacher.

During the entire procession, both to the parents and to the relatives, the senior pupil, the khalife, sings a special hymn composed for the occasion called 'alyamnasher'. The content of this hymn is practically the same in all schools. It praises the talents of the pupil, the wisdom of the teacher and asks God to bless the pupil in the career he has undertaken, to study the wisdom of Islam. After every two lines sung or spoken by the khalife, the other pupils, his schoolmates, sing a refrain: 'bale', 'bale', which means - just so, just so.

Then the pupil advances to the reading of the remaining 58 chapters of that part of the Koran which is called Khavtu-Ek, which contains 69 chapters, among which are the 21 chapters first studied by the pupil. As he reads the Khavtu-Ek the pupil /362/ skips the chapters already read and repeated. When he has finished the Khavtu-Ek, he sets to work on the Kalyam-Sherif (the holy word) of the Koran.

This advance to the study of the word of God is initiated by a grand preliminary celebration and gifts which the pupil's parents give the teacher.

When the pupil has learned the whole Koran by rote, automatically, he progresses to the Chakhar-Kitab (1), a collection of the laws of faith written in Persian.

8:Kostenko -56-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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872 1. The Chakhar-Kitab or four books, consists of the first, Khak (the explanation of the name of God, the laws of religion, of ablutions, Namaza (prayers and the like), the second, Bidan (the knowledge of faith); the third, Kalik-nabi (the knowledge of tradition); the fourth, Khamdekhad (the glorification of God).

872 Until now[1] all the wisdom in the school
876 has consisted in the automatic mastering of Arabic reading and writing. With the book Chakhar-kitab, the Tadzhik pupil advances to reading what is more or less interpreted, and to understanding what he learns. On the other hand for the boy of any other nationality, not speaking Tadzhik, his learning by rote changes only in regard to the sounds, but not in greater understanding of what is read and learned.

872 When he has finished the Chakhar-Kitab and presented the teacher with a gift from his parents of one or two tengas, the pupil takes up the book Mantyk, the writing of Sheikh Atar Valiya, written in Tadzhik. After the book of Mantyk, the pupil turns to the work of Hodji Hafiz, one of the favorite poets of the east. His poetry is written in Persian and is very widely known. A collection of his verses serves as an oracle in female circles.

[875] When he has finished learning Hafiz, the pupil brings his teacher the inevitable gift of the dostorkhan and two tengas, which follows the completion of study of every book, and the next day he starts in on the book Mirza Bidyl, written in Tadzhik. After learning this,

[1 Qe: when the pupil has learned the entire Koran by rote-- Analyst]

876 a school in the neighborhood makes itself known from quite a distance.

872 According to Central Asian pedagogy it is not acceptable to give the pupil lessons at home. According to the existing custom the pupils spend the entire day in school. The children gather at school about eight o'clock in the morning and remain there until sundown, going home only at noon for one hour to have dinner. The school program usually continues the year round, excluding Fridays every week and the holidays of Ramazan, Kurban-Bairam and New Year's. The teacher is not left without gifts if his work ceases on these days. On the eve of Friday, on Thursday, when the pupils gather at school, each brings the teacher one rich flat cake (kulche-nan). On this day school is in session until noon. Usually at twelve o'clock before the pupils are dismissed the teacher inspects the nails of all the boys, and those with dirty nails he beats with a book cover, a ruler or the board on which the alphabet is written. After the inspection /364/ of their nails all the pupils stand in a row facing the 'kaabe' (stone of Mecca) and the instructor teaches them the rules of the namaz (prayers). When the namaz is finished he reads the 'fatikha' (a prayer). Then he instructs the pupils how to behave toward older people, not to omit the time of prayer, to answer the questions of his parents respectfully and not to shout back when they are called with noises like "Ha" etc., and finally not to play skittles and other games on the streets. For disobeying these admonitions the guilty are punished with the 'falak' /cf. below/.

In addition to the advice lavished so

8:Kostenko -59-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan SartRN4

872 In addition to the advice lavished so
876 generously by the teacher on Thursdays, he has a long stick for disciplinary measures which always lies beside him, also a bound book and a ruler to punish those who have dirty nails, and finally, a higher measure of punishment, the 'falak', made of a pole, half an arshin long, with a loop of rope at the middle. They take the pupil to be punished, bind his legs with the loop of the falak, and raise his feet, holding the ends of the falak so it will be easier to use another falak on his heels. Punishment of this sort is usually applied for escape from school duties. When a pupil has not appeared in school for several days a report is sent to his parents, and if it is shown that the absent pupil has been leaving home but not appearing at school, then some of his schoolmates are ordered to look for him. The deserter who is caught and sent before the teacher is brought to the falak, and those of his comrades who caught him are rewarded with the right of flogging him with sticks.

872 It is impossible to determine exactly the length of time it takes the pupil to learn the course of study outlined above. On the average it takes from 6 to 8 years. Much depends on the circumstances of the case. Quite often a boy who has finished the Koran is taken out of school by his parents to enter trade or work at home. For the same reason it is also difficult to determine the average number of pupils in the schools.

871 The number of pupils in attendance changes and fluctuates very much. Lately, with the occupation of the region by the Russians, the number of pupils attending

871 school has decreased considerably. Thus in Samarkand today the average number of pupils in each school /365/ fluctuates between 20 and 30, although even now there are schools where the teachers' reports show the number of pupils to be up to 60. Schools with this many pupils are certainly not numerous, however.

According to the reports of the natives of Samarkand, they had the largest number of pupils in school at the time of Emir Nasr Allah, when it was made a strict obligation of the 'rais' (policemen) to see that parents sent their children to school. During this time those parents who had children between the ages of 5 to 8 not attending school were subject to a money fine, besides which the rais led the children off to school. When Emir Muzaffar mounted the throne, however, little attention was paid to public education, and school attendance began to decline.

If one takes 20 to 25 boys in each district as an average number of pupils in the schools, the following figures appear:

Khodzhent /Leninabad/, 20 mahalas	- 400 boys
Ura-Tyube, 13 mahalas	- 280 boys
Dzhizak, 7 mahalas	- 140 boys
Zaamina, 2 schools	- 100 pupils
Samarkand, 80 schools	1600 pupils
Tashkent, 118 schools	2360 boys

Although literacy among the Moslem women in Central Asian cities is very limited yet in almost every city there are one or two 'bibi-khalife,' called bivsatun in some towns,

871 who have the special occupation of teaching Moslem reading and writing to girls.

The methods of teaching and organization used by bibi-khalife are the same as those used by the school teachers. The study of the books proceeds in the same manner, one after the other. The following figures of the bibi-khalife who teach the girls can serve as an indication of the literacy of women:

	9	bibi-khalife	in Khodzhent /Leninabad/
	7	"	in Ura-Tyube
	1	"	in Zaamina
/366/	5	"	in Dzhizak
	10	"	in Samarkand
	25	"	in Tashkent

The girls who study are usually children of rich people. For their schooling they assemble at the house of the bibi-khalife.

873 Medresse. Sarts receive their higher education in a medresse. The word medresse, from 'dars', meaning "reading", "lectures", literally it means the place where lectures are read, just as the word 'makhtab', from 'ktab', meaning "to write", indicates the place where there is instruction in reading and writing.

346 All medresses are built according to one general type. The most prominent part of the building is the facade of the entrance. This entrance is a massive structure, considerably higher than the other parts of the building, sometimes with towers on each side, or above, or with a cupola. In the middle of the frontal

346 is a huge pointed form, a niche, in the depths of which there is a disproportionately small wooden door with carving on it.

To this entrance structure the other parts are adjoined as though to the center. The building is usually constructed of fire bricks which are square and thin. The prominent parts are decorated with a multicolored glazed adornment, consisting either of holy sayings in artistic script, or simply of arabesques. Inside the entrance there are more spacious halls, sometimes adorned with sculptured alabaster work. This gives much beauty to these halls which are usually dark, lacking in real windows and furniture. Inside the entrance door a rather spacious court opens out in the form of a quadrangle, which is surrounded on all sides with the main part of the building. The court is sometimes paved with fire bricks or stones. The entire main part is divided into separate cells (khudzhra), which are not of the same number everywhere, but usually range from 20 to 60. The doors of all the cells open on the court. They have no windows. Usually the cells are situated in one-story separate buildings. In general the whole appearance of the medresse recalls a monastery.

/367/ The interior of the cell is melancholy. Usually the cells are five to six paces in length and about the same in width. Through the small door, which one cannot enter without stooping low, only a feeble light comes in. There is no furniture, except perhaps a chest of Russian manufacture which has found its way into some cells. In the

346 walls there are usually niches (chakhchi), taking the place of our chests of drawers, cupboards, tables, etc., where the books and wretched household goods of the students are kept. On the floor reed mats of closely woven twisted bast are spread out to sit on, and among the richer students, thin felt rugs and sometimes carpets are found. In general, however, luxury is not permitted.

In every cell there are three or four students.

873 There are no definite rules concerning the life of the student but, in general, the principle prevails that the student in the medresse is learning not only sciences but also morality. For this reason behavior not in accord with Moslem morals is not approved. For example, games like chess, or amusements like the partridge fights which the natives like so much, or music, are not considered suitable for the students. In their free time when they are not studying it is recommended that they meditate, and those who have wives go home.

Externally, life in a medresse has a pleasant appearance to the foreign observer. The visitor usually finds the students either in their cells studying something, or in the court of the medresse with books in their hands.

The staff of a medresse is made up of the person in charge of the household management, the instructors and the students. The director of the household (mutevalli) is one of the clergy who is related to the founder of the medresse.

873 Under the Moslem rulers confirmation of these duties depended on the rulers (the khans or begs). Apparently, under Russian rule it is simply transferred from one person to another by hereditary succession. The duties of the mutevalli include superintending the property belonging to the medresse, and the extraction of income from this property. One tenth of all the income of the medresse is for the use of the mutevalli. He usually does not interfere
873 with the teaching division. /368/ The teach-
875 ers are called 'mudariss', which means in translation "lecturer." They are men chosen from those best known for their scholarship. Often the calling of the mudariss is combined with the duties of the kazi. As a general rule the best mudarisses teach in the richer medresses. In addition to the profit incentive, however, the mudarisses are led to teaching by the need of the spirit to teach others their knowledge, since this is a deed pleasing to God according to Moslem views. A certain part of the income of the medresse is set aside for the salaries of the mudarisses. In addition to this they are rewarded by the fact that they enjoy great respect in the community.

873 The students are called 'talibul-il'm', which means in translation "pursuer of knowledge," and fully corresponds to the European word "student." They are also called 'shagirds', or "pupils." Grown boys enter the medresse, not younger than fifteen years old, and also mature men. Quite often one may find decrepit old men among the students, for whom the end is already near. The students number among them residents of the town or village where the medresse is, and outsiders (musafirs).

8:Kostenko -65-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
SartRN4

873 No formal requirements are made of entering students, and no personal documents are collected. Thus, for example, Tatars, emigrants from Russia, are very often found in the medresses. They are accepted eagerly not only in Russian dominions but also in Bukhara and Karshi. The students receive part of the income of the medresses for their maintenance, but this is usually the smallest part. In Tashkent, for example, a student at a medresse gets from 50 kopecks to 1 tilli (4 rubles) a year. Thus the students themselves must seek means for their support. They obtain this in the form of alms distributed by the town residents on holidays or family festivals, as for example, the circumcision of the children, marriage, etc. Sometimes the students work at some sort of suitable occupation like copying books especially chosen for study in the elementary schools, or they may cobble, and the like. In addition, the poor students do some sort of work for the rich ones, for example, cooking the food, and for this they receive food themselves.

/369/ The course of instruction in the medresse is not determined as to time. A student may leave the medresse with equal right at any time as well as continue his attendance as long as he feels it fitting. It is not unusual to find students who have been continuing their course at the medresse for 30 to 40 years, and still do not wish to finish. Usually they refer to the depth and breadth of Islamic learning, saying that if a bird were to fly at its natural speed for thirty thousand years in a straight line, the territory covered by it would scarcely give an idea of the profundity

873 of Islamic learning. But actually the matter can be explained much more simply. They do not wish to part with the cell, to which they have grown as accustomed as to their own home, and where they can find some piece of bread without any work. If one does not count these old inhabitants of the medresse, the majority of the students do not go through the full course of learning included in the general program. They are satisfied with the reading of one or two books, and then either turn directly to their occupations, or go away to continue their wandering. Then, as soon as they feel like resting they again obtain a place at another medresse.

873 The students[1] are divided into three
874 categories or courses, in accordance with the success of their studies and partly according to the subjects studied. These categories are: lower, intermediate and upper. There is no strict division between these courses, however. They correspond approximately to the three course of our theological seminaries, as they were formerly organized: rhetoric, philosophy and theology. Thus in the medresse those studying grammar and to some extent rhetoric are considered to be in the lower course, dialectics and metaphysics belong to the intermediate course, and the upper course is law, which also includes the study of divine worship. There is no strict necessity for the student to progress gradually through all three courses. He can begin with the study of any subject, according to his own judgment, and usually, in the majority of cases, students turn to the study of law, and limit their education in the medresse to this. To study the whole course is a great luxury and is not done by many high priests of Islamic learning

1 [i.e. at the medresse - Analyst]

8:Kostenko -67-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

1 Sart RN4

873 /370/ The method of instruction, is to
874 have the student read some work and if possible
876 learn it by heart, while the mudariss explains its meaning.

Usually at the beginning they read short textbooks, containing an exposition of the subjects of dogmatic form, and they learn simple propositions. Then they advance to works containing more or less extensive commentaries, along with an explanation of the sense of the text, an index of sources, and a statement of argumentation. This means is used especially in the study of law (shariat).

[871] Moslem law is built upon the idea that the entire order of man's life down to the last details is foreseen and predetermined by a higher divine power. Therefore the science of law, which sets forth the norms by which divine order must be realised on earth is directly dependent upon theology, and as a practical consequence, serves as the crown of Islamic learning.

871 From what has been said of instruction in the medresse it is easy to see how one-sided Moslem schooling is, and how far the Moslem program is from the program of European schools. The Moslem school has never even heard of science based on facts and on observations made by the inductive method, such as physics, chemistry, history, geography and others. The entire Moslem school program is permeated with a strictly speculative but religious principle, and this is carried through very consistently and systematically, capturing the mind of the student from the very beginning and drawing it irrevocably in one direction, by the evidence of dogmas,

1 [i.e. at the medresse — Analyst]
2 [see category 116, pp. 66-67 — Analyst]

871 argued by dialectics and deductions. All paths departing from the circle of knowledge defined by religion are cut off for the Moslem student. He is fated to know only what the authors of the works he is studying knew 500 or 1000 years before. It is sinful and forbidden for him to know more. He is required to exercise his mind by the same gymnastics which were defined so long ago. The use of other devices makes him a monster in the eyes of the believers, an outcast. He is required by his authorities not to believe in a definite scientific order of rotation of the planets, /371/ in laws established by physical phenomena, in the forces of nature, in historical facts, purged by criticism from any admixtures of fantasy. He is required to know that there are seven heavenly spheres, inhabited by creatures of heaven, and that everything done on earth is carried out by the direct will of God. He must know that the whole earth is divided into seven climates, and that the Moslems are called from above to rule the peoples The history, geography and cosmology of the Moslems are full of absurd fables and fantastic legends. The mind, bound by the chains of slavery, cannot break out alone from this darkness, this chaos, to a clearer path, cannot make the existence of man more meaningful and reasonable. There is an important and exalted goal for Russian influence in the east: to destroy the intellectual chains of Islam and bring these people closer to the broad development of mankind.

815 821 823

771 Religious development. In spite of the fact that among the Sarts religion enters all facets of public and domestic life, yet the population cannot be called religious. Even the mullahs and kazis do not know the Koran

771 and the shariat well. Only the muftis are well enough acquainted with the shariat, which serves them as a reason for existence. Of the ordinary people many do not know even the most ordinary prayers.

The Sarts consider the requirements of their religion, such as praying five times a day, making ablutions, etc., a boring formality, the more so since in earlier times (and even today in the independent khanates) there were special officials (rais during the day, and the kurbash at night) using sticks to force the people to perform these acts. With the elimination of these officials the religious fervor also has diminished considerably.

771 181 Only hypocrisy, an outstanding feature of the Sart character, impels them to piety. A Sart decides to build a mechet, or a school or to give to the poor only when he sees some material advantage for himself in it. In this regard the clergy of the Sarts also are fanatic guardians of the faith only because they draw their living from their religion. The most zealous mullahs, once having established their prosperity with the cooperation of Russian authorities, became supporters of new principles, in disagreement /372/ with the stipulation of the shariat, which is distinguished for its intolerance and does not allow any agreements with the kafirs (non-believers).

181 563 In regard to intelligence the Sarts are very adequately endowed. They are sharp, clever, resourceful and expedient and all sorts of trade and crafts are accessible to them. They are, so to speak, Jacks of all trades, and they are

181 poor masters of their trades, but in comparison
563 with the nomads around them they really hold them under their thumb in intellectual, religious and also in economic and industrial matters. The Sarts were and are the mullahs and kazis (judges) for the nomads, and they supply them with various necessary objects, such as mats, printed linen and other cheap cotton materials for clothing, as well as shoes and many other things.

181 As for commerce, the Sarts are remarkable
441 for their enterprise and ability to make commercial agreements. This seems to be the strongest and most developed side of the Sart character.
[439] Many merchants possess enormous capital, sending their caravans for thousands of versts to India,
[452] Persia, Russia and China. The credit system is practiced widely.

441 Several merchants, even the majority of them, carry on commerce on credit. Many of these merchants begin their undertakings on a shoestring. With the unnatural patience and perseverance of the Sart, little by little they expand their trade, and from a small trader they become a 'saudagar' (merchant) after which they add the title 'bai' (wealthy, well-to-do) after their names.

000 It may be said in general that the Sarts have every inclination for development, but this has been hampered until now by many factors, such as: the despotism of small property owners, the precariousness of property, the rivalry of various khanates among themselves, and finally the antagonism among the various nationalities living in Central Asia. Under the influence

000 of Russian domination all these obstacles have either been removed or are being removed and a new era is opening for the development of the Sarts and their gradual progress.

577 Moral state. In regard to many aspects of morality the Sarts make a very favorable [273] impression. For example, the absence of drunkenness preserves them from /373/ many vices and crimes committed by people addicted to drink. In addition abstinence from wine preserves the strength and health of the Sarts. They rest [461] only from noon on Thursday until Friday evening. On Saturday morning they are already at work with renewed strength and with heads not clouded with hang-overs. The use of buza is very moderate [276] The smoking of opium and kuknar is not widespread, and occurs only among special addicts, whose number is very limited.

[574] One should also add to the good qualities of the Sarts their cordiality and hospitality and especially their aid to the poor. In every [747] town the community clamors to make sure that the poor and the orphans are cared for. This is why there are few paupers among the Sarts and almost no begging. Here the man with a crust of bread will divide it without fail with him who has none.

562 On the other hand, however, there are 837 many bad sides to the character of the Sarts, one of which is lack of sexual purity. Although the Moslem law-givers paid the strictest attention to this matter, taking the woman out of society and confining her to the harem with a law which was in the past extremely strict in order to remove temptation, yet today absolute looseness prevails in their morals.

8:Kostenko -72-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Sart RN4

562 The Sarts regard the woman as a sort of
593 working cattle, or as an object for the satisfaction of lust, and therefore she enjoys no respect. The permission to have several wives leads to the most ruinous consequences. The wives of one husband live in constant discord with each other, and the endless arguments and squabbles among them are reflected in the children as well, who are involuntary participants in the antagonism between the various mothers.

837 For the contempt which the husband bears his wife, he is repaid by unfaithfulness. The husband, on his part, weighed down by family life, seeks amusement with various vices, the cynicism and indecency of which can only recall the days of the fall of Greece and Rome.

685 Stealing and crime against property
674 occurs rarely among the Sarts, but this is because there were extremely heavy punishments for stealing under the native rule. For petty thievery an arm was cut off, and for a major theft the offender was decapitated.

165 Character. The despotism and high-
181 handedness of their rulers, the system of spying, the arbitrariness of the chiefs and their merciless punishments are reflected in the formation of the character of the Sarts, and have made of them people who are dissembling, suspicious, cowardly and inclined to deceit.

186 Among the Sarts there is no concept of a fatherland. The frequent changes of rulers have taught them to be indifferent to every ruler. The Russians found opposition to the installation of their rule in Central Asia only from the clergy and the officials. The

186 common people and especially the merchants were even glad of the arrival of the Russians, under whose protection they might carry on their occupations in peace.

761 An atmosphere of constant executions during the previous regime and the precariousness of existence caused the Sarts to be indifferent, with a sort of torpor toward life in cases when they saw no more hope. Those condemned to death gave up their lives remark-
763 ably peacefully. In battle the bravery of the Sarts has been only passive, that is, they have sometimes held out with remarkable steadfastness against the murderous fire of the Russians, but on the other hand they have never shown ardor, military daring, energy, or active bravery.

181 Just as civil courage is foreign to the Sarts, so they have always preferred the crooked path to the straight, cleverness and deceit to the honorable and open way of action.

577 To make a false statement or a false oath means nothing to a Sart. If he is caught making an untrue statement he will advance ten new ones in its place and mix up the issue until it is found that he was bribed for some 20 kopecks. But when he has been convinced that his deceit has been brought to light and his bribe is known to the investigator, then the Sart will calmly acknowledge it himself with the explanation that he is poor, that he cannot even buy a flat cake and by the false statement that he only wanted to earn a few kopecks.

576 /375/ The Sart is flattering and obsequious to those whom he considers for some

576 reason to be above him. In such a case he will address this special person with a stack of compliments, purely in the eastern style, with flowery comparisons, hyperbole, and the like.

181 Vanity is also one of the noticeable features of the Sart character. The Sart will deny himself and his family everything only to be able to have a new costume on a holiday (a khalat, a turban and boots). Dressed in this costume, he will show himself with haughty importance at the bazaar and in the tea booths (chaikhana), scarcely noticing those who are dressed more shabbily than he.

8:Kostenko -75-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkesta
RL1

000 Part III. Population. Accounts of the Quartering of the Military.

I

I. The population of the okrug. General survey of the population of the okrug. The distribution in more or less populated areas. The relation of the sedentary population to the nomadic. The urban population. The village population. The colonization of the region: 1) by natives in the Syr-Darya oblast' and the Zeravshan okrug; 2) by the Russians in the Semirechie oblast'.

161 The tables in Part 1, Chapter 1 (not translated here) indicate that the density of population of the Turkestan region is very low. It is equal only to 156 persons per square mile, that is, almost one-fifth the density of the population of European Russia; yet while it is about equal to the density in the Vologda guberniya (137), it is three times higher than the density of population of western Siberia.

The densest population is in the Zeravshan okrug (734), where the density is close to that of Kostroma guberniya. Next is the Fergana oblast' (552), which can be compared with the Ufa guberniya.

The sparsest population is found in the Semirechie oblast' (103), which is populated almost exclusively by nomads. This region is comparable in density to the Olonets guberniya.

/377/ Although Turkestan is poor in general compared with the sparsely populated parts of European Russia, nevertheless there

161 is no corner of European Russia with as dense a population as in certain fertile valleys in this region. Such valleys are those of Fergana and Zeravshan, where the density is not only greater than the most populated places in European Russia but also no less than the most fertile regions of western Europe. In the Fergana valley there are 4158 persons per square mile.

In the Zeravshan valley the population density reaches 5000 per square mile. Thus in the Afarikent district there are 5091 persons per square mile, and in the Sugut district 4315.

In the valley of the Ili River in the Kuldja district, the population density in some places can be compared with the density of population of the Zeravshan okrug.

Likewise, a dense population is found in the valleys of the Chirchik, Angren and Keles rivers along the piedmont of the Turkestan mountain range, and in general in all places where the abundance of water rewards the farmer's labor with a surplus. Where the topographic and climatic conditions are not favorable to sedentary life, however, the population is very sparse. To the latter category belong the mountainous areas, covered with bare and sterile rocks and the sandy dry steppes, which can be used only for the movement of nomads.

Yet there are many places in Turkestan which possess all the conveniences for nomadic and sedentary life, but still remain unsettled. Such are the valleys of the Chirchik, Arys, Talas, Chu and many other rivers, which can

8:Kostenko -77-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLi Turkestan
RLi

161 support a many more people than those living there at the present time.

In regard to the density of population of the Turkestan region, it should be noted that it is greatest where the sedentary element predominates. Thus the southeastern part of the region (Zeravshan okrug, Fergana and the two southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast'), which is populated primarily by sedentary people has a higher population density than the northwestern /378/ part of the region (Semirechie, the five northern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', and the Amu-Darya otdel), where nomads predominate.

In the table below, the total territory of the region is divided in this way into two unequal halves, and the relative population of each and the corresponding stage of development of sedentary life is shown (1).

1. This table and those following are taken from the official report.

8: Kostenko -78-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL: Turkestan

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	Territory in square miles	Population			Persons per square mile	Percent of sedentary population
		Total	Sedentary	Nomadic		
Southeast cultivated belt (Zeravshan okrug, Fergana and two southern uyezds of Syr-Darya oblast'	3,292 (17%)	1,588,945 (52%)	1,379,690 (85%)	209,255 (15%)	483	87
Northwest steppe belt (Semirechie, the five northern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast' and the Amu-Darya otdel	16,149 (83%)	1,449,175 (48%)	240,120 (15%)	1,209,055 (85%)	90	17

8: Kostenko 479-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RLI Turkestan
RLI

162 The population distribution is shown in relation to place of residence in the following table:

Names of Oblast'	Number of inhabitants		
	In towns	Outside of towns	
		Sedentary	Nomadic
Semirechie (2)..	37,822	89,239	631,189
Syr-Darya.....	146,272	326,660	621,625
Fergana.....	133,278	472,422	123,990
Zeravshan okrug.	55,051	293,362	-
Amu-Darya otdel.	959	65,470	40,780
Total	373,382	1,247,153	1,417,584

2. This includes the Kuldja district, in which 14,653 persons live in towns, 63,477 persons live sedentarily outside towns, and 61,550 are nomads.

/379/ The relation between the urban and rural population and the sedentary and nomadic population according to the individual oblast' is shown in the mean figures below:

8:Kostenko -80-0-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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162

For every 1000 persons in the total population there are:			
In the Oblast' of	Urban Dwellers	Rural Sedentary	Rural Nomadic
Semirechie.....	50	118	832*
Syr-Darya.....	134	229	567
Fergana.....	183	647	170
Zeravshan okrug...	158	842	-
Amu-Darya otdel...	9	611	380
In entire region	123	410	467

The populated places which can be considered towns because of their administrative and economic importance are shown in the following table, in which the number of inhabitants and the number of separate households are indicated:

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Households
Semirechie oblast'		
Vernyi (Alma Ata)	17,544	983
Kapal (Kopal)	2,309	344
Sergiopol (Ayaguz)	112	37
Tokmak	427	119
Karakol	2,777	257
Total	23,169	1,640

8:Kostenko -81-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

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162

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Households
Syr-Darya oblast'		
Tashkent	81,900	15,000
Kazalinsk	2,010	448
/380/ Perovsk (Kzyl-Orda)	3,417	230
Turkestan	6,700	1,620
Chimkent	5,121	1,476
Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul)	4,455	844
Chinaz	77	20
Kuilyuk	87	29
Khodzhent (Leninabad)	29,000	8,409
Dzhizak	8,701	1,765
Ura-Tyube	4,804	1,328
Total	146,272	31,169
Fergana oblast':		
Kokand	34,805	7,804
Namangan	15,920	1,309
Margelan	26,195	5,260
Andizhan	42,879	10,602
Chust	3,326	725
Osh	3,307	1,049
Vuadil	1,461	328
Kassan	2,000	400
Makhram	385	77
Isfara	3,000	600
Total	133,278	28,154
Zeravshan okrug:		
Samarkand	35,910	4,411
Katty-Kurgan (Katta-Kurgan)	7,029	1,435
Peishambe	4,600	1,143
Pendzhakent (Pendzhikent)	1,789	380
Urgut	5,543	948
Total	55,051	8,317

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Households
Amu-Darya otdel:		
Petro-Alexandrovsk (Turtkul)	50	10
Shurakhan	196	40
Chimbay	713	(1) 801
Total	959	851

1. In the number of households are included also empty courtyards and booths, which are occupied periodically at bazaar time. Chimbay is the trade center of its district.

Kuldja region:		
Kuldja	10,953	2,906
Suidun (Sui-ting)	2,781	540
Chin-Cha-Ho-Dzi (Ching-shui--ho-tzu)	349	127
Luutsugun	570	200
Total	14,653	3,773
Grand Total	373,534	74,035

Of the 38 towns counted only Tashkent has a significant population, more than 80,000 persons. In the list of Russian cities, it is seventh in population, after Petersburg (Leningrad), Moscow, Warsaw, Odessa, Kishinev and Saratov.

Of the remaining towns in the Turkestan region:

5 towns have a population over 20,000
4 " " " " " 10,000
5 " " " " " 5,000

112

4	towns	have	a	population	over	3,000
2	"	"	"	"	"	2,000
5	"	"	"	"	"	1,000

/382/ The village population of the region has been published for the Semirechie and Syr-Darya oblast', the Zeravshan okrug and the Amu-Darya otdel. For the Fergana oblast' only general and approximate data have been gathered on the number and density of the villages. On the basis of this evidence the number of village settlements in the entire region is 3,171 with a population which is extremely varied, not only among the different oblast's, but also in the separate uyezds.

In the table below the data has been organized to show the number of urban and village populated places, the average density and relative crowdedness in the separate oblast's:

Oblast'	Settlements		Populated Places	Number of Houses		Number of populated places per square mile	Number of houses per village	Number of inhabitants per populated place
	Urban	Village		In towns	outside towns			
Semirechie (1)	9	85	94	5,513	19,221	0.01	226	1352
Syr-Darya	13	501	514	31,169	65,384	0.06	131	900
Fergana	10	1166	1176	28,154	94,485	0.88	81	626
Zeravshan okrug	5	1342	1347	8,317	61,362	2.84	46	259
Amu-Darya otdel	3	77	80	851	12,823	0.05	167	830
Total	40	3171	3211	74,035	253,275	0.17	80	946

1. The Kuldja region is included here, in which there are 24 populated places (4 urban and 20 village), with 3773 houses in the towns and 13,157 houses in the villages. There is an average of 2.4 populated places per square mile, an average of 658 houses per village and 3,005 residents per populated place.

8:Kostenko -84-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan
RLl

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It has already been said that the population of the Turkestan region is growing not as a result of natural increase but for the most part, as a consequence of a large influx of native and Russian colonists. The influx of nomad camps from other oblast's and adjacent dominions, although they do increase the population /383/ of the steppe belt of the government general, is not a permanent matter.

The in-migration of sedentary aliens is of a completely different nature. This movement has every earmark of a colonizing movement of permanent character, and it has already shown remarkable success in a comparatively short time in populating the area. This promises a still greater development of a sedentary way of life in the populated oases in the future.

In this movement one can trace two original currents: one, a mass of newcomers moving toward the southern oases of the cultivated belt, consists of migrants from the adjacent independent dominions; the second, coming from interior Russia and Siberia, furnishes the region with a Russian colonizing population.

The peace and order established in the Russian oblast's of Turkestan and the incomparably fewer taxes serve as attractions for the emigration of natives from the neighboring countries. The significance of this migration can be judged by the gradually rising figures of the sedentary houses in the uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', where the population has not increased by the addition of new settlements.

/384/ 8:Kostenko -86-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan RLl

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167

By Uyezds	The Number of Sedentary Houses										Increase	
	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	Absolute	%
Kurama..	27,631	28,784	28,877	30,417	30,507	30,508	31,383	31,283	31,283	31,330	3,699	13
Khodzhent.. including former Dzhazak (Dzhizak)	15,806	15,806	18,393	20,915	24,333	24,333	24,620	24,620	23,339	25,727	9,920	63
Chimkent..	3,467	5,063	5,347	6,735	4,030	4,327	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,633	4,007	116
Turkestan..					2,750	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,841		
Auliye-Ata..	363	413	564	709	709	709	791	795	795	932	569	157
Total	47,267	50,066	53,181	58,776	62,329	62,682	64,066	63,970	62,689	65,463	18,196	39

161 /385/ From this table it can be seen that the number of
167 sedentary households in the oblast' increased on the whole by almost 40%. In the Turkestan, Chimkent and Auliye-Ata uyezds, the sedentary population more than doubled, in Khodzhent uyezd it increased 63% and only in the Kurama uyezd was the increase as low as 13% according to the official figures.

The figure of 18,196 new houses corresponds approximately to 100,000 persons of both sexes. This figure does not include, however, the members of the immigrant trade, crafts and the class of unskilled laborers, who are not registered in the volost's and villages, but whose number must be quite considerable after the twelve years of existence of the region. It cannot be expressed in definite figure because of the lack of reliable evidence. The total sum of new colonizing population which has settled in the Syr-Darya oblast' from 1867 to 1877 adds up to approximately 300,000 persons. In the Zeravshan okrug from 1871 to 1876 the number of houses increased from 44,794 to 52,171, which amounts to about a 25% increase for five years.

167 The colonizing movement in Semirechie is just as successful. This part of the region is being colonized almost exclusively by Russian immigrants from western Siberia (primarily from the Tobolsk guberniya) as well as the interior guberniyas of the empire (especially from the Voronezh guberniya). Every year more and more transports of immigrants pour in, so many that the local administration can scarcely provide land for all of them. The distribution of Russian settlers in Semirechie moved along

8:Kostenko -88-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to se-
[311] dentary life. However, because of the elevation of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

167 One can judge the success of the colo-
563 nizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

1 [In Seminechie - Analyst]

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain cultivation the peasants work in orchards and do
[691] vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

000 The Characteristics of the Native Dwellings.

The characteristics of the populated places of the native population. The structure of the houses: walls, roofs, floors, windows, etc. The interior decoration of the lodging. Means of heating. The general appearance of the towns and villages. The nomad dwelling. The yurt: the component parts, the decoration, etc. The value of the Kazakh portable domicile.

342 The form of life of the two chief representatives of the peoples of the Turkestan region, the nomads and the sedentary people, also determines the character of their dwellings.

361 All the locations of the sedentary, so called Sart population in the Turkestan territory are very similar to each other externally, so it is enough to see one to get an idea of all of them.

Although the native sedentary settlements in Turkestan are divided into towns and villages (kishlaks), this division is only nominal. The entire difference between the Central Asian town and the village lies in the fact that a town, according to Moslem law, must be surrounded by a public wall, must have a citadel (ark), and must include not less than
342 three mosques. The town walls and the houses are always made of clay, a material directly available under foot. The houses are flat and squat. They consist of one or several square courtyards, surrounded with buildings. The living quarters are primarily one-story buildings and in general all are without foundations and socles.

8:Kostenko -92-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL!

342 If one does find a two-story building, the second story is either a covered terrace (balakhane), or there is a storage place there for the drying of fruit and vegetables. The actual construction of the native /389/ buildings is done by a process resembling a framework construction. On the place where the walls are to be, low frames are placed in one row or two.(foundation beams). Supports are laid on top of these, close to each other, which are also reinforced from above by a frame (capping). Cross beams are placed on the slant in the spaces between the supports. Then they begin to build the walls of lumps of clay. These walls are usually very thin, not thicker than 6 vershok (one vershok is 1-3/4 inches -ed.). After this beams are laid across the top, spaced 12 vershok apart, and these spaces between the beams are filled in with sticks (about three-quarters of an inch long) on which they throw reeds or reed wattlings. After this they need only smear clay on this structure several times, mixing thin straw in the clay, and the roof (ceiling) is ready. The windows for the most part open on the courtyard and are closed over with wooden sticks in the manner of barred windows in prisons. They are sometimes covered with greased paper. The windows are made quite high up on the walls and are extremely small, not larger than half an inch in diameter. Wealthy Sarts build a veranda (gallery) on the eastern side of the courtyard, supported by wooden columns decorated with carving.

In such houses the walls are usually plastered with alabaster with carved decorations which the Sarts do with great skill.

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets, nor about the purity of the water flowing through the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the [164] street or into the aryk. As a result both the air and the water are infected and transmit, one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy, Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis, 727 goiter). In general /391/ our military administration in Turkestan has never billeted army detachments in the native towns and villages, first, because of the poor construction of the [609] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness of the population, who have not yet mixed at all with the conquerors, and who, according to their religious law, almost never permit strangers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity, 712 occupy only such native dwellings as those which are confiscated and can be made suitable for European habitation. In most cases they have occupied the homes of former rulers or begs who have fled, and whose property consequently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either as barracks or as military hospitals. The adaptation has consisted of putting in large windows, installing ventilation, and so on. The Russians who occupied Tashkent built barracks for the army in the native manner, i.e., with the framework type of construction. But they soon discarded this system and began to build both the military buildings and the living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a regular manner.

8:Kostenko -96-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

342 From the dwellings of the sedentary population we move to the description of the nomadic dwellings.

The dwelling of the nomad is very unusual. It consists of a folding yurt (tent) capable of being easily carried from place to place. During our* steppe wars and campaigns the true value of these yurts was soon appreciated. They were adopted with particular advantage by the Orenburg detachment in the Khiva expedition of 1873, when the whole detachment was outfitted with them. During the Turkestan wars the yurts were almost always used during the winter or autumn campaigns, and in general for the movement of troops. As campaign hospital shelters these yurts were used all the year around.

000 The proven usefulness of the Kazakh yurts caused their introduction also as temporary hospitals of the active armies in the recent Turkish war. Thanks to the initiative of Dr. Priselkov, the Kzakh tents were introduced as hospitals for the army in the field. By order of the General Staff about 30 temporary hospitals were prepared in Orenburg before the war, with 5 tents /392/ in each, and all 150 tents were sent to Kishinev. Each one easily contained up to five men, and cost 150 rubles in Orenburg. The cost of railroad transport was counted as 45 rubles per tent. Thus 150 tents, with transport, cost 27,750 rubles. Personnel of the lower ranks , well-acquainted with the putting up and storing of these portable dwellings were sent with the tents.

*[ie: Russian--Analyst]

8:Kostenko -97-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

342 In view of the importance of the portable Kazakh dwelling for the needs and demands of our armies, let us examine this dwelling in detail.

The dwelling of the Kazakh must satisfy the following main conditions: it must be inexpensive, cheap to repair, easy and quick to set up take down and load on a camel, and in addition, lightweight, yet not carried away by the wind. At the same time to gain time in packing, it should not be too firmly fastened to the ground. It should contain in itself all the necessary property of one family, protect people well in winter from frost, snow and wind, and in summer from rain, heat and dust. Finally it should provide certain conveniences for interior furnishing, that is, make it possible to accommodate the necessary domestic utensils in it conveniently, to store and hang up clothes, and the like. Nothing satisfies all these conditions better than that felt tent used since time immemorial by nomadic peoples which is called yurt (orta or orda). It consists of four parts: 1) a wooden framework; 2) an interior 'chiy' (a kind of grass; see below) or reed lining; 3) an outside felt lining, and 4) various connections and supports both to reinforce the three preceding parts, and for the convenient furnishing of the yurt.

1) The wooden framework consists of three main parts:

a) a 'kerege' or folding frame made of several parts, forms the walls of the dwelling. These are set up around a circle, the diameter of which is determined by the purpose for which

8:Kostenko -98-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
Kazak R02

342 the yurt is intended, or by the material available for the covering and decorating of the dwelling, or on the basis of considerations as to how long the tent is expected to stay there, etc. Each part or 'kanaat' of the kerege /393/ consists of two rows of poles, 5 or 6 inches (3 or 4 vershoks) apart. The upper or outside row of poles is laid on crosswise on the inside side of the yurt, but in such a way that every pole in each row forms the same angle with the surface of the ground. In this position the poles stick through at their points of contact, and through the opening which has been made a strap or strand is put through or tied with knots at either end. The length of the lathes in such a framework is rarely more than 7 feet (one sazhen'), the thickness is less than ½ inch (vershok) and the width one inch (three-fourths of a vershok). Consequently for one separate part of a framework which would take up 7 feet (one sazhen') in circumference, one would need 12 or 13 such crossbeams, if the space between each were taken as 4 inches (3 vershoks). Sometimes a kanaat has just this length, if 6 feet (2½ arshins) is added to the height of the framework with poles 7 feet (one sazhen') long. This height can be increased or decreased, let us say, by 5 feet (up to 2 arshins), by the length of the framework poles designated; this is done to make a yurt higher or lower, or to make the upper wooden parts, of which we will speak in a minute, fit more neatly with the edges of the tent. Thus the height of the kanaat is increased at the expense of the length, and vice versa. The poles, which turn freely on leather thongs, and are also somewhat bent inward at the ends, make it very convenient

342 to set up the framework along the circumference of the area selected. Usually they make the side framework 6 feet (2½ arshins) high, and the length of its separate parts, or kanaats, varies. Thus the length may be from one sazhen', of 12 or 13 poles, up to two sazhen's or 24 poles, and sometimes even more. The longer the kanaat, the fewer needed, and the simpler the setting up of the yurt because fewer bonds are needed. On the other hand, the large framework parts need repair more often than the small ones. Influenced by these considerations, the length of a kanaat which is 6 feet high (when it is set up) is fixed at 7, 10½, 14, 17½ or 21 feet (1, 1½, 2, 2½, and 3 sazhen's), rarely more. The diameter of the area selected for the tent determines /394/ the number of kanaats of specified size needed to be set up all the way around the circumference. And since the chosen diameter is always changing, under the influence of various considerations of needing to give the yurt various capacities, so every Kazakh family always carries along several reserve kanaats. A certain limit is fixed, however, for the extent of a yurt's diameter. This limit results from the impossibility of obtaining poles ('uks') which are too long; these permit the side framework to fasten to the top of the tent. Therefore there are no tents over 28 feet (4 sazhen's) in diameter, and 21 foot (3 sazhen's) ones are quite rare. Most of them are 10½ to 17½ feet (1½ to 2½ sazhen's), depending on what sort of property the owner of the yurt has, whether he expects to invite guests into his dwelling, whether everything needed for the covering and decoration of the yurt, such as felts, chiy (grass) matting,

8:Kostenko 100-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 BL1 Turkestan
Kazak RQ2

342 rugs, etc., will stay in one place for a long time, etc. The specified number of kanaats for the size of the area selected are tossed down from the camel, and spread out along the circumference in such a way that the entrance to the yurt will face west, (1) then the kanaats are fastened together by small loops, and the foundation of the yurt is ready.

1. This is not observed everywhere and always, however. Usually in the yurts which stand alone, the door is really almost always facing west, but in winter, when all the yurts are placed close to each other in each individual aul to form an inside courtyard serving as an enclosure for the cattle, then the doors of all these tents open upon this square.

b) The chagarak or hoop, which forms the upper part of the wooden framework is usually made of birch and may have various diameters, from 56 inches (2 arshins) to 125 inches (1½ sazhen'), and various thicknesses, from 3 to 10 inches (2 to 7 vershoks). If the diameter is large or if the arch is not made of a single tree trunk, then from two to four lathes are put across the hoop, bent slightly upwards and these are intersected perpendicularly by others which connect the other two sides of the hoop. Thus in the center a small lattice is formed, made of one, four or nine squares. /395/ This lattice also constitutes the very top of the yurt, as the intersecting lathes are bent upward. The transverse connections of the hoop are necessary both for its stability and also so that the felt which covers the entire outside of the tent will not fall inside

342 the chagarak. The whole ring of the chagarak is a row of slits, more or less close together, in which the straight ends of poles are inserted which are attached by other poles with curved ends to the side frame of the yurt.

c) These uks or poles fastened together constitute the third main part of the wooden framework of the tent. Their number is determined by the number of slits made in the chagarak ring. The more uks inserted, the better the felt rests which covers them, and the better various objects can be hung from the chagarak, like meat to be smoked, clothing to be dried, and the like. On the other hand it slows down the work of setting up the yurt, because every end of the uk, as was said above, has to be looped on to the side frame. The length of the connecting pole plays an important role, because it determines the longest possible diameter possible for the yurt, as was noted earlier. The uk is almost the same as the radius of the area of the circle chosen for the tent, and therefore if they want to set up a small yurt, they choose other short poles, and if they do not have any they use long ones in the following manner: When they have inserted the straight end of the uk into the corresponding slit in the chagarak they lower the other, flatter end (of 1 to 3 inches, that is ½ to 1½ vershoks) down to the kerege to the place where the pole begins to bend, and in this place they fasten it with a loop to the upper part of the kerege. Meanwhile the top of the tent which is covered with felt takes on a more cone-shaped appearance, so that when it is secured in the normal fashion it has the look of a semi-circular cupola. The other wooden parts of every tent are less important. The bakan, or

342 long thick pole (3 to 5 inchies, from 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 vershoks in diameter) must also be mentioned. The bakan must be at least 4 inches higher (1/2 an arshin) than the highest yurt. One of its ends is blunt, the other forked. The latter supports the hoop of the chagarak, while the blunt end is fixed in the ground on the opposite side from the direction from which the /396/ wind blows. In a heavy snow storm several of such inside supports are put up in every yurt for otherwise the tent would be carried away by the wind. In tranquil weather there is no need of a bakan, but in the large yurts the chagarak is always supported by them from various sides, because it is convenient to hang clothes to dry on the pegs hammered into them, as well as other things which it is desirable to protect from the soot which fills almost all the upper half of the yurt. To hang a thing on a rope stretched across the yurt is dangerous because of the soot, and on the walls of the frame it would be far away from the campfire laid inside the tent between the bakans. Sometimes a door is added, sometimes it is dispensed with. In either case the space left for the entrance is covered with a special kind of thick felt which is almost always embroidered on the outer side with various designs of plush, fine cloth, etc.

The Kazakhs store up material with which to build the wooden framework in the summer, when they are passing near wooded areas. They make and repair all the parts of the tent described above themselves. One of the better wooden frameworks for yurts is about 21 feet (3 sazhen's) in diameter, with poles which are nicely turned, decorated with red paint and

8. Kostenko 103-G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RLI Turkestan
Kazak RQ 2

lacquered with various intricate adornments, as, for example, bone inlaid in the doors, various pegs on the bakans, and the like. Such a framework would cost about 100 silver rubles, and sometimes more. The simplest yurt construction of medium size, without felt and other non-wooden appurtenances, costs at least around 20 rubles among the Kazakhs, and usually goes up to 30 rubles and more.

2) The chiy facing consists of woven matting made from the steppe plant chiy (Lasiagrostis splendens). (1)

1. Cf. p. 117 /On p. 117 it is stated that in the lower Alay valley/ feather-grass and chiy are the predominant grasses.

This woven matting is placed inside and sometimes outside the side frame, serving, first of all, as a decoration of the yurt, and secondly, to protect the inside of it from dust on windy days when the lower part of the felt cover is usually raised to let the current of air come through. The cloth woven of chiy may be of various sizes, and sometimes one cloth covers the entire yurt. Among the rich the chiy is wound with silk thread, among the poor, if at all, with wool, and it happens that they dispense with matting altogether. /397/ But in the winter, in such a case, it is too cold in the yurt, and therefore few poor men deny themselves this luxury.

3) The felt covering consists of side pieces of felt of varying lengths from 6 to 7 feet (2 1/2 to 3 arshins) wide; of upper pieces which are wider but shorter, with a special

342 pattern which fits the upper part of the tent; and of a special piece of felt (tunduk), covering the chagarak. The first are fastened to the upper and lower parts of the kerege, the second are thrown over the uks with the help of the bakans, and spread over the top of the tent with the help of ropes which are attached to their corners, or, to speak more exactly, with the help of a special long wide braid, which encompasses the entire side cover of the yurt, and the other end of the braid is fastened somewhere, to the door, or to some sort of peg hammered into the ground. Finally, the tunduk felt also has a long wide braid fastened to all its four corners, with the other end fastened outside the yurt to one of the braids for loops which hold it. In this way at night when the tunduk felt covers the chagarak, all four braids are fastened, while in the daytime, to admit light into the yurt, or to let the smoke from the hearth escape, one of the tunduk braids is unfastened (the one attached to the corner of the tunduk which is in the direction from which the wind blows). Then the corner which is unfastened in this way is thrown open with the help of a bakan. When the wind changes, and the smoke has no free outlet, and the yurt begins to fill with soot, then this corner of the tunduk felt is fastened down again, and a new corner is opened in the same way. With the help of this arrangement the Kazakh is always able to direct the draught, and the fire laid in the center of the tent does not smoke. When it is necessary to smoke meat or something else, which is hung from the chagarak or from the ropes which stretch through the whole yurt, they do the contrary or even close the tunduk entirely,

342 and raise the door felt to let out the smoke.

The felt used for the covering of the yurt is usually grey; among the rich one sometimes comes across white felt, but rarely, because /398/ stylishness is not achieved by this means but lies in having felt pieces of various sizes intended in advance for certain purposes. It is not easy to bunch together a piece of felt which is too wide or too long, and also large pieces of felt are too bulky, and considerably complicate folding, packing and trasport. On the other hand with the fixed 6 foot (2½ arshin) width, the longer the side felt, the smaller the number of slits in the tent, the darker it is in winter, and vice versa. For the upper uk felts, the [redacted] has no special importance, but the width must correspond to the length of the uks and must even be considerably longer, because the further the felt comes down the side of the yurt, the pleasanter, that means, the warmer it is inside the tent. The rich actually have these kinds of convenient pieces, which do not bother them in packing and unpacking of the yurt because each one has plenty of workmen. In winter some bais put a second layer of the same material on top of the felt cover. On the other hand the one layer of felt which covers the tents of the poor is so full of holes, that in the winter the occupants' teeth chatter from the cold, while in the summer, especially when it rains, there is no more refreshing place than his modest dwelling.

4) The ties which fasten all the parts of the yurt together are mostly made of loops of various sizes, but since the constant

342 rubbing of the ropes over the felt would cut down their length of durability, all those which are to be next to the felt which covers the tent have pieces of camel's hair braid fastened to their ends, of various lengths and widths. These braids are also stretched out inside the tent to hang up the clothes on them which are used every day, using the loops in such cases only for decoration. In addition to these, other supports are set up within the yurt besides the bakans, of varying style and beauty, which are also used for hanging up things.

This is the entire structure of the Kazakh dwelling. As we see, it fully answers all the conditions listed above, which are demanded of it by the nomads. A complete yurt of medium size with grey felts costs the Kazakh about 100 rubles, many 150. Consequently to prepare such a yurt for every daughter who is being married /399/ is not burdensome, if the kalym (bride's dowry) is intelligently disposed of. Under proper management the repair of the yurts in the aul is also not difficult. Only the repair of the wooden framework sometimes costs money. Everything else is taken care of within the household, and therefore there are not even any expenses for all the remaining parts of the dwelling for the Kazakhs.

The dwelling is perfectly suited to the climactic peculiarities of the steppe. The strongest winds do not upset the tent, and at the same time, no matter how complex the tent is, it is not fastened down to the ground, so that this does not interfere with rapid assembling and dismantling. In the summer on

342 days of suffocating heat it is cool and there is no dust inside. During heavy frost it remains quite warm within the good tent covers, [144] and only the smoke from the hearth is bad for the eyes, developing the eye disease, which is one of the most wide spread diseases among the nomads.

The yurt, containing all the property of the Kazakh, and providing certain conveniences for the disposal of various household articles, can be dismantled and assembled easily and quickly, in about half an hour, can be loaded conveniently and is light enough so that [192] the whole establishment of a tent of medium size can be packed on one camel. All the felts, piled up in several layers, are put over the backbone of the animal; the kerege, the uks, and the chiy mats, rolled up into a tube, are hung on his sides, while the chagarak is put over the humps, and all this is very skilfully looped on. This same camel with his load, when he comes to a new station, at the place where the yurt is to be - indicated by a lance which has been left in the ground by the householder when he went there ahead - is quickly unloaded, two women set up the kerege according to the indicated circumference with kanaats, and fasten them; two others or the same ones. after finishing the first job, put up the chagarak over the center of the space being formed, with the help of bakans, insert the uks into it, and at once fasten the other ends to the side screen, which they cover with chiy and side felts, on top of the uk they put the felts and the tunduk felt, fasten all this down, and the tent is ready within the half hour. On the floor of the yurt they spread out felts leaving in the center

342 a /400/ small space for the hearth. Over the felt, among the rich, they spread rugs, naples rugs, and so on, and sometimes, in order to give more decoration to the tent, they hang them along the walls. Across the tent they stretch ropes and various braids; they hammer in pegs; they bring in their things. Finally, in the middle of the tent they start a fire, put up a tripod, and on it a kettle of water, and prepare the food.

415 The necessary utensils, both for the rich, the moderately wealthy and the poorest yurt are: the tripods, of various sizes, set up over the fire, the cast iron kettles, also of various sizes, wooden troughs for washing the meat, others for storage of beef extract, also wooden dishes, on which they serve the smaller [412] pieces of meat on the table. In order to cut meat into still smaller pieces every Kazakh has a small knife (pyshak) carefully kept in a sheath hung on his belt. There are also wooden, leather and metal pails, tubs, vats, milk pails, sabas (large skins for kumys), tursuks (small skins for kumys), and other vessels of various shapes and sizes, for the storage of milk, cheeses, meat, and for bouillon which is poured from large [273] kettles, and is sometimes drunk at the meat table. There are also wooden mortars, cups for drinking kumys (fermented mare's [372] milk) and for various other uses, and sometimes metal and earthenware plates, leather bags for gathering tezek (dry cow dung, used for fuel), as well as teapots and metal kumgans (pitcher with spout, handle and lid for washing hands) and other appurtenances of the kitchen and table. The more breakable and the more or less valuable objects

415 are kept in cases and in chests of various sizes and various outside trimmings. Clothing and all soft things are wrapped up in more or less new and costly rugs, and napless rugs, and even in ordinary ones, and carefully looped on to packages conveniently transportable on
368 camels. With these packages, as well as chests,
513 cases, and with sometimes also cupboards, the yurt is barricaded up to the top on the side opposite the door. Wooden folding beds are placed on the right and left sides, which are very low and short, but with unusually slanting backs which fold back. With this kind of arrangement the bed does not take up much space in the yurt with its legs, which are held in an oblique position by a special kind of wedges, and much can be laid and stood up under the back. At the same time the upper part of these legs form a back /401/ at the head and foot of the bed which is at an extremely obtuse angle with the plane of the bed, so that when the bed is covered with many felts taking the place of a mattress here, the Kazakh can lie down on it at full length. The felts are covered also with many quilted blankets, covered with calico, of various sizes and values, and with several pillows, also padded with calico. Others also have another arrangement for a bed, something like ours, sometimes iron folding beds, and also feather comforters and pillows with clean white pillowcases, but all this, especially the last, is extremely rare. Many do not even have the simplest type of bed. They spread out felt bedding in such cases in the same places where others have the beds. The Kazakh
854 crib is similar to our children's cribs. They not only do not rock but also do not have

354 inside them any little rocking boxes. Not all people have these very convenient cribs, however, and therefore they carry the children in basket beds, fastened on their backs, wrapping the children in felts. They are also carried in these same baskets, tied onto the sides of the camels, during the migrations.

353 The bed, or that side place where the bedding is placed, is almost always separated from the rest of the tent by a calico curtain. If the second wife of the householder lives in the same tent with the first, which does sometimes occur, although rarely, then the other side part of the tent, opposite the first, is also hidden behind a curtain.

Between the bed and the pile of packages laid near the back wall stand more or less voluminous [415] sacks, filled in summer with kumys. These sacks usually have a square bottom, one side of which is 28 to 56 inches long. The tops of the sacks, which gradually narrow, end in a slender neck, more or less beautifully made, sometimes bound in copper and sometimes in silver, which is tied to one of the uks by a string, so that the sack will not fall to the floor. Around these huge [352] tursuks /kumys skins/ there is sometimes placed a low cupboard for vessels of special construction in which various other necessary small things are kept, such as knives, razors, needles, trays, thread, brushes, /402/ sewing work which has been started, and the like. Among some wealthy people the corners of such little cupboards are decorated with bunches of ostrich feathers. In addition they also have other devices, wardrobes and cupboards

353 for dishes, like ours. The poorer Kazakhs, on the contrary, do not even have the first mentioned, and make do with one or two simple chests. Between the beds and the door extra tripods are stored, large kettles, all the larger cooking vessels, and various other domostic utensils among which one may sometimes find a small low table or a small stool.

[231] Among the poor, the sick livestock, yearling calves, sheep still growing horns, and a yound camel, are protected from frost, standing in the door among the rubbish. However, with all the feeling of love of animals here expressed, the people do not deny themselves adequate room. On a special stand there also sits a falcon or a golden eagle, with a [411] leather cap over its eyes. Over it hangs a [412] saddle, a drum to frighten away the wild beasts, a matchlock gun, and various other hunting appurtenances, and other things, such as bridles, various saddles, and saddle trees, reserve nooses, belts of all sorts, lashes of all possible kinds, nagaikas or kamchis (whips), etc. The clothing constantly used by the men and women is kept partly in the chests, which are placed behind the curtains around the beds, where the cradles also stand, and part of them hang on bakans or on the nooses which are stretched low down all through the yurt.

251 Provisions, such as smoked meats, hang on ropes which are stretched across up higher. Meat is also hung from the chagarak, especially if it has to be smoked. Fresh meat, milk, cheeses, and other provisions are preserved in tubs, vats, kettles, sacks, etc., all standing and hanging in this same part of the yurt.

251 between the beds and the door. If there is one bed, then the provisions are stored in the side opposite it, in which case the place where they are stored is walled off by the chiy matting to protect it from the dogs, but in spite of this they sometimes get behind the matting at night. Thus all the walls of the tent are shown to be piled up with the miserable household articles of
513 the Kazakhs, but all the space around the hearth is free. During the day the whole family gathers just in this spot, while at night the small children, little girls, workmen and /403/ guests
264 spending the night make their beds here. The space between the campfire and the pile of packages is the place where they dine, sitting in a circle around the dish which is placed before the head of the house. He has the place of honor, that is, just opposite the door, and right among the packages. He gives up this place only to a distinguished guest, an elder, a biy who is
513 passing by for dinner, etc. In this case the head of the house sits besides these persons, on their right. If it happens that the honored guest is to spend the night, they put him in the place where they ate. If not, the girls sleep there, the boys spread out on the right and left of the fire, and the workmen by the door.

342 The cost of a good new yurt is from 30 to 150 rubles,
[435] sometimes more. A small yurt is called 'dzhulameika' in Kazakh pronunciation, and 'yulameika' in Sart and Russian. The dzhulameika costs no more than 30 rubles. In addition the Kazakhs still use the kosh, the most simplified primitive kind of yurt. This is simply a felt which is placed over straight poles stuck into the ground and tied together

& Kostenko 113-G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RLI Turkestan
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342

at the top so that the kosh looks like a felt cone.

[177] The incomparable qualities of a yurt in summer have been appreciated not only by the armies but also by the Russian inhabitants of Turkestan. The householder who is only the slightest bit wealthy provides himself with such a yurt or yulameika, which he puts up in his garden near his house. In such yulameikas they can be free of the suffocating heat which makes it impossible to sleep in the house.

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A Description of Some Important Populated Places

A description of the town of Tashkent: the Asiatic and Russian parts. Vernyi /Alma Ata/. Kuldja. Samarkand. Khodzhent /Leninabad/. Ura-Tyube.

Tashkent

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361

Tashkent is the center of the government of the whole region of Turkestan. Both in size and in expanse it is one of the most spacious towns not only in the Turkestan region but in all of Central Asia. In number of inhabitants it is comparable only with Bukhara, and in expanse with Kokand. This is one of the oldest towns, and its origin is lost in the mists of time. It is situated at 41° 19'32" north, and 38° 57'58" east. Tashkent is located on a flat plateau beginning about 30 versts from Chimkent, and is surrounded on three sides with gardens, while the fourth side is contiguous with the Russian town.

8:Kostenko 114-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 At the present time one must think of it as two essentially different towns: the Asiatic and the European. The latter, although it lies directly next to the former on the eastern side, has a completely different appearance. Therefore we will describe Asiatic Tashkent first, and then give a few data about the European town.

361 Both the Asiatic and the European Tash-
312 kent are irrigated by aryks /irrigation canals/ led from the Chirchik river, which flows 8 versts south of the town. A large aryk which looks like a river flows from the Chirchik 45 versts from Tashkent. /405/ This is the Zakh-Aryk (1) which passes 10 versts north of the town.

1. The entire length of the Zakh-aryk is 85 versts. In the upper part it is 77 feet (eleven sazhen's) wide and 3 feet deep. It flows into the river Keles.

Another aryk, the most important one for the town is the Bos-Su, which is conducted from the Chirchik 31 versts from the town. At the Lyabzak gates it enters Tashkent in two branches and flows through the town under various names. A third aryk is led from the Chirchik around Niaz-bek 25 versts east of Tashkent, and flows directly to the Russian part of town. It then flows into the Gadragan aryk, and after that, branching out into small trenches it irrigates the gardens of Russian Tashkent.

[133] The small river Salar, a branch of the Chirchik, independent of the aryks already mentioned, flows 2 versts south of the town.

8:Kostenko 115-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Tashkent, like all important Central Asian towns, used to be surrounded by a high crenelated wall, to which there were 12 gates (darvaza). The wall had a rounded form and extended over an area of 20 versts. The gates bore the names of the towns toward which they opened. Today, the part of the town wall on the side of the Russian town has been completely demolished and the moat filled up. The gates on this side were also destroyed. On the other sides, although they still exist, they are no longer closed.

361 632 Administratively, Tashkent is divided into four parts (yurts) which were formerly under the administration of special officials called ming-bashi. These districts are: Shaikhantaur, Sibzor, Kukchi and Bish-Agach.

361 312 The Shaikhantaur district constitutes the northeastern part of the town. Situated in a flat locality, it is divided almost in half by a deep ravine, through which the Ankhor flows, a wide and swift aryk. The other main aryk flowing through this part of the town, called Gadragan, enters the Russian town not far from the beginning of Tash-Kuche street, and provides it with water, flowing out in
361 small aryks. The Shaikhantaur district has 48 'mahalas' (wards), which are: Tadzhik, /406/ Kashgar, five Yangi-shakhars, Sellim-mechet, Illya, Kiot, Keriady, Tash-kucha, Mir-gancha, Okhche, Zandzhilik, two Kator-turas, Tyurk, Igerchi, Ol'mazar, Doom-begi, Kurgan-araksy, Balyan-mechet, Goukush, Shur-tepe, Degriot, Khadrya, Khouz-bok, Dzhangokh, Khish-mechet, Khodzharush-noye, two Okh-mechets, Darkhon, Padar-kush, Kuduk-bashi, Badak, Shatak,

8:Kostenko 116-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since
[574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the
[141] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty
[368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town,[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward – Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district – Analyst]

361 Much more is used for plowland (1814 tanaps) and rice planting (1896 tanaps).

The Sibzor district, occupying the northwestern corner of the town, is divided into 38 mahalas, which are: Kagat, Great /407/ Middle and Little Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-Saray, Yau, Mazar-khan, Kanly-kucha, Dessin-kucha, Pshta-khammom, Masse-duz, Khatyn-mechet, Khich-kupriuk, Khodzha-kugachi, Labzak, Rabat, Kunlak, Khodja-kucha, Yakhkachub, Khazret-imam, Tyk-kuche, Shakar, Dzhim-kucha, Parchabob, Batyr, Akhun-guzar, Kundzhak, Tchinchak, Kadavod, Chegyt-bashi, Khodja-Taressekon, Turnau-bashi, Big Sibzor, Darbaza-kent, Shakyr-guzar, Kazy-kucha, and Agmem-seid. In addition, four settlements also belong to this part of the town: Ibrahim-ata, whose inhabitants are agriculturists and raise 'dzhenushka', Chalo-kazak, Shano-vod, and Kosh-kizyl. The houses in the Sibzor district total 2230, with a population
361 of 18,650. The Keikaus(1) aryk, which divides
312 off from the Bos-Su aryk 8 versts away and enters the town at the Takhtapul' gates, is the main aryk in this part of town.

1. This aryk is named for Keikaus, the chief of the Tashkent okrug.

It irrigates the Big Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kunlak and Yau mahalas, then flows into the Kukcha district, from which it goes
[256] out of the town at the Kuchi-mazar gates. All the flour mills and crushing mills of Sibzor are concentrated on this aryk. The other mahalas are irrigated by small trenches which lead out of the main Keikaus aryk, and bear the names of the mahalas through which they

361 flow. The plowed land belonging to Sibzor
312 is irrigated by water which is led from the Zakh aryk and Bos-Su, as we have mentioned before.

361 The chief productivity of this district
438 of the town is making boots. The boots made by the inhabitants of the Sibzor district are distributed even to other towns in the territory. After this comes weaving and the decoration of cotton materials. The inhabitants have worked at the last two occupations for a very long time. The most important class of people, as regards wealth, are the herdsmen. The residents of all four settlements are agriculturists, as well as the people of the Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-sarai, Yau, Sibzor and Kazy-kucha mahalas.

361 /408/ Three medresses (higher insti-
368 tutions of learning): Beklyar-beg, Barakhon, and Kizyl-Kurgan, with about 260 students, make up almost all the educational provision of this part of the town. In addition to the medresses there are also schools (mekhtebe) here, located in private houses.

There are ten major mosques: Odin-mechet, Okhun-guzar, Khatyn-mechet, Mazar-khan, Muimu-barek, Khonoki, Tokhtonun, Rebot, Khodji-Toroskon and Kara-saray.

361 Kukcha, the western part of the town, consists of thirty-one mahalas: Khafiz, Guyaki, Kuttut, Kupryuk-bashi, Big and Little Sauvan, Chakara, Tyapi, Kunzhak, Chagatai, Psyakchi, Chikchiman, Tokle-dzhalob, Kalalan, Ishkuvat, two Langars, Uzgan, Kisya-kurgan, Khuavon,

361 Chukchi, Kunchi, Padikhan, Chukur-Kishlak, Sara-khundan, Kukchi, Abnazar, Ailish, Khalimkup, Damak and Yangy. In all these mahalas together, there are 2511 houses with a population of 22,088. Three main streets cut through this part of town: Sauvan, Kukcha and Chagatai. There are four main [312] aryks which irrigate the Kukcha district: the Keikaus, which enters from the Sibzor district, the Zakh aryk, the Kara-kamysh, and the Dzhangag. The last branches off from the Keikaus at the Lyabzak gates and divides the town into two sections.

The land on which this part of the town is laid out is quite hilly. It is cut through with deep trenches and has many gardens, situated both inside and outside the town. The main [438] production of the Kukcha district is leather working. Thus of the 695 workshops in 1871, 341 were in leather, and 218 were for bootmaking. After this there are 6 brick factories, 7 places making earthenware vessels, 22 mills for grinding and crushing, and also 22 oil manufacturing [368] places. There are two medresses in this part of the town and 34 schools. There are 51 mosques and 18 tombs, of which one, Sheikh Zenedzhin-Baba, deserves attention for its antiquity. The Sheikh came from Bagdad and was buried here 400 years ago.

The Bish-agach district, in the southern corner of the town, consists of 32 mahalas: Yany-Bakhan, Kamalan, Chakar, Darkhan, Zivak-khish-kupryuk, Balyan-mechet, Sarparaz, Char-su, Ishan-Guzar, Samarkand, Okshi, Darbaza, Zenfata, Millyar, /409/ Chupan-ata, Suzugata, Sary-chapak, Dzhillik-mechet, Uzbek, Mirza-khazy, Gul'-bazar, Kugurmach, Ters-aryk, Kuk-mechet, Kul'gulyk,

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

361 are grouped in the districts in accordance with their occupations. Of course in each district one can also find other occupations (blacksmiths, bootmakers, etc.), but they are much less developed than the specific industry. The extent of the town is so great that many of its residents never learn to know all its winding streets, even though they live there a whole lifetime.

The figures for all the buildings in Asiatic Tashkent are as follows:

Houses occupied by the residents	13,260
Empty courts and separate courts for non-residents	322
Sheds (including 519 stalls)	23
[368] /410/ Medresses	8
Baths	8
Mosques	255
Flour mills	116
Crushing mills	42

[366] Booths in the large bazaar:

Occupied by traders	2324
Empty booths	307
Booths in the town streets	594
Empty booths in the town streets	96

Booths occupied by Sarts in Russian Tashkent	69

361 The population of Asiatic Tashkent ac-
162 cording to the census of 1868 was:

8:Kostenko-122 G-4, 5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

	Families	Males	Females
361 Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162 non-residents	22	987	68
Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
non-residents		37	
Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
non-residents		122	29
Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
non-residents			
Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
non-residents		6	
Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
non-residents		18	
Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	78
non-residents		11	
Hindus		93	
Chinese			3
Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 Russian or European Tashkent is directly
[312] next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by
a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the
town is developing very quickly.

[631] /411/ All the okrug administration
as well as the oblast' administration for the
Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent.

8:Kostenko 123-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

8:Kostenko 124-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
217

A Central Asian museum has been established here also, and a Public Library. The foundation of the latter was laid by the Governor General of Turkestan, von Kaufmann.

At the present time there are 5,381 book titles in this library and 9,734 volumes, of which there are:

		Titles	Volumes
	in Russian	2,695	5,018
	in French	1,444	2,761
	in German	850	1,450
/412/	in English, Latin, Italian Swedish, Dutch, Czech, etc.	392	505
	Total	5,381	9,734

The wealth of the Tashkent Public Library lies in the collection of material on the region of Turkestan, and in general on Central Asia, a collection which is known as "the Turkestan Collection." This collection has been brought together, by order of General Kaufmann by the well-known bibliographer Mezhov, who has already gathered 200 volumes up to now. All newspaper and magazine articles, as well as separate pamphlets and books are being catalogued by Mr. Mezhov in chronological order in large tomes, specially bound. He is also compiling an alphabetic list, and a catalogue to make it easier to find the articles in the tomes.

The Tashkent Public Library receives a subsidy of 1300 rubles from the treasury, of which 800 rubles go for the salary of the librarian, and 500 toward the subscription to newspapers, magazines, the purchase of various books, bindings, etc.

8:Kostenko 125-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 In 1878 there were over 183 subscribers,
217 and 2780 volumes were in circulation, that is,
the average number would be between 15 and 16 volumes per reader.

361 The number of residents in Russian Tash-
kent was determined by a one day census in 1875.
162 According to this census the total number of residents was 4,859 persons, not including the military personnel. One should note that this is a minimal figure for the Russian population in Tashkent.

The total number of Russians in Tashkent can be divided as follows:

By Religious Belief:

	Orthodox Christian	3,473
	Moslem	938
	Jewish	159
/413/	Catholic	155
	Lutheran	115
	Hindus	4
	Evangelical	4
	Armenian - Gregorian	2
	Reform	1
	Anglican	1
	Total	4,859

Of this number:

Males	2,982
Females	1,877

According to occupation, the residents of Russian Tashkent can be divided as follows:

8:Kostenko 126-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Clergy and Church workers 10
162 In military service 613 (1)

/416/ 1. Not counting the army and the officers. But the army clerks and in general the army personnel living in separate quarters are included here.

In civil service 525 (2)

2. This figure does not include hired clerks.

Doctors 11
Obstetricians 2
Doctors' assistants
(Russian: fel'dsher) 9 (3)

3. This figure does not include those permanently assigned to hospitals, and resident there.

Traders 144 (4)

4. Mostly small traders, carrying on trade at the bazaars. Included in this figure are also proprietors of hotels and cafe restaurants, the keepers of public houses, wine cellars, and various stalls and stores.

Owners and Directors of factories 3
Shop clerks 118 (5)

5. Including the advanced clerks also, or the so-called 'doverennye' (in Russian - trusted assistants, agents)

[Tashkent]

361
162

Proprietors in shops and stalls (sidel'tsev)	30	(6)

6. Primarily in drinking establishments. This figure also includes women.

Office clerks	3	
Contractors	4	
Keepers of Exchanges (Russian: birzha)	18	(7)

7. Of this number 6 are occupied only with transport.

Carters	84	(8)

8. Mostly Tatars

Manufacturers of tobacco	2	
Skilled workers in leather	2	
Skilled workers in making brandy	1	
Brandy distillers	2	
Wine growers	3	
Photographers	9	(9)

9. Counting the photographers' helpers: the retouchers, the pressers and also apprentices

Type setters	9	
Printers	3	
Supervisors for printing	1	
/414/ Post Office staff	4	(10)

10. This includes the station inspector and the overseer.

Postillions, drivers	11	(11)

361
162

11. Mostly Kazakhs from the Kurame uyezd.

Messengers	2
Foremen	2
Drivers of arbas (two-wheeled wagons)	14 (12)

12. All Sarts.

Mullahs	1 (13)

13. A mullah and an 'azanchi' (the man who calls from the minaret at prayer time) are at the mosque for the Moslem population of Russian Tashkent.

Azanchi	1
Watchmen and Guards	40
Unskilled workmen	241 (14)

14. Most of these are Moslems: Sarts, Kazakhs and Tatars.

Cigarette manufacturers	2
Florists	1
Confectioners	2
Sausage makers	4
Brewers	2
Hairdressers and barbers	5
Butlers	6
Markers at billiards	3
Economists	5
Apothecaries	4
Tutors	4
Teachers	6 (15)

15. Including governesses and female teachers.

361	Hired clerks	31	
	Soap boilers	1	
162	Engravers	1	(16)

16. This same man cuts the print.

	Bookbinders	2
	Skilled match workers	2
	Chimney sweeps	1
	Furriers	1
	Locksmiths	3
	Coopers	6
	Smiths	30
	Carpenters	26
	Cabinet makers	50
	Hammerers	3
	Planers	1
	Water carrier	1
	Harness makers	3
	Stove makers	8
	Tailors	55
	Boot makers	36
/415/	Makers of bast shoes	1
	House painters	11
	Plasterers	2
	Turners	1
	Parquet floor layers	1
	Cartwrights	3
	Coachmakers	1
	Carriage spring makers	1
	Gardeners	15 (17)

17. Including kitchen gardeners.

	Bread bakers and bakers	37
	Embroiderers in gold	3
	Clockmakers	3
	Fishermen	5
	Musicians	11 (18)

361 18. All hired, and mostly Jews.

162

Bread sellers	6
Keepers of the baths	5 (19)

19. Those who work at the baths are counted as attendants.

Skilled weapon makers	3
Masons	18
Hatters	2
Upholsterers	1
Butchers	3
Skilled goldsmiths	4 (20)

20. Including their apprentices.

Roofers	1
Sawyers	3
Translators	5
Glaziers	1
Brothel keepers	18 (21)

21. All Moslems. They include also women.

Prostitutes	66 (22)

/417/ this and following footnotes
22. All Moslem women. Some of these are married, and live in the brothels together with their husbands, brothers, fathers, small children, etc.

Attendants and Servants	314 (23)

23. Also including orderlies.

8:Kostenko 131-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
162

Coachmen	32
Cooks	111
Chefs	41
Grooms	16
Nurses	67
Wetnurses	4
Chambermaids	25
Seamstresses and milliners	31
Laundresses	61
Without known occupation	1708
Total:	4859

/416/ Of this number 532 women have known occupations.

/417/ According to age the population of the Russian part of Tashkent divides as follows.

Less than 10 years old	880
From 10 to 15	230
From 15 to 20	461
From 20 to 30	1588
From 30 to 40	1156
From 40 to 50	396
From 50 to 60	100
From 60 to 70	24
Over 70 years of age	24

From the above table it can be seen that young people predominate in the population of Russian Tashkent, followed by those in the prime of their lives (from 20 to 40 years old), and after that children up to the age of 15.

8:Kostenko 132-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Vernyy (Alma Ata)

361 After the Russian occupation of the
132 Trans-Ili region in 1853, the fortress town of Vernoe (Alma Ata) was established in the following year, 1854, with the aim of consolidating the Russian domination of the Great Horde. It was founded on the spot where the town of Almata, which means 'apple', had been, a town known for its trade and as a station on the great road to China in the Middle Ages frequented, among others, by the Genoese merchants.

At first the fortress town of Vernoe was the administrative center for the Alatau okrug, subordinate to the military governor of the Semipalatinsk oblast'. After the establishment of the Turkestan military okrug, however, the fortress was made the capital town of the Semirechie oblast' and began to be called Vernyy. The natives and many Russians call Vernyy "Almata", as it was formerly called.

361 /418/ Vernyy lies on even sandy clay place, just at the foot of the Trans-Ili Alatau mountains, along the small Almatinka river.

133 The Almatinka has its source in an unusually picteresque spot in the mountains, and flows very swiftly, roaring and foaming along its course which is sprinkled with large rocks in many spots. After it emerges from the mountains it retains its swiftness and the special quality of the river bottom even though flowing through level country.

8:Kostenko 133-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

133 The Almatinka is no wider than 7 feet (3 arshins), with a depth of about 9 feet (4 arshins) and it can be forded anywhere. Furthermore the amount of water in the river is decreasing every year.

[312] This decrease of the water of the Almatinka is caused, first of all, by the fact that aryks or canals are led off from it, just after its emergence from the mountains, for the irrigation of the fields, gardens and kitchen gardens. Secondly, it is affected by the cutting down of the trees in the upper reaches of the river. The Almatinka flows into another mountain river, the Keskelen, which in turn flows into the Ili river. The Almatinka owes its name to the fact that its source in the mountains is thickly overgrown with apple trees ('alma') and apricot trees (uryuk).

361 132 Vernyy is located at a height 2500 feet above sea level, and enjoys a warm and healthy climate. The summer heat rises to 30° centigrade in the shade. The inhabitants have remarked that the climate of the town is growing dryer every year. Formerly the winter cold was more bearable and the snow lasted only a few days. In more recent years the winters have begun to be Russian, about three months long. There is no doubt that here too the cutting down of the forests in the environs of the town has had a somewhat deleterious effect.

The summer heat spells are almost unbearable, but in the evenings and at night it is always cool because of the proximity

361 132 of the Alatau peaks, which are always covered with snow.

[164] The sudden change of temperature during the day causes intermittent fevers, which also constitutes the main sickness in Vernyy. Diarrhea is added to this in the summer, resulting from eating too much ripe and moderately unripe fruit.

361 364 /419/ The lack of endorsement of measures to keep the air and water pure also has a bad effect on the health of the residents from time to time. Every kind of filth and impurity is left uncovered, either in the courtyards or in the streets, or they throw it into the water, so that both the air and the water are poisoned. The Kalmyks play a particularly active part in this. They are known for their unusual slovenliness, and are settled both in the town and on the outskirts along the Almatinka river.

361 132 The prevailing winds are the northwest, from Lake Balkhash, and the east wind, which blows in the spring. The former carries with it the sand, picked up from the dry and sandy Bet Pak Dala steppe and brings rain clouds.

Apples ripen at the beginning of August in Vernyy and apricots in the second half of June, while rye and wheat ripen in July.

The mean temperature of Vernyy, as determined by Golubev in 1861 is 7° centigrade. The city of Marseilles, which is situated on almost the same latitude as Vernyy, has a median annual temperature of 14.1° centigrade so that plums, peaches and tomatoes will grow there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

000 there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

361 The environs of Vernyy, with the ex-
133 ception of the mountains, are level and depressingly monotonous.

On the other hand, the Alatau mountain range, which closes off the horizon of Vernyy on the south, is usually picturesque. The altitude of the range rises to 14,000 feet, and
[137] the crests are always covered with snow. In the recent past, not only the slopes but also the foothills were covered with dense forests. Now only grass grows in the foothills, a bright emerald green which harmonizes with the dark green of the spruce forest growing in the mountains themselves. All this is topped by a crown of white snow, etched against the bright blue sky. In the mountains it rains frequently, and when it does the mountains are overcast, as though enveloped in a shroud, with dark clouds, which grow whiter, as they rise higher, /420/ assume all sorts of whimsical contours, and gradually diminish and vanish into space.

The foothills are a particularly beautiful sight in the spring time (in April), when the nomads spread a pall over them, that is, they burn the old grass to make the new grass grow better. The skies are filled with a glowing fire, and it fills the whole surrounding countryside with waves of light. Yet no matter how beautiful the Alatau mountains are from the side, the views in the mountains themselves are still more wonderful, and more striking. The thick undergrowth of the valleys and ravines, streams bubbling with foam against

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
the snakes winding over the precipices, all
133 this makes an unforgettable impression. With
every step the views change, as though in a
kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking
and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is
the tree which grows in the greatest abundance.
After it, but much less abundant, are the apple
trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees,
the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the
following parts: the Almata station (the old
part of the town), the Almata settlement, the
Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually
the town which has developed since the beginning
of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a consider-
able degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick
buildings, while the old parts of the town are
built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been
[363] planned regularly. The streets are straight,
level and wide, in most cases planted (although
quite sparsely) with trees. There are often
small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look
like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked
up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/
partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the
birds, for which reason cracks are always forming
in the walls.

361 1. In Russia, as we know, a special
342 kind of moss is used for this purpose, which is called kukushkin len (cuckoo flax).

Secondly, the wooden floors and ceilings, as they shrink, acquire cracks, which also admit the cold. In addition the inhabitants do not know the use of double windows in winter.(1)

1. One must add the danger of fire to the inconveniences of the wooden structures. In 1871 there were three fires in Vernyy with losses figured at 3,462 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The number of buildings in Vernyy are as follows:

Types of buildings	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches (2)	1	1

2. A cathedral is being built, for which the foundation is already laid.

Mosques	-	1
Houses	234	972
Uninhabited buildings	4	9
[366] Stalls		226
Bins and Booths		164
Eating establishments (3)		21

3. Some of these are built of adobe clay and some of softened clay.

Mills		62
Total number of buildings	239	1,456

8:Kostenko 138-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches		1
Houses	1	678
[366] Stores and Stalls		55
Mills		32
Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar dominions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

8:Kostenko 139-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
[Vernyy] RL1

361 There are also Chinese here who have come from
563 the Celestial Empire on commercial business. Finally, there are Jews, also making their living in commerce.

361 Here is an inventory of the Vernyy po-
162 pulation by nationality and estate:

In 1871		Male	Female	Total
Aristocracy	Hereditary	109	46	155
	Non-hereditary	71	52	123
Notable Citizens		8	5	13
Secular Clergy		8	12	20
Merchants		174	107	281
Lower Middle Class		1,176	1,306	2,482
Peasants		174	101	275
Colonists		5	3	8
Military Estate		2,512	250	2,762
Cossacks		2,048	1,839	3,887
Soldiers retired or on indefinite leave		583	180	763
Sarts		459	106	565
Chinese		9	3	12
Kazakhs		271	132	403
Kalmyks	Christians	91	52	143
	Non-Christians	107	81	188
/423/ Persons not belonging to the above estates		187	93	280
Transients with passports		194	83	277
	Total	8,186	4,451	12,637

From this table it can be seen that 1) there is a considerable preponderance of the Russian population over the other nationalities; 2) there is a considerable preponderance of males over females. For 100 males here, there are 54 females.

361 In 1863 there were 4,322 men and 1,842
162 women, totalling 6,164. At that time there were 43 women for every 100 men.

Thus, although the population also doubled in the eight year period, the numerical proportion of men to women changed much less.(1)

1. According to the one day census, made on April 5, 1879 in Vernyy and the stations and suburbs belonging to it, the population of both sexes was 14,837, excluding the military, which numbered 3,586. Thus the total population of Vernyy, including the military, came to 18,423 persons of both sexes. The figure 14,837 is the sum of the following figures:

6,934, the population of both sexes in the new town.

2,230, in the Tatar suburb, in the pastures, in the Khokhlats suburb, in Great valley (Bol'shoi log), in Soroch'ye ostrova (Magpie island), in the prison, the hospital and the Kuznetsov brandy factory.

5,673, in the Great Almata station with the Little Almata settlement. In the first 3,505, in the second 1,868.

361 Concerning births and deaths in the town
163 of Vernyy, we have the following data, which
165 refer especially to the Russian population, which, as was said before, is considerably more numerous than the native.

In 1871 in Vernyy:	Males	Females	Total
Births	308	288	596
Deaths	263	220	483

361 Thus the predominance of male births
163 over deaths is 45, while the females show 68
165 more births than deaths. The total figure for the predominance of births over deaths is 113 persons of both sexes.

361 /424/ The number of deaths according
165 to age are divided as follows:

Deaths in 1871:	Males	Females	Total
From birth to 1 year, inclusive	99	94	193
From 1 year to 5 years of age	47	57	104
From 5 years 10	4	5	9
From 10 to 15 years	7	2	9
From 15 to 20	2	2	4
From 20 to 25	22	6	28
From 25 to 30	16	6	22
From 35 to 40 (sic)	8	6	14
From 40 to 45	9	6	15
From 45 to 50	8	5	13
From 50 to 55	2	2	4
From 55 to 60	6	4	10
From 60 to 65	4	4	8
From 65 to 70	4	4	8
From 70 to 75	5	6	11
From 75 to 80	3	1	4
From 80 to 85	3	3	6
From 85 to 90	1	-	1
From 90 to 95	-	-	-
From 95 to 100	-	2	2
Total	263	220	483

000 Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

8:Kostenko 142-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

	Males	Females	Total
162 Roman Catholic	136	1	137
Protestant	22	2	24
Moslem	550	152	702
Buddhist	136	67	203
Jewish	14	-	14
Old Believers (raskol'niki)	15	13	28

All the rest of the population is of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

361 The chief occupation of the inhabitants
241 is agriculture. The types /425/ of grain grown here are spring and winter rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet and buckwheat. In addition potatoes are grown in considerable quantity.

In 1871 there was:

		chetverts sown	chetverts reaped
Rye	spring	249	2,922
	winter	498	1,754
Spring wheat		1,937	19,022
Oats		3,079	33,831
Barley		420	1,881
Buckwheat		23	191
Potatoes		223	1,239

The grain is used for domestic consumption and is not exported abroad. A part of it is disposed of to the Kazakhs, however, and a part goes to the distilleries and breweries.

361 The residents of Vernyy are very active
244 in kitchen gardening. Among their products there is a special kind of sweet melon planted with seeds from Kuldja, which is particularly worthy of note.

8:Kostenko 143-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 It would be impossible to pass over
231 another branch of Vernyy production, one which is very rare in Central Asia, namely, apiculture. (1)

1. In addition to Vernyy, apiculture is carried on in the Lepsinskaya station.

The raising of bees began here in 1857. In 1859 there were 254 hives, and in 1871 there were 75 apiaries and up to 1,456 hives. One should mention, furthermore, that 1869 and 1870 were bad years for apiculture because of drought, which dried the flowers in the grass, and the trees, so that the bees had no food.

After agriculture the main branch of Vernyy production is livestock raising. In 1871 Vernyy had the following number of animals:

Horses	3,611 head
Horned cattle	2,266
Sheep	729
Pigs	449
Goats	126
Camels	88
Total	7,369

/426/ In 1862 there were only 4,460 animals.

361 One may mention distilling, vodka making,
438 leather and brick making among the large factory enterprises. The remaining industries are in the form of home industries.

The factories in 1871 were:

8:Kostenko 144-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[vernyy] RL1

361 438

Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
[433] Distillery	1	146,000 gal.	171,000	145
Brewery	1	5,700 gal.	1,540	5
Leather	3	23,659 pieces	82,774	57
Brick	11	520,000 pieces	7,800	52
Vodka	1	5,500 gal.	7,524	6
Total	17	-	270,638	265

361 441 438 The commerce of Vernyy is developing quite perceptibly, due to the favorable position of the town at the junction of roads from Kuldja to Tashkent and to Kokand, and from Kashgar to Semipalatinsk. Formerly the caravans passed through Vernyy without stopping. In recent times they have begun to be unloaded for roadside sale. In addition, many merchants from Tashkent and neighboring dominions have come here purposely for continuous trade.

In the environs of Vernyy every year there is a considerable purchase of animals from the Kazakhs, not only for Tashkent and Kuldja, but also for Petropavlovsk, which is over 1200 versts away.

[366] At the present time there are two bazaars in Vernyy: a large and a small one. The total number of stalls in 1871 came to 390, whereas in 1863 there were only 50, and in 1859 about 20.

361 438 The trade in Vernyy is developing in proportion to the strengthening of tranquility

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

1. Here are the prices for certain
361 articles on the Vernyy market:
435 A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

8:Kostenko 146-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 at which 175 boys and 39 girls are enrolled.
871

2) elementary school in the Almata settlement, where 45 boys are enrolled.

3) a Moslem school in the Tatar suburb, with 40 pupils, taught by a mullah.

4) a trade school with 21 pupils, who learn various trades in addition to reading and writing.

5) a school of gardening with 21 pupils, who study with an experienced gardener from the Crimea.

6) A classical preparatory school for girls.

7) A classical preparatory school for boys.

Children of the privileged estate as well as the Cossack estate may enter the elementary schools and the trade school, although the number of the former is not large.

361 In 1878 at the Military Club quite a
217 good library was established, which now contains 2,000 volumes on various subjects. There is a marked trend among the population to use books from this library. From August 5, 1878 to April 5, 1879, i.e., in a period of 8 months, there were 1,474 recipients to whom 2,749 books were distributed.

8:Kostenko 147-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
RL1

Kuldja

361 The town Kuldja discussed here is also
133 called "Old Kuldja" or "Taranchi Kuldja", as distinguished from "New Kuldja" or "Chinese Kuldja" which was destroyed in 1866, and was 35 versts southwest of the old town. Old Kuldja is situated in the broad valley of the river Ili, on its right bank, 3 versts from the river. Near Kuldja the Ili flows between wide banks, a broad and well-watered river. The right bank is steeper than the left both here and along the entire course of the river. Its width is about 136 feet. It is crossed by three ferryboats, maintained by a Russian businessman. It flows so swiftly, especially when there is a wind, so that the crossing is slow. The river freezes over 60 days a year, from the end of December to the end of February. Wood has long been floated down the Ili from the upper reaches to the middle course of the river.

[134] The soil in the environs of the town is
132 sandy loam and very fertile. The climate of Kuldja is warm, healthy and pleasant. Although
361 the summer heat here goes up to 41° centigrade in the shade, the heat is modified considerably by the summer rains. Because of the spring rains, grain takes root in the environs of Kuldja even without watering. The winters here are uniform, and the snow remains on the ground up to a month and a half. The cold in winter reaches 32° centigrade.

The Kuldja valley is protected by high mountains from all sides except the west, and apparently this fact goes far to explain the moderateness of the climate, which notwithstanding, permits the growing of delicate trees and

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[131] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
563 population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley in general, the most different nationalities are mixed together. Until the beginning of the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

[Kuldja]

361 563 were obliged to maintain at their own expense the numerous herds of the Chinese Emperor. The property of the population was not safeguarded in any way. If something was pleasing to a Chinese official he took it without any discussion. The same thing happened if the official found the wife or daughter of a Dungan or Taranchi attractive. In addition to all this, the people also suffered other kinds of humiliation. When a person of another nationality met a Chinese, he had to stand if he was sitting, or dismount from his horse, if he were riding. This chain of insults, humiliations and affronts could no longer be born with patience. The Dungans and Taranchi revolted and had a terrible accounting with their oppressors. The central Chinese government, being powerless, remained a non-participating observer of the massacre and the loss of her provinces.

The Dungans, having thrown off the yoke of the Chinese, soon yielded the rule of the Ili province to the Taranchi.

563 173 The origin of the Dungans is unsolved. The coming of this people into their present abode is lost in the mists of time. There is a tradition in Kuldja that the Dungans came here with Timur and that this hero, when he married a Chinese princess, received the Ili province as a dowry from the Chinese Emperor. The followers obeyed the example of their leader and also married Chinese girls. Later, when Timur went on his way these followers remained and received the land as a gift, as a result of which the Dungans also consider themselves its rightful rulers.

8:Kostenko 150-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

563
144 In physical type the Dungans resemble the Turkic peoples, such as the Uzbeks and Sarts, populating Tashkent, Kashgar and other towns in Turkestan, more than they do the Chinese. By religious faith they are Moslems. In everything else - in language, dress and custom - they are true Chinese. Yet, in spite of the fact that they retain the Chinese costume completely, the Ili Dungans keep the Moslem custom of shaving the head and wear a skull cap (tubeteika) on their heads.

/430/ In any case it can be assumed that the Dungans first belonged to a Turkic people and then later mixed with the Chinese and adopted their civilization. Then, since the Chinese are the most passive people in the world in the matter of religion, while the Moslems, on the other hand are primarily fanatics, the Dungans took everything from the Chinese, but kept their old religious faith.

The Taranchi are purely Turkic in nationality. They were transferred to this area in the middle of the last century from eastern Turkestan (from the towns of Turfan, Ak-Su, Kashgar and others) in order to develop grain growing and agriculture in the Ili valley, which had been ruined and conquered shortly before then by the Chinese. The word "tarancha" in Chinese means "worker". By order of the Chinese government most of the people transferred were criminals and in general men of bad morals. About 7000 families of these settlers were sent out. By marrying Dungans they multiplied, became stronger, and were even able to wrest the power from the Dungans after the Chinese massacre.

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1
[Kuldja]

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
[346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

361 shooing away the flies with a special instru-
366 ment, a whisk made of hair, attached to a handle. In the Chinese bazaar there is constant movement, bustle and noise. The vendors of wares cry out and invite the customers in. Hordes of children some half-naked, some completely naked, scurry back and forth.

In a group of men the Chinese women stand out in their original costumes, on their tiny misshapen, squeezed little feet, on which they walk with difficulty, as though on stilts, tottering sideways.

/432/ With every step one runs into vendors, carrying all their goods in one hand, and charging two or three kopecks for it. Here is an unbelievably dirty urchin holding a piece of mutton on his finger, yelling with all his might, announcing his wares../sic/

The greatest crowding, noise and throng takes place in the so-called row of eating houses, where various food is sold. A beggar can satisfy his appetite for some three or four kopecks here. Having satisfied their hunger, Chinese beggars lie down somewhere in the shade along the booths and spend the whole day doing nothing.

361 Trade at the Chinese bazaar is divided
443 into three categories:

1) The permanent trade, which is carried on in booths, and in which the more valuable articles are sold: mats, cotton prints, tea, sugar, iron, etc. 2) Mobile trade, on small tables set up in front of the booths. Here the articles sold are already cheaper: ordinary

361 soap, mirrors, wooden combs, dirty tobacco,
443 needles, handfuls of two Russian candies, etc. These wares are gathered up at night and spread out again in the morning. 3) Hawking, carried about in baskets or simply in the hands. To this category belongs the sale of eggs, fruit, birds, etc.

There are practically no proper goods in Kuldja now. Up until 1866 one could find Chinese silk textiles, porcelain articles, and precious stones here. Now decent textiles and porcelain have gradually become an archeological rarity and are much more expensive.

After our occupation of Kuldja a special article of trade were the Chinese "burkhans" (small copper or cast iron representations of gods). But even the burkhans have all been sold.

361 This town, which is dirty and unattractive
364 from the outside, appears even filthier inside, that is, in the courtyards and the houses. The courtyards are filled with every sort of refuse, and in the houses the dirt and disorder is beyond imagination. Even the lodgings of the rich and those who are comfortably well off suffer from the absence of light, ventilation and cleanliness. In addition the Chinese houses are distinguished by some sort of a special sharp odor, peculiar to them.

/433/ Of the public buildings in Kuldja, in addition to the two mosques, mentioned above[3], the Chinese temple of idols is worthy of mention. The entrance to the temple leads through several dirty courts. In the front court in a dark hovel is the school where the children gather to study

[3] [See category 116, p. 151 — Analyst]

361 the laws of Confucius. Each lad has a book in
his hand, but they all study together, shouting,
346 similar to the way it is done in Jewish and
Moslem schools.

The chapel itself is housed in a dark but quite spacious room. The furnishings are strongly reminiscent of a Catholic church. By the front wall there is a large altar, set with various viands, church lamps and vessels from which smoke issues forth. Behind the altar as well as along the side walls there are images of a dragon. The figures of saints are distinguished by their corpulence and rotundity. Flags are hung along the walls like banners.
788 Finally, bells are hung up near the altar. The divine service is carried out by a dirty and ragged personage, who, with a bundle of smoldering candles in his hands, and accompanied by measured beating of the bells, makes endless bows, to the ground and halfway to the ground as he approaches and retires from the sacrificial table or altar.

On important occasions, instead of spoken prayers they burn little pieces of paper with written prayers or wishes, in the belief that prayers born up in this manner reach God more quickly. (1)

1. There is still another original way of praying. They fasten a small piece of paper to a wheel, with a prayer written on it. The wheel turns about quickly, and each turn of the wheel is considered as a whole prayer, separately uttered.

8:Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 Among the Chinese of Kuldja there are
795 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

In general the Kuldja "Catholics" are very insecure in the foundations of their faith. They wear crucifixes around their necks, and read prayers /434/ in Latin. When they appear before the authorities with a plea they set their crucifixes outside.

In the houses of the Kuldja Catholics one sees on the walls an image of the cross instead of icons. In addition, one may also see from time to time rosaries with a crucifix, or a palm on which a crucifix hangs.

[797] Christianity was brought to Kuldja by French missionaries, who came here from Peking.

361 Here are the statistical data for the number of houses and population in Kuldja. In 1872 there were in Kuldja:

[346]

Eastern Orthodox Churches	1
Roman Catholic Churches	1
Chinese temples of idols	2
Mosques	36
Houses	1,258
Total number of buildings	1,298

361 The population of Kuldja divides accord-
162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

8:Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
[565] Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn

361 the Ili province have slowed down the useful
433 activity by the population considerably, and they are now beginning to breathe easily and recover.

361 The number of booths in the town is con-
438 siderable: there are 650. The amount of wares, however, is insignificant, and is limited to
439 the absolute needs of the population. The more important trade is carried on by Sarts from Tashkent, Kokand and Kashgar, and Tatars from Vernyy and Kopal. The chief articles of import are mats and khalats (long cloaks) from Kashgar and other Moslem towns, inferior types of cotton prints, nankeen, calico, plush, broadcloth and metal objects from Vernyy and Kopal, and tea from Urumchi and China proper. In exchange for these products they export sheep (mostly from Kashgar), dressed lamb skins, raw hides, pottery wares, apples and apricots, fox pelts, young staghorns. These last are sold very profitably through Kyakhta by the Chinese and are used by them as a medicine against impotency.

361 The factory and craft industries are even
433 more insignificant than the trade. Here is a list of the largest industries:
438

Types of factories and workshops	number	sum of production in rubles	number of workers
Oil manufacturing	10	12,000	78
Paper mill	4	500	24
Cast iron foundries	5	600	20
/436/ Pottery	2	960	6
Dye works	1	300	5
Vermicelli makers	3	101	6
Total	25	14,461	139

8: Kostenko 159-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuld]a] RL1

361 Few of the population worked in agricul-
241 ture in the past because many hands were taken away for the forces of the Sultan's armies. Since 1872 the population has entered actively into the cultivation of the land, being free of recruitment and having no obligations to the soil.

The wheat harvest here has only a 30-fold yield. (1)

361 1. In 1872 prices in the Kuldja market
435 were as follows:

Wheat in ordinary times costs 7 to 8 kopecks for 36 lb., but in 1872, because of military activities, disturbance, and the large number of military personnel supported in 1871, the price went up to 1 ruble, 80 kopecks. After that ordinary prices were 15 kopecks for rice, 15 kopecks for millet, 15 kopecks for barley, 4 kopecks for clover for 36 lb.

One hundred eggs cost 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of beef and mutton varies from 70 kopecks to 2 rubles, 40 kopecks. Before Kuldja was taken a hen cost 30 kopecks, afterwards the price rose to 8 kopecks. A pound of butter costs 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of tallow candles cost 5 rubles, the average cost of sugar is 30 rubles for 36 lb. Ordinary tea is sold for 1 ruble, 50 kopecks a pound.

A piece of matting 42 ft. (18 arshins) long costs from 60 to 70 kopecks. Russian cotton print material is sold at 22 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

8:Kostenko 160-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

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435

Tent cloth is sold at 30 kopecks for 2 ft. (per arshin) and calico for from 25 to 35 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

A cow costs from 16 to 25 rubles. A horse costs from 20 to 60 rubles. A sheep costs 3 rubles and a bull from 25 to 40 rubles.

A beam of wood 14 in. (8 vershoks) in diameter and 14 ft. (2 sazhen's) long costs 2 rubles. A board 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide and 6 ft. (2½ arshins) long costs 10 kopecks. A board 7 ft. (3 arshins) long and 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide costs 50 kopecks.

Fire brick costs 2 rubles a thousand, and sun-dried brick 1 ruble 60 kopecks. An unskilled workman is paid 15 kopecks a day; a worker with a horse receives from 40 kopecks to 1 ruble daily.

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Education in Kuldja is shown by the following figures for schools and the number of pupils enrolled in them:

	No. schools	No. of pupils Boys	Girls	Total
At the Chinese temple	1	25	-	25
At the great Moslem mosque	1	60	10	70
At the houses of the mullahs	4	82	21	103
Total	6	167	31	198

/437/ The population of Kuldja has quite a gentle and peaceful character.

8:Kostenko 161-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Samarkand

361 Samarkand is situated at 39°38'50" latitude north and 36°57' longitude east (67° east of Greenwich), and is the administrative center of the Zeravshan okrug. This town is set out 6 versts south of the Zeravshan river and the gardens and fields belonging to the town are irrigated by the waters of the river.

The foundation of the town, according to tradition, is ascribed to an Arab sheikh, whose lust for conquest led him to the rich valley of the river Sogda (Zeravshan) in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At that time the town was called Marakanda. The armies of Alexander the Great came as far as this, and the residents of the town showed such strong resistance that, according to tradition, it was burned to its foundations after it was [103] taken. Afterwards it was soon rebuilt and fortified by the slave of Alexander of Macedonia, Samar, in honor of whom it received its name, and then became the capital of Sogdiana, one of the provinces formed on the ruins of the Alexandrian monarchy. The conquest of the region by the Greeks made it possible for Greek civilization to penetrate far into Central Asia, and even now Graeco-Bactrian coins are found in the ruins of ancient cities, lying in the basin of the Amu-Darya.

The Arabs brought a new religion and civilization into their conquered lands. Genghis Khan conquered Samarkand at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and Tamerlane chose it as the capital of his broad empire and thought of making it the first city of the

8:Kostenko 162-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 world. For one hundred years Samarkand was the seat of broad scholarly, administrative and commercial activity, and contained over 150,000 inhabitants. The massive remains of ancient buildings testify even today to the past glory of this city. The new (Moslem) town is not strikingly beautiful. Like all other Central Asian towns, it is made up of narrow crooked streets, lined with clay walls, ugly squat little houses, miserable small stalls similar to dog kennels, etc. etc.

361 346 /438/ The pleasantest place in town is the Rigistan - a small town square, which is formed by three ancient mosques and medresses, situated perpendicular to each other: the Tillya-kari (i.e., gold) medresse, the Shir-dar (named for the mosaic figures on the front of two animals resembling lions; the Persian word for lion is shir, and the Ulu-begi. This last building was once famous for its seat of learning and its observatory, but now it has suffered much from the ravages of time and earthquakes.

361 764 In the eastern section of Samarkand an ancient building of Persian architecture is to be seen, known by the name of Gur-emir (the tomb of the emir), and containing the tomb of Timur. This mausoleum is crowned by a cupola which looks like a truncated melon. Along the sides there were two minarets, but one recently collapsed. The interior of the building is octagonal and consists of two rooms. The floors are laid with white marble, and the walls are covered with graceful azure arabesques and with quotations from the Koran in gold. The tomb of Timur is made of dark green jasper, and has the shape of a truncated pyramid, about

361 three feet wide and six feet long, turned with
764 the foundation uppermost. (1)

1. This stone constitutes a remarkably large single piece of nephrite.

This stone was split in two while in transport, after the conquest of Samarkand by Shakh-Nadir. Next to the tomb of the Emir are tombs of his teacher and various other members of his family. All these tombs are enclosed by a carved marble grating. By a narrow staircase one reaches the dark vault, which is also decorated with arabesques and on the floor of which there are the tombstones in the same order as they are placed up above. The copy of the Koran copied by Osman himself (the third Caliph of the faithful) was preserved in this underground vault, which still show traces of the Caliph's blood, for he was killed apparently while he was working on it. This historical document was sold for 100 rubles by Samarkand mullahs when the Russians took the city, and was placed in the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg.

361 /439/ The most interesting of the
346 monuments of the past are the ruins of the Bibi-Khanum mosque, which was built by one of Timur's wives, the Chinese princess Khanum. The best artists and architects were engaged for the erection of this building, which is imposing in its proportions and magnificence. This temple occupies a large area, and consists of three mosques, connected with each other by a square structure in which the cells and the auditorium of one of the largest medresses are located. The main entrance gates were at one time cast in bronze and covered with

361 inscriptions and arabesques. Later one of the
346 impecunious rulers of Bukhara had the gates melted down for coins. With the passing of time the walls of the building have cracked and fallen into ruin in many places. The western cupola is the best preserved part. Here the walls are covered with tile mosaics which are strikingly colorful, and in addition the design has been made very artistically and shows highly original taste. In some places the azure and gold are as fresh as though they
364 had been put on the walls only recently. In the middle of the building is a huge table of white marble on nine short legs. This table is turned toward the window behind which was the enclosed place of Timur's wife - Khanum. On the table lay a huge Koran, on pages of parchment, so that the wife of the terrible conqueror could read it from her window. Not far from this building they show the tomb of the founder herself, Khanum. But this tomb is scarcely remarkable, being a formless pile of ruins.

361 Not far outside the town are the extensive ruins of the summer palace of Timur, the Khozreti-Shakh-Zinda, where the former rulers of Samarkand went to worship, and then made their triumphal entrance into the town. Samarkand, like most of the Central Asian towns, is enclosed by a wall, which is 13 versts in length. The town has quite a regular square shape, on the western side of which is an extensive citadel, which itself is enclosed by a wall which is 8 feet (3½ arshins) high by 10½ feet (1½ sazhen's) at the base. The walls are crenelated, and have flanking projections. This citadel is the most extensive in all of

8:Kostenko 165-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880.RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 Central Asia. The circumference of the walls is 2½ versts, and the interior area occupies about 10 square versts. /440/ The Russian population lives in the citadel, and here also is the Russian church, which is nicely finished on the inside. Also in the citadel is the extensive court of the Emir, transformed into a hospital when Samarkand was taken. In this palace is the very famous stone said to be the throne of Timur. This stone is called kok-tash. (1)

1. Kok or kuk in Turkic means blue, green and grey.

It is set on a terrace bordered by an inside square court, which is paved by fire brick. The stone is greyish in color with dark veins. It has rather considerable dimensions, hewn in the shape of an oblong parallele piped on and decorated with carving. The rulers of Bukhara sat upon this stone when they took the reins of government into their hands.

Formerly there was a remarkable library in Samarkand, housed in a special building. The Armenian scholars believe that it contained a large collection of ancient Armenian books. But both the library and its building have disappeared without trace, as well as the Kalinder-khany, institute of higher learning, famous in its time, and the observatory Mirza-Ulugbegi. North of Samarkand, in the direction of the Zeravshan, there is an extensive area which is covered by the ruins of an ancient city and is now called Kala i Afrosiab (the fortress of Afrosiab).

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
438 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat,
439 rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

8:Kostenko 167-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkesta:
[Samarkand] RL1

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Types of factories, plants and other undertakings: (1)

1. According to evidence of Mr. Virskii, in Turkestanskii ezhegodnik (Turkestan Yearbook), IV, 1876.

a) Manufactories	Number
Cast-iron foundry	12
Soap boiling and fat melting	34
Leather	30
Pottery	37

b) Machine manufacture	
Taffeta	7
Mats	188
Cheap striped cotton	17
Silk scarves	3
'Alacha' /silk or halfsilk Turkish or Persian fabric/	4
'Adryas' /Bukharan and Persian halfsilk fabric with bright designs against a plain background/	27

c) Workshops and other undertakings	
Carpenters	42
Turners and Cabinetmakers	11
Weaving looms	7
Dye works	42
Bootmakers	162
Saddle makers	25
Gold and silver work	23
Makers of two-wheeled carriages	23
Horsehair ropes	17
Dye works for wood	15

361	Wooden combs	7
438	/442/ Water smoking pipes	8
	Tailor shops	20
366	Copper wares	6
	Smiths	56
	Wattling and chiy (rush) weaving	12
	Silk winding	15
	Sesame oil manufacturers	23
	Barbers	20
	Bakers of flat cakes	33
	Candy makers	7
	Shops making pilaf and pil'mene	108
	Tea shops	30
	Commercial baths	7
	Brick sarais (ovens)	4
	Stalls at the bazaars	712
	Bazaar places for traders	270
	Various small stalls (dishes and utensils, horse trappings, clothing, iron, salt, dyes, cast iron, knives, wooden hoes, kettles, beef)	1,085

One should note that not all the factories and other undertakings mentioned here have the same arrangement as those in European Russia. These are no more than cottage industries, the trade of which is decidedly insignificant. The machines in all these undertakings are the most primitive, and there are no special accomodations in any of them. In the same hut where the proprietor lives he produces his wares. The figures on the number of the above undertakings certainly change often, if not every day.

8:Kostenko 169-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

Khodzhent (Leninabad)

361 The residents of Khodzhent consider
103 their town the oldest of all the towns in Central Asia, since it was founded according to legend by the daughter of Adam, whose name was Khodzhyanda. As a result, say the natives, the town was given the name of Khodzhent.

According to the explanation of some natives, who also consider Khodzhent one of the oldest towns in Central Asia, the /443/ town received the name of Khopchyant (from the two words khop and chyant) because it was built in a beautiful spot, and this is expressed in the words khop and chyant (very nice, beautiful) Later this was changed to Khodzhent. There also exists a third explanation for the name of Khodzhent; saying that it is a compound of the words hodja and kent, i.e., the village of hodjas. For in the town there are extremely many 'aksiyaks', men of the white bone (aristocracy), that is, hodjas.

361 Khodzhent, together with Ura-Tyube, Dzhizak and their regions, have always been a separate dominion, administered from time to time by independent begs. One of these, Ak Buta beg (Uzbek by birth), who ruled Khodzhent at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was particularly important. He was the first to reinforce the town, he built a citadel and divided the town into twenty-four wards. Gul'-bakh, the place of residence of the begs, was built by Shadman beg, born in Tashkent. Later, at the beginning of the present century, Khodzhent was taken by the ruler of Kokand, Alim Khan, and from that time it lost its

8:Kostenko 170-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

361 independence, being alternately under the rule of Kokand and the Bukharans until it was conquered by the Russians.

Although after he took Khodzhent, Alim Khan also conquered Tashkent and had a universal census taken there, this was never done in Khodzhent.

Khodzhent spreads out along the Syr-Darya river, which borders the town from the north and northwestern sides, and the town is surrounded from the east, south and southwest by gardens and plowed fields which take up a huge area. To the southwest they spread out approximately 6 to 7 versts, to the south 2 to 3 versts, to the east 7 to 8 versts. The town, which has a circumference of about 12 versts, is shaped like an irregular polygon, narrow in the middle part. The eastern half is much larger than the western. The town is surrounded on three sides by a double wall, and on the Syr-Darya side with a single wall, and it has eight gates. On the eastern side of the town are the Kalinau, Kazy and Kokand gates, and to the south are the Chervak, Chuyanchi, Char-Chrak and Machet'-Saur gates. There are no gates on the western /444/ side, and on the north the Yange-Darvuaza gate opens toward the Syr-Darya. There are many other small exits cut through the walls in addition to these gates.

As was mentioned above, Khodzhent was divided by Ak Buta Beg into 24 mahalas or wards, which were later subdivided into 80 mahalas. This is the present number of mahalas. Outside the town are 6 mahalas: 1) Undzhi,

361 2) Ruman, 3) Kulangyr, 4) Sheikh Burkhan, 5) Pumchi-kur, 6) Gava or Kuruk, which are named after the aryks of greater or lesser importance which irrigate their plowed lands and gardens. These mahalas are formed from the outskirts of town which are laid out in gardens. Here part of the inhabitants live permanently and part move out from the town only for the summer.

Khodzhent is divided into two districts: Rozak on the west, and Kalinau on the east. The border line between them is taken as the aryk Mazar, which enters the town between the Chervak and Chuyanchi gates and flowes into the Syr-Darya near the Kalendar Khan mahala. The town is thus divided into two parts by this aryk. In one part, the Razak district, there are 2,800 dwellings together with the suburb mahalas Iova and Kuruk. In the other district of Kalinau, there are 3,000 dwellings including the remaining suburban mahalas. Cal-
[161] culating an average of 5 persons per house, one may infer that there are about 14,000 persons in the Razak district, and about 15,000 in the Kalinau district. Thus in the entire town of Khodzhent there are about 29,000 inhabitants. They are almost all Tadzhiks, except for about 100 Uzbeks, 50 Kashgarians, 30 Jews and 7 Hindus.

In Khodzhent there are many gardens in
361 addition to those which surround it from the
247 outside. It is calculated that 733 tanaps (a tanap is 0.45 acres) in Khodzhent are in gardens. There is a particularly large number of gardens in the western part or district of town, Razak, which is larger in area than the Kalinau district although it has a smaller

361 population. In the Kalinau district the po-
247 pulation is more densely settled as a result of the fact that the largest of the two town bazaars is located there, and therefore practically all the trading estate lives /445/ in that district. In the Razak district the inhabitants work more in gardening.

361 Of the town buildings in Khodzhent,
346 three medresses of fire brick are particularly remarkable. One was begun by Ak Buta Beg, who was mentioned above, and finished by his wife Izyat Alyam, about 150 years ago. In this medresse one teacher (mudaris) instructs about 50 students, who live in 28 separate rooms. The remaining medresses were built 40 to 50 years ago. One was built by the Khodzhent Beg Shakhi Divan Begi, and has 23 apartments. In it there are about 40 students and 2 teachers The other medresse was built by Mukhamed Sadyk Alim, also with 23 lodgings, in which 30 students live and one teacher. These medresses are named for the persons who built them.

Of the medresses which are built not of firebrick but of clay the following are worthy of note. One is the medresse Namazga, which was built about 60 years ago by Beg Khaly Kum Mirza. In it are 23 lodgings, 2 teachers and about 50 students. Another is the medresse Hazret Sheik Maslah-Eddin, which was built about 20 years ago by Mirza Hakim Potavali, with 10 lodgings, in which there are 14 students A third is the medresse Mahomed-Hussar, built by the Beg Hash Barkan Bay, about 180 years ago. It contains 13 cells, in which one teacher instructs 30 students.

8:Kostenko 173-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[446] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built a mosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

[Khodzhent]

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Type of shop, workshop, etc. (1)	Number

1. In Central Asian towns it is impossible to separate a shop from an industrial plant, because in most cases the manufacturer, or more accurately the craftsman works in his shop and sells his wares there.

Silver products	4
Iron and iron mongers	13
Cast iron	6
Knives	5
Copper wares	8
Shops selling knives	7

Types of establishments	Number
Smithies	6
Leather factories	2
Sale of leather goods	23
Saddlers	5
Boots and footgear in general	54
Earthenware vessels	11
Tobacco (smoking)	15
Tobacco (snuff)	6
Oil producers	50
Sesame oil producers	22
Soap boilers	18
Stalls selling soap	8
/447/Candles	6
Meat	48
Cabinet makers	2
Dairy houses	32
Stalls with tea and sugar	22
Stalls with salt	5
Stalls with flour and grain crops	24
Rice	15

8:Kostenko 175-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

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Types of establishments	Number
Fruit	27
Vegetables	4
Stalls with halva	10
Bakeries of flat cakes	12
Tea stalls	17
Stalls with thread	6
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	5
Woolen goods	9
Silk winding	20
Sawing	4
Silk weaving	95
Cotton weaving	115
Shops for finishing material of silk and cotton mixed	9
Stalls with silk textiles	7
Stalls with textiles of mixed silk and cotton	26
Stalls for khalats	10
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	5
Stalls with alacha /a kind of silk fabric/	6
Stalls with muslin and turbans	10
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	78
Money changing stalls	4
Barbers	4
Mills (1)	52

1. Rice mills are counted as mills.

361
366 There are two bazaars in Khodzhent: the big one and the small one. In the first

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[371] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later. as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

361 finally it became an independent dominion. This happened when the begs stopped recognizing the emir or khan as their sovereigns and ruled the town independently for a while until they finally fell under the rule of the neighboring khans again.

Ura-Tyube is situated at the foot of two elevations. On one of these stands a citadel, and on the slopes of the other is the northwestern part of the town. The town is about 6 versts in circumference, and is enclosed by a double wall which contains 7 gates: 1) Chakmak-tash; 2) Yase-Bak; 3) Say-Bala; 4) Kara-Bek; 5) Darvoaza-Bala; 6) Darvoaza-Nidzhsany; 7) Saypayak.

/449/ The town is divided into 'Guzars', of which there are 58 and which correspond to the mahalas of Khodzhent. This division into Guzars has existed for a long time, but it is not known when and by whom it was introduced and what factors were taken into account when it was done, since the guzars are unequal both in size and in number of population. In the town there are almost no gardens, so that all the houses are crowded close together. They are distributed mostly on side streets, which are entered through large wooden gates. The bazaar is placed almost in the middle of the town and occupies a large area.

361 Of the town buildings two medresses
346 which are constructed of firebrick are worthy of note. One is the Kok-Gumbes medresse, which has 17 lodgings (cells) in which 6 teachers instruct 20 students. This medresse was built 320 years ago by Abdul Latyf sultan. The

361 other, which is the completely new Rustam beg
medresse, was built about 15 years ago. In
346 its 49 separate apartments live 50 students,
who are instructed by 4 teachers. There are
two remaining medresses built of clay. In the
Namazga medresse there are 12 apartments for
30 students which were built by the two begs
Mohammed Rakhim Attalyk and Khudoyar Vallyami,
and 18 other lodgings for 25 students, built
by another beg. The mosque at this medresse
was built by the first two begs out of firebrick.
It has four teachers. At the fourth medresse,
built by the Beg Said Gaza Hodja, there are
12 apartments for 15 students, who are instructed
by 1 teacher.

361 There are 1,398 houses in Ura-Tyube and
the population is counted as 4,804 persons of
162 both sexes. The predominating nationality is
Tadzhik. After them come the Uzbeks with 900
persons. There are in addition 6 Jews and
12 Hindus in the town. Not having their own
households they live permanently in caravan-
series which belong to them.

There are no other native peoples in
the town. The Kazakhs never settle there but
travel only to the bazaar to sell wood, coal
and cattle and to buy such necessary objects
for themselves which they are unable to produce
in their own domestic industry, and indeed
their own produce does not satisfy almost all
their needs.

361 /450/ Outside the town, to the south,
west, north and northeast, there are the gardens
and plowed land of the town dwellers, who move
out in the summer to these gardens, so that

3: Kostenko 180-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1
[Ura-Tyube]

Types of establishments (ctd)	Number
/451/ Cabinet makers	2
Milk stalls	28
Stalls with tea and sugar	40
Stalls with salt	23
Stalls with flour and grain	11
Stalls with rice	22
Fruit	46
Stalls with vegetables	16
Stalls with halva	4
Bakeries of flat cakes	8
Tea stalls (kharcheven)	25
Stalls with thread	2
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	4
Woolen goods	25
Sawing	3
Cotton weaving	98
Finishers shops for mixed cotton and silk material	7
Stalls with silk textiles	5
Stalls with mixed silk and cotton textiles	19
Stalls with khalat textiles	13
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	9
Stalls with alacha /kind of silk fabric/	4
Stalls with muslin and turbans	7
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	25
Money changers' stalls	18
Barbershops	10
Mills	73

361
438
366

361 in summer the town is almost deserted.

In addition, separate groups of houses are scattered among these gardens, called all together Char mahala, where the proprietors live almost permanently, summer and winter. Char mahala constitutes 17 separate groups of houses.

361 There are 854 stalls, industrial and
438 manufacturing plants in Ura-Tyube.

366 This number is split up into the followin categories:

Types of establishment	Number
Silver wares	3
Iron and iron mongers	14
Cast iron	4
Knives	7
Copper	5
Stalls selling knives	10
Smithies	7
Leather works	2
Stalls selling leather goods	15
Saddlers	4
Boots and footgear in general	40
Factories for production of clay vessels	10
Stalls selling smoking tobacco	14
Stalls selling snuff	5
Oil manufacturers	45
Stalls with sesame oil	24
Soap boiling factories	11
Stalls with soap	3
Candle workshops	9
Meat stalls	61

RL1
8:Kostenko 181-G-4, 5 (1868-80)1880 R L1 Turkestan

[Ura-Tyube]

361 There is one bazaar in the town, which
[366] contains 642 stalls. There are two bazaar days
a week; Wednesday and Sunday.

There are three caravanseries, of which
two are Sart and one is for Jews and Hindus.

Of the advanced schools (medresses)
[368] there are 4, and the lower schools number 35.

[452] There are 122 mosques altogether.
Of these 9 large mosques perform the public
prayers on Fridays. There are 147 clergymen
serving at the mosques.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia RL

PREFACE

ABOUT the middle of the XIXth century the shadow of Russia in Central Asia began to fall across the vision of a Britain which had just succeeded to the Sikhs in the Panjab and was occupied in the consolidation of territories which became known as the North-West Frontier. From that date the external policy of the British government in India was directed mainly to the stabilization of Middle Eastern frontiers and to safeguarding the continued existence of Persia and Afghanistan against the forces of Russian expansion. As a result of that policy the Russian advance was halted, where it still stands, on the Oxus and along the fringe of the Turkmen mountains.

In due course the Soviets succeeded the Tsars in the Turkish lands of Central Asia, and Britain withdrew her forces from a partitioned Indian continent. In Southern and South-Western Asia the bonds of the Commonwealth are now loosened. In Central Asia Soviet Russia remains in control of many million Muslims of Turco-Iranian stock. These territories, once known as Turkistan, are in fact an overlap between the Islamic and the Soviet world. It is the purpose of this book at a moment of solvency brought on by Stalin's death to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist world and the West.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least fifty years. It is extremely hard today to uncover modern sources of real value in a field of peculiar importance and little known outside Soviet Russia. The gap has to be filled mainly from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period in particular — the uneasy interregnum between the October Revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power — I have

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

127 The primary sources of information for this essay consisted of the
124 standard literature on Central Asia, pre-Revolutionary and Soviet, and of materials collected in the course of interviews conducted with 31 Muslim refugees from the Soviet Union, most of them from Central Asia.[2] These interviews concentrated on the personal experiences of the informants, and avoided, insofar as possible, references to politics, in order to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of deliberate concealment or lying. All the informants were male, and consisted, in their majority, of persons 30 to 50 years of age, with a high school or *tekhnikum* education, who had left the Soviet Union as laborers or prisoners of war in the course of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. They represented, in other words, largely the middle-aged Soviet "intelligentsia" (in the Communist sense of the word). The conclusions derived from the interviews were placed against the historical background of Central Asia for the purpose of separating the accidental from the essential, on the assumption that generalizations obtained from interviews were both more reliable and more significant in terms of the future when in agreement with pre-Soviet developments in Central Asia. The fact that in the main there is such agreement seems to the author an added reason for confidence in the correctness of the conclusions thus derived.

• 121 The main criteria used in investigating the cultural tendencies of Central Asian Muslim were five: religion, customs, language, ethnic identity, and the character and trends of the native intelligentsia. An attempt was made in each case to determine the extent and nature of the changes which had occurred under Soviet rule; to ascertain whether these changes agreed with or ran contrary to the spontaneous developments taking place prior to the 1917 Revolution; and finally, to evaluate their meaning in terms of the probable future.

RELIGION

000 The term "religion" comprises at least three distinct phenomena: a belief in the existence of one or more supreme beings; a set of rituals which gives this belief external expression; and a way of life based upon the principles explicitly and implicitly enunciated by the belief's founders. In analyzing the religious life of a community, these aspects must be clearly differentiated.

101 Russian Central Asia consists of two main parts, distinguished from each other by historic tradition, culture, and topography: the northern half, the steppe region (today's Kazakhstan), and the southern half, Turkestan (comprising the remaining four Central Asian republics). The

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000 Russian Empire. Our entire aim should be to prepare the population for the acceptance of Russian principles and Russian civilization - for the assimilation, as rapid and as rational as possible, of the provinces which have been newly annexed. The Kazakh steppes, it is true, have long been considered part of the Empire, but their incorporation has been only nominal until this time. The proof that the government has regarded the Kazakhs only as a foreign people can be seen most clearly in the fact that until 1868 the Kazakh steppes were divided from the Empire by the Orenburg/Chkalov/ - Siberian customs line.

What measures must be taken in order to blend the native population of Turkestan with the Russian is a complex and broad question, and cannot be the object of our investigation. Here we will indicate only in general lines characteristics of the organization of life and the character of the natives of the Turkestan region. These can contribute in their turn to finding the necessary ways of inculcating the principles of Russian civilization among the natives.

121 In the preceding chapter we saw that numerically, the chief people of the Turkestan area are the nomads; that is, the Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them. After them come the Sarts, who before the coming of the Russians, held the rule of the natives in their hands. The remaining peoples are relatively few in number. For this reason in surveying the public and domestic way of life of the natives/338/ it is enough to describe the Kazakhs, representatives of a nomadic way of life, and the Sarts, representatives of the sedentary natives of the area.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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114 RICHARD PIPES is Research Associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center and Tutor in History and Literature, Harvard University. He is the author of *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), a history of the nationalist movements in the Russian borderlands during and immediately after the Russian Revolution.

A summary of this article has been published for limited circulation by the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The present complete text is here presented with the Center's full permission.

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia [RL]

000 drawn, among others, on the writings of Professor Togan of Istanbul University, himself a chief actor in the field and the author of a notable book in Turkish entitled *Bugünkü Türkili* (Turkistan today). Page references to this book would not help the English reader and I have therefore been compelled, with the author's ready permission, to include a number of translated passages. I am also greatly in the debt of Mr. W. E. D. Allen, who has given ungrudgingly of the great store of his own knowledge in this field of orientalia, and of Dr. Stefan Wurm of Vienna University, whose knowledge of Turkic linguistics is unrivalled in any country. The linguistic map is his work. No Turcologist myself, I can plead that a lifetime spent among the neighbouring Muslim peoples of the Afghan borderland provides some of the conditions in which insight can do something to fill the gaps in knowledge. Russia in Transoxiana was never far from the thought of those who looked outward towards the Oxus from Peshawar. To English readers the Oxus is so much more familiar than the Amu Darya that I have been tempted to use the names indiscriminately, as the context suggests.

101 128 The accepted linguistic and ethnic classifications of the Turks are somewhat more complex than those adopted in this book, which does not aim at the precise resolution of such problems. The connotation of *Turkey* is clear enough; where distinction is necessary, I have included the Turks of Turkey in the definition *Western Turks*, which also covers the *Azeris* of Azerbaijan and (linguistically though not geographically) the *Turkmens*. On the Volga, in the Urals and in part of the Crimea (before the deportations) the term *Tatar*, or *Turco-Tatar*, has the sanction of usage. In those parts of Central Asia formerly known as *Turkistan* — the real hub of this book — I have avoided the doubtful appellation *Turkistani*, replacing it by *Eastern* or *Central Asian Turk*, and confining the word *Turki* to those Eastern Turks who live in Sinkiang under Chinese dominion. Where more precision is needed in references to the Turks of Russian Central Asia, I have particularized them as *Uzbeks*, *Kazaks*, and so on. Except in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

a few cases, clear from the context, my choice between *Turkish* and *Turkic* is determined by a convention whereby scholars seek to allot the one to peoples and the other to languages. 101 128

The transliteration of names in a Turkic tongue is not to be simply resolved by reference to the canons of Arabists or the Hunterian system. An explanation of the method adopted in the text will be found in an appendix.

In quoting from the great Russian historian Barthold I have used a French translation, which he authorized. It will be stronger thus, without further distillation. If what follows fails to give the picture, it is because (as Barthold truly wrote) —

> L'histoire turque exige des connaissances qui ne se trouvent que rarement réunies chez une seule personne. Il ne suffit donc point d'être turcologue pour écrire l'histoire des peuples turcs. Suivant l'époque qu'on étudie, il faut être également ou bien sinologue, ou bien arabisant, ou bien iranisant.

For the Western writer even that is not enough, for he should be able to go through the Russian medium also. In this region many studies meet and cross.

O. C.

March 1953

The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edgar Newgass for help in the compilation of the index.

[See cat. 116, pp. 269-272 -- Analyst]

[p. viii is blank]

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the Semidesert zone of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 111-124. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the mountains of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 164-191. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of the Steppe of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 90-110. --Analyst/

113, 13 Turkestan RL1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna, and soil of desert zone of Turkestan (Soviet Central Asia), see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116, pp. 125-163. --Analyst/

shash means "six" in Sanskrit, and therefore Shashkent had the same 103
meaning as the Greek Hexapolis. Probably Tashkent developed in 361
ancient times with the five other towns in the Scythian wastes on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, which later bore the names Turkestan, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, Otrar and Sauran, of which the last two are long since in ruins, forming a league of six towns, and as the capital of the league it had the name of 'City of Six' Such word formations, which are known to have been employed often by the ancient Greeks, are still in use in Turkestan today. Thus, for example, the realm founded by Yakub Beg in the Tarym Basin which was originally designated as Alty-Shaar (City of Six), had the name of Djety-Shaar (City of Seven) after Yakub Beg incorporated a seventh city, Kara-Shaar, into his dominion. The later Turkic invaders, for whom the word Shashkent, a foreign word, was incomrehensible, probably changed it, because of its similar sound into Tashkent, which means in their language (city of stone). In similar manner they also changed the name Baktra into Balkh or "capital", the name Chashmkent (well city) into Chimkent or (turf city), and the like. The second /151/
/Figure 48. Caption: Loess landscape near Tashkent Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher.)/ syllable, kent, although it was Indo-European, was /152/left unchanged by the Turkic peoples because they were already accustomed to it; for many other city names in Turkestan had the same formation, such as Kokand, Samarkand, Chimkent, Pskent, Yarkand, etc. 'kand' and 'kent' have the same meaning; the form 'kand' is used when the preceding syllable contains the vowels a, o or u, otherwise it is 'kent'. Thus in our case the correct orthography would be Tashkand, which is also the way the natives pronounce it. The Russians, however, who had little familiarity with linguistics, adopted the form Tashkent from the beginning, and this is now the official name of the town.

3. The Situation of the Town of Tashkent

Tashkent is situated 4° 37' 11" east of Greenwich on a latitude 131
of 41° 19' 32" N. lat.; thus it lies approximately on the parallel of 361
Naples; it is 488 meters above sea level. The coordinates correspond to the observatory of Tashkent, which is one kilometer east of the former city wall.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

000 and American representatives in the capital, Urumchi. In the sands of Khotan in the Tarim basin the great archaeologist, Aurel Stein, discovered the lost cities that made his name. Since his time a succession of travellers have made it their business to describe what they were able to learn of the tangled politics of the Tarim and Jungarian oases from the time of the fall of the Manchus up to the rise to power of Communism in China. Only then, some three years back, did Sinkiang become inaccessible to the West. Before then it shared with the more remote parts of the Himalayas the distinction of being the favourite goal of the more enterprising travellers in Asiatic lands. Some may think that for that reason it has attained a quite spurious importance.

131 142 With Russian Turkistan — now become the five Socialist Soviet Republics of Central Asia — the case is otherwise. The Eastern Turks of the Oxus region have always dwelt in a strange isolation, and the Russians have only drawn closer the veils which for centuries shrouded a forbidden land. Relatively to the size of the country and the antiquity of its history, it is true to say that the West knows less of Soviet Central Asia than of any part of the civilized world. In extent alone it is impressive. Including the steppe up to the northern limits of modern Kazakistan, the aggregate territory is larger in area than India before partition[1] and more than half the size of the United States; and, although in a land of which much is desert the population in 1939 was under seventeen million,[1]

	Area	Population (last census)	
		Total	'Native'
	(sq. miles)		
Kazakistan	1,073,000	6,146,000	3,090,000
Uzbekistan	158,000	6,282,000	4,980,000
Tajikistan	56,000	1,485,000	1,220,000
Kirghizia	77,000	1,459,000	880,000
Turkmenia	189,000	1,254,000	830,000
Total	1,553,000	16,626,000	11,000,000

Note that the 'Native' population figures given are the figures of Kazaks, Uzbeks etc., *for the whole USSR.* The 1939 census, unlike that for 1926, did not give figures by nationality separately for each republic. But, although there is some inter-

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized population in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge of these peoples with that which has been gathered about Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is immediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India, the comparison is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 river's flow. Both Kashka and Zarafshan sink into the sand before reaching the Amu Darya. North of the Sir Darya and the Kara Tav prolongation of the Tienshan comes the real steppe, much of it half-desert and known as the Betpak Dala (Plain of Misfortune) but part of it watered by yet other rivers, the Talash and the Chu. The Chu possibly at one time drained Lake Issik Köl, but now it passes some miles from it and down the Bum gorge into the plain. Like the Zarafshan, both these northern rivers sink into the sand.

133 Up to this point, going northward and eastward, the
131 watershed has been broadly coincident with the frontier between China and the Russian Empire, and the basins of the two great rivers lie wholly in Russian territory. But to the north-east of the Betpak Dala lies Lake Balkhash with Yedisu (in Russian, Semirechye, the Land of the Seven Rivers) to the east of it. The main affluent to this basin is the River Ili, flowing past Kulja out of Sinkiang. Occupied by the Tsar's forces in 1876 during Yakub Beg's period of rule in Kashgharia, Kulja was surrendered to the Manchu Empire on the resumption of Chinese control a few years later, and since then has been beyond the formal frontier of Russia.[1] As things are, this part of the Russian frontier has no mountain-screen. It lies open not only to an approach down the Ili Valley, but through the gaps in the lower hills which connect the Tienshan with the Altai farther north. These are the passages leading to Jungaria, along which the tides of conquest, and later the trade-routes, moved westward and eastward under Chingiz and Timur. They are known as the gap of Chuguchak, the Jungarian Gate and the Iron Gate (or Talki Pass), and the Ili River Valley itself. Together they offer an easier entrance than the passes farther south from Kashghar into Farghana by Irkishtam, the most practicable of which, the Terek Davan, rises to 13,000 feet.

000 It is in the mountains above the Ili Valley that we find

[1] For the reality as between Russian and Chinese control on this frontier, even in the period between the Great Wars, see Fitzroy Maclean, *op. cit.* Since then the advent to power of the Mao régime in China, for the time at least, has further deprived this frontier of its meaning.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 be free of Russian interference and so act as an effective buffer to their empire in India. A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh, inhabited by people of Turkish stock, and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan.

175 There now remained only a small mountain area never 13) penetrated by Turkish peoples. This was the high table-land of the Pamirs east of the Bukhara mountain country, hitherto a no-man's-land too distant for effective management by the Mangit Emirs of Bukhara and beyond the limits attained either by the Manchus working from Sinkiang or by the British from the Panjab. This remote region also finally fell to Russia, a narrow tongue of Afghanistan known as Wakhan being left as a cartographical buffer — it is little else — between the limits of British expansion in Gilgit and Chitral and Russian expansion on the Pamirs. Many writers have left the impression that there exists a point in this region where met 'the frontiers of three empires', namely, Russia, China, India[1] and indeed a fourth, Afghanistan. This was never the case. The Russian and Indian empires were parted by the finger of Wakhan, the Russian frontier having been so demarcated by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in the summer of 1895, rounding off the Russian dominion towards India but in this sector as elsewhere leaving Afghan territory in between. At one point the Wakhan tongue is only eight miles wide. Here, however, it is buttressed on the Pakistan side by the massive chain of the Hindu Kush, which in Tirich Mir rises to 25,000 ft. At another point farther east is an easy 12,000 ft. pass, the Baroghil, leading from northern Chitral into Wakhan, whence it is possible to look straight across on to Russian territory on the Pamirs. The Russian territory north of Wakhan is now known as Gorno-Badakhshan, or Hill Badakhshan, and is inhabited by Tajiks and pockets of odd mountain peoples, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismaili, followers of the Aga Khan.

[1] Now Pakistan, which succeeded to the hegemony of Chitral and controls the Gilgit passes north of Kashmir.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. 642
Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR 631
within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is 1310
now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice 631
of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

131 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihila-
631 tion of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these
312 administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like
[162] the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were nothing short of national frontiers between independent units of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that the irrigation systems have been kept within single administrative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across 000
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who possesses experience, for there is no administrative question which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assuming for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy. Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential matters would be in central hands. In either case their only meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

● 131 Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks
361 Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

OOO I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history [101] shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

Turkestan

101 131 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts [137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only 1½ million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly populated countries in the world.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1



Anau in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

133 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

101 By comparison with this desert area Western Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all
● 131 times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the
[63] present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province
000 of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL2

CHAPTER 17

Central Asia

SU
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SCA
131

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA extends from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Chinese frontier in the east, from Kazakhstan in the north to the borders of Iran and Afghanistan in the south. This region, which has some of the most unusual features of the natural divisions of the USSR, has an area of about 475,000 square miles. It is located farthest south and most removed from the tempering influence of the oceans.

SU
133*
SCA
133

The structure and relief of Central Asia can be divided into two parts: the northwestern section, comprising about two thirds of the total area, which includes extensive low, sandy deserts and irrigated oases in the foothills of the mountains, and the southeastern part, one third of the total area, a mountainous zone with some of the longest, highest, and most glaciated ranges of the world. The low region is part of the Turan lowland. It stretches from the Caspian Sea to the Syr Darya and the range Kara-Tau in the east and includes the southern portion of the Ust'-Urt plateau and the two largest deserts of Central Asia, the Kara-Kum and the Kyzyl-Kum, separated from each other by the Amu Darya. The Kara-Kum has the greater area, of which nine tenths are covered by sand. Here and there one encounters barren clay flats and salt-covered depressions. A number of dry river beds, similar to the *wadi* of the Sahara, run from the present river course toward the Caspian Sea. The largest of these dry valleys is the Uzboy, which is thought to have been a branch of the Amu Darya. Along the southern edge of the Kara-Kum, at the foot of the Kopet Dagh, are steppes and oases extending in a narrow belt along the USSR-Iran frontier. Other oases lie on the Tedzhen and Murgab rivers, as well as in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya (oasis of Khorezm). The Kyzyl-Kum lies somewhat higher than the Kara-Kum and has more rocky areas, devoid of sand cover. In its central section there are outcrops of Paleozoic rocks, rising to over 3,000 feet, which are the eroded and weathered remains of ancient mountain ranges. In the eastern part of the Kyzyl-Kum numerous steppe areas penetrate be-

361 133 dust in constant suspension in the air. When the air is particularly pure one can see from Tashkent the Turkestan mountain range, two hundred kilometers away, the continuation of the Alai mountains, with snow-covered crests, glistening like silver in the sunlight, are a magnificent sight.

[132] Tashkent has a very advantageous position in respect to climate as well. The town is protected in winter from the icy northeast winds by the high mountains in the northeast, so that Tashkent has a much warmer temperature during the coldest part of the year than locations farther west in the open steppe. Furthermore, since the valley of the Chirchik opens to the southwest, the amount of precipitation is relatively great, and Tashkent always has, for this reason, even during the worst droughts, a more than adequate water supply, an advantage of which hardly any other town in Turkestan can boast.

2. A Description of Sart Tashkent

361 ### 1. The Grounds and Fortifications of the Town

The Tashkent of today falls into two sharply separated and fundamentally different parts: the native town, so-called Sart Tashkent, and the Russian town, founded only after the Russian occupation. The later lies between the Bos-su canal and the Salar; Sart Tashkent extends primarily west of the Bos-su canal and has today, on the whole, the same dimensions and the same appearance as it did before the Russian conquest.

All Central Asian towns and even the larger villages divide into three separate parts: the bazaar, the most important part of the town, /154/ the residential quarters, which surround the bazaar, and finally the gardens and fields which surround the town proper from all sides. In Figure 49 this division of Turkestan towns is shown schematically. All the towns more or less approximate the basic type shown in the drawing, and deviate from it only insofar as the respective terrain and water conditions require. In the center of the town is the free bazaar square, in which are held the weekly bazaars or fairs as well as all sorts of public gatherings, executions, and the like. Along the bazaar square the permanent shops are joined together, mostly concentrically, while these again are surrounded by the residential quarters, consisting o simple clay huts. /Figure 49 p. 9a/ The sections we have mentioned so far, which together form the real town, are surrounded by an unbroken

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

000 meadows in springtime. The fields are well watered, the water-courses well planted with mulberry, poplar and willow against a drop-scene of violet-coloured hills rising to spires of ever-
[137] lasting snow. From the mountain-skirts descend many clear streams, and springs well out shadowed by immemorial *chenars*.[1] Often, sheltering in a well-planted grove and watered by a rivulet, there stands a mosque antiquely carved in commemoration of the shrine of some local saint. Schuyler describes with delight the beauties of a refuge of this kind, reached after a thirsty march across a desolate valley strewn with gravel. He writes with understanding of the sense of refreshment to be gained from repose on ground so hallowed, whose beauty is the greater set against what Curzon describes as the wide and doleful plain, the sorrowful waste of a desert once at the bottom of a larger Caspian Sea. But there are none to tell us now whether the people can still find rest from the stridencies of Soviet life in garden cloisters such as this, holy places long before the advent of Islam. According to the Soviet press, the beauties of nature are banned as a subject for discourse or poetry.

● 132 There are other aspects of physical geography not without interest to the life of modern Turkistan. One of these is the influence on the movements of man of changes of climate that in this region took place either just before or after the opening of history. The clearest illustration is to be found in the discoveries of Aurel Stein in the archaeological field in Sinkiang. The remains of the cities he found buried in the Taklamakan sands prove that the water supply of the Tarim basin, when those cities flourished, was far more plentiful than it is today. There has in fact been a process of desiccation which, developing after the time when civilized man dwelt in cities, has led to mass migration out of Central Asia to more favourable

[1] The *platanus orientalis*, the eastern plane, possibly the finest of all deciduous trees. At its best in Kashmir, it flourishes from northern India in the east right across the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux as far as the Balkans in the west.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

climes. Because of the distance from the sea, precipitation even 132
on the mountains around the Tarim basin is low, and there is ground for the belief that the glaciers are still shrinking, with a resultant steady diminution of the fertilizing water. In other words, the recession of the ice-age is to this extent and in this area linked with history.[1] A process which is working in Sinkiang has its application also to the very similar conditions of soil and climate obtaining in Russian Central Asia.

Another change, in this case historical, is that in the 133
courses of the two great rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, and possibly even of other waters which empty into the Turanian basin. The records state that more than once in historical times the Oxus[2] (Amu Darya) at least has changed its course as between the Caspian and the Aral Sea. This is an aspect of physical geography at which all who write of Transoxiana glance again and again, with never-failing fascination. The idea runs like a thread through the literature of the region. The general thesis has the support of the Russian historian Barthold, who explains the decline of Khorezm by the shifting of the rivers' course in the XVIth century. He and others write as if they saw the Oxus with the eyes of Matthew Arnold — the great river moving mysteriously across the plain, seeming now to be lost and broken up in little channels 'a foiled circuitous wanderer', yet in the end flowing inevitably forward to release in the Aral Sea — a symbol of the history of the land.

According to Togan,[3] at the time of the Arab conquest the main waters of the Amu Darya (Oxus) flowed not to the Aral but to the now dry Özboy bed, after filling up the Sarikamish depression in the north of the Karakum desert and just below the Ust Yurt escarpment. At that time only one arm reached the Aral Sea, which was a great reed-swamp much smaller than

[1] Bib. I, 87, Sir C. Skrine.

[2] The name Oxus can be variously derived from Ak-su, the White Water, a tributary; or from Oghush (Arabic Vakhsh), the main tributary from the Terskey Alai and Karategin. In its upper course the Oghush is called the Surkhab or Kizilsu — Persian and Turkish for Red River — by the Tajiks and Turks respectively who live on its banks. [103]

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 108 *et seqq.*

2: Carce S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

III

PATTERN OF PEOPLES

Few cases, perhaps, in romance or history, can sustain a close collation with this as to the complexity of its separate interests.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

WE see a land wide and open like the ocean, closed in by the barriers of high mountain on one side and the unharvested desert or inhospitable inland waters on the other. Before the railways were built, in one quarter only, the north-east, was there comparatively easy passage from outside. And in restricted regions only, along the foothills of these mountains, and within their glens, or farther along the rivers which issue from them, is there a certain livelihood to be won through a settled agriculture. Elsewhere the steppe and the hillside offer a life only to the nomad, equipped to move his flocks and herds in pursuit of a precarious rainfall and an uncertain season. We shall expect then to find two forms of subsistence, the intensive cultivation of the oasis by the farmer bound to traditional uses, and the wandering life of the stockbreeder on the Alpine pasture or the steppe.

Many of the flatlands of what is now Russian Central Asia are farther from the sea than any part of the world land-mass save Sinkiang alone. Hence the uncertain precipitation in all but the mountain regions, and the need for the herdsman to wander far afield in search of pasture for his flocks. There are recurrent years of famine without winter snow or spring rain, years which are really reminders of the peril of desiccation hanging over these countries. It is this that has driven the pastoralist in history to become a nomad, wandering over the steppe almost as urgently as the tribes of Arabia in their

492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this waterless and treeless country. The temperature
[132] varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.[1]

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly
487 adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

1 [In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

132 Western Turkestan, too, is a land of contrasts no less marked than those of Eastern Turkestan. Its climate is continental in the extreme and very dry. During the summer the temperature reaches more than 40° centigrade, and in the winter it falls to 25° below zero and even lower. Nine tenths of Western
133 Turkestan consist of barren desert. The desert of Kara Kum (Black Sand) to the South of the Aral Sea, the home of the wandering Turkoman tribes (see map on page 1434), was named the Grave of the Caravans, and Kizil Kum (Red Sand), the desert situated North of Kara Kum, gives but meagre sustenance to the nomad Kirghiz tribes and their herds.

All the more fertile by contrast are the oases of Western Turkestan. The district is watered by no fewer than six large rivers, among which are the two historically important streams of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, known to the ancients as Oxus and Jaxartes. The valley of the upper Sir Darya is named Ferghana, a fertile area surrounded by mountains, which in the course of history has been coveted and conquered by many peoples, chiefly for the sake of its famous horses. In more recent times it has become known as one of the principal cotton and silk producing countries (see ill. page 1438).

More than once within human recollection the Amu Darya has changed its course; three hundred years ago it sent at least one arm into

[See cat 116, p 4 -- Analyst]

[See cat 116, pp 13, 16 -- Analyst]

8:Kostenko 133-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

133 The Almatinka is no wider than 7 feet (3 arshins), with a depth of about 9 feet (4 arshins) and it can be forded anywhere. Furthermore the amount of water in the river is decreasing every year.

[312] This decrease of the water of the Almatinka is caused, first of all, by the fact that aryks or canals are led off from it, just after its emergence from the mountains, for the irrigation of the fields, gardens and kitchen gardens. Secondly, it is affected by the cutting down of the trees in the upper reaches of the river. The Almatinka flows into another mountain river, the Keskelen, which in turn flows into the Ili river. The Almatinka owes its name to the fact that its source in the mountains is thickly overgrown with apple trees ('alma') and apricot trees (uryuk).

361 132 Vernyy is located at a height 2500 feet above sea level, and enjoys a warm and healthy climate. The summer heat rises to 30° centigrade in the shade. The inhabitants have remarked that the climate of the town is growing dryer every year. Formerly the winter cold was more bearable and the snow lasted only a few days. In more recent years the winters have begun to be Russian, about three months long. There is no doubt that here too the cutting down of the forests in the environs of the town has had a somewhat deleterious effect.

The summer heat spells are almost unbearable, but in the evenings and at night it is always cool because of the proximity

361 of the Alatau peaks, which are always covered with snow.
132

[164] The sudden change of temperature during the day causes intermittent fevers, which also constitutes the main sickness in Vernyy. Diarrhea is added to this in the summer, resulting from eating too much ripe and moderately unripe fruit.

361 /419/ The lack of endorsement of measures to keep the air
364 and water pure also has a bad effect on the health of the residents from time to time. Every kind of filth and impurity is left uncovered, either in the courtyards or in the streets, or they throw it into the water, so that both the air and the water are poisoned. The Kalmyks play a particularly active part in this. They are known for their unusual slovenliness, and are settled both in the town and on the outskirts along the Almatinka river.

361 The prevailing winds are the northwest, from Lake Balkhash,
132 and the east wind, which blows in the spring. The former carries with it the sand, picked up from the dry and sandy Bet Pak Dala steppe and brings rain clouds.

Apples ripen at the beginning of August in Vernyy and apricots in the second half of June, while rye and wheat ripen in July.

The mean temperature of Vernyy, as determined by Golubev in 1861 is 7° centigrade. The city of Marseilles, which is situated on almost the same latitude as Vernyy, has a median annual temperature of 14.1° centigrade so that plums, peaches and tomatoes will grow there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

8:Kostenko 147-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
RL1

Kuldja

361 The town Kuldja discussed here is also
133 called "Old Kuldja" or "Taranchi Kuldja", as distinguished from "New Kuldja" or "Chinese Kuldja" which was destroyed in 1866, and was 35 versts southwest of the old town. Old Kuldja is situated in the broad valley of the river Ili, on its right bank, 3 versts from the river. Near Kuldja the Ili flows between wide banks, a broad and well-watered river. The right bank is steeper than the left both here and along the entire course of the river. Its width is about 136 feet. It is crossed by three ferryboats, maintained by a Russian businessman. It flows so swiftly, especially when there is a wind, so that the crossing is slow. The river freezes over 60 days a year, from the end of December to the end of February. Wood has long been floated down the Ili from the upper reaches to the middle course of the river.

[134] The soil in the environs of the town is
• 132 sandy loam and very fertile. The climate of Kuldja is warm, healthy and pleasant. Although
361 the summer heat here goes up to 41° centigrade in the shade, the heat is modified considerably by the summer rains. Because of the spring rains, grain takes root in the environs of Kuldja even without watering. The winters here are uniform, and the snow remains on the ground up to a month and a half. The cold in winter reaches 32° centigrade.

The Kuldja valley is protected by high mountains from all sides except the west, and apparently this fact goes far to explain the moderateness of the climate, which notwithstanding, permits the growing of delicate trees and

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[131] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry
trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley
563 in general, the most different nationalities
are mixed together. Until the beginning of
the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the
Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL2

133* water volume, its speed, and the variability of its course. The other river,
SCA the Syr Darya, rises in the Tien Shan system. It is formed by the Naryn,
133 which flows through wide valleys south and southwest of lake Issyk-Kul',
and the lesser Kara Darya, which rises in the Fergana range. As opposed to the Amu Darya, it has a smaller volume, width, and depth, but it is longer and very suitable for irrigation. It flows through the Fergana Valley and then turns northwest through the desert zone toward the Aral Sea, which it enters also through a delta. Its most important affluent is the Chirchik which waters the oasis of Tashkent.

Among the mountain lakes the most notable is Issyk-Kul' which has an area of 2,395 square miles and lies 5,198 feet above sea level. It is slightly saline and does not freeze in the winter. Lesser lakes are the
SCA Kara-Kul' and the Zor-Kul', in the Pamir plateau.

132 Due to its remoteness from the oceans, the climate of Central Asia is
SCA very continental in nature. The continental characteristics already noted
● 132 in Kazakhstan are still more accentuated in this region. The internal seas, the Caspian and the Aral, which border on Central Asia are too small to exert any tempering influence. Average summer temperatures in the lowland rise as high as 90° F, and in a great part of the region frosts of a few degrees below 0° F are possible in the winter. Evergreen vegetation, such as that along the Batumi coast of the Black Sea, does not exist in Central Asia. There is very little precipitation, generally 4 to 5 inches a year over a great part of the territory; only in the foothills does the rainfall amount to 16 inches or more. These climatic extremes are especially notable in such high mountain areas as the Pamir. In the valleys, such as the Fergana and the Zeravshan valleys, the climate is milder. Winter conditions are unsettled. Snow generally falls in December and remains on the ground till February, although it may melt earlier. The transition from the cold of February to the warmth of May is very sudden. Toward the end of that summer month wheat ripens and apricots are ready for picking. This period is followed by a long, hot, dry summer, in which predominantly dry winds blow from the north and wither the vegetation. These winds create sandstorms in the desert and sometimes raise a fine dust which blots out the sun. In the foothills and the mountains the summer is more temperate: there is precipitation, and the vegetation does not dry out. Toward the end of August or the beginning of September the heat lets up and is followed by a warm autumn, the best season in Central Asia. The climate of the Pamir and of the higher ranges of the Tien Shan reminds one of the Far North. Frosts

Z3: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia Rl 1

occur even in the early part of July; in the winter they fall to —49° F. During the summer the temperature rises to 60° F, and there is a great temperature difference between areas exposed to the sun and those in the shadow. The average yearly temperature in these mountain fastnesses approximates that on the shores of the White Sea.

The dry and extremely continental climate exerts a strong influence on the vegetation of Central Asia. Plants which adapt themselves to these conditions and are able to withstand drought periods are predominant in the desert and in the mountains. Steppe vegetation covers not only the plain but also the mountain slopes, reaching even to the area of permanent snows. In the high mountain valleys of the Tien Shan and the Pamir are salt steppes and salt lakes. Only a portion of the mountains is wooded, generally the northern and western slopes. Wooded belts (*tugay*) also occur along some rivers.

The desert vegetation consists of rather poor varieties. The plants are sometimes covered with thorns or fibers and are very sturdy. In the sandy desert the *saksaul* tree is the predominant type; of the other plants, umbrella-shaped plants, among which the Asafetida Giantfennel, exuding an ill-smelling resinous substance, and desert rhubarb, with large meaty leaves, are the most common. The long roots of the desert plants immobilize the sand, so that moving sand dunes are found only where no vegetation normally exists or where it has been destroyed by irrational grazing of livestock. Among the sands, occasional clay flats are covered sparsely by various types of wormwood and camelthorn, and saltwort is found in salt depressions. During spring and summer, the desert and steppe supports various bulbous plants, including wild onions. Along the rivers and the salt lakes there are thickets of *chiy*, a feathergrass often reaching a height of 12 feet, which is used by the local inhabitants for making mats and thatching roofs. The densely wooded clusters along streams include tamarisk, willow, poplar, and wild olive.

The mountain forests include deciduous trees on the lower slopes, with wild-growing walnut, pistachio, and apricot trees. Common European types, such as pine, oak, and linden, are completely lacking. In the eastern Tien Shan a type of fir is found. Above the forest zone there are rich mountain pastures, similar to Alpine meadows in the humid areas and to the Caspian steppe in the drier sections.

Central Asia has considerable reserves of mineral resources, but their exploitation has only recently been begun to any large extent. Along the mountain foothills there is a zone of petroleum deposits extending

361
133

In all of Turkestan there are only a few places which have in every sense as favorable a situation as does Tashkent. It lies in a broad valley, flanked on both sides by the low thrust of the Chatkal mountains, a valley which is fed from one side by the river Chirchik, from the other by the Keles. The ground on which Tashkent is built, consists, as already mentioned, of a thick loess stratum which continues all the way to the bank of the Syr-Darya, sixty kilometers away. The terrain of Tashkent is undulating and, like all loess landscapes, furrowed through, here and there, by deep cuts, made by the flowing water. As for water resources, upon which all life and success depends in the steppes of Turkestan, no other town in Central Asia can be compared with Tashkent. Ten kilometers away, the well-watered Chirchik, largest of all the tributaries of the Syr-Darya, flows southeast of Tashkent. The town itself lies upon the Salar, a tributary of the Chirchik, which supplies the fields and gardens east of the town and the Russian town with water through its numerous canals. The deeply cut Bos-su canal flows through the native city, which is also a tributary of the Chirchik. (Figure 48, p. 151)

Tashkent is an oasis surrounded by undulating steppe land. The steppe reaches from the bank of the Syr-Darya to the Chatkal mountains, about eighty kilometers east of Tashkent, and its slopes likewise consist, for the most part, of steppe soil. Every year during the spring rain this steppe is covered with relatively luxuriant steppe grass which dries up immediately when the rainy season ends, whereupon the steppe all the way to the mountains /153/ has a frightfully monotonous, pale appearance throughout the summer. West of Tashkent is an extensive marshy landscape, to which the town is probably indebted for a fair share of its fevers. From the Syr-Darya to the mountains the steppe is covered with a number of villages, which are scattered like oases very far apart along the rivers and in the mountain valleys.

Looking out from Tashkent there is a lovely view of the whole spreading steppe country to the northeast, east and southeast between the town and the mountains, and of the Chatkal mountains themselves, which are covered with snow the greater part of the year. Only during the hottest summer months does the snow disappear from the highest peaks. Because of the extraordinary purity of the air the mountains appear to be much closer than they really are. Only during the dry summer months, when no rain has fallen for a long time, does the view become somewhat overcast by the fine

1: von Schwarz--8a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1
Tashkent

133
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

Fig. 4. Loess landscape near Tashkent. Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher.)

[Tashkent]

361 133 dust in constant suspension in the air. When the air is particularly pure one can see from Tashkent the Turkestan mountain range, two hundred kilometers away, the continuation of the Alai mountains, with snow-covered crests, glistening like silver in the sunlight, are a magnificent sight.

[132] Tashkent has a very advantageous position in respect to climate as well. The town is protected in winter from the icy northeast winds by the high mountains in the northeast, so that Tashkent has a much warmer temperature during the coldest part of the year than locations farther west in the open steppe. Furthermore, since the valley of the Chirchik opens to the southwest, the amount of precipitation is relatively great, and Tashkent always has, for this reason, even during the worst droughts, a more than adequate water supply, an advantage of which hardly any other town in Turkestan can boast.

2. A Description of Sart Tashkent

361 ### 1. The Grounds and Fortifications of the Town

The Tashkent of today falls into two sharply separated and fundamentally different parts: the native town, so-called Sart Tashkent, and the Russian town, founded only after the Russian occupation. The later lies between the Bos-su canal and the Salar; Sart Tashkent extends primarily west of the Bos-su canal and has today, on the whole, the same dimensions and the same appearance as it did before the Russian conquest.

All Central Asian towns and even the larger villages divide into three separate parts: the bazaar, the most important part of the town, /154/ the residential quarters, which surround the bazaar, and finally the gardens and fields which surround the town proper from all sides. In Figure 49 this division of Turkestan towns is shown schematically. All the towns more or less approximate the basic type shown in the drawing, and deviate from it only insofar as the respective terrain and water conditions require. In the center of the town is the free bazaar square, in which are held the weekly bazaars or fairs as well as all sorts of public gatherings, executions, and the like. Along the bazaar square the permanent shops are joined together, mostly concentrically, while these again are surrounded by the residential quarters, consisting of simple clay huts. /Figure 49 p. 9a/ The sections we have mentioned so far, which together form the real town, are surrounded by an unbroken

133

OLAF CAROE SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

-ii-(A)

133
102

60°
66°
72°
78°
Ural Mts.
Northern Steppe
Ishim R.
Ob-Irtishev-Tiumen to Arctic
Ob Irtysh R.
Tiumen to R.
Turgay Gap
Turgay R.
BETPAK DALA
(Hungry Steppe)
L. BALKH
ARAL SEA
160'
Sir Darya (Jaxartes) or Syhoun
Kara Tau
Talas
Chu R.
Yani Darya (old bed)
KIZIL KUM
Mirza Chöl
Amu Darya (Oxus) or Jaihun
Zaravshan R.
Kashka Darya
Murghab R.
Tejen R.
60°
66° East of Greenwich
72°

133
102

78°
84°
90°
52°
44°
36°
Ob R.
Tropic of Arctic
Chinghis
Jungarian Gate
Ili Dorga
Issik Kol
Basin
SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA
Physical
Miles
0
100
200
300
400
International boundary
Mountains, over 2000 metres
Mountains, 500 to 2000 metres
Sea level to 100 metres
Below sea level
78°
84°

22(2)

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

I

INTRODUCTORY

ALMOST in the centre of Asia, and far removed from the oceans, are two great natural basins of continental land, known until quite recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkistan. Much of the perimeter of both these territories is ringed round by some of the highest mountains in the world, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by peoples in whom a Turkish strain (though overlaying and overlaid by others) may still be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them as the Eastern or Central Asian Turks.

The two parts of this Turkistan are divided from one another by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring all the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-parting, linking the Tienshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkistan and the Chinese Turki dominion now known as Sinkiang.

Of Sinkiang much is known and much has been written. In earlier centuries there was a parallel movement in the history of the Central Asian Turks in the oasis civilizations both west and east of the Pamirs. Certain dynasties held sway on both sides of the mountains, while, farther north, the Ili gap supplied a route for migration, conquest and trade. More recently Sinkiang opened its gates more widely to the West. For the half-century before 1947 the government in India maintained a consulate in Kashghar on behalf of the British government, and until the other day there were British

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

101 substitute, Türkili, the Turkish homeland.

In a sense this new habit is a return to the geographical thought which obtained in the early XVIth century, when Babur left his home in the vale of Farghana to become by conquest the ruler of Kabul and later the first Mughul Emperor of Hindustan. In the whole of his Memoirs Babur speaks [1] of Turkistan only three times and that in the connotation of the town of Yese. To him the territories now collectively known as Russian Central Asia were centred on Maveraunnehr, an Arabic term meaning the land beyond the river. This is the *duab* or mesopotamia bounded by the rivers called by the Greeks Oxus and Jaxartes, known to Arab geographers as the Jaihun and Saihun, and to Persians as the Amu and the Sir Darya. European writers conveniently translate Maveraunnahr as Transoxiana.[2]

The lands south of the Amu Darya up to the Hindu Kush Babur knew as Balkh or (farther east) as Badakhshan, while those north of the Sir Darya were roughly divided into Chach or Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughulistan (the Ili valley and Jungaria). Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau then, as now, were known as Khorasan, the eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. The upper valley of the Sir Darya (known to Babur as the Saihun) then, as now, was called Farghana, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers, then possibly connected in one network of waterways, made up the famous delta country of Khorezm, with its capital at Urgench. These old names are woven into the history and aptitudes of the land and its peoples; without them there can be no understanding of the reactions which followed the Tsarist conquest or of the later development under the pressures of the Soviet system.

133 Just as Tigris and Euphrates give life and meaning to the riverain basin of Irak, so do the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya to the much greater Turanian basin. There are other

[1] Bib. I, 12 and 61.

[2] Scholars seem unable to decide between Transoxiana and Transoxania. Barthold and G. Kirk use the former, Arnold Toynbee and M. Czaplicka the latter, Schuyler and Mrs. Beveridge both!

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

analogies. Like Irak, Turan is ringed round with great 133
mountains on much of its circumference, and away from the rivers the flat lands tail off into inhospitable desert — the Karakum or Black Sands between the Amu and the Caspian, the Kizilkum or Red Sands in the *duab* between the rivers and the Aral sea, and, north of the Sir, the half-desert steppe known as the Betpak[1] Dala, or Plain of Misfortune.

This is a land buttressed by immense mountains. The cathedral nave of the Tienshan, with its southern aisles the Alai and Transalai, is a system of high alpine structures, running parallel in a general direction from east to west. It is joined with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram by the Sarikol transept, which runs tranversely north and south. West of the Sarikol is the well-known upland of the Pamirs. There are peaks in the north around Khan Tenri, and southward in the Pamir-Sarikol region, some 24,000 feet in height.[2] These ranges are on a scale only surpassed by the Himalaya and Karakoram, and they contain some of the biggest glaciers in the world outside the Arctic circle. They form the watershed between Western and Eastern Turkistan, the Russian and the Chinese dominions. Both the great rivers watering Russian Central Asia rise west of that watershed, the Sir Darya in various gorges of the Alai south of the lake Issik Köl, and the Amu Darya in Karategin and the Pamirs.

The upper waters of the Amu proper are known to the Tajiks of that region as the Ab-i-Panja or Pianj. It is joined from the north by four large tributaries, the Aksu, the Vakhsh (Turkic Oghush) running out of Karategin, the Kafirnihan and the Surkhan. The Sir Darya is made up of three main streams, the muddy and turbulent Narin from south of Issik Köl, the clear Karasu with its affluents the Tar and Kara Kulja from the east, and the Sukh from the south, all joining in the Vale of Farghana.

[1] A corruption of the Persian word *badbakht*.

[2] Khan Tenri, just under 24,000 ft., is right on the frontier of Chinese and of Russian Turkistan. The Russians claim to have discovered another peak close to it, and within their territory, of greater height. Two peaks in the Pamir region, now named after Lenin and Stalin, are of some 24,000 ft.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

● 133

Turkistan is also a land of vast stretching plains and deserts, with a very gentle decline from the mountain-skirts to the Aral and the Caspian Seas. The fall from the point where the two great rivers issue from the mountains, the Amu near Kelif and the Sir at Begovat, a new town just west of Khojent,[1] is not more than a few hundred feet in many hundreds of miles. The flatness of the plain causes the lower courses of the rivers to be much beset by reedy marshes, which split up their channels and render them difficult for navigation. Towards the Caspian the Turanian basin sinks to nearly 100 feet below sea-level. The Sarikamish depression between the two seas is another earth-hole deeper than the Caspian, and there is a point on the Mangishlak Peninsula on the north-eastern shore of the Caspian over 400 feet below the sea.

The southern mountain-rim of this great basin is formed by the Kopet Dagh barrier, a westward continuation to the Caspian of those Paropamisus outliers of the Hindu Kush which form a shield in front of the Afghan city of Herat. The Kopet Dagh is the traditional limit between Iran and Turan, and its crest still roughly defines the frontier between the USSR and Persia. Its highest point is not much more than 8000 feet and in itself, seen from the plain, it is a range of barren spires, reminiscent of a lunar landscape. But to one who approaches the Turanian basin from the Iranian plateau this escarpment offers a prospect wonderful and revealing. The edge of the plateau is like the shore of a land facing a limitless sea. The mountains form the rim of a vast bowl, a rim on which the traveller stands gazing over undulations of sand to a horizon without more feature than the ocean. His eye wanders farther, until in imagination he can discern across the Black Sands the low cliffs of the Ust Yurt plateau, lying between Caspian and Aral, and one of the most desolate regions on earth. In one or two favoured spots a stream descends from the plateau to form a string of green oases

[1] The Soviets have repamed the ancient city of Khojent as Leninabad. It is amusing to think how Babur, who wrote of Khojent and its virtues about the year 1500, would have smiled at the idea of this new prophet and his name.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

across a plain which finally engulfs it. But at most places, as the caravan reaches the top, men and animals find themselves on the extreme edge of one world, looking into the void of another. This rim was always the natural dividing-line between two geographical regions and two climates: from time to time, it has been a boundary between two ways of life. Across it certainly in history Arab, Turk, Mongol and Persian have carried their several ways of life in pursuit of conquest and trade, and there has been wide action and reaction on both sides of the line. Indeed the Persian poet Firdausi, writing at the end of the Xth century, was able to claim the Amu Darya rather than the mountain-rim as the limit between the two lands and civilizations that he was the first to name Iran and Turan,[1] and since then the tides of conquest and assimilation have ebbed and flowed many times over these mountains. Even so, it is like a cliff, opening on the land-ocean of the desert, and it remains the geographical symbol of a barrier far older than the frontier defences set up by the Soviet Empire.

The two great rivers are not the only waterways of the Turanian basin. At the point on the Afghan frontier where the Kopet Dagh joins the outliers of the Hindu Kush, the Tejen (the Hari Rud of Khorasan) and the Murghab spill out to the desert to irrigate the lands around Merv and to be lost in the sand. In Transoxiana, between the two great rivers are two streams as famous as they — the Kashka Darya, on the banks of which Tamerlane (Timur)[2] was born, and the even better known Kohik or Zarafshan, the Gold-Scatterer which waters the rich lands of Samarkand and Bukhara. The name Zarafshan is by some attributed to the richness of the cultivation; others point to the gold-washings to be had from the river's sand. One of the river's sources is a large glacier, another the Iskandar Köl Lake, nearly 7000 feet above the sea, and there is a legend that the lake was formed by Alexander, who set across the valley a golden dam to form a reservoir and regulate the

[1] This distinction appears in the Avesta, but Firdausi gave it popular expression for the first time.

[2] Tamerlane = Timur Lang = Timur the lame = (in Turkish) Aksak-Temür.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

133 river's flow. Both Kashka and Zarafshan sink into the sand before reaching the Amu Darya. North of the Sir Darya and the Kara Tav prolongation of the Tienshan comes the real steppe, much of it half-desert and known as the Betpak Dala (Plain of Misfortune) but part of it watered by yet other rivers, the Talash and the Chu. The Chu possibly at one time drained Lake Issik Köl, but now it passes some miles from it and down the Bum gorge into the plain. Like the Zarafshan, both these northern rivers sink into the sand.

133 Up to this point, going northward and eastward, the
131 watershed has been broadly coincident with the frontier between China and the Russian Empire, and the basins of the two great rivers lie wholly in Russian territory. But to the north-east of the Betpak Dala lies Lake Balkhash with Yedisu (in Russian, Semirechye, the Land of the Seven Rivers) to the east of it. The main affluent to this basin is the River Ili, flowing past Kulja out of Sinkiang. Occupied by the Tsar's forces in 1876 during Yakub Beg's period of rule in Kashgharia, Kulja was surrendered to the Manchu Empire on the resumption of Chinese control a few years later, and since then has been beyond the formal frontier of Russia.[1] As things are, this part of the Russian frontier has no mountain-screen. It lies open not only to an approach down the Ili Valley, but through the gaps in the lower hills which connect the Tienshan with the Altai farther north. These are the passages leading to Jungaria, along which the tides of conquest, and later the trade-routes, moved westward and eastward under Chingiz and Timur. They are known as the gap of Chuguchak, the Jungarian Gate and the Iron Gate (or Talki Pass), and the Ili River Valley itself. Together they offer an easier entrance than the passes farther south from Kashghar into Farghana by Irkishtam, the most practicable of which, the Terek Davan, rises to 13,000 feet.

000 It is in the mountains above the Ili Valley that we find

[1] For the reality as between Russian and Chinese control on this frontier, even in the period between the Great Wars, see Fitzroy Maclean, *op. cit.* Since then the advent to power of the Mao régime in China, for the time at least, has further deprived this frontier of its meaning.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

 173

It is in the mountains above the Ili valley that we find

the legendary springboard of the Turkish races. 'God has chosen the Turks as his own army, and settled them in the highest parts of the earth with the best air, that he may send them at his chosen time against any nation in the world.'[1] These are the words of Mahmud Kashghari, a native of the Issik Köl country, writing in Baghdad in the XIth century. They suggest not only the early movements of the Turkish clans, issuing from the highlands of the great mountain systems of the Tienshan and the Altai, but the disasters of the more terrible Mongol flood which was to succeed the Turks. The Turkic name for the Tienshan is the Tenri Taghi,[2] with its central peak the Khan Tenri, marking the boundary with Chinese Turkistan. This was the land sanctified by the epics, the Askar mountain beyond Issik Köl and the pastures of Yulduz, used by Timur as a summer retreat between campaigns. Here he summoned the clans to celebrate his victories. Even today the Osmanlis sing, 'I mounted my horse and rode to Askar, the most beautiful, for I loved it, the shining one'.[3] The Khans from the east and the Khans from the west would gather in summer on these highlands, the central position from which government and conquest, east and west, were planned. For these reasons the epics spoke reverently of the high mountains, giving them names after Afrasiab or Kök Türk, or the divine attributes of a Turkish Olympus, Khan Tenri or Muztagh Ata. The idea of a nation riding out of the dawn, and moving in cavalcade towards the sunset, is familiar in Turkish poetry and legend. Later, when the conquering hordes had gone by, these passages became the main caravan routes for trade; the Silk Road of Marco Polo went this way, passing across Turkistan. In a sense Turkish Central Asia, then on the highway of commerce, had become the centre of the world. It was soon to decline.

West of Balkhash, and as far as Aral, lie hundreds of miles 133
of open steppe, stretching down from the Siberian flatlands

[1] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 13.

[2] Tenri = Tanri = God. Tagh (alternative Tav) = dagh = mountain.

[3] *Atima bindim de gittim Askara çok güzel sevdim de aydin askara.* Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 in the north, and becoming more and more barren with the southern latitude until it merges with the Betpak Dala. But, as the caravan goes north, the traveller reaches first the low hills of the Ulu Tav and Orta Tav, excellent seasonal pasturage when the snows melt, and the favourite summer resort of the Kipchak clans, from whom many of the true Uzbeks, Kazaks and Bashkurds trace descent. As he goes north, the pastures in spring become greener and are starred with flowers, the north of Kazakistan being in the temperate zone, and enjoying a precipitation sufficient to support agriculture and tree-growth. Almost all the well-known specie tulips of our gardens have their home on these steppe-lands. The best recent description in English of this land comes from the American pen of Littlepage:[1]

> We pushed along day after day through some of the finest pasture land I have ever seen, all well-watered, with rivers and lakes enough to support herds which probably could feed the whole of Europe . . . plateaus brilliant with green grass and sprinkled with multicolored wild flowers. The weather was warm and the skies cloudless and the only drawback the clouds of mosquitoes which gave us little peace.

There is a geographical feature of this steppe which at some future time may be of great account. Round about latitude 51 degrees there is an imperceptible west to east watershed, north of which all the waters flow towards the Arctic Ocean. From west to east the rivers are Tobol, Ishim and Irtish, all headwaters of the great Arctic river Ob. There are those who think in terms of a possible diversion of water running to waste in the Arctic Ocean to fertilize the arid deserts of Turkistan.

133 311 Another fact of geography looming large in the thought of all who write of Turkistan is the broad Vale of Farghana or Kokand, the heart of the scanty oasis country of Transoxiana. Schuyler[2] in 1876 described in vivid language the contrast between the desert and the sown, saying that even in Zarafshan

[1] Bib. I, 62, p. 185.

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 284.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and Farghana, the most fertile regions, it was possible then to ride long distances without so much as seeing a blade of verdure, so small was the extent of country irrigated by the rivers. Since then much has been achieved, but even now it would be instructive and curious to see a map of these regions on which the arable lands were carefully marked, so narrow would be the strips along the rivers and at the foot of the mountains. In Farghana the irrigated areas, and even the *lalmi*[1] lands dependent on rainfall, cover broader acres than elsewhere in Turkistan. Its predominance as the agricultural, and now one of the industrial, centres of this country has a certain inevitability. The surrounding mountains with their fertilizing streams give it a climate relatively mild in summer and winter, and an alluvial soil on the deposits which fan out from the river mouths. In these oases intensive cultivation by a large population has always been possible — the cluster of townships is apparent from any map. The lie of the land has favoured the construction of many ancient irrigation channels, now supplemented by great modern works. Climate, latitude and water provide exactly the right environment for the cultivation of cotton and of the mulberry-trees on which the silk-worm thrives. The rapid transition from high mountain valley to open plain offers many natural sites for the harnessing of water-power for the production of electricity. The more recent discovery of oil and coal and quantities of valuable non-ferrous and other mineral resources in and around the valley, combined with the Soviet policy of moving textile factories to the site of production of raw material, has given it a new industrial significance not lost upon any who contemplate this land. Kokand, its old capital, and the hills around the valley were the main focus of the Basmachi movement of 1918–24 for the independence of Turkistan.

In its way the natural beauty of the oasis country is greater and certainly more intense than that of the steppe

[1] It is interesting to note that the Eastern Turks use here the same word as the Pathans of Peshawar for unirrigated cropped land. They also use *hashar*, a helping party of friends at harvest-time, and *baranta*, a raid and seizure of an enemy's flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong; both words in common use in Pashtu.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

climes. Because of the distance from the sea, precipitation even 132
on the mountains around the Tarim basin is low, and there is ground for the belief that the glaciers are still shrinking, with a resultant steady diminution of the fertilizing water. In other words, the recession of the ice-age is to this extent and in this area linked with history.[1] A process which is working in Sinkiang has its application also to the very similar conditions of soil and climate obtaining in Russian Central Asia.

Another change, in this case historical, is that in the 133
courses of the two great rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, and possibly even of other waters which empty into the Turanian basin. The records state that more than once in historical times the Oxus[2] (Amu Darya) at least has changed its course as between the Caspian and the Aral Sea. This is an aspect of physical geography at which all who write of Transoxiana glance again and again, with never-failing fascination. The idea runs like a thread through the literature of the region. The general thesis has the support of the Russian historian Barthold, who explains the decline of Khorezm by the shifting of the rivers' course in the XVIth century. He and others write as if they saw the Oxus with the eyes of Matthew Arnold — the great river moving mysteriously across the plain, seeming now to be lost and broken up in little channels 'a foiled circuitous wanderer', yet in the end flowing inevitably forward to release in the Aral Sea — a symbol of the history of the land.

According to Togan,[3] at the time of the Arab conquest the main waters of the Amu Darya (Oxus) flowed not to the Aral but to the now dry Özboy bed, after filling up the Sarikamish depression in the north of the Karakum desert and just below the Ust Yurt escarpment. At that time only one arm reached the Aral Sea, which was a great reed-swamp much smaller than

[1] Bib. I, 87, Sir C. Skrine.

[2] The name Oxus can be variously derived from Ak-su, the White Water, a tributary; or from Oghush (Arabic Vakhsh), the main tributary from the Terskey Ala and Karategin. In its upper course the Oghush is called the Surkhab or Kizilsu — Persian and Turkish for Red River — by the Tajiks and Turks respectively who live on its banks. [103]

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 108 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 it is at present. After the Arab conquest, the Amu Darya changed its course to carry all its water as at present into the Aral Sea, where previously only one arm had debouched. The Özboy Channel dried up, and the waters that had once filled Sarikamish were diverted into the Aral. But in 1221, when the Mongols captured Urgench, then capital of Khorezm, the Amu Darya had reverted to its old course, and once more flowed to the Caspian by the Özboy as its main branch, thus opening up a very important channel of trade from east to west. The Sir Darya (Jaxartes), or more probably a large arm of it, flowed through the now dried up Yeni Darya, which began above Ak Mechit (Kizil Orda) and, moving to the south-west past the Aral Sea, debouched into the Amu Darya to swell its waters on their way through the Özboy to the Caspian. Muslim authority is quoted to establish that it was only in exceptional years of flood that the combined Oxus and Jaxartes — a sort of 'Shatt-al-Turk' — reached the Caspian, flowing through the Balkhan gap to the gulf by what is now Krasnovodsk. The river usually sank into the Karakum at a point known to Arab geographers as Kalat-us-sin (in Mongol times Rebat Tamgach) near the present Kurtish and over 100 miles east of the Balkhan hills. At this point there is a fault in the desert, with a declivity a few feet high, over which the combined river flowed whenever its volume sufficed to take it on to reach the Caspian.

133 175 This continued until 1573, when the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya settled into their present courses to the Aral Sea, and trade on the Özboy and Yeni Darya came to an end. The alteration in the course of the rivers Togan counts as the great catastrophe of the XVIth century affecting Turkistan.

He continues:

Before 1573 goods could be shipped direct by boat from Azerbaijan and from the Volga by the Özboy to the waterfalls near Rebat Tamgach, and trans-shipped thence to Urgench. As long as the route by Urgench on the Özboy and Yeni Darya remained open, the towns on the rivers Talash, Chu and Ili grew immensely

alternate changes in river beds -- See pp 23-24 ct 116 - Ana

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, 133
and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of 176
many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu 185
Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts 133
of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages [1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler [2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Köl greatly reduced
183 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were nothing short of national frontiers between independent units of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that the irrigation systems have been kept within single administrative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across ooo
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who possesses experience, for there is no administrative question which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assuming for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy. Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential matters would be in central hands. In either case their only meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

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A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.

101 pulated countries in the world. It is also known
133 as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of
492 this territory, along which the roads run. All
133 commerce goes by way of caravans which re-
484 quire months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

1 [Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]
2 [See cat 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

133

Ruins of Buddhist temples in Eastern Turkestan. Tajuk Mazar in the Oasis of Turfan.



492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this water-
[132] less and treeless country. The temperature varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.[1]

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly
487 adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

1 [In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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[172]
[487]

the trade-routes between China and the West. In ancient and medieval times they were numbered among the busiest caravan-routes in the world (see Ciba Review No. 10, page 316). Silks, brocades, precious stones, Chinese porcelain, metal and glass goods of enormous value were transported by these roads. Nevertheless Marco Polo's report shows that even in his day, that is to say towards the end of the thirteenth century, the population must have been very small, and that the water-works were falling into decay. It is very probable that the Mohammedan invasion which destroyed the Buddhist civilization of Eastern Turkestan was not entirely responsible for this decline; a general change of climatic conditions must be presumed to have taken place. In Marco Polo's

4-Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Fl.1 Turkestan Fl.1

Anau in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

133 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

101 By comparison with this desert area West-
131 ern Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all
[631] times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province
000 of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

132 Western Turkestan, too, is a land of contrasts no less marked than those of Eastern Turkestan. Its climate is continental in the extreme and very dry. During the summer the temperature reaches more than 40° centigrade, and in the winter it falls to 25° below zero and even lower. Nine tenths of Western
133 Turkestan consist of barren desert. The desert of Kara Kum (Black Sand) to the South of the Aral Sea, the home of the wandering Turkoman tribes (see map on page 1434),[1] was named the Grave of the Caravans, and Kizil Kum (Red Sand), the desert situated North of Kara Kum, gives but meagre sustenance to the nomad Kirghiz tribes and their herds.

All the more fertile by contrast are the oases of Western Turkestan. The district is watered by no fewer than six large rivers, among which are the two historically important streams of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, known to the ancients as Oxus and Jaxartes. The valley of the upper Sir Darya is named Ferghana, a fertile area surrounded by mountains, which in the course of history has been coveted and conquered by many peoples, chiefly for the sake of its famous horses. In more recent times it has become known as one of the principal cotton and silk producing countries (see ill. page 1438).

More than once within human recollection the Amu Darya has changed its course; three hundred years ago it sent at least one arm into

[1] [See cat 116, p 4 -- Analyst]
[2] [See cat 116, pp 13, 16 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

532

Bokhara ruler of the 16th century cutting a melon. The features show a pronounced Turkic-Mongol cast. Contemporary miniature.

133 the Caspian Sea, and it is possible that at one time the entire river ran into that sea. Therefore, we find in the middle of the Kara Kum desert the ruins of large medieval towns marking the course which the water at one time took. At the present day both the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya run into the Aral Sea.

312 The four other rivers have no outlet, and would disappear in the desert, were it not for the fact that a system of irrigation which has been developed over a period of thousands of years serves to turn their waters to useful account. By means of this system the water is conducted through a net-work of canals which finally become mere ditches (ariks); thus it finds its way all over the country into every field, cotton-plantation, and orchard (see ill. page 1436). The distribution of the water is so well regulated that every peasant in Western Turkestan knows exactly on what day he can water his fields. Among these four rivers there are two particularly important ones, the Serafshan, the waters of which fill the ariks and mosque-ponds of Bokhara and Samarkand, and the Murghab, on which the prosperity of the oasis of Merv depends. In war-time the first thing to be destroyed was invariably the canal-system. The ancient city of Merv, at one

8:Kostenko 114-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 At the present time one must think of it as two essentially different towns: the Asiatic and the European. The latter, although it lies directly next to the former on the eastern side, has a completely different appearance. Therefore we will describe Asiatic Tashkent first, and then give a few data about the European town.

361 Both the Asiatic and the European Tash-
312 kent are irrigated by aryks /irrigation canals led from the Chirchik river, which flows 8 versts south of the town. A large aryk which looks like a river flows from the Chirchik 45 versts from Tashkent. /405/ This is the Zakh-Aryk (1) which passes 10 versts north of the town.

1. The entire length of the Zakh-aryk is 85 versts. In the upper part it is 77 feet (eleven sazhen's) wide and 3 feet deep. It flows into the river Keles.

Another aryk, the most important one for the town is the Bos-Su, which is conducted from the Chirchik 31 versts from the town. At the Lyabzak gates it enters Tashkent in two branches and flows through the town under various names. A third aryk is led from the Chirchik around Niaz-bek 25 versts east of Tashkent, and flows directly to the Russian part of town. It then flows into the Gadragan aryk, and after that, branching out into small trenches it irrigates the gardens of Russian Tashkent.

[133] The small river Salar, a branch of the Chirchik, independent of the aryks already mentioned, flows 2 versts south of the town.

8:Kostenko 132-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Vernyy (Alma Ata)

361 After the Russian occupation of the
632 Trans-Ili region in 1853, the fortress town of Vernoe (Alma Ata) was established in the following year, 1854, with the aim of consolidating the Russian domination of the Great Horde. It was founded on the spot where the town of Almata, which means 'apple', had been, a town known for its trade and as a station on the great road to China in the Middle Ages frequented, among others, by the Genoese merchants.

At first the fortress town of Vernoe was the administrative center for the Alatau okrug, subordinate to the military governor of the Semipalatinsk oblast'. After the establishment of the Turkestan military okrug, however, the fortress was made the capital town of the Semirechie oblast' and began to be called Vernyy. The natives and many Russians call Vernyy "Almata", as it was formerly called.

361 /418/ Vernyy lies on even sandy clay place, just at the foot of the Trans-Ili Alatau mountains, along the small Almatinka river.

133 The Almatinka has its source in an unusually picteresque spot in the mountains, and flows very swiftly, roaring and foaming along its course which is sprinkled with large rocks in many spots. After it emerges from the mountains it retains its swiftness and the special quality of the river bottom even though flowing through level country.

8:Kostenko 133-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

133 The Almatinka is no wider than 7 feet (3 arshins), with a depth of about 9 feet (4 arshins) and it can be forded anywhere. Furthermore the amount of water in the river is decreasing every year.

[312] This decrease of the water of the Almatinka is caused, first of all, by the fact that aryks or canals are led off from it, just after its emergence from the mountains, for the irrigation of the fields, gardens and kitchen gardens. Secondly, it is affected by the cutting down of the trees in the upper reaches of the river. The Almatinka flows into another mountain river, the Keskelen, which in turn flows into the Ili river. The Almatinka owes its name to the fact that its source in the mountains is thickly overgrown with apple trees ('alma') and apricot trees (uryuk).

361 132 Vernyy is located at a height 2500 feet above sea level, and enjoys a warm and healthy climate. The summer heat rises to 30° centigrade in the shade. The inhabitants have remarked that the climate of the town is growing dryer every year. Formerly the winter cold was more bearable and the snow lasted only a few days. In more recent years the winters have begun to be Russian, about three months long. There is no doubt that here too the cutting down of the forests in the environs of the town has had a somewhat deleterious effect.

The summer heat spells are almost unbearable, but in the evenings and at night it is always cool because of the proximity

000 there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

361 133 The environs of Vernyy, with the exception of the mountains, are level and depressingly monotonous.

On the other hand, the Alatau mountain range, which closes off the horizon of Vernyy on the south, is usually picturesque. The altitude of the range rises to 14,000 feet, and [137] the crests are always covered with snow. In the recent past, not only the slopes but also the foothills were covered with dense forests. Now only grass grows in the foothills, a bright emerald green which harmonizes with the dark green of the spruce forest growing in the mountains themselves. All this is topped by a crown of white snow, etched against the bright blue sky. In the mountains it rains frequently, and when it does the mountains are overcast, as though enveloped in a shroud, with dark clouds, which grow whiter, as they rise higher, /420/ assume all sorts of whimsical contours, and gradually diminish and vanish into space.

The foothills are a particularly beautiful sight in the spring time (in April), when the nomads spread a pall over them, that is, they burn the old grass to make the new grass grow better. The skies are filled with a glowing fire, and it fills the whole surrounding countryside with waves of light. Yet no matter how beautiful the Alatau mountains are from the side, the views in the mountains themselves are still more wonderful, and more striking. The thick undergrowth of the valleys and ravines, streams bubbling with foam against

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
133 the snakes winding over the precipices, all this makes an unforgettable impression. With every step the views change, as though in a kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is the tree which grows in the greatest abundance. After it, but much less abundant, are the apple trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees, the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the following parts: the Almata station (the old part of the town), the Almata settlement, the Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually the town which has developed since the beginning of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a considerable degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick buildings, while the old parts of the town are built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been [363] planned regularly. The streets are straight, level and wide, in most cases planted (although quite sparsely) with trees. There are often small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/ partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the birds, for which reason cracks are always forming in the walls.

8:Kostenko 147-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
RL1

Kuldja

361 The town Kuldja discussed here is also
133 called "Old Kuldja" or "Taranchi Kuldja", as distinguished from "New Kuldja" or "Chinese Kuldja" which was destroyed in 1866, and was 35 versts southwest of the old town. Old Kuldja is situated in the broad valley of the river Ili, on its right bank, 3 versts from the river. Near Kuldja the Ili flows between wide banks, a broad and well-watered river. The right bank is steeper than the left both here and along the entire course of the river. Its width is about 136 feet. It is crossed by three ferryboats, maintained by a Russian businessman. It flows so swiftly, especially when there is a wind, so that the crossing is slow. The river freezes over 60 days a year, from the end of December to the end of February. Wood has long been floated down the Ili from the upper reaches to the middle course of the river.

[134] The soil in the environs of the town is
132 sandy loam and very fertile. The climate of Kuldja is warm, healthy and pleasant. Although
361 the summer heat here goes up to 41° centigrade in the shade, the heat is modified considerably by the summer rains. Because of the spring rains, grain takes root in the environs of Kuldja even without watering. The winters here are uniform, and the snow remains on the ground up to a month and a half. The cold in winter reaches 32° centigrade.

The Kuldja valley is protected by high mountains from all sides except the west, and apparently this fact goes far to explain the moderateness of the climate, which notwithstanding, permits the growing of delicate trees and

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

489 It has been said that this rich area has no communication with the world outside, and difficult communications within. It is true that the only sea-outlet is through the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei; but with the recent re-opening of the Kara Sea route the northern river-ways have a great commercial value. This will especially be the case when, on the completion of the Ob–Arctic Ocean Railway, there will be no necessity to cross the Kara Sea with its dangerous straits.

Within this region the communication is carried on—

491 (*a*) By means of natural roads, of which there are some 109,000 versts in Siberia, and 58,000 versts in Russian Central Asia, not counting the secondary roads.

133 505 (*b*) By means of river-ways, in which especially Western Siberia is very well endowed. The basin of the River Ob alone is navigable for a distance of some 15,000 versts, while some 16,000 more is passable for floating. Turkestan, with its two chief rivers Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria, has much more limited river communications; Amu-Daria is navigable for a distance of some 1,400 versts, but for steam-ships only 800 versts. Syr-Daria could be made navigable for a distance of 1,200 versts, but at present the river is more important for irrigation purposes. The southern rivers are free from ice for about six months in the year, while the rivers north of the Altai Mountains are navigable from three to four months a year.

496 (*c*) The railway is, of course, the most important means of communication, and each new line causes a great industrial and social upheaval in the district. The Trans-Siberian has only a relative value, and much greater importance is attached to the southern line of the Trans-Siberian (Chelyabinsk–Omsk) and the new branches; the Altai (Novo-Nikolaevsk–Biisk–Semipalatinsk) and the Minusinsk (Achinsk–Minusinsk). The Central Asiatic (Krasnovodsk–Andijan), covering 2,368 versts, and the Tashkent Railway (Orenburg–Tashkent), covering some 1,756 versts, unite to some extent Russian Central Asia with Western Siberia. A line between Semipalatinsk and some point on the Tashkent Railway will be of enormous importance for the further development of Western Siberia,

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL2

CHAPTER 17

Central Asia

SU 131 SCA 131 SU 133* SCA 133

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA extends from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Chinese frontier in the east, from Kazakhstan in the north to the borders of Iran and Afghanistan in the south. This region, which has some of the most unusual features of the natural divisions of the USSR, has an area of about 475,000 square miles. It is located farthest south and most removed from the tempering influence of the oceans.

The structure and relief of Central Asia can be divided into two parts: the northwestern section, comprising about two thirds of the total area, which includes extensive low, sandy deserts and irrigated oases in the foothills of the mountains, and the southeastern part, one third of the total area, a mountainous zone with some of the longest, highest, and most glaciated ranges of the world. The low region is part of the Turan lowland. It stretches from the Caspian Sea to the Syr Darya and the range Kara-Tau in the east and includes the southern portion of the Ust'-Urt plateau and the two largest deserts of Central Asia, the Kara-Kum and the Kyzyl-Kum, separated from each other by the Amu Darya. The Kara-Kum has the greater area, of which nine tenths are covered by sand. Here and there one encounters barren clay flats and salt-covered depressions. A number of dry river beds, similar to the *wadi* of the Sahara, run from the present river course toward the Caspian Sea. The largest of these dry valleys is the Uzboy, which is thought to have been a branch of the Amu Darya. Along the southern edge of the Kara-Kum, at the foot of the Kopet Dagh, are steppes and oases extending in a narrow belt along the USSR-Iran frontier. Other oases lie on the Tedzhen and Murgab rivers, as well as in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya (oasis of Khorezm). The Kyzyl-Kum lies somewhat higher than the Kara-Kum and has more rocky areas, devoid of sand cover. In its central section there are outcrops of Paleozoic rocks, rising to over 8,000 feet, which are the eroded and weathered remains of ancient mountain ranges. In the eastern part of the Kyzyl-Kum numerous steppe areas penetrate be-

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL 1

 SCL

tween the outspurs of the mountainous section. Such a steppe is the Fergana Valley, one of the densest populated areas of Central Asia. 133* SCA

The Tien Shan mountain system forms the most extensive portion of the mountainous section of Central Asia. It is composed of a number of separate ranges, all directed generally east and west; many of them bear the local name *ala-tau* [mottled mountains], because of the typical isolated patches of perpetual snow. The northern and the central ranges of the Tien Shan form part of the Lower and Upper Paleozoic (Hercynian) folded systems. The individual crests are separated by wide mountain valleys, constituting rich agricultural and pasture lands. On the frontier of the USSR and China, in the easternmost section of the central Tien Shan, several ranges merge into a powerful glaciated mountain hub, where the Pobeda [victory] Peak rises to 24,400 feet, the highest point in the Tien Shan. South of the Tien Shan lies the younger (tertiary) Pamir-Alay mountain system, distinguished by more compact and higher ranges, which includes the highest mountain of the USSR, Stalin Peak (24,595 feet). Near by is the greatest glacier of the world, the Fedchenko Glacier, about 50 miles long. The southernmost crest of the Tien Shan, the Alay range, is separated by the Alay valley from the northernmost range of the Pamir-Alay system, the Trans-Alay range, which rises to 23,377 feet at Lenin Peak. South of the Pamir-Alay system lies the Pamir, "the roof of the world." This is a high mountain mass of a plateau character in the east, but having high ranges separated by deep, precipitous river gorges in the west. Lesser ranges are the Kopet Dagh on the frontier between the USSR and Iran, and the Balkhan ranges near the Caspian Sea. 133

The entire territory of Central Asia drains into inland sea basins; not one drop of water reaches the open oceans. Most of the waterways of this region drain into the two most important rivers of Central Asia, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya; both flow into the Aral Sea. The larger and more important of the two, the Amu Darya, is fed by the snows and glaciers of the Pamir-Alay mountain system and the Pamir plateau. It is formed by the junction of the Panj and the Vakhsh rivers, the former a boundary stream between the USSR and Afghanistan, the latter an important irrigation source in its lower reaches. The Amu Darya rapidly loses its mountain torrent characteristics and, turning northwest into the desert region, widens its course, but still maintains a strong eroding action. It enters the Aral Sea through a wide delta. Unfortunately, it is not very suitable for irrigation, because of its great

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia Rl 2

SU 133* SCA ● 133 water volume, its speed, and the variability of its course. The other river, the Syr Darya, rises in the Tien Shan system. It is formed by the Naryn, which flows through wide valleys south and southwest of lake Issyk-Kul', and the lesser Kara Darya, which rises in the Fergana range. As opposed to the Amu Darya, it has a smaller volume, width, and depth, but it is longer and very suitable for irrigation. It flows through the Fergana Valley and then turns northwest through the desert zone toward the Aral Sea, which it enters also through a delta. Its most important affluent is the Chirchik which waters the oasis of Tashkent.

Among the mountain lakes the most notable is Issyk-Kul' which has an area of 2,395 square miles and lies 5,198 feet above sea level. It is slightly saline and does not freeze in the winter. Lesser lakes are the SU Kara-Kul' and the Zor-Kul', in the Pamir plateau.

132 SCA 132 Due to its remoteness from the oceans, the climate of Central Asia is very continental in nature. The continental characteristics already noted in Kazakhstan are still more accentuated in this region. The internal seas, the Caspian and the Aral, which border on Central Asia are too small to exert any tempering influence. Average summer temperatures in the lowland rise as high as 90° F, and in a great part of the region frosts of a few degrees below 0° F are possible in the winter. Evergreen vegetation, such as that along the Batumi coast of the Black Sea, does not exist in Central Asia. There is very little precipitation, generally 4 to 5 inches a year over a great part of the territory; only in the foothills does the rainfall amount to 16 inches or more. These climatic extremes are especially notable in such high mountain areas as the Pamir. In the valleys, such as the Fergana and the Zeravshan valleys, the climate is milder. Winter conditions are unsettled. Snow generally falls in December and remains on the ground till February, although it may melt earlier. The transition from the cold of February to the warmth of May is very sudden. Toward the end of that summer month wheat ripens and apricots are ready for picking. This period is followed by a long, hot, dry summer, in which predominantly dry winds blow from the north and wither the vegetation. These winds create sandstorms in the desert and sometimes raise a fine dust which blots out the sun. In the foothills and the mountains the summer is more temperate: there is precipitation, and the vegetation does not dry out. Toward the end of August or the beginning of September the heat lets up and is followed by a warm autumn, the best season in Central Asia. The climate of the Pamir and of the higher ranges of the Tien Shan reminds one of the Far North. Frosts

8:Kostenko 147-C-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
RL1

Kuldja

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Near Kuldja the Ili flows between wide banks,
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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 not prevent large-scale construction in Turkistan in certain spheres. Delays over the Mointy–Chu line must be attributed to other causes. Whatever the actual cause in any given case, it is possible to affirm with certainty first that it has become a habit for engineers and announcers alike to make a point of confusing blueprints with actual construction, and secondly that Soviet railway construction in Turkistan up to the present time has not added very materially to the network which existed twenty years ago.

Shortcomings and delays of this kind are worth mentioning, for the picture must be seen in light and shade. But the general impression would be as true, namely, that the five republics have now become, for their population if not for their size, a highly industrialized area. Statistics, if nothing else, show something like one in three of the population as
316 living in towns and centres. Karaganda, the centre of the coal-
135 field in Kazakistan, has grown from nothing to 200,000. Like Magnitogorsk in earlier days, it is in fact a concentration camp of helot labour, producing over sixteen million tons of coal a year and qualifying as the third most productive coal-field in the Union, the next after the Don and Kuznetz basins. There are large coal deposits in the Angren Valley close to Tashkent, well sited to serve the industries of the capital and near the nodal point of the railway network. There is also
315 coal in the Tajik foothills. Ishimbay, the heart of the Second Baku in the Urals, already mentioned, is not far outside the five republics and within Bashkiria, while in the republics are three most important groups of oil-wells. The first is in the Emba area (in Kazakistan north-east of the Caspian), with the fields round Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, the third most productive field in the Union. Next is the Nebit Dagh field close to Krasnovodsk, followed by various smaller wells in the Farghana Valley at Kim-Shorsu, at Yarkurgan and Chimion and also near Andijan. Others find mention in enthusiastic articles in press and encyclopedia alike. Some 1950 targets of production — all realized — are given in the selective table appended to this chapter. 2

2 [Lore cath 116, p213 -- Analyst]

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

APPENDIX A

311 WHEN speaking of 'Central Asian riches', it is understood to mean all the natural resources found in what is called Russian Central Asia. In particular, one stretch of land deserves the reputation of possessing a value surpassing all known colonial possessions. This is the part inhabited by various Turkic-speaking people, stretching from the mouth of the Ob on the Arctic, through the forest, agricultural and cattle-breeding regions of Western Siberia, the Steppe country and Turkestan, as far south as the frontiers of Persia.

In commercial value this area represents—rich fishing in the sub-Arctic region; rare fur animals in the forest region; valuable timber, of which in Western Siberia alone some 110 million dessiatins were registered by the Russian Government; rich cornfields, almost half of which are occupied by wheat; steppes swarming with cattle, and lakes abundant in fish; mountains rich in minerals; and finally, the irrigated fields of Turkestan covered with cotton plantations, not to mention such promising industries as butter and eggs, fruit and vegetables.

• 135 As to the minerals, the 'Golden' or Altai Mountains, as well as the Northern Steppes are equally rich in gold, silver, iron, coal, copper, and almost all known mineral resources. However, in the production of gold it is Eastern Siberia which occupies first place in the Russian Empire (in 1910 it produced 2,828 puds; in 1914, 2,729 puds); the second place belongs to the Ural Mountains (in 1910, 642 puds; in 1914, 299 puds), and Western Siberia stands third (in 1910, 416 puds; in 1914, 133 puds). This can be accounted for chiefly by the lack of enterprise and capital. The chief deposits of gold in Western Siberia are in the following

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

districts: 1, Tomsk; 2, Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk; 3, Southern Steppes; 4, Yenisei; 5, Altai; 6, Minusinsk; 7, Northern Steppes. Probably some gold deposits could be found in Bokhara and Turkestan. 135

The silver deposits are found in great number in the Altai and north of Semipalatinsk. The richest deposits of coal, iron, and copper are found in the district between Novo-Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, and Kuznietsk; also in the region of Semipalatinsk. The Kuznietsk basin alone occupies some 15,000 sq. klm.

The best-known oilfields are situated on the western coast of the Caspian. But it is possible that the Transcaspian oilfields, now almost entirely limited to Chikishliar and some other points along the railway, may prove to be no less abundant. In Ferghana the oilfields are being exploited in four regions: 1, Shar-Su; 2, Maili-Su; 3, Chimionand; 4, Sel-Kokko, but so far the export is fairly limited; in 1914 it amounted to some 2,000,000 puds.

But it is cereals that form the most important product of export from Western Siberia, and 90 per cent. of the population is devoted to agriculture. Agriculture is found chiefly between 60° of N. lat. and 50° of S. lat. Beyond these limits the country is only half agricultural; while fishing, shooting, and cattle-breeding is carried on alongside. Out of some 12 million dess. occupied by cornfields in Asiatic Russia in 1911, some 4½ millions were situated in Western Siberia, 2½ millions in the Steppe country, and 3½ millions in Turkestan. The chief centres of the corn export are Novo-Nikolaevsk, Omsk, Kurgan, Pyetukhovo, Barnaul, and Semipalatinsk. In 1906–10 average early export = 93,014·4 thousand puds. 241 [62] [439]

Closely connected with agriculture is sheep-breeding, which is especially carried on in the Kirghis Steppes. While in European Russia at the outbreak of war for a hundred inhabitants there were only 32 sheep, in Russian Central Asia it amounted to some 200. The area of pasture land in Western Siberia amounted to some six million dess.; in the Steppe country some three million, and in Turkestan half 233

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia Rl 1

occur even in the early part of July; in the winter they fall to —49° F. SU 132
During the summer the temperature rises to 60° F, and there is a great SCA
temperature difference between areas exposed to the sun and those in the 132
shadow. The average yearly temperature in these mountain fastnesses approximates that on the shores of the White Sea. SU

The dry and extremely continental climate exerts a strong influence 137
on the vegetation of Central Asia. Plants which adapt themselves to SCA
these conditions and are able to withstand drought periods are predominant in the desert and in the mountains. Steppe vegetation covers 137
not only the plain but also the mountain slopes, reaching even to the area of permanent snows. In the high mountain valleys of the Tien Shan and the Pamir are salt steppes and salt lakes. Only a portion of the mountains is wooded, generally the northern and western slopes. Wooded belts (*tugay*) also occur along some rivers.

The desert vegetation consists of rather poor varieties. The plants are sometimes covered with thorns or fibers and are very sturdy. In the sandy desert the *saksaul* tree is the predominant type; of the other plants, umbrella-shaped plants, among which the Asafetida Giantfennel, exuding an ill-smelling resinous substance, and desert rhubarb, with large meaty leaves, are the most common. The long roots of the desert plants immobilize the sand, so that moving sand dunes are found only where no vegetation normally exists or where it has been destroyed by irrational grazing of livestock. Among the sands, occasional clay flats are covered sparsely by various types of wormwood and camelthorn, and saltwort is found in salt depressions. During spring and summer, the desert and steppe supports various bulbous plants, including wild onions. Along the rivers and the salt lakes there are thickets of *chiy*, a feathergrass often reaching a height of 12 feet, which is used by the local inhabitants for making mats and thatching roofs. The densely wooded clusters along streams include tamarisk, willow, poplar, and wild olive.

The mountain forests include deciduous trees on the lower slopes, with wild-growing walnut, pistachio, and apricot trees. Common European types, such as pine, oak, and linden, are completely lacking. In the eastern Tien Shan a type of fir is found. Above the forest zone there are rich mountain pastures, similar to Alpine meadows in the humid areas and to the Caspian steppe in the drier sections.

Central Asia has considerable reserves of mineral resources, but their 135
exploitation has only recently been begun to any large extent. Along the mountain foothills there is a zone of petroleum deposits extending

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia R1 I

SU 135 SCA 135

from the Caspian Sea (at Nebit-Dag), to the Fergana Valley and the lower Surkhan Darya, an affluent of the Amu Darya. Much importance is attached to the salt deposits in the Caspian gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. This inlet, acting as a natural evaporating basin for the water of the Caspian Sea, has large deposits of Glauber salt (mirabilite). Sulphur deposits are found here to a greater extent than in any other part of the USSR, mainly in the center of the desert Kara-Kum, at Gaurdak, near the Amu Darya, and in the Fergana Valley. The ranges which surround this valley abound in nonferrous and rare metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, mercury, and antimony. In the highlands of the Pamir, Iceland spar (a variety of calcite), precious stones, and gold are being mined at the present time. The combination of coal and iron deposits in and near the Fergana Valley have permitted the development of heavy industry.

SU 162 SCA 162

The population of Soviet Central Asia amounts to 10.4 million people, with an average density of 22 per square mile. While in the desert area the average density falls as low as a few people per 100 square miles, the fertile and well-irrigated oases have a population density of about 1,000–1,500 per square mile, the highest rural population concentration in the USSR. The basic elements of the population belong to the Turkic and Iranian groups. The former, by far the more numerous, includes Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks, while the latter takes in the Tadzhiks, the remaining members of an ancient nationality of Central Asia, who speak a language akin to Iranian. The Uzbeks number more than one half the total population, besides Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Turkmen. Russians (above 6 percent), Bukhara Jews, Chinese Dungans, and others make up the remainder of this colorful ethnic mélange.

SU 631 SCA 631

Until 1924 Soviet Central Asia was divided politically into the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (formed in 1922) and the Bukhara and the Khorezm Soviet People's republics (formed in 1920). Late in 1924 a reorganization of these territories and a redemarcation of boundaries along essentially ethnic lines led to the establishment of the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR), and the Kara-Kirghiz (later Kirghiz) Autonomous SSR, which became part of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 and 1936, respectively, the Tadzhik and Kirghiz Autonomous SSR became full union republics.

SU 241 SCA 241

Agricultural activities play the leading role in the economy of Central Asia. Depending upon the land form and the development of irrigation, the following branches of agriculture can be distinguished: (1) ir-

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

meadows in springtime. The fields are well watered, the water-courses well planted with mulberry, poplar and willow against a drop-scene of violet-coloured hills rising to spires of ever-lasting snow. From the mountain-skirts descend many clear streams, and springs well out shadowed by immemorial *chenars*.[1] Often, sheltering in a well-planted grove and watered by a rivulet, there stands a mosque antiquely carved in commemoration of the shrine of some local saint. Schuyler describes with delight the beauties of a refuge of this kind, reached after a thirsty march across a desolate valley strewn with gravel. He writes with understanding of the sense of refreshment to be gained from repose on ground so hallowed, whose beauty is the greater set against what Curzon describes as the wide and doleful plain, the sorrowful waste of a desert once at the bottom of a larger Caspian Sea. But there are none to tell us now whether the people can still find rest from the stridencies of Soviet life in garden cloisters such as this, holy places long before the advent of Islam. According to the Soviet press, the beauties of nature are banned as a subject for discourse or poetry.

There are other aspects of physical geography not without interest to the life of modern Turkistan. One of these is the influence on the movements of man of changes of climate that in this region took place either just before or after the opening of history. The clearest illustration is to be found in the discoveries of Aurel Stein in the archaeological field in Sinkiang. The remains of the cities he found buried in the Taklamakan sands prove that the water supply of the Tarim basin, when those cities flourished, was far more plentiful than it is today. There has in fact been a process of desiccation which, developing after the time when civilized man dwelt in cities, has led to mass migration out of Central Asia to more favourable

[1] The *platanus orientalis*, the eastern plane, possibly the finest of all deciduous trees. At its best in Kashmir, it flourishes from northern India in the east right across the Iranian and Anatolian plateaux as far as the Balkans in the west.

Turkestan

101 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and
131 Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts
[137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only $1^1/_2$ million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly po-
pulated countries in the world.

000 there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

361 133 The environs of Vernyy, with the exception of the mountains, are level and depressingly monotonous.

On the other hand, the Alatau mountain range, which closes off the horizon of Vernyy on the south, is usually picturesque. The altitude of the range rises to 14,000 feet, and [137] the crests are always covered with snow. In the recent past, not only the slopes but also the foothills were covered with dense forests. Now only grass grows in the foothills, a bright emerald green which harmonizes with the dark green of the spruce forest growing in the mountains themselves. All this is topped by a crown of white snow, etched against the bright blue sky. In the mountains it rains frequently, and when it does the mountains are overcast, as though enveloped in a shroud, with dark clouds, which grow whiter, as they rise higher, /420/ assume all sorts of whimsical contours, and gradually diminish and vanish into space.

The foothills are a particularly beautiful sight in the spring time (in April), when the nomads spread a pall over them, that is, they burn the old grass to make the new grass grow better. The skies are filled with a glowing fire, and it fills the whole surrounding countryside with waves of light. Yet no matter how beautiful the Alatau mountains are from the side, the views in the mountains themselves are still more wonderful, and more striking. The thick undergrowth of the valleys and ravines, streams bubbling with foam against

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
133 the snakes winding over the precipices, all this makes an unforgettable impression. With every step the views change, as though in a kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is the tree which grows in the greatest abundance. After it, but much less abundant, are the apple trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees, the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the following parts: the Almata station (the old part of the town), the Almata settlement, the Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually the town which has developed since the beginning of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a considerable degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick buildings, while the old parts of the town are built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been
[363] planned regularly. The streets are straight, level and wide, in most cases planted (although quite sparsely) with trees. There are often small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/ partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the birds, for which reason cracks are always forming in the walls.

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[137] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry
trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley
563 in general, the most different nationalities
are mixed together. Until the beginning of
the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the
Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia Rl2

occur even in the early part of July; in the winter they fall to —49° F. During the summer the temperature rises to 60° F, and there is a great temperature difference between areas exposed to the sun and those in the shadow. The average yearly temperature in these mountain fastnesses approximates that on the shores of the White Sea.

The dry and extremely continental climate exerts a strong influence on the vegetation of Central Asia. Plants which adapt themselves to these conditions and are able to withstand drought periods are predominant in the desert and in the mountains. Steppe vegetation covers not only the plain but also the mountain slopes, reaching even to the area of permanent snows. In the high mountain valleys of the Tien Shan and the Pamir are salt steppes and salt lakes. Only a portion of the mountains is wooded, generally the northern and western slopes. Wooded belts (*tugay*) also occur along some rivers.

The desert vegetation consists of rather poor varieties. The plants are sometimes covered with thorns or fibers and are very sturdy. In the sandy desert the *saksaul* tree is the predominant type; of the other plants, umbrella-shaped plants, among which the Asafetida Giantfennel, exuding an ill-smelling resinous substance, and desert rhubarb, with large meaty leaves, are the most common. The long roots of the desert plants immobilize the sand, so that moving sand dunes are found only where no vegetation normally exists or where it has been destroyed by irrational grazing of livestock. Among the sands, occasional clay flats are covered sparsely by various types of wormwood and camelthorn, and saltwort is found in salt depressions. During spring and summer, the desert and steppe supports various bulbous plants, including wild onions. Along the rivers and the salt lakes there are thickets of *chiy*, a feathergrass often reaching a height of 12 feet, which is used by the local inhabitants for making mats and thatching roofs. The densely wooded clusters along streams include tamarisk, willow, poplar, and wild olive.

The mountain forests include deciduous trees on the lower slopes, with wild-growing walnut, pistachio, and apricot trees. Common European types, such as pine, oak, and linden, are completely lacking. In the eastern Tien Shan a type of fir is found. Above the forest zone there are rich mountain pastures, similar to Alpine meadows in the humid areas and to the Caspian steppe in the drier sections.

Central Asia has considerable reserves of mineral resources, but their exploitation has only recently been begun to any large extent. Along the mountain foothills there is a zone of petroleum deposits extending

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
P.736 piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead./ In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan./
P.736

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
P.736 tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
P.737
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots./

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

101 him in 1871 and annex his dominions to the Empire.

162 11) The Dungans. They are reckoned at about 20,000 persons in the okrug. In the Kuldja region before the last emigration of the Dungans from Kashgaria after its conquest by the Chinese, they totalled 4,030 persons. They lived then and live now in the towns of Suidun, /Sui-ting/ Chinchakhodzi /Ch'ing-shui-ho-tzu/ and Tardzhi /Hui-yuan?/. The Dungans who migrated settled in the Fergana and Semirechie oblast'v. The largest settlement of the Dungan emigrants is in the Tokmak uyezd, 7 versts north of Tokmak in the Karakunus valley, where about 4,000 of them now live. They came in 1878 and as a result of their industry have built up and established excellent farming land.

101 The origin of the Dungans is unclear. According to their own tradition their ancestors, who were moslems, conquered China by force of arms but gradually submitted to the conquered people, adopting their language, customs and costume. Although the Dungans also mixed considerably with the Chinese through intermarriage they still retained their tribal individualism and, most important, their religion. Their hatred for the Chinese is without limit.

141 The Dungans are of medium height and are notably corpulent. They have a high protuberant
142 forehead; their brows are thick and arched; the eyes are slightly raised in the corners; the cheekbones protrude very insignificantly; the face is oval; the mouth is of

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (13;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik

The man of the oasis is often small-
boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142]
the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369
beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman; the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly 101
called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appellation Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan, the old North-West Frontier. There too the town populations, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the *indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as 'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word *Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation (as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

619
162

ward from the border of Turkestan almost to the Volga. The Kara Kirghiz, who number about 540,000 in all, are native to Turkestan. Most of them live on the inclement slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains.

The differences in the character of these two Kirghiz tribes find expression in many details. The itinerant minstrels who wander from camp to camp of the Kara Kirghiz recite for the most part epic poems of heroic character, in which the glorious past and the great men of bygone days are praised. On the other hand the poetry of the Kirghiz Kasaks, who range the wide plains, consists mainly of romantic lays and love songs.

[588]

In spite of these differences both are hardy nomad peoples, insensible to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They have retained the Turco-Mongol type comparatively purely, and are of sturdy build. Their obliquely set eyes, high cheek-bones, and sparse growth of beard proclaim them as genuine Mongols. The well-known Mongolian spot (a blue blotch on the skin of the lower part of the back) has been observed in their children up to the age of two years.

[144]

The Turkomans number about 700,000 in all, they roam the western part of the country between the Persian frontier and the Aral Sea. The finest types are found among the Tekke Turkomans, a group comprising

162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Salors and Saryks extend their wanderings into Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the northermost of the Turkoman tribes, who number about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
[181] Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day knows how hospitable, frank, and trustworthy the people are. They are of a decidedly warlike character. Until after the middle of
567 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put
579 a stop to their activities, they were the most redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan, and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards kidnapping and the slave trade. They extended their raids far into Persia, seizing what prisoners they could. The wealthier of these were released after the extortion of as large a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be gathered from the fact that when the Russians conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000 slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and vigorous race with an abundant growth of beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow, skin. The women, too, are tall and slender; they are among the most beautiful in Asia. The tribe is much farther removed from the Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason for this may be that the Turkomans live so close to the Iranian frontier, and that they have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian Tribes.

53

8:Kostenko --1-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

/324/

000 Part II. Population. Accounts of the Composition of the Military District.

I. Ethnographic Data. The national composition of the population of the district. The population figures by religious belief; by estates. Birth and mortality. Natural increase. The movement of populations. The relation of the nomadic to the sedentary population.

144 The population of the Turkestan district belong to two races: 1) the Caucasian (white) race, and 2) the Mongol (yellow) race.

The first of these races is divided into two branches: a) Aryan, or Indo-European, and b) Semitic, to which a small number of Jews and Arabs who live in this region belong. To the Aryans belong the Russians and Iranians; the Iranians can be divided into two branches: the Iranians of the upper Oxus /Amu-Darya/, i.e., the Tadzhiks, the descendants of the ancient populations of Bactria, Trans-Oxiana and Sogdiana, and the Iranians proper: Persians and Afghans. Then follow the Hindi and the Gypsies.

The Mongol race in its turn is divided into two branches: the Altai peoples (Turko-Tatar), and the true Mongol peoples. The Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Karakalpak, Kipchak people as well as the Turkmen and Tatars belong to the first branch. The Kalmuks, Chinese, Sibo, Solons and others, to the second. The Sarts, Taranchi, and Kurama represent a mixture of various peoples But while the Sarts and Taranchi are closest to the Uzbeks in physical type and language, /325/ and the Kurama are closest to the Kazakhs, one may still say without great inaccuracy

144 that the Sarts, Taranchi and Kurama belong among the Turko-Tatar peoples. As for the Dungans, it may be said that they form a link between the Turkic and Mongolian peoples. But although they are closer in type to the Turks, it is more accurate to place them among the Mongolian peoples.

162 The great majority of the population belongs to the Turko-Tatar branch. But even within this branch the Kazakhs have the numerical superiority, followed by the Sarts.

It has been impossible for us to determine with accuracy the statistics of the population according to peoples because of the variety of peoples and the complications of their origin. Therefore our data are only approximate. The Kazakhs and Sarts are the most numerous, then the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kurama, Kipchaks, Russians, Karakalpaks, Taranchi, Kalmuks, Mongol-Manchus, Tatars, Turkmen, Dungans, Persians, Indians, Jews and Gypsies.

The distribution of the population according to peoples is shown in the following table:

8:Kostenko 150-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

563
144 In physical type the Dungans resemble the Turkic peoples, such as the Uzbeks and Sarts, populating Tashkent, Kashgar and other towns in Turkestan, more than they do the Chinese. By religious faith they are Moslems. In everything else - in language, dress and custom - they are true Chinese. Yet, in spite of the fact that they retain the Chinese costume completely, the Ili Dungans keep the Moslem custom of shaving the head and wear a skull cap (tubeteika) on their heads.

/430/ In any case it can be assumed that the Dungans first belonged to a Turkic people and then later mixed with the Chinese and adopted their civilization. Then, since the Chinese are the most passive people in the world in the matter of religion, while the Moslems, on the other hand are primarily fanatics, the Dungans took everything from the Chinese, but kept their old religious faith.

The Taranchi are purely Turkic in nationality. They were transferred to this area in the middle of the last century from eastern Turkestan (from the towns of Turfan, Ak-Su, Kashgar and others) in order to develop grain growing and agriculture in the Ili valley, which had been ruined and conquered shortly before then by the Chinese. The word "tarancha" in Chinese means "worker". By order of the Chinese government most of the people transferred were criminals and in general men of bad morals. About 7000 families of these settlers were sent out. By marrying Dungans they multiplied, became stronger, and were even able to wrest the power from the Dungans after the Chinese massacre.

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

Turkestan

101
131 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts
[137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only 1½ million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly populated countries in the world.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

167 settling some of their excess population in the sparsely inhabited steppe regions of Central Asia. This colonizing enterprise brought to Central Asia about 1 million peasants, most of whom made their home in the eastern parts of the steppe region and in the Semirechensk province of Turkestan. The newcomers were provided by the government with generous land allotments (transferred from the Crown, which claimed as its property all the nomadic grazing lands) and inventory, and settled in compact villages, apart from the Kazakh-Kirghiz natives, most of whom continued their traditional nomadic or seminomadic habits. The colonization program had only a limited success, for after the outbreak of World War I the large-scale Russian influx into the steppe regions ceased; the Russians living in the Kazakh Republic in 1939 still consisted in their majority of the original
•161 Stolypin colonists or their direct descendants. The proportion of Russians in the total population of the steppe region would not have grown appreciably, therefore, were it not for the fact that the upheavals which had occurred in that area during World War I and the Russian Revolution (the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt, and the famine of 1920–21) led to a considerable decrease in the native population. While the Kazakh-Kirghiz population remained virtually constant between 1911 and 1926, the local Russian population increased during the same period through natural growth by one-fourth. As a result of these demographic changes, Muslims constituted by 1926 only two-thirds of the population of the Kazakh Republic. (See Table II.)

167 Turkestan succeeded in maintaining its ethnic homogeneity somewhat
162 longer than the steppe region. The Russian influx into Turkestan prior to the Revolution was predominantly urban, consisting of officials, merchants, military personnel, and other groups connected with this area's administration and economic development. Thus, in 1926 the Russians still constituted merely 7.4 percent of the population of Turkestan.

The next important change in the demography of Central Asia occurred around 1930 as a consequence of Russian immigration and the further decrease of the native population. The Russians who migrated into Central Asia during this period were both victims of collectivization seeking to find refuge and to make a living on the Asiatic frontier, and settlers who followed in the wake of the newly constructed Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) railroad. These migrants — whose number may be tentatively esti-

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162 *Table II:* DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Steppe	500,000	1,600,000	2,100,000	c. 2,600,000
Turkestan	200,000	400,000	600,000	c. 1,900,000
Percent of Russians in total population of Central Asia	6.8	15.3	19.7	c. 27.1

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLI Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers:

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth.

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952.

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification,

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

000 preponderance of males over females.

•161 In order to judge the growth of population we have data from three uyezds of the
163 Semirechie oblast which show
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1 birth for every 20 persons
1 death for every 21 persons
Natural increase: 0.3%

It is clear from this that the birth rate among the natives is very high, which is in agreement with the general rule: the more civilized a people is, the lower is its birth rate. On the other hand the death rate of the native population also is considerably higher than the death rate of other peoples. Thus the percent of natural increase is two-thirds below that of the population of European Russia, where the annual increase is up to 1%.

The birth rate and mortality and the natural increase of the Russian population living in the Turkestan region corresponds to the data for European Russia.

165 /335/ Among the Kazakhs and Sarts one observes a high female mortality, which results in a preponderance of males, as mentioned above. This predominance is reported to be as much
562 as 10%. The high female mortality among the Kazakhs and Sarts (and in general among our Moslem subjects in the Turkestan region) is due, apparently, to the more terrible and oppressed position which the woman occupies in the Mosler world here. Doomed to heavy labor, knowing no rest and peace, suffering various hardships, the Moslem woman ages early and dies before her time.

8: Kostenko--17 G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

161 If the percent of natural increase in the Turkestan region is not high, we will see something quite different if we examine the population increase which results from other causes. The annexation of new lands and the colonization of the region both by the Russians and by natives coming in from neighboring territories, has increased the population figure for the area threefold.

The table on the following page shows the population change in the region for the eleven years from 1867 through 1877.

/336/ From this table it is found that:

1) In general, the density of the population of the region almost tripled.

162 2) The newly occupied territories not only increased the actual population of the region by almost 60%, but what is more essential, with their annexation to the area, the earlier proportion of sedentary to nomadic population was changed favorably and decisively. The nomads, who constituted between 1867 and 1869 around 70 to 80% of the total population of the region, by 1876 had already lost the numerical superiority to the sedentary population. In 1877 the sedentary group numbered over 200,000 more than the nomads, and represented up to 53% of the total population.

3) The sedentary population in the region increases much faster than the nomadic population.

II

The significance of the local population in relation to the composition of the military district.

64 702 The native population of the Turkestan area is excused from the obligation of military recruitment. It is difficult to say whether this gift

Years	Population			of 1000 persons of the total population there are:		
	Sedentary		Nomadic	Russians	non-Russians	
	Russian	Non-Russian			Sedentary	Nomadizing
1867	24,689	146,650	887,975	23	138	839
1868	24,589	309,835	1,048,585	18	224	758
1869	31,956	482,630	1,014,975	21	316	663
1870	30,815	531,790	1,031,585	19	334	647
1871	37,743	623,290	1,087,880	21	356	623
1872	38,726	645,108	1,095,431	22	363	615
1873	40,334	769,208	1,171,041	20	388	592
1874	44,995	787,188	1,194,841	22	388	590
1875	51,414	907,262	1,276,730	23	406	571
1876	51,414	1,404,027	1,381,533	18	495	487
1877	59,273	1,561,262	1,417,584	19	514	467

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8:Kostenko -75-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkesta
RL1

000 Part III. Population. Accounts of the Quartering of the Military.

I

I. The population of the okrug. General survey of the population of the okrug. The distribution in more or less populated areas. The relation of the sedentary population to the nomadic. The urban population. The village population. The colonization of the region: 1) by natives in the Syr-Darya oblast' and the Zeravshan okrug; 2) by the Russians in the Semirechie oblast'.

111 The tables in Part 1, Chapter 1 (not translated here) indicate that the density of population of the Turkestan region is very low. It is equal only to 156 persons per square mile, that is, almost one-fifth the density of the population of European Russia; yet while it is about equal to the density in the Vologda guberniya (137), it is three times higher than the density of population of western Siberia.

The densest population is in the Zeravshan okrug (734), where the density is close to that of Kostroma guberniya. Next is the Fergana oblast' (552), which can be compared with the Ufa guberniya.

The sparsest population is found in the Semirechie oblast' (103), which is populated almost exclusively by nomads. This region is comparable in density to the Olonets guberniya.

/377/ Although Turkestan is poor in general compared with the sparsely populated parts of European Russia, nevertheless there

111 is no corner of European Russia with as dense a population as in certain fertile valleys in this region. Such valleys are those of Fergana and Zeravshan, where the density is not only greater than the most populated places in European Russia but also no less than the most fertile regions of western Europe. In the Fergana valley there are 4158 persons per square mile.

In the Zeravshan valley the population density reaches 5000 per square mile. Thus in the Afarikent district there are 5091 persons per square mile, and in the Sugut district 4315.

In the valley of the Ili River in the Kuldja district, the population density in some places can be compared with the density of population of the Zeravshan okrug.

Likewise, a dense population is found in the valleys of the Chirchik, Angren and Keles rivers along the piedmont of the Turkestan mountain range, and in general in all places where the abundance of water rewards the farmer's labor with a surplus. Where the topographic and climatic conditions are not favorable to sedentary life, however, the population is very sparse. To the latter category belong the mountainous areas, covered with bare and sterile rocks and the sandy dry steppes, which can be used only for the movement of nomads.

Yet there are many places in Turkestan which possess all the conveniences for nomadic and sedentary life, but still remain unsettled. Such are the valleys of the Chirchik, Arys, Talas, Chu and many other rivers, which can

161 support a many more people than those living there at the present time.

In regard to the density of population of the Turkestan region, it should be noted that it is greatest where the sedentary element predominates. Thus the southeastern part of the region (Zeravshan okrug, Fergana and the two southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast'), which is populated primarily by sedentary people has a higher population density than the northwestern /378/ part of the region (Semirechie, the five northern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', and the Amu-Darya otdel), where nomads predominate.

In the table below, the total territory of the region is divided in this way into two unequal halves, and the relative population of each and the corresponding stage of development of sedentary life is shown (1).

1. This table and those following are taken from the official report.

8:Kostenko -78-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

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	Territory in square miles	Population			Persons per square mile	Percent of sedentary population
		Total	Sedentary	Nomadic		
Southeast cultivated belt (Zeravshan okrug, Fergana and two southern uyezds of Syr-Darya oblast'	3,292 (17%)	1,588,945 (52%)	1,379,690 (85%)	209,255 (15%)	483	87
Northwest steppe belt (Semirechie, the five northern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast' and the Amu-Darya otdel	16,149 (83%)	1,449,175 (48%)	240,120 (15%)	1,209,055 (85%)	90	17

8:Kostenko -85-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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It has already been said that the population of the Turkestan region is growing not as a result of natural increase but for the most part, as a consequence of a large influx of native and Russian colonists. The influx of nomad camps from other oblast's and adjacent dominions, although they do increase the population /383/ of the steppe belt of the government general, is not a permanent matter.

The in-migration of sedentary aliens is of a completely different nature. This movement has every earmark of a colonizing movement of permanent character, and it has already shown remarkable success in a comparatively short time in populating the area. This promises a still greater development of a sedentary way of life in the populated oases in the future.

In this movement one can trace two original currents: one, a mass of newcomers moving toward the southern oases of the cultivated belt, consists of migrants from the adjacent independent dominions; the second, coming from interior Russia and Siberia, furnishes the region with a Russian colonizing population.

The peace and order established in the Russian oblast's of Turkestan and the incomparably fewer taxes serve as attractions for the emigration of natives from the neighboring countries. The significance of this migration can be judged by the gradually rising figures of the sedentary houses in the uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', where the population has not increased by the addition of new settlements.

/384/ 8: Kostenko -86-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkesta
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RL1

By Uyezds	The Number of Sedentary Houses										Increase	
	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	Absolute	%
Kurama..	27,631	28,784	28,877	30,417	30,507	30,508	31,383	31,283	31,283	31,330	3,699	13
Khodzhent.. including former Dzhazak (Dzhizak)	15,806	15,806	18,393	20,915	24,333	24,333	24,620	24,620	23,339	25,727	9,920	63
Chimkent..	3,467	5,063	5,347	6,735	4,030	4,327	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,633	4,007	116
Turkestan..					2,750	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,841		
Auliye-Ata..	363	413	564	709	709	709	791	795	795	932	569	157
Total	47,267	50,066	53,181	58,776	62,329	62,682	64,066	63,970	62,689	65,463	18,196	39

161 /385/ From this table it can be seen that the number of
167 sedentary households in the oblast' increased on the whole by almost 40%. In the Turkestan, Chimkent and Auliye-Ata uyezds, the sedentary population more than doubled, in Khodzhent uyezd it increased 63% and only in the Kurama uyezd was the increase as low as 13% according to the official figures.

The figure of 18,196 new houses corresponds approximately to 100,000 persons of both sexes. This figure does not include, however, the members of the immigrant trade, crafts and the class of unskilled laborers, who are not registered in the volost's and villages, but whose number must be quite considerable after the twelve years of existence of the region. It cannot be expressed in definite figure because of the lack of reliable evidence. The total sum of new colonizing population which has settled in the Syr-Darya oblast' from 1867 to 1877 adds up to approximately 300,000 persons. In the Zeravshan okrug from 1871 to 1876 the number of houses increased from 44,794 to 52,171, which amounts to about a 25% increase for five years.

167 The colonizing movement in Semirechie is just as successful. This part of the region is being colonized almost exclusively by Russian immigrants from western Siberia (primarily from the Tobolsk guberniya) as well as the interior guberniyas of the empire (especially from the Voronezh guberniya). Every year more and more transports of immigrants pour in, so many that the local administration can scarcely provide land for all of them. The distribution of Russian settlers in Semirechie moved along

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since [574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the [161] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty [368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[1] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town,[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

361 2) Ruman, 3) Kulangyr, 4) Sheikh Burkhan, 5) Pumchi-kur, 6) Gava or Kuruk, which are named after the aryks of greater or lesser importance which irrigate their plowed lands and gardens. These mahalas are formed from the outskirts of town which are laid out in gardens. Here part of the inhabitants live permanently and part move out from the town only for the summer.

Khodzhent is divided into two districts: Rozak on the west, and Kalinau on the east. The border line between them is taken as the aryk Mazar, which enters the town between the Chervak and Chuyanchi gates and flowes into the Syr-Darya near the Kalendar Khan mahala. The town is thus divided into two parts by this aryk. In one part, the Razak district, there are 2,800 dwellings together with the suburb mahalas Iova and Kuruk. In the other district of Kalinau, there are 3,000 dwellings including the remaining suburban mahalas. Cal-
[161] culating an average of 5 persons per house, one may infer that there are about 14,000 persons in the Razak district, and about 15,000 in the Kalinau district. Thus in the entire town of Khodzhent there are about 29,000 inhabitants. They are almost all Tadzhiks, except for about 100 Uzbeks, 50 Kashgarians, 30 Jews and 7 Hindus.

361 In Khodzhent there are many gardens in addition to those which surround it from the
247 outside. It is calculated that 733 tanaps (a tanap is 0.45 acres) in Khodzhent are in gardens. There is a particularly large number of gardens in the western part or district of town, Razak, which is larger in area than the Kalinau district although it has a smaller

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad and Fergana, and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorperated into Russia. 642

The political and social arrangements were the same in all the Uzbek khanates. (1) The ruling classes were formed by the Uzbeks, 565 554

1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar [641] 643 554

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL]

000 and American representatives in the capital, Urumchi. In the sands of Khotan in the Tarim basin the great archaeologist, Aurel Stein, discovered the lost cities that made his name. Since his time a succession of travellers have made it their business to describe what they were able to learn of the tangled politics of the Tarim and Jungarian oases from the time of the fall of the Manchus up to the rise to power of Communism in China. Only then, some three years back, did Sinkiang become inaccessible to the West. Before then it shared with the more remote parts of the Himalayas the distinction of being the favourite goal of the more enterprising travellers in Asiatic lands. Some may think that for that reason it has attained a quite spurious importance.

131 142 With Russian Turkistan — now become the five Socialist Soviet Republics of Central Asia — the case is otherwise. The Eastern Turks of the Oxus region have always dwelt in a strange isolation, and the Russians have only drawn closer the veils which for centuries shrouded a forbidden land. Relatively to the size of the country and the antiquity of its history, it is true to say that the West knows less of Soviet Central Asia than of any part of the civilized world. In extent alone it is impressive. Including the steppe up to the northern limits of modern Kazakistan, the aggregate territory is larger in area than India before partition[1] and more than half the size of the United States; and, although in a land of which much is desert the population in 1939 was under seventeen million,[1]

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	Area	Population (last census)	
		Total	'Native'
	(sq. miles)		
Kazakistan	1,073,000	6,146,000	3,090,000
Uzbekistan	158,000	6,282,000	4,980,000
Tajikistan	56,000	1,485,000	1,220,000
Kirghizia	77,000	1,459,000	880,000
Turkmenia	189,000	1,254,000	830,000
Total	1,553,000	16,626,000	11,000,000

Note that the 'Native' population figures given are the figures of Kazaks, Uzbeks etc., *for the whole USSR.* The 1939 census, unlike that for 1926, did not give figures by nationality separately for each republic. But, although there is some inter-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized population in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge of these peoples with that which has been gathered about Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is immediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India the comparison is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

nationalities are already safely moored. So runs the argument,[1] still in 1953 unshaken by exposures such as the words written in 1920 to Stalin.

In spite of all that has happened in the colonial areas *within the USSR*, in spite of rebellions, suppressions, mass movement of populations, decimation of peoples, purges, the phrase 'freedom for colonial peoples' remains on Communist lips as the open sesame giving access to that new Soviet world where the lion and the lamb lie down together.

COLONIZATION

How has this come about? The answer begins to appear when we turn to examine certain particulars distinguishing Soviet Central Asia entirely from other parts of the world which from time to time have been regarded as dependencies.

The first distinction is that the people of what may be called the metropolitan race in the USSR — the Great Russians — have an absolute majority over all other races in the Union, and constitute over 58 per cent of the total population.[2] The Great Russians and Ukrainians together make up exactly three-quarters of the total. There is thus a very large preponderance of Europeans over Asian races in the Union as a whole, while the two most important Asian races, the Uzbeks and Kazaks, together make up less than 5 per cent of the population. It follows that in areas suitable for European colonization there are no such problems as beset the Commonwealth in countries

[1] The following are typical passages. 'The Bolsheviks had one exceptionally effective reply — *i.e.* the Soviet decrees on the right to secede if the native peoples so desired.' Coates, *op. cit.* (1951). 'The kernel of the answer is contained in the Party's proclaimed policy . . . every national has the right to self-determination, including the right to secession . . .' *Soviet Studies* (Jan. 1952), M. Holdsworth. For the exposure see pp. 112-13 *supra*.

[2] 1939 census. After the Great Russians come Ukrainians, 16·5 per cent; White Russians, 3·1 per cent; Uzbeks, 2·8 per cent; Tatars (*i.e.* Volga and Idel-Ural Turks), 2·5 per cent; Kazaks, 1·8 per cent; Jews, 1·8 per cent; Azeris, 1·3 per cent. Georgians, 1·3 per cent; Armenians, 1·3 per cent. Since that census the addition to the Russian Empire after the war of the Baltic States, and large parts of Poland and Rumania, may have increased the non-Russian population of the USSR by some 20 million, reducing the percentage of Great Russians to about 50 per cent, or even less, of the total population. But even this does not substantially affect the argument.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

131 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihila-
631 tion of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these
312 administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like
• [162] the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S.4 (no date) 1953
R.1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

197
162

REFERENCE

Kazak
Kirghiz
Turkmen
Uzbek
Taranchi, Turki
Karakalpak
Tajik

Broken lines:- Scattered and scarce population

No marks within U.S.S.R.:- Practically uninhabited, (deserts, high mountains, etc.)

To avoid complexity, areas of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the south have not all been marked

International frontier
Boundaries of Republics

PRINCIPAL SOURCES

1. Völker- und Sprachenkarte des vorderen Orients, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, 1943.
2. Dominant Linguistic Groups along the Southern USSR Boundary, CIA, 11830.
3. Географический Атлас СССР, для средней школы, Москва 1950.
4. Maps and descriptions of the distribution of languages in Western and Soviet publications on the languages involved: e.g. A. von Gabain, K. Menges, J. Benzing, G. Jarring, E. D. Polivanov, and many others.
5. Results of systematic questioning of former inhabitants of the various republics, and particularly of linguistically overlapping areas.

OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILL

[facing page 272 - A]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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

RE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

[facing page 272.- B]

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

[facing page 272: C]

175 and for a time took up residence at Samarkand. At a later period it became the subject of conflict between Persia and the Chinese. The ethnological fate of Turkestan was, however, finally decided by the Turks. It formed the Western part of the Great Empire which the Turks founded in the centre of Asia in the sixth century, and in the following period other Turkish tribes pressed after those who
•[162] had preceded them. To this day they form the major portion of the population of Eastern and Western Turkestan beside which the other components are comparatively insignificant. Even the conquest of the country by Islam, so decisive an event in the history of the peoples of other countries, such as North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, was in Turkestan of almost exclusively religious significance. Turkish predominance in Central Asia was in no way shaken by this new movement, the originators and pioneers of which were Arabs. On the contrary it was the Turks who after their conversion assumed the leadership in the Islamic world of Asia. They founded powerful dynasties in Afghanistan, India, and even in Egypt; Turkestan itself, geographically the extreme outpost of the Mohammedan world, was in political re-
361 spects very often its centre. That was particular-
175 ly the case under Timur (Tamerlane) (see ill. page 1437) who brought artists and craftsmen from all his conquering raids to Samarkand, which he made a city of marvels, far surpassing in its magnificence any other town within the world of Islam (see ill. on this page). Its superb buildings are entirely covered with coloured glaze that reflects the brilliant sun, producing an effect of beauty which would almost seem beyond anything in the nature of mere brick and stone. The tradition of this art outlived Timur's feeble successors; later Turkestan rulers like the Emirs of Bokhara continued to support the arts, though their standard had by then perceptibly declined. In ethnographic respects too, the inhabitants have changed but little, and the country has remained the centre of the Turkish world in Inner Asia.

[See p. 12--Analyst]

[See cat. 116, p. 20--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1
Costumes of the Settled Population of Turkestan

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The wealthier portion of the population of Turkestan, the merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and peasants, live in the towns and the villages of the fertile areas. They differ considerably in culture, dress, and customs from the nomads who range the deserts. It is usual to distinguish between three different domiciled groups, the Tajiks, Uzbegs, and the Sarts.

Of these three groups the Tajiks are the most interesting. They number about 1,200,000, and live in the southern part of the former emirate of Bokhara, which now forms an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union under the name of Tajikistan. They are above all a mountain people, and are at the same time skilled agriculturists. As their language has preserved Iranian elements, it may be assumed that they are a remnant of the original population of the country, which retreated before the invasion of the Turks.

The Uzbegs, about two million souls, form the majority of the agricultural population. They live in the heart of the fertile areas round about Samarkand, Bokhara, and Khiva. They appear to have originated in an army formed by Uzbeg Khan in the 14th century, which was made up of men who were willing to renounce the shamanistic customs which persisted and still persist throughout the country,

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

View of the courtyards of Mohammedan houses in Samarkand. In the background the ruins of the great mosque built by Timur between 1398–1403.

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and to profess a pure form of Islam. For that reason the Uzbegs contain all the elements of the Turkestan population, Arab, Turkish, and Tajik.

The two million Sarts who in the main make up the municipal population of Western Turkestan are even more of a racial mixture than the Uzbegs. That is not surprising considering the fact that the cities of Turkestan have always been great trading centres of international character. Nowadays, the differ-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

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ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regarded as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

162 619 184 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other side of the border. The domiciled population there is made up of the so-called Turki people, more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

[1] [See cat. 116, p 24.-- Analyst]

[2] [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The Nomads of Turkestan and Their Dress

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The picture presented by Turkestan and its peoples is very varied indeed; deserts, fertile country, and towns are areas clearly distinct from each other, each of which imposes different modes of life on its inhabitants. Such distinctions are found all over the world; they may be observed in Egypt, Arabia, and elsewhere. In Turkestan, however, they are the more striking as the inhabitants of these zones not only represent different stages of cultural advancement, but separate peoples and tribes, which differ markedly from each other in appearance, customs, and dress. Even nomad tribes, whose mode of life is essentially similar, have distinctive characteristics which vary with the nature of the districts which they range.

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In Western Turkestan there are two principal nomad tribes, the Kirghiz and the Turkomans. The Kirghiz are made up of two main groups, the Kirghiz Kasaks and the Kara Kirghiz. The Kirghiz Kasaks are by far the more numerous of the two tribes; they number about 1,600,000 souls, and form four groups (orda, hord). They roam through the Kizil Kum Desert in Western Turkestan between Tashkent and Khiva; they are scattered over a wide area, and have even encroached on the lands of the Turkoman tribes. Isolated groups are found all over the country. The majority of the Kirghiz Kasaks wander through the so-called Kirghiz Steppes which extend north-

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ward from the border of Turkestan almost to the Volga. The Kara Kirghiz, who number about 540,000 in all, are native to Turkestan. Most of them live on the inclement slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains.

The differences in the character of these two Kirghiz tribes find expression in many details. The itinerant minstrels who wander from camp to camp of the Kara Kirghiz recite for the most part epic poems of heroic character, in which the glorious past and the great men of bygone days are praised. On the other hand the poetry of the Kirghiz Kasaks, who range the wide plains, consists mainly of romantic lays and love songs.

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In spite of these differences both are hardy nomad peoples, insensible to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They have retained the Turco-Mongol type comparatively purely, and are of sturdy build. Their obliquely set eyes, high cheek-bones, and sparse growth of beard proclaim them as genuine Mongols. The well-known Mongolian spot (a blue blotch on the skin of the lower part of the back) has been observed in their children up to the age of two years.

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The Turkomans number about 700,000 in all, they roam the western part of the country between the Persian frontier and the Aral Sea. The finest types are found among the Tekke Turkomans, a group comprising

162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Sa-
lors and Saryks extend their wanderings into
Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the nor-
thermost of the Turkoman tribes, who num-
[181] ber about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in
a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day
knows how hospitable, frank, and trustwor-
thy the people are. They are of a decidedly
567 warlike character. Until after the middle of
579 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put
a stop to their activities, they were the most
redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan,
and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards
kidnapping and the slave trade. They extend-
ed their raids far into Persia, seizing what
prisoners they could. The wealthier of these
were released after the extortion of as large
a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold
into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be
gathered from the fact that when the Russians
conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000
slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans
and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and
vigorous race with an abundant growth of
beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow,
skin. The women, too, are tall and slender;
they are among the most beautiful in Asia.
The tribe is much farther removed from the
Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason
for this may be that the Turkomans live so
close to the Iranian frontier, and that they
have for centuries been in close
contact with Iranian Tribes.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

167 settling some of their excess population in the sparsely inhabited steppe regions of Central Asia. This colonizing enterprise brought to Central Asia about 1 million peasants, most of whom made their home in the eastern parts of the steppe region and in the Semirechensk province of Turkestan. The newcomers were provided by the government with generous land allotments (transferred from the Crown, which claimed as its property all the nomadic grazing lands) and inventory, and settled in compact villages, apart from the Kazakh-Kirghiz natives, most of whom continued their traditional nomadic or seminomadic habits. The colonization program had only a limited success, for after the outbreak of World War I the large-scale Russian influx into the steppe regions ceased; the Russians living in the Kazakh Republic in 1939 still consisted in their majority of the original 161 Stolypin colonists or their direct descendants. The proportion of Russians in the total population of the steppe region would not have grown appreciably, therefore, were it not for the fact that the upheavals which had occurred in that area during World War I and the Russian Revolution (the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt, and the famine of 1920–21) led to a considerable decrease in the native population. While the Kazakh-Kirghiz population remained virtually constant between 1911 and 1926, the local Russian population increased during the same period through natural growth by one-fourth. As a result of these demographic changes, Muslims constituted by 1926 only two-thirds of the population of the Kazakh Republic. (See Table II.)

167 Turkestan succeeded in maintaining its ethnic homogeneity somewhat longer than the steppe region. The Russian influx into Turkestan prior to 162 the Revolution was predominantly urban, consisting of officials, merchants, military personnel, and other groups connected with this area's administration and economic development. Thus, in 1926 the Russians still constituted merely 7.4 percent of the population of Turkestan.

The next important change in the demography of Central Asia occurred around 1930 as a consequence of Russian immigration and the further decrease of the native population. The Russians who migrated into Central Asia during this period were both victims of collectivization seeking to find refuge and to make a living on the Asiatic frontier, and settlers who followed in the wake of the newly constructed Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) railroad. These migrants — whose number may be tentatively esti-

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162 *Table II:* DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Steppe	500,000	1,600,000	2,100,000	c. 2,600,000
Turkestan	200,000	400,000	600,000	c. 1,900,000
Percent of Russians in total population of Central Asia	6.8	15.3	19.7	c. 27.1

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers:

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth.

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952.

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification,

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

167 177 which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

474 162 As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers. 475 162

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred. 361 177 167

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

563 186 177 Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

● 162 [11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often
563 completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[12] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[12] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 12–83.

144 that the Sarts, Taranchi and Kurama belong among the Turko-Tatar peoples. As for the Dungans, it may be said that they form a link between the Turkic and Mongolian peoples. But although they are closer in type to the Turks, it is more accurate to place them among the Mongolian peoples.

162 The great majority of the population belongs to the Turko-Tatar branch. But even within this branch the Kazakhs have the numerical superiority, followed by the Sarts.

It has been impossible for us to determine with accuracy the statistics of the population according to peoples because of the variety of peoples and the complications of their origin. Therefore our data are only approximate. The Kazakhs and Sarts are the most numerous, then the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kurama, Kipchaks, Russians, Karakalpaks, Taranchi, Kalmuks, Mongol-Manchus, Tatars, Turkmen, Dungans, Persians, Indians, Jews and Gypsies.

The distribution of the population according to peoples is shown in the following table:

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Oblast's	Russians	Tatars	Sarts	Tadzhiks	Uzbeks	Karak-alpaks	Kip-chaks	Turk-men
Semirechie	44,585	2,978	3,365	-	-	-	-	-
Syr-Darya	8,477	4,321	210,774	57,841	25,771	-	-	-
Fergana	1,229	-	344,023	11,580	19,852	7,060	70,107	-
Zeravshan okrug	3,838	-	132,138	67,862	140,154	-	-	-
Amu-Darya division	1,184	10	5	110	16,195	51,710	-	5,860
Total	59,283	7,300	690,305	137,283	182,120	58,770	70,107	5,860

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Oblast's	Dungans	Taran-chi	Kazakhs	Kurama	Kalmuks	Manchus	Pers-ians	Indians
Semirechie	19,657	36,265	595,237	-	24,787	21,932	-	-
Syr-Darya	-	-	709,370	77,301	-	3	-	135
Fergana	343	-	126,006	-	-	182	-	370
Zeravshan okrug	-	-	695	-	-	-	2,211	352
Amu-Darya division	-	-	31,385	-	-	-	715	-
Total	20,000	36,265	1,462,693	77,301	24,787	22,117	2,926	857

●162/327/1) The Russian population, not counting those in military service, constitutes about 1% of the entire population of the region. It is concentrated primarily in the Semirechie oblast' (44,089 persons, male and female), being mostly village people (Cossacks and peasants), with a small number of residents in the towns of the oblast'. Taken with the non-Russian population the Russian element constitutes over 7% here.

In the Syr-Darya oblast' the Russian population totals 8,447 persons (0.8% of the total population), and is concentrated primarily in the towns of Tashkent (up to 5,000 persons) and Kazalinsk (ca.1500), with a very limited number in other urban settlements of the oblast.

The Russian inhabitants in the towns of the Zeravshan okrug number about 4,000 (about 1% of the population of the okrug). In the Amu-Darya otdel the Russian element consists of 1,184 persons (1%) of whom the majority are Ural Cossack emigrants.

In the Fergana oblast' in 1876 there were 1,229 Russians.

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162 2) The Tatars have migrated into this region at various time and have figured as traders, exploiting the nomads. Staying in the towns only temporarily, the Tatars have evaded the census, for which reason there must actually be more of them than is shown in the table.

3) The Sarts constitute about 22% of

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the total population of the region and up to 44% of all the sedentary natives. They spring from a mixture of various peoples and represent themselves as sedentary nomads, occupied in agriculture and trade. The Sarts constitute the nucleus of the native town and village population in the southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast and in all the Fergana oblast, and also in the Zeravshan okrug. In the Semirechie oblast there are no solid Sart settlements as yet. Here the Sarts live in small numbers, dispersed among the towns, are newcomers and are occupied in trade. The Sarts will be described in greater detail below.

4) The Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them, constitute numerically the predominant element in the population of the region, 48%. Nevertheless their distribution among the various oblast is by no means equal. /328/ Thus in the Semirechie oblast they are over 78% of the population, in the Syr-Darya oblast, 62%, in the Amu-Darya otdel they are only 29%, in the Fergana oblast not over 17%, and in the Zeravshan okrug barely o.2%.

The primary occupation of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz is cattle raising. Yet a part of these people, these who are poor and do not own cattle, work of necessity in cotton cultivation, or in sowing millet and barley. These poor nomads are called 'iginchi', and they make up the sedentary element of the Kazakh population. In the Syr-Darya oblast, of 124,325 tents over 50,000 households belong to such Kazakhs, who are agriculturalists. The total number of iginchi in the okrug comes to about 300,000 persons, male and female. (1)

1. The Cholo-Kazakhs are counted as

1 [See category 116, pp 46-70 - analyst]

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

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162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent
line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have
lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have
turned into a special family, so to speak, which
is known in Central Asia by the name of the
Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in
the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40%
of the total population. On the right bank of
the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks
constitute about 3% of the population and in
the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life,
and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans,
lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./
Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-
Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes,
a list of which was appended by him to his
well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva
(A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes.
Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that
the classification of Uzbek clans can probably
never be explained since the two essential
sources for this can never be thoroughly re-
conciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie
svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge
(Geographical and statistical inform-
ation on the Zeravshan okrug)
Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

8:Kostenko --9-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki (Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg. 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

●162 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of [101] them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

162 Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive [162] ommunity composed of twelve separate clans. [433] They use the land jointly according to common right.

162 101 9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now they have been put on a level with the other groups of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in regard to obligations, and must themselves maintain the irrigation required for their needs.

101 10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese, meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chinese government in the middle of the last century, just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettlement was undertaken as a form of punishment for these people for their participation in the revolt of 1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley, which was ruined and depopulated at that time. [162] There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local population. Their form of life is the same as that of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into their hands. They routed the Dungans (under Bayandai) and formed an independent state under the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

101 him in 1871 and annex his dominions to the Empire.

162 11) The Dungans. They are reckoned at about 20,000 persons in the okrug. In the Kuldja region before the last emigration of the Dungans from Kashgaria after its conquest by the Chinese, they totalled 4,030 persons. They lived then and live now in the towns of Suidun, /Sui-ting/ Chinchakhodzi /Ch'ing-shui-ho-tzu/ and Tardzhi /Hui-yuan?/. The Dungans who migrated settled in the Fergana and Semirechie oblast'v. The largest settlement of the Dungan emigrants is in the Tokmak uyezd, 7 versts north of Tokmak in the Karakunus valley, where about 4,000 of them now live. They came in 1878 and as a result of their industry have built up and established excellent farming land.

101 The origin of the Dungans is unclear. According to their own tradition their ancestors, who were moslems, conquered China by force of arms but gradually submitted to the conquered people, adopting their language, customs and costume. Although the Dungans also mixed considerably with the Chinese through intermarriage they still retained their tribal individualism and, most important, their religion. Their hatred for the Chinese is without limit.

141 The Dungans are of medium height and are notably corpulent. They have a high protuberant
142 forehead; their brows are thick and arched; the eyes are slightly raised in the corners; the cheekbones protrude very insignificantly; the face is oval; the mouth is of

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

162 101 in the Kuldja region and are the remnants of RL 1 military settlers once settled on the Ili river by the Chinese government.

16) The Tadzhiks constitute about 4.5% of the total population of the area. They are Aryans and are related to the Persians. These are the aborigines of the country, some of whom were forced out by the invasions of the Turko-Mongol peoples into the mountainous places, difficult of access. There are therefore two subdivisions of Tadzhiks: those who live in the valleys, and those in the mountains. These people are very intelligent; although oppressed by the Uzbeks, they have nevertheless had a good influence on their oppressors, with whom they have been mixing up to the present time. Within the okrug the largest number of Tadzhiks are in the Khodzhent uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast, where they constitute over 30% of the total population; then in the Zeravshan region they make up over 19% of the total, in the Kurama uyezd (in the mountains) they are 3% and in the Fergana oblast they are 1.6% of the total population. The mountain Tadzhiks in the Zeravshan okrug are called Galchas.

17) The Persians live in small numbers in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Amu-Darya otdel. They are former slaves who were freed when the Russians conquered this region. A large number of them were sent back to their [795] country at the expense of the state. Being of the Shi'ite religious sect the Persians are in /333/ sharp opposition to all the other Moslem people of Turkestan, who belong to the Sunnite sect.

18) The Hindus are scattered all over the

162 101 region in commercial industrial centers, where they are moneylenders. Their number is actually much higher than the official figure and they should be counted as at least 3,000 persons. Only Indian men live in Turkestan.

19) The Gypsies, called Liuli by the natives, live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug. Their number is no higher than 1,000 persons, male and female.

20) Jews also live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug where their number is as high as1,974 persons; their total in this area is up to 3,000 persons, male and female. Before the Russian occupation of the region they were terribly oppressed. As in Europe the Jews here are occupied in crafts and in trade.

21) The Arabs are descendants of the conquerors who entered Central Asia in the ninth century. They lead a semi-nomadic life in the environs of Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. They number 2,000 to 3,000 persons.

162 The Division of the Population by Religious Faith

The religious faith with the largest number of adherents among the population of Turkestan is the Sunnite sect of the Moslems. There is only a small number of Persians who are Shiites. The Christians form the next largest group, followed by the pagans and finally by the Jews.

Moslems	2,900,000
Orthodox Christian	57,000
Catholics	2,000

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Protestants	1,000
Pagans	50,000
Jews	3,000

In relation to estates, of the 60,000 persons of Russian origin, not counting the military, the division is as follows:

Privileged estates	2,600
Merchants	920
/334/Propertied estate	10,076
Peasants	10,708
Cossacks, reserves and other lower ranks settled in the area	25,694
Russians of various estates, residing in the area temporarily and not counted in the local communities	10,000

The native population of the area constitutes the local part of the total non-Russian estate in the realm.

The population of the Turkestan region is remarkable in that there are more males than females there. In this regard the Turkestan area is unlike the European countries where there is a general rule confirmed by statistics, that the number of females is larger than the number of males. This predominance of females in Europe is reported to be from two to three percent.

The numerical predominance of men over women in the Turkestan region is increased by the presence of a considerable number of military personnel. Yet aside from the army, among the native population there is a noticeable preponderance of males over females.

161 If the percent of natural increase in the Turkestan region is not high, we will see something quite different if we examine the population increase which results from other causes. The annexation of new lands and the colonization of the region both by the Russians and by natives coming in from neighboring territories, has increased the population figure for the area threefold.

The table on the following page shows the population change in the region for the eleven years from 1867 through 1877.

/336/ From this table it is found that:

1) In general, the density of the population of the region almost tripled.

162 2) The newly occupied territories not only increased the actual population of the region by almost 60%, but what is more essential, with their annexation to the area, the earlier proportion of sedentary to nomadic population was changed favorably and decisively. The nomads, who constituted between 1867 and 1869 around 70 to 80% of the total population of the region, by 1876 had already lost the numerical superiority to the sedentary population. In 1877 the sedentary group numbered over 200,000 more than the nomads, and represented up to 53% of the total population.

3) The sedentary population in the region increases much faster than the nomadic population.

I I

The significance of the local population in relation to the composition of the military district.

GH 702 The native population of the Turkestan area is excused from the obligation of military recruitment. It is difficult to say whether this gift

Years	Population			of 1000 persons of the total population there are:		
	Sedentary		Nomadic	Russians	non-Russians	
	Russian	Non-Russian			Sedentary	Nomadizing
1867	24,689	146,650	887,975	23	138	839
1868	24,589	309,835	1,048,585	18	224	758
1869	31,956	482,630	1,014,975	21	316	663
1870	30,815	531,790	1,031,555	19	334	647
1871	37,743	623,290	1,087,880	21	356	623
1872	38,726	645,108	1,095,431	22	363	615
1873	40,334	769,208	1,171,041	20	388	592
1874	44,995	787,188	1,194,841	22	388	590
1875	51,414	907,262	1,276,730	23	406	571
1876	51,414	1,404,027	1,381,533	18	495	487
1877	59,273	1,561,262	1,417,584	19	514	467

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8: Kostenko -78-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan

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	Territory in square miles	Population			Persons per square mile	Percent of sedentary population
		Total	Sedentary	Nomadic		
Southeast cultivated belt (Zeravshan okrug, Fergana and two southern uyezds of Syr-Darya oblast'	3,292 (17%)	1,588,945 (52%)	1,379,690 (85%)	209,255 (15%)	483	87
Northwest steppe belt (Semirechie, the five northern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast' and the Amu-Darya otdel	16,149 (83%)	1,449,175 (48%)	240,120 (15%)	1,209,055 (85%)	90	17

162 The population distribution is shown in relation to place of residence in the following table:

Names of Oblast'	Number of inhabitants		
	In towns	Outside of towns	
		Sedentary	Nomadic
Semirechie (2)..	37,822	89,239	631,189
Syr-Darya.....	146,272	326,660	621,625
Fergana.....	133,278	472,422	123,990
Zeravshan okrug.	55,051	293,362	-
Amu-Darya otdel.	959	65,470	40,780
Total	373,382	1,247,153	1,417,584

2. This includes the Kuldja district, in which 14,653 persons live in towns, 63,477 persons live sedentarily outside towns, and 61,550 are nomads.

/379/ The relation between the urban and rural population and the sedentary and nomadic population according to the individual oblast' is shown in the mean figures below:

8:Kostenko -80-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

162

For every 1000 persons in the total population there are:			
In the Oblast' of	Urban Dwellers	Rural	
		Sedentary	Nomadic
Semirechie.....	50	118	832
Syr-Darya.....	134	229	567
Fergana.....	183	647	170
Zeravshan okrug...	158	842	-
Amu-Darya otdel...	9	611	380
In entire region	123	410	467

The populated places which can be considered towns because of their administrative and economic importance are shown in the following table, in which the number of inhabitants and the number of separate households are indicated:

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Household
Semirechie oblast'		
Vérnyi (Alma Ata)	17,544	983
Kapal (Kopal)	2,309	344
Sergiopol (Ayaguz)	112	37
Tokmak	427	119
Karakol	2,777	257
Total	23,169	1,640

8:Kostenko -81-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

RL1

162

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Households
Syr-Darya oblast'		
Tashkent	81,900	15,000
Kazalinsk	2,010	448
/380/ Perovsk (Kzyl-Orda)	3,417	230
Turkestan	6,700	1,620
Chimkent	5,121	1,476
Auliyè-Ata (Dzhambul)	4,455	844
Chinaz	77	20
Kuilyuk	87	29
Khodzhent (Leninabad)	29,000	8,409
Dzhizak	8,701	1,765
Ura-Tyube	4,804	1,328
Total	146,272	31,169
Fergana oblast':		
Kokand	34,805	7,804
Namangan	15,920	1,309
Margelan	26,195	5,260
Andizhan	42,879	10,602
Chust	3,326	725
Osh	3,307	1,049
Vuadil	1,461	328
Kassan	2,000	400
Makhram	385	77
Isfara	3,000	600
Total	133,278	28,154
Zeravshan okrug:		
Samarkand	35,910	4,411
Katty-Kurgan (Katta-Kurgan)	7,029	1,435
Peishambe	4,600	1,143
Pendzhakent (Pendzhikent)	1,789	380
Urgut	5,543	948
Total	55,051	8,317

Names of urban settlements	Population of both sexes	Households
Amu-Darya otdel:		
Petro-Alexandrovsk (Turtkul)	50	10
Shurakhan	196	40
Chimbay	713	(1) 801
Total	959	851

1. In the number of households are included also empty courtyards and booths, which are occupied periodically at bazaar time. Chimbay is the trade center of its district.

Kuldja region:		
Kuldja	10,953	2,906
Suidun (Sui-ting)	2,781	540
Chin-Cha-Ho-Dzi (Ching-shui-ho-tzu)	349	127
Luutsugun	570	200
Total	14,653	3,773
Grand Total	373,534	74,035

Of the 38 towns counted only Tashkent has a significant population, more than 80,000 persons. In the list of Russian cities, it is seventh in population, after Petersburg (Leningrad), Moscow, Warsaw, Odessa, Kishinev and Saratov.

Of the remaining towns in the Turkestan region:

5 towns have a population over 20,000
4 " " " " " 10,000
5 " " " " " 5,000

8:Kostenko -83-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

112

4	towns	have	a	population	over	3,000
2	"	"	"	"	"	2,000
5	"	"	"	"	"	1,000

/382/ The village population of the region has been published for the Semirechie and Syr-Darya oblast', the Zeravshan okrug and the Amu-Darya otdel. For the Fergana oblast' only general and approximate data have been gathered on the number and density of the villages. On the basis of this evidence the number of village settlements in the entire region is 3,171 with a population which is extremely varied, not only among the different oblast's, but also in the separate uyezds.

In the table below the data has been organized to show the number of urban and village populated places, the average density and relative crowdedness in the separate oblast's

8: Kostenko -84-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

Oblast'	Settlements		Populated Places	Number of Houses		Number of populated places per square mile	Number of houses per village	Number of inhabitants per populated place
	Urban	Village		In towns	outside towns			
Semirechie (1)	9	85	94	5,513	19,221	0.01	226	1352
Syr-Darya	13	501	514	31,169	65,384	0.06	131	900
Fergana	10	1166	1176	28,154	94,485	0.88	81	626
Zeravshan okrug	5	1342	1347	8,317	61,362	2.84	46	259
Amu-Darya otdel	3	77	80	851	12,823	0.05	167	830
Total	40	3171	3211	74,035	253,275	0.17	80	946

1. The Kuldja region is included here, in which there are 24 populated places (4 urban and 20 village), with 3773 houses in the towns and 13,157 houses in the villages. There is an average of 2.4 populated places per square mile, an average of 658 houses per village and 3,005 residents per populated place.

361 are grouped in the districts in accordance with their occupations. Of course in each district one can also find other occupations (blacksmiths, bootmakers, etc.), but they are much less developed than the specific industry. The extent of the town is so great that many of its residents never learn to know all its winding streets, even though they live there a whole lifetime.

The figures for all the buildings in Asiatic Tashkent are as follows:

Houses occupied by the residents	13,260
Empty courts and separate courts for non-residents	322
Sheds (including 519 stalls)	23
[368] /410/ Medresses	8
Baths	8
Mosques	255
Flour mills	116
Crushing mills	42

[366] Booths in the large bazaar:

Occupied by traders	2324
Empty booths	307
Booths in the town streets	594
Empty booths in the town streets	96

Booths occupied by Sarts in Russian Tashkent 69

361 The population of Asiatic Tashkent ac-
162 cording to the census of 1868 was:

8:Kostenko-122 G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

		Families	Males	Females
361	Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162	non-residents	22	987	68
	Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
	non-residents		37	
	Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
	non-residents		122	29
	Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
	non-residents			
	Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
	non-residents		6	
	Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
	non-residents		18	
	Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	73
	non-residents		11	
	Hindus		93	
	Chinese			3
	Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 Russian or European Tashkent is directly
[312] next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by
a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the town is developing very quickly.

[631] /411/ All the okrug administration as well as the oblast' administration for the Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent,

8:Kostenko 125-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan
[Tashkent] RLl

361 In 1878 there were over 183 subscribers,
217 and 2780 volumes were in circulation, that is, the average number would be between 15 and 16 volumes per reader.

361 The number of residents in Russian Tash-
162 kent was determined by a one day census in 1875. According to this census the total number of residents was 4,859 persons, not including the military personnel. One should note that this is a minimal figure for the Russian population in Tashkent.

The total number of Russians in Tashkent can be divided as follows:

By Religious Belief:

Orthodox Christian	3,473
Moslem	938
Jewish	159
/413/ Catholic	155
Lutheran	115
Hindus	4
Evangelical	4
Armenian - Gregorian	2
Reform	1
Anglican	1
Total	4,859

Of this number:

Males	2,982
Females	1,877

According to occupation, the residents of Russian Tashkent can be divided as follows:

8:Kostenko 126-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
162

Clergy and Church workers	10
In military service	613 (1)

/416/ 1. Not counting the army and the officers But the army clerks and in general the army personnel living in separate quarters are included here.

In civil service	525 (2)

2. This figure does not include hired clerks.

Doctors	11
Obstetricians	2
Doctors' assistants (Russian: fel'dsher)	9 (3)

3. This figure does not include those permanently assigned to hospitals, and resident there.

Traders	144 (4)

4. Mostly small traders, carrying on trade at the bazaars. Included in this figure are also proprietors of hotels and cafe restaurants, the keepers of public houses, wine cellars, and various stalls and stores.

Owners and Directors of factories	3
Shop clerks	118 (5)

5. Including the advanced clerks also, or the so-called 'doverennye' (in Russian - trusted assistants, agents)

[Tashkent]

361
162

Proprietors in shops and stalls (sidel'tsev)	30	(6)

6. Primarily in drinking establishments. This figure also includes women.

Office clerks	3	
Contractors	4	
Keepers of Exchanges (Russian: birzha)	18	(7)

7. Of this number 6 are occupied only with transport.

Carters	84	(8)

8. Mostly Tatars

Manufacturers of tobacco	2	
Skilled workers in leather	2	
Skilled workers in making brandy	1	
Brandy distillers	2	
Wine growers	3	
Photographers	9	(9)

9. Counting the photographers' helpers: the retouchers, the pressers and also apprentices

Type setters	9	
Printers	3	
Supervisors for printing	1	
/414/ Post Office staff	4	(10)

10. This includes the station inspector and the overseer.

Postillions, drivers	11	(11)

8.Kostenko 128-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan [Tashkent] RLl

361
162

11. Mostly Kazakhs from the Kurame uyezd.

Messengers	2
Foremen	2
Drivers of arbas (two-wheeled wagons)	14 (12)

12. All Sarts.

Mullahs	1 (13)

13. A mullah and an 'azanchi' (the man who calls from the minaret at prayer time) are at the mosque for the Moslem population of Russian Tashkent.

Azanchi	1
Watchmen and Guards	40
Unskilled workmen	241 (14)

14. Most of these are Moslems: Sarts, Kazakhs and Tatars.

Cigarette manufacturers	2
Florists	1
Confectioners	2
Sausage makers	4
Brewers	2
Hairdressers and barbers	5
Butlers	6
Markers at billiards	3
Economists	5
Apothecaries	4
Tutors	4
Teachers	6 (15)

15. Including governesses and female teachers.

361	Hired clerks	31
162	Soap boilers	1
	Engravers	1 (16)

16. This same man cuts the print.

	Bookbinders	2
	Skilled match workers	2
	Chimney sweeps	1
	Furriers	1
	Locksmiths	3
	Coopers	6
	Smiths	30
	Carpenters	26
	Cabinet makers	50
	Hammerers	3
	Planers	1
	Water carrier	1
	Harness makers	3
	Stove makers	8
	Tailors	55
	Boot makers	36
/415/	Makers of bast shoes	1
	House painters	11
	Plasterers	2
	Turners	1
	Parquet floor layers	1
	Cartwrights	3
	Coachmakers	1
	Carriage spring makers	1
	Gardeners	15 (17)

17. Including kitchen gardeners.

	Bread bakers and bakers	37
	Embroiderers in gold	3
	Clockmakers	3
	Fishermen	5
	Musicians	11 (18)

8:Kostenko 130-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RIL

361 18. All hired, and mostly Jews.

162

Bread sellers	6
Keepers of the baths	5 (19)

19. Those who work at the baths are counted as attendants.

Skilled weapon makers	3
Masons	18
Hatters	2
Upholsterers	1
Butchers	3
Skilled goldsmiths	4 (20)

20. Including their apprentices.

Roofers	1
Sawyers	3
Translators	5
Glaziers	1
Brothel keepers	18 (21)

21. All Moslems. They include also women.

Prostitutes	66 (22)

/417/ this and following footnotes
22. All Moslem women. Some of these are married, and live in the brothels together with their husbands, brothers, fathers, small children, etc.

Attendants and Servants	314 (23)

23. Also including orderlies.

361	Coachmen	32
162	Cooks	111
	Chefs	41
	Grooms	16
	Nurses	67
	Wetnurses	4
	Chambermaids	25
	Seamstresses and milliners	31
	Laundresses	61
	Without known occupation	1708
	Total:	4859

/416/ Of this number 532 women have known occupations.

/417/ According to age the population of the Russian part of Tashkent divides as follows.

Less than 10 years old	880
From 10 to 15	230
From 15 to 20	461
From 20 to 30	1588
From 30 to 40	1156
From 40 to 50	396
From 50 to 60	100
From 60 to 70	24
Over 70 years of age	24

From the above table it can be seen that young people predominate in the population of Russian Tashkent, followed by those in the prime of their lives (from 20 to 40 years old), and after that children up to the age of 15.

361 In 1863 there were 4,322 men and 1,842
162 women, totalling 6,164. At that time there were 43 women for every 100 men.

Thus, although the population also doubled in the eight year period, the numerical proportion of men to women changed much less.(1)

1. According to the one day census, made on April 5, 1879 in Vernyy and the stations and suburbs belonging to it, the population of both sexes was 14,837, excluding the military, which numbered 3,586. Thus the total population of Vernyy, including the military, came to 18,423 persons of both sexes. The figure 14,837 is the sum of the following figures:

6,934, the population of both sexes in the new town.

2,230, in the Tatar suburb, in the pastures, in the Khokhlats suburb, in Great valley (Bol'shoi log), in Soroch'ye ostrova (Magpie island), in the prison, the hospital and the Kuznetsov brandy factory.

5,673, in the Great Almata station with the Little Almata settlement. In the first 3,505, in the second 1,868.

361 Concerning births and deaths in the town
163 of Vernyy, we have the following data, which
165 refer especially to the Russian population, which, as was said before, is considerably more numerous than the native.

In 1871 in Vernyy:	Males	Females	Total
Births	308	288	596
Deaths	263	220	483

8:Kostenko 142-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

361

	Males	Females	Total
162 Roman Catholic	136	1	137
Protestant	22	2	24
Moslem	550	152	702
Buddhist	136	67	203
Jewish	14	-	14
Old Believers (raskol'niki)	15	13	28

All the rest of the population is of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

361 The chief occupation of the inhabitants
241 is agriculture. The types /425/ of grain grown here are spring and winter rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet and buckwheat. In addition potatoes are grown in considerable quantity.

In 1871 there was:

		chetverts sown	chetverts reaped
Rye	spring	249	2,922
	winter	498	1,754
Spring wheat		1,937	19,022
Oats		3,079	33,831
Barley		420	1,881
Buckwheat		23	191
Potatoes		223	1,239

The grain is used for domestic consumption and is not exported abroad. A part of it is disposed of to the Kazakhs, however, and a part goes to the distilleries and breweries.

361 The residents of Vernyy are very active
244 in kitchen gardening. Among their products there is a special kind of sweet melon plant with seeds from Kuldja, which is particularly worthy of note.

8:Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 Among the Chinese of Kuldja there are
795 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

In general the Kuldja "Catholics" are very insecure in the foundations of their faith. They wear crucifixes around their necks, and read prayers /434/ in Latin. When they appear before the authorities with a plea they set their crucifixes outside.

In the houses of the Kuldja Catholics one sees on the walls an image of the cross instead of icons. In addition, one may also see from time to time rosaries with a crucifix, or a palm on which a crucifix hangs.

[797] Christianity was brought to Kuldja by French missionaries, who came here from Peking.

361 Here are the statistical data for the number of houses and population in Kuldja. In 1872 there were in Kuldja:

[846]

Eastern Orthodox Churches	1
Roman Catholic Churches	1
Chinese temples of idols	2
Mosques	36
Houses	1,258
Total number of buildings	1,298

361 The population of Kuldja divides accord-
162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

8: Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
•162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
365 Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
438 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat,
439 rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

361 other, which is the completely new Rustam beg
346 medresse, was built about 15 years ago. In its 49 separate apartments live 50 students, who are instructed by 4 teachers. There are two remaining medresses built of clay. In the Namazga medresse there are 12 apartments for 30 students which were built by the two begs Mohammed Rakhim Attalyk and Khudoyar Vallyami, and 18 other lodgings for 25 students, built by another beg. The mosque at this medresse was built by the first two begs out of firebrick. It has four teachers. At the fourth medresse, built by the Beg Said Gaza Hodja, there are 12 apartments for 15 students, who are instructed by 1 teacher.

361 There are 1,398 houses in Ura-Tyube and
162 the population is counted as 4,804 persons of both sexes. The predominating nationality is Tadzhik. After them come the Uzbeks with 900 persons. There are in addition 6 Jews and 12 Hindus in the town. Not having their own households they live permanently in caravanseries which belong to them.

There are no other native peoples in the town. The Kazakhs never settle there but travel only to the bazaar to sell wood, coal and cattle and to buy such necessary objects for themselves which they are unable to produce in their own domestic industry, and indeed their own produce does not satisfy almost all their needs.

361 /450/ Outside the town, to the south, west, north and northeast, there are the gardens and plowed land of the town dwellers, who move out in the summer to these gardens, so that

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

districts: 1, Tomsk; 2, Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk; 3, Southern Steppes; 4, Yenisei; 5, Altai; 6, Minusinsk; 7, Northern Steppes. Probably some gold deposits could be found in Bokhara and Turkestan. 135

The silver deposits are found in great number in the Altai and north of Semipalatinsk. The richest deposits of coal, iron, and copper are found in the district between Novo-Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, and Kuznietsk; also in the region of Semipalatinsk. The Kuznietsk basin alone occupies some 15,000 sq. klm.

The best-known oilfields are situated on the western coast of the Caspian. But it is possible that the Transcaspian oilfields, now almost entirely limited to Chikishliar and some other points along the railway, may prove to be no less abundant. In Ferghana the oilfields are being exploited in four regions: 1, Shar-Su; 2, Maili-Su; 3, Chimionand; 4, Sel-Kokko, but so far the export is fairly limited; in 1914 it amounted to some 2,000,000 puds.

But it is cereals that form the most important product of export from Western Siberia, and 90 per cent. of the population is devoted to agriculture. Agriculture is found chiefly between 60° of N. lat. and 50° of S. lat. Beyond these limits the country is only half agricultural; while fishing, shooting, and cattle-breeding is carried on alongside. Out of some 12 million dess. occupied by cornfields in Asiatic Russia in 1911, some 4½ millions were situated in Western Siberia, 2½ millions in the Steppe country, and 3½ millions in Turkestan. The chief centres of the corn export are Novo-Nikolaevsk, Omsk, Kurgan, Pyetukhovo, Barnaul, and Semipalatinsk. In 1906–10 average early export = 93,014·4 thousand puds. 241 [62] [439]

Closely connected with agriculture is sheep-breeding, which is especially carried on in the Kirghis Steppes. While in European Russia at the outbreak of war for a hundred inhabitants there were only 32 sheep, in Russian Central Asia it amounted to some 200. The area of pasture land in Western Siberia amounted to some six million dess.; in the Steppe country some three million, and in Turkestan half 233

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

233 a million. Next to sheep in importance is the breeding of
[234] horses and cows. In the cattle-breeding area the butter industry is very successfully carried on, especially in the governments of Tomsk and Tobolsk, and the chief centres
439 of its export are Barnaul, Omsk, and Kurgan. In 1913 the exports equalled 4·9 million puds as against 1·7 million puds in 1903. Closely allied to these industries is the export of live stock, bacon, game, wool, hair, skins and furs. But although they occupy a considerable place, it is the corn which comes first in quantity and cotton first in value among all Central Asiatic products. The pre-war export along the railway shows the following proportion between the various goods: Corn, 35·6 per cent. (of all exported goods); cotton, 4·3 per cent.; butter, 1·5 per cent.; fish, 1·2 per cent.; meat, 1·0 per cent.

• 162 In the production of corn Western Siberian ranks first; 7 per cent. of the native population scarcely take any part in this industry; while out of 93 per cent. of European population, 87 per cent. is composed of Great Russians, on whom agriculture chiefly depends. The cattle- and especially sheep-breeding depend to a great extent on the Kirghis and other Turkic tribes, forming 50 per cent. of the population in the Akmolinsk and 85 per cent. in the Semipalatinsk territories. But it is the cotton industry which almost entirely rests upon the native (Sarts and other Turkic tribes) labour.

312 The cotton industry is closely connected with irrigation, and again the irrigation canals form the most valuable possession of the natives. The canals seem to have been much more numerous in ancient times, and the remnants of them are found even in such barren deserts as Kizyl-Kumakh or Gary-ishek-otran. The native law codes (*shariat* as well as *'ādat*) recognize that the water is common property, which cannot be sold or bought, and that the land belongs to him who irrigates it. To look after the equal use of the irrigation canals, called *aryka*, an elder, called *mirab*, is chosen from among one settlement, and over several *mirabs* an *aryk-*

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL2

THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance. T. 642 631

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm. T. 162

The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.[1] (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia. S.U. 631 185 563 T. 642 162

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

land for settlement purposes as well as exemptions from taxes for a period of ten years. The new subjects of the Russian Empire proved to be an asset, both economically and culturally, in South-East Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan. After 1881, in the Semirechie district on the skirts of China, the Uigurs founded sixty settlements. Most of the settlements survived the revolution and Soviet statistics mention the existence of forty-five Uigur villages in the same area. They are forming a 'Uigur National District' which is part of the Alma Ata Province of Kazakhstan. The Uigurs also have over sixty National Collective Farms in Uzbekistan. Tu. 563

The total number of Uigurs in the Soviet Union, together with ethnical groups who are practically identical with them, can be placed with some certainty in the neighbourhood of 100,000. In regard to the Dungans, Soviet statistics mention a total figure of 14,600 for the whole Soviet Union, but that figure would seem to be an understatement. The Dungans have been allotted a special 'National District' in Kazakhstan and have fifteen National Collective Farms in Kirghizistan.[59] Tu. 162

Considering their small numerical strength the two national minorities enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions. As many as five newspapers, two theatres (one each in Alma Ata and Andizhan) and two teachers' training colleges are at the disposal of the Uigurs, while the Dungans have two newspapers and a teachers' training college in addition to a Dungan department in the teachers' training college of Frunze. An Uigur-Dungan department has also been attached to the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan. Tu. 563 658

Such liberality by the Soviet authorities may be explained by the political-military role of considerable importance which, in addition to the economic and cultural one, the Uigurs and Dungans had all along been called to play. Having settled down in the Russo-Chinese frontier area the Uigurs and Dungans took upon themselves the tasks usually reserved for Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In the cultural and economic fields the Uigurs and Dungans exercised a stabilizing and beneficial influence on their nomad surroundings. In the domain of politics, thanks to their anti-Chinese outlook, they provided Russian frontier districts with a human wall as reliable as if composed of Russian colonists themselves. S.U. 563 721

From the point of view of Soviet diplomatic strategy the Uigurs, who are the largest people in multi-national Sinkiang, are by far the more important of the two. The 2,900,000 Uigurs of Sinkiang are, however, split up into a large number of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit. Soviet nationalities policy, taking the Soviet Uigurs as a basis, may assist them to develop a clearer national consciousness. S.U 563 648

During the decade of active Soviet interference (1933–43) in the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL1

SU 135 SCA 135 from the Caspian Sea (at Nebit-Dag), to the Fergana Valley and the lower Surkhan Darya, an affluent of the Amu Darya. Much importance is attached to the salt deposits in the Caspian gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. This inlet, acting as a natural evaporating basin for the water of the Caspian Sea, has large deposits of Glauber salt (mirabilite). Sulphur deposits are found here to a greater extent than in any other part of the USSR, mainly in the center of the desert Kara-Kum, at Gaurdak, near the Amu Darya, and in the Fergana Valley. The ranges which surround this valley abound in nonferrous and rare metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, mercury, and antimony. In the highlands of the Pamir, Iceland spar (a variety of calcite), precious stones, and gold are being mined at the present time. The combination of coal and iron deposits in and near the Fergana Valley have permitted the development of heavy industry.

SU 162 SCA 162 The population of Soviet Central Asia amounts to 10.4 million people, with an average density of 22 per square mile. While in the desert area the average density falls as low as a few people per 100 square miles, the fertile and well-irrigated oases have a population density of about 1,000–1,500 per square mile, the highest rural population concentration in the USSR. The basic elements of the population belong to the Turkic and Iranian groups. The former, by far the more numerous, includes Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks, while the latter takes in the Tadzhiks, the remaining members of an ancient nationality of Central Asia, who speak a language akin to Iranian. The Uzbeks number more than one half the total population, besides Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Turkmen. Russians (above 6 percent), Bukhara Jews, Chinese Dungans, and others make up the remainder of this colorful ethnic mélange.

SU 631 SCA 631 Until 1924 Soviet Central Asia was divided politically into the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (formed in 1922) and the Bukhara and the Khorezm Soviet People's republics (formed in 1920). Late in 1924 a reorganization of these territories and a redemarcation of boundaries along essentially ethnic lines led to the establishment of the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR), and the Kara-Kirghiz (later Kirghiz) Autonomous SSR, which became part of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 and 1936, respectively, the Tadzhik and Kirghiz Autonomous SSR became full union republics.

SU 241 SCA 241 Agricultural activities play the leading role in the economy of Central Asia. Depending upon the land form and the development of irrigation, the following branches of agriculture can be distinguished: (1) ir-

000 preponderance of males over females.

161 In order to judge the growth of population we have data from three uyezds of the
•163 Semirechie oblast which show
165

1 birth for every 20 persons
1 death for every 21 persons
Natural increase: 0.3%

It is clear from this that the birth rate among the natives is very high, which is in agreement with the general rule: the more civilized a people is, the lower is its birth rate. On the other hand the death rate of the native population also is considerably higher than the death rate of other peoples. Thus the percent of natural increase is two-thirds below that of the population of European Russia, where the annual increase is up to 1%.

The birth rate and mortality and the natural increase of the Russian population living in the Turkestan region corresponds to the data for European Russia.

165 /335/ Among the Kazakhs and Sarts one observes a high female mortality, which results in a preponderance of males, as mentioned above. This predominance is reported to be as much
562 as 10%. The high female mortality among the Kazakhs and Sarts (and in general among our Moslem subjects in the Turkestan region) is due, apparently, to the more terrible and oppressed position which the woman occupies in the Mosler world here. Doomed to heavy labor, knowing no rest and peace, suffering various hardships, the Moslem woman ages early and dies before her time.

361 In 1863 there were 4,322 men and 1,842
162 women, totalling 6,164. At that time there were 43 women for every 100 men.

Thus, although the population also doubled in the eight year period, the numerical proportion of men to women changed much less.(1)

1. According to the one day census, made on April 5, 1879 in Vernyy and the stations and suburbs belonging to it, the population of both sexes was 14,837, excluding the military, which numbered 3,586. Thus the total population of Vernyy, including the military, came to 18,423 persons of both sexes. The figure 14,837 is the sum of the following figures:

6,934, the population of both sexes in the new town.

2,230, in the Tatar suburb, in the pastures, in the Khokhlats suburb, in Great valley (Bol'shoi log), in Soroch'ye ostrova (Magpie island), in the prison, the hospital and the Kuznetsov brandy factory.

5,673, in the Great Almata station with the Little Almata settlement. In the first 3,505, in the second 1,868.

361 Concerning births and deaths in the town
163 of Vernyy, we have the following data, which
165 refer especially to the Russian population, which, as was said before, is considerably more numerous than the native.

In 1871 in Vernyy:	Males	Females	Total
Births	308	288	596
Deaths	263	220	483

361 Thus the predominance of male births
• 163 over deaths is 45, while the females show 68
165 more births than deaths. The total figure for the predominance of births over deaths is 113 persons of both sexes.

361 /424/ The number of deaths according
165 to age are divided as follows:

Deaths in 1871:	Males	Females	Total
From birth to 1 year, inclusive	99	94	193
From 1 year to 5 years of age	47	57	104
From 5 years 10	4	5	9
From 10 to 15 years	7	2	9
From 15 to 20	2	2	4
From 20 to 25	22	6	28
From 25 to 30	16	6	22
From 35 to 40 (šic)	8	6	14
From 40 to 45	9	6	15
From 45 to 50	8	5	13
From 50 to 55	2	2	4
From 55 to 60	6	4	10
From 60 to 65	4	4	8
From 65 to 70	4	4	8
From 70 to 75	5	6	11
From 75 to 80	3	1	4
From 80 to 85	3	3	6
From 85 to 90	1	-	1
From 90 to 95	-	-	-
From 95 to 100	-	2	2
Total	263	220	483

000 Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets, nor about the purity of the water flowing through the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the [164] street or into the aryk. As a result both the air and the water are infected and transmit, one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy, Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis, 727 goiter). In general /391/ our military administration in Turkestan has never billeted army detachments in the native towns and villages, first, because of the poor construction of the [609] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness of the population, who have not yet mixed at all with the conquerors, and who, according to their religious law, almost never permit strangers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity, 712 occupy only such native dwellings as those which are confiscated and can be made suitable for European habitation. In most cases they have occupied the homes of former rulers or begs who have fled, and whose property consequently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either as barracks or as military hospitals. The adaptation has consisted of putting in large windows, installing ventilation, and so on. The Russians who occupied Tashkent built barracks for the army in the native manner, i.e., with the framework type of construction. But they soon discarded this system and began to build both the military buildings and the living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a regular manner.

[Vernyy]

361 132 of the Alatau peaks, which are always covered with snow.

[164] The sudden change of temperature during the day causes intermittent fevers, which also constitutes the main sickness in Vernyy. Diarrhea is added to this in the summer, resulting from eating too much ripe and moderately unripe fruit.

361 364 /419/ The lack of endorsement of measures to keep the air and water pure also has a bad effect on the health of the residents from time to time. Every kind of filth and impurity is left uncovered, either in the courtyards or in the streets, or they throw it into the water, so that both the air and the water are poisoned. The Kalmyks play a particularly active part in this. They are known for their unusual slovenliness, and are settled both in the town and on the outskirts along the Almatinka river.

361 132 The prevailing winds are the northwest, from Lake Balkhash, and the east wind, which blows in the spring. The former carries with it the sand, picked up from the dry and sandy Bet Pak Dala steppe and brings rain clouds.

Apples ripen at the beginning of August in Vernyy and apricots in the second half of June, while rye and wheat ripen in July.

The mean temperature of Vernyy, as determined by Golubev in 1861 is 7° centigrade. The city of Marseilles, which is situated on almost the same latitude as Vernyy, has a median annual temperature of 14.1° centigrade so that plums, peaches and tomatoes will grow there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

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8:Kostenko 141-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 their external relations, but without much interference at that time with the anachronistic orientalism of their governments in the administration of justice within the limits of each State. Indeed it has been held that, while the Russians under the Tsars posed as protectors of the Muhammadan law, the Sheriat, there is reason for attributing to them a real policy of maintaining the conditions of the Middle Ages in a city such as Bukhara, a hotbed of clerical reaction. The object of such a policy would be to encourage societies of this kind to rot internally and finally to break up of themselves under a new impact, like a mummy exposed to the air. It is not without interest to observe that a visit to Bukhara just before World War II led Fitzroy Maclean[1] to ascribe the same continuing motive to the Soviets in that city.

175 The distinction noted between the steppe and the oases
166 was carried through into Russian policy. The Kazak nomads of the vast northern *dala*, already disorganized by the Kalmuck invasions and lacking the stability afforded by a settled cultivation with its attendant towns and forts, fell easy prey to the invaders. Many of them were forced south, and their places were taken by Russian and Ukrainian colonists, the settlement of whom became the fixed policy of Petersburg and proceeded steadily up to 1914. Towards the close of the XIXth century a scientific investigation was made of the availability of Kazak land for purposes of European colonization, ostensibly not without regard to the then existing population of Kazaks (these were wrongly known to the Russians of that time as Kirghiz). This subject formed the terms of reference of two weighty commissions of enquiry under two investigators named Shcherbina and Kuznetzev. These commissioners produced monumental reports in the best Germanic manner, complete with maps and extending to many volumes. But, says the commentator, though these claim to be highly scientific, they are thoroughly tendentious, and from beginning to end are written from the executioner's point of view. The authors set out to prove that the Kazaks are not the original

[1] Bib. I, 65, p. 149.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

owners of the land, and their needs for a minimum subsistence are reckoned with a view to getting rid of them. On this basis 14 million hectares on the steppe were confiscated by decree, and two million Russian immigrants brought in. A more humane, and less scientific, Russian named Zwilling in 1911 compared these methods to that of the Jew who tried to accustom his ass to lower standards of nourishment by giving it a lower and lower ration, and eventually nothing at all. When the ass got used to eating nothing, it died.[1]

The real policy comes out in the outburst of Kriukov,[2] President of the Agricultural Administration in 1907, in which he accused the Kazaks of being the descendants of Chingiz and Timur and therefore deserving only of destruction. When in 1916 the Kirghiz rose against the Tsar's conscription order, and their old leader, Kanat son of Ayuke, was captured on the Chu River and brought to trial, he accused his Russian judges of leaving him and his people no place to lay their heads, and later in despair committed suicide by dashing himself against the prison wall.

When in the period 1865–86 Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe in their turn fell to the Russians, the government at first compromised with tradition by leaving Bukhara (with its mountainous extension to the east) and Khiva as 'native states' under their princes. The rest of the oasis country was brought under direct administration but there was not at that time a serious attempt to do much here in the way of Russian colonization. Indeed, as is usual in the oases of Asia, the already existing sedentary population was thick on the ground, and was engaged in an intensive system of agriculture little above subsistence level. But, just as Tsarist pressure on the steppe had taken the form of infiltration, so in the southern and submontane regions it was exercised by means of a turnover from grain to cotton cultivation, particularly in the rich Farghana Vale with its suitable climate and the natural irrigation brought from the rivers issuing from the surrounding mountains. Already emerging into leadership under the Min

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 301-3. [2] *Ibid.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

[See pp. 230-242 — Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the
727 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] [For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga–Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the
727 Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not
167 formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal com-
727 missioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining
167 seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

727 of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out
668 of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the
167 body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *göz kanli* — bloody-eyes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

167 settling some of their excess population in the sparsely inhabited steppe regions of Central Asia. This colonizing enterprise brought to Central Asia about 1 million peasants, most of whom made their home in the eastern parts of the steppe region and in the Semirechensk province of Turkestan. The newcomers were provided by the government with generous land allotments (transferred from the Crown, which claimed as its property all the nomadic grazing lands) and inventory, and settled in compact villages, apart from the Kazakh-Kirghiz natives, most of whom continued their traditional nomadic or seminomadic habits. The colonization program had only a limited success, for after the outbreak of World War I the large-scale Russian influx into the steppe regions ceased; the Russians living in the Kazakh Republic in 1939 still consisted in their majority of the original 161 Stolypin colonists or their direct descendants. The proportion of Russians in the total population of the steppe region would not have grown appreciably, therefore, were it not for the fact that the upheavals which had occurred in that area during World War I and the Russian Revolution (the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt, and the famine of 1920–21) led to a considerable decrease in the native population. While the Kazakh-Kirghiz population remained virtually constant between 1911 and 1926, the local Russian population increased during the same period through natural growth by one-fourth. As a result of these demographic changes, Muslims constituted by 1926 only two-thirds of the population of the Kazakh Republic. (See Table II.)

167 Turkestan succeeded in maintaining its ethnic homogeneity somewhat 162 longer than the steppe region. The Russian influx into Turkestan prior to the Revolution was predominantly urban, consisting of officials, merchants, military personnel, and other groups connected with this area's administration and economic development. Thus, in 1926 the Russians still constituted merely 7.4 percent of the population of Turkestan.

The next important change in the demography of Central Asia occurred around 1930 as a consequence of Russian immigration and the further decrease of the native population. The Russians who migrated into Central Asia during this period were both victims of collectivization seeking to find refuge and to make a living on the Asiatic frontier, and settlers who followed in the wake of the newly constructed Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) railroad. These migrants — whose number may be tentatively esti-

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162 *Table II:* DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Steppe	500,000	1,600,000	2,100,000	c. 2,600,000
Turkestan	200,000	400,000	600,000	c. 1,900,000
Percent of Russians in total population of Central Asia	6.8	15.3	19.7	c. 27.1

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers: 167 162

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth. 161 661

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952. 162 162

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification, 167 177 [162]

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

167 177 which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

474 162 As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers. 475 162

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred. 361 177 167

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLI Turkestan RLI

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[18] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[18] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

8:Kostenko -85-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
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It has already been said that the population of the Turkestan region is growing not as a result of natural increase but for the most part, as a consequence of a large influx of native and Russian colonists. The influx of nomad camps from other oblast's and adjacent dominions, although they do increase the population /383/ of the steppe belt of the government general, is not a permanent matter.

The in-migration of sedentary aliens is of a completely different nature. This movement has every earmark of a colonizing movement of permanent character, and it has already shown remarkable success in a comparatively short time in populating the area. This promises a still greater development of a sedentary way of life in the populated oases in the future.

In this movement one can trace two original currents: one, a mass of newcomers moving toward the southern oases of the cultivated belt, consists of migrants from the adjacent independent dominions; the second, coming from interior Russia and Siberia, furnishes the region with a Russian colonizing population.

The peace and order established in the Russian oblast's of Turkestan and the incomparably fewer taxes serve as attractions for the emigration of natives from the neighboring countries. The significance of this migration can be judged by the gradually rising figures of the sedentary houses in the uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', where the population has not increased by the addition of new settlements.

/384/ 8:Kostenko -86-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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By Uyezds	The Number of Sedentary Houses										Increase	
	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	Absolute	%
Kurama..	27,631	28,784	28,877	30,417	30,507	30,508	31,383	31,283	31,283	31,330	3,699	13
Khodzhent.. including former Dzhazak (Dzhizak)	15,806	15,806	18,393	20,915	24,333	24,335	24,620	24,620	23,339	25,727	9,920	63
Chimkent..	3,467	5,063	5,347	6,735	4,030	4,327	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,633	4,007	116
Turkestan..					2,750	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,841		
Auliye-Ata..	363	413	564	709	709	709	791	795	795	932	569	157
Total	47,267	50,066	53,181	58,776	62,329	62,682	64,066	63,970	62,689	65,463	18,196	39

161 /385/ From this table it can be seen that the number of
167 sedentary households in the oblast' increased on the whole by almost 40%. In the Turkestan, Chimkent and Auliye-Ata uyezds, the sedentary population more than doubled, in Khodzhent uyezd it increased 63% and only in the Kurama uyezd was the increase as low as 13% according to the official figures.

The figure of 18,196 new houses corresponds approximately to 100,000 persons of both sexes. This figure does not include, however, the members of the immigrant trade, crafts and the class of unskilled laborers, who are not registered in the volost's and villages, but whose number must be quite considerable after the twelve years of existence of the region. It cannot be expressed in definite figure because of the lack of reliable evidence. The total sum of new colonizing population which has settled in the Syr-Darya oblast' from 1867 to 1877 adds up to approximately 300,000 persons. In the Zeravshan okrug from 1871 to 1876 the number of houses increased from 44,794 to 52,171, which amounts to about a 25% increase for five years.

• 167 The colonizing movement in Semirechie is just as successful. This part of the region is being colonized almost exclusively by Russian immigrants from western Siberia (primarily from the Tobolsk guberniya) as well as the interior guberniyas of the empire (especially from the Voronezh guberniya). Every year more and more transports of immigrants pour in, so many that the local administration can scarcely provide land for all of them. The distribution of Russian settlers in Semirechie moved along

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to se-
[311] dentary life. However, because of the elevation of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

167 563 One can judge the success of the colonizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

1 [In Semirechie - Analyst]

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
P.736
piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead./ In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan./
P.736

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
P.736
tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
P.737
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots./

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

342 to insure our houses against some sort of damage from aerolites.

The manner of building used today in Turkestan obviously dates back to very ancient times, and one can assume, with certainty, that the houses here have never been built in any other way than they are at present. The loess earth which is available in abundance at every building site is such a tractable and useful material, and the buildings constructed with it are so solid and relatively long lasting thanks to the extraordinary dryness of the climate, that the inhabitants have never had occasion to look around for another material. The lack of firewood does not permit the use of firebricks for the building of private houses, for /235/ Figure 86. Caption: A View of Khiva from the West. / /236/ there are no woods in the oases of Turkestan and only reeds and the wood of garden trees can be used for burning material. Two important circumstances stand in the way of using stones for house construction. First of all, walls erected from unhewn stones can withstand earthquakes much less successfully than clay walls; secondly, there are no stones at all in loess regions, and they would have to be collected from the mountains, hundreds of kilometers away, which in the absence of highways and bridges is absolutely unthinkable. It can be clearly concluded from the history of Alexander the Great, that already in his time the houses and town walls were erected in the same way as today. Arrian writes that the town walls of Ghaz (probably the modern Nau, as I have deduced in my monograph Alexanders des grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/) were built of earth and were not high.

/He reports further that Alexander had the town of Alexandria on the Tanais, the present-day Khodzhent /Leninabad/ built in 20 days, with town walls and houses. Curtius has reduced this to 17 days. This would only have been possible if Alexander had built the town in the way that the Khodzhent of today and the other towns of Turkestan are still being built. --Translator/

342 It can be concluded, that the towns of Turkestan were built in
172 the manner still used today even during the periods of glory under the rule of the Arabs and the Timurides, from the fact that no remnants of masonry erected of stone or firebricks have been found in any great volume. All the town ruins still in existence prove that everywhere only public buildings were built of firebricks, and even this was only since the time of the Arabs; on the other hand, except for the splendid

342 Tamerlane buildings in Samarkand, one finds not a trace of stone buildings
172 in the plains. These are found only in mountain regions, in the Darvaz and Badakhshan ranges and the like, where even today in some places the houses are erected of unhewn stones, for the simple reason that there is no loess there and the climate is damper than in the lowlands.

In prehistoric times the inhabitants of Turkestan must have lived in artificial underground caves and passages made in the loess ground; this is demonstrated among other things by the passages and holes found in Samarkand and lately also near Karti on the Amu-Darya. These are extensive and form unmistakable underground towns.

354 The interior arrangement of the dwellings is just as simple as the dwellings themselves. There are no stoves anywhere; instead, usually, I have found a 'kamin' /fire place/ in Afghan Turkestan and among the Taranchis of the Ili valley. /237/ which are completely similar to those used by us. Real heating of the living rooms would not be possible in any case even with a stove, because the doors close only very imperfectly, and are even completely lacking among the poorer people, and because the window openings, when there are any are either quite open or most often pasted over with thin paper. Glass windows are not used by the natives, and both the very rich people and the khans themselves pass the cold season of the year in unheated rooms into which the air enters freely. The felt yurts /tents/ of the nomads offer much better protection in winter against the cold and inclement weather than the dwellings of even the richest of the sedentary population. The Kazakhs are therefore perfectly right in preferring their yurts to the walled dwelling houses.

In order to keep warm during the bitterest cold the natives of Turkestan use wrought-iron braziers, resting on four legs, like those in use in ancient times in Greece and Rome. /Figure 87, p. 69a. Caption: Brazier of Turkestan./ This brazier, after it is filled with glowing embers, is placed under a small table, round or square, twenty to forty centimeters in height, which is then covered with a large quilted cotton coverlit. The members of the family now seat themselves on the floor around this little table and stretch their hands and feet out under the coverlet in the space warmed by the coals. In Figure 87 there is such a brazier drawn from life, shown with the tongs and coal shovel which belong to it.

For the poor people who cannot afford the luxury of a brazier, there is nothing left but to freeze and sometimes to freeze to death, par-

492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this water-
[132] less and treeless country. The temperature varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries
487 excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

[In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

133
[172]
[487]

the trade-routes between China and the West. In ancient and medieval times they were numbered among the busiest caravan-routes in the world (see Ciba Review No. 10, page 316). Silks, brocades, precious stones, Chinese porcelain, metal and glass goods of enormous value were transported by these roads. Nevertheless Marco Polo's report shows that even in his day, that is to say towards the end of the thirteenth century, the population must have been very small, and that the water-works were falling into decay. It is very probable that the Mohammedan invasion which destroyed the Buddhist civilization of Eastern Turkestan was not entirely responsible for this decline; a general change of climatic conditions must be presumed to have taken place. In Marco Polo's

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

It is in the mountains above the valley that we find 173

the legendary springboard of the Turkish races. 'God has chosen the Turks as his own army, and settled them in the highest parts of the earth with the best air, that he may send them at his chosen time against any nation in the world.'[1] These are the words of Mahmud Kashghari, a native of the Issik Köl country, writing in Baghdad in the XIth century. They suggest not only the early movements of the Turkish clans, issuing from the highlands of the great mountain systems of the Tienshan and the Altai, but the disasters of the more terrible Mongol flood which was to succeed the Turks. The Turkic name for the Tienshan is the Tenri Taghi,[2] with its central peak the Khan Tenri, marking the boundary with Chinese Turkistan. This was the land sanctified by the epics, the Askar mountain beyond Issik Köl and the pastures of Yulduz, used by Timur as a summer retreat between campaigns. Here he summoned the clans to celebrate his victories. Even today the Osmanlis sing, 'I mounted my horse and rode to Askar, the most beautiful, for I loved it, the shining one'.[3] The Khans from the east and the Khans from the west would gather in summer on these highlands, the central position from which government and conquest, east and west, were planned. For these reasons the epics spoke reverently of the high mountains, giving them names after Afrasiab or Kök Türk, or the divine attributes of a Turkish Olympus, Khan Tenri or Muztagh Ata. The idea of a nation riding out of the dawn, and moving in cavalcade towards the sunset, is familiar in Turkish poetry and legend. Later, when the conquering hordes had gone by, these passages became the main caravan routes for trade; the Silk Road of Marco Polo went this way, passing across Turkistan. In a sense Turkish Central Asia, then on the highway of commerce, had become the centre of the world. It was soon to decline.

West of Balkhash, and as far as Aral, lie hundreds of miles 133
of open steppe, stretching down from the Siberian flatlands

[1] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 13.

[2] Tenri = Tanri = God. Tagh (alternative Tav) = dagh = mountain.

[3] *Atima bindim de gittim Askara çok güzel sevdim de aydin askara.* Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* p. 7.

173

173

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

THE DYNASTIES DESCENDED FROM CHINGIZ KHAN



Those underlined became Khakan

p. 54

8: Kostenko--8-G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan

RL1

162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent
[173] line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have
lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have
turned into a special family, so to speak, which
is known in Central Asia by the name of the
Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in
the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40%
of the total population. On the right bank of
the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks
constitute about 3% of the population and in
the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life,
and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans,
lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./
Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-
Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes,
a list of which was appended by him to his
well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva
(A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes.
Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that
the classification of Uzbek clans can probably
never be explained since the two essential
sources for this can never be thoroughly re-
conciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie
svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge
(Geographical and statistical inform-
ation on the Zeravshan okrug)
Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

361 were obliged to maintain at their own expense
563 the numerous herds of the Chinese Emperor. The property of the population was not safeguarded in any way. If something was pleasing to a Chinese official he took it without any discussion. The same thing happened if the official found the wife or daughter of a Dungan or Taranchi attractive. In addition to all this, the people also suffered other kinds of humiliation. When a person of another nationality met a Chinese, he had to stand if he was sitting, or dismount from his horse, if he were riding. This chain of insults, humiliations and affronts could no longer be born with patience. The Dungans and Taranchi revolted and had a terrible accounting with their oppressors. The central Chinese government, being powerless, remained a non-participating observer of the massacre and the loss of her provinces.

The Dungans, having thrown off the yoke of the Chinese, soon yielded the rule of the Ili province to the Taranchi.

563 The origin of the Dungans is unsolved.
173 The coming of this people into their present abode is lost in the mists of time. There is a tradition in Kuldja that the Dungans came here with Timur and that this hero, when he married a Chinese princess, received the Ili province as a dowry from the Chinese Emperor. The followers obeyed the example of their leader and also married Chinese girls. Later, when Timur went on his way these followers remained and received the land as a gift, as a result of which the Dungans also consider themselves its rightful rulers.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak 197
in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange, but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not [563]
blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings, they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours, so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of 000
cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or completely losing their own in the process. The language of a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care. Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the population in this part of the world, language does in fact give some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor, namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it 174
can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [For metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1958 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 101 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar, [197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain-
369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

361 Khan; likewise, the Russian conquest of Turkestan proper began with the capture of Tashkent. Consequently Tashkent has a more mixed population than any other town in Turkestan; until recent times it has been almost entirely composed of Sarts, the mixed race par excellence.

361 175 Of the earlier history of Tashkent little is known. The date of its origin is unknown, although it certainly goes back far into antiquity. /141/ At the time of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the region of Tashkent was still populated by the Indo-European Scythians, ancestors of the present Slavs /sic/ for at that time the Syr-Darya formed the boundary between the Persian Kingdom and the land of the Scythians. If Tashkent already existed then, as is almost certain on the basis of local relationships, it was in any case the seat of that Scythian king whose subjects Alexander fought on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, and who sent a legation to Alexander after the battle near Khodzhent /Leninabad/ to Alexandria Eskate, founded by Alexander. (1)

1. Cf. my monograph: Alexanders des Grossen Feldzuge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/ Munich, 1893.

Tashkent is first mentioned by a Chinese traveler Hsüan Tsang, who went through it in the Seventh century A. D. on his pilgrimage to India. From the second half of this century on it belonged to the realms established by the Arabs in Central Asia. Later it came under the rule of the Seljuks, who ruled Bukhara from 1004 on, as well as under a series of various other Turkic peoples who constantly were coming from Dzungaria. About the year 1220, Tashkent was taken by Chinggis Khan and remained thereafter under his rule and that of his successors until Tamerlane incorporated it into his great empire. Later it came into the possession of the famous Uzbek Prince Shaibani Khan, who took Bukhara from the last successors of Tamerlane. In 1598 Tashkent was captured by the Kazakhs, whose power reached its height at that time, and it remained in their power until 1723. In that year the Kazakhs were overpowered by the Dzungarians under the command of Galdan Tseren, and pushed back to the west, whereupon Tashkent remained for a time a part of the land of Dzungaria. When this empire was destroyed by the Chinese in 1757, who shortly thereafter slew almost all the Dzungarians, over a million people, Tashkent remained independent for a time, and set up a sort of confederation with the towns of Turkestan and Chimkent, but was forced

from time to time to recognize the supremacy of the emir of Bukhara. 361
In 1814, Tashkent was captured by the Khan of Kokand and remained 175
in his possession until the Russian conquest. Only transitorily did it pass again into the possession of the emir of Bukhara Nasr Allah, when he conquered Kokand in 1840 and executed the current ruler, Khan Mohammed Ali. The association between Kokand and Tashkent was always loose, however, and the Tashkent people revolted at every favorable and unfavorable /142/ opportunity. Tashkent was usually ruled by a beg appointed by the khan, but was also temporarily the residence of the khan and as such was the capital of the Kokand Khanate.

Tashkent was taken by storm by the Russians in 1865. This is not the place for a detailed history of the Russian conquest of Turkestan; I will only explain the general course of events and the circumstances surrounding them, which led the Russians, actually against their will, to advance into Central Asia and to the subjugation of these distant lands.

The advance of the Russians into Turkestan, which ultimately led them in a relatively short time to the borders of India, was brought about by the Kazakhs. As mentioned above, the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, having already seized the towns of Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/, Turkestan and Chimkent, in 1598 captured Tashkent as well and made it their chief stronghold. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, they were so hard pressed by the Dzungarians, that they felt impelled to turn to Russia for aid. Since this help could not be granted by Russia because of her position at that time, the Kazakhs were defeated by the Dzungarians and forced westward, away from the Tashkent region. As a result of this involuntary westward advance of the Middle Horde, the Little Horde/the westernmost Kazakhs/ was cramped in its nomadic grounds. For this reason, in 1732, the Little Horde sought to become subjects of Russia, and this was granted in the following year. Two years later, the Middle Horde also submitted voluntarily to Russian rule. In 1801, part of the Little Horde migrated, with permission of the Russian authorities, into the region vacated by the Kalmycks between the Ural and the Volga Rivers and from that time these Kazakhs have been known as the Inner Horde or Bukey Horde. In 1847 the Great Horde finally submitted to the Russians as well. Eight years later, part of the Kirgiz followed the example of the Kazakhs, when those nomadizing in the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains, likewise submitted to the Russians.

The submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule, however, was in

175 fact only nominal. The Kazakhs understood their relation to the
361 Russians to be one in which the latter were obliged to protect the Kazakhs against enemy attack, while the Kazakhs for their part recognised no obligation to the Russians and with the greatest impartiality plundered the Russian caravans and settlers as much as their neighbors on the Turkestan side. The Russian administrators tried everything possible to establish some order among the Kazakhs and to stop the attacks of banditry /143/ on the Russian settlements and caravans. At first, they sought to achieve this by installing khans who were completely loyal to them. Since these men, however, precisely because they were installed by the Russians, enjoyed no influence with and no attention from the Kazakhs, the irritation increased and almost complete anarchy reigned. The post of honor of khan was, for this reason, entirely abolished in 1833, and the Kazakhs were divided into a number of Volosts /small administrative unit/ and auls /nomadic village/ with elders elected by them, who were subordinate to the Russian district head. This measure, which subsequently proved very useful because thereby the power of the sultan and the previous hereditary tribal heads was permanently broken, created a violent ferment among the Kazakhs, which was used by the eminent Sultan Kasym and his son Kenesary to call for a general uprising of the Kazakhs in 1838 against the Russian rule which was not completely suppressed until 1844.

For all that, the establishment of peace and order in the Kazakh steppe was still unsuccessful, because the Kazakhs were continually incited by their neighbors in Turkestan, the peoples of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva against Russia, and because the Kazakh bandits, after perpetrating an act, could always flee without difficulty to the Central Asian khanates, since the borders along the territories of China, Kokand Bukhara and Khiva were not in Russian hands.

The Russian regime, therefore, had recourse to other means, which finally achieved the end in view, but which entangled the Russians in a new and much more serious action and one of much greater consequence, with the Central Asian khanates. These means consisted in gradually surrounding the whole Kazakh steppe on the Turkestan side with an unbroken line of defences, on the one hand, to make it more difficult for the Kazakhs to slip over the border after an attack on the Russians, and on the other hand to secure themselves against attacks from the Khiva and Kokand. These defences were pushed forward simultaneously from two sides, out from Orenburg /Chkalov/

which had been founded in 1735, and from Siberia, gradually 175
nearing the Syr-Darya on one side, and the Tyan Shan on the other. 361
After the Russians reached the Syr-Darya, near the Aral Sea, they advanced eastward along the river, while a series of fortresses were built from the east along the northern piedmont of the Alexander range /Kirgizskiy khrebet/ until these two fortifications met at Chimkent. From Orenburg, the forts of Emba and Ak-Bulak were established in 1839, Orenburgk and Uralsk in 1845, Raim or Aralsk in 1847, and Kosa-Aralsk and Kara-Butak in 1848. From Siberia /144/ the forts of Kopal, Vernoye /Alma Ata/ and Kastek were established in 1847. Sergiopol /Ayaguz/ was already founded in 1831.

Until this time the establishment of fortified works proceeded without particular difficulties, being within Russian territory. Upon the continuation east from the Aral Sea, and west from Vernoye /Alma Ata/, there was frequent fighting with Kokand, since further fortresses all had to be built on Kokand territory, for their establishment in the desert was naturally impossible.

The battle was opened from the west by General Perovsky, who took the first Kokand fort on the Syr-Darya, Ak-Mechet', by storm in 1853, despite a brave defence by the Kokand commander, Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg was destined for still greater things, for he later rose to be independent ruler of Kashgar, and as such inspired the respect of Russians and Englishmen alike. On the site of the destroyed Ak-Mechet' a Russian fortification, Fort Perovsk, /Kzyl-Orda/ was established, and in addition the forts of Kazalinsk and Karmakchi, /Dzhanaly/ were built in the same year. In 1861 Fort Dzhulek was added to these. From Vernoye /Alma Ata/ out, where a Russian town was founded in 1854, the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak and Pishpek /Frunze/ were conquered in 1860, and that of Merke in 1862. /From middle page 144 to middle page 149 of the original text has not been translated--Translator/

The capture of Tashkent was, to be sure, against the express will of the Russian regime and Chernyaev was subsequently removed from his position for disobedience. Nevertheless it was impossible to give the town back to Kokand, for the pro-Russian party in Tashkent, which had essentially facilitated the taking of the town, was too compromised, and would have been abandoned without defense to the revenge of its fanatical enemies, and because then Russia would have lost the confidence of the natives of Turkestan for all time. For this

175 361 reason in 1866, Tashkent was joined to the regions conquered previously into a single province /Government/ called the Syr Darya province, which was assigned to the general province of Orenburg. Since, however, no governor could get along with the General Governor Kryzhanovski, in 1867, the Syr-Darya province was again separated from Orenburg and combined with the Semirechiye province into a separate General Government which retained the name Turkestan. General Adjutant Konstantin Petrovich von Kauffmann was named first General Governor of Turkestan with his capital in Tashkent, and he later added the region of Samarkand (1868), the districts of Amu Darya (1873), Fergana (1876) and temporarily also the region of Kuldja (1871 to 1881) to the Turkestan General Government.

2. The Meaning and Origin of the Name "Tashkent."

103 361 Concerning the origin of the name of the town of Tashkent, etymologists have often wracked their brains without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. /150/ The word Taskent means "city of stone," and is a combination of two words from different languages: the Turkish 'tash' (stone) and the Iranian 'kent' (city). Now Tashkent is built not of stone but of clay throughout, and in the surrounding region there is no stone to speak of because the ground on which the town is built is an extensive and thick stratum of loess. One can therefore explain Tashkent according to the theory of 'lucus a non lucendo, as a city in which there is no stone. Many have therefore interpreted the name as indicating a city with the diameter of a 'tash,' since a tash is used by the natives as a unit of measurement, in this case, eight kilometers. I think, however, that the origin of the name Tashkent can be explained much more naturally. The Chinese monk Hsüan Tsang, who passed Tashkent on his pilgrimage to India (629-645 A.D.), calls the town in his travel account Chashkent in Chinese orthography; among the later Arabic writers it appears under the name Shashkent, (1) and

1. Sultan Baber already knows Tashkent by the name Tashkend; he notes expressly, however, that this appeared in the works of earlier writers as Shash or Djadj.

this is oviously the original Indo-European name of the town; for

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity of the Western world.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 it is at present. After the Arab conquest, the Amu Darya changed its course to carry all its water as at present into the Aral Sea, where previously only one arm had debouched. The Özboy Channel dried up, and the waters that had once filled Sarikamish were diverted into the Aral. But in 1221, when the Mongols captured Urgench, then capital of Khorezm, the Amu Darya had reverted to its old course, and once more flowed to the Caspian by the Özboy as its main branch, thus opening up a very important channel of trade from east to west. The Sir Darya (Jaxartes), or more probably a large arm of it, flowed through the now dried up Yeni Darya, which began above Ak Mechit (Kizil Orda) and, moving to the south-west past the Aral Sea, debouched into the Amu Darya to swell its waters on their way through the Özboy to the Caspian. Muslim authority is quoted to establish that it was only in exceptional years of flood that the combined Oxus and Jaxartes — a sort of 'Shatt-al-Turk' — reached the Caspian, flowing through the Balkhan gap to the gulf by what is now Krasnovodsk. The river usually sank into the Karakum at a point known to Arab geographers as Kalat-us-sin (in Mongol times Rebat Tamgach) near the present Kurtish and over 100 miles east of the Balkhan hills. At this point there is a fault in the desert, with a declivity a few feet high, over which the combined river flowed whenever its volume sufficed to take it on to reach the Caspian.

133 175 This[1] continued until 1573, when the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya settled into their present courses to the Aral Sea, and trade on the Özboy and Yeni Darya came to an end. The alteration in the course of the rivers Togan counts as the great catastrophe of the XVIth century affecting Turkistan.

He continues:

Before 1573 goods could be shipped direct by boat from Azerbaijan and from the Volga by the Özboy to the waterfalls near Rebat Tamgach, and trans-shipped thence to Urgench. As long as the route by Urgench on the Özboy and Yeni Darya remained open, the towns on the rivers Talash, Chu and Ili grew immensely

1 alternate changes in river beds -- see pp 23-24 ct. 116 -- Ana

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages [1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler [2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Köl greatly reduced
183 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

● 175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175

convenient to refer to them at this point.

In the XIIIth century the Mongol Chingiz Khan conquered China, Turkistan and Persia. The Empire of Chingiz was divided between his four sons: here it will suffice to say that the Ilkhan dynasty which established itself in Persia and Irak on the ruins of the Caliphate and the Seljuks was founded by Hulagu, who belonged to the same branch of Chingiz' family as Kublai the Great Khan of China, both being sons of Chingiz' fourth son Tului.

It was therefore in the interests of Kublai to conclude, if possible, with his brother Hulagu an arrangement for the transport of goods between the Tului family dominions in the east and in the west, and this in fact is what was done as soon as Kublai Khan was able to seize the ports in southern China. Trade entered the Persian Gulf. This led to the enrichment of Hormuz as the port on the Gulf, and to the rise of the great and prosperous city at Herat. For a time Herat became the principal clearing centre for the trade of Central and Western Asia and a distinguished culture flourished there under the later Timurid princes. The countries to the north of the Oxus, allotted without any very clear definition to the elder branches of Chingiz' family (the Golden Horde and the Chaghatai Horde), were left in the cold. This process had been accelerated by the utter destruction of Khorezm itself at the hands of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son. The products of the Far East now came up to the Oxus by way of Baluchistan and Hormuz. The Far Eastern traffic had thus been diverted from the caravan to the sea, and in so far as caravan routes in Turkistan were needed to serve it these ran from north to south, and not through the mountain passes. But still some trade with Europe and the West remained.

With the rounding of the Cape by the Portuguese at the end of the XVth century, and the formation of British, Dutch and French companies a century later, the trade by caravan through Turkistan to Europe also died. Except for local commerce, even the Persian Gulf became a backwater, and Herat lost its pre-eminence. The economic axis had swung

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 from a latitudinal to a longitudinal direction. The maritime age had succeeded that of the caravan, and Turkistan was no longer a centre of power or commerce. In a seaman's age its place had been taken by Western Europe.

Once the through routes were empty of traffic, the only remaining attraction keeping Turkistan within a southern orbit was the gravitational pull of a common Islamic tradition. Even this began to weaken as communications broke down. Religious and cultural bonds began to snap, and local religions to spring up. Shiah votaries will dispute Togan's conclusion, given as an instance of this tendency, that the spectacular rise of the Shiahs of Persia in Safavid times from being mainly a mountain sect to the position of a State religion was due to this cause. Small principalities began to arise in Turkistan. The process was hastened by the internecine wars between the two Turkish houses, the Ottomans in Istanbul and the Safavids in Isfahan — also Turks from Erdebil in Azerbaijan. The Turkish world was disintegrating, and the way was open for European pressure from the south and Russian pressure from the north.

000 Some of these ideas are curiously like the theme developed in one of the essays of Arnold Toynbee.[1] He too sees the world in terms of a caravan age succeeded by a maritime age, and to him also Farghana in the caravan age appears as a central point of the world. Can it be, Toynbee asks, that in an air age it may once more become so? This, he judges, may come about for the reason that in an air age a world centre of gravity is likely to be determined not by physical but by human geography, and to be situated at a point equidistant from two main poles of world population. If so, it will not be because Farghana is a void. Like Kashmir and Peshawar farther south, it is itself a jewel of fertility, ringed round by the world's greatest mountains and deserts. It is remarkable that one of the greatest of contemporary historians has seen the same light, spreading from the past and casting a beam into the future.

[1] Bib. I, 93.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

175 The central points in the earlier history of Turkistan are two. The first is the Mongol deluge which, under Chingiz Khan, swept over the land in the years 1219–24; the second the thunderbolt launched by Timur nearly two centuries later (1379–1405). Timur, though of Mongol antecedents, used Chaghatai Turkish as his mother tongue and belonged to what Barthold [1] called *la tribu mongole turquisée* of the Barlas, established at the ancient twin city of Kesh [2] where the Kashka Darya issues from the mountains.

It will be found that the human material, and the forces applied to it, will fall into a more comprehensible order if viewed in periods divided by these two outstanding events in the history of Central Asia. But, before embarking on any analysis of these periods, there are a number of general distinctions and definitions that I must make, if there is to be any understanding of the people mixed together in the crucible which is Central Asia.

197 A reference to the map at the end of this book will show the reader the disposition of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, arranged as it stands today in accordance with the various languages, Turkic and Iranian, spoken by the agglomerations known loosely as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Turkmens (all Turkish) and the Tajiks (Iranians). It will be seen that in more than one case the speakers of these languages overlap across the international frontiers into China, Afghanistan and Persia. There are also areas within the country in which Uzbek mingles with Tajik, Turkmen or Karakalpak, Kirghiz with Uzbek, and so on. Bilingualism in Uzbek and Tajik is common in areas of overlap, especially so in the towns from Khojent to Bukhara. Turkic Uzbek in the towns has lost its vowel harmony under Iranian influence, but has preserved it in the north of the Uzbek linguistic territory, where there was no such influence. On the other hand, the juxta-

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 168.

[2] The modern name of these cities is Shahr-i-Sabz and Kitab. They are separated from Samarkand by the Takhta Karacha pass over a spur of the Hissar mountains.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods ● 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

After the Turks came flooding in the Mongols. Much ink has been spilt by the learned in discussing the relationship between Mongol and Turk in Central Asian history. Confusion reigns in the use of such terms as Mongol, Tatar, Turk, Sart, Kazak and Uzbek, and there is a tendency to complicate the discussion still further by an approach through linguistics. For instance, Chuvash, a Turkic language spoken on the Volga, has a distinct admixture of Bulgar terms, and it is sometimes sought therefore to distinguish its speakers as the true representatives of the Golden Horde, who mingled with the Bulgars — an earlier-than-Mongol stock — upon the Volga. But even if the armies of Chingiz were themselves pure Mongols (and there is reason to believe they were not), the ultimate truth is that at that date this was a Turkish sea into which the Mongol rivers flowed. The Mongol civilization was absorbed by the Turkish civilization in Transoxiana, just as it was absorbed by the higher culture of China and Russia. The name of Chaghatai, the second son of the Mongol Chingiz, even became that of the literary Turkic language of the Eastern Turks, and, less than two centuries later, Timur himself, belonging to a tribe of Mongol origin, had become in all essentials a Turk. Perhaps the best way of setting this question in its true light is again to point to the last great Timurid, the Emperor Babur. Himself described on his father's side as descended in the fifth generation from Timur, and on his mother's side in the thirteenth generation from Chaghatai the second son of Chingiz — and so of Mongol ancestry on both sides — he writes in Turkish, and in his Memoirs [1] speaks with disdain of the Mughul (Mongol) race: 'Of all others', he says, 'the wretches of Mughuls were most active in unhorsing and stripping the stragglers'. And later in verse: [2]

Were the Mughuls angels, they would be bad,
Written in gold, evil would be the name Mughul.

[1] Bib. I, 61, p. 150.

[2] The verse may be an interpolation by Babur's son, the Emperor Humayun. But the argument stands.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

IV

CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRES

000

We are dead but our living was great : we are dumb, but
a song of our State
Will roam in the desert and wait with its burden of long,
long ago. . . .

FLECKER

175

I HAVE remarked that the history of the Eastern Turks after the Arab conquest falls into clearer relief if it is grouped round the two violent upheavals caused by the invasion of the Mongols under Chingiz Khan early in the XIIIth century and the conquests of Timur issuing from his base at Kesh, near Samarkand, at the end of the XIVth century. The periods before the Russian pressure began early in the XVIIIth century then become :

(i) The pre-Mongol era, 700–1200.
(ii) Chingiz Khan and his successors, 1200–1350.
(iii) Timur and the Timurids, 1350–1500.
(iv) The Uzbek conquest under the Shaibanids, with the period of growing disorder and dissolution into the three petty States of Khiva (Khorezm), Bukhara and Kokand, 1500–1750.

(i) *Pre-Mongol Era*

Transoxiana as far as the Saihun (Sir Darya) was conquered by the Arabs during the reign of the *Umayyid* Caliph Abdul Malik in the last decade of the VIIth century. The conquest was the natural extension to the north of the overrunning of Sassanian Persia and was achieved by the Emir Kotaiba ibn Muslim with armies of which Arabs formed the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1958 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

spearhead only, reinforced by many thousands of troops from almost every part of Persia. 175

Not more than fifty years later grave disaffection broke out among the virile peoples of this north-eastern part of the Arab dominion, stirred by an oppressive Umayyid policy which refused to accord equal rights even to Muslim converts who were not Arabs. The estrangement of Khorasan and Transoxiana was adroitly used by the *Abbasids* of Baghdad, who with aid from Persia succeeded round about 750 in supplanting the Damascus house of the Umayyids. It was during the Abbasid period that a second centre of urban civilization was firmly planted in Transoxiana under Muslim auspices. Abbasid rule was largely in the hands of Khorasanis, so that Persian influences, as representing the new faith, became dominant in the oasis-cities along and between the Jaihun and the Saihun. What had taken place in fact under the impact of the faith was a Persian invasion and consolidation of the settled Turkish lands in the Turanian basin. Indeed Barthold holds that Persian population and influence in and over this region predated Islam and were evident under the Sassanian dynasty, during which Turkish tribes near the rim of the bowl had adopted Zoroastrianism.[1]

When towards the end of the IXth century the *Samanids* (874–999) succeeded to the Abbasid heritage in the frontier provinces of Khorasan and Transoxiana, the result was to clamp down the Persian yoke and influence even more tightly on the homelands of the Turks. Until the Turkish tribes adopted Islam they were in no position to aspire to rule, and up to this time Islam had had no success with them. There was indeed a period of about 300 years (last decade of VIIth to last decade of Xth century) between the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana and the first certain testimony to the adoption of Islam by Turks of any marked political influence. Up to that time Arab writers consistently number the Turkish tribes as enemies of the faith.

The Samanids came from Balkh and enforced a rigorous

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 33.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175

form of Hanafi Sunniism,[1] perhaps stimulated by the struggle which Islam had had to conduct with Buddhism for the mastery of that region. In the Hindu Kush, not far south of the rim, the great idols of Bamian, hewn in the rock, still stand to attest the strength which Buddhism once had on the southern fringe of Turan, and it has been suggested that the prevalence of theological schools (*medreses*) in Bukhara and other Turkish cities is to be explained as a relic of Buddhist [103] influence. The Sanskrit word *vihara* means a monastery, and the name Bukhara is probably derived from it.

The first Turkish house to embrace Islam was that of the *Karakhanids*, in the somewhat legendary person of Bughra Khan of Kashghar (d. *circa* A.D. 960). They are known to some historians as the *Ilak Khans*. The domains of this house extended to the north over Yedi Su, and its capital came later to be at a place named Balasagun, now unknown but probably on the Chu River. Bughra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in the year 999 in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from the Samanids, thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries. Flushed with success the Karakhanids tried to carry their conquests farther south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni,[2] with the result that the Amu became the dividing-line between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realms. Early in the XIth century and not long after the establishment of Turkish rule in Transoxiana by the Karakhanids began the famous thrust of the *Ghuzz* or *Oghuz* Turks from the regions north of the Saihun (Sir Darya).

It was this great agglomeration of Turkish tribes, divided into twenty-four clans, which was destined to produce three of the most famous peoples in Islamic history. The first of

[1] The *Hanafi* is regarded as the school of the Sunnat, as opposed to the Shiah, in the most orthodox descent. There are three other Sunni schools, the Hanbali, the Shafii and Maliki. The Hanafi doctrine was that professed by the Ottomans, by the Turks of Transoxiana and by the great majority of Indian and Afghan Muslims.

[2] The first Ghaznavid with his seat at Ghazni between Kabul and Kandahar, the patron of the Persian poet Firdausi and the curse of India in the XIth century.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

these was the *Khalij* or *Khalji*,[1] the forerunners of the great 175
Ghilzai tribe of eastern Afghanistan who gave a dynasty to Delhi and, centuries later, having adopted the Afghan language and custom, crushed the Safavid dynasty of Persia and disputed with the Durranis the mastery of Afghanistan. The second was the *Seljuks* (1038–1150), who pressed down into Khorasan from across the Oxus with armies whose discipline astonished the Muslim world, becoming converted to Sunni Islam as they did so. Having conquered Persia, they entered Baghdad to release the degenerate Abbasid caliphs from tutelage to Turkish mercenary bodyguards, and went on into Syria and Armenia. In 1071, Alp Arslan, their chief, defeated the Byzantines at Melasgird and for a few years their rulers controlled an Empire which was bounded by the Oxus and the Persian Gulf to north and south and by the Indus and the Mediterranean to east and west. The *Turkmens* of the lower Oxus and Turkmen steppe are their descendants. Great Seljuk rulers were Tugrul Bey, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. They succeeded to the Samanid heritage of strictly orthodox Hanafi Sunniism, and persecuted not only Shiahs but the devotees of all other Sunni schools. Like other hordes which poured off the steppes of Central Asia, the Seljuk Empire could not survive the death of one or two great war-leaders and started to break up by A.D. 1100. It left as its most important segment in the west the Konia sultanate in Anatolia, and in the east the hereditary governorate of Khorezm (Khiva) under a line which came to be known as the Shahs of Khorezm. The Mongol invasion of the XIIIth century gave both of these their death-blow, the Anatolian kingdom yielding place to a third offshoot of the Oghuz tribal confederacy.

In Anatolia these were the *Ottomans*. A small border Khan Othman, acting as Khan of a fief of Turkdom on the Byzantine frontier, in 1326 obtained control of Bursa and founded the Ottoman Empire. His exploits and those of his

[1] For a very clear exposition of the identification of the Khalij with the Ghilzai see Fraser-Tytler, Bib. I, 36. His argument is strengthened by the fact that in the Pashtu language these tribes are not called *Ghilzai*, a Persianized form, but *Ghalji* or *Khalji*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

•175 immediate successors fall in a period more than a century after the Mongol invasions of Turkistan and are not directly related to the pattern of events in Central Asia. But it is necessary to mention them in order to indicate the stages in the spread of Turkish influence. More important for our purposes is the fact that, however far the Anatolian Turks (including in this context Osmanlis and Turks of the Caucasus) [1] may have diverged from those of Transcaspia, in the Turkmens, also descendants of the Oghuz, may be found a connecting link between Eastern and Western Turk.

There remains yet another ruling house which held sway in parts of Transoxiana before the Mongol deluge. This is the *Kara Kitai* (*circa* 1137–1200). On their passage through Transoxiana the Seljuks had given but passing attention to affairs nearer home, bent on conquest far afield. But the tumult of their going had weakened the Karakhanids of Samarkand, exposing them to attack from powerful forces from the east. These new arrivals were the Kitai, who, issuing from North China (where their dynasty had been known as the Leao), established themselves in Mongolia and, passing on thence by the usual Ili Valley route, succeeded early in the XIIth century in defeating the Karakhanids (with whom they are not to be confused), and established themselves both in Transoxiana and in Kashghar. The Kara Kitai were Chinese in appearance, tradition and culture, and they never embraced Islam. Their chief claim to remembrance is that, although their dominion lasted less than a century, they gave a name to China, which many Muslims and all Russians to this day know as Kitai.

After Chingiz Khan the Kitai disappear from history, and the survival of their memorial in the name they gave to China is therefore the more extraordinary. It can only be explained by saying that, being the only conquering people reaching

[1] The Azerbaijanis are the most important Caucasian Turks. Having been subjected for many years to the Safavid dynasty of Persia, they, along with their brethren in what is still Persian Azerbaijan, have been induced, alone among Turks, officially to embrace Shijism.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175

as far as Maveraunnahr out of China proper, they deeply impressed their Turkish subjects with the Chinese culture of which they were representative. So, when thinking of China, the thoughts of an Eastern Turk would turn to the Kitai.

Making their capital at Balasagun, the forgotten site in the Chu region, they defeated the Karakhanids at Khojent in 1137, and even at one time carried their arms successfully against Sanjar, the last great Sultan of the Seljuks, who by that time had attained to a vague overlordship over the Karakhanid chiefs. The Kitai prince took the title of Gurkhan, and at the height of their power this dynasty controlled the country as far as Khorezm. Their administration was Chinese in fashion, and they permitted the local chiefs, including the Karakhanids, a limited authority subject to payment of tribute. The district of Khorezm became a border battleground between the Muslim Seljuk rulers, who maintained there an important governorship, and the 'infidel' Kitai. It was the importance of Khorezm as the Muslim outpost that led to this appointment becoming hereditary in the line of the Seljuk governors known as the Shahs of Khorezm, who in the years immediately preceding the Mongol deluge maintained a fruitless and inconclusive struggle against the Kitai masters of the upper rivers.

Some of the Kitai professed Christianity in the Nestorian tradition. Many scholars have identified them with the legends of Prester John, but in the event it is the name of this dynasty, and not its faith, which constitutes its right to remembrance. The poetry of our own tongue still knows the name Cathay.

The *Shahs of Khorezm* (1097–1220) by the beginning of the XIIIth century had attained a considerable magnificence. As the Russians found later, the oasis of Khiva on the lower Oxus (which was once Khorezm) is ringed round on all sides by deserts and sea, the passage of which is rendered harder by the winter blizzards and the intolerable summer heats. We have seen[1] that at about this time (1220) there is some reason to think that the Amu may have reverted to its old course to the Caspian, and a branch of the Sir may have reached across towards the Khorezm capital Urgench, making of the 'hushed

1 [See cat. 116 p.23-24 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Chorasmian waste' a fertile network of canals. Entrenched in this fertility, and protected by the sands, had arisen an intellectual and Islamic life of a high order. Here was laid the foundation of that Eastern Turkic literature in a language which later took the Mongol name of Chaghatai. The Khorezm eastern frontier reached across the Kizilkum as far as the town of Otrar on the Sir Darya, and it was near here in the town of Yese that the mystic Ahmed was born and flourished (d. 1167).1 Muhammad, the last Shah of Khorezm, became wealthy and powerful, and succeeded in obtaining a somewhat uncertain control over Bukhara and Samarkand, having defeated the Kitai on the Talash in 1210. This victory encouraged the Shah to a show of self-esteem; he posed as Caliph and Protector of the Faith, arrogating to himself the name and titles of the last Seljuk and even of Alexander the Great. When, a few years later, the challenge came from Chingiz Khan, he fancied himself strong enough not only to defy it but to take the initiative against the Mongols. But his kingdom was like that of the Chaldees.

(ii) *Chingiz*[1] *and the Mongols*

Chingiz Khan rose to power in Mongolia in the year 1205 after defeating his rival Jamuga, who had tried to unite the popular party against him. According to Soviet historians,[2] Chingiz, like others after him, decided on war to distract attention from civil strife between contending Mongol factions at home. His first assault was directed on Turkish tribes, the Kirghiz of the Yenisei, the Merkit and the Naiman, whom by 1269 he had subdued. The remnants fled westward, the Merkit towards the Kipchak country, the Kirghiz to the Tienshan and the Alai, where they now are, and the Naiman farther south into the kingdom of the Kitai, then, as we have seen, engaged in a struggle with the Shah of Khorezm for predominance in Maveraunnahr. Chingiz then turned his

[cat. 116, pp. 272 -- Analyst]

[1] For spelling see Appendix, final paragraph.

[2] The official theory is crystallized in a Soviet novel which won the Stalin prize, *Janghiz Khan*, by V. Yan. Bib. I, 106.

1 [for the importance of Ahmed Yesevi, see cat. 116, pp. 45-46 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 arms eastward, overran China and in 1215 took Peking. While he was doing this he left his eldest son, Juchi, in command on the western frontier, and it was when Juchi was in pursuit of the fleeing Merkit on the Kipchak steppe that his troops first clashed with the borderguards of the Khorezm Shah. At this time Muhammad, the last Shah, had reached the peak of his arrogance and, seeing himself as the champion of Islam and encouraged by his victory over the Kitai, he dreamed of the conquest of China, and held the intervening Mongols in contempt. Embassies of merchants passed between Chingiz and Muhammad; finally, with a total disregard of good faith or the consequences, a caravan sent by Chingiz was treacherously slaughtered by Muhammad's order at the frontier town of Otrar (close to the modern Aris) in 1218.

This brought the Mongol down on Khorezm in the following year. Leaving a column under his son Juchi to storm Otrar, he himself took Bukhara and Samarkand and other of the oasis-cities, sacked and burned them, and slaughtered the populations. The Shah Muhammad fled to a Caspian island, where he died; his son Jalaluddin, after putting up a gallant fight, was forced to flee by way of Ghazni into India, and after a last desperate battle barely escaped his pursuers by swimming the Indus into safety. Meanwhile Chingiz had carried his arms far and wide to the Caucasus, the Don, and Kiev, slaughtering and burning all the way. Juchi meanwhile had sacked all the cities of Khorezm. In 1225 the tale of destruction was complete and Chingiz returned to Mongolia to die two years later at the age of 65.[1] He was predeceased by a few months by his eldest son Juchi, the father of the Golden Horde.

The dominions of the great Mongol descended to the branches of his four sons, Juchi, Chaghatai, Ogodai and Tului. Each area was known as the *ulus* or tribe, and, as is natural with a nomadic organization, the allotment was tribal rather than territorial. For this reason the limits of each are difficult to

[1] Some historians give Chingiz' age at death as 72. I follow Howorth, Bib. I, 44

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

trace and there was much merging at the margins. But the general pattern is clear enough [1] if only because the allotment from west to east happened in this case to follow the order of seniority of the conqueror's sons. Thus Juchi's patrimony, which owing to his death descended direct from Chingiz to Juchi's sons Orda and Batu, was dominion over all the country farthest to the west, from the Sir Darya over the Urals to the valleys of the Volga and Don. This was the Golden Horde.

The domain of Chaghatai embraced most of Turkistan, that is to say, Maveraunnahr, Farghana and Yedisu, but it included also what is now Sinkiang and, to the south, a large part of Khorasan. It thus comprised most of the settled populations of the agricultural districts, and all the most flourishing cities of Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khojent, Kashghar, Herat and Ghazni. Chaghatai's *ordu* or capital was at Almalik, a lost encampment in the valley of the Ili, probably near the site of the present Kulja but placed by some at the modern Alma Ata.

Ogodai, the third son, succeeded to the country of the original Mongols, where he established his *ordu* at Karakoram, near the present Ulan Bator, and held at first the supreme authority, or Khakanate, of the Mongol Empire. The limits between the dominions of Chaghatai and Ogodai were ill-defined as all boundaries between nomadic hordes must be, but the subsequent struggle for power indicates a shifting frontier somewhere in the Jungarian region on the Ili. As the house of Ogodai declined, most of this region was merged with the territories of the Chaghatai Khans.

The descendants of Tului, the fourth and youngest son, inherited the Far-East conquests of Chingiz in China, with capital at Peking. It was not long before the Khakanate was usurped by this branch, which developed into the famous Yüan dynasty of China.

Chaghatai and Ogodai both died in 1241, depriving two of the four *ulus* of leadership and setting the brood at one

[1] See Genealogical Table with this chapter. [cat. 116, p.54 - Hindu]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 another's throats. Although Ogodai's son Kuyuk maintained a precarious position as Khakan for a few years, and his nephew Kaidu was later to come near to retrieving the position, in the end the chief power fell in 1251 into the hands of Mangu, the eldest son of Tului, from him descending to his brother Kublai — Marco Polo's Great Khan and Emperor of China — in 1257. Tului had three famous sons, Mangu, Kublai and Hulagu, and it was the third of these, the notorious Hulagu, who was sent by Mangu to the south-west. He it was who captured and sacked Baghdad in 1258, finally destroying the shadow of the Abbasid Caliphate and setting up the Il Khan dynasty of Persia to dispute with Chaghatai's descendants the dominion of Turkistan. In the meantime Mangu, succeeded by Kublai, had established himself in the supreme Khakanate, with its base now in China and not on the Mongol steppe. We have seen how communication between the eastern and western branches of the Tului *ulus* was opened by sea to the detriment of the Chaghatai *ulus* which, after a number of vicissitudes, at this period had contrived to retain the major control over Transoxiana and the caravan routes.

The position reached in Turkistan at the close of the XIIIth century must be viewed in two aspects, that of the *ulus* of the steppe, and that of the *ulus* of the settled country. On the steppe the descendants of Juchi and Batu, the Golden Horde, were still in control of all the country right into the heart of Russia. In 1236–40 Batu had extended his grandfather's conquests even farther: passing over a prostrate Russia he pillaged Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, and the terror of his banners was spread as far as the gates of Udine near Venice. Owing to their distance from the Mongol homelands, the Golden Horde, at the western limits of the Empire, were able to develop their own policies untouched by the struggles of the other branches of the Mongol house. Since they controlled only a small part of the settled area — Khorezm for a while was subject to their Khans — and severed, as they were, by the interposing steppe from the troubles of High Asia, they were free to cope with the Russian princes and to

1 [see c-1 116 p 27 -- Aug 26 pst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

establish a power in the west as far as the Crimea.[1] They 1750
became indeed the ancestors of the Turco-Tatar tribes of the Eurasian steppe on both sides of the Caspian and in the Urals. Although the Mongol element no doubt transfused and enriched the original Turkish stock, it was gradually absorbed in it, until the name Tatar as distinct from Turk remains one of the few reminders of the mingled heritage. This process was aided and accelerated by the gradual adoption of Islam as the faith of these peoples. Berke (1257–66) was the first prince of the Golden Horde to embrace Islam, but a century had elapsed from Chingiz' death before Islam became universally acknowledged by the Mongol hordes. Shaiban, Batu's and Berke's brother, and Uzbek, a descendant of this branch, appear in the genealogies as the eponymous ancestors of the Shaibanids and the Uzbek tribes, thus further demonstrating what Barthold calls the *turquisation* of the descendants of Chingiz. It was indeed the Golden Horde which, after Timur's Empire had failed, was destined to supply the Uzbek chieftains who restored Turkish power in Transoxiana.

In the settled areas of the two rivers the position was not so simple.

It is hard to devastate the steppe, nor was it the Mongol way, for they needed flocks and herds for the subsistence of their terrible armies. With the oases it was otherwise. The sack of cities and mass slaughter of the inhabitants is one aspect and the better known. But there is another. The flocks were let loose on the rich irrigated lands as pasturage, after a tradition not yet entirely dead, that of the outspoken contempt of the herdsman for the cultivator. Clavijo, ambassador from the Spanish Court to Timur in 1404, has left a vivid description of this nomadic spirit, each band following its own fancy, pasturing its herds where crops were finest, so that Timur in his time had to intervene to protect the sedentary population.

[1] In 1475, shortly after their capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans occupied the Crimea. Thus the two horns of the advancing Turks, western and eastern, had joined.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLL

175

The factional struggles between the rival *ulus* led to the sacking of cities not only once but again and again. Thus Khorezm passed from the Golden Horde to the Chaghatai Horde, and back again. Urgench and Otrar were subject to constant pillage and the canals decayed. The irruption of Hulagu into Khorasan led to internecine strife between the Ilkhans (his dynasty) and the Chaghatai, with one result that Bukhara, destroyed by Chingiz in 1220 and rebuilt, was again razed to the foundations in 1272 and lay for ten years a ruin. Other cities suffered a like fate, the situation in Turkistan being rendered more confused owing to the uncertain power of the Chaghatai and Ogodai domains squeezed between the stronger forces on the flanks, that of the Golden Horde in the north-west and that of the sons of Tului exercised both from China in the north-east and from Persia under Hulagu's descendants in the south. Commerce too suffered terribly, one insane Mongol method of warfare being for each prince to murder the traders from his rival's domain who happened to be within his power. Thus in 1262 Hulagu decreed the slaughter of every merchant from Berke's territory, and Berke retaliated by executing Hulagu's merchants.

Yet all the time behind the carnage a slow process of *turquisation*, accompanied or perhaps caused by the conversion to Islam, was being worked out in the naturally wealthy areas which formed the heart of the Chaghatai domain. There were Muslim Governors commanding Mongol respect such as Mahmud Yalavash and his son Masud Beg who were able in the cities of the plains to ensure for themselves a position which confounded their savage masters, and to preserve the essence of an Islamic civilization, already in Transoxiana six centuries old.

The first Muslim Khan of the Chaghatai was Borak, and he and his successor Dava are in the direct Chaghatai line, from which was descended Kutluk Nigar, the mother of Babur. After Dava's death the situation became more and more confused, the nominal power passing rapidly down a line of shadow-princes, of whom the last of any note was Kazan

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLL

(d. 1347). The real power fell into the hands of Turkish governors, wielding authority in the Chaghatai name. The distinction between princes and vezirs was marked by title, the Chaghatai prince being known as *Khan*, and the vezir as *Beg*. Like Timur himself, and Babur after him, there is no doubt that many of these *Begs* were of an ancestry inextricably mixed, but by Timur's time, in Western Turkistan at least, their *turquisation* had become complete. Thus they began to take the name of Chaghatai to distinguish themselves and their country from Jungaria and Eastern Turkistan, which came to be known to Babur and others as Mughulistan. There is of course what may be called a Tamerlane legend, written up by a group of chroniclers at the direct orders of Timur himself, and sycophancy has obscured the facts by glorifying the ancestry of Timur and identifying him with the Mongol princes who had gone before. In practice, what had happened was that there remained a pride in Mongol antecedents as shown by the retention of the name Chaghatai itself, but that by the end of the XIVth century the atmosphere had become definitely both Muslim and Turkish.

The Mongol dominion in its prime achieved a staggering immensity. Indeed Chingiz and his four sons, in an age of horse transport, had established across Asia and Europe the vastest continental empire ever known until it was rivalled by the empire of the Russias and their satellites seven centuries later. Like Russia, the Mongol power stretched from China to the Black Sea; the Mongol threat, like Russia today, overhung both Western Europe and the Indian peninsula. To us, and viewed in the perspective of time, the Mongols seem to have come and gone in a fleeting moment, so that historians are accustomed to speak of their rule as a passing phenomenon. But in their passing they threw on the screen a shadow premonitory of a dominion which was to be as extensive in bounds and as lacking in mercy as their own. So too the new Eurasian empire, as dependent as that of the Mongols on the life of one man and on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace circle, may prove to be as ephemeral as theirs.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(iii) *Timur and the Timurids*

175 Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh on the Kashka Darya south of Samarkand. The fact that he came from an irrigated and settled part of the country is significant: while he maintained the tradition of close relations with the nomads who, with their horses and arms, provided the sinews of war, he was attracted by the garden pleasances and the flavour of the already hoary civilization whose cities were grouped along the mountain-skirts where the fertilizing waters spring. In the matter of martial tradition, Timur may have felt himself closer to the men of the steppe than to the people of the towns and villages, but, as Barthold says, he had recourse to a procedure gravely suspect in Chaghatai and Mongol eyes, for he chose a great city to serve as his dwelling-place, and he began to
346 construct in it great buildings. Nor was it only in Samarkand
175 that Timur is remembered for the splendid architecture that bears his name. At Yese too he built a magnificent shrine over the grave of the mystic Ahmed, and at Shahr-i-Sabz, his native place, there still stand the immense piers of the Ak Serai, the white palace of his dreams. Though after the manner of his kind Timur carried fire and terror across all Western Asia, his memorials attest not only a passion to build grandiosely, as have many conquerors before and after him, but something more intimate. He had a feeling for the setting of a shrine — at Yese in the plain beneath the Kara Tav not far from the flowing Sir Darya, at Samarkand the jewels in a green garden against a mountain background. Man of violence himself, his grandsons, and their grandsons, had that peculiar touch and feeling after beautiful things, the work of nature, the product of man's artistry, that we associate with the Muslim spirit at its best. Most famous is the Registan in Samarkand with its three *medreses*, the oldest built by Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg. Of it Curzon said he found it still in his time, even in ruin, the noblest public square in the world, a triumph of massive simplicity and grandeur with which nothing in Europe, save

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86.

[2] Op. cit. p. 326.

2: Carote S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

●175 clash between Eastern and Western Turk at Ankara, where Timur defeated the Ottoman Bayezid in 1402, had small significance. He returned to die three years later at Otrar on the Sir Darya, while the Ottomans, girding up their loins, half a century later finally shattered the Byzantines by storming Constantinople, and went on to thunder at the gates of Vienna. Yet it is rightly said that Timur left a heritage, greater than that of a warrior. It is enough to name his grandson Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer; the [538] Timurid the Sultan Hussain Baikara (1438–1506), with his splendid city at Herat and the great literature fostered there by the poet Alishir Nevai; Hussain's cousin that other Timurid, Babur (1482–1530), author of the Memoirs and founder of the Chaghatai Empire in Hindustan. All these men were Turks self-confessed, they thought and spoke and wrote in the Eastern Turkic language called by the Mongol name Chaghatai. The annals of this house were rendered illustrious by the names of poets, philosophers and theologians, still household words throughout the East.[1]

000 It was a glorious flowering. There is need to live in Muslim lands in order to understand how close are the deeds and words of the men of the classic age to the minds of men today, closer in some strange way than are the Elizabethans to us. The reason for this nearness may be found perhaps in the fact that deeds and words in the East have been handed on so much by word of mouth, and a man will speak of forebears who lived centuries ago as if he had known them as a child. Thus the flowering of the Timurid age is to the Eastern Turks what the Elizabethans are to us, and more: it was a positive achievement for all time which cannot be annulled, a guarantee which later men may strive to redeem. To those who are lost it still provides a rallying-point.

(iv) *Period of Dissolution*

175 Much of the first part of Babur's Memoirs is occupied with stirring accounts of his struggles against Shaibak or Shaibani

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 88, p. 180.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1958 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175

Khan for the mastery of Samarkand, and indeed of the whole of Transoxiana. He was Babur's enemy, and Babur came off second-best. But, although Babur thought Shaibani a barbarian, condemning him for his rough and rude ways of dealing with the women-folk of those he defeated, he was too great a man to blacken an opponent. Shaibani appears in his story as a prince of great valour and of no mean military talent, whose defeat and death at Merv at Persian hands Babur is inclined to deplore. Shaibani traced his descent through his grandfather Abul Khair back to Juchi, the Mongol father of the Golden Horde, and was in the same line as Uzbek Khan. His ancestry may have been direct from Chingiz, but he was in fact an Uzbek and a Turk and was so regarded by Babur. His Uzbeks formed, as it were, a backwash from the Golden Horde, who during 300 years of mastery in Eastern Europe since Chingiz had not succeeded either in subduing the Russians or in assimilating themselves with them. The Uzbeks were a returning wave; they had gone out under Mongol leadership, they returned as Turks. It was this prince who after many struggles defeated Babur and Hussain Baikara and took from them the whole of Transoxiana, Balkh and that part of Khorasan dependent on Herat. His successes encouraged him to challenge Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia (1502–1736), and he was defeated and killed at the battle of Merv in 1510, some years before Babur entered India. The result was the loss of Khorasan and all the land south of the Amu to the Safavids, and the relegation of the newly arisen Uzbek power to the country north of that river. It was at this time that the pattern of the present frontier was laid down. Shah Ismail took Bukhara and Samarkand, but later negotiated with the next Shaibanid a frontier along the Amu and the mountains not very different from that now existing between the USSR and the Middle East. Herat and Balkh went to Persia, eventually to be incorporated in the Durrani Afghan Kingdom, the Amu and the Kopet Dagh becoming the limit of Uzbek rule to the south. Moreover, the growth of Shiism in Safavid Persia set up a theological barrier

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

between the orthodox of Bukhara and the Shiahs whom they regarded as Isfahani heretics, thus for the first time since the Arab conquest severing Transoxiana in the realm of thought from the south.

It is seldom realized how great has been the difference in outlook and ideology between Sunni and Shiah. Vambéry in 1863, on his way from Turkey through Persia in the garb of an Istanbul dervish, found himself spat upon as a supposed Sunni by Shiah wayfarers, while ten years later Schuyler in Turkistan was surprised to find that the orthodox pilgrim from Bukhara travelled to Mecca always by Istanbul or India rather than expose himself to Shiah taunts on the direct road through Persia. Thus even in Muslim times a curtain had begun to drop along the Oxus.

The Shaibanids ruled for a century from Bukhara, their greatest Khan being Abdullah, who before his death in 1598 succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana. Like Akbar and Elizabeth of England, his contemporaries, Abdullah ruled for nearly half a century. He conquered Meshed, Herat and Badakhshan, and at the height of his power even had designs on Akbar's India. After his death began a period of anarchy, confused by fighting with the Persian Safavids for the possession of Khorezm, which in the end became independent under another line of Uzbek Shaibanids, of whom the best known was the historian Abulghazi (d. 1663). He and his successors reversed the tables, making Khorezm for a time the overlord of Bukhara. But, as we have seen, its prosperity had been undermined before this time — according to some in 1573 — by a change in the course of the river, a disaster which led to the abandonment of the old capital at Urgench and the rise of a new city at Khiva. By this name the Khanate was thereafter known.

At Bukhara, after Abdullah's death, the power of the Shaibanids rapidly waned. It gave way first to the Janids, and then to the Mangits, both Uzbek houses tracing descent from Shaibani on the distaff side. Two centuries of nonentities are lit by a single high-light, the invasion in 1740 of the great

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Persian usurper Nadir Shah, himself of Turkmen blood of the 175
Afshar clan, but Persianized. Nadir had just returned from his sack of Delhi and, having found the Ottoman Turks too hard a nut to crack, formed the ambition of carrying his arms to the north to the farthest point reached by Darius' Persia, beyond the Sir Darya. This he did unchecked by any serious reverse, but, except for building a gateway to the Bukhara citadel and (as legend tells) attempting the violation of Timur's tomb at Samarkand, he left no memorial other than an increased dislike for the Persian invader from the south. He himself was murdered by his Kizilbash troops in 1747, and his empire over Turkistan did not pass to the Kajars who succeeded him. But he left in Turkistan what he had left in India, native dynasties in slow decay, and a determination now stronger than ever to seal off Transoxiana from contact with the heretics of Khorasan. The curtain had already begun to fall.

A temporary revival after a period of disorder led to the rise of the last dynasty, the Mangit Emirs, in the person of the Emir Masum in 1784. This dynasty lasted until 1921. These nominally Uzbek chieftains of Bukhara had to face a threefold danger, the first from various tribal confederacies of the north which had never entered the oases and by then were called Kazaks, the second from rebellious Tajik subjects in the more hilly regions to the east, the third a continuous threat, both to Khiva and Bukhara, from the Turkmens dwelling in the Merv, Tejen and Akhal oases south of the Karakum. These sometimes raided in their own interest, at others they were enlisted as mercenaries by contending Khans. Though of the race from which came the founders of the most powerful Turkish Empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, in their own country the Turkmens never succeeded in establishing anything more than the loosest of tribal organizations.. But, as the Russians found later at Gök Tepe, they were no mean warriors, and they kept the sedentary people of city and oasis in continual alarm. This state of things gave birth to a sort of feudal system very like that of the Khans and Begs before the rise of Timur, the Bukhara Emir relying increasingly on local chiefs,

2: Caroe 4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 his own writ being circumscribed by the edges of the cultivation around the city. The cities became more and more Tajik in character, and the Emirs themselves, as their portraits show, took on the appearance of Tajiks, losing their Turkish ruggedness. Within the city a fanatical priesthood fulminated from three hundred mosques and *medreses*, and the methods of government, jealous of all foreign influence, were scarcely even medieval. The condemned were torn to pieces or hurled to death from the Great Minar, and torture was the indispensable accompaniment of justice. The Emir Nasrullah (1826–60) is remembered chiefly for his vermin-chamber, the bug-pit to which in 1842 he condemned the two Englishmen, Stoddart and Conolly, to suffer in agony for months before beheading them. Under such a government Bukhara was soon unable to control even the Farghana Valley, in which a hereditary line of Khans, known as the Min, was established at Kokand about the year 1700 and became independent before the century had passed.

At the opening of the XVIIIth century the country under some form of Eastern Turkish domination still extended from the Caspian in the west almost to the Gobi in the east, and from the Hindu Kush and Kuenlun in the south to the Russian frontiers in Siberia in the north. Over against this the Russian outposts had stretched out right across Siberia early in the XVIIth century, and reached the Pacific almost simultaneously with the rise to power of the Manchu or Ching dynasty in China in 1643. (The actual year in which a Russian Cortez first stared at the Pacific is variously given; 1638 seems the best authenticated.) But all this great territory of the Eastern Turks was in a state of cultural decadence and military confusion. In the Turanian basin itself the control over the sedentary population was in the hands of the three petty rulers, the Emir of Bukhara and Khans of Khiva and Kokand; on the Kazak and Turkmen steppe companies of armed graziers wandered without much cohesion, sometimes banded together to meet emergencies under Khans who were able to impose a loose authority by force of character or temporary

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

wealth. I have tried to show how the decline of Turkistan had begun with the substitution of sea-routes for caravan-roads by the Il Khans after the Mongol invasion; this process was carried further by the European discovery of the maritime route to India round the Cape and the establishment of the Dutch, French and English Companies in the XVIIth century. Even so the land-routes across Asia might have retained a limited importance. But the Silk Road received its death-blow when the Russians pushed their power eastward to China and the Pacific. Russian domination in Siberia had now provided a new land-route from west to east passing north of Turkistan. The old caravan routes on which prosperity had depended were almost forgotten, the petty wars between the little States and the raids from the steppe scarcely permitting of their use even for local commerce. Turkistan was in eclipse and seclusion. There remained on the steppe incomparable human material, but no adequate equation had been worked out between that rough material and the culture, most rich in its way, of the cities at the steppe's edge. Here was a political vacuum which would in the end be filled from without.

Meanwhile, unconscious of the fate impending and closely walled from the steppe, there remained only the shell of past glories, a string of flat-roofed cities, fed by a rich but scanty cultivation, the haunt of a narrow bigotry, and dominated by minarets which served for the execution of criminals and the call to prayer alike.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India, and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk

175 as a pawn in the struggle for position between China and Russia which followed the Russian advance to the Pacific. Unlike their Mongol predecessors under Chingiz, they were never absorbed in Turkdom nor did they embrace Islam; they took title and inspiration from the Dalai Lama of Tibet and remained Buddhists of the Greater Way. But although they maintained their High Asian tradition and their identity, their story provides yet another instance of those raindrops on the window which separate only to meet. The bitter slaughter which went on between Kalmuck and Kazak weakened both and opened the steppe to penetration. But there was also an element of attraction, for at the same time Kazaks constantly married Kalmuck women abducted from Jungaria or the Volga steppe, and their sturdy Mongol physique and appearance is to be attributed to this coalescence.[1]

Throughout the XVIIIth century the Russians, moving in where all was disorder on the steppe, were busily engaged in strengthening the right flank of their long line of communication through Siberia (they had reached the Pacific in the XVIIth century). They had only to carry into Asia the tactics so well proved against the Golden Horde during the conflicts of five centuries on the Volga steppe. In 1716 they built Omsk in the Irtish basin, in 1718 Semipalatinsk, in 1724 Orenburg (now Chkalov), in 1734 Orsk, in 1753 Petropavlosk[2]. These places are situated roughly on, or along the southern flank of, the subsequent alignment of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and for many years the advance was confined to this west-east line. But, as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia moved gradually farther south, until in 1842 the frontier had reached the northern coasts of the Aral Sea and in 1847 had been pushed forward to command the lower reaches of the Sir Darya. In 1853 control was assumed of the waterway of the Sir Darya for a distance of 280 miles

[1] Cf. Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 34-5. (Where he speaks of Kirghiz he uses the old Tsarist nomenclature, meaning Kazak.) [2] See Railway map on p. 192.

175
102

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Page 73



Adapted from Fraser-Tytler's *Afghanistan*

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 538 829 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL.1

175 assumption of authority on the Sir Darya and the capture of Chimkent. The nomads, he said, were now surrounded and the Russians 'found themselves confronted by a solid and compact social organization, offering conditions favourable to colonization and the supply of their garrison'.

Thus far, according to Gorchakov, and no farther. But the very next year saw the capture of Tashkent. Samarkand, forcibly detached from Bukhara, followed three years later. Bukhara itself at the time of Schuyler's visit in 1873 had been reduced to vassalage, and there followed in that same year the conquest of Khiva. Russian power was now on the Oxus and up against the Afghan frontier. Except for the Pamir region, too remote for penetration by the now satellite Bukharan State — a frontier settlement was made there between Russia and the Afghans under British auspices in 1895–6 — there remained only the Merv and Tejen oases on the Turkmen steppe between the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. The absorption of these was delayed a few years by Russia's war with Turkey, and to some extent by the British advance into Afghanistan in the Second Afghan War. But during the decade that followed the Afghan War the Russians once more pressed forward to crush a spirited Turkmen resistance, until, after the conquest of Penjdeh in 1885, 'the only thing which could stop this expansion — the upward thrust of some equally powerful empire — challenged and arrested the mighty steam roller of Russia'.[1]

The play and counterplay of Russian and British forces in this region is more properly a part of the history of Persia and Afghanistan. Although Gorchakov failed to press his own argument to its conclusion, he was right in claiming a certain inevitability for the absorption by Russia of Central Asia up to the limit where some counter-force of stabilization should be encountered. The points at which the two forces did in fact meet are sufficiently demonstrated by the map, both on the southern and the eastern sides. It is now more profitable to consider how far the withdrawal of British power from

[1] Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.* p. 129, likely to become the *locus classicus* on this subject.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

India has made to quiver once more a balance that had come to rest. For the moment it is enough to observe that of all her land frontiers this, with that of Transcaucasia, is the only one on which Soviet Russia has not, whether by annexation or by means of satellites, advanced her outposts beyond the line established by the Tsars.

The campaigns in Khiva, Kokand (Farghana) and on the Turkmen steppe were conducted with much ferocity on both sides.[1] The capture of Khiva in 1873 was scarcely opposed by the people of the oasis; the difficulties were due to the great ring of desert surrounding it, and the fierce Turkmen raiders who roamed upon the desert. Up to 1717 there had already been three Cossack expeditions which fared disastrously. On one of these the Cossacks, laden with spoils and a thousand women, were cut off from water and perished to a man; on another the Cossacks lost the road and were reduced by hunger to kill and eat each other. In 1717 Prince Bekovich succeeded in reaching and occupying the city for Peter the Great, only to have his troops set upon and exterminated after peace was made. The Prince's head was cut off and sent as a present to the Bukhara Emir, who refused to accept it! This disaster deterred the Russians for over 100 years: in 1839 an expedition under Perovsky, thinking Russian soldiers could endure the cold, advanced in midwinter but had to return, its goal unreached, after losing the whole of its camel transport and more than half its men. Throughout the next thirty years the Khivans showed their defiance by making captive and enslaving all the Russians who came into their hands. In 1873 Kaufmann, the Governor-General and after Chernaiev[2] the father of Russian Central Asia,

[1] There are good accounts in Schuyler of the Kokand and Khiva campaigns, and in Curzon of the Turkmen campaign. Barbarities on the Russian side are vouched for by the chief Russian actors themselves. Schuyler gives the Perovsky expedition the date 1829, ten years too early.

[2] *Chernaiev*, the first Governor-General (1865, and again in 1882–4), a gallant and chivalrous soldier whom all admired. The Uzbeks spoke of him familiarly by the nickname *Shernaib*, the Lion Viceroy. *Kaufmann*, Governor-General 1867–82, cold, calculating, ruthless, vastly ambitious, a very able consolidator. His name stinks in Central Asia to this day. The last Governor-General was *Kuropatkin* (1914–17), the Varus of the Russo-Japanese war.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

●175 determined on the *coup de grâce*. Four separate columns were to converge on Khiva, from Chekishler on the Caspian near the Persian frontier, from the Mangishlak Peninsula farther north, from Orenburg and, under Kaufmann himself, from Tashkent. The command of the whole was under Kaufmann, who gave strict orders that any other column reaching its goal before he himself arrived was to defer its assault.

Of these only the Orenburg column, better provided and marching down the west coast of the Aral Sea, succeeded in arriving at its destination without terrible losses from heat and thirst. On the way its commander managed to pick up the Mangishlak column, and on reaching Khiva found himself compelled to attack the city before the Tashkent column could arrive. It was only by a happy chance and not good management that Kaufmann reached Khiva at all, his troops decimated by hardships encountered in the Kizilkum on the way. The Chekishler column had to turn back, harried by Turkmen horsemen and stricken by sunstroke, the troops having thrown away their arms and abandoned their camels in the Karakum desert. The expedition was not the first to establish the incapacity of Russians to provide for campaigning under a pitiless sun. But the success of the Orenburg column, for which Kaufmann himself could claim no credit, enabled him to obtain the surrender of the Khan and the reduction of Khiva to Russian vassalage.

The campaign was marred by the subsequent measures taken by Kaufmann to subdue what he called the pride and license of the Turkmens who had hovered on the flanks of his columns and caused them many losses. He first imposed on them a fine in cash which he knew the Turkmens, whose property was in kind, could not pay. Then, by a breach of faith, he directed his forces to attack them before the date given for payment of the fine had run out. Worst of all, he issued orders, in writing as all his campaign orders were [1]—

[1] Schuyler explains how the excessive Russian habit of writing formal orders on campaigns compelled every commander to carry a large secretariat in the field. He saw masses of great volumes comprising the orders for this campaign. Cf. *op. cit.* ii, 357.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and there is therefore no escape — 'to give over the Yomud [Turkmen] settlements, and their families, to complete destruction'. He followed this up by orders for extermination in case of the least resistance. The execution of this order resulted in a slaughter by the Cossacks, sparing neither age nor sex. MacGahan, the American freelance and hero of the *Ride to Khiva*, who was present on the occasion, describes how the subordinate commanders in the field proceeded to an indiscriminate butchery, and how he saw women and children go down before the Cossacks who rushed about like madmen. 175

Savagery of this order lives in the memory of later generations.

The most distinguished Russian officer in the Turkistan wars was undoubtedly Skobelev. He was present at Khiva, and took a leading part in the later Kokand campaign, where he brought resistance to an end by a ruthless bombardment of the cities and bazaars. The new Russian city in the Farghana Valley, founded near Margilan after the Kokand campaign, was named Skobelev after him (the Soviets changed it first to New Margilan, and later to Farghana). It was Skobelev too who in January 1881, after Lomakin had failed, finally overcame Turkmen resistance at Gök Tepe, the famous Tekke fortress. The curious reader will find the full details given in Curzon's work,[1] much of it reproduced from Skobelev's own words. When the fortress was stormed in the face of the utmost gallantry on the part of ill-armed defenders, the order was given to pursue the retreating enemy and give no quarter, an order pursued with savage precision over eleven miles until darkness fell. The morning found 8000 persons of both sexes and all ages cut down in rows like fresh-mown hay. Within the fort too all who did not escape were slaughtered to a man.

Skobelev himself explained his policy by saying:

> I hold it a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy.

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 78 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Strike hard, and keep on striking till resistance fails; then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.

Curzon remarks that no greater contrast could be imagined to the British method, which is to strike a series of taps, to prohibit slaughter, and to abstain no less wholly from subsequent fraternization. Much could be written on the practical and moral issues involved in this debate, but one thing must surely be clear. The memory of deliberate cruelty does not fade.

Skobelev was a character whom Gibbon would have delighted to portray. He rode to battle clad in white, scented and curled as a bridegroom to a wedding, his voice tremulous, his eyes gleaming so that the Turkmens knew him as Göz Kanli — Bloody-eyes. His white uniform he matched against his horse, always a grey, and mounted he seemed magnificent. Boulangier, a French engineer, writing of him at the crisis of the siege of Gök Tepe, says that at that solemn moment Skobelev shone so splendidly in the eyes of his men that he seemed to their imagination to be the god of war. After Gök Tepe, like Alexander, he exclaimed against boredom, protesting there was nothing left for him to do. His exploits in the field attest his personal courage and his contempt for danger, and, like Napoleon, he exercised a magnetic influence over his troops by his mere presence. His friends he treated with alternate affection and contempt, the transition being reflected in his countenance, which was now beautiful, now ugly, and in his physical condition, which oscillated between masculine vigour and nervous exhaustion. He was for years the darling of the army and a political idol whom to criticize was blasphemy. Yet, a general at 30, he died in a low haunt and discreditably at the age of 38.

In a prophetic passage written more than sixty years ago, Curzon claims Skobelev as typical of the Russian nation, with one foot planted in a barbarian past, the past of Chingiz Khan, while the other is advancing into a new world of ideas and action. And, surely, this extraordinary man was not only a

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

meteor; he was the lodestar of a creed destined to sway many worshippers. It is not visionary to suggest that those who made him their idol must even then have been troubled by a sense of strain mingling with their hero-worship, not unlike that atmosphere of anxious adoration which was to surround a later figure, in the Kremlin.

But here too, even beside the blood and horror of Gök Tepe, there appears a worthier record of the essential kindliness of the Russian common man. After the butchery soldiers were to be seen patting and comforting the few children surviving after their parents had been slaughtered, and there is evidence that the Russian fighting man's spirit of comradeship after the war won affection and respect from the very tribesmen who, a few years before, had most stoutly contested his advance. Even from the ranks of Tartary there comes an unwilling tribute[1]— The Russian himself is not really such a bad fellow: what makes him a nightmare to his neighbours is his notion of imperialism which for four centuries has preached to him the possibility of growth and expansion.

The defeat of the Turkmens at Gök Tepe in 1881 was the first thrust of the final Russian deployment which was to round off the occupation of the entire Turanian basin up to the point where the advance came face to face with the protective shield held out by the British from India. It was followed by two small advance-guard actions only, designed to test the firmness of British resistance, that to Merv in 1884, and the defeat of the Afghan force by Komarov at Penjdeh on the road to Herat on 30th March 1885. This famous incident almost brought Russia and Britain into war, but in the event wisdom on both sides prevailed. The Russians had reached the outer fringes of the mountain barrier south of Turkistan and had subdued their most doughty opponents, the Tekke Turkmens; the British were still able to support an Afghan kingdom behind the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, which should

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 592.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 be free of Russian interference and so act as an effective buffer to their empire in India. A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh, inhabited by people of Turkish stock, and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan.

175 There now remained only a small mountain area never 13) penetrated by Turkish peoples. This was the high table-land of the Pamirs east of the Bukhara mountain country, hitherto a no-man's-land too distant for effective management by the Mangit Emirs of Bukhara and beyond the limits attained either by the Manchus working from Sinkiang or by the British from the Panjab. This remote region also finally fell to Russia, a narrow tongue of Afghanistan known as Wakhan being left as a cartographical buffer — it is little else — between the limits of British expansion in Gilgit and Chitral and Russian expansion on the Pamirs. Many writers have left the impression that there exists a point in this region where met 'the frontiers of three empires', namely, Russia, China, India [1] and indeed a fourth, Afghanistan. This was never the case. The Russian and Indian empires were parted by the finger of Wakhan, the Russian frontier having been so demarcated by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in the summer of 1895, rounding off the Russian dominion towards India but in this sector as elsewhere leaving Afghan territory in between. At one point the Wakhan tongue is only eight miles wide. Here, however, it is buttressed on the Pakistan side by the massive chain of the Hindu Kush, which in Tirich Mir rises to 25,000 ft. At another point farther east is an easy 12,000 ft. pass, the Baroghil, leading from northern Chitral into Wakhan, whence it is possible to look straight across on to Russian territory on the Pamirs. The Russian territory north of Wakhan is now known as Gorno-Badakhshan, or Hill Badakhshan, and is inhabited by Tajiks and pockets of odd mountain peoples, like their neighbours in Gilgit and

Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Aga Khan.

[1] Now Pakistan, which succeeded to the hegemony of Chitral and controls the Gilgit passes north of Kashmir.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Agha Khan. 175

We see then that the whole process of the Russian occupation of the Turanian basin occupied nearly 200 years from the early XVIIIth century, when the posts were established east of the Urals along the direct road through Siberia, to the occupation of the line of the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. It took place in two stages. The first part of the process, in its beginning, was nothing but an eastward expansion over the same Eurasian continent of the gradual Russification of the Tatar steppe, which had already taken place west of the Urals. In the second and subsequent movement there was something new, for the Russians, having conquered the Kazak steppe, moved on into Transoxiana and Farghana, and brought the sedentary populations also under their control. One result of the earlier pressures on the Kazaks was to force the nomads southward into the irrigated areas, so increasing the sedentary population, and leaving vacant spaces on the northern steppes. And there is an important distinction between north and south, to be constantly borne in mind. The Kazaks on the steppe have now been mingled with Russians for over two hundred years, while the conquest of the south was achieved only in 1865–86 and is therefore less than a hundred years old even today. Indeed the actual annexation of Khiva and Bukhara to the Russian Empire did not take place until after the Soviet reconquest of these States during the period 1918–24. We may therefore affirm that the final consolidation of Turkistan under Russian rule is barely thirty years old, and had to wait for the fall of Tsardom to be achieved.

But that is to anticipate. The effect of the Russian impetus under the Tsars was to bring the whole of the Turanian basin, except Balkh and the Bukhara and Khiva satellites, under direct Russian administration from a capital at Tashkent. The Kokand State in Farghana had been destroyed, and Samarkand had been wrenched from Bukhara, both Samarkand and Farghana therefore being Russian territory. Bukhara and Khiva survived as vassal States under close Russian control in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 their external relations, but without much interference at that time with the anachronistic orientalism of their governments in the administration of justice within the limits of each State. Indeed it has been held that, while the Russians under the Tsars posed as protectors of the Muhammadan law, the Sheriat, there is reason for attributing to them a real policy of maintaining the conditions of the Middle Ages in a city such as Bukhara, a hotbed of clerical reaction. The object of such a policy would be to encourage societies of this kind to rot internally and finally to break up of themselves under a new impact, like a mummy exposed to the air. It is not without interest to observe that a visit to Bukhara just before World War II led Fitzroy Maclean[1] to ascribe the same continuing motive to the Soviets in that city.

175 166 The distinction noted between the steppe and the oases was carried through into Russian policy. The Kazak nomads of the vast northern *dala*, already disorganized by the Kalmuck invasions and lacking the stability afforded by a settled cultivation with its attendant towns and forts, fell easy prey to the invaders. Many of them were forced south, and their places were taken by Russian and Ukrainian colonists, the settlement of whom became the fixed policy of Petersburg and proceeded steadily up to 1914. Towards the close of the XIXth century a scientific investigation was made of the availability of Kazak land for purposes of European colonization, ostensibly not without regard to the then existing population of Kazaks (these were wrongly known to the Russians of that time as Kirghiz). This subject formed the terms of reference of two weighty commissions of enquiry under two investigators named Shcherbina and Kuznetzev. These commissioners produced monumental reports in the best Germanic manner, complete with maps and extending to many volumes. But, says the commentator, though these claim to be highly scientific, they are thoroughly tendentious, and from beginning to end are written from the executioner's point of view. The authors set out to prove that the Kazaks are not the original

[1] Bib. I, 65, p. 149.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

owners of the land, and their needs for a minimum subsistence are reckoned with a view to getting rid of them. On this basis 14 million hectares on the steppe were confiscated by decree, and two million Russian immigrants brought in. A more humane, and less scientific, Russian named Zwilling in 1911 compared these methods to that of the Jew who tried to accustom his ass to lower standards of nourishment by giving it a lower and lower ration, and eventually nothing at all. When the ass got used to eating nothing, it died.[1]

The real policy comes out in the outburst of Kriukov,[2] President of the Agricultural Administration in 1907, in which he accused the Kazaks of being the descendants of Chingiz and Timur and therefore deserving only of destruction. When in 1916 the Kirghiz rose against the Tsar's conscription order, and their old leader, Kanat son of Ayuke, was captured on the Chu River and brought to trial, he accused his Russian judges of leaving him and his people no place to lay their heads, and later in despair committed suicide by dashing himself against the prison wall.

When in the period 1865–86 Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe in their turn fell to the Russians, the government at first compromised with tradition by leaving Bukhara (with its mountainous extension to the east) and Khiva as 'native states' under their princes. The rest of the oasis country was brought under direct administration but there was not at that time a serious attempt to do much here in the way of Russian colonization. Indeed, as is usual in the oases of Asia, the already existing sedentary population was thick on the ground, and was engaged in an intensive system of agriculture little above subsistence level. But, just as Tsarist pressure on the steppe had taken the form of infiltration, so in the southern and submontane regions it was exercised by means of a turnover from grain to cotton cultivation, particularly in the rich Farghana Vale with its suitable climate and the natural irrigation brought from the rivers issuing from the surrounding mountains. Already emerging into leadership under the Min

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 301-3. [2] *Ibid.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Khans, Farghana in the Russian era has achieved first place in the economic life of Turkistan, agricultural and more recently industrial also. In many respects, ringed round by protecting hills and watered by streams from every quarter, it is like a larger and even more fertile edition of the vale of Peshawar farther south, even to the narrow exit for the waters at Khojent (Leninabad) — a northern Attock — and its central desert only waiting for the water that gives life — another Yusufzai *maira*.[1]

There was much behind this policy. It was not only cotton that the Russians needed; they sought to impose a measure of economic dependence. The cultivation of cotton was pressed by the appeal of higher prices and the fact that it requires less water and less labour than that of grain — much less water than rice. The consequent diminution in the area under grain entailed the import of corn from Russia to meet a marginal deficiency which was high enough at the time of the Revolution to bring famine to the country when grain imports failed owing to breakdown in communications. This policy could not fail to set Turkistan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary matter of the basic food supply.

175 496 If it was to become the main source of the all-important raw material of cotton, Turkistan required above all a means of rapid transport to Europe. We have seen how the Russian advance came from the north along the line of the Sir Darya, and pre-dated by some decades the conquest of the Turkmen steppe. At first the plan was to use the Sir Darya, and after the conquest of Khiva and the practical absorption of Bukhara in 1873 the streams of the Amu Darya, as channels of river navigation, both fed by a flotilla on the Aral Sea. But the Sir Darya was so beset with shoals that even today the difficulty of navigating it has not been properly surmounted and, although the Amu Darya is rather more satisfactory as a waterway, it too did not then provide the solution that was needed, nor indeed is the Aral Sea ideally situated as an

[1] Pashtu word for a barren rolling plain or steppe, equivalent to Persian *dasht* Kazak *dala*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

entrepôt of commerce. It followed that the practical problems 175 of railway construction had to be faced, and were indeed met, 496 by Tsarist Russia in Turkistan before they had presented themselves in the other parts of her Asiatic Empire. It is interesting that the Trans-Siberian Railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Trans-Caspian line, on the other hand, was begun in 1880 from an original terminus at Uzun Ada (later extended to Krasnovodsk), and reached Samarkand in 1888, whence it was extended subsequently both to Tashkent, the capital, and up the Farghana Valley to Andijan.

Thus railway construction in Russian Central Asia was carried out in inverse order to the initial penetration by force of arms. The Turkmen country, which was the last to be subdued, was the first to enjoy rail communications with the west, and that in spite of the interruption caused by the need to break the journey for the Caspian crossing from Baku. It was not until the end of 1905 that uninterrupted communication with the Russian railway network was achieved by means of a line skirting the Aral Sea and traversing the original road of the Russian advance up the Sir Darya and past the town of Turkistan to Tashkent.

The Russians had at first envisaged the initial approach as leading up the Sir Darya from the north, and did not commit themselves to the Trans-Caspian line without much thought and in the face of strong opposition from Chernaiev[1] and others. The Trans-Caspian project was largely tactical at the outset: it was put forward by their engineer Annenkov as a means of supplying the forces engaged against the Turkmens which had failed disastrously under Lomakin. When Skobelev took over in 1880, he lent his powerful support to the idea, not so much because he needed it to win his campaign — indeed he boasted, and fulfilled the boast, that he would subdue the Turkmens without such adventitious aids — as that his eyes had been opened to what seemed to him its strategic possibilities. It would afford a rapid means of consolidating and

1 [first Governor-General of Turkistan (1865, 1882-84) -- Ed.]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might
496 even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

175 It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes
669 when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293. [2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669

matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for non-combatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed
669 by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service
669 was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[1] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[1] [1st ed. of 1898 and 1911; see cat. 116, pp 88-90 — Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

000 men, among the Eastern Turks of a perception fine enough to be able to look through that fog and knowing the landmarks to perceive a way that might have led them to safety. At that time the vision failed, but they have been able to give an account of wrong turnings taken which may avail their successors in some future time. In their company we begin to get a glimmering of what happened and to understand some of the reasons for the ultimate triumph of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia.

It is important to grasp the essentials of the very inauspicious circumstances existing in Turkistan when Tsardom was overthrown. The very fact that these conditions were so difficult renders the Soviet success the more remarkable, and one cannot deny a tribute to that astonishing combination of diplomatic ability and ruthlessness in action which in the end ensured their victory. Here was a land which had only been finally conquered by the Tsars a little more than thirty years before; conquest over tribal populations had been achieved at the cost of bitter and bloody clashes. The urban centres were traditionally the home of an ancient fanaticism of the more extreme kind. Much of the terrain was either desert or mountain and therefore hard for organized armed forces to
175 control. Only a year before the country had been swept by the storm of a bloody revolt[1], mercilessly crushed. Scarcely was the flame of revolt extinguished when railway communications, in themselves scant enough, broke down, and a severe famine swept a land whose most fertile areas had been given over to the production of a cash-crop, cotton. The situation was the more complex in that the Tsar's government had used Turkistan as the place of internment for thousands of prisoners of war, mainly Austrians, taken on the Western front and released shortly after the revolution in November 1917. During one of the most critical periods of the War (late 1917 and early 1918) and just when Russia was tottering out of it, these released prisoners provided a focus of intrigue for the agents of the Central Powers, Germany and Turkey, in their strenuous endeavours to create diversions on a territory

1 [1916 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

leading to the Indian frontier. British anxiety on that score 175
led to what Russians have called the 'Intervention Period'. Lastly, Turkistan was to a great extent isolated from the effective deployment of Bolshevik force by the armies of White Russians and Cossacks operating under Denikin and Wrangel from north of the Black Sea and under Kolchak from Siberia. All these factors were unfavourable to the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, and some of them might have been expected to encourage separatism.

There were, however, other factors. These are little 000
known and in the end they told decisively in favour of the determination of the Kremlin, as we now know, to retain for the Revolution in spite of all professions every vestige of the imperial power to which they had succeeded. In the sphere of power, as in that of prophecy, the Soviets were to play the part of a more specious Elisha to the ruder Tsarist Elijah who had vanished from the earth.

In the Bolsheviks' favour was, first, the fact that Tsarist 175
education had produced few among the Turkish or Tajik population who were able to give effect to any modern conception of the organization of a State. There were plenty of pious doctors in the Muslim law, learned in the old ways, but there was no local or even municipal autonomy, no press and, among the Turks, very little higher education on Western lines. The number of 'intellectuals' among the indigenous people could be numbered on the fingers, while that other more ancient cement, the system of tribal authority, was disintegrating under the impact of the Russian wars and governments. In any case the tribal Khan did not count for much in the urban centres. There was consequently a real absence of experience in all that pertains to political architecture in a modern world. In the words of Mustafa Chokai, the leader of the Kokand government, the efforts of the men capable of thought or action at this level had to be directed entirely to the hurried creation of some sort of centre, to bringing together a group capable of uniting people unaccustomed to a political idea. At the moment when these leaders ought to have been

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 engaged on construction, they were not only without architects, they had to wear themselves out in hunting for masons and building materials.[1]

Secondly, although the military tradition of the Eastern Turks was a celebrated one, they had been excluded from Russian military service and they therefore had no cadres with modern military knowledge. Nor had they any share even in the subordinate grades in the working of the communications services, whether railway, telegraph or telephone: all these were by deliberate policy in Russian hands. Nor had they even been admitted to such few industrial organizations as existed, except as labourers under rigid subordination to Russian foremen. The Russian finger was on every control, whether civil, military, municipal or the communications machine.

Thirdly, there existed, outside the towns and away from the railways, a condition which was perhaps even more radical and decisive in the struggle which lay ahead. This sprang from the widespread colonization of the land by Russians under the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and previous agrarian settlements. It is true that Russians were thicker and longer established on the land upon the northern steppe and in the Ili Valley than in Transoxiana or Farghana, but even there in the oases, and in the glens around Farghana, the Russian population by the time of the Revolution was rapidly increasing. Although it suffered severe casualties in the 1916 rising, it had been compelled by those very dangers and difficulties to organize in opposition to the indigenous peoples. There was thus a fundamental difference of interest between the indigenous and the Russian populations in any colonized area. The Russians, moreover, had settled down as peasants, while the people of the soil tended more and more to be nomadic, some of them expropriated, others maintaining a traditional contempt for agriculture.

The result was that in the period of chaos following the Revolution the Russians in Turkistan looked for support to

[1] Bib. II, 7, Tcholnieff.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

any authority offering them protection against the indigenous 175
population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia 000
between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does 114
at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is 175
understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern 669

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669

Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

The fourth force should have been these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine.

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At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669

(Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

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[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also.

The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:

(1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
(2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states*. . . .

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] [cat. 116 p105 - Analyst] Bib. II, 2, R. E. Pipes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669 563

> The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

175 669 563

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669 563

was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia 814

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary consent.
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563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

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In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

VII

ENVER AND THE BASMACHIS

O, young Lochinvar is come out of the west . . .

000 IT is now time to turn from events in the north, which had worked themselves to a standstill in so far as the redemption of Central Asian freedom was concerned, and to examine what had been happening along the courses of the rivers and in the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva. I have shown that very soon after the Revolution the Bolsheviks had captured and held the key to Turkistan at Tashkent, and from that centre had succeeded in crushing the short-lived Kokand government early in 1918. From that point we have followed a circle against the clock, starting from Kokand, proceeding over the Kazak steppe to its fringe in Bashkiria in the Urals, and thence by way of Moscow and the Crimea
● 175 to Baku. By the end of 1920, disillusioned but not despondent, Togan has left Baku and, travelling incognito to escape the attention of the Soviets whom he had defied, crossed the Caspian back into Turkistan to arrive in Bukhara in January 1921. Here he soon found himself dealing with the very tribal forces whose movement, touched off by the train lit at Kokand three years earlier, was due for a big explosion in a few months' time.

The difficulties of the Bolsheviks in the south of Turkistan had been greater than any they were called on to meet on the northern steppe, where they were contending only with disorganized Cossacks or the Whites under Kolchak. In the south these difficulties sprang partly from the internal political situation bequeathed to them by the continued existence of quasi-independent 'Native States', much of whose territory was either in the mountains or behind the desert (for Khiva

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

had no railway). Partly they arose from the fact that Bukhara 175
at least was a frontier territory bordering on Afghanistan, a country which their predecessors had acknowledged was beyond the sphere of Russian influence. The southern frontier with Afghanistan stood on that general line against which the Russian tide had washed and found itself unable to advance farther against British resistance organized in the defence of India. Both politically and geographically it had seemed that on this line a stable international balance had at last been attained. But the stability of a frontier depends on the continued existence of steady conditions on each side of it; disturbance on either side is likely to upset the balance.

The six months or so following the October Revolution in Russia were coincident in time with a most critical period of World War I. The weight of America had not had time to affect the issue, Russia had fallen in the race, and the possibility of a German victory could not yet be ruled out. Turkey, though hard hit in Irak and Syria, was still formidable. In 1918 the Turks under Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver, began a thrust forward to the Caucasus and succeeded in capturing Baku. A German mission under von Hentig and von Niedermeyer had been in Kabul in an endeavour to persuade the Afghan Emir Habibullah to denounce his undertakings to the British in India and in the name of Islam to raise the North-West Frontier in revolt.[1] Meanwhile in Turkistan all was turmoil and it remained uncertain in 1918 which side would prevail in the civil war then raging. Thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war, interned in and around Tashkent and elsewhere, had been released and were at large. It is not surprising that Britain thought it necessary to look to the defences of India.

This it was always the British way to achieve by the use of the smallest possible force at the farthest accessible point on the glacis of the Indian fort, not waiting for the turmoil

[1] This German effort failed to affect the outcome of the war, but it left its seed. In 1919 Habibullah was murdered, and there followed Amanullah's assault on India and the Afghan war — events as it happened beyond the present story. Had this pistol gone off a year earlier, events would have merged.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 outside to spread to the buffer States along the marches and expose India's own frontiers to direct attack. And this, in accordance with a well-tried principle, is what was done in the present case, and carried through successfully.

The object of the government in India at that time was to prevent a German-Turkish thrust being launched from the Caucasus by way of northern Persia or Turkistan into Afghanistan and so against India. A serious invasion of this kind in 1918 would have tied down many troops in India and borne hardly on the conduct of the war in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, a small force of less than brigade strength, under General Dunsterville and known later as Dunsterforce, was sent to Baku; and another even smaller force under General Malleson, known as the North Persian cordon, stood on guard at Meshed and pushed forward outposts in the direction of Merv in Turkistan. At about the same time a diplomatic mission was sent to Tashkent from India via Kashghar, where the government of India maintained a Consulate on behalf of His Majesty's government. This mission was under the direction of Colonel Bailey, of the Indian Political Department,[1] who was ordered to open negotiations with whatever authority should be found to be in power in Turkistan. The situation was kaleidoscopic and the future unguessed, but the main object was to induce any authority capable of implementing an agreement to neutralize the dangers which were expected to arise from the release of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners, and their possible junction with any Turkish or German force which might advance from the west.

Dunsterville succeeded in occupying Baku for a few days, but was driven out. His advance did, however, result in securing for the Royal Navy the vital command over the waters of the Caspian Sea which was needed to anticipate any attempt to extend the Turco-German thrust in the direction of India. And Malleson was in position in reserve on the

[1] This service was not concerned with politics but was in effect the government's diplomatic corps. For an account see Bib. I, 18.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Meshed–Merv line as an outpost in the second line to deal with any advance attempted by the land-route through Persia or Turkistan. On reaching Merv he was attacked by Bolshevik forces, which he drove off. He then opened negotiations with a group of Mensheviks, who had succeeded in obtaining temporary control of Ashkabad and agreed that they would aid him in opposing any enemy advance from the west. (It has to be remembered that the Mensheviks were for continued prosecution of the war against Germany and Turkey, while the Bolsheviks had made peace.) This group, supported by Malleson, was for some time in control of the Trans-Caspian Railway, so blocking communications by that route to the Bolsheviks in Tashkent. It was during this time that these Mensheviks caught and murdered twenty-six Red Commissars trying to make their way through from Baku (which had again changed hands) to Tashkent — an incident which Soviet propaganda still bitterly attributes to British influence, unknowing that it is not our way to murder captives in cold blood, or if we can prevent it, permit others to do so.[1] Meanwhile Bailey, arriving with difficulty at Tashkent and having presented his credentials, was threatened with arrest and even with execution, and had to go to ground. After more than a year of hide-and-seek he managed to elude capture by the delightful ruse of going to the Bolsheviks in disguise and offering to pursue and catch himself. His offer was accepted and he chased himself with alacrity into Persia early in 1920 under a hail of bullets to the last. It is pleasant to believe that even the Soviets enjoyed the jest, for to save face they announced sadly a little later that Bailey had died, they were sorry, for they had never borne him any malice and had given him a military funeral. He lives to tell the tale.[2]

By this time World War I was safely over and British forces could be withdrawn from the glacis of India. But it has been necessary to digress in order to explain how it came about that British intervention in the south of Turkistan,

[1] For details of this incident see Bib. I, 51, pp. 144-6, and II, 7, Malleson.
[2] Bib. I, 5.

2: Carne S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

●175 essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

6668 It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political repre-

p. 12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1/A [p. 3 -- Analyst]

175 logical schools of Turkestan in its early Islamic period were famous throughout Asia. The physician Ibn Sina (980–1037), better known under the name of Avicenna, worked at Bokhara, and the famous geographer Jakut (1179–1229) took three years to exploit the works of the ten great libraries of Merv for his geographical studies. Early descriptions of the bazaars of Samarkand, such as that given

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

175 by Gonzales del Clavijo, who in 1403 travelled to the court of Timur (1370–1405) as an ambassador of Spain, confirmed the fact that it was a centre of international commerce, where the goods of all the countries of Asia, even those of the remotest, were to be found. Silks of Turkestan and horses from Ferghana were important articles of export, and reports on the arts at the court of the Indian Mogul em-

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the
best in the world for artistic purposes and for
calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering
fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsur-
passed anywhere in the world. To this day the
town has remained an important centre of cul-
ture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and
Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see
ill. page 1438) became not only wealthy towns,
but places of extravagant luxury in the Euro-
pean sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of
many wars in the course of its history, was
from the middle of the eighteenth century on-
ward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara;
Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the
Russian administration, in these towns the
Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[439] in size and importance. At the present time
the country's commerce with India and China
[177] is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
has greatly declined. Though Western civili-
zation has made progress, modernization has
not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely
surprising in view of the extreme conservatism
prevailing among the Islamic population of
Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different
tribes that are found both in town and country
and whose manifold ethnological differences

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

184
6A

find expression in habits and customs, dress and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page 1451) The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

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[See cat. 116, p. 52--Analysis]

18

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

346

Tamerlane's tomb at Samarkand.

175 cient times it was the northernmost part of Persia, closely united to that country by ties of religion and culture. Its inhabitants, even those of the extreme northern districts in the neighbourhood of the Aral Sea are frequently depicted on sculptures of the tombs of Persian kings, and are seen among the tribute bearers on the friezes of Persepolis (see ill. page 1439). They are shown wearing caps that cover the entire head with the exception of the face; these caps are not unlike those worn by some Kirghiz tribes as a protection against sand and snow-storms. The figures depicted as subjects of Persia may have belonged to a nation which spoke one of the Indo-Germanic languages, and it is assumed that Turkestan was originally peopled by one of the many Indo-Germanic races. However that may be, large-scale migrations of tribes, the effects of which were felt throughout Asia and sometimes even in Europe, swept over the country, and changed the character of the population. In 329 B.C. Alexander the Great conquered Turkestan,

* [see cat. 116, p. 19 --Analyst]

175 and for a time took up residence at Samarkand. At a later period it became the subject of conflict between Persia and the Chinese. The ethnological fate of Turkestan was, however, finally decided by the Turks. It formed the Western part of the Great Empire which the Turks founded in the centre of Asia in the sixth century, and in the following period other Turkish tribes pressed after those who [162] had preceded them. To this day they form the major portion of the population of Eastern and Western Turkestan beside which the other components are comparatively insignificant. Even the conquest of the country by Islam, so decisive an event in the history of the peoples of other countries, such as North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, was in Turkestan of almost exclusively religious significance. Turkish predominance in Central Asia was in no way shaken by this new movement, the originators and pioneers of which were Arabs. On the contrary it was the Turks who after their conversion assumed the leadership in the Islamic world of Asia. They founded powerful dynasties in Afghanistan, India, and even in Egypt; Turkestan itself, geographically the extreme outpost of the Mohammedan world, was in political re-
361 175 spects very often its centre. That was particularly the case under Timur (Tamerlane) (see ill. page 1437) who brought artists and craftsmen from all his conquering raids to Samarkand, which he made a city of marvels, far surpassing in its magnificence any other town within the world of Islam (see ill. on this page). Its superb buildings are entirely covered with coloured glaze that reflects the brilliant sun, producing an effect of beauty which would almost seem beyond anything in the nature of mere brick and stone. The tradition of this art outlived Timur's feeble successors; later Turkestan rulers like the Emirs of Bokhara continued to support the arts, though their standard had by then perceptibly declined. In ethnographic respects too, the inhabitants have changed but little, and the country has remained the centre of the Turkish world in Inner Asia.

7/1 [See p. 12--Analyst]

7/1 [See cat. 116, p. 20--Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[8] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[8] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

517 tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in
177 Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits
previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of
186 loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the his-
●175 tory of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that
177 area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 517 175

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo*[14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats. 177 668

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 177 668

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL]

IX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power. S.U. 636 648 185

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful. T. 101

THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the foundations for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the eighteenth century onwards. S.U 175 [636] 185

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two-pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction. T. 175

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political S.U. [361]
planning]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 175 185 T 175 S.U. [103]

planning. Some of the finest Russian brains of the epoch, such as I. K. Kirillov, the author of the first geographical atlas of the Russian Empire, and the prominent historian V. N. Tatishchev, were associated with the Orenburg project. It is characteristic of the methods of Russian colonization that Orenburg was actually founded three times. In 1737 the original Orenburg fortress was erected at the confluence of the rivers Or and Ural; in 1740 it was transplanted about 112 miles down the river, and in 1742 it was shifted to a place about 165 miles from Orenburg II. The very name of Orenburg was no longer justified since the fortress was, in its final location, far away from the Or river.

For a hundred years the Russians stopped at Orenburg. They used it as a cornerstone for the building of the Orenburg Line, a chain of small fortresses along the Ural river, but for a long time they did not move further. A similar chain of fortresses called the Irtysh Line was built at the north-eastern fringe of Central Asia, south of Omsk. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russians started to move again. They advanced from Orenburg to the Lake Aral and reached the mouth of the Syr Darya river in 1847. Starting from the Irtysh Line they pushed forward to the Lake Balkash and beyond. In 1853, troops of the military governor of Orenburg gained command of the middle course of the Syr Darya by capturing Ak Mechet, which then became the Fort Perovsk, while in the next year troops advancing from the Irtysh Line erected the fortress of Verny – 'The Faithful'.

The most triumphant day of the whole Central Asiatic campaign was June 15th, 1865, when General M. G. Chernayev, with only 1,500 men and twelve cannons, captured Tashkent against enemy forces 30,000 men strong and having fifty guns at their disposal. Only two persons were killed in the final 'assault' on the city, which became the administrative centre of Russian Central Asia.

Three years later another Russian force took, likewise almost without casualties, the town of Samarkand, once one of the most splendid cities of the world, for the possession of which Asiatic rulers had sacrificed tens of thousands of people. A great act of historic *revanche* was associated with this victory. In Samarkand was the grave of Timur the Lame, before whom Russia had trembled and whose men had set Moscow on fire.

From the point of view of Soviet Russian state ideology it is of no small importance that the most vital parts of Central Asia and, in particular, some large and famous towns joined Russia's fold, not as a result of bloody battles, but by virtue of the respect inspired by Russian might and superiority, and as the outcome of skilled manœuvring and diplomatic action. When the Soviet régime reconquered Central Asia for Russia from local nationalists during the Civil War, it was at a much higher cost in human life.

354 ticularly if they lack an adequate supply of warm clothes and covers as well. Every great cold costs a number of lives in the towns of Turkestan and the natives judge the degree of cold, in the absence of meteorological instruments, by the number of persons frozen to death during the course of a night. In 1879, when the temperature once sank to 27° Centigrade below freezing in Tashkent, in the Sart section of [171] that town, 126 natives froze to death /238/ in one night. Here one can marvel at the stubborness with which the people hang on to what is traditional. Although the natives have the Russian household establishments before their eyes and are aware of their efficiency, it still does not occur to them to imitate the latter, even when they have the means to do so.

342 The doors which lead from the courts into the living rooms are usually very low, so that one can only pass through by stooping. In most cases, these doors take the place of the window as well, and therefore are present in large numbers in the larger rooms. The doors always consist of two parts which do not move on hinges but on two pegs fixed in the lintel and the threshold. They always push inward and are so small that each time one must open both parts in order to enter. [353] Among the rich the door wings are usually adorned with artistic intertwining arabesques carved in the wood, or at least painted with bright red, green or blue colors. Since in Turkestan poplar wood, which is not very solid, is used almost exclusively for building and wood carving and it is usually worked and finished before it has completely dried out, the door posts and door wings are always more or less warped as they dry out, and consequently they close either badly or not at all. The fastening of the door is peculiar: outside one part of the door is a short iron chain, and on the other part a peg is fastened ending in a ring. The last link of the chain, which has a slit through it, is hung over this ring. If such doors are to be locked, a padlock is hung on the ring mentioned above.

There are windows only in the houses of the richer people, while the poorer ones must be satisfied with the light entering through the doorway. The window opening in its dimension is always greater horizontally than vertically in private houses, is always found over the door, and therefore in every room there are as many windows as doors. The window opening is either left completely open or it is covered with a grating of wood or alabaster in order to prevent the entrance of swallows and sparrows, of which there is an enormous number here, as well as of other birds. The sticks of which the wooden

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity of the Western world.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 railways, regarded as strategic, did not become the highways of international commerce, and permits to travel were notoriously difficult to obtain. During the first part of World War I the seclusion became even more rigorous; the government first used the country as a convenient prison-house for Austro-Hungarians captured on the front in Europe, and later became involved in the bloody suppression of a bitter rebellion leading to famine and pestilence on a vast scale. It took the two revolutions of 1917 to raise the curtain high enough to reveal to the outside world a confused scene fitfully illumined by the torches of many factions, each struggling against a dark background of terror to plant its own light on the ramparts and herald a new dawn. A brief glimpse only, and the curtain fell again.

It is the Soviet habit to allude angrily to the years 1918 to 1920 as the Period of Intervention, meaning it to be inferred that the chaos of these years of transition was brought about by British machiavellian intrigue in a colonial sphere which should have concerned the Russians only. That period in due course I shall consider: here it is enough to say that the limit of British penetration into Turkistan reached no farther than Merv, while the time was far too short to afford any real insight into, much less any control over, the forces then
114 striving for mastery in Russia's Asiatic Empire. It is rather to the men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a period of intense struggle, during which they themselves for a short time figured as founders or upholders of independent national States. These are they who not only knew the inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern. The fact that this fresh inspiration was quickly followed by the bitterest disillusion over the failure of Bolshevik practice to live up to early promises, does not mean that the positive

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail.

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes,

[1] Bib. I, 62.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

642 631 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a centralizing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mechanization.) The Russians, coming fresh to the science 241
of tropical agriculture, believed that the native use of wooden 312
ploughs and shares instead of the iron plough implied a primitive condition. They could not estimate the value of the intensive cultivation that had gone on for thousands of years in the country. Togan tells us[1] how they tried to teach the unirrigated system of agriculture, as if the Turkistan people in their ignorance were incapable of understanding what it meant. They aimed not at getting a good crop out of a small-holding, but at cultivating large areas in order to get a large crop. Even Nalivkin, a former Governor of Farghana, had to admit that the Russian conquest had brought with it the cessation of intensive cultivation.

There was a time when even the Orsk and Emba areas north of the Caspian used to be cultivated by irrigation. There is evidence that in 1920 irrigation in that area was still being maintained to some extent, though the tradition was even then disappearing as the nomad Kazak inhabitants were driven south and agriculture in the Sir Darya basin decayed. Two Russians, Asmolovsky and Yusuf Karamshev, observed that, although the Sir Darya Kazaks used old primitive ploughs, it was for that reason that the land ploughed up with them retained its moisture and was more productive than that worked with the Russian plough. But there was one useful [177] thing the people of Turkistan did learn from the Russians — how to mow with the scythe. Men like Barthold at that time issued warnings about the new methods and from the start were pessimistic about the attempt to cultivate the Mirza Chöl[2] (the desert near Jizak west of the point where the Sir Darya issues from the basin of Farghana). Never in history had these parts been farmed, although they were close to the river, and this was a case for learning from the experience of the native population, who must have had good reason for leaving these lands alone. Why not revive with the quickening

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 291-3. [see ref, 116, pp 7-8 -- Analyst]

[2] The *Mirza Chöl* is a name also applied to the Betpak Dala, north of the Chu-Talash area.

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the
best in the world for artistic purposes and for
calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering
fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining)[1] are unsur-
passed anywhere in the world. To this day the
town has remained an important centre of cul-
ture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and
Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see
ill. page 1438)[2] became not only wealthy towns,
but places of extravagant luxury in the Euro-
pean sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of
many wars in the course of its history, was
from the middle of the eighteenth century on-
ward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara;
Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the
Russian administration, in these towns the
Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[459] in size and importance. At the present time
the country's commerce with India and China
is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civili-
zation has made progress, modernization has
not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely
surprising in view of the extreme conservatism
prevailing among the Islamic population of
Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different
tribes that are found both in town and country
and whose manifold ethnological differences

1 [See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

2 [See cat 116 p 19-- Analyst]

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part I

•177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

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798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the
177 regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation. It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

faithfully observed by the Turkestan natives; those of the steppe region were less strict, prevented as they were by the exigencies of nomadic and seminomadic life. During Ramazan, Muslim communities in Central Asia customarily reversed their routine, resting daytimes, eating and entertaining at night. Shortly after the end of the fast there occurs a major holiday, *kurban bayram* (feast of sacrifice), attended by the slaughter of sheep and by festivities. 785

The difficulties of observing the Ramazan fast in the Soviet Union are obvious at first sight. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a period of a month is possible only for a people economically independent; it is inconceivable in a society in which virtually every breadwinner is an employee of the state, and the state drives relentlessly to increase production. Furthermore, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result, the Ramazan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. 785 177

Several of the refugees recalled instances of Communist Party officials subjecting Muslims suspected of fasting to "tests." Thus, for example, many Muslim employees of state institutions were called in for conferences with their superiors sometime during the month of Ramazan and there offered a drink or a cigarette; refusal to accept the offer was tantamount to an admission of fasting and could lead to expulsion from work. Similar "tests" were recalled by schoolteachers — during Ramazan teams of officials from neighboring towns often visited schools and checked on both the teachers and the students.

Nevertheless, the observance of the fast, although severely restricted, appears to have partly survived. Some Muslims, unable to fast for 28 consecutive days, compromise by abstaining for three days only: the 1st, 15th, and last days of Ramazan. Others, compelled to eat in order to have strength for work and to avoid the suspicion of authorities, eat and drink as little as possible. It is quite likely — although there is no direct evidence — that the fast may be observed more regularly among those who are not gainfully employed.

The *kurban bayram*, despite its originally religious significance, appears to have suffered the fate of most religious festivities in societies which are secularized or on their way to becoming so: the religious element has largely been forgotten, and the holiday has acquired a predominantly secular, national character. This, in part, may be one of the reasons for its survival. Almost all the informants agreed that the *kurban bayram* was widely observed at least until the outbreak of the war, even by members of the Communist Party. The main difficulty in observing this holiday is the shortage of sheep, which are essential for the ceremony. Not only are almost all the sheep in the hands of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and 782 796 177 233

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

782 796 •177 233 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclopedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subterfuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 177 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving, known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 177 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union.

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed.

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The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities.

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As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate, after

177 584

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

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the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

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age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues
[353] sleeping on the floor."[8] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of whitewash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[8] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

[1] [i.e., the discarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

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LANGUAGE

With the exception of the Tajiks, virtually all the Muslims of Central Asia speak local dialects of one and the same Turki language group. Varying cultural influences to which the individual subgroups have been subjected in the course of history have led to a certain differentiation in the vocabulary and grammar of the principal dialects. Uzbek especially, having been exposed to strong Iranian and Arabic influences, has changed much, even to the extent of losing the vowel harmony common to the sound system of the Turki languages. By and large, however, it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turki literary language for Central Asia. The latter, however, had not yet been formed when the Communists conquered Central Asia in the 1920's and suppressed its further development. 197 177

The importance of language for national consciousness is self-evident: language represents the most ready means of national identification, available alike to the literate and illiterate. While not absolutely indispensable for nationality (witness the Jews), it is so intimately connected with it as to make it one of nationality's very best criteria.

Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia has two principal aspects, both of which follow closely the general lines of Soviet nationality policy. In the first place it strives at all costs to prevent the formation of a single Turki literary language in Central Asia on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. In the second place, it endeavors to promote the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups. The first goal is fostered by exploiting all, even the minutest, dialectical differences among the various Turkic subgroups, and by granting the status of full-fledged national-literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turki language. The second is fostered through the official change of Turki alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and, finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of Russian for all citizens, regardless of nationality, desirous of making any kind of a career. It is apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, such policies will make Russian the language of all the socially dynamic elements of the Muslim population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance. 177 197 668

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and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.[6]

This policy of linguistic Russification is far more subtle than that practiced by the tsarist regime in some of its borderlands during the darkest days of modern Russian autocracy (1881–1903), and, if successful, could deal a very considerable blow to Muslim prospects in Central Asia. Thirty-five years is admittedly too short a time to judge the effects of a set of measures apparently designed to operate for several generations; but certain evidence permits us to draw some conclusions about its efficacy and prospects of success.

Soviet linguistic policies seem to have had very little effect on the speech habits of the bulk of the Muslim *rural* population. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with Russians, the Muslim peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. They seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been. None of the peasants interviewed knew more than a few words of Russian; after ten years in Germany several could speak better German than they could Russian after several decades of residence in the Soviet Union. For most of the rural Muslims in the USSR, the first important contact with Russians and the Russian language comes with entrance into military service. After being drafted they are distributed among Russian soldiers and are expected to learn the language as best they can. For many of them, the military service is the first and most efficient school of Russian.

The situation is somewhat different in the cities and small towns, where Muslims live side by side with Russians, and where a large proportion of Muslim youths attend high schools and institutions of higher learning. It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the linguistic training in Central Asia, because it varies from area to area and from time to time. If there is a general principle, it seems to consist in a direct correlation between level of education and Russian language instruction. In the elementary schools, the instruction is predominantly in the prevailing local language, either Turki or Russian, and in areas where both groups are numerous, in both. In the secondary schools Russian is either the principal language of instruction (in schools attended largely by Russian students) or else it is taught

[6] An alternate interpretation of Soviet linguistic policies in Central Asia is suggested by a British authority, G. E. Wheeler: "[The Soviet authorities] evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the 'Arabization' of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics." G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 41 (July–Oct. 1954), p. 181.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[1]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[1] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65–66.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

191 517 with each other in Russian, even on occasions when, because of diverse ethnic origins, communication in Turki presents considerable difficulties.

•177 191 517 It is as yet too early to estimate the effects of Soviet linguistic policy aimed at Russification through methods which are both negative (division of Muslim groups) and positive (the imposition of Russian through compulsion, linguistic infiltration, and career inducements). On the eve of World War II the Muslim rural masses seemed to have been quite unaffected by Soviet linguistic measures, and so were the poorer and less educated elements in the cities. These groups continued, as before, to communicate exclusively in their native dialects, being ignorant of Russian. Soviet policies did cause the numerous and growing Muslim intelligentsia to acquire a working knowledge of Russian; but instead of becoming Russified these groups became bilingual, using Russian for the purposes of work, and Turki or Persian, as the case may be, for all other purposes. Of linguistic assimilation there does not seem the slightest evidence; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong external pressures.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers:

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth.

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952.

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification,

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers. 475 162

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred. 361 177 167

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

162

[11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universi- 517
ties, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves 517
superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling 461
with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which [668]
aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the charac- 517
teristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addi- 177
tion it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in 517
Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this 177
may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian 186
"Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

517 tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in
•177 Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits
previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of
186 loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the his-
175 tory of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that
area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very
177 scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 517 175

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats. 177 668

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 177 668

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

177 668

without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

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The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 668 648

Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination), it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
[346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 631 563 T. 631 563

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. 517 814 177 S.U. 563 658

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[8]

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

S.U. 563 185 S.U. [871]

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

T. 871 555 S.U. 871 563 555

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

177.47

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries free-born and untrammelled, meeting only with rivalry from their own kind if they should overstep their limits. Their flocks were part of their family and they lived by and on them. For houses they had only tents (*yurts*) and wooden or adobe huts. For their Khans they had a real veneration recorded in epic poetry handed down by minstrels by word of mouth. The way of their life implied that they would be here today and gone tomorrow, and it had always been difficult for authority to control or tax them. If the seasons were kind, a tribe was self-contained and asked little of any man. In bad seasons there might be raiding and local forays. By 1929 the Soviets had not fully succeeded in driving a satisfactory wedge between the Khans and the other tribesmen on the steppe. In the settled areas it had been possible to appeal to the cupidity of the lesser men by redistributing the land of the richer; but on the steppe the redistribution of pasture lands was a most difficult operation, and that of flocks and herds almost impossible. In either case the bond between Khan and free tribesman was too close and intimate to brook official interference of that kind. It was for this reason, that, when Littlepage arrived on the steppe in 1928, he was able to record that the old life and manners of the tribes up to that time remained unchanged. Some of the old loyalties to the chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula or prohibition, the old laws of hospitality, were still in force. At that time the tribal herds were increasing every year and the tribes supplied meat and dairy products ample for themselves and for the dwellers in cities alike. It was this system that the Soviets had to break up, if they needed these men for industry. It was a tough job.

In a pregnant passage Littlepage[1] states both points of view:

> The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the Second Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 185-6.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

from the original prophets of Communism.[1] Responses to Soviet challenges of this nature are sometimes as involved as the sentences and sentiments which provoke them. With both sides, as it were, throwing words into a machine, it seems all too likely that it is not in human nature to listen, and that the propagandists are wasting their time. Unless one can shut down, even for a moment, all the surface clatter of these well-worn abstractions, it is impossible to hear the rhythm of the life behind. Yet, though for a time it may seem to be drowned in the noise of the machines, that music can still echo faintly for him who has ears to hear.

A final thought of a general kind is this. So far, I have tried to depict the influences which shaped the lives of the people of Central Asia in the sequence of some sort of chronological order. This way of looking at things has even served to some extent when we came to examine the confused conflicts between Communism and Turkish nationalism during the interregnum period. There is of course also a chronology in the thirty years of the Soviet era which followed the first consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia in 1922. As, for instance, the period from 1922 to 1928 was occupied mainly with the territorial establishment of new republics, the 'rooting' of the Party, and the nationalization of land and water; the periods 1928–32 and 1933–7 were those of the first and second Five-Year Plans, with collectivization of agriculture and suppression of nomadism in the countryside and the rapid creation of an urban proletariat by means of redeployment of population to serve industry; the periods 1938–41 and 1941–5 represented the third Five-Year Plan (broken off by the War) and the War period, and saw a large increase in production of coal, oil and heavy industry generally under the spur of war needs and evacuation of industry from Europe; lastly, the period 1946–50 is that of the fourth Five-Year Plan, which set targets for the over-all increase of industrial output in Central Asia by 80 per cent.[1]

[1] A good example: 'It is the establishment, by means of the collectivization of the rural proletariat, of the forms of practical application of a complete and good measure directly answering the requirements of today which is at stake'.

287 technique primarily for the making of floor-
352 coverings. The fact that Sir Aurel Stein discovered fragments of pile rugs during his excavations of the stations along the ancient silk road through Eastern Turkestan, distinctly points to the origin of the technique among the nomads of Central Asia. Apart from that, nothing certain is known of the origin and development of the different kinds of Turkoman rugs. Some examples may date back to the early eighteenth century. That is, however, no more than surmise, probable though
287 it may be. The one established fact is that all
178 the good examples of the craft now in existence must have been made before the seventies of the last century, that is to say, before the conquest of the country by the Russians. The reason for this is the complete transformation of the life of the Turkoman tribes under Russian rule. As the Russians put an end to the activities of the Turkomans as caravan robbers and slave traders, they were obliged to cast about for some other means of livelihood. From that time on the burden of providing a substitute for the gains formerly achieved by robbery fell to the women, whose skill in carpet-knotting was exploited. Carpets of huge size were made for the palaces of Russian nobles and generals. In time the desire to execute these profitable orders as speedily as possible led to a decline in the great care formerly exercised in the making of Turkoman rugs.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
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563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

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563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

St Cairoe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Uzbek
Nogai
Kazak

101 with Barthold's views, in that it was these Uzbek and Nogai clans, and others of their kind, who became the forerunners of the true (*ulugh*) Uzbeks, of the Tatars of Idel-Ural, and of the Kazaks alike. Those of them that became masters of the oases in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses naturally assimilated some degree of the Persianized manner and habit of mind, body and speech prevailing among the sedentary population, until in the end the Turkic-speaking Sarts
•181 claimed enlistment under the Uzbek banner. But, as the Basmachi troubles showed as late as 1920, there were many Uzbeks left in the villages and hill-country who retained all their ancient prowess as warriors up to the time of the coming of the Soviets to Turkistan.

Of the Uzbeks proper Togan writes:[1]

> They do not display that Muslim fanaticism and pride in an effete civilisation which is almost a disease among the Kent-Turks. Although today the Uzbeks live a settled life, their tribal divisions have not entirely lost their political and social importance. They are serious, peaceable and honest, but in war they are as courageous and pitiless as ever they were. They love hard exercise and games on horseback called Kökbori. They have retained their aptitude for war, as they shewed in the Basmachi rebellion, and it is surely they who will one day play the chief part in the political life of Turkistan.

101 Those who remained on the steppe took to themselves in time the generic name of Kazak. As stated, the word Kazak means a vagabond or outlaw — one beyond the pale; it is not a tribal name. The process is not unlike that whereby the branches of the great Ghilzai clans, which cross the North-West Frontier in annual migration from homes in the Afghan highlands to the softer climate of the Indus Valley, are known not by the tribal name of Ghilzais but as Powindahs or graziers. Just as the word *Sart* was used to designate a cultivator or townsman, so Kazak was applied without tribal significance to the nomads of the steppe. In such a country with such a history the ancestry of the Kazaks has been tangled

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 46-7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kazak

beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique 101
suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the 000
languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle 619
against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, 181
> courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirat*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[3] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 85.

181 combined region of Kitab and Shahr-i-Sabz before the Russians came. He found him a man whose word he could implicitly trust, possessed of much delicacy of mind and feeling, with an appreciation of what is due to himself and of an aristocratic bearing in every look and movement. In appearance Jūre Beg was tall and handsome, simply dressed but exquisitely neat, with a thin beard, pleasant dark eyes, and a serious face — a strict Muslim, but altogether without fanaticism — an excellent judge of character, with the politeness of Asia at his finger's end, yet with dignity to act as he thought right. He conformed indeed, says Schuyler, to his notion of perfect breeding. Togan, writing sixty years later of the same man, speaks of the great respect in which Jūre was held by his own people and Russians alike. He came of a nomad Uzbek tribe, like the Kazaks not greatly influenced by Persian manners, but he had a fine library which he was proud to show to Barthold, whom he allowed to catalogue it. To the Russian Barthold, he said, 'The Russian administration in Turkistan is very like that of the Mongols; they choose the worst men from among us and use them against their fellow countrymen'.

186 No writer on the Turks of Central Asia can avoid a reference to the slogans under which various forces interested in this region have from time to time sought to enlist the interest of the Eastern Turks in a larger political union. Different banners have been unfurled, beneath which a Turkic renascence should take place. The following definition [1] is that given in Togan's work, with a conclusion that no one creed offers, as it stands, a worthy or practicable goal for the Turks.

The three terms, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, are first stated. The first, the religious appeal, which would draw in other peoples of the Muslim world, is seen as a strand only of a more real and deep Turkish patriotism. Generally, pan-Islamism is dismissed as a political force, partly because most of these writers and thinkers themselves started

[1] Op. cit. pp. 360 et seqq.

2 [i.e. by Togan - see cat 116. pp. 7-9 .. Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Asian peoples have not yet failed; there are also grounds for supposing that the impact of the new has not been wholly destructive, but by a process of catalysis may even bring about some renewal of life. A re-birth of this sort is more likely in a society which has released women from subjection and cast off the outworn bigotry of mosque and school. From this meeting of old and new some offspring will surely be born. It is for the free world to forecast the delivery and nurse it when it comes.

The message sent out by those who would speak for the Eastern Turks is this:[1] In order to bring about the disappearance of the nations of Central Asia by complete assimilation, Russia will have to torture and oppress these millions for centuries. For even if the Russian domination were assured, the people of Turkistan will not forget their freedom so far as to renounce their languages and their faith. The dangers caused by the Soviet domination are indeed a reality on a scale never imagined, yet just as quickly and on just such a scale the day of the crack is approaching. The tide will turn and bring with it either liberation — or disappearance from the pages of history. Never has anyone been able to force a religion or course of action on the Turks. A nation has its own idealism — its own romance. Life moves forward and nothing can prevent a nation from developing.

Remembering how the Mongols came and conquered and passed away, Turkistan will struggle on, like the Oxus —

A foiled circuitous wanderer, till at last
The longed-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright
And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea.

[1] End of Togan, *op. cit.*

162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Salors and Saryks extend their wanderings into Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the northermost of the Turkoman tribes, who number about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
[181] Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day knows how hospitable, frank, and trustworthy the people are. They are of a decidedly
567 warlike character. Until after the middle of
579 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put a stop to their activities, they were the most redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan, and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards kidnapping and the slave trade. They extended their raids far into Persia, seizing what prisoners they could. The wealthier of these were released after the extortion of as large a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be gathered from the fact that when the Russians conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000 slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and vigorous race with an abundant growth of beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow, skin. The women, too, are tall and slender; they are among the most beautiful in Asia. The tribe is much farther removed from the Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason for this may be that the Turkomans live so close to the Iranian frontier, and that they have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian Tribes.

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

S:Kostenko --9-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki (Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg. 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

162 [101] 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

342 Central Asian is the high outer wall which surrounds the dwelling houses, together with the gardens and courtyards belongint to them; these surround the houses on all sides, and completely shut off the outer world. These outer walls are entered from the street by only one gate, behind which a special inner wall is built in order to obstruct the view into the courtyard from the street. They form, as it were, the fortress of each house owner /229/, which no trespasser has the right to break
183 into. Within his walls the Central Asian is his own master, and the administrative authorities never venture to infringe upon the sacredness of the private dwellings, especially the women's quarters. This is what has made the collection of a more exact population census impossible up to now. For according to Central Asian mores, it is already regarded as an impertinence if one asks the father of a family only for the number of his wives and children, or about events transpiring within his four walls.

/Figure 82, p. 63a. Caption: Cross section of a Sart dwelling

1. Veranda
2. Veranda columns
3. Room door
4. Window opening
5. Hollowed place for overshoes
6. Niches in the wall
7. Smoke hole
8. Pool
9. Fodder trough
10. Alfalfa Supply for the winter
11. Terrace
12. Outer wall./

342 The space enclosed by the outer walls already mentioned is divided into two parts, which are strictly separated and are connected only by a low narrow garden gate. The larger part, lying next to the street, forms the men's quarters. Here the father of the house lives with his grown sons and the male relatives and servants who are always living with him, here he carries on his business, and receives visitors and strangers. /Figure 83, p. 63a. Foundation plan of a Sart dwelling. (The lines in the sketch indicate canals.)

1. Living rooms. 2. Veranda. 3. Sheds. 4. Outhouse. 5. Pond. 6. Terrace./ The other part is alloted exclusively for the residence of the women and children, and it may be entered only by women. Otherwise the only man allowed is the father of the /230/ house. (1)

183 1. The sacredness of the women's quarters is so great in the eyes of the Central Asians, that they are profaned even

183 by the glance of a stranger. In 1886 in Baysun when I had to carry out astronomical observations from the roof of my dwelling, because there was no other suitable place, all the surrounding houses were emptied of their occupants for the night in question.

342 Each of these two parts is divided again into two or perhaps three subdivisions, depending on the circumstances: the living quarters, the courtyard and the garden, the last of which is usually lacking among the poorer people. Especially in arid regions and in towns densely built up, the inhabitants must content themselves with a simple court, while the gardens are relegated to a place outside the town walls. Where there is a garden, it is usually divided from the court and dwelling houses by a wide partition wall. As a rule, the general arrangement of the dwelling houses, sheds, courts, and gardens is that indicated in the two sketches above (Figures 82, p. 63a and 83, p. 229), of which the first shows the vertical cross section, and the second the ground plan of an average dwelling.

The dwelling houses, which consist of one or more rooms situated next to each other, the number depending upon the financial means of the owner, are built along the outer wall in such a way that this wall always forms the rear wall of the dwelling. The dwellings are almost exclusively one-story houses, which is partly due to the building material used, and partly to the frequent earthquakes. (2)

731 2. The frequency of earthquakes differs widely in different parts of Turkestan. While rare in many regions, as in Samarkand, for example, other places are often visited by earthquakes. The town of Vernoye /Alma Ata/, for example, was almost completely destroyed by one on June 9th, 1887, and since then it has felt earth tremors of greater or lesser intensity almost every day. Also in Osh, at the eastern end of the Fergana valley, there were almost daily earthquakes for a period several years ago. In Tashkent there are on the average about a dozen earthquakes in the course of a year. On the whole in Turkestan the earthquakes are light and rarely result in the caving in of houses and the loss of human life. In Tashkent I experienced only two such earthquakes in fifteen years, of which the one of November 29, 1886 was the strongest and caused considerable damage. The greatest earthquake in Turkestan of recent times was the

the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues
[353] sleeping on the floor."[8] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of white-wash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[8] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

1 [i.e., the discarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the best in the world for artistic purposes and for calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. To this day the town has remained an important centre of culture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see ill. page 1438), became not only wealthy towns, but places of extravagant luxury in the European sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of many wars in the course of its history, was from the middle of the eighteenth century onward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara; Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the Russian administration, in these towns the Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[139] in size and importance. At the present time the country's commerce with India and China is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civilization has made progress, modernization has not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely surprising in view of the extreme conservatism prevailing among the Islamic population of Central Asia.

● 184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different tribes that are found both in town and country and whose manifold ethnological differences

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

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find expression in habits and customs, dress and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page 1451). The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

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[See cat. 116, p 52--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Customs of the Settled Population of Turkestan

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The wealthier portion of the population of Turkestan, the merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and peasants, live in the towns and the villages of the fertile areas. They differ considerably in culture, dress, and customs from the nomads who range the deserts. It is usual to distinguish between three different domiciled groups, the Tajiks, Uzbegs, and the Sarts.

Of these three groups the Tajiks are the most interesting. They number about 1,200,000, and live in the southern part of the former emirate of Bokhara, which now forms an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union under the name of Tajikistan. They are above all a mountain people, and are at the same time skilled agriculturists. As their language has preserved Iranian elements, it may be assumed that they are a remnant of the original population of the country, which retreated before the invasion of the Turks.

The Uzbegs, about two million souls, form the majority of the agricultural population. They live in the heart of the fertile areas round about Samarkand, Bokhara, and Khiva. They appear to have originated in an army formed by Uzbeg Khan in the 14th century, which was made up of men who were willing to renounce the shamanistic customs which persisted and still persist throughout the country,

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

View of the courtyards of Mohammedan houses in Samarkand. In the background the ruins of the great mosque built by Timur between 1398–1405.

162 and to profess a pure form of Islam. For that
619 reason the Uzbegs contain all the elements of
184 the Turkestan population, Arab, Turkish, and Tajik.

The two million Sarts who in the main make up the municipal population of Western Turkestan are even more of a racial mixture than the Uzbegs. That is not surprising considering the fact that the cities of Turkestan have always been great trading centres of international character. Nowadays, the differ-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

162 ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regard-
619 ed as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name
184 Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

162 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other
619 side of the border. The domiciled population
184 there is made up of the so-called Turki people, more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

[1] [See cat. 116, p 24.--Analyst]
[2] [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The Nomads of Turkestan and Their Dress

184 619 The picture presented by Turkestan and its peoples is very varied indeed; deserts, fertile country, and towns are areas clearly distinct from each other, each of which imposes different modes of life on its inhabitants. Such distinctions are found all over the world; they may be observed in Egypt, Arabia, and elsewhere. In Turkestan, however, they are the more striking as the inhabitants of these zones not only represent different stages of cultural advancement, but separate peoples and tribes, which differ markedly from each other in appearance, customs, and dress. Even nomad tribes, whose mode of life is essentially similar, have distinctive characteristics which vary with the nature of the districts which they range.

162 619 In Western Turkestan there are two principal nomad tribes, the Kirghiz and the Turkomans. The Kirghiz are made up of two main groups, the Kirghiz Kasaks and the Kara Kirghiz. The Kirghiz Kasaks are by far the more numerous of the two tribes; they number about 1,600,000 souls, and form four groups (orda, hord). They roam through the Kizil Kum Desert in Western Turkestan between Tashkent and Khiva; they are scattered over a wide area, and have even encroached on the lands of the Turkoman tribes. Isolated groups are found all over the country. The majority of the Kirghiz Kasaks wander through the so-called Kirghiz Steppes which extend north-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

342 ish. The Kirghiz tent may be described as a portable house (see ill. p. 1457). The frame consists of three parts, the walls, which are made of trellissed laths that can easily be folded up. the roof-frame, and a ring to which wall-frame and roof-frame are secured. The whole structure can be taken to pieces in a very short time, transported by a camel to a fresh pasture, and re-erected without great difficulty. After the framework has been set up, it is first surrounded by mats made of reeds, which bear a pattern formed by wrapping coloured threads round the stalks. These bold patterns with their angular geometrical figures are visible from afar. According to the time of the year the roof or the whole kibitka is covered with felt, which is tied down by means of cords. Against the burning heat of summer as well as the icy winter blizzards the felt kibitka affords the best protection imaginable.

287 531 Tents of similar kind are used by the Turkoman nomads. Unlike those of the Kirghiz, where the materials consist mainly of felt and leather, the Turkoman tents are characterized by the predominance of fabrics worked according to the technique of carpet-knotting.

[184] The perfection of this technique and the great variety of articles produced demonstrate the advanced stage of Turkoman civilization as compared with that of the Kirghiz. The knot-technique gives to the tent as well as to articles of daily use an artistic character which in no way impairs the mobility of the household.

Most of the rectangular Turkoman rugs were hung in the opening of the tents, where they served as substitutes for doors. None of the older pieces are larger than the moderately wide tent-openings. Some Turkoman tribes fixed a specially decorative piece, also worked in the knot-technique, above the entrance. The

7 [See p 67 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages [1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler [2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Köl greatly reduced
123 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are situated the largest copper-workings and smelting plants
328 in the Union, and there is another at Almalik close to Tashkent and therefore better placed for transport than the larger mines farther north. At Chimkent is the largest lead centre in the Union, working ore from many quarters, including the Tajik hills. And there are important minerals, said to include mercury, radium and uranium, in the mountains surrounding
433 the Farghana Valley. But, apart from the man-power they can supply to feed the industrial Moloch, the main importance of the five republics in this field is to be found in the production of the raw material for textiles — cotton and silk — and the availability of supplementary sources of power, which include oil, coal and water-generated electricity. The production of the last, hydro-electric power, is tied up in the minds of Soviet engineers with large-scale irrigation, and this in turn with transport, both by waterway and railway. In all these spheres there has been ambitious planning, and forecasts are often extravagant and even grandiose. In almost all cases it is hard to disentangle prospective targets from actual results, publicity media being regularly used to give an impression that projects which have not in fact left the draughtsman's table are on the point of realization in the field. Indeed it can fairly be said that almost any account of planned development in Soviet Russia, industrial or agricultural, calls for question on this ground. Usually the more poetic the vision of the publicist, the less advanced will be found to be the execution of the work. Another tendency is to claim as the triumph of the Soviet genius works which were in fact conceived and carried to an advanced stage by Tsarist engineers. This is particularly apparent in the field of railway works.

•185 It is convenient to view industrial development in this region under four main heads:

(*a*) power, including oil, coal and hydro-electric;
(*b*) light industry, mainly cotton and silk textiles;
(*c*) irrigation;
(*d*) transport, railway and waterway.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 These four overlap, as for instance in the case of irrigation and hydro-electric works, or irrigation and navigation canals, both of which Russian engineers like to set side by side. They do not by any means give an exhaustive analysis — the copper and lead mines and works above mentioned are instances of this — and at many points they have to be considered in relation to agricultural development also. But they do provide some general idea of the all-over Soviet plan for the development of Turkistan. In broad terms this may be said to be to continue the Tsarist policy of using Central Asian products to make Russia self-sufficient in the raw materials of the finer textiles (cotton and silk); to improve on that by bringing the mills to the fields in order to manufacture on the spot; largely to increase the area under cash-crops by irrigation; to use the irrigation canals to aid in the supply of power; to increase also to the limit the fuel sources of power available within these territories; and finally to provide the rail transportation necessary for bringing the whole agricultural and industrial complex within the all-Union economic system.[1]

496 I mention transportation by rail last because the Soviet record in the matter of railway construction has been remarkably unimpressive, and one has the impression that the provision of enough and efficient transportation links does not precede or synchronize with, but follows, developments in other fields, seriously handicapping the prospect of a balanced economy. Only one really important trunk railway is known to have been fully completed in Turkistan during the thirty-five years of the Soviet era, and that is the Turk-Sib. Even that was planned and surveyed under the Tsars, and but for the Revolution would almost certainly have been put through much earlier than 1930, which was the year in which the Soviets with a great fanfare announced its eventual completion. The Tsarist engineers completed the Trans-Caspian (or Central Asian) Railway in the eighties of last century and the

[1] A table of a few targets set under the fourth Five-Year Plan which ended in 1950 follows this chapter. The targets for the most part are said to have been reached, and the Soviets have now moved on to a fifth Plan. For rail-network see map opposite.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander
653 scale. The first two schemes which follow may be called
312 'local' in the sense that, in appearance at least, they are not
185 part of a continental linked project dealing in the waters of more than one river. These two projects are:

(i) *The Karakum Canal*

The project was an old one, but it was revived in 1945, and ratified in 1947. The main channel is to be some 350 miles long and to irrigate nearly half a million acres. The headworks were to be somewhere near Kerki on the Oxus left bank, and the main objective is to increase the cultivated area watered by the Murghab and Tejen rivers in the Merv and Serakhs oases. Work was stated to have been started in 1949.

A work of this kind, skirting the Kopet Dagh line of mountains which forms the Persian frontier, must cross the natural drainage lines of the country, and involve heavy bridging or siphoning and much danger of being breached by floods, to say nothing of being choked by sand-drifts. Without any local knowledge it is possible to affirm that this canal must take time to construct and will be expensive to maintain. Confidence in the Soviet engineers is not increased by loose talk that the canal will be used for shipping. Navigation and irrigation are ill partners.

(ii) *The Uzbek, or Upper Oxus, Canal*

This project was planned by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in May 1947. It is a very large scheme for a canal 500 miles long to supplement the irrigation at the tail of the Kashka Darya and the Zarafshan systems — among the best cotton-lands in Central Asia — by water from the Oxus. The project was described at some length by a spokesman of the Central USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The plan envisages the construction of a headworks at Kelif on the Oxus right bank, where the river finally emerges from the hills into the plain. At this point the right bank rests on a spur of the Hissar Range, a rocky eminence which canalizes the channel

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

and prevents it from shifting as it is always doing in its course 653 through the plains lower down. On the face of it then the 185 site is well chosen for the headworks of a perennial canal. 312 At this point a dam described as 6 km. long and 20 metres high was to be constructed. For the next 100 km. the main canal would run along the skirt of the Hissar Range, passing on its way a point named Akyar where it would drop 34 metres, the fall being used to establish a hydro-electric power station. The canal would then swing northward to cross the Kaskha and Zarafshan rivers and augment the water-supply in both. The forecast spoke of opening up new irrigation to the extent of 1·2 million hectares, or nearly 3 million acres, and the estimated cost was 7000 million roubles. No date of completion was named.

This project, like the last, involves cutting across the natural drainage lines of the country, and the upper part of the main channel, skirting the great chain of the Hissar mountains (rising at one point to over 15,000 feet) will necessarily have to withstand occasional floods of extreme violence. Further, the crossing of the Kashka and Zarafshan basins at a point presumably not far distant from the debouchment of those rivers into the plains will demand engineering and constructional skill of no mean order.

The plan calls for the establishment on the falls of hydro-electric generating stations of an aggregate capacity of 1 million kilowatts, equal to about ten times that of the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon.

The spokesman said that these two canals together were expected to take nearly 2000 cubic metres per second [1] from the Amu Darya. On the assumption that each is designed to take 1000 cubic metres, each of these canals would be about twice as large as any of the great works constructed in the Panjab. This 2000 cubic metres volume is quoted as taking about half the total discharge of the river even in July and

[1] To convert cubic metres into the normal British engineer's standard of water-volume, viz., cubic feet per second, an adequate rule of thumb is to multiply by thirty. 1000 c.m.s. would therefore be equivalent to about 30,000 'cusecs'.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

653 185 312

August, the flood months owing to summer melting of snow in Oxus' 'high mountain cradle in Pamere'. A draught on the river of this order must of course put in jeopardy the irrigation down-stream in the Khorezm area, but the spokesman met this by explaining that three reservoirs were to be constructed to store 6000 million cubic metres in the seasons of low demand.

These two projects for irrigation from the Oxus, great as they are, pale into insignificance when set against an immense integrated plan, described as 300 times the size of the T.V.A.[1], for the application of the latest sciences to the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Amu Darya basins in the connected fields of irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power and afforestation. Here we are concerned with the Amu Darya only, but the plans announced cover much the same ground on the European rivers. Over the whole field the planners speak in terms of transforming an area of two million square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The rivers are to be dammed at a number of points, the dams forming reservoirs many miles across; power stations of great capacity are to be established at these barrages with irrigation canals taking off at the same points; ocean-going steamers are seen as penetrating to the lakes through locks; and finally belts of forest, three miles wide (quite modest this), are to be planted in the valleys 'to keep them damp and on the watersheds to let the run-off from melting snows down gently'. In the Karakum, an awkward place for labour, the forests are to be sown with seed broadcast from aircraft. Finally, the suggestion is that, to avoid a fall in the Caspian Sea following the diversion of rivers to irrigation, waters flowing to the Arctic are to be impounded to compensate the southern rivers. A presumably serious commentator[1A] has written that it is possible that ultimately no water from Siberia will go to the Arctic, and it has even been suggested that the consequent greater salinity of the Arctic Ocean may reduce the size of the Polar ice-cap.

[1] Tennessee Valley Authority.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning more particularly to that part of the scheme to be derived from the waters of the Amu Darya, to be called the Turkmenian Canal, the same commentator [14] stated: 653 185 312

> The scientists told me a great deal about how they had planned the scheme for the Karakum desert. . . . They are chosen to cover the whole range of interests . . . there are hydrologists, navigation experts, electrical experts, every kind of engineer, soil scientists, zoologists, botanists, geologists, there are also geo-physicists and seismologists . . . besides all these there are the archaeologists, who are considered a very important part of the scheme.

In the presence of this battalion of experts from Academies of Sciences, with some conflict of interest (one would think) even in Russia, the genie of the scheme will surely sigh for one good practical engineer.

The Turkmenian Canal itself was announced in September 1950 in a decree of the Central Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is nothing short of an attempt to realize the old dream for the redirection of the Oxus back into its ancient course to the Caspian Sea by means of a canal 700 miles long starting from Takhya Tash on the left bank close to Nukus, skirting the Sarikamish depression (which, being even deeper than the Caspian, would take too long to fill up), and thence along the old bed of the Özboy across the middle Karakum and through the Balkhan gap into the sea near Krasnovodsk.[1] It is not unamusing to reflect that this also was an idea in the minds of Tsarist engineers more than fifty years ago. Curzon, writing in 1889, mentions that as a navigation project it had even occurred to the fertile mind of Peter the Great, and quotes the scornful saying of the German engineer Kiefert referring to the project, when at the height of its favour in the seventies of last century, as the great Central Asian sea-serpent. But it seems clear that a decision has now been taken for a canal to irrigate 1,300,000 hectares or about 3,000,000 acres, and to carry three hydro-electric generating stations, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts (each about equivalent to the Shannon Station in Ireland). Work was to begin in

[14] Professor J. Bernal, F.R.S., Bib. II, 1.

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 23-26 - Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

653 /185 312

1951 and is scheduled for completion in 1957. The official spokesman [1] stated:

> The idea of bringing life to the desert by turning the course of the Amu Darya towards the Caspian Sea originated long ago. Yet Tsarist Russia was incapable of carrying it out. It was on the initiative of Stalin that the Government decision was taken to revive the desert and fulfil the age-old dreams of the people of Central Asia. The special characteristic of the present scheme is that the waters will be used in their entirety for irrigation and will not be discharged into the Caspian Sea as proposed in all preceding projects. All remaining canals of the world, including those of America, Egypt and India, are considerably shorter. . . . Krasnovodsk will receive an abundant supply of water [is this inconsistent with the special characteristic ?]. The new irrigation construction is an important link in the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature. The Caspian desert plain will soon be converted into a marvellous flourishing land.

The project is linked with the railway constructional plan already mentioned for a line northward from Charjui to Kungrad along the Oxus left bank, that described as one of the great railway building feats of all time.[2]

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In face of the admissions of short supply in the river which will follow the completion of the first two Amu Darya projects above mentioned, it is not easy to see how the Takhya Tash headworks — down-stream of Kelif and Kerki — would find sufficient volume to irrigate the whole of the Karakum from Khorezm to the Caspian. Can it be that this grandiose project for restoring the prosperity of the days before 1573, the year when the Oxus turned to the Aral Sea, is alternative and not supplementary to the Karakum project? It is possible that the surveys may have convinced the Soviet engineers of the difficulties of constructing a canal along the skirts of the Kopet Dagh, with all the dangers of breaching by flood, and induced them to have second thoughts. It is not inconceivable that they, or their political superiors, may have been influenced by the romance which appeals so greatly to the local bourgeois patriots, that of turning the Oxus back

[1] Deputy Minister, Cotton Cultivation USSR.

[2] Bib. II, 10.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

has been erected and the longest derivation canal in the Union has been excavated. Work was begun in 1943, and the station is supposed to have started to operate in 1948. The capacity is stated to be 200,000 kilowatts. The next largest is on the Chirchik and Boz-Sir, near Tashkent, where there is a series of linked stations, six of them finished in 1945 and four more in 1947. Others are planned. The capacity stated is 150,000 kilowatts. There is also planning for the construction of a series of generating stations on canal falls on the Upper Oxus–Zarafshan project, to reach an aggregate capacity of 1,000,000 kilowatts, and for three similar stations of an aggregate capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, also on canal falls on the great project for a Turkmenian Canal along the old Amu-Darya bed of the Özboy. There are, moreover, numerous small power stations, listed in hundreds, on mountain torrents and streams, and also on canal falls in Farghana and elsewhere in the piedmontane area. The largest recently mentioned seem to be in Tajikistan on the Varzob and Vakhsh rivers, 13,000 and 10,000 kilowatts respectively.

The impression derived is that the Soviet engineers have two techniques: the first for the establishment of large stations at canal headworks or on canal falls, and the second for the dispersal of large numbers of small local plants on mountain torrents.

Now, on a general view, the terrain of Turkistan should be admirably suited for the harnessing of water-power in the east where the mountains merge into the plains. But it is unlikely to be so favourable well out in the plains, where the declivity is very small in the direction of the Caspian and Aral Seas. Canal falls do not normally provide good sites for large stations, the fall being insufficient except in favourable circumstances. The plains of Turkistan are flatter than central Ireland. It may be that the great volume of the Turkistan rivers will make up for any insufficient fall. The discharge of the Oxus in flood may be anything up to 10,000 cubic metres a second, but water for a generating plant must be canalized in a derivation channel. Some scepticism is

[P.213]

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1950 TARGETS[1]

	Population 1939		Heavy Industry (Millions of Tons)			Textiles (Millions of Metres)			Crops (Millions of Hectares *)	
	Total	'Native'	Coal	Oil	Steel	Cotton	Silk	Woollen	Cash	Grain
Kazakistan	6,146,000	3·09	16·4 (Karaganda)	1·2 † (Emba)	0·07	19·0	Nil	2·9	0·34	5·34
Kirghizia	1,459,000	0·88	1·6	0·08	Nil	0·7	0·92	0·5	0·11	0·7
Tajikistan	1,485,000	1·22	0·44	0·06	Nil	18·0	5·1	Nil	0·18	0·63
Turkmenia	1,254,000	0·83	0·06	1·1 (Nebit Dagh)	Nil	22·0	0·83	0·82	0·16	0·16
Uzbekistan	6,282,000	4·98	1·1 (Angren)	1·1	0·1	161·0	14·0 (Samarkand and Margilan)	Nil	1·13	1·38
Total	16,626,000	11·00	19·6 = 7·8% of USSR total of 250 m. tons	3·54 = 9·9% of USSR total of 35·4 m. tons	0·17 USSR total given as 25 m. tons	220·7 = 4·7% of USSR total of 4·686 m. metres	20·85 USSR total not ascertained	4·22 USSR total not ascertained	1·92 of which 1·35 m. is under cotton = 80·4% of USSR total	8·21 = 7·7% of USSR total of 105·8 m. hectares

* 1 hectare = 2·5 acres approx.

† Does not include Ural oilfields at Ishimbay, producing in 1950 at the rate of, say, 7 million tons a year.

1 [i.e. of Fourth Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadiks
Kent Turks

101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, •186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description[1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] 101 Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan[2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — [6 K] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is ooo replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

181 combined region of Kitab and Shahr-i-Sabz before the Russians came. He found him a man whose word he could implicitly trust, possessed of much delicacy of mind and feeling, with an appreciation of what is due to himself and of an aristocratic bearing in every look and movement. In appearance Jüre Beg was tall and handsome, simply dressed but exquisitely neat, with a thin beard, pleasant dark eyes, and a serious face — a strict Muslim, but altogether without fanaticism — an excellent judge of character, with the politeness of Asia at his finger's end, yet with dignity to act as he thought right. He conformed indeed, says Schuyler, to his notion of perfect breeding. Togan, writing sixty years later of the same man, speaks of the great respect in which Jüre was held by his own people and Russians alike. He came of a nomad Uzbek tribe, like the Kazaks not greatly influenced by Persian manners, but he had a fine library which he was proud to show to Barthold, whom he allowed to catalogue it. To the Russian Barthold, he said, 'The Russian administration in Turkistan is very like that of the Mongols; they choose the worst men from among us and use them against their fellow countrymen'.

186 No writer on the Turks of Central Asia can avoid a reference to the slogans under which various forces interested in this region have from time to time sought to enlist the interest of the Eastern Turks in a larger political union. Different banners have been unfurled, beneath which a Turkic renascence should take place. The following definition [1] is that given in Togan's work, with a conclusion that no one creed offers, as it stands, a worthy or practicable goal for the Turks.

The three terms, pan-Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism, are first stated. The first, the religious appeal, which would draw in other peoples of the Muslim world, is seen as a strand only of a more real and deep Turkish patriotism. Generally, pan-Islamism is dismissed as a political force, partly because most of these writers and thinkers themselves started

[1] Op. cit. pp. 560 et seqq.

2 [i.e. by Toga- , see cat 116. pp. 7-9 .. Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

very much to the left, and partly no doubt in deference to the inspirations of modern Turkey. While therefore it is possible to speak in moving terms of Islam in the hearts of the people, far beyond the confines of the mosque or the conceptions of the *ulema*, as a political watchword it is regarded by the new nationalism as a mirage of imperialists. 186

The pan-Turanian idea is defined as a Hungarian proposal for a league of all Turkish, Mongol, Hungarian and Finno-Ugrian stocks — a sort of political Altaics. This has only to be stated to be dismissed as theory empty of political content, because it lacks the necessary social and geographical nexus.

Lastly, pan-Turkism is defined as originally the product of the mind of the Hungarian Vambéry. As a political force it is discounted, but the new nationalism finds attractions in the idea of an entente of races of strictly Turkish stock. There is a search for a cultural and social image of a sort to appeal to those lost in the desert, who need a well whereby to quench their thirst and recover their bearings. Togan himself by no means envisages a unified Turkic State, federal or otherwise, under the hegemony of Turkey; indeed he quotes sayings of that protagonist of such impulses, Enver Pasha, recognizing that, although there should be a common inspiration for peoples of Turkish stock, and all Turks, west and east, should be free of foreign domination, it is no use to look forward to a formal unity, even of language. He does not say it, but he seems to look forward to a loose gathering of the clans not unlike the modern conception of the Commonwealth, in cultural harmony, a group of adults, acting together in danger but under no formal obligations. The inspiration of his thought is best imparted in his own words.[1]

The movement for Turkish unity [he writes], is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit. In Turkey, as in Turkistan, there was research into Turkish history, national literature and custom. It aroused intense interest not only in Turcological publications by

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 558.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 European scholars, but also among Europeans generally as giving an increased insight into the Turkish world. The question of the historical unity of Turkish culture is being more and more explained. The two mystics, Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century in Yese [the town now itself called Turkistan near the Sir Darya] and Yunus Emre 150 years later in Anatolia, represented one and the same school and culture. The ancient enmity typified by the war between Bayezid and Timur, the respective national heroes of the Western and Eastern Turks, began to lose its force. The national literature of Azerbaijan shows how Chingiz and Timur are becoming the greatest heroes of a national consciousness common to all Turks. There is no doubt that Ismail Gaspirali's [1] work had an influence in Turkey, and was the first sign of the reforms which took shape 50 years later under Atatürk.

The Yesevite School of Ahmed Yesevi in the realm of religion; the epics of Oghuz Khan, Dede Korkut and Köroghlu [2] in the domain of literature; the works of art and monuments of the East Turks and the West Turks; all these are a pledge of th. universal significance of Turkish civilization. Until recently [346] historians of the art of the Osmanli period held the Green Mosque at Bursa to be purely an Osmanli work; it now transpires that it is ornamented by Tabriz tile-artists who knew the art of the Ilkhans, and by a Bursa decorator who had learned his craft in the time of Timur at Samarkand. The monuments of the Ilkhan period at Tabriz, the mosques of the Timurids at Meshed and Herat, the glorious *medreses* at Samarkand, Yese and Urgench are of one and the same Turkish civilization.

000 In the Caucasus a pan-Turkish ideal arouses jealousies among those who are not Turks, or even Muslims. But that is another story; here in Turkistan emphasis on this ideal need not weaken the national resistance from Europe against the Great Russians, nor should Georgians and Armenians suspect motives which inspire those who seek the independence of the homelands of the Turks.

On the narrower stage of Turkistan east of the Caspian,

[1] Crimean writer, XIXth century. See Chapter XIII, p. 226.

[2] Old epics of the Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen tribes handed down by word of mouth. Soviet scholars have done much to reduce them to writing, but usually to Russian and not in the original. The latest Ukase is that this is the literature of a bygone feudal age, teaching a false bourgeois nationalism and must be shunned. On this subject see Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 More recently there has been no pretence of the respect-
186 ability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

1 [See cat. 116 pp. 104-05 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to overcome any centrifugal impulse in the colonial territories of the Soviet Empire. First in order was the power derived from the presence of a Russian population, infusing into a plural society an outside element as strong as are the Chinese in Malaya. The monolithic Constitution, the rooting of the Party sprung from its parent stem, the artificial division of natural local unities, applied education and linguistics — all these pressures have been steadily brought to bear against the realization of national or industrial particularism over a period of some thirty years. And in the background, always present, is the secret police and military force at the disposal of the Union.

The flood is the same flood as that which swept over Turkistan in Tsarist days. Like the waters of the Oxus after storms in the mountains, it may be turgid, but it is the same river, unpredictable in the direction of its attack, but submerging the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance is overcome.

XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

000 IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

626 517 1860

ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 626 The dogma of the Lesser Evil is briefly this. Oppressive though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil and oppressive than the alternative then open to non-Russian nationalities, namely, annexation by Turkey. (At this time the case of Armenia was chiefly in point.) And oppressive and evil though the Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led the annexed peoples away from Feudalism through Capitalism along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser evil than a continued independence. Thus this dogma was an extension backwards into Tsarist history of the sort of reasoning from first principles which enabled the Soviets by means of the Doctrine of the Proletariat to justify to their own minds the crushing in their time of the new nationalism that arose in the interregnum period. Both dogmas were shafts aimed at one target, the native nationalists who, if they believed in the dialectic of historical materialism, wished that it should develop within the framework of a national and not a Great Russian consciousness. The difference was that under the newest dogma — that of the Lesser Evil — it was no longer even respectable for a 'Colonial' nationalist to take pride in the prowess of his people even against the Tsarist conqueror. Great Russia in both her incarnations was henceforward to be regarded as unassailable, above criticism, the instrument by which the ultimate reality was inevitably to prevail.

The ground was prepared for the propagation of this doctrine in 1937, before World War II, at about the period of the greatest intensity of the purges. But other preoccupations, with the War itself, prevented active steps being taken for its enforcement until the post-War period. From 1945 onwards enforcement has taken the form of an all-out campaign against nationalism in any form. Such tendencies are compendiously described as bourgeois-nationalism, feudal survivalism or pan-Islamic pan-Turkic capitalist distortions or deviations, and are detected in every field of thought or cultural endeavour, social, literary and aesthetic. In their most secret thoughts all men, women and children must turn

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

to Moscow as their Mecca; language, literature and the arts must follow suit; the praise of past achievement is ruled out; and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said[1] that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct views on the history of their republic in relation to its association with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 230-33 Bib. II, 2 — Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various 186
versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not 538
been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not 626
people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmens persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846–1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 7

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens — and certainly not erotic poetry —, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone. [538]

This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a
531 seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are
287 distinguished from all others by their simple
186 but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur.
[352 The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

[cat. 116, p. 72 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

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

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

The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.

287 plained by the strongly developed organiza-
531 tion of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on
a long tradition which is strictly observed.
186 There are only a limited number of patterns
for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

287 In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the
fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separ-
531 ately as rugs—usually go under the name of
Bokhara, though not one of them was ever
352 knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

563 •186 177 Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

162 [11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universi- 517
ties, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves 517
superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling 461
with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which [668]
aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the charac- 517
teristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addi- 177
tion it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in 517
Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this 177
may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian 186
"Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

517
177
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tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

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For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the history of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and Farghana, the most fertile regions, it was possible then to ride long distances without so much as seeing a blade of verdure, so small was the extent of country irrigated by the rivers. Since then much has been achieved, but even now it would be instructive and curious to see a map of these regions on which the arable lands were carefully marked, so narrow would be the strips along the rivers and at the foot of the mountains. In Farghana the irrigated areas, and even the *lalmi*[1] lands dependent on rainfall, cover broader acres than elsewhere in Turkistan. Its predominance as the agricultural, and now one of the industrial, centres of this country has a certain inevitability. The surrounding mountains with their fertilizing streams give it a climate relatively mild in summer and winter, and an alluvial soil on the deposits which fan out from the river mouths. In these oases intensive cultivation by a large population has always been possible — the cluster of townships is apparent from any map. The lie of the land has favoured the construction of many ancient irrigation channels, now supplemented by great modern works. Climate, latitude and water provide exactly the right environment for the cultivation of cotton and of the mulberry-trees on which the silk-worm thrives. The rapid transition from high mountain valley to open plain offers many natural sites for the harnessing of water-power for the production of electricity. The more recent discovery of oil and coal and quantities of valuable non-ferrous and other mineral resources in and around the valley, combined with the Soviet policy of moving textile factories to the site of production of raw material, has given it a new industrial significance not lost upon any who contemplate this land. Kokand, its old capital, and the hills around the valley were the main focus of the Basmachi movement of 1918–24 for the independence of Turkistan.

In its way the natural beauty of the oasis country is greater and certainly more intense than that of the steppe

[1] It is interesting to note that the Eastern Turks use here the same word as the Pathans of Peshawar for unirrigated cropped land. They also use *kashar*, a helping party of friends at harvest-time, and *baramta*, a raid and seizure of an enemy's flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong; both words in common use in Pashtu.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Tadiks
Kent Turks

101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, 186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description[1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators 101 south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan[2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — [617] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is 000 replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

175
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(Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

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[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

The central points in the earlier history of Turkistan are two. The first is the Mongol deluge which, under Chingiz Khan, swept over the land in the years 1219–24; the second the thunderbolt launched by Timur nearly two centuries later (1379–1405). Timur, though of Mongol antecedents, used Chaghatai Turkish as his mother tongue and belonged to what Barthold [1] called *la tribu mongole turquisée* of the Barlas, established at the ancient twin city of Kesh [2] where the Kashka Darya issues from the mountains.

It will be found that the human material, and the forces applied to it, will fall into a more comprehensible order if viewed in periods divided by these two outstanding events in the history of Central Asia. But, before embarking on any analysis of these periods, there are a number of general distinctions and definitions that I must make, if there is to be any understanding of the people mixed together in the crucible which is Central Asia.

A reference to the map at the end of this book will show the reader the disposition of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, arranged as it stands today in accordance with the various languages, Turkic and Iranian, spoken by the agglomerations known loosely as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Turkmens (all Turkish) and the Tajiks (Iranians). It will be seen that in more than one case the speakers of these languages overlap across the international frontiers into China, Afghanistan and Persia. There are also areas within the country in which Uzbek mingles with Tajik, Turkmen or Karakalpak, Kirghiz with Uzbek, and so on. Bilingualism in Uzbek and Tajik is common in areas of overlap, especially so in the towns from Khojent to Bukhara. Turkic Uzbek in the towns has lost its vowel harmony under Iranian influence, but has preserved it in the north of the Uzbek linguistic territory, where there was no such influence. On the other hand, the juxta-

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 168.

[2] The modern name of these cities is Shahr-i-Sabz and Kitab. They are separated from Samarkand by the Takhta Karacha pass over a spur of the Hissar mountains.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Persian as the official language for administration and the law.[1] 000
Literary Chaghatai, written in the Persian *shikasta* form of 194
Arabic letters, has another and important liability, if regarded as a mode of transcription of a Turkic language. This is the relative weakness of the Arabic alphabet in vowel signs, and its consequent inability to express the very varied vowels of Turkic languages, and particularly the vowel qualities and harmonies. It is true that the form of Uzbek itself, as spoken at least in Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand, has become Persianized to the extent of losing its vowel quality and most of its vowel harmony. But, even so, Chaghatai Arabic expresses the vowel sounds inadequately, the more so because in the Farghana and Yese (Turkistan) forms of Uzbek the harmonies are still to be found. *A fortiori* Chaghatai, based 197
(as Babur tells us) on the purest Uzbek, spoken then as today in the Andijan district of Farghana, was not a medium easily adaptable to the languages spoken in Kirghizia or in the countries now known as the Kazak and Turkmen steppe. There is an elaborate system of comparative morphology to be acquired before it becomes possible for a student, even on paper, to relate the various Eastern Turkic languages, *e.g.* Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen, one to the other. In speech the difference is great enough to cause difficulty of understanding between even native speakers. The path of the reformer 000
seeking to establish one language as current coin for all Turkistan is therefore not so easy as has often been suggested.[2] As a long-term project, if circumstances were favourable, it should not be impossible. But, as we know, the Soviets are doing all they can to promote linguistic and other distinctions between the five republics, and it follows that any move towards assimilation runs counter to tendencies within modern Turkistan itself. None the less, as a social and political

[1] Exactly the same process can be seen at work today in Afghanistan. The Barakzai Sardars who rule the country, themselves of Afghan blood, often can not even talk Pashtu, the Afghan tongue. Persian is the official language.

[2] A group of émigrés in Germany, mainly Uzbek, issue a journal, *Millij Türkistan*, in a language which they call *ortanili*, or the middle tongue. It is really Uzbek, with a few extraneous words, written in an alphabet adapted from the Turkish Roman. It is an interesting experiment.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia KL1

APPENDIX

TRANSLITERATION

A SYSTEM of transliteration of names should be consistent and broadly scholarly without being pedantic. It is particularly hard to observe this mean in the presentation of a Turkic nomenclature for English readers, and harder still when the theme is not Turkey but the Eastern Turks under Russian rule. The difficulty is still further increased by the fact that the Soviets have forced the Turkic and Iranian languages of Russian Central Asia into two distinct transcriptions, first a set of Roman letters, and then a set of Cyrillic letters. There have also been variants in the Roman and in the Cyrillic alphabets used to transcribe the various languages, *e.g.* a slightly different alphabet has been applied to Uzbek and Kazak. A final complication is introduced by my use of Togan's book in modern Western Turkish as one of the media through which these Trans-Caspian names are here presented for study. (It is consoling to observe that even Togan does not use an alphabet always consistent with that used in Turkey today, *e.g.* he introduces a '*q*' for Arabic ق, and a '*kh*' for Arabic خ, both unknown to the modern Turkish alphabet.) 197

2. Turkic nomenclature has often, by no means always, a Muslim background, but even then the value of the Arabic or Persian words is altered both in pronunciation and spelling, *e.g.* in the simplest case Mehmet for Muhammad. There are also the modifications (umlaut) on vowel sounds, and the vowel harmonies. In modern Turkish there is no '*kh*' (Russian *x*) for Arabic خ, its place being taken by a simple '*h*', but خ does exist in Eastern Turkic tongues. Finally, superimposed on the Persian and Arabic, one finds many names of pure Turkic origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

● 174 3. For these reasons the accepted Western system of transliteration adopted by Arabists does not fit any Turkic tongue. For instance, 'Abdu'l Raḥman or Ḥafidh, apart from their pedantic look, do not represent the words as they are apprehended by a Turk's eye or ear, west or east of the Caspian. There is rather more to be said for the simpler Hunterian system as used for Muhammadan nomenclature in India, but that too misses the distinctive elaboration of vowel sounds to be found in Turkic languages. It has, however, the advantage of familiarity to an English eye, and some adaptation of it may be a possible solution.

4. Next to be considered is a system taken through the Russian. This has the advantage that it represents the written word within modern Turkistan, and is therefore familiar to the educated in the five Central Asian republics. It is, however, anathema to every Eastern Turk outside the USSR and, opposed as it deliberately is to the memories and traditions of a Muslim past, is probably to the distaste of many of the indigenous populations within the country. It is, moreover, clumsy, *e.g.* the use of *dzh* for Arabic ج (jim) and the Russian patronymic *-ov* so strange to a Muslim ear. Why write *Tadzhik* in English for *Tajik*, or *Shayakhmetov* for the son of *Shah Ahmed*?

5. There remains the modern Western Turkish Roman alphabet. In many ways this might be suitable, but it involves the use of the following:

c for English *j* (French *dj*, Russian *dzh* дж)
ç for English *ch* (French *tch*)
ş for English *sh* (French *ch*)
h for Arabic and Persian خ (German or Scottish *ch*, Russian *x*).

N.B.—In English systems this is usually given as *kh*. In modern Western Turkish it has lost its original sound and is pronounced as an aspirated *h* only. But the original sound remains east of the Caspian. In any case, words such as

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

Khiva, *Bukhara*, *Khan* look absurd in the dress *Hiva*, *Buhara*, *Han*.

ğ for Arabic and Persian غ (not unlike French *r*)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *gh*.

k for Arabic ك (not unlike *ck* in cock)

N.B.—In English systems usually given as *q*.

ö as in German

ü as in German

ı (undotted) for Russian ы, something like English *u* in *hut* or *but*, or *y* in the adverbial termination *-ly*.

The use of all these in an English text would make it tiresome and unfamiliar to the general reader, and might introduce difficulty for the printer. All should be ruled out except *ö* and *ü* and possibly *k*.

6. It is easy to proceed so far negatively. As a positive contribution I suggest the following, which rejects the Russian and the scholarly Arabic, and represents a compromise between the modern Turkish and the Hunterian.

(*a*) *Vowels*. Adopt Western Turkish vowel signs except *ı* (undotted). (I have considered possibility of using *y* for *ı*, but this would be unsightly and unfamiliar, *e.g. Osmanly* for *Osmanlı*. On the whole it is probably better that *ı* (undotted) should appear without distinction from *i*.)

N.B.—I should modify this general principle in the case of names whose spelling has become standardized according to Hunterian values, *e.g.* write Samarkand, Farghana, Timur, Turk, not Semerkend, Ferghana, Temür, Türk.

(*b*) *Consonants*. Adopt Western Turkish consonants with following important exceptions:

(i) Turkish *c* to become *j*, *e.g.* Tajik, not Tacik, Tadzhik or Tadjik;

(ii) Turkish *ç* to become *ch*, *e.g.* Chaghatai, not Çaghatai or Tchaghatai;

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

● 194 (iii) Turkish *ş* to become *sh*, *e.g.* Shah, Sherif, not Şah, Şerif, Chah, Cherif;

(iv) Turkish *h*, when used for Persian or Arabic خ, to become *kh* (not *x*), *e.g.* Khan, Khiva, Sheikh, not Han, Hiva, Şeih;

(v) Turkish *ğ* to become *gh*, *e.g.* oghlu, not oğlu; Chaghatai, not Chagatai.

N.B.—I have considered what to do with Turkish *k* when used for ق. Scientific systems use *q*, but this would involve writing *e.g.* Qazaq, Qirghiz and Samarqand, all somewhat pedantic. Kazak and Kirghiz are probably better (Kazakh often used, following the Russian, is wrong in any case, the Arabic form being قزاق not قزاخ).

7. It is suggested that the text need not be complicated by using commas for *ain* and *hamza*. They are apt to give an air of dust, and are not very important for Turkic languages, for which is needed a system generally phonetic in intention and effect, yet conforming broadly with an educated approach to orientalia.

104 8. One name calls for comment. It may be said that Jengis, Jenghis, and Cheng(h)iz Khan are recognizable, but Chingiz is unfamiliar. On the system suggested Chingiz is a correct transliteration of the spelling adopted by Babur and others in Chaghatai. A correct transliteration from the original Mongolian would be Chingis, since there is no ز in the old Mongol writing.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1.

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak 197
in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange, but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not [563]
blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings, they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours, so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of 000
cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or completely losing their own in the process. The language of a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care. Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the population in this part of the world, language does in fact give some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor, namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it 174
can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.1 Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

After the Turks came flooding in the Mongols. Much ink has been spilt by the learned in discussing the relationship between Mongol and Turk in Central Asian history. Confusion reigns in the use of such terms as Mongol, Tatar, Turk, Sart, Kazak and Uzbek, and there is a tendency to complicate the discussion still further by an approach through linguistics. For instance, Chuvash, a Turkic language spoken on the Volga, has a distinct admixture of Bulgar terms, and it is sometimes sought therefore to distinguish its speakers as the true representatives of the Golden Horde, who mingled with the Bulgars — an earlier-than-Mongol stock — upon the Volga. But even if the armies of Chingiz were themselves pure Mongols (and there is reason to believe they were not), the ultimate truth is that at that date this was a Turkish sea into which the Mongol rivers flowed. The Mongol civilization was absorbed by the Turkish civilization in Transoxiana, just as it was absorbed by the higher culture of China and Russia. The name of Chaghatai, the second son of the Mongol Chingiz, even became that of the literary Turkic language of the Eastern Turks, and, less than two centuries later, Timur himself, belonging to a tribe of Mongol origin, had become in all essentials a Turk. Perhaps the best way of setting this question in its true light is again to point to the last great Timurid, the Emperor Babur. Himself described on his father's side as descended in the fifth generation from Timur, and on his mother's side in the thirteenth generation from Chaghatai the second son of Chingiz — and so of Mongol ancestry on both sides — he writes in Turkish, and in his Memoirs [1] speaks with disdain of the Mughul (Mongol) race: 'Of all others', he says, 'the wretches of Mughuls were most active in unhorsing and stripping the stragglers'. And later in verse: [2]

Were the Mughuls angels, they would be bad,
Written in gold, evil would be the name Mughul.

[1] Bib. I, 61, p. 150.

[2] The verse may be an interpolation by Babur's son, the Emperor Humayun. But the argument stands.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr
101 and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar,
[197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain-
369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kipchak
Uzbek
Nogai

The Kent-Turks may even grasp that they are one nation with other Turks. . . . Seen from this point of view the extended use of the name Uzbek may be a stepping stone to the use of the name Turk to describe the national unity of Turkistan.

The Turkmen with his Oghuz ancestry I have already noted. He is rather to be grouped with the Western Turks. As for the Eastern Turks, I have put forward the tribal name Kipchak as typical of the Turkish stock of the steppe, upon which the Mongol deluge descended. After the Mongol conquest Kipchak disappears as the name of an *ulus*[1] from the pages of the Muslim chronicles. But the Kipchaks, with others like them, supplied the fundamental Turkish element which, overlaid by the Mongol invasion and having joined the Mongols in the wanderings of the Golden Horde, produced in time a mingled Turco-Mongol agglomeration of tribes. From this rough fashioning the Uzbek and the Nogai — also known as the Mangit — issued as pre-eminent. The process worked itself out over the whole range of country from Maveraunnahr, over the Urals, and down to the Volga and the Don, and it is on this ground some of the emigration claim that the cause of the Kazan Tatars of the Volga, and of the Bashkurds[2] in the Urals is one with that of the peoples who were later to be known as the Uzbeks and the Kazaks in Turkistan.

It is interesting, and typical of the Mongol-Turk confusion, that the Uzbek and the Nogai, Turkish tribes, took their name from eponymous Mongol princes of the house of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son and father of the Golden Horde. The imaginative have given the name Uzbek an alternative derivation from the words *öz*, essence, spirit, self, and *beg*, a master — one who is captain of his soul. To each his choice, but Uzbek Khan (1312–40) was an historical prince of the line of Juchi. The picture emerging, which in the main conforms

[1] A Mongol or Turkish nation or tribe. The Pathans too use the word.

[2] The ethnologists set the Bashkurds in the Finno-Ugrian group. But the Bashkurd language belongs to the Turkic, not the Finno-Ugrian, branch of the Altaic system, and their country lay across the way of the Turco-Mongol migrations of the Golden Horde.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Persian as the official language for administration and the law.[1] 000
Literary Chaghatai, written in the Persian *shikasta* form of 194
Arabic letters, has another and important liability, if regarded as a mode of transcription of a Turkic language. This is the relative weakness of the Arabic alphabet in vowel signs, and its consequent inability to express the very varied vowels of Turkic languages, and particularly the vowel qualities and harmonies. It is true that the form of Uzbek itself, as spoken at least in Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand, has become Persianized to the extent of losing its vowel quality and most of its vowel harmony. But, even so, Chaghatai Arabic expresses the vowel sounds inadequately, the more so because in the Farghana and Yese (Turkistan) forms of Uzbek the harmonies are still to be found. *A fortiori* Chaghatai, based 197
(as Babur tells us) on the purest Uzbek, spoken then as today in the Andijan district of Farghana, was not a medium easily adaptable to the languages spoken in Kirghizia or in the countries now known as the Kazak and Turkmen steppe. There is an elaborate system of comparative morphology to be acquired before it becomes possible for a student, even on paper, to relate the various Eastern Turkic languages, *e.g.* Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen, one to the other. In speech the difference is great enough to cause difficulty of understanding between even native speakers. The path of the reformer 000
seeking to establish one language as current coin for all Turkistan is therefore not so easy as has often been suggested.[2] As a long-term project, if circumstances were favourable, it should not be impossible. But, as we know, the Soviets are doing all they can to promote linguistic and other distinctions between the five republics, and it follows that any move towards assimilation runs counter to tendencies within modern Turkistan itself. None the less, as a social and political

[1] Exactly the same process can be seen at work today in Afghanistan. The Barakzai Sardars who rule the country, themselves of Afghan blood, often can not even talk Pashtu, the Afghan tongue. Persian is the official language.

[2] A group of émigrés in Germany, mainly Uzbek, issue a journal, *Millij Türkistan*, in a language which they call *ertanili*, or the middle tongue. It is really Uzbek, with a few extraneous words, written in an alphabet adapted from the Turkish Roman. It is an interesting experiment.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953
RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
•197
162

REFERENCE

Kazak
Kirghiz
Turkmen
Uzbek
Taranchi, Turki
Karakalpak
Tajik

Broken lines:- Scattered and scarce population

No marks within U.S.S.R.:- Practically uninhabited, (deserts, high mountains, etc.)

To avoid complexity, areas of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the south have not all been marked

International frontier

Boundaries of Republics

PRINCIPAL SOURCES

1. Völker- und Sprachenkarte des vorderen Orients, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, 1943.
2. Dominant Linguistic Groups along the Southern USSR Boundary, CIA, 11830.
3. Географический Атлас СССР, для средней школы, Москва 1950.
4. Maps and descriptions of the distribution of languages in Western and Soviet publications on the languages involved: e.g. A. von Gabain, K. Menges, J. Benzing, G. Jarring, E. D. Polivanov, and many others.
5. Results of systematic questioning of former inhabitants of the various republics, and particularly of linguistically overlapping areas.

OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MACMILL

[facing page 272 - A]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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162



RE (MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.)

[facing page 272. - B]

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162



[facing page 272: C]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

LANGUAGE

With the exception of the Tajiks, virtually all the Muslims of Central Asia speak local dialects of one and the same Turki language group. Varying cultural influences to which the individual subgroups have been subjected in the course of history have led to a certain differentiation in the vocabulary and grammar of the principal dialects. Uzbek especially, having been exposed to strong Iranian and Arabic influences, has changed much, even to the extent of losing the vowel harmony common to the sound system of the Turki languages. By and large, however, it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turki literary language for Central Asia. The latter, however, had not yet been formed when the Communists conquered Central Asia in the 1920's and suppressed its further development. 197 177

The importance of language for national consciousness is self-evident: language represents the most ready means of national identification, available alike to the literate and illiterate. While not absolutely indispensable for nationality (witness the Jews), it is so intimately connected with it as to make it one of nationality's very best criteria.

Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia has two principal aspects, both of which follow closely the general lines of Soviet nationality policy. In the first place it strives at all costs to prevent the formation of a single Turki literary language in Central Asia on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. In the second place, it endeavors to promote the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups. The first goal is fostered by exploiting all, even the minutest, dialectical differences among the various Turkic subgroups, and by granting the status of full-fledged national-literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turki language. The second is fostered through the official change of Turki alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and, finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of Russian for all citizens, regardless of nationality, desirous of making any kind of a career. It is apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, such policies will make Russian the language of all the socially dynamic elements of the Muslim population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance. 177 197 668

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

000 and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.*

177 This policy of linguistic Russification is far more subtle than that prac-
197 ticed by the tsarist regime in some of its borderlands during the darkest days of modern Russian autocracy (1881–1903), and, if successful, could deal a very considerable blow to Muslim prospects in Central Asia. Thirty-five years is admittedly too short a time to judge the effects of a set of measures apparently designed to operate for several generations; but certain evidence permits us to draw some conclusions about its efficacy and prospects of success.

177 Soviet linguistic policies seem to have had very little effect on the speech
191 habits of the bulk of the Muslim *rural* population. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with Russians, the Muslim peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. They seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been. None of the peasants interviewed knew more than a few words of Russian; after ten years in Germany several could speak better German than they could Russian after several decades of residence in the Soviet Union. For most of the rural Muslims in the USSR, the first important contact with Russians and the Russian language comes with entrance into military service. After being drafted they are distributed among Russian soldiers and are expected to learn the language as best they can. For many of them, the military service is the first and most efficient school of Russian.

191 The situation is somewhat different in the cities and small towns, where
871 Muslims live side by side with Russians, and where a large proportion of Muslim youths attend high schools and institutions of higher learning. It
177 is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the linguistic training in Central Asia, because it varies from area to area and from time to time. If there is a general principle, it seems to consist in a direct correlation between level of education and Russian language instruction. In the elementary schools, the instruction is predominantly in the prevailing local language, either Turki or Russian, and in areas where both groups are numerous, in both. In the secondary schools Russian is either the principal language of instruction (in schools attended largely by Russian students) or else it is taught

191 * An alternate interpretation of Soviet linguistic policies in Central Asia is suggested by a
177 British authority, G. E. Wheeler: "[The Soviet authorities] evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the 'Arabization' of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics." G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 41 (July–Oct. 1954), p. 181.

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

●197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[1] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 at the centre of things and had no cause to be troubled or cast down. To him and to Jami, the illustrious Persian and Nevayi's colleague at the Herat court, Gibb [1] gives honour as the twin suns in the east, by whose warmth West-Turkish Ottoman poetry was kindled into light.

> By the middle of the XVth century [writes Gibb] there was nothing wanting but the man of destiny, the man who by stammering, if not by singing, was to inaugurate the literature of the Osmanic Empire and become the van-courier of Ottoman poets. The voice of the age cried aloud for a leader, and in response arose Ahmed Pasha. Vaguely conscious of an ideal which he could not clearly conceive, Ahmed was stumbling along his way when, lo, out of the East came light, the light for which he and all his fellows were straining with eager gaze. When the *ghazels* sent by Nevayi to Constantinople came into the hands of Ahmed, his eyes were opened; he saw before him embodied in a form, fairer than which he could not picture, these very moods and fantasies which he and his companions had been vainly striving to express.

Ali Shir Nevayi, like Babur, was an Eastern Turk of Turkistan, and Herat under the Timurids was a Turkish city where the Turkic and Persian cults met. It was Nevayi's poetry, which for a century and more after Ahmed, was the main source of inspiration of all the Ottoman lyric writers. In this way the Eastern Turks not only gave the ancestors of the men who carved out the Western Turkish empires, but added those currents of song and poesy which can be traced in Turkish poetry even today.

198 538 It was a bequest of which the Eastern Turks may well be proud. But Chaghatai as a medium had its limitations. It was in essence a literary language of the court and, although many have claimed for it that at one time it had in the East the same currency as literary Osmanli had in the West, it was deeply impregnated with Arabic and Persian extravagances and therefore not well adapted to become the medium of business and cultural relations. Moreover, so strong was Persian influence in Transoxiana that it became the habit of the Khivan and Bukharan courts in the Uzbek period to use Persian as the official language for administration and the law.

[1] Bib. I, 38.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

dominion is proverbially associated with the encouragement of artificial local divisions. We have already noted the cleavage of class which it was the Party's task to bring about between the local peoples and their natural leaders, and the queer boundaries which at best can only have been laid down with tongue in cheek. But a policy first of division, and later of absorption, can be promoted as well by a system of education as by the drawing of frontiers. And, as Macaulay knew, the language in which education is to be conducted is a most vital factor for consideration in a dependent territory. In their turn applied linguistics begin with alphabets.

Different methods of transcribing Turkic languages may appear at first sight to be a subject of academic interest only, but between 1920 and 1940 the controversy in various aspects was a major issue in Turkey herself and among the Turkish peoples both in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The case is known as the alphabet controversy, and relates to the adoption first of a Roman script in place of the Arabic traditional to all Muslims, and later (in the areas of Russian dominion) of a Cyrillic in place of the Roman script. The first steps to the adoption of the Roman script were taken in 1921–2 in the Turkic-speaking parts of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan and parts of the North Caucasus). On 1st May 1925 this change was consolidated by decree of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and Party, ratifying a Roman alphabet as the official script. On that day all papers appeared in the new garb, to the dismay of Arabic literates who could not follow a word of it. During the following three years rather different Roman scripts, varying *inter se*, were introduced into Central Asia also.

One effect was to insulate the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the cultural influences of Turkey herself, who was then still using the Arabic script. Soviet preference at that time for a Roman rather than a Cyrillic script is partly attributable to the fact that in Azerbaijan there was already a native movement in favour of Roman, and partly no doubt to a sound calculation that immediate insistence on the Cyrillic would give too much away. Any script other than Arabic

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

212 would isolate the Turkic-speaking peoples in the USSR from the natural cultural influences brought to bear from outside, and that for the moment was sufficient.

Meanwhile a number of prominent Azeri exiles in Turkey, of whom Ahmet Aghaiev and Yusuf Akchura were the best known, were actively pursuing with the Kemalist government a project for the introduction of a Roman script into Turkey also. In 1928, as is well known, this movement was successful. It was then necessary for the Soviets to think again, for Turkey's action had re-established a basis for the cultural unity of all Turkic-speaking peoples. But time was needed to prepare the ground, and ten years went by before the plunge was taken, and Cyrillic alphabets, again varying somewhat, were introduced one by one into all the Soviet republics inhabited by peoples of Turkish and Iranian stock.[1]

This second change was uneconomic, for millions of textbooks had been issued for the schools in Roman, all the new teachers knew the Roman alphabet, and before they could teach they had to learn again. It was as if everybody in Britain had been ordered overnight to read and write in Greek letters. There has been much speculation as to the causes for the change, but, given the Soviet mentality, one answer is clear enough. Ankara had compelled the ship to go about on a new tack, a tack which incidentally should lead more directly to the home harbour. If linguistic unity were the aim, it had better be not a unity of the Turkic languages themselves but a shaping at least of their alphabets into a Russian mould.[2] Apart from that was the reasonable point that the adoption of the Cyrillic script for the local tongues would make it easier to

[1] Georgia and Armenia were exempted from this *ukase*; it is not difficult to see why.

[2] *E.g.* the Soviet press, speaking of a linguistics conference assembled at Baku in Jan. 1951, wrote: 'The duty of linguists is to write really scientific works on the origin and history of the [Azeri] language, in doing which they must fully show the favourable influence of the Russian language on it, and establish the identical elements in the two languages. The [Azeri] language must be enriched with words employed in the Russian language which are the possession of all the peoples of the USSR.'

It is hardly necessary to add that Azeri, a form of Western Turkish, has no identical elements with Russian.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

teach Russian as a second language. But there was surely a motive of a more subtle kind — the realization that change upon change in the medium of education would tend to sever the generations one from another and help to usher in the new age. It is indeed through the new education that the Soviets strive unceasingly to draw a line between the historical past and the world into which, as they see it, man is inevitably moving. This is a fundamental of their thought.

There remains one theme, connected with languages. Of late much has been made of Stalin's 1950 pronouncements on what has come to be known as the 'Marr controversy'. This hinges on the interpretation of a philological doctrine, taught by Professor N. Ya. Marr (d. 1934), that language is a superstructural phenomenon which changes as the basis of society changes. In his day Marr was reputed a great and scholarly philologist and not only in the Soviet Union, but the inclination now is to condemn him for having later prostituted his science to meet the demands of Marxist theory. The best illustration of the later jargon of the Marr school is perhaps the saying that personal pronouns were invented when private property was first instituted. It needs a philologist to unravel the technical complexities of this controversy; but as Stalin (who opened the ball by exclaiming 'I am no philologist') attempted it, it may not be impertinent to join in. References to such abstractions as globogenic process, Japhetic theory or morphological structure at the best probably meant no more to Stalin than to the general reader; at the worst as ground for a political argument they read like charlatanism. What is interesting is that on so strange a peg Stalin himself should have chosen to hang a long series of articles in *Pravda* and *Bolshevik*, reaching the conclusion that every dogma in Marxism, and no doubt in Marrism too, is to be understood relatively to the conditions in which it is sought to apply it. That this is sophistry as a contribution to scholarship is clear from the accompaniment of a mocking challenge to the scholars and the inclusion of more than one platitude. For not only was Stalin 'no philologist', he proceeded to instruct us

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation.
177 It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

8:Kostenko 124-C-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

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A Central Asian museum has been established here also, and a Public Library. The foundation of the latter was laid by the Governor General of Turkestan, von Kaufmann.

At the present time there are 5,381 book titles in this library and 9,734 volumes, of which there are:

	Titles	Volumes
in Russian	2,695	5,018
in French	1,444	2,761
in German	850	1,450
/412/ in English, Latin, Italian Swedish, Dutch, Czech, etc.	392	505
Total	5,381	9,734

The wealth of the Tashkent Public Library lies in the collection of material on the region of Turkestan, and in general on Central Asia, a collection which is known as "the Turkestan Collection." This collection has been brought together, by order of General Kaufmann by the well-known bibliographer Mezhov, who has already gathered 200 volumes up to now. All newspaper and magazine articles, as well as separate pamphlets and books are being catalogued by Mr. Mezhov in chronological order in large tomes, specially bound. He is also compiling an alphabetic list, and a catalogue to make it easier to find the articles in the tomes.

The Tashkent Public Library receives a subsidy of 1300 rubles from the treasury, of which 800 rubles go for the salary of the librarian, and 500 toward the subscription to newspapers, magazines, the purchase of various books, bindings, etc.

8:Kostenko 125-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 In 1878 there were over 183 subscribers,
217 and 2780 volumes were in circulation, that is, the average number would be between 15 and 16 volumes per reader.

361 The number of residents in Russian Tash-
162 kent was determined by a one day census in 1875. According to this census the total number of residents was 4,859 persons, not including the military personnel. One should note that this is a minimal figure for the Russian population in Tashkent.

The total number of Russians in Tashkent can be divided as follows:

By Religious Belief:

	Orthodox Christian	3,473
	Moslem	938
	Jewish	159
/413/	Catholic	155
	Lutheran	115
	Hindus	4
	Evangelical	4
	Armenian - Gregorian	2
	Reform	1
	Anglican	1
	Total	4,859

Of this number:

Males	2,982
Females	1,877

According to occupation, the residents of Russian Tashkent can be divided as follows:

8:Kostenko 146-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 at which 175 boys and 39 girls are enrolled.
871

2) elementary school in the Almata settlement, where 45 boys are enrolled.

3) a Moslem school in the Tatar suburb, with 40 pupils, taught by a mullah.

4) a trade school with 21 pupils, who learn various trades in addition to reading and writing.

5) a school of gardening with 21 pupils, who study with an experienced gardener from the Crimea.

6) A classical preparatory school for girls.

7) A classical preparatory school for boys.

Children of the privileged estate as well as the Cossack estate may enter the elementary schools and the trade school, although the number of the former is not large.

361 In 1878 at the Military Club quite a
217 good library was established, which now contains 2,000 volumes on various subjects. There is a marked trend among the population to use books from this library. From August 5, 1878 to April 5, 1879, i.e., in a period of 8 months, there were 1,474 recipients to whom 2,749 books were distributed.

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration when a child is born. The mother remains in
844 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
846 name the day after it is born, in the presence
553 of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
852 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/
583 After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
● 221 are related to them,[1] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

As might be expected, cotton and silk production is the peculiar pride of Turkistan. The Farghana Valley, we know, has the ideal climate and the water both for cotton cultivation, and for the growth of mulberry-trees[1] for the silk-worm. The same is true of the other southern oases, watered by the Chirchik (Tashkent), Zarafshan and Kashka Darya, and also of the Vakhsh river irrigation in Tajikistan. In the early years cotton cultivation was in danger of becoming a monoculture, and more than once brought the country into terrible famine conditions. The figures of the fourth Five-Year Plan, if reliable, suggest that, even in Uzbekistan, there has now been a considerable reversion from commercial cropping to grain, and, if so, the rural economy is not so brittle as many have supposed. The great Soviet achievement has been to bring the mills into Turkistan and process the crops locally. The largest cotton-processing establishment is the Stalin Textile Combine and Institute at Tashkent, while for silk there is a combine at Margilan, said to be the largest in the world, and integrating all processes from the unwinding of the cocoon to the weaving of the final material. Woven silk is in great demand for parachutes.

IRRIGATION

The aim to free Russia from all dependence on foreign cotton and then to build heavy stock-piles is bound up with the Soviet policy of irrigation. Irrigation in its turn is linked both with waterways and (more important) with the production of hydro-electric power. In some respects, on the face of them, the Soviet plans for development under these heads are more imaginative even than the metallurgical projects realized in the Urals before the War. For the claim is that they will turn a great desert into a smiling countryside, and even divert waters destined by nature for the Arctic into the Turanian basin. But the science of the irrigation engineer

[1] *Morus alba*, known locally by the Persian word *tut*.

000 have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian tribes.

361 Between the customs and mode of life of these two peoples there are many interesting distinctions. To neither of them does the soil afford the conditions necessary for permanent settlement. Wherever there is a well or a water-hole which provides the moisture necessary to vegetation, they pitch their tents at will, and allow their herds to graze. When the pastures are exhausted, the camp is transferred to a favourable spot elsewhere, and the [241] same process is repeated. Where the soil is suitable, the nomads of Turkestan grow grain and other food-plants, without, however, becoming permanently settled. Only in the oases have the Turkomans abandoned the nomad form of life, and have become domiciled.

● 231 The two nomad peoples of Turkestan, the Turkomans and the Kirghiz, breed livestock — horses for riding, sheep for food and for their skins, and camels as beasts of burden. In addition to the horse the Turkomans also breed donkeys for riding. The different domestic animals kept by the two tribes explains another characteristic distinction between 234 their otherwise very similar habits. Both are skilled in the preparation of a beverage of sour milk, which is particularly refreshing at the time of the burning summer heat. The Turkomans make yogurt of sheep's milk, whilst the Kirghiz ferment a similar drink known as kumyss from mare's milk. The reason for this is that the Turkomans, who

* [The Kara Kirghiz and the Turkoman — Analyst]

8:Kostenko 143-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 It would be impossible to pass over
231 another branch of Vernyy production, one which is very rare in Central Asia, namely, apiculture. (1)

1. In addition to Vernyy, apiculture is carried on in the Lepsinskaya station.

The raising of bees began here in 1857. In 1859 there were 254 hives, and in 1871 there were 75 apiaries and up to 1,456 hives. One should mention, furthermore, that 1869 and 1870 were bad years for apiculture because of drought, which dried the flowers in the grass, and the trees, so that the bees had no food.

After agriculture the main branch of Vernyy production is livestock raising. In 1871 Vernyy had the following number of animals:

Horses	3,611 head
Horned cattle	2,266
Sheep	729
Pigs	449
Goats	126
Camels	88
Total	7,369

/426/ In 1862 there were only 4,460 animals.

361 One may mention distilling, vodka making,
438 leather and brick making among the large factory enterprises. The remaining industries are in the form of home industries.

The factories in 1871 were:

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL2

rigated farming, with intensive crops adapted to land irrigation (mainly cotton); (2) dry farming, including chiefly grain crops on mountain slopes having sufficient rainfall; (3) lowland livestock raising, including sheep and camels, adapted to the dry steppe and the desert; (4) highland livestock raising of cattle, goats, and sheep, adapted to valley pastures. Of all these activities, irrigated farming is by far the most important; it employs the greater portion of the population and covers more than two thirds of the sown area. The main crop in the irrigated area is cotton, remarkably well suited to the fertile loess soil of the lower valleys and the warm, sunny climate of Central Asia. The chief cotton areas are the Fergana Valley, the oases of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the Vakhsh valley. The cotton is processed in local ginning plants, the seeds are sent to oil-extracting presses, and the husks are used for fodder. Other irrigated crops are rice, alfalfa, wheat, corn, sesame, and melons. The irrigated fields are generally bordered by mulberry trees, on which the silkworm is cultivated. One of the most common fruit-trees is the apricot; widespread orchards also produce peaches, apples, pears, pomegranates, grapes. Dried fruits (apricots, peaches, and raisins) form important articles of export. Grain crops occupy a very small portion of the irrigated area and are grown mainly on the non-irrigated mountain slopes.

Livestock is raised all year round, generally in the high mountain valleys in the summer and the lowland steppe and desert in the winter. The most important herds are sheep (including the karakul sheep), camels, cattle, horses, and mountain goats and yak.

Beside the mining industry developed at the deposits of petroleum, coal, salt, sulphur, and nonferrous metals, the industry is concentrated in the region of Tashkent, where it is supplied with power by the two large hydroelectric installations, the Chirchik and the Farkhad power plants. Tashkent is the center of the heavy metallurgy, textile, machine-construction, and food industries. Plants which process agricultural products are located in many other parts of Central Asia; they include ginning plants, oil presses, tanneries, fruit canneries, sugar refineries, and cotton and silk mills.

The basic transportation route is the Trans-Caspian Railroad, which sends many branches into the chief economic regions of Central Asia: the spur from Mary to Kushka, on the Afghan border, and the branches from Chardzhou to Kungrad (now under construction), from Kagan to Termez and Stalinabad, and from Ursat'yevskaya to Andizhan-Ko-
Kand-Namangan

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

III

PATTERN OF PEOPLES

Few cases, perhaps, in romance or history, can sustain a close collation with this as to the complexity of its separate interests.

DE QUINCEY, Revolt of the Tartars

WE see a land wide and open like the ocean, closed in by the barriers of high mountain on one side and the unharvested desert or inhospitable inland waters on the other. Before the railways were built, in one quarter only, the north-east, was there comparatively easy passage from outside. And in restricted regions only, along the foothills of these mountains, and within their glens, or farther along the rivers which issue from them, is there a certain livelihood to be won through a settled agriculture. Elsewhere the steppe and the hillside offer a life only to the nomad, equipped to move his flocks and herds in pursuit of a precarious rainfall and an uncertain season. We shall expect then to find two forms of subsistence, the intensive cultivation of the oasis by the farmer bound to traditional uses, and the wandering life of the stockbreeder on the Alpine pasture or the steppe.

Many of the flatlands of what is now Russian Central Asia are farther from the sea than any part of the world land-mass save Sinkiang alone. Hence the uncertain precipitation in all but the mountain regions, and the need for the herdsman to wander far afield in search of pasture for his flocks. There are recurrent years of famine without winter snow or spring rain, years which are really reminders of the peril of desiccation hanging over these countries. It is this that has driven the pastoralist in history to become a nomad, wandering over the steppe almost as urgently as the tribes of Arabia in their

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

000 The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

0 233 In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[474] [245] [1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

subsequent rainfall may be precarious and the owners of flocks 233
and herds often have to move many miles in pursuit of grass. Except about latitude 50 degrees, where the steppe reaches the zone where crops can be grown without irrigation, much of it is bare but for seasonal grazing. Before the Soviet cataclysm the various tribes had recognized ranges which in bad seasons would overlap and lead them into tribal warfare. Or a stronger tribal combination might oust a weaker. The form of life was not unlike that of the sailor in a primitive age, when each ship had to fend for itself and be on watch for enemies or pirates. Endurance, courage, a free and adventurous spirit, counted high in the scale of human values, but, as at sea, there had to be leadership, for without discipline all might perish. It was the same tradition that produced the Khans of the Golden Horde, and later, when the Russians came, gave birth to men such as Abilay and his grandson Kine Sari Khan. The tradition of reverence for the Khan died hard. It is not dead yet.

The tribal background was the same for the mountains as for the steppe, but the hill Uzbeks and Kirghiz, the peoples of mountain Turkdom, had to face climatic conditions of a different order to those upon the steppe. As we know, a large part of Turkistan consists of very high mountains standing over deep valleys, and it is possible for a man to change his climate in a few hours, or at most in a day or two. In Farghana and the Tajik valleys, for instance, the heat in summer is fierce and the lower-lying land, unless irrigated (and that is needed for cropping), burnt brown. But a short journey leads the shepherd to flowery Alpine meadows (*Yaylaks*), where his flocks can pasture at their ease. In the same country in winter the *yaylaks* will be deep under snow, but at that season the skirts of the hills afford a comparatively clement refuge and a good pasture. So the shepherd would move up and down with the seasons. And because the land is so free and large, and not over-crowded, he would have little need to store up winter food; some part of his accustomed range would suffice for his animals right through the year.

2: Cases 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 661 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233 [474] The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

research work — all are lagging. In Turkmenia nearly half the *Kolkhozes* at the beginning of 1951 had not the minimum number of sheep, and things were even worse for horned cattle. A search for scapegoats has begun. Bagirov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in Azerbaijan and heresy-hunter of the deviationists who praised the North Caucasian XIXth-century patriot Shamil, entered the lists with an attack on the Minister of Agriculture, Abdullaev. Abdullaev and his deputies Nagyzade and Barbaev — all, by the way, of Azerbaijani stock — are accused by him of nepotism and corrupt practices. The widespread nature of the complaints, extending as they do from the Tienshan to the Black Sea, suggests that the malady is attributable to deeper causes. What can those causes be?

The first and obvious reason is that the policy of destruction of nomadism was unsuited to the climatic conditions of Central Asia and to the aptitudes of the people. In the semi-desert of the steppe, or in the sharp contrasts of mountainside and glen, with all the variations brought about by season and altitude, there exists a stage on which it is difficult, if not impossible, for men or animals to survive unless they adapt themselves to a migratory life. The Soviet agronomists talk of winter storage. But the production of fodder-crops or winter-feed cannot easily replace these rotational pastures. Mountain and steppe pastures do not produce long grass very suitable for hay or silage, even if it could be transported with the seasons, and the irrigated fields, on which it could be produced, are all required for cash or grain crops. In other words, the right economic system for stock-raising, imposed by this climate and its contrasts, is a form of nomadism and nothing else.

All dictators, of course, dislike nomads, so hard to reach and tax, or in any way to discipline or organize. It was so with Reza Shah of Persia, also a dictator, whose main and unfulfilled ambition was to settle all the nomadic tribes of Persia. And inevitably it has been so with the Soviets. It is because autocracy has given way to this irrational dislike and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

tried to substitute a social and economic organization which defies nature and defeats the tried and tested initiative of the local stock-breeders, that this experiment has been such a ghastly failure. There is need of another Lenin, courageous enough to admit defeat and inaugurate a New Economic Policy for the animals.

233 Of all this there is no mention in the stream of invective that pours from Soviet publicists on this subject. The Party line is quite otherwise. Defects are due, they cry, to insufficient Party-political and educational work among the stock-breeders. Leading workers do not concern themselves with the matter, but leave it to subordinates. The managers of stock *Kolkhozes* do not understand the importance of mechanization. Fodder supplies are not made available — here there is a shadow of the truth; irrigation works have not been reorganized. Winter pasturing is insufficient and badly arranged; the local Soviets in many districts fail to assume responsibility. And hear Bagirov. Great harm had been done, he said, by over-concentration on cotton-growing, and neglect of stock. The total of stock was still below the figure of 1940, and there was negligence in the provision of fodder. Blame was due not only to the Minister and his deputies but to all Party officials. They had themselves neglected the interests of stock-breeders, and had allowed embezzlement. People of doubtful honesty were kept as officials. The Ministry did not check them but actually defended them. The *Sovkhozes* — State farms — were almost as bad as the *Kolkhozes*. And so on — without a hint of the essentials of the art of animal management.

In all this there is yet another and more subtle failure. It has been remarked that the beginnings of Soviet stock-rearing in Asiatic Russia were not encouraging, for an iron system failed to allow for that elasticity of adjustment which alone can secure a satisfactory return to the stock-farm. But it is impossible to read these diatribes without concluding that the failure goes deeper even than that. The bond between herdsman and herd, between man and the animal which serves him and which he serves, is in essence a close and individual

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

faithfully observed by the Turkestan natives; those of the steppe region were less strict, prevented as they were by the exigencies of nomadic and seminomadic life. During Ramazan, Muslim communities in Central Asia customarily reversed their routine, resting daytimes, eating and entertaining at night. Shortly after the end of the fast there occurs a major holiday, *kurban bayram* (feast of sacrifice), attended by the slaughter of sheep and by festivities. 785

The difficulties of observing the Ramazan fast in the Soviet Union are obvious at first sight. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a period of a month is possible only for a people economically independent; it is inconceivable in a society in which virtually every breadwinner is an employee of the state, and the state drives relentlessly to increase production. Furthermore, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result, the Ramazan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. 785 177

Several of the refugees recalled instances of Communist Party officials subjecting Muslims suspected of fasting to "tests." Thus, for example, many Muslim employees of state institutions were called in for conferences with their superiors sometime during the month of Ramazan and there offered a drink or a cigarette; refusal to accept the offer was tantamount to an admission of fasting and could lead to expulsion from work. Similar "tests" were recalled by schoolteachers — during Ramazan teams of officials from neighboring towns often visited schools and checked on both the teachers and the students.

Nevertheless, the observance of the fast, although severely restricted, appears to have partly survived. Some Muslims, unable to fast for 28 consecutive days, compromise by abstaining for three days only: the 1st, 15th, and last days of Ramazan. Others, compelled to eat in order to have strength for work and to avoid the suspicion of authorities, eat and drink as little as possible. It is quite likely — although there is no direct evidence — that the fast may be observed more regularly among those who are not gainfully employed.

The *kurban bayram*, despite its originally religious significance, appears to have suffered the fate of most religious festivities in societies which are secularized or on their way to becoming so: the religious element has largely been forgotten, and the holiday has acquired a predominantly secular, national character. This, in part, may be one of the reasons for its survival. Almost all the informants agreed that the *kurban bayram* was widely observed at least until the outbreak of the war, even by members of the Communist Party. The main difficulty in observing this holiday is the shortage of sheep, which are essential for the ceremony. Not only are almost all the sheep in the hands of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and 782 796 177 233

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

782 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclo-
796 pedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all
177 number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in
233 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subter-
fuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving,
177 known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca,
177 the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

districts: 1, Tomsk; 2, Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk; 3, Southern Steppes; 4, Yenisei; 5, Altai; 6, Minusinsk; 7, Northern Steppes. Probably some gold deposits could be found in Bokhara and Turkestan. 135

The silver deposits are found in great number in the Altai and north of Semipalatinsk. The richest deposits of coal, iron, and copper are found in the district between Novo-Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, and Kuznietsk; also in the region of Semipalatinsk. The Kuznietsk basin alone occupies some 15,000 sq. klm.

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But it is cereals that form the most important product of export from Western Siberia, and 90 per cent. of the population is devoted to agriculture. Agriculture is found chiefly between 60° of N. lat. and 50° of S. lat. Beyond these limits the country is only half agricultural; while fishing, shooting, and cattle-breeding is carried on alongside. Out of some 12 million dess. occupied by cornfields in Asiatic Russia in 1911, some 4½ millions were situated in Western Siberia, 2½ millions in the Steppe country, and 3½ millions in Turkestan. The chief centres of the corn export are Novo-Nikolaevsk, Omsk, Kurgan, Pyetukhovo, Barnaul, and Semipalatinsk. In 1906–10 average early export = 93,014·4 thousand puds. 241 [62] [439]

Closely connected with agriculture is sheep-breeding, which is especially carried on in the Kirghis Steppes. While in European Russia at the outbreak of war for a hundred inhabitants there were only 32 sheep, in Russian Central Asia it amounted to some 200. The area of pasture land in Western Siberia amounted to some six million dess.; in the Steppe country some three million, and in Turkestan half 233

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
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233 a million. Next to sheep in importance is the breeding of
[234] horses and cows. In the cattle-breeding area the butter industry is very successfully carried on, especially in the governments of Tomsk and Tobolsk, and the chief centres
439 of its export are Barnaul, Omsk, and Kurgan. In 1913 the exports equalled 4·9 million puds as against 1·7 million puds in 1903. Closely allied to these industries is the export of live stock, bacon, game, wool, hair, skins and furs. But although they occupy a considerable place, it is the corn which comes first in quantity and cotton first in value among all Central Asiatic products. The pre-war export along the railway shows the following proportion between the various goods: Corn, 35·6 per cent. (of all exported goods); cotton, 4·3 per cent.; butter, 1·5 per cent.; fish, 1·2 per cent.; meat, 1·0 per cent.

162 In the production of corn Western Siberian ranks first; 7 per cent. of the native population scarcely take any part in this industry; while out of 93 per cent. of European population, 87 per cent. is composed of Great Russians, on whom agriculture chiefly depends. The cattle- and especially sheep-breeding depend to a great extent on the Kirghis and other Turkic tribes, forming 50 per cent. of the population in the Akmolinsk and 85 per cent. in the Semipalatinsk territories. But it is the cotton industry which almost entirely rests upon the native (Sarts and other Turkic tribes) labour.

312 The cotton industry is closely connected with irrigation, and again the irrigation canals form the most valuable possession of the natives. The canals seem to have been much more numerous in ancient times, and the remnants of them are found even in such barren deserts as Kizyl-Kumakh or Gary-ishek-otran. The native law codes (*shariat* as well as *'ādat*) recognize that the water is common property, which cannot be sold or bought, and that the land belongs to him who irrigates it. To look after the equal use of the irrigation canals, called *aryka*, an elder, called *mirab*, is chosen from among one settlement, and over several *mirabs* an *aryk-*

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7 [The Kara Kirghiz and the Turkoman --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291

A Kirghiz woman on horse-back. Her smock-like dress is lavishly patterned with flowers, and she is wearing a headdress made of narrow strips of cloth.

• 234 sometimes remain for considerable periods in one place, possess large flocks of sheep, whereas the Kirghiz, as the more pronounced nomads, use the milk of their horses.

291 In their dress, too, the Kirghiz have retained a more archaic stage of civilization than the Turkomans. According to the report of the scientist Peter Simon Pallas, who explored

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Turkestan RL1

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291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
[302] very much like that of the man. The manner of dressing their hair is very attractive. It is worn in innumerable plaits into which black ribbons are worked, from the ends of which small silver bells are suspended.

As in all other Islamic countries only the women of the towns strictly observe the custom of veiling. When working in the fields the peasant-woman wears neither long cloak nor veil. When she goes to town, however, to sell her cotton at the market, she dons cloak and veil.

286 Throughout the centuries of Turkestan's history the textile crafts have maintained a considerable standard. That is natural enough as the country produces all the more important
[234] textile fibres itself. Wool was indeed used but little in the manufacture of clothing, sheep being mainly bred for slaughter, as well as for the sake of their skin, which is known as "karakul". The best kind, the skin of unborn lambs, fetches a very high price, particularly in
248 certain colours. Silk and cotton growing have always been of great importance in Turkestan, and flourish to this day (see ill. page 1445).[1/1] The two principal kinds of cotton grown are Gossypium herbaceum and Gossypium hirsutum. In 1910 over 410,000 tons of cotton were grown on an area of about 940,000 acres. Silk growing was entirely in the hands of women. Its yields were always considerable, though no statistics are available.

[1/1] [See cot 116, p 36-- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

236 The most valuable textile material which the Turkomans and Kirghiz use, is that which their herds provide. A camel yields twenty or thirty pounds of wool, which is simply plucked out when the animals shed their winter coats; only neck, throat, and chin have to be shorn. Goats yield two to three pounds of wool once a year, sheep are shorn twice a year, the winter wool amounting to about 10 lbs, the summer crop to about 3 lbs.

286 Wool which is designed for weaving is first carded by the women by means of a comb-like instrument, and is then spun by hand, the spindle being rolled rapidly along the spinner's thigh, a method also common in India. The spindle used by the Turkoman women has a whorl attached to its upper end, that of the Kirghiz women has the whorl at the lower end. The spun thread is braided into cords, or woven into belts, ribbons or broad bands, and made into horses' harness. As everywhere in East and West Turkestan narrow, patterned ribbons are made by board-weaving. At this task two women work simultaneously, one of them turning the boards, the other passing the threads through the shed.

The two most interesting textile techniques of the nomads of Turkestan are without doubt the felting of unspun wool and the manufacture of textiles in the manner of carpet knotting. Both of these are discussed in the following article. 1

1 [cat. 116, pp. 65-81--Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

is far from being a technical one to be applied successfully from a central draughtsman's office: it is a form of public works which to command success requires of its professor a sort of sixth sense, a feeling after the countryside, the climate, the lie of the land, the local native knowledge acquired by experience, the queer things water does both above and under the ground. The successful irrigator must be more than an expert scientist; his science has become an art. To see how and where he can give life to desert lands he needs some of those intuitive qualities of genius that distinguish the architect from the builder, the landscape-gardener from the tractor-driver. There have been men like this in the Panjab, Egypt, the Tennessee Valley; they have gained great experience which with wisdom could be turned to account by the Russians in Asia also. Such men treat water like a precious fluid that must be humoured. They know, for instance, that to preserve its power to grant fertility water must have its outlets as well as its infall.

312 The beginnings of Russian irrigation in Turkistan were not particularly auspicious. In all the piedmontane tracts there existed before the Russians came an indigenous system of irrigated channels, constructed with primitive tools and maintained by the joint labours of the village communities. The skill going to the construction and maintenance of such systems is well described in such books as Holdich's *Indian Borderland* and *Gates of India*; it was considerable. In all these countries water is more important than land, and whoever controls the water has power over the land. The method by which this power was acquired by the Russians has been described, and it constitutes one of the most definite steps taken to give effect to the new economic policy. In a land dependent on artificial watering the State thus secures a more absolute control over the peasant than can be the case where fertility depends on rainfall.

241 In such lands intensive cultivation of small-holdings is the
312 rule. (Incidentally, intensive cultivation is akin to gardening, and of all types of agriculture the least suited to collective

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mechanization.) The Russians, coming fresh to the science of tropical agriculture, believed that the native use of wooden ploughs and shares instead of the iron plough implied a primitive condition. They could not estimate the value of the intensive cultivation that had gone on for thousands of years in the country. Togan tells us[1] how they tried to teach the unirrigated system of agriculture, as if the Turkistan people in their ignorance were incapable of understanding what it meant. They aimed not at getting a good crop out of a small-holding, but at cultivating large areas in order to get a large crop. Even Nalivkin, a former Governor of Farghana, had to admit that the Russian conquest had brought with it the cessation of intensive cultivation.

There was a time when even the Orsk and Emba areas north of the Caspian used to be cultivated by irrigation. There is evidence that in 1920 irrigation in that area was still being maintained to some extent, though the tradition was even then disappearing as the nomad Kazak inhabitants were driven south and agriculture in the Sir Darya basin decayed. Two Russians, Asmolovsky and Yusuf Karamshev, observed that, although the Sir Darya Kazaks used old primitive ploughs, it was for that reason that the land ploughed up with them retained its moisture and was more productive than that worked with the Russian plough. But there was one useful thing the people of Turkistan did learn from the Russians — how to mow with the scythe. Men like Barthold at that time issued warnings about the new methods and from the start were pessimistic about the attempt to cultivate the Mirza Chöl[2] (the desert near Jizak west of the point where the Sir Darya issues from the basin of Farghana). Never in history had these parts been farmed, although they were close to the river, and this was a case for learning from the experience of the native population, who must have had good reason for leaving these lands alone. Why not revive with the quickening

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 291-3.

[2] The *Mirza Chöl* is a name also applied to the Betpak Dala, north of the Chu-Talash area.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

241 water the lands where there existed traces of former irrigation,
312 as, for instance, the disused canal system of Gavkhore on the right bank of the Amu Darya opposite Khorezm? But no: Barthold was a mere professor, who had made for himself a picture of the country from 'Sart' sources. The Russian engineers were convinced of their wisdom, and money was devoted to schemes which, far from turning the land into a garden, in a few years led to water-logging, no measures having been taken to prevent the land turning into a morass, a home of reeds and waterfowl and a source of malaria.

In September 1922 [says Togan], I passed by the lower side of the canals in Mirza Chōl, and a Kazak showed me how the poplars planted by the Russians were drying up, and the surface of the land, cultivated a few years before with care and trouble, was now covered with saltpetre.[1]

653 The Tsarist irrigation engineers seem to have had little
312 conception of the dangers of water-logging and saltpetre which arise in a flat riverain country under a tropical sun, when water is brought to it and the fall is insufficient for natural drainage. The remedy lies in the provision of artificial drainage by digging channels to lower the watertable, but this is not always easy and it is very expensive. Even in their weirs and dams the Russian engineers set their bricks much too loosely, as compared with the old brick walls of indigenous canals, which had held for centuries. An effort by the Grand Duke Nicholas at the end of the XIXth century to construct a perennial irrigation system on the Amu Darya in Khorezm resulted only in cutting across and destroying the old indigenous inundation channels. The project was conceived as one in line with British irrigation works in the Panjab and in Egypt, but it is evident that the Russian engineers of that time had much to learn both as regards original canal construction and the remodelling of old works.

The Soviets have given great attention to irrigation works in Central Asia, and have certainly profited from the mistakes of their predecessors. Although in this case also it is hard to

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 295.

000 have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian tribes.

361 Between the customs and mode of life of these two peoples there are many interesting distinctions. To neither of them does the soil afford the conditions necessary for permanent settlement. Wherever there is a well or a water-hole which provides the moisture necessary to vegetation, they pitch their tents at will, and allow their herds to graze. When the pastures are exhausted, the camp is transferred to a favourable spot elsewhere, and the same process is repeated. Where the soil is suitable, the nomads of Turkestan grow grain and other food-plants, without, however, becoming permanently settled. Only in the oases have the Turkomans abandoned the nomad form of life, and have become domiciled.

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234

* [The Kara Kirghiz and the Turkoman --, Analyst]

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain cultivation the peasants work in orchards and do
[691] vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

8:Kostenko 142-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

361

	Males	Females	Total
162 Roman Catholic	136	1	137
Protestant	22	2	24
Moslem	550	152	702
Buddhist	136	67	203
Jewish	14	-	14
Old Believers (raskol'niki)	15	13	28

All the rest of the population is of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

361 241 The chief occupation of the inhabitants is agriculture. The types /425/ of grain grown here are spring and winter rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet and buckwheat. In addition potatoes are grown in considerable quantity.

In 1871 there was:		chetverts sown	chetverts reaped
Rye	spring	249	2,922
	winter	498	1,754
Spring wheat		1,937	19,022
Oats		3,079	33,831
Barley		420	1,881
Buckwheat		23	191
Potatoes		223	1,239

The grain is used for domestic consumption and is not exported abroad. A part of it is disposed of to the Kazakhs, however, and a part goes to the distilleries and breweries.

361 244 The residents of Vernyy are very active in kitchen gardening. Among their products there is a special kind of sweet melon planted with seeds from Kuldja, which is particularly worthy of note.

8:Kostenko 159-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 Few of the population worked in agricul-
241 ture in the past because many hands were taken away for the forces of the Sultan's armies. Since 1872 the population has entered actively into the cultivation of the land, being free of recruitment and having no obligations to the soil.

The wheat harvest here has only a 30-fold yield. (1)

361 1. In 1872 prices in the Kuldja market
435 were as follows:

Wheat in ordinary times costs 7 to 8 kopecks for 36 lb., but in 1872, because of military activities, disturbance, and the large number of military personnel supported in 1871, the price went up to 1 ruble, 80 kopecks. After that ordinary prices were 15 kopecks for rice, 15 kopecks for millet, 15 kopecks for barley, 4 kopecks for clover for 36 lb.

One hundred eggs cost 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of beef and mutton varies from 70 kopecks to 2 rubles, 40 kopecks. Before Kuldja was taken a hen cost 30 kopecks, afterwards the price rose to 8 kopecks. A pound of butter costs 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of tallow candles cost 5 rubles, the average cost of sugar is 30 rubles for 36 lb. Ordinary tea is sold for 1 ruble, 50 kopecks a pound.

A piece of matting 42 ft. (18 arshins) long costs from 60 to 70 kopecks. Russian cotton print material is sold at 22 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

districts: 1, Tomsk; 2, Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk; 3, Southern Steppes; 4, Yenisei; 5, Altai; 6, Minusinsk; 7, Northern Steppes. Probably some gold deposits could be found in Bokhara and Turkestan. 235

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23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia R1 1

SU 135 SCA 135

from the Caspian Sea (at Nebit-Dag), to the Fergana Valley and the lower Surkhan Darya, an affluent of the Amu Darya. Much importance is attached to the salt deposits in the Caspian gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. This inlet, acting as a natural evaporating basin for the water of the Caspian Sea, has large deposits of Glauber salt (mirabilite). Sulphur deposits are found here to a greater extent than in any other part of the USSR, mainly in the center of the desert Kara-Kum, at Gaurdak, near the Amu Darya, and in the Fergana Valley. The ranges which surround this valley abound in nonferrous and rare metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, mercury, and antimony. In the highlands of the Pamir, Iceland spar (a variety of calcite), precious stones, and gold are being mined at the present time. The combination of coal and iron deposits in and near the Fergana Valley have permitted the development of heavy industry.

SU 162 SCA 162

The population of Soviet Central Asia amounts to 10.4 million people, with an average density of 22 per square mile. While in the desert area the average density falls as low as a few people per 100 square miles, the fertile and well-irrigated oases have a population density of about 1,000–1,500 per square mile, the highest rural population concentration in the USSR. The basic elements of the population belong to the Turkic and Iranian groups. The former, by far the more numerous, includes Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks, while the latter takes in the Tadzhiks, the remaining members of an ancient nationality of Central Asia, who speak a language akin to Iranian. The Uzbeks number more than one half the total population, besides Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Turkmen. Russians (above 6 percent), Bukhara Jews, Chinese Dungans, and others make up the remainder of this colorful ethnic mélange.

SU 631 SCA 631

Until 1924 Soviet Central Asia was divided politically into the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (formed in 1922) and the Bukhara and the Khorezm Soviet People's republics (formed in 1920). Late in 1924 a reorganization of these territories and a redemarcation of boundaries along essentially ethnic lines led to the establishment of the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR), and the Kara-Kirghiz (later Kirghiz) Autonomous SSR, which became part of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 and 1936, respectively, the Tadzhik and Kirghiz Autonomous SSR became full union republics.

SU 241 SCA 241

Agricultural activities play the leading role in the economy of Central Asia. Depending upon the land form and the development of irrigation, the following branches of agriculture can be distinguished: (1) ir-

23· Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL2

rigated farming, with intensive crops adapted to land irrigation (mainly cotton); (2) dry farming, including chiefly grain crops on mountain slopes having sufficient rainfall; (3) lowland livestock raising, including sheep and camels, adapted to the dry steppe and the desert; (4) highland livestock raising of cattle, goats, and sheep, adapted to valley pastures. Of all these activities, irrigated farming is by far the most important; it employs the greater portion of the population and covers more than two thirds of the sown area. The main crop in the irrigated area is cotton, remarkably well suited to the fertile loess soil of the lower valleys and the warm, sunny climate of Central Asia. The chief cotton areas are the Fergana Valley, the oases of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the Vakhsh valley. The cotton is processed in local ginning plants, the seeds are sent to oil-extracting presses, and the husks are used for fodder. Other irrigated crops are rice, alfalfa, wheat, corn, sesame, and melons. The irrigated fields are generally bordered by mulberry trees, on which the silkworm is cultivated. One of the most common fruit-trees is the apricot; widespread orchards also produce peaches, apples, pears, pomegranates, grapes. Dried fruits (apricots, peaches, and raisins) form important articles of export. Grain crops occupy a very small portion of the irrigated area and are grown mainly on the non-irrigated mountain slopes.

SCL 241 SCA 241 SCL [248] SCA [248] SCL

Livestock is raised all year round, generally in the high mountain valleys in the summer and the lowland steppe and desert in the winter. The most important herds are sheep (including the karakul sheep), camels, cattle, horses, and mountain goats and yak.

SCL 231 SCA 231 SCL

Beside the mining industry developed at the deposits of petroleum, coal, salt, sulphur, and nonferrous metals, the industry is concentrated in the region of Tashkent, where it is supplied with power by the two large hydroelectric installations, the Chirchik and the Farkhad power plants. Tashkent is the center of the heavy metallurgy, textile, machine-construction, and food industries. Plants which process agricultural products are located in many other parts of Central Asia; they include ginning plants, oil presses, tanneries, fruit canneries, sugar refineries, and cotton and silk mills.

SCL 438 SCA 438 SCL

The basic transportation route is the Trans-Caspian Railroad, which sends many branches into the chief economic regions of Central Asia: the spur from Mary to Kushka, on the Afghan border, and the branches from Chardzhou to Kungrad (now under construction), from Kagan to Termez and Stalinabad, and from Ursat'yevskaya to Andizhan-Ko-
Kand-Namangan.

SCL 496 SCA 496 SCL

[Vernyy]

Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

361

	Males	Females	Total
162 Roman Catholic	136	1	137
Protestant	22	2	24
Moslem	550	152	702
Buddhist	136	67	203
Jewish	14	-	14
Old Believers (raskol'niki)	15	13	28

All the rest of the population is of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

361 241 The chief occupation of the inhabitants is agriculture. The types /425/ of grain grown here are spring and winter rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet and buckwheat. In addition potatoes are grown in considerable quantity.

In 1871 there was:		chetverts sown	chetverts reaped
Rye	spring	249	2,922
	winter	498	1,754
Spring wheat		1,937	19,022
Oats		3,079	33,831
Barley		420	1,881
Buckwheat		23	191
Potatoes		223	1,239

The grain is used for domestic consumption and is not exported abroad. A part of it is disposed of to the Kazakhs, however, and a part goes to the distilleries and breweries.

361 244 The residents of Vernyy are very active in kitchen gardening. Among their products there is a special kind of sweet melon planted with seeds from Kuldja, which is particularly worthy of note.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1/1 [p. 3 -- Analysis]

361 2) Ruman, 3) Kulangyr, 4) Sheikh Burkhan, 5) Pumchi-kur, 6) Gava or Kuruk, which are named after the aryks of greater or lesser importance which irrigate their plowed lands and gardens. These mahalas are formed from the outskirts of town which are laid out in gardens. Here part of the inhabitants live permanently and part move out from the town only for the summer.

Khodzhent is divided into two districts: Rozak on the west, and Kalinau on the east. The border line between them is taken as the aryk Mazar, which enters the town between the Chervak and Chuyanchi gates and flowes into the Syr-Darya near the Kalendar Khan mahala. The town is thus divided into two parts by this aryk. In one part, the Razak district, there are 2,800 dwellings together with the suburb mahalas Iova and Kuruk. In the other district of Kalinau, there are 3,000 dwellings including the remaining suburban mahalas. Cal-
[161] culating an average of 5 persons per house, one may infer that there are about 14,000 persons in the Razak district, and about 15,000 in the Kalinau district. Thus in the entire town of Khodzhent there are about 29,000 inhabitants. They are almost all Tadzhiks, except for about 100 Uzbeks, 50 Kashgarians, 30 Jews and 7 Hindus.

361 In Khodzhent there are many gardens in addition to those which surround it from the
247 outside. It is calculated that 733 tanaps (a tanap is 0.45 acres) in Khodzhent are in gardens. There is a particularly large number of gardens in the western part or district of town, Razak, which is larger in area than the Kalinau district although it has a smaller

361 population. In the Kalinau district the po-
247 pulation is more densely settled as a result of the fact that the largest of the two town bazaars is located there, and therefore practically all the trading estate lives /445/ in that district. In the Razak district the inhabitants work more in gardening.

361 Of the town buildings in Khodzhent,
346 three medresses of fire brick are particularly remarkable. One was begun by Ak Buta Beg, who was mentioned above, and finished by his wife Izyat Alyam, about 150 years ago. In this medresse one teacher (mudaris) instructs about 50 students, who live in 28 separate rooms. The remaining medresses were built 40 to 50 years ago. One was built by the Khodzhent Beg Shakhi Divan Begi, and has 23 apartments. In it there are about 40 students and 2 teachers The other medresse was built by Mukhamed Sadyk Alim, also with 23 lodgings, in which 30 students live and one teacher. These medresses are named for the persons who built them.

Of the medresses which are built not of firebrick but of clay the following are worthy of note. One is the medresse Namazga, which was built about 60 years ago by Beg Khaly Kum Mirza. In it are 23 lodgings, 2 teachers and about 50 students. Another is the medresse Hazret Sheik Maslah-Eddin, which was built about 20 years ago by Mirza Hakim Potavali, with 10 lodgings, in which there are 14 students A third is the medresse Mahomed-Hussar, built by the Beg Hash Barkan Bay, about 180 years ago. It contains 13 cells, in which one teacher instructs 30 students.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

As might be expected, cotton and silk production is the peculiar pride of Turkistan. The Farghana Valley, we know, has the ideal climate and the water both for cotton cultivation, and for the growth of mulberry-trees[1] for the silk-worm. The same is true of the other southern oases, watered by the Chirchik (Tashkent), Zarafshan and Kashka Darya, and also of the Vakhsh river irrigation in Tajikistan. In the early years cotton cultivation was in danger of becoming a monoculture, and more than once brought the country into terrible famine conditions. The figures of the fourth Five-Year Plan, if reliable, suggest that, even in Uzbekistan, there has now been a considerable reversion from commercial cropping to grain, and, if so, the rural economy is not so brittle as many have supposed. The great Soviet achievement has been to bring the mills into Turkistan and process the crops locally. The largest cotton-processing establishment is the Stalin Textile Combine and Institute at Tashkent, while for silk there is a combine at Margilan, said to be the largest in the world, and integrating all processes from the unwinding of the cocoon to the weaving of the final material. Woven silk is in great demand for parachutes.

IRRIGATION

The aim to free Russia from all dependence on foreign cotton and then to build heavy stock-piles is bound up with the Soviet policy of irrigation. Irrigation in its turn is linked both with waterways and (more important) with the production of hydro-electric power. In some respects, on the face of them, the Soviet plans for development under these heads are more imaginative even than the metallurgical projects realized in the Urals before the War. For the claim is that they will turn a great desert into a smiling countryside, and even divert waters destined by nature for the Arctic into the Turanian basin. But the science of the irrigation engineer

[1] *Morus alba*, known locally by the Persian word *tut*.

291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
[302] very much like that of the man. The manner of dressing their hair is very attractive. It is worn in innumerable plaits into which black ribbons are worked, from the ends of which small silver bells are suspended.

As in all other Islamic countries only the women of the towns strictly observe the custom of veiling. When working in the fields the peasant-woman wears neither long cloak nor veil. When she goes to town, however, to sell her cotton at the market, she dons cloak and veil.

286 Throughout the centuries of Turkestan's history the textile crafts have maintained a considerable standard. That is natural enough as the country produces all the more important
[234] textile fibres itself. Wool was indeed used but little in the manufacture of clothing, sheep being mainly bred for slaughter, as well as for the sake of their skin, which is known as "karakul". The best kind, the skin of unborn lambs, fetches a very high price, particularly in
248 certain colours. Silk and cotton growing have always been of great importance in Turkestan, and flourish to this day (see ill. page 1443). 1/1 The two principal kinds of cotton grown are Gossypium herbaceum and Gossypium hirsutum. In 1910 over 410,000 tons of cotton were grown on an area of about 940,000 acres. Silk growing was entirely in the hands of women. Its yields were always considerable, though no statistics are available.

1/1 [See cat 116, p. 36 -- Analyst]

3. Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

aksakala is elected, looking after the whole system of the chief canal. The lands irrigated by the natives in Turkestan (including Transcaspia), Bokhara, and Khiva equal 4,758,000 dess., or 2·6 per cent. of all the area. Since the Russian occupation, many attempts were made at reconstructing some of the ancient canals on modern lines. As the result of this, in the last few years before the war the Murgab canals were accomplished, irrigating some 25,000 dess., and the Romanoff canal, irrigating some 65,000 dess., in the north-eastern part of the Golodnaya ('Hunger') Steppe. A plan for irrigating a further four million dess. has been drafted. 312

No doubt this energy of the Russian administration was guided by appreciation of the immense value of the cotton industry. In 1913 some 550,000 dess., including the vassal Khanates, was under cotton plantations, realizing about 13½ million puds of cotton fibre (in 1914 some 675,000 dess., realizing some 13·9 million puds). Ferghana, which, it must be remembered, is the best-irrigated province, produced 75 per cent. of all cotton. Next comes the Tashkent district of Syr-Daria territory; the Katta-Kurgan, Khojent, and Samarkand districts of Samarkand territory; and the Merv and Tejent districts of the Transcaspian territory. It is owing to Russian influence that the old Central Asian specie of cotton (*Gossypium herbaceum*, L.) was almost entirely replaced by the American specie (*Gossypium hirsutum*, L.). The cotton plantations form a chief revenue of the Central Asiatic people, and were designated almost entirely for export. At the outbreak of war Russia occupied fifth place in cotton production (after U.S.A., Great Britain, Egypt, and China), and fourth place in cotton manufacture (after Great Britain, U.S.A., and Germany), and only one-fifth of her cotton was grown outside Central Asia (in Transcaucasia). 248

Other industries which might have a prosperous future are the rice and tobacco plantations and the rearing of silk-worms (at present Turkestan produces about 100,000 puds of dry cocoons per annum). 249

It has been said that this rich area has no communication 000

23· Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL1

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3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

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It has been said that this rich area has no communication 000

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92. Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native. In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p. 165, and Figure 85, p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analys]

354 For the baking of bread a special baking oven of burnt clay is
252 used. It has the form of a large overturned water /245/ cask, with
no floor and an opening in the side. This oven, which is made all in
one piece and sold ready-made at the bazaar is either /Figure 93. B764
Caption: Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the
background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the
emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place. / buried underground
or walled into the court wall and surrounded with a thick layer of
clay so that both openings /246/, the one on top and that on the
side, remain open. When bread is baked in such an oven a strong
fire is laid inside it; after this has gone out, the coals and ashes are
removed and then the thin flakes of bread are pasted to the heated
inner walls of the oven from above. In many places, especially in
the colder mountainous regions like Badakhshan, these baking ovens
are buried in the middle of the living rooms, in the floor, and thus
they also serve for the heating of the living quarters (Figure 94). B765
/Figure 94. Caption: Baking Oven of Turkestan. /

343 The privies in the dwellings of the natives are arranged very
suitably and in keeping with the local conditions. In a distant part
of the court a separate large room is built. In the middle of this space
there is a pit about 8 meters deep with a diameter of about 3 meters,
which is covered over with heavy, well cut, wooden planks. In these
planks a small bamboo-shaped slit is cut out. Naturally there are no
seat boards since the natives are not accustomed to sitting on chairs.
A hole is left in the roof just over the slit mentioned above, in which
a short pipe of burnt clay is placed. The open door opening and this
roof opening provide adequate ventilation and there is no sign of a
bad smell. When the sunken pit is finally almost full after many years
it is then filled up with earth and the privy is moved to another place.
Care is taken almost always to have a canal flowing by in which the
residents may make their ablutions in the manner prescribed by the
Koran.

Since in Turkestan every house owner is at the same time an
owner of horses, the stables have a very important role in the dwell-
ings of the natives. The stalls are always built next to the court wall,
and are usually on the opposite sides of the court square from the
dwelling quarters, sometimes even occupying three sides of the court.
The stalls are little more than sheds and the supporting girders are
fixed in the court wall on one side and are supported on the other by

361 Much more is used for plowland (1814 tanaps) and rice planting (1896 tanaps).

The Sibzor district, occupying the northwestern corner of the town, is divided into 38 mahalas, which are: Kagat, Great /407/ Middle and Little Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-Saray, Yau, Mazar-khan, Kanly-kucha, Dessin-kucha, Pshta-khammom, Masse-duz, Khatyn-mechet, Khich-kupriuk, Khodzha-kugachi, Labzak, Rabat, Kunlak, Khodja-kucha, Yakhkachub, Khazret-imam, Tyk-kuche, Shakar, Dzhim-kucha, Parchabob, Batyr, Akhun-guzar, Kundzhak, Tchinchak, Kadavod, Chegyt-bashi, Khodja-Taressekon, Turnau-bashi, Big Sibzor, Darbaza-kent, Shakyr-guzar, Kazy-kucha, and Agmem-seid. In addition, four settlements also belong to this part of the town: Ibrahim-ata, whose inhabitants are agriculturists and raise 'dzhenushka', Chalo-kazak, Shano-vod, and Kosh-kizyl. The houses in the Sibzor district total 2230, with a population
361 of 18,650. The Keikaus(1) aryk, which divides
312 off from the Bos-Su aryk 8 versts away and enters the town at the Takhtapul' gates, is the main aryk in this part of town.

1. This aryk is named for Keikaus, the chief of the Tashkent okrug.

It irrigates the Big Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kunlak and Yau mahalas, then flows into the Kukcha district, from which it goes
[256] out of the town at the Kuchi-mazar gates. All the flour mills and crushing mills of Sibzor are concentrated on this aryk. The other mahalas are irrigated by small trenches which lead out of the main Keikaus aryk, and bear the names of the mahalas through which they

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

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age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
P.736 piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead./ In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan./
P.736

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
P.736 tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
P.737
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots./

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[275] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the
[305] rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.
485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

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Men of Bokhara in a tea-house, wearing chalats and turbans.

415 with long pouring spouts are used to pour out the water for the washing. These washbasins with the water pitchers which accompany them are sometimes made very luxuriously, as show pieces; in Bukhara I was once offered a fine specimen which was gold plated, with beautiful chased work and set with many semi-precious stones, for which the maker asked 300 marks (Figure 92). P.75 &

Porcelain plates have come into use in Turkestan only in recent times through the Russians. Until that time the natives had only relatively large round plates, quite shallow, with small almost perpendicular rims, similar to our serving plates. These are made of brass or tin-plated copper, are sometimes nearly a meter in diameter and are used only for the serving of fruit, sweetmeats and the countless cups and basins which are carried in all at once for the accomodation of distinguished guests.

276 The (tobacco) waterpipes, which are inevitable in every Turkestan household are called chilim by the Sarts and Uzbeks, and kalyan by the Tajiks, and differ from the water pipes of Turkey. They consist of a hollowed-out gourd container in which reeds are placed at both the top and on one side. The reed at the side serves as the mouthpiece, and the vertical reed for the attachment of the bowl of the pipe, /243/ which consists of burnt clay either unglazed, or glazed in blue or green. In the upper part of the water pipe a small hole is bored on the side. This serves to blow out the smoke during the kindling of the coals which are laid on top of the tobacco, and it must be held shut with the finger during the actual smoking. The poor use the pipe in this simplest form; richer people, on the contrary, sheathe the brown-stained body of the pipe with bronze and decorate the mounting with chased work and mounted turquoises; then they provide the reeds with burnt-in decorations and cover the bowl of the pipe with strings of beads and semi-precious stones, so that this kind of apparatus finally acquires a pleasing appearance. In rare cases the body of the water pipe is made entirely of brass, but even in such cases the vessel always has the shape of a gourd container (cf. Figure 105, 118 and 123).

352 Finally, an article of furniture which is missing in only a few [523] households is the bird cage, for the natives are great bird lovers. The bird cages are made in the same artless fashion as almost all the products of native industry. They consist of a simple round wooden or cardboard box without a lid (discarded Russian hatboxes are often used for this purpose) on which a pointed dome-shaped net is placed made of many-colored cotton yarn. This is held tight by the weight of the box

291 particularly those of Turkestan proper, wear conical felt hats, the slashed brims of which are turned up. This type of headgear is demonstrably of great age. Indian miniatures of the time of the first Mogul emperors, i. e. the sixteenth century, show that such conical hats were frequently worn by the soldiers of those rulers. As the Mogul dynasty, and a great proportion of the armies with whose help it was founded, came from Turkestan, it is probable that the type of hat described above also originated there.

291 Belts and bags are also of leather. In one of these bags, which are very strongly made,
281 the Kirghiz carries his tea-making utensils. The pouches are usually bound or studded with metal, not only by way of decoration, but also to increase their strength. R. Karutz, who lived for a long time among the Kirghiz of the Caspian Sea, and who wrote at the beginning of the present century, gave a brief description of the treatment of hides. When scraped for dressing as leather, they are treated with a paste consisting of the boiled ashes of grasses which grow on the steppes. Hides which are to retain their hair are covered for a week with a paste of flour and sour milk. Pallas, too, was familiar with this method of treatment. Vámbéry described how a skin which was to be used for carrying water was salted.

291 The dress of Kirghiz women differs from that of the men in so far as the usually patterned outer garment is smock-like in cut and reaches to the ground in accordance with the custom in many Islamic countries. In addition they wear trousers which, like those of the men

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Sulling cane for the manufacture of mats in a village near Bukhara. These mats form part of the tent walls.

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

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ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regarded as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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A fuller of Tashkent. The heavy wedge-like head of the mallet and the way in which the handle is mounted serve to increase its effect. Sepia drawing.

291 trousers. Unlike the corresponding garment in other Mohammedan countries, this smock reaches to the ground, thus also completely enveloping the wearer's body. Members of the wealthier classes frequently wear smocks made of silk, as this material is only forbidden to the men. The patterns are much the same as those

291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
[302] very much like that of the man. The manner of dressing their hair is very attractive. It is worn in innumerable plaits into which black ribbons are worked, from the ends of which small silver bells are suspended.

As in all other Islamic countries only the women of the towns strictly observe the custom of veiling. When working in the fields the peasant-woman wears neither long cloak nor veil. When she goes to town, however, to sell her cotton at the market, she dons cloak and veil.

286 Throughout the centuries of Turkestan's history the textile crafts have maintained a considerable standard. That is natural enough as the country produces all the more important
[234] textile fibres itself. Wool was indeed used but little in the manufacture of clothing, sheep being mainly bred for slaughter, as well as for the sake of their skin, which is known as "karakul". The best kind, the skin of unborn lambs, fetches a very high price, particularly in
248 certain colours. Silk and cotton growing have always been of great importance in Turkestan, and flourish to this day (see ill. page 1445).[1] The two principal kinds of cotton grown are Gossypium herbaceum and Gossypium hirsutum. In 1910 over 410,000 tons of cotton were grown on an area of about 940,000 acres. Silk growing was entirely in the hands of women. Its yields were always considerable, though no statistics are available.

[1] [See cat 116, p 36 -- Analyst]

4: Leix U-6 (no date) 1941 Turkestan R1.1

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

Weaver's workshop in Turkestan. The weaver is passing the shuttle through the shed which is formed on the further side of the batten.

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000 438 statistics are available. The best silk came on to the market in Bokhara and the towns of Ferghana; Khokand and Khojent were the main trading centres for both silk and cotton. Another important cotton market was Andishan. At the present day the breeding of silkworms and to an even greater extent the growing of cotton in Western Turkestan are promoted by the government in every possible way.

286 In Turkestan fabrics are woven in narrow pieces only about twenty inches wide; these are then sewn together to make garments. The type of loom generally used in Western Turkestan (see ill. page 1446) consists of a frame of four roughly hewn poles driven vertically into the ground. It is maintained in a state of equal tension by means of a rope fixed tightly above it. Breast-beam and warp-beam are slung in rollers at so short a distance from each other that very little of the fabric is visible. Unlike the weavers of other districts the craftsman of Turkestan passes the shuttle through the rear shed at the other side of the batten. In order to impart lustre, smoothness, and thickness to the fabric it is beaten on a wooden block with a heavy mallet (see ill. page 1446). The rhythmical beats of the fuller's mallet are heard everywhere in the bazaars of Turkestan. The mallet used for fulling is shaped like a blunt wooden wedge. It has a short handle which is not fixed to the centre of the head, but close to the narrower striking surface. This increases the efficacy of the instrument, but it requires great strength to wield it.

[See p. 39-- Analyst]

[See p. 37--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Pl.1 Turkestan Pl.1

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

Part of a patterned chalat of Turkestan. The patterns are produced by winding threads tightly round parts of the fabric before dyeing it.

In Eastern Turkestan the ethnologist and archaeologist Albert Le Coq found a much more primitive weaver's craft than in the western region. In the manner common in India the weaver sits in a pit across which the warp-threads are stretched horizontally. Le Coq also observed board-weaving, which is practised also in Western Turkestan in the making of tape-like fabrics (see ill. below). This technique was familiar to the Ancient Egyptians; as practised in Turkestan it is, however, simpler. The boards or cards which are used to form the shed are square, and have a hole in each corner, through which the thread is

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Board-weaving in Eastern Turkestan. Unlike the corresponding instruments used in Ancient Egypt, the boards or cards through which the weft is passed have only four corners. After Le Coq.

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286 passed. As the richness of the pattern depends on the combinations which result from turning the cards, the patterns or fabrics made in Turkestan show much less variety than those of Ancient Egypt.

286 From the earliest times dyeing in Turkestan
294 has not only been a craft, but a highly developed art. In that country, as everywhere in Asia, patterns and ornaments are to a large extent produced by dyeing rather than by weaving. It must, however, be said, that in Turkestan the dyer's art never reached the same high standard of excellence that is found in India or Indonesia.

The simplest technique is that adopted in dyeing textiles blue for women's clothes. For this purpose indigo is used. The material is tightly rolled into bundles, and at certain intervals is wound round with the threads which prevent the dye from penetrating the fibre in these places. It is a matter of course that the patterns produced by this technique are comparatively simple. The ornaments consist of large circles, stripes, and spots. In addition to blue a very delicate red and also yellow are popular colours (see ill. page 1447).* In the streets of towns and villages in Turkestan one often sees such bundles of cloth, usually "mesru" and silk, hung up between two trees to dry. More complicated patterns, which are made up of small individual elements and which make the fabric appear "flamed", are dyed according to the ikat method. As far as is known only the warp-ikat technique is employed. The ikat patterns of Turkestan are geometrical, and even the more complicated

*[Cat. 116, p. 41 --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Man from Bokhara wearing a chalat made according to the ikat technique. The threads are dyed before weaving.

286 ones which are made in Ferghana (see ill.
294 below) and the neighbouring districts of Eastern Turkestan are not nearly so rich and so vivid as Indian and Indonesian ikat patterns.
386 With the exception of indigo, which was imported from India, all the dyestuffs used in

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

Chelat pattern from the Ferghana district produced by the ikat method.

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

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236 The most valuable textile material which the Turkomans and Kirghiz use, is that which their herds provide. A camel yields twenty or thirty pounds of wool, which is simply plucked out when the animals shed their winter coats; only neck, throat, and chin have to be shorn. Goats yield two to three pounds of wool once a year, sheep are shorn twice a year, the winter wool amounting to about 10 lbs, the summer crop to about 3 lbs.

286 Wool which is designed for weaving is first carded by the women by means of a comb-like instrument, and is then spun by hand, the spindle being rolled rapidly along the spinner's thigh, a method also common in India. The spindle used by the Turkoman women has a whorl attached to its upper end, that of the Kirghiz women has the whorl at the lower end. The spun thread is braided into cords, or woven into belts, ribbons or broad bands, and made into horses' harness. As everywhere in East and West Turkestan narrow, patterned ribbons are made by board-weaving. At this task two women work simultaneously, one of them turning the boards, the other passing the threads through the shed.

The two most interesting textile techniques of the nomads of Turkestan are without doubt the felting of unspun wool and the manufacture of textiles in the manner of carpet knotting. Both of these are discussed in the following article. 7/1

7 [cat. 116, pp. 65-81 -- Analyst]

63

291 the steppes of Central Asia at the command of the Empress Catherine of Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century, the nomad Turkic peoples at one time did not make their clothing of textile materials, but rather of leather prepared from horses' hides. This was the only material strong enough to withstand the ravages of the sandstorms and blizzards which sweep across the vast steppes. In the dress of the Kirghiz Kasaks this tradition still survives. Over their cotton trousers they wear others of leather, which are of very loose cut. The upper part of the body is covered with a coarse shirt, over which the wide, long-sleeved coat, known throughout Central Asia as the chalat, is worn. The chalats of the nomads are often thickly padded and quilted, and are, therefore, very warm. In former times they, too, were made of leather, and in very rare cases they still are. As a protection against cold winter weather coats of sheep or wolf skin are also worn.

Among the Kirghiz the types of headgear are particularly numerous, the traditional ones also being of leather. In the North a species of helmet is worn; it has four flaps which are let down in such a manner as to cover the face almost completely when a snowstorm is raging. Such helmets are made of strong leather, and are usually red in colour. The Kirghiz also wear high fur caps, with the hair to the inside. Only the turned-up flaps show a strip of fur.

[287] A textile material which is particularly characteristic of the Mongol tribes of Northern Asia is felt (see ill. page 1460). The Kirghiz,

[See cat. 116, p 75 -- Analyst]

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Felted and Knotted Fabrics in Turkestan

287 Whereas settled peoples usually prefer stable and rigid materials for building their houses, nomads require a material which is light and unbreakable, which can easily be loaded on to the backs of their camels or other beasts of burden, and thus transported from place to place. For that reason nomads tend to develop textile techniques of distinctive character. It is in this respect that the fundamental difference between Kirghiz and Turkomans finds its most notable expression. The Kirghiz, who prefers stout, serviceable, and plain materials, makes use of felt manufactured by a most primitive method, whereas the Turkomans have adopted the same complicated technique of knotting which is used in the making of pile carpets, and which permits of such rich and varied effects.

In this respect as in many others the Kirghiz perpetuate an ancient technique of the Mongol nomads of Inner Asia. Fabrics of felt with elaborate appliqué patterns have been found in the tombs of Noin Ula in Mongolia, which date from about the beginning of the Christian era (see Ciba Review No. 37, p. 1322).

Felt is made of wool, usually of the summer wool of lambs born the same year. The process of converting loose wool into a thick, strong,

287 yet at the same time pliable material consists of several stages. First of all the wool is spread out on the ground in a thick layer, where it is vigorously beaten with rods, a task performed by women and girls. It is then placed on a straw mat, also in an even layer, and sprayed with hot water in order to make it pliable. After that the mass is rolled up in the mat, and this roll is moved to and fro for hours until the wool has become felted. In Eastern Turkestan the Kirghiz make their yak oxen drag the roll back and forward. The felt is of the same colour as the natural wool, that is to say, white, brown, or fawn. White felt is regarded as the [531] best of all. Patterned rugs are made by cutting out pieces of felt of contrasting colours, and arranging them on the layer of wool as desired. They are then stamped and pressed in until the whole mass becomes firmly felted together. In Western Turkestan the Kirghiz prefer angular geometrical patterns, in Eastern Turkestan undulating ribbon-like lines are more usual (see ill. p. 1460).

342 The felt made in the manner described above is so strong that the Kirghiz and other nomad peoples of Asia use it as a material for making tents; these are called alajak by the Kirghiz, kibitka in Russian, and yurt in Turk-

[See p. 75--Analyst]

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

Section of a tent band (dam-i-khirgah) which the Turkomans wrap round their tents. The pattern shows a camous executed in the knot-technique.

342 ish. The Kirghiz tent may be described as a portable house (see ill. p. 1457). The frame consists of three parts, the walls, which are made of trellissed laths that can easily be folded up, the roof-frame, and a ring to which wall-frame and roof-frame are secured. The whole structure can be taken to pieces in a very short time, transported by a camel to a fresh pasture, and re-erected without great difficulty. After the framework has been set up, it is first surrounded by mats made of reeds, which bear a pattern formed by wrapping coloured threads round the stalks. These bold patterns with their angular geometrical figures are visible from afar. According to the time of the year the roof or the whole kibitka is covered with felt, which is tied down by means of cords. Against the burning heat of summer as well as the icy winter blizzards the felt kibitka affords the best protection imaginable.

287 531 Tents of similar kind are used by the Turkoman nomads. Unlike those of the Kirghiz, where the materials consist mainly of felt and leather, the Turkoman tents are characterized by the predominance of fabrics worked according to the technique of carpet-knotting.

[184] The perfection of this technique and the great variety of articles produced demonstrate the advanced stage of Turkoman civilization as compared with that of the Kirghiz. The knot-technique gives to the tent as well as to articles of daily use an artistic character which in no way impairs the mobility of the household.

Most of the rectangular Turkoman rugs were hung in the opening of the tents, where they served as substitutes for doors. None of the older pieces are larger than the moderately wide tent-openings. Some Turkoman tribes fixed a specially decorative piece, also worked in the knot-technique, above the entrance. The

[See p 67 -- Analyst]

287 finest examples of this kind are those made by
531 the Yomuds; they are pentagonal in shape, and are ornamented with long black fringes. From the point of view of ethnology the most interesting fabric of this kind is a strip about forty or forty-five feet long and not more than about fourteen inches wide. Such strips are called daur-i-khirgah, and are passed right round the tent. They are covered with pictorial scenes or patterns made up of conventionalized landscapes or trees, all worked on a white ground according to the knot-technique. The figural scenes show caravans on the march, laden and grazing camels, horsemen, and other scenes from the daily life of the Turkomans. It is possible that certain events from the history of the tribe or clan are represented there. Religious or magic elements may also be discerned in these friezes. Essentially similar figures are found among primitive or semi-civilized peoples all over the world, executed in the style predominant in the respective areas.

531 In the tent of the Turkomans, as in the
352 dwellings of all Islamic peoples, the floor-carpet is one of the most important items. It is very likely that the Turkomans made no distinction between ordinary rugs and prayer mats, as their carpets had no pictorial patterns, and did not, therefore, run counter to Islamic law. One very common type of rug, patterned, strangely enough, with almost cruciform figures and claw-shaped ornaments interspersed with them, certainly served both as a floor-covering and a prayer-mat. Pillows and cushions on which the Turkoman rests his arms when seated are never made in knot-technique, but always covered with cloth.

415 The fronts of the various bags and pouches which the Turkomans use as receptacles for everything, even for butter and cheese, are al-

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a
531 seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are
287 distinguished from all others by their simple
186 but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur.
[352 The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

[cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

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

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

The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.

287 plained by the strongly developed organiza-
531 tion of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on
186 a long tradition which is strictly observed. There are only a limited number of patterns for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

287 In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the
531 fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separately as rugs—usually go under the name of
352 Bokhara, though not one of them was ever knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

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in so far as the best known kinds are made by the women of the Tekke Turkomans, whose pastures are in the Merv area. Incidentally, all Turkoman carpets are made exclusively by women. Typical of the rugs of Merv is an octagonal star which is checkered red and white; the octagon is divided into four parts, each of which is in a colour contrasting to that of the adjacent part. The figures which fill the octagon are very simple and severely geometrical in style. The octagons are dispersed over the surface in even rows (see ill. p. 1459). The rugs of the Tekkes found their way to the West in large quantities; they are very popular, and have often been imitated.

The women of the Saryk tribe, which lives southward from Merv to the Afghan frontier, also use octagons as patterns, and arrange them in a manner similar to that of the Tekke rugs. There is, however, a difference in so far as the edges of these figures are not jagged. The rugs made in the southermost part of this area, known as Punjdeh (five towns), have a style of their own. They avoid red altogether, and are distinguished by a very finely graded scale of colours, in which brown and black predominate, yellow and white being used very sparingly. These dark colours form a marked contrast to the brilliant tints of all other Turkoman rugs. They correspond to the natural colour of the wool or hair used in making all Turkoman rugs. And even though these colours are often obtained artificially by dyeing, the origin of the colour scheme is doubt-

[See p. 72 -- Analyst]

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287 531 352

less to be sought in the use of undyed wool. The western neighbours of the Saryks are the Salors. They, too, use the octagon as the sole ornament of their knotted rugs; it is filled with hook-shaped figures on an undivided ground of even red (see ill. page 1459).

Of entirely different pattern are the rugs of the northermost Turkoman tribe, the Yomuds. They prefer scalloped figures and rows of hooks. Instead of octagons, lozenges form the ground of their rugs (see ill. page 1461).

In addition to these principal motives a number of minor ones are used, none of which are, however, of importance for the distinction of the various kinds of Turkoman rugs. Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to put some symbolic interpretation on these figures. That may be justified to a certain extent, but there can be no doubt that for some centuries at least the Turkomans have been as unconscious of the symbolic significance of these elements of designs as the Persian carpet-knotters are of that of the Buddhist symbols which they use as decorative elements. The intellectual and religious life of the early Turk peoples is far too little known to permit of anything more than surmise in this respect. Moreover, Turkestan has in the last few centuries been less accessible to foreigners that in Marco Polo's day.

287 The Turkoman rugs of the best period are so closely knotted that they must from a technical point of view be classed among the best Oriental carpets. Really good rugs

[see cat. 116, p. 71 -- Analyse]
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[see cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyse]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Foli rug from Eastern Turkestan with the rounded ornaments popular in that area.



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

A "torba" or small camel-bag as used by the Turkomans. An early example, the pattern of which is hooked. Privately owned. New York.

287 number from 420 to 450 knots to the square inch, and some times even more than that. The knot is usually the Persian Sennah knot; the Turkish Ghiordes knot occurs in exceptional cases only (cf. Ciba Review No. 15). The material used is the wool of camels, sheep, and goats. The strong knee-hair of the camel serves as material for the warp-threads. For the knot-thread the soft under-wool which goats and camels grow in the cold season is used. Unlike the camels of other Oriental countries the heavy beasts of burden in Turkestan, the so-called Bactrian camels, have an exceedingly thick coat of hair, which covers their bodies in thick tufts during the winter months. Cotton is never used in the making of Turkoman rugs, and silk only very rarely, usually in making small knotted bags from the region of Merv and Punjdeh, and then only for a few details of the pattern.

The treatment of the wool used in knotting rugs has been brought to great perfection in the course of a long tradition. Washing, which is done in running water, is of great importance. It is very difficult to remove all the grease from the fibre, and if that is not done there is danger of maggots finding their way into the pile and destroying it.

386 The same care and skill are devoted to the dyeing of the wool. As elsewhere in the East the important red dye was extracted from the root of the madder-plant (known in the vernacular as rujan) or from the kermes shield-louse. Madder grew wild throughout Turkestan, and

386 was also cultivated. Blue was achieved by means of indigo, which had to be brought from India, and for that reason it is rarely found in Turkoman rugs. Black was usually extracted from the gall-nuts of the pistachio (known as busgunch) and from pomegranate skins. Sometimes mate-

● 287 *Pattern in knot-technique as used by the Yomud Turkomans. Lozenges and rows of books are distributed over the background.*

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

386 rials such as pyrites were used, which had the effect of corroding the wool, so that the black parts of many otherwise good rugs give the impression of having been eaten away. In spite of the limited selection of colours the shades and the number of combinations are surprisingly
● 287 varied. The Turkomans are good observers,
531 and were not slow in making use of the fact that the colours varied with the time of the year at which the plants were gathered, or with the length of time during which they were allowed to boil, to ferment, or to be exposed to the rays of the sun. For that reason the simplicity which characterizes these rugs is never monotonous. Both technically and artistically they are the perfect expression of that form of life which ethnologists describe as nomadic. They fulfil all the requirements of daily use, and the patterns are designed and perpetuated by skilled workers of a tribe, whose members all live under precisely the same geographical and social conditions.

287 These connections between the knotting
352 technique and nomad life are so striking that one feels tempted to regard the craft as an invention of wandering tribes. For the town-dwellers of Persia and India, of Egypt and Asia Minor, who developed the craft of carpet-knotting into an art, the necessity to use such light and easily transportable «textile furniture» is not nearly so great, and it is but natural that they should have adopted the

287 technique primarily for the making of floor-
352 coverings. The fact that Sir Aurel Stein discovered fragments of pile rugs during his excavations of the stations along the ancient silk road through Eastern Turkestan, distinctly points to the origin of the technique among the nomads of Central Asia. Apart from that, nothing certain is known of the origin and development of the different kinds of Turkoman rugs. Some examples may date back to the early eighteenth century. That is, however, no more than surmise, probable though
287 it may be. The one established fact is that all
178 the good examples of the craft now in existence must have been made before the seventies of the last century, that is to say, before the conquest of the country by the Russians. The reason for this is the complete transformation of the life of the Turkoman tribes under Russian rule. As the Russians put an end to the activities of the Turkomans as caravan robbers and slave traders, they were obliged to cast about for some other means of livelihood. From that time on the burden of providing a substitute for the gains formerly achieved by robbery fell to the women, whose skill in carpet-knotting was exploited. Carpets of huge size were made for the palaces of Russian nobles and generals. In time the desire to execute these profitable orders as speedily as possible led to a decline in the great care formerly exercised in the making of Turkoman rugs.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

As might be expected, cotton and silk production is the 231
peculiar pride of Turkistan. The Farghana Valley, we know, 248
has the ideal climate and the water both for cotton cultivation, and for the growth of mulberry-trees[1] for the silk-worm. The same is true of the other southern oases, watered by the Chirchik (Tashkent), Zarafshan and Kashka Darya, and also of the Vakhsh river irrigation in Tajikistan. In the early years cotton cultivation was in danger of becoming a monoculture, and more than once brought the country into terrible famine conditions. The figures of the fourth Five-Year Plan, if reliable, suggest that, even in Uzbekistan, there has now been a considerable reversion from commercial cropping to grain, and, if so, the rural economy is not so brittle as many have supposed. The great Soviet achievement has been to bring the mills into Turkistan and process the crops locally. The 288 ●
largest cotton-processing establishment is the Stalin Textile Combine and Institute at Tashkent, while for silk there is a combine at Margilan, said to be the largest in the world, and integrating all processes from the unwinding of the cocoon to the weaving of the final material. Woven silk is in great demand for parachutes.

IRRIGATION

The aim to free Russia from all dependence on foreign ooo
cotton and then to build heavy stock-piles is bound up with the Soviet policy of irrigation. Irrigation in its turn is linked both with waterways and (more important) with the production of hydro-electric power. In some respects, on the face of them, the Soviet plans for development under these heads are more imaginative even than the metallurgical projects realized in the Urals before the War. For the claim is that they will turn a great desert into a smiling countryside, and even divert waters destined by nature for the Arctic into the Turanian basin. But the science of the irrigation engineer

[1] *Morus alba*, known locally by the Persian word *tut*.

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 366 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 172).

291 369 363 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

[Tashkent]

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

363 Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for the streets
361 of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiquitous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets, running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch. Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very uncomfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy road safely.

[491] In the towns, bridges are built only over those of the numerous brooks and canals with banks which are too high and steep to walk or ride over easily. Otherwise it is left to the pedestrian to get through the water as
[492] best he can. This is based on the fact that in Turkestan every halfway respectable person, man, woman and child is mounted and only the poorest beggars and tramps go on foot; for these there is no pity if they must walk with bare feet through the ice cold water and the knee-deep mud, in the winter.

In Tashkent the streets in the Sart town are considerably better than in many other Central Asian towns, but even here the conditions are such, that among other things, once eleven women drowned in

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Cotton bazaar in Andizhan (Ferghana). The cotton is offered for sale by veiled peasant women.

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4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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The head of a wedding-procession in Bokhara. Boys and workmen in typical dress.

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162 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other
619 side of the border. The domiciled population
184 there is made up of the so-called Turki people, more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

1 [See cat. 116, p 24.--Analyst]
2 [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts--Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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Men of Bokhara in a tea-house, wearing chalats and turbans.

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 p. 29

Chalat of Bokhara with striped pattern.

cotton trousers (see ill. page 1441), the material of which is rather coarsely woven, and is neither bleached nor dyed. The name given to this material is "bes". The trousers are secured by an attractively worked band, which is drawn through the upper seam, and tied round the waist. The upper part of the body is covered with a blouse cut in the manner of a shirt. It is also of cotton, and is girded round the waist with a diagonally folded square of [294] cloth. This cloth is often prettily embroidered or decorated with regular ornaments in the block-printing style (see ill. page 1442). Before beginning his devotions the wearer unties it, and spreads it out before him, thus making it serve as a prayer-mat. These garments form the customary dress of the labourers, artisans, 554 and of the poorer classes generally. Merchants, 291 priests, and all men of wealth and rank wear as an additional item of dress the chalat, which is also put on by poorer people on festive occasions (see ill. page 1442).

The word "chalat" signifies a rich garment of honour of the kind traditionally bestowed by Oriental princes as a badge of distinction. Hermann Vámbéry, who in the second half of the nineteenth century travelled in Central Asia under the disguise of a dervish, reports that in Khiva he met a high official sorting chalats which were intended as rewards for soldiers, and the value of which was graded according to the number of enemies' heads

1 [See p 25 -- Analyst]
2 [See p 25 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 which each man had brought home from the
[554] war. The chalat as the usual outer garment is known in the vernacular as "chapan". It is cut like an overcoat, reaches to the ankles, and has very long sleeves, into which the wearer
[834] can withdraw his hands in order to comply with the Mohammedan law that no part of the body should be uncovered (see ill. below).

It is the chalat which gives the crowds in the cities of Turkestan their colourful appearance. When on the great Mohammedan feast-days the crowds of the faithful in their many-coloured chalats stand in front of the glittering mosques, when they kneel or throw themselves on the ground to pray, the scene is one which can probably be parallelled nowhere in
291 Europe or in the East. The patterns and colours of the chalats are of an extraordinary
294 variety, and their edges are trimmed with narrow borders of embroidered or woven material from which small tassels are suspended at regular intervals. Though the materials of the costly gold-brocaded garments worn by the very rich and the cheap printed cottons common to the poorest classes were of Russian manufacture, the greater part of the chalat fabrics were and still are characteristic products of the weavers and dyers of Turkestan. These fabrics are gaily striped, pattern-

Men of Bokhara in striped chalats and white turbans.

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

Typical caps or tibetsikas of Turkestan. Left: Tibetsikas from the region of Bokhara overlaid in coloured embroidery. Right: A tibetsika or cap of Ferghana decorated with four white palmettes.

[294]
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ed with large spots, or delicately flamed (see ill. page 1448). The material usually consists of a mixture of silk and cotton fibres. These beautiful, heavy, and very characteristic textiles owe their origin to Islamic religious laws. The wearing of garments made of pure silk is forbidden to the Mohammedan, no less than the use of pure gold and silver. Just as the latter decree led to the production of pottery of unsurpassable quality and beauty, the edict against the wearing of silk resulted in the manufacture of the mixed fabric known as "mesru" (= permitted), which satisfied the desire for luxury, and could at the same time

Women of Turkestan wearing long cloaks and veils.

*[See cat. 116, p. 45--Analyst]

291 be worn without infringing the Mohammedan laws.

The headgear of the townspeople in Turkestan as in other Mohammedan countries consists of a cap round which the turban-cloth is wound. The cap, usually known as "tibeteika" in Turkestan, is small and round, and covers only the crown of the head, which is shaven completely, with the exception of one
291 strand of hair. The decoration of the tibeteika varies with the district. In Bokhara it is worked
294 in coloured emboidery (see ill. above), in Tashkent it is black and decorated with coloured embroidery, in Ferghana it is also black, but is adorned with four white leaves (see ill. above). In the mountain districts the tibeteikas are also worked in coloured embroidery by the women. More frequently than in other Islamic countries the cap is worn in Turkestan without a turban. This is invariably the case when the wearer is working. The ordinary cotton turban-cloth is about ten or twelve feet long and roughly eight inches wide. It is of one colour, very often pale red. This cloth can be wound round the head four times. The end which hangs down over the neck is usually decorated with woven stripes.
291 Costly turban-cloths of thin material are generally longer, and are arranged in a more intricate manner. The wearer literally winds himself into the cloth, which is held by another man who twists it constantly. The name for these turbans is "chihil petch" which means forty, that is to say innumerable, windings.

The footwear commonly worn consists of a pair of light top-boots over which slipper-like shoes are worn which can easily be taken off when entering a house, as is demanded by custom. In the place of these slippers it has long been customary to wear rubber overshoes of Russian manufacture.

7 [see cat. 116, p. 31 - -Analyst]

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The Uzbeg woman is beyond doubt more closely veiled than anyone else in the Orient. When she goes out (see ill. page 1444)[1] she wears a heavy cloak (faranji) which in Samarkand and in the Ferghana district is usually of blue material; in Bokhara the colours are sometimes brighter, for instance yellow and green. This cloak is drawn over the head, and hangs down to the ground in straight heavy folds. The long narrow sleeves are never used, but are allowed to hang down the wearer's back (see ill. adjoining). In the majority of cases they could not be used even if it were desired, being more like long narrow ribbons than sleeves; they are only retained because tradition demands it. In addition to this veiling of her figure, the Uzbeg woman does not even reveal a shadowy outline of her face. The narrow opening left by the cloak is covered with a close veil of black horse-hair (chashpent). If a woman carries a baby in her arms, which is frequently the case, it is also completely covered by the cloak. Thus the woman of Turkestan is completely enveloped in a tent of cloth; in this respect she differs very considerably from the lightly veiled Mohammedan women of Egypt. One of the first measures taken by the Soviet government in Turkestan was to forbid this method of veiling. However, this decree met with the stubborn resistance of the strictly orthodox Islamic population of Central Asia, a resistance offered both by men and women. As a result, the authorities were unable to enforce the decree even in Tashkent itself, the seat of the government.

[1] [See cat. 116 p. 32 -- Analyst]

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Women of Turkestan wearing veils and long robes, seen from behind. The woman on the right is carrying a burden on her head.

ment. In Eastern Turkestan by contrast, the veil worn by women is no more than a thin cloth drawn over the head.

Under the cloak and when indoors, the women wear a shirtlike garment over wide

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

286

A fuller of Tashkent. The heavy wedge-like head of the mallet and the way in which the handle is mounted serve to increase its effect. Sepia drawing.

291 trousers. Unlike the corresponding garment in other Mohammedan countries, this smock reaches to the ground, thus also completely enveloping the wearer's body. Members of the wealthier classes frequently wear smocks made of silk, as this material is only forbidden to the men. The patterns are much the same as those

291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
[302] very much like that of the man. The manner of dressing their hair is very attractive. It is worn in innumerable plaits into which black ribbons are worked, from the ends of which small silver bells are suspended.

As in all other Islamic countries only the women of the towns strictly observe the custom of veiling. When working in the fields the peasant-woman wears neither long cloak nor veil. When she goes to town, however, to sell her cotton at the market, she dons cloak and veil.

286 Throughout the centuries of Turkestan's history the textile crafts have maintained a considerable standard. That is natural enough as the country produces all the more important
[236] textile fibres itself. Wool was indeed used but little in the manufacture of clothing, sheep being mainly bred for slaughter, as well as for the sake of their skin, which is known as "karakul". The best kind, the skin of unborn lambs, fetches a very high price, particularly in
248 certain colours. Silk and cotton growing have always been of great importance in Turkestan, and flourish to this day (see ill. page 1445).[1] The two principal kinds of cotton grown are Gossypium herbaceum and Gossypium hirsutum. In 1910 over 410,000 tons of cotton were grown on an area of about 940,000 acres. Silk growing was entirely in the hands of women. Its yields were always considerable, though no statistics are available.

[1] [See cat 116, p 36-- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Man from Bokhara wearing a chalat made according to the ikat technique. The threads are dyed before weaving.

286 ones which are made in Ferghana (see ill.
294 below) and the neighbouring districts of Eastern Turkestan are not nearly so rich and so vivid as Indian and Indonesian ikat patterns.
386 With the exception of indigo, which was imported from India, all the dyestuffs used in

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 R.1 Turkestan R.1

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A Kirghiz woman on horse-back. Her smock-like dress is lavishly patterned with flowers, and she is wearing a headdress made of narrow strips of cloth.

234 sometimes remain for considerable periods in one place, possess large flocks of sheep, whereas the Kirghiz, as the more pronounced nomads, use the milk of their horses.

291 In their dress, too, the Kirghiz have retained a more archaic stage of civilization than the Turkomans. According to the report of the scientist Peter Simon Pallas, who explored

291 the steppes of Central Asia at the command of the Empress Catherine of Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century, the nomad Turkic peoples at one time did not make their clothing of textile materials, but rather of leather prepared from horses' hides. This was the only material strong enough to withstand the ravages of the sandstorms and blizzards which sweep across the vast steppes. In the dress of the Kirghiz Kasaks this tradition still survives. Over their cotton trousers they wear others of leather, which are of very loose cut. The upper part of the body is covered with a coarse shirt, over which the wide, long-sleeved coat, known throughout Central Asia as the chalat, is worn. The chalats of the nomads are often thickly padded and quilted, and are, therefore, very warm. In former times they, too, were made of leather, and in very rare cases they still are. As a protection against cold winter weather coats of sheep or wolf skin are also worn.

Among the Kirghiz the types of headgear are particularly numerous, the traditional ones also being of leather. In the North a species of helmet is worn; it has four flaps which are let down in such a manner as to cover the face almost completely when a snowstorm is raging. Such helmets are made of strong leather, and are usually red in colour. The Kirghiz also wear high fur caps, with the hair to the inside. Only the turned-up flaps show a strip of fur.

[287] A textile material which is particularly characteristic of the Mongol tribes of Northern Asia is felt (see ill. page 1460). The Kirghiz,

[See cat. 116, p 75.. Analyst]

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Kirghiz men and women in their characteristic dress. Note the jaunty checking and felt hats.

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291 particularly those of Turkestan proper, wear conical felt hats, the slashed brims of which are turned up. This type of headgear is demonstrably of great age. Indian miniatures of the time of the first Mogul emperors, i. e. the sixteenth century, show that such conical hats were frequently worn by the soldiers of those rulers. As the Mogul dynasty, and a great proportion of the armies with whose help it was founded, came from Turkestan, it is probable that the type of hat described above also originated there.

291 Belts and bags are also of leather. In one of these bags, which are very strongly made,
281 the Kirghiz carries his tea-making utensils. The pouches are usually bound or studded with metal, not only by way of decoration, but also to increase their strength. R. Karutz, who lived for a long time among the Kirghiz of the Caspian Sea, and who wrote at the beginning of the present century, gave a brief description of the treatment of hides. When scraped for dressing as leather, they are treated with a paste consisting of the boiled ashes of grasses which grow on the steppes. Hides which are to retain their hair are covered for a week with a paste of flour and sour milk. Pallas, too, was familiar with this method of treatment. Vámbéry described how a skin which was to be used for carrying water was salted.

291 The dress of Kirghiz women differs from that of the men in so far as the usually patterned outer garment is smock-like in cut and reaches to the ground in accordance with the custom in many Islamic countries. In addition they wear trousers which, like those of the men

291 are thrust into long boots. Over the chalat-like coat another one of fur is worn during the cold season. The high white headdress characteristic of the Kirghiz women consists of narrow lengths of cloth which are wrapped round head and chin in such a manner as to leave only the face uncovered. Among the women of Eastern Turkestan this headdress is very bulky. Young girls wear headdresses of [302] red instead of white cloth. Their manner of arranging their hair is also different. Married women plait their hair into two thick braids, whereas girls wear theirs in innumerable small plaits. Both women and girls intertwine the strands with strips of leather to make the braids appear longer and thicker; the ends are decorated with silver coins. Like other nomad women in Central Asia the Kirghiz women go unveiled.

Unlike the dress of the Kirghiz, that of the Turkomans is of cloth, a fact which in itself shows that they belong to a different civilization. The principal items of men's dress are a cotton shirt, which in the East is worn like a blouse or smock, cotton trousers, and a chalat. Chalats are usually dark red, a colour for which the Turkoman shows great preference. Whereas in the southern Turkoman regions chalats reach almost to the ground, in the North they are scarcely longer than the beshmet of the Tartars. As leg-coverings the Turkomans wear woollen stockings and sometimes light boots, but always heelless shoes of slipper-like character, which can easily be removed before entering a tent. The use of this kind of footwear shows that the Turko-

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Tahda Tuareg with the leather cups which form their typical headdress.

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291 mans have had contact with municipal civilization. The most distinctive feature of their dress is the high lambskin cap, which is not even discarded when summer is at its hottest. It is usually worn over a kind of skull-cap. The high-crowned fur caps impart to the tall, well-built Turkomans a striking and exceedingly martial note. The tribes who roam the regions of Khiva wear caps which are lower and broader in shape than those of the others. Though both Turkomans and Kirghiz are Mohammedans, neither of the two triber wear [793] turbans with the exception of the mollahs, teachers of law and religion, who, however, mainly occupy themselves with foretelling the future and writing amulets.

The dress of the Turkoman women, like that of the men, seems expressly designed to make their tall, slender figures appear even taller. They wear long, loose gowns of brilliant red, reaching to the ground, and a high head-band resembling a cap, from which a ribbon hangs down at the back over the wearer's 301 neck. The women are very fond of ornaments, particularly those of the wealthy Tekke Turkomans who inhabit the oasis of Merv. They wear bracelets and anklets, breast ornaments of silver coins, and each of their numerous plaits ends in a small silver tassel. Nose-rings are worn by the women of the Salor tribe only. Even the small helmet-like caps of the children end in a high silver point.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

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age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullahs. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
● 291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

l: von Schwarz--38a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 88. Duvanas (Moslem mendicant friars).

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 p. 29

Chalat of Bokhara with striped pattern.

cotton trousers (see ill. page 1441),[2] the material of which is rather coarsely woven, and is neither bleached nor dyed. The name given to this material is "bes". The trousers are secured by an attractively worked band, which is drawn through the upper seam, and tied round the waist. The upper part of the body is covered with a blouse cut in the manner of a shirt. It is also of cotton, and is girded round the waist with a diagonally folded square of cloth. This cloth is often prettily embroidered or decorated with regular ornaments in the block-printing style (see ill. page 1442).[1] Before beginning his devotions the wearer unties it, and spreads it out before him, thus making it serve as a prayer-mat. These garments form the customary dress of the labourers, artisans, and of the poorer classes generally. Merchants, priests, and all men of wealth and rank wear as an additional item of dress the chalat, which is also put on by poorer people on festive occasions (see ill. page 1442).[2]

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The word "chalat" signifies a rich garment of honour of the kind traditionally bestowed by Oriental princes as a badge of distinction. Hermann Vámbéry, who in the second half of the nineteenth century travelled in Central Asia under the disguise of a dervish, reports that in Khiva he met a high official sorting chalats which were intended as rewards for soldiers, and the value of which was graded according to the number of enemies' heads

1 [See p 25 -- Analyst]
2 [See " 114, p 28 -- Analyst]

291 which each man had brought home from the
[554] war. The chalat as the usual outer garment is known in the vernacular as "chapan". It is cut like an overcoat, reaches to the ankles, and has very long sleeves, into which the wearer
[834] can withdraw his hands in order to comply with the Mohammedan law that no part of the body should be uncovered (see ill. below).

It is the chalat which gives the crowds in the cities of Turkestan their colourful appearance. When on the great Mohammedan feast-days the crowds of the faithful in their many-coloured chalats stand in front of the glittering mosques, when they kneel or throw themselves on the ground to pray, the scene is one which can probably be parallelled nowhere in
291 Europe or in the East. The patterns and co-
294 lours of the chalats are of an extraordinary variety, and their edges are trimmed with narrow borders of embroidered or woven material from which small tassels are suspended at regular intervals. Though the materials of the costly gold-brocaded garments worn by the very rich and the cheap printed cottons common to the poorest classes were of Russian manufacture, the greater part of the chalat fabrics were and still are characteristic products of the weavers and dyers of Turkestan. These fabrics are gaily striped, pattern-

Men of Bokhara in striped chalats and white turbans.

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ed with large spots, or delicately flamed (see ill. page 1448).* The material usually consists of a mixture of silk and cotton fibres. These beautiful, heavy, and very characteristic textiles owe their origin to Islamic religious laws. The wearing of garments made of pure silk is forbidden to the Mohammedan, no less than the use of pure gold and silver. Just as the latter decree led to the production of pottery of unsurpassable quality and beauty, the edict against the wearing of silk resulted in the manufacture of the mixed fabric known as "mesru" (= permitted), which satisfied the desire for luxury, and could at the same time

Women of Turkestan wearing long cloaks and veils.

*[See cat. 116, p. 45--Analyst]

291 be worn without infringing the Mohammedan laws.

The headgear of the townspeople in Turkestan as in other Mohammedan countries consists of a cap round which the turban-cloth is wound. The cap, usually known as "tibeteika" in Turkestan, is small and round, and covers only the crown of the head, which is shaven completely, with the exception of one
291 strand of hair. The decoration of the tibeteika
294 varies with the district. In Bokhara it is worked in coloured emboidery (see ill. above), in Tashkent it is black and decorated with coloured embroidery, in Ferghana it is also black, but is adorned with four white leaves (see ill. above). In the mountain districts the tibeteikas are also worked in coloured embroidery by the women. More frequently than in other Islamic countries the cap is worn in Turkestan without a turban. This is invariably the case when the wearer is working. The ordinary cotton turban-cloth is about ten or twelve feet long and roughly eight inches wide. It is of one colour, very often pale red. This cloth can be wound round the head four times. The end which hangs down over the neck is usually decorated with woven stripes.
291 Costly turban-cloths of thin material are generally longer, and are arranged in a more intricate manner. The wearer literally winds himself into the cloth, which is held by another man who twists it constantly. The name for these turbans is "chihil petch" which means forty, that is to say innumerable, windings.

The footwear commonly worn consists of a pair of light top-boots over which slipper-like shoes are worn which can easily be taken off when entering a house, as is demanded by custom. In the place of these slippers it has long been customary to wear rubber overshoes of Russian manufacture.

* [see cat. 116, p. 31 - Analyst]

286 passed. As the richness of the pattern depends on the combinations which result from turning the cards, the patterns or fabrics made in Turkestan show much less variety than those of Ancient Egypt.

286 From the earliest times dyeing in Turkestan
294 has not only been a craft, but a highly developed art. In that country, as everywhere in Asia, patterns and ornaments are to a large extent produced by dyeing rather than by weaving. It must, however, be said, that in Turkestan the dyer's art never reached the same high standard of excellence that is found in India or Indonesia.

The simplest technique is that adopted in dyeing textiles blue for women's clothes. For this purpose indigo is used. The material is tightly rolled into bundles, and at certain intervals is wound round with the threads which prevent the dye from penetrating the fibre in these places. It is a matter of course that the patterns produced by this technique are comparatively simple. The ornaments consist of large circles, stripes, and spots. In addition to blue a very delicate red and also yellow are popular colours (see ill. page 1447).[1] In the streets of towns and villages in Turkestan one often sees such bundles of cloth, usually "mesru" and silk, hung up between two trees to dry. More complicated patterns, which are made up of small individual elements and which make the fabric appear "flamed", are dyed according to the ikat method. As far as is known only the warp-ikat technique is employed. The ikat patterns of Turkestan are geometrical, and even the more complicated

1 [Cat. 116, p. 41 --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Man from Bokhara wearing a chalat made according to the ikat technique. The threads are dyed before weaving.

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4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Ghalat pattern from the Ferghana district produced by the ikat method.

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

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291 of the chalats. By way of headgear the women frequently wear a round flat cap. Very young girls usually go unveiled; they wear a tibeteika
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[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[295] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the
[305] rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.

485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

133 in the north, and becoming more and more barren with the southern latitude until it merges with the Betpak Dala. But, as the caravan goes north, the traveller reaches first the low hills of the Ulu Tav and Orta Tav, excellent seasonal pasturage when the snows melt, and the favourite summer resort of the Kipchak clans, from whom many of the true Uzbeks, Kazaks and Bashkurds trace descent. As he goes north, the pastures in spring become greener and are starred with flowers, the north of Kazakistan being in the temperate zone, and enjoying a precipitation sufficient to support agriculture and tree-growth. Almost all the well-known specie tulips of our gardens have their home on these steppe-lands. The best recent description in English of this land comes from the American pen of Littlepage: [1]

> We pushed along day after day through some of the finest pasture land I have ever seen, all well-watered, with rivers and lakes enough to support herds which probably could feed the whole of Europe . . . plateaus brilliant with green grass and sprinkled with multicolored wild flowers. The weather was warm and the skies cloudless and the only drawback the clouds of mosquitoes which gave us little peace.

There is a geographical feature of this steppe which at some future time may be of great account. Round about latitude 51 degrees there is an imperceptible west to east watershed, north of which all the waters flow towards the Arctic Ocean. From west to east the rivers are Tobol, Ishim and Irtish, all headwaters of the great Arctic river Ob. There are those who think in terms of a possible diversion of water running to waste in the Arctic Ocean to fertilize the arid deserts of Turkistan.

133 311 Another fact of geography looming large in the thought of all who write of Turkistan is the broad Vale of Farghana or Kokand, the heart of the scanty oasis country of Transoxiana. Schuyler [2] in 1876 described in vivid language the contrast between the desert and the sown, saying that even in Zarafshan

[1] Bib. I, 62, p. 185.

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 284.

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and Farghana, the most fertile regions, it was possible then to ride long distances without so much as seeing a blade of verdure, so small was the extent of country irrigated by the rivers. Since then much has been achieved, but even now it would be instructive and curious to see a map of these regions on which the arable lands were carefully marked, so narrow would be the strips along the rivers and at the foot of the mountains. In Farghana the irrigated areas, and even the *lalmi*[1] lands dependent on rainfall, cover broader acres than elsewhere in Turkistan. Its predominance as the agricultural, and now one of the industrial, centres of this country has a certain inevitability. The surrounding mountains with their fertilizing streams give it a climate relatively mild in summer and winter, and an alluvial soil on the deposits which fan out from the river mouths. In these oases intensive cultivation by a large population has always been possible — the cluster of townships is apparent from any map. The lie of the land has favoured the construction of many ancient irrigation channels, now supplemented by great modern works. Climate, latitude and water provide exactly the right environment for the cultivation of cotton and of the mulberry-trees on which the silk-worm thrives. The rapid transition from high mountain valley to open plain offers many natural sites for the harnessing of water-power for the production of electricity. The more recent discovery of oil and coal and quantities of valuable non-ferrous and other mineral resources in and around the valley, combined with the Soviet policy of moving textile factories to the site of production of raw material, has given it a new industrial significance not lost upon any who contemplate this land. Kokand, its old capital, and the hills around the valley were the main focus of the Basmachi movement of 1918–24 for the independence of Turkistan.

In its way the natural beauty of the oasis country is greater and certainly more intense than that of the steppe

[1] It is interesting to note that the Eastern Turks use here the same word as the Pathans of Peshawar for unirrigated cropped land. They also use *kashar*, a helping party of friends at harvest-time, and *baranta*, a raid and seizure of an enemy's flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong; both words in common use in Pashtu.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

justifiable. Nor is it ordinarily economic to transmit power over very long distances by cable.

SUMMARY

311 The industrial picture of Turkistan emerging from all this has certain very distinguishable features and falls into clear geographical compartments.

(*a*) There is one area which industry, agriculture and population all mark out as the strategic heart of Turkistan. This is the relatively small ellipse centred on the Farghana basin, including its outlying glacis with Tashkent to the north-west, Samarkand to the west and the Vakhsh valley with Stalinabad to the south. This is the heart of the oasis country where the large towns are grouped, whence comes most of the cotton and the silk, and where also are found valuable deposits of oil and coal, many non-ferrous metals and rare minerals.

(*b*) The area in the middle of Kazakistan holds the third greatest coal-fields in the Union as well as the largest copper deposits and smelting works — Karaganda, Kunrad, Jezkazgan.

(*c*) The Emba area, north-east of the Caspian, with fields at Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, is the third most important oil producer in the Union. First of course is Baku, and second the Ural fields round Ishimbay, both in territory once inhabited by Turkish peoples, but outside the five Central Asian republics.

(*d*) The port at Krasnovodsk with the oilfields at Nebit Dagh.

(*e*) The string of extensive piedmontane oases north of the Tienshan, viz. Alma Ata, Frunze (Pishpek), Jambul (Aulie Ata) and Chimkent.

All these are situated on an exposed flank, in peripheral territories annexed to the Empire and relatively close to an international frontier. The impression is one of a country as large as the main block of Europe but with industry and agriculture concentrated into quite a few well-marked areas, defined either by the rivers or by discoveries of minerals.

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to sedentary life. However, because of the elevation of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

[311]

167 563 One can judge the success of the colonizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

APPENDIX A

311 When speaking of 'Central Asian riches', it is understood to mean all the natural resources found in what is called Russian Central Asia. In particular, one stretch of land deserves the reputation of possessing a value surpassing all known colonial possessions. This is the part inhabited by various Turkic-speaking people, stretching from the mouth of the Ob on the Arctic, through the forest, agricultural and cattle-breeding regions of Western Siberia, the Steppe country and Turkestan, as far south as the frontiers of Persia.

In commercial value this area represents—rich fishing in the sub-Arctic region; rare fur animals in the forest region; valuable timber, of which in Western Siberia alone some 110 million dessiatins were registered by the Russian Government; rich cornfields, almost half of which are occupied by wheat; steppes swarming with cattle, and lakes abundant in fish; mountains rich in minerals; and finally, the irrigated fields of Turkestan covered with cotton plantations, not to mention such promising industries as butter and eggs, fruit and vegetables.

135 As to the minerals, the 'Golden' or Altai Mountains, as well as the Northern Steppes are equally rich in gold, silver, iron, coal, copper, and almost all known mineral resources. However, in the production of gold it is Eastern Siberia which occupies first place in the Russian Empire (in 1910 it produced 2,828 puds; in 1914, 2,729 puds); the second place belongs to the Ural Mountains (in 1910, 642 puds; in 1914, 299 puds), and Western Siberia stands third (in 1910, 416 puds; in 1914, 133 puds). This can be accounted for chiefly by the lack of enterprise and capital. The chief deposits of gold in Western Siberia are in the following

wooden posts, as can be seen in Figure 82, p. 229. Facing the court, 343
the stalls are as open as the verandas and therefore they provide shelter only against rain and snow, while the animals are exposed, without protection against the winter cold. Fodder troughs made of clay run the length of the walls of the stalls. /247/ Their borders are made of beams to prevent their crumbling away.

These stalls serve not only as shelter for the horses, donkeys and oxen of the owner but also for the riding animals and beasts of burden of the visitors and guests. Therefore they are always laid out on a much larger scale than would be necessary for the needs of the owner alone. In addition, the stalls are also used for the storage of grain, alfalfa, straw, etc. and for the night lodging of the boys and servants during the rain. The winter provisions are piled up on dry alfalfa on the roofs of the stables and are either exposed without protection to the rain and snow or in the best circumstances are covered on top with reed mats.

Threshed grain is stored in the same kind of underground pits as the nomads use. The historians of Alexander the Great already mention these underground storage granaries, which they called seir or sir, as a characteristic of the Bactrians and the Sogdians who were the inhabitants of Turkestan of that time. (1)

1. Curtius, for example, writes in Chapter 17 of Book VII concerning the presence of underground granaries in Bactria, the Afghan Turkestan of today: Siros vocabant barbari scrobes, quos ita sollerter abscondunt, ut, nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint: in his conditae fruges erant.

In the middle of the court there is a pond of a larger or smaller 312
size and its stagnant and usually incredibly dirty water is used not only for drinking water for cattle but also for humans, as well as being used for the preparation of tea and food and in the meantime for washing clothes as well.

From the court one enters the gardens by a small low door, and 351
this is the real dwelling place of the more prosperous Central Asians during the warm part of the year. The gardens are usually planted very densely with trees to provide as intense a shade as possible, and they are intersected by a countless number of small canals which serve

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

131 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihila-
631 tion of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map[2] reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these
312 administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like
[162] the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[2 See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst.]

Turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were nothing short of national frontiers between independent units of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that the irrigation systems have been kept within single administrative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across 000
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who possesses experience, for there is no administrative question which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assuming for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy. Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential matters would be in central hands. In either case their only meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail.

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes,

[1] Bib. I, 62.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

is far from being a technical one to be applied successfully from a central draughtsman's office: it is a form of public works which to command success requires of its professor a sort of sixth sense, a feeling after the countryside, the climate, the lie of the land, the local native knowledge acquired by experience, the queer things water does both above and under the ground. The successful irrigator must be more than an expert scientist; his science has become an art. To see how and where he can give life to desert lands he needs some of those intuitive qualities of genius that distinguish the architect from the builder, the landscape-gardener from the tractor-driver. There have been men like this in the Panjab, Egypt, the Tennessee Valley; they have gained great experience which with wisdom could be turned to account by the Russians in Asia also. Such men treat water like a precious fluid that must be humoured. They know, for instance, that to preserve its power to grant fertility water must have its outlets as well as its infall.

The beginnings of Russian irrigation in Turkistan were not particularly auspicious. In all the piedmontane tracts there existed before the Russians came an indigenous system of irrigated channels, constructed with primitive tools and maintained by the joint labours of the village communities. The skill going to the construction and maintenance of such systems is well described in such books as Holdich's *Indian Borderland* and *Gates of India*; it was considerable. In all these countries water is more important than land, and whoever controls the water has power over the land. The method by which this power was acquired by the Russians has been described, and it constitutes one of the most definite steps taken to give effect to the new economic policy. In a land dependent on artificial watering the State thus secures a more absolute control over the peasant than can be the case where fertility depends on rainfall.

In such lands intensive cultivation of small-holdings is the rule. (Incidentally, intensive cultivation is akin to gardening, and of all types of agriculture the least suited to collective

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mechanization.) The Russians, coming fresh to the science of tropical agriculture, believed that the native use of wooden ploughs and shares instead of the iron plough implied a primitive condition. They could not estimate the value of the intensive cultivation that had gone on for thousands of years in the country. Togan tells us[1] how they tried to teach the unirrigated system of agriculture, as if the Turkistan people in their ignorance were incapable of understanding what it meant. They aimed not at getting a good crop out of a small-holding, but at cultivating large areas in order to get a large crop. Even Nalivkin, a former Governor of Farghana, had to admit that the Russian conquest had brought with it the cessation of intensive cultivation.

There was a time when even the Orsk and Emba areas north of the Caspian used to be cultivated by irrigation. There is evidence that in 1920 irrigation in that area was still being maintained to some extent, though the tradition was even then disappearing as the nomad Kazak inhabitants were driven south and agriculture in the Sir Darya basin decayed. Two Russians, Asmolovsky and Yusuf Karamshev, observed that, although the Sir Darya Kazaks used old primitive ploughs, it was for that reason that the land ploughed up with them retained its moisture and was more productive than that worked with the Russian plough. But there was one useful thing the people of Turkistan did learn from the Russians — how to mow with the scythe. Men like Barthold at that time issued warnings about the new methods and from the start were pessimistic about the attempt to cultivate the Mirza Chōl[2] (the desert near Jizak west of the point where the Sir Darya issues from the basin of Farghana). Never in history had these parts been farmed, although they were close to the river, and this was a case for learning from the experience of the native population, who must have had good reason for leaving these lands alone. Why not revive with the quickening

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 291-3. [see ref. 116, pp 7-8 -- Analyst]

[2] The *Mirza Chōl* is a name also applied to the Betpak Dala, north of the Chu-Talash area.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

241 water the lands where there existed traces of former irrigation,
312 as, for instance, the disused canal system of Gavkhore on the right bank of the Amu Darya opposite Khorezm? But no: Barthold was a mere professor, who had made for himself a picture of the country from 'Sart' sources. The Russian engineers were convinced of their wisdom, and money was devoted to schemes which, far from turning the land into a garden, in a few years led to water-logging, no measures having been taken to prevent the land turning into a morass, a home of reeds and waterfowl and a source of malaria.

In September 1922 [says Togan], I passed by the lower side of the canals in Mirza Chöl, and a Kazak showed me how the poplars planted by the Russians were drying up, and the surface of the land, cultivated a few years before with care and trouble, was now covered with saltpetre.[1]

653 The Tsarist irrigation engineers seem to have had little
312 conception of the dangers of water-logging and saltpetre which arise in a flat riverain country under a tropical sun, when water is brought to it and the fall is insufficient for natural drainage. The remedy lies in the provision of artificial drainage by digging channels to lower the watertable, but this is not always easy and it is very expensive. Even in their weirs and dams the Russian engineers set their bricks much too loosely, as compared with the old brick walls of indigenous canals, which had held for centuries. An effort by the Grand Duke Nicholas at the end of the XIXth century to construct a perennial irrigation system on the Amu Darya in Khorezm resulted only in cutting across and destroying the old indigenous inundation channels. The project was conceived as one in line with British irrigation works in the Panjab and in Egypt, but it is evident that the Russian engineers of that time had much to learn both as regards original canal construction and the remodelling of old works.

The Soviets have given great attention to irrigation works in Central Asia, and have certainly profited from the mistakes of their predecessors. Although in this case also it is hard to

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 295.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

disentangle achievement from expansive visions existing only in the planner's mind, there is no doubt that in Farghana, in the Chu–Talash area, and also on the Zarafshan and the Vakhsh, much good work has been brought to a conclusion. The best-known completed works are:

(a) The Stalin Great Farghana Canal, 270 km. long.
(b) The Mikoyan, or Northern Farghana, Canal, 165 km. long.
(c) The Andreev, or Southern Farghana, Canal, 108 km. long.
(d) The Katta Kurgan and Verkhno-Bukhara Reservoirs on the Zarafshan.
(e) The Great Chu Canal, 270 km. long.
(f) The Vakhsh Canal.

The construction of the first was widely advertised, with due praise allotted to the 160,000 *Kolkhoz* members who dug it out, and completed it in forty-five days. The availability of *corvée* labour of this kind, which can be used in the off-season for irrigation work, must greatly aid the authorities in their task, not only on construction but on maintenance and silt-clearance. The official case is that a considerable percentage of all *Kolkhoz* workers in canal areas is used for such duties, and the labourers while absent from their homes receive their fair share of *Kolkhoz* produce. That may work in the rich and smiling Farghana Valley. But how is the case with those transported to dig in the wastes of the deserts? The logistical effort alone needed to feed armies of workers in the Karakum must be colossal.

It has been suggested that construction of the Stalin-Farghana Canal called out nearly one million labourers and that there was suffering on a large scale. Yet, in the face of all criticism, there remains an impression that this in itself was a great work, which has added much to the fertility of an already productive region. Systems of government change, but an irrigation work remains.

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander
653 scale. The first two schemes which follow may be called
● 312 'local' in the sense that, in appearance at least, they are not
185 part of a continental linked project dealing in the waters of more than one river. These two projects are:

(i) *The Karakum Canal*

The project was an old one, but it was revived in 1945, and ratified in 1947. The main channel is to be some 350 miles long and to irrigate nearly half a million acres. The head-works were to be somewhere near Kerki on the Oxus left bank, and the main objective is to increase the cultivated area watered by the Murghab and Tejen rivers in the Merv and Serakhs oases. Work was stated to have been started in 1949.

A work of this kind, skirting the Kopet Dagh line of mountains which forms the Persian frontier, must cross the natural drainage lines of the country, and involve heavy bridging or siphoning and much danger of being breached by floods, to say nothing of being choked by sand-drifts. Without any local knowledge it is possible to affirm that this canal must take time to construct and will be expensive to maintain. Confidence in the Soviet engineers is not increased by loose talk that the canal will be used for shipping. Navigation and irrigation are ill partners.

(ii) *The Uzbek, or Upper Oxus, Canal*

This project was planned by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in May 1947. It is a very large scheme for a canal 500 miles long to supplement the irrigation at the tail of the Kashka Darya and the Zarafshan systems — among the best cotton-lands in Central Asia — by water from the Oxus. The project was described at some length by a spokesman of the Central USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The plan envisages the construction of a headworks at Kelif on the Oxus right bank, where the river finally emerges from the hills into the plain. At this point the right bank rests on a spur of the Hissar Range, a rocky eminence which canalizes the channel

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RLI Soviet Central Asia RL 1

and prevents it from shifting as it is always doing in its course 653
through the plains lower down. On the face of it then the 185
site is well chosen for the headworks of a perennial canal. 312
At this point a dam described as 6 km. long and 20 metres high was to be constructed. For the next 100 km. the main canal would run along the skirt of the Hissar Range, passing on its way a point named Akyar where it would drop 34 metres, the fall being used to establish a hydro-electric power station. The canal would then swing northward to cross the Kaskha and Zarafshan rivers and augment the water-supply in both. The forecast spoke of opening up new irrigation to the extent of 1·2 million hectares, or nearly 3 million acres, and the estimated cost was 7000 million roubles. No date of completion was named.

This project, like the last, involves cutting across the natural drainage lines of the country, and the upper part of the main channel, skirting the great chain of the Hissar mountains (rising at one point to over 15,000 feet) will necessarily have to withstand occasional floods of extreme violence. Further, the crossing of the Kashka and Zarafshan basins at a point presumably not far distant from the debouchment of those rivers into the plains will demand engineering and constructional skill of no mean order.

The plan calls for the establishment on the falls of hydro-electric generating stations of an aggregate capacity of 1 million kilowatts, equal to about ten times that of the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon.

The spokesman said that these two canals together were expected to take nearly 2000 cubic metres per second [1] from the Amu Darya. On the assumption that each is designed to take 1000 cubic metres, each of these canals would be about twice as large as any of the great works constructed in the Panjab. This 2000 cubic metres volume is quoted as taking about half the total discharge of the river even in July and

[1] To convert cubic metres into the normal British engineer's standard of water-volume, viz., cubic feet per second, an adequate rule of thumb is to multiply by thirty. 1000 c.m.s. would therefore be equivalent to about 30,000 'cusecs'.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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August, the flood months owing to summer melting of snow in Oxus' 'high mountain cradle in Pamere'. A draught on the river of this order must of course put in jeopardy the irrigation down-stream in the Khorezm area, but the spokesman met this by explaining that three reservoirs were to be constructed to store 6000 million cubic metres in the seasons of low demand.

These two projects for irrigation from the Oxus, great as they are, pale into insignificance when set against an immense integrated plan, described as 300 times the size of the T.V.A.[1], for the application of the latest sciences to the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Amu Darya basins in the connected fields of irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power and afforestation. Here we are concerned with the Amu Darya only, but the plans announced cover much the same ground on the European rivers. Over the whole field the planners speak in terms of transforming an area of two million square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The rivers are to be dammed at a number of points, the dams forming reservoirs many miles across; power stations of great capacity are to be established at these barrages with irrigation canals taking off at the same points; ocean-going steamers are seen as penetrating to the lakes through locks; and finally belts of forest, three miles wide (quite modest this), are to be planted in the valleys 'to keep them damp and on the watersheds to let the run-off from melting snows down gently'. In the Karakum, an awkward place for labour, the forests are to be sown with seed broadcast from aircraft. Finally, the suggestion is that, to avoid a fall in the Caspian Sea following the diversion of rivers to irrigation, waters flowing to the Arctic are to be impounded to compensate the southern rivers. A presumably serious commentator[1A] has written that it is possible that ultimately no water from Siberia will go to the Arctic, and it has even been suggested that the consequent greater salinity of the Arctic Ocean may reduce the size of the Polar ice-cap.

[1] Tennessee Valley Authority.

2: Carse S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning more particularly to that part of the scheme to be derived from the waters of the Amu Darya, to be called the Turkmenian Canal, the same commentator [1A] stated: 653 185 312

> The scientists told me a great deal about how they had planned the scheme for the Karakum desert. . . . They are chosen to cover the whole range of interests . . . there are hydrologists, navigation experts, electrical experts, every kind of engineer, soil scientists, zoologists, botanists, geologists, there are also geo-physicists and seismologists . . . besides all these there are the archaeologists, who are considered a very important part of the scheme.

In the presence of this battalion of experts from Academies of Sciences, with some conflict of interest (one would think) even in Russia, the genie of the scheme will surely sigh for one good practical engineer.

The Turkmenian Canal itself was announced in September 1950 in a decree of the Central Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is nothing short of an attempt to realize the old dream for the redirection of the Oxus back into its ancient course to the Caspian Sea by means of a canal 700 miles long starting from Takhya Tash on the left bank close to Nukus, skirting the Sarikamish depression (which, being even deeper than the Caspian, would take too long to fill up), and thence along the old bed of the Özboy across the middle Karakum and through the Balkhan gap into the sea near Krasnovodsk.[1] It is not unamusing to reflect that this also was an idea in the minds of Tsarist engineers more than fifty years ago. Curzon, writing in 1889, mentions that as a navigation project it had even occurred to the fertile mind of Peter the Great, and quotes the scornful saying of the German engineer Kiefert referring to the project, when at the height of its favour in the seventies of last century, as the great Central Asian sea-serpent. But it seems clear that a decision has now been taken for a canal to irrigate 1,300,000 hectares or about 3,000,000 acres, and to carry three hydro-electric generating stations, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts (each about equivalent to the Shannon Station in Ireland). Work was to begin in

[1A] Professor J. Bernal, F.R.S., Bib. II, 1.

[1] [See cat. 16, pp. 23-26 - Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

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1951 and is scheduled for completion in 1957. The official spokesman [1] stated:

> The idea of bringing life to the desert by turning the course of the Amu Darya towards the Caspian Sea originated long ago. Yet Tsarist Russia was incapable of carrying it out. It was on the initiative of Stalin that the Government decision was taken to revive the desert and fulfil the age-old dreams of the people of Central Asia. The special characteristic of the present scheme is that the waters will be used in their entirety for irrigation and will not be discharged into the Caspian Sea as proposed in all preceding projects. All remaining canals of the world, including those of America, Egypt and India, are considerably shorter. . . . Krasnovodsk will receive an abundant supply of water [is this inconsistent with the special characteristic?]. The new irrigation construction is an important link in the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature. The Caspian desert plain will soon be converted into a marvellous flourishing land.

The project is linked with the railway constructional plan already mentioned for a line northward from Charjui to Kungrad along the Oxus left bank, that described as one of the great railway building feats of all time.[2]

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In face of the admissions of short supply in the river which will follow the completion of the first two Amu Darya projects above mentioned, it is not easy to see how the Takhya Tash headworks — down-stream of Kelif and Kerki — would find sufficient volume to irrigate the whole of the Karakum from Khorezm to the Caspian. Can it be that this grandiose project for restoring the prosperity of the days before 1573, the year when the Oxus turned to the Aral Sea, is alternative and not supplementary to the Karakum project? It is possible that the surveys may have convinced the Soviet engineers of the difficulties of constructing a canal along the skirts of the Kopet Dagh, with all the dangers of breaching by flood, and induced them to have second thoughts. It is not inconceivable that they, or their political superiors, may have been influenced by the romance which appeals so greatly to the local bourgeois patriots, that of turning the Oxus back

[1] Deputy Minister, Cotton Cultivation USSR.

[2] Bib. II, 10.

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

312

An "arik" or irrigation ditch in the orchard zone round Samarkand. Large parts of Turkestan can only be kept fertile by artificial irrigation.

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Bokhara ruler of the 16th century cutting a melon. The features show a pronounced Turkic-Mongol cast. Contemporary miniature.

133 the Caspian Sea, and it is possible that at one time the entire river ran into that sea. Therefore, we find in the middle of the Kara Kum desert the ruins of large medieval towns marking the course which the water at one time took. At the present day both the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya run into the Aral Sea.

312 The four other rivers have no outlet, and would disappear in the desert, were it not for the fact that a system of irrigation which has been developed over a period of thousands of years serves to turn their waters to useful account. By means of this system the water is conducted through a net-work of canals which finally become mere ditches (ariks); thus it finds its way all over the country into every field, cotton-plantation, and orchard (see ill. page 1436). The distribution of the water is so well regulated that every peasant in Western Turkestan knows exactly on what day he can water his fields. Among these four rivers there are two particularly important ones, the Serafshan, the waters of which fill the ariks and mosque-ponds of Bokhara and Samarkand, and the Murghab, on which the prosperity of the oasis of Merv depends. In war-time the first thing to be destroyed was invariably the canal-system. The ancient city of Merv, at one

p. 12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1 [p. 3 -- Analyst]

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

361 At the present time one must think of it as two essentially different towns: the Asiatic and the European. The latter, although it lies directly next to the former on the eastern side, has a completely different appearance. Therefore we will describe Asiatic Tashkent first, and then give a few data about the European town.

361 312 Both the Asiatic and the European Tashkent are irrigated by aryks /irrigation canals/ led from the Chirchik river, which flows 8 versts south of the town. A large aryk which looks like a river flows from the Chirchik 45 versts from Tashkent. /405/ This is the Zakh-Aryk (1) which passes 10 versts north of the town.

1. The entire length of the Zakh-aryk is 85 versts. In the upper part it is 77 feet (eleven sazhen's) wide and 3 feet deep. It flows into the river Keles.

Another aryk, the most important one for the town is the Bos-Su, which is conducted from the Chirchik 31 versts from the town. At the Lyabzak gates it enters Tashkent in two branches and flows through the town under various names. A third aryk is led from the Chirchik around Niaz-bek 25 versts east of Tashkent, and flows directly to the Russian part of town. It then flows into the Gadragan aryk, and after that, branching out into small trenches it irrigates the gardens of Russian Tashkent.

[133] The small river Salar, a branch of the Chirchik, independent of the aryks already mentioned, flows 2 versts south of the town.

8:Kostenko 115-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Tashkent, like all important Central Asian towns, used to be surrounded by a high crenelated wall, to which there were 12 gates (darvaza). The wall had a rounded form and extended over an area of 20 versts. The gates bore the names of the towns toward which they opened. Today, the part of the town wall on the side of the Russian town has been completely demolished and the moat filled up. The gates on this side were also destroyed. On the other sides, although they still exist, they are no longer closed.

361 632 Administratively, Tashkent is divided into four parts (yurts) which were formerly under the administration of special officials called ming-bashi. These districts are: Shaikhantaur, Sibzor, Kukchi and Bish-Agach.

361 312 The Shaikhantaur district constitutes the northeastern part of the town. Situated in a flat locality, it is divided almost in half by a deep ravine, through which the Ankhor flows, a wide and swift aryk. The other main aryk flowing through this part of the town, called Gadragan, enters the Russian town not far from the beginning of Tash-Kuche street, and provides it with water, flowing out in
361 small aryks. The Shaikhantaur district has 48 'mahalas' (wards), which are: Tadzhik, /406/ Kashgar, five Yangi-shakhars, Sellim-mechet, Illya, Kiot, Keriady, Tash-kucha, Mir-gancha, Okhche, Zandzhilik, two Kator-turas, Tyurk, Igerchi, Ol'mazar, Doom-begi, Kurgan-araksy, Balyan-mechet, Goukush, Shur-tepe, Degriot, Khadrya, Khouz-bok, Dzhangokh, Khish-mechet, Khodzharush-noye, two Okh-mechets, Darkhon, Padar-kush, Kuduk-bashi, Badak, Shatak,

361 Much more is used for plowland (1814 tanaps) and rice planting (1896 tanaps).

The Sibzor district, occupying the northwestern corner of the town, is divided into 38 mahalas, which are: Kagat, Great /407/ Middle and Little Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-Saray, Yau, Mazar-khan, Kanly-kucha, Dessin-kucha, Pshta-khammom, Masse-duz, Khatyn-mechet, Khich-kupriuk, Khodzha-kugachi, Labzak, Rabat, Kunlak, Khodja-kucha, Yakhkachub, Khazret-imam, Tyk-kuche, Shakar, Dzhim-kucha, Parchabob, Batyr, Akhun-guzar, Kundzhak, Tchinchak, Kadavod, Chegyt-bashi, Khodja-Taressekon, Turnau-bashi, Big Sibzor, Darbaza-kent, Shakyr-guzar, Kazy-kucha, and Agmem-seid. In addition, four settlements also belong to this part of the town: Ibrahim-ata, whose inhabitants are agriculturists and raise 'dzhenushka', Chalo-kazak, Shano-vod, and Kosh-kizyl. The houses in the Sibzor district total 2230, with a population
361 of 18,650. The Keikaus(1) aryk, which divides
312 off from the Bos-Su aryk 8 versts away and enters the town at the Takhtapul' gates, is the main aryk in this part of town.

1. This aryk is named for Keikaus, the chief of the Tashkent okrug.

It irrigates the Big Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kunlak and Yau mahalas, then flows into the Kukcha district, from which it goes
[256] out of the town at the Kuchi-mazar gates. All the flour mills and crushing mills of Sibzor are concentrated on this aryk. The other mahalas are irrigated by small trenches which lead out of the main Keikaus aryk, and bear the names of the mahalas through which they

361 flow. The plowed land belonging to Sibzor
312 is irrigated by water which is led from the
Zakh aryk and Bos-Su, as we have mentioned
before.

361 The chief productivity of this district
of the town is making boots. The boots made
438 by the inhabitants of the Sibzor district are
distributed even to other towns in the territory.
After this comes weaving and the decoration
of cotton materials. The inhabitants have
worked at the last two occupations for a very
long time. The most important class of people,
as regards wealth, are the herdsmen. The residents of all four settlements are agriculturists, as well as the people of the Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-sarai, Yau, Sibzor and Kazy-kucha mahalas.

361 /408/ Three medresses (higher insti-
368 tutions of learning): Beklyar-beg, Barakhon,
and Kizyl-Kurgan, with about 260 students,
make up almost all the educational provision
of this part of the town. In addition to the
medresses there are also schools (mekhtebe)
here, located in private houses.

There are ten major mosques: Odin-mechet, Okhun-guzar, Khatyn-mechet, Mazar-khan, Muimu-barek, Khonoki, Tokhtonun, Rebot, Khodji-Toroskon and Kara-saray.

361 Kukcha, the western part of the town,
consists of thirty-one mahalas: Khafiz, Guyaki,
Kuttut, Kupryuk-bashi, Big and Little Sauvan,
Chakara, Tyapi, Kunzhak, Chagatai, Psyakchi,
Chikchiman, Tokle-dzhalob, Kalalan, Ishkuvat,
two Langars, Uzgan, Kisya-kurgan, Khuavon,

361 Chukchi, Kunchi, Padikhan, Chukur-Kishlak, Sara-khundan, Kukchi, Abnazar, Ailish, Khalimkup, Damak and Yangy. In all these mahalas together, there are 2511 houses with a population of 22,088. Three main streets cut through this part of town: Sauvan, Kukcha and Chagatai. There are four main [312] aryks which irrigate the Kukcha district: the Keikaus, which enters from the Sibzor district, the Zakh aryk, the Kara-kamysh, and the Dzhangag. The last branches off from the Keikaus at the Lyabzak gates and divides the town into two sections.

The land on which this part of the town is laid out is quite hilly. It is cut through with deep trenches and has many gardens, situated both inside and outside the town. The main [438] production of the Kukcha district is leather working. Thus of the 695 workshops in 1871, 341 were in leather, and 218 were for bootmaking. After this there are 6 brick factories, 7 places making earthenware vessels, 22 mills for grinding and crushing, and also 22 oil manufacturing [368] places. There are two medresses in this part of the town and 34 schools. There are 51 mosques and 18 tombs, of which one, Sheikh Zenedzhin-Baba, deserves attention for its antiquity. The Sheikh came from Bagdad and was buried here 400 years ago.

The Bish-agach district, in the southern corner of the town, consists of 32 mahalas: Yany-Bakhan, Kamalan, Chakar, Darkhan, Zivak-khish-kupryuk, Balyan-mechet, Sarparaz, Char-su, Ishan-Guzar, Samarkand, Okshi, Darbaza, Zenfata, Millyar, /409/ Chupan-ata, Suzugata, Sary-chapak, Dzhillik-mechet, Uzbek, Mirza-khazy, Gul'-bazar, Kugurmach, Ters-aryk, Kuk-mechet, Kul'gulyk,

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

		Families	Males	Females
361	Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162	non-residents	22	987	68
	Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
	non-residents		37	
	Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
	non-residents		122	29
	Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
	non-residents			
	Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
	non-residents		6	
	Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
	non-residents		18	
	Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	78
	non-residents		11	
	Hindus		93	
	Chinese			3
	Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 Russian or European Tashkent is directly
[312] next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by
a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the town is developing very quickly.

[631] /411/ All the okrug administration
as well as the oblast' administration for the
Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent,

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

8:Kostenko 133-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

133 The Almatinka is no wider than 7 feet (3 arshins), with a depth of about 9 feet (4 arshins) and it can be forded anywhere. Furthermore the amount of water in the river is decreasing every year.

[312] This decrease of the water of the Almatinka is caused, first of all, by the fact that aryks or canals are led off from it, just after its emergence from the mountains, for the irrigation of the fields, gardens and kitchen gardens. Secondly, it is affected by the cutting down of the trees in the upper reaches of the river. The Almatinka flows into another mountain river, the Keskelen, which in turn flows into the Ili river. The Almatinka owes its name to the fact that its source in the mountains is thickly overgrown with apple trees ('alma') and apricot trees (uryuk).

361 132 Vernyy is located at a height 2500 feet above sea level, and enjoys a warm and healthy climate. The summer heat rises to 30° centigrade in the shade. The inhabitants have remarked that the climate of the town is growing dryer every year. Formerly the winter cold was more bearable and the snow lasted only a few days. In more recent years the winters have begun to be Russian, about three months long. There is no doubt that here too the cutting down of the forests in the environs of the town has had a somewhat deleterious effect.

The summer heat spells are almost unbearable, but in the evenings and at night it is always cool because of the proximity

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

233 a million. Next to sheep in importance is the breeding of
[234] horses and cows. In the cattle-breeding area the butter industry is very successfully carried on, especially in the governments of Tomsk and Tobolsk, and the chief centres
439 of its export are Barnaul, Omsk, and Kurgan. In 1913 the exports equalled 4·9 million puds as against 1·7 million puds in 1903. Closely allied to these industries is the export of live stock, bacon, game, wool, hair, skins and furs. But although they occupy a considerable place, it is the corn which comes first in quantity and cotton first in value among all Central Asiatic products. The pre-war export along the railway shows the following proportion between the various goods: Corn, 35·6 per cent. (of all exported goods); cotton, 4·3 per cent.; butter, 1·5 per cent.; fish, 1·2 per cent.; meat, 1·0 per cent.

162 In the production of corn Western Siberian ranks first; 7 per cent. of the native population scarcely take any part in this industry; while out of 93 per cent. of European population, 87 per cent. is composed of Great Russians, on whom agriculture chiefly depends. The cattle- and especially sheep-breeding depend to a great extent on the Kirghis and other Turkic tribes, forming 50 per cent. of the population in the Akmolinsk and 85 per cent. in the Semipalatinsk territories. But it is the cotton industry which almost entirely rests upon the native (Sarts and other Turkic tribes) labour.

312 The cotton industry is closely connected with irrigation, and again the irrigation canals form the most valuable possession of the natives. The canals seem to have been much more numerous in ancient times, and the remnants of them are found even in such barren deserts as Kizyl-Kumakh or Gary-ishek-otran. The native law codes (*shariat* as well as *'ādat*) recognize that the water is common property, which cannot be sold or bought, and that the land belongs to him who irrigates it. To look after the equal use of the irrigation canals, called *aryka*, an elder, called *mirab*, is chosen from among one settlement, and over several *mirabs* an *aryk-*

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

aksakala is elected, looking after the whole system of the chief canal. The lands irrigated by the natives in Turkestan (including Transcaspia), Bokhara, and Khiva equal 4,758,000 dess., or 2·6 per cent. of all the area. Since the Russian occupation, many attempts were made at reconstructing some of the ancient canals on modern lines. As the result of this, in the last few years before the war the Murgab canals were accomplished, irrigating some 25,000 dess., and the Romanoff canal, irrigating some 65,000 dess., in the north-eastern part of the Golodnaya ('Hunger') Steppe. A plan for irrigating a further four million dess. has been drafted. 312

No doubt this energy of the Russian administration was guided by appreciation of the immense value of the cotton industry. In 1913 some 550,000 dess., including the vassal Khanates, was under cotton plantations, realizing about 13½ million puds of cotton fibre (in 1914 some 675,000 dess., realizing some 13·9 million puds). Ferghana, which, it must be remembered, is the best-irrigated province, produced 75 per cent. of all cotton. Next comes the Tashkent district of Syr-Daria territory; the Katta-Kurgan, Khojent, and Samarkand districts of Samarkand territory; and the Merv and Tejent districts of the Transcaspian territory. It is owing to Russian influence that the old Central Asian specie of cotton (*Gossypium herbaceum*, L.) was almost entirely replaced by the American specie (*Gossypium hirsutum*, L.). The cotton plantations form a chief revenue of the Central Asiatic people, and were designated almost entirely for export. At the outbreak of war Russia occupied fifth place in cotton production (after U.S.A., Great Britain, Egypt, and China), and fourth place in cotton manufacture (after Great Britain, U.S.A., and Germany), and only one-fifth of her cotton was grown outside Central Asia (in Transcaucasia). 248

Other industries which might have a prosperous future are the rice and tobacco plantations and the rearing of silk-worms (at present Turkestan produces about 100,000 puds of dry cocoons per annum). 249

It has been said that this rich area has no communication 000

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

464 The sites of heavy industry are, however, in the Urals and in the Kuznetz basin in Central Siberia, both outside the five republics of Turkistan. This great combine, with its iron-ore at Magnitogorsk, and very rich coal deposits in the Kuznetz, supplied the metallurgical foundation of the heavy industry base which was to supplement, and if necessary replace, the old industrial areas of the Ukraine. At Magnitogorsk, next door to the iron-ore mines, were sited the steel-foundries. Also in Bashkiria, not far away, is Ishimbay, the • [315] focal point of the region now known as the Second Baku,[1] the wells of which may now be yielding as much as 19 million tons of oil a year. All these, although beyond the northern limit of Kazakistan, are situated in what was once a country of Turkish nomads, and their development was made possible largely by the use of Kazak unskilled labour. As John Scott wrote:[2]

His ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the flat plains of Kazakistan. They had been dimly conscious of the Czarist government; they had had to pay taxes. Reports of the Kirghiz insurrection in 1916 had reached them. They had heard stories of the October Revolution; they even saw the Red Army come and drive out a few rich landlords. They had attended meetings of the Soviet without understanding very clearly what it was all about. Now he was building a blast furnace bigger than any in Europe. He had learned to speak Russian, he read newspapers. His life had changed more in a year than that of his antecedents since the time of Tamerlane.

Some fifty thousand Magnitogorsk workers were directly under GPU supervision. About eighteen thousand de-Kulakized well-to-do farmers, and from twenty to thirty-five thousand criminals — thieves, prostitutes, embezzlers who performed unskilled labour usually under guard — these formed the reservoir of labour power needed to dig foundations — and do other heavy work.

[1] 'The Second Baku' is the propaganda name attached to a vast region stretching from the Volga to the Urals, producing over 11 m. tons of oil in 1950 and expected to reach an output of some 19 m. tons in 1952. Ishimbay is the centre of the most productive wells. Others are at Tuimazi, also in Bashkiria, at Syzran and Buguruslan, near Kuibishev, on the Volga bend, and at Krasnokamsk on the Kama farther north. Most of this was once Golden Horde territory.

[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 16 and 70.

[see cat. 116, pp. 89-90 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 not prevent large-scale construction in Turkistan in certain spheres. Delays over the Mointy–Chu line must be attributed to other causes. Whatever the actual cause in any given case, it is possible to affirm with certainty first that it has become a habit for engineers and announcers alike to make a point of confusing blueprints with actual construction, and secondly that Soviet railway construction in Turkistan up to the present time has not added very materially to the network which existed twenty years ago.

Shortcomings and delays of this kind are worth mentioning, for the picture must be seen in light and shade. But the general impression would be as true, namely, that the five republics have now become, for their population if not for their size, a highly industrialized area. Statistics, if nothing else, show something like one in three of the population as
316 living in towns and centres. Karaganda, the centre of the coal-
135 field in Kazakistan, has grown from nothing to 200,000. Like Magnitogorsk in earlier days, it is in fact a concentration camp of helot labour, producing over sixteen million tons of coal a year and qualifying as the third most productive coal-field in the Union, the next after the Don and Kuznetz basins. There are large coal deposits in the Angren Valley close to Tashkent, well sited to serve the industries of the capital and near the nodal point of the railway network. There is also
•315 coal in the Tajik foothills. Ishimbay, the heart of the Second Baku in the Urals, already mentioned, is not far outside the five republics and within Bashkiria, while in the republics are three most important groups of oil-wells. The first is in the Emba area (in Kazakistan north-east of the Caspian), with the fields round Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, the third most productive field in the Union. Next is the Nebit Dagh field close to Krasnovodsk, followed by various smaller wells in the Farghana Valley at Kim-Shorsu, at Yarkurgan and Chimion and also near Andijan. Others find mention in enthusiastic articles in press and encyclopedia alike. Some 1950 targets of production — all realized — are given in the selective table appended to this chapter. 2

2 [See each 116, p213 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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Scott, who shared these labours and saw the heroism and misery of the workers, speaks with understanding of the passionate idealism that sustained the Russians who made the sacrifice. He and they thought of it all as a war, in which the soldiers must be prepared to die. It was, he felt, a society for which it was worth while to shed blood and tears. The expropriated peasants, the political exiles, were a lost tribe, sacrificed on the altar of progress. They would die off, but by their death Socialism would win through to a time when it could function without scrapping blocks of its population every decade. A cruel concept, but there it was.

There was most certainly a great Russian idealism, even a grandeur in this plan and its achievement. But, like the valour of Sparta, it was a heroism that depended for survival on the labour of countless slaves and helots, pitilessly ground down and made to work at menial tasks without thought of human dignity. The helots of Turkish stock had not been born into the ranks of citizens, but they were set in the forefront of the battle to fight a cause that was not theirs. Most of them were inarticulate at the time, but later events were to demonstrate clearly enough that the iron had entered into their souls. Unlike the Russians, these did not believe the papers which told them daily they were the luckiest people in the world. The vast metallurgical combine of the Urals, the centre of the heavy industry of Soviet Asia, was set up just beyond and on the fringe of the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics. Their part in it was only to sweat and groan and die in mine or mill, to be frozen stiff on a scaffold at construction work or burned at a furnace mouth. In their own homeland they did not fare much better.

Beyond the Urals and within the political boundaries of the five republics the industrial lay-out was not quite so intensive and was certainly more varied. There are indeed non-ferrous metals in Turkistan of great importance. North of Balkhash at Kunrad, and in the Jezkazgan area of the northern steppe,

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are situated the largest copper-workings and smelting plants
328 in the Union, and there is another at Almalik close to Tashkent and therefore better placed for transport than the larger mines farther north. At Chimkent is the largest lead centre in the Union, working ore from many quarters, including the Tajik hills. And there are important minerals, said to include mercury, radium and uranium, in the mountains surrounding
433 the Farghana Valley. But, apart from the man-power they can supply to feed the industrial Moloch, the main importance of the five republics in this field is to be found in the production of the raw material for textiles — cotton and silk — and the availability of supplementary sources of power, which include oil, coal and water-generated electricity. The production of the last, hydro-electric power, is tied up in the minds of Soviet engineers with large-scale irrigation, and this in turn with transport, both by waterway and railway. In all these spheres there has been ambitious planning, and forecasts are often extravagant and even grandiose. In almost all cases it is hard to disentangle prospective targets from actual results, publicity media being regularly used to give an impression that projects which have not in fact left the draughtsman's table are on the point of realization in the field. Indeed it can fairly be said that almost any account of planned development in Soviet Russia, industrial or agricultural, calls for question on this ground. Usually the more poetic the vision of the publicist, the less advanced will be found to be the execution of the work. Another tendency is to claim as the triumph of the Soviet genius works which were in fact conceived and carried to an advanced stage by Tsarist engineers. This is particularly apparent in the field of railway works.

185 It is convenient to view industrial development in this region under four main heads:

(*a*) power, including oil, coal and hydro-electric;
(*b*) light industry, mainly cotton and silk textiles;
(*c*) irrigation;
(*d*) transport, railway and waterway.

361 town wall, beyond which extend the gardens and fields of the towns-people. On a place elevated naturally or artifically /155/ /Figure 50, p. 10a. Caption: Palace of the Emir of Bukhara./ /156/ inside the town wall, which is not intended to serve as a bulwark against an outside enemy, but as a castle to defend the ruler or commanding officer against any kind of uprising of the subject townsmen. The ruler or governor therefore always lives in the Urda. (cf. Figure 50, p. 155 and Figure 51, p. 10b, p. 157). From the bazaar square a larger or smaller number of streets lead out in a radial manner through the rows of shops, the houses, and on through the town gates the the outlying gardens and fields to the neighboring villages. Immediately beyond the gardens and fields the dry steppe begins, or the sand or gravel desert, completely without vegetation.

On the basis of the schematic drawing (Figure 49, p. 9a), and taking the climate into consideration, anyone can orient himself easily in any town in Turkestan, without a guide and without knowing a word of the native language, as I myself have proven a hundred times.

Also in Tashkent in earlier days, before the Russian conquest, the main town was surrounded by a high and very strong wall which
333 was made of loess as almost everywhere in Turkestan. For local purposes the loess is the best building material one could wish for. When dry it is as hard as stone, and is therefore very well adapted for the building of walls, because of the extraordinary dryness of the air and the slight precipitation. When dampened with water, however, the loess becomes quite soft and is as easy to work with as ordinary clay. All circular walls, towns walls as well as garden and courtyard walls, are made in the following manner in Turkestan. First, along the place where a wall is to be built, a ditch of the proper width and depth is dug and water is led into it. The earth from the ditch is mixed with straw, and by treading on it with the bare feet it is kneaded into a sticky paste. After this paste has been properly worked, it is piled up on the earth by means of a heavy hoe, used in the field, simply and without any sort of foundation, and is tamped down firmly with the feet. At first only a layer of about 0.6 meters high is laid down, and this is left until it is dry enough to hold the weight of a new layer without its sinking in. Then a second layer of the same height is laid on top, and so it continues until the wall has reached the desired height. The uneven places resulting from this type of building on the sides of the walls are usually eliminated by smoothing over the various layers with the

hoes before putting on a new layer. The direction of the strokes for 333
one layer will be diagonal, from left /157/ to right, and for the next one from right to left, and so forth, from which the walls in Figure 52 (p. 158) retain a marked zigzag effect. /Figure 51. Caption: The palace of the khan of Khiva/

Considering the nature of the material, the walls must naturally be thicker at the bottom than at the top. The upper edge of the wall 712
is indented, /158/ and it serves partly as decoration and partly pro- 361
vides loopholes for shooting. Inside the town walls runs a platform on which the defenders can place cannons, and on which a person can walk all the way around the entire town. (Figure 53) For the walls continue without any interruption over rivers, canals, and ravines. /Figure 52. Caption: Turkestan town wall. / Therefore the water courses are bridged over with thick beams and on these the walls are built in the same manner as on dry land. The height of the town walls differs according to the terrain, the importance of the place, and the greater or lesser danger of the position. The walls of Tashkent, which are among the strongest, still standing at the time of my visit in 1874, had a height of from four and a half to six meters. Their circumference was about 25 kilometers. /Figure 53. Caption: Turkestan town wall, cross section. / The houses were not built against the town walls, but instead a wide street went around the whole town inside the wall, clearly to facilitate the defense. The gardens and fields nearly all lay outside the town walls, but each of them was likewise surrounded by its own wall, also made of clay. From the basic town twelve gates led out to the gardens and the nearby settlements, and these were usually named after the towns /159/ to which they led, as, for example, the Kokand gate, the Samarkand gate, etc. The arrangement of the town gates is quite a characteristic one in Turkestan. To shoot breaches in a loess wall is very difficult, because thin walls can be easily penetrated by the bullets without causing further damage, whereas from thick walls the bullets ricochet. In attacking a Turkestan town, therefore, the gates must always be stormed. These are therefore always built as solidly as possible. On both sides of the gate, very solid, more or less conical, round towers are built with platforms on which to put the fortification guns (Figures 52 and 54). The gate, provided with these massive wings, leads into a large, high, quadrangular hall, the floor of which is raised about two meters above the road. /Figure 54. Caption: The town gate of Khiva. / In this hall, through which everyone who walks, rides horseback or drives through the gate

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The
875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

342 Central Asian is the high outer wall which surrounds the dwelling houses, together with the gardens and courtyards belongint to them; these surround the houses on all sides, and completely shut off the outer world. These outer walls are entered from the street by only one gate, behind which a special inner wall is built in order to obstruct the view into the courtyard from the street. They form, as it were, the fortress of each house owner /229/, which no trespasser has the right to break
183 into. Within his walls the Central Asian is his own master, and the administrative authorities never venture to infringe upon the sacredness of the private dwellings, especially the women's quarters. This is what has made the collection of a more exact population census impossible up to now. For according to Central Asian mores, it is already regarded as an impertinence if one asks the father of a family only for the number of his wives and children, or about events transpiring within his four walls.

/Figure 82, p. 63a. Caption: Cross section of a Sart dwelling

1. Veranda
2. Veranda columns
3. Room door
4. Window opening
5. Hollowed place for overshoes
6. Niches in the wall
7. Smoke hole
8. Pool
9. Fodder trough
10. Alfalfa Supply for the winter
11. Terrace
12. Outer wall./

342 The space enclosed by the outer walls already mentioned is divided into two parts, which are strictly separated and are connected only by a low narrow garden gate. The larger part, lying next to the street, forms the men's quarters. Here the father of the house lives with his grown sons and the male relatives and servants who are always living with him, here he carries on his business, and receives visitors and strangers. /Figure 83, p. 63a. Foundation plan of a Sart dwelling. (The lines in the sketch indicate canals.)

1. Living rooms. 2. Veranda. 3. Sheds. 4. Outhouse. 5. Pond. 6. Terrace./ The other part is alloted exclusively for the residence of the women and children, and it may be entered only by women. Otherwise the only man allowed is the father of the /230/ house. (1)

183 1. The sacredness of the women's quarters is so great in the eyes of the Central Asians, that they are profaned even

1: von Schwarz --63a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 R.1 Turkestan R.1

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

Fig. [illegible] Cross section of a Sart dwelling.



Fig. [illegible] Foundation plan of a Sart dwelling. (The lines in the sketch ind
canals.)

183 by the glance of a stranger. In 1886 in Baysun when I had to carry out astronomical observations from the roof of my dwelling, because there was no other suitable place, all the surrounding houses were emptied of their occupants for the night in question.

342 Each of these two parts is divided again into two or perhaps three subdivisions, depending on the circumstances: the living quarters, the courtyard and the garden, the last of which is usually lacking among the poorer people. Especially in arid regions and in towns densely built up, the inhabitants must content themselves with a simple court, while the gardens are relegated to a place outside the town walls. Where there is a garden, it is usually divided from the court and dwelling houses by a wide partition wall. As a rule, the general arrangement of the dwelling houses, sheds, courts, and gardens is that indicated in the two sketches above (Figures 82, p. 63a and 83, p. 229), of which the first shows the vertical cross section, and the second the ground plan of an average dwelling.

The dwelling houses, which consist of one or more rooms situated next to each other, the number depending upon the financial means of the owner, are built along the outer wall in such a way that this wall always forms the rear wall of the dwelling. The dwellings are almost exclusively one-story houses, which is partly due to the building material used, and partly to the frequent earthquakes. (2)

731 2. The frequency of earthquakes differs widely in different parts of Turkestan. While rare in many regions, as in Samarkand, for example, other places are often visited by earthquakes. The town of Vernoye /Alma Ata/, for example, was almost completely destroyed by one on June 9th, 1887, and since then it has felt earth tremors of greater or lesser intensity almost every day. Also in Osh, at the eastern end of the Fergana valley, there were almost daily earthquakes for a period several years ago. In Tashkent there are on the average about a dozen earthquakes in the course of a year. On the whole in Turkestan the earthquakes are light and rarely result in the caving in of houses and the loss of human life. In Tashkent I experienced only two such earthquakes in fifteen years, of which the one of November 29, 1886 was the strongest and caused considerable damage. The greatest earthquake in Turkestan of recent times was the

731 one already mentioned in Vernoye /Alma Ata/, which was felt all over Turkestan.

342 The walls of the dwelling houses are made of the same material as the town, court and garden walls, and erected in practically the same manner. In the court a large pit is dug, and the earth from it is kneaded with water and chopped straw into a sticky paste. From this large balls are formed, and these are piled up on each other and stamped down with the feet. Like the town and garden walls the house walls too are erected by layers, for the lower layer must always be allowed to dry first /231/ before a further layer can be placed on top. The straw which is mixed with the clay gives the walls great solidity, especially since the seeds remaining with the straw turn into buds under the great heat of the sun and grow through the walls in all directions, so that on the outside of newly built houses countless barley and wheat stalks are sprouting forth. Such a wall holds up much better in an earthquake than one built, no matter how solidly, of firebricks. Firebricks are not used for the building of private houses and are employed only for the larger public buildings like mosques, medreses, caravansaries, and baths, where their use is unavoidable since clay walls naturally cannot hold up under the heavier weight. In the rare cases when a dwelling house has an upper story superimposed, the walls of the second story are produced in a special manner with a combination of wood and clay. First a wooden frame of medium heavy beams is joined together and a large number of short thin wooden sticks are set in between the beams in a completely irregular fashion, usually fanwise. The spaces between the main beams and the wooden sticks are then filled in with balls of clay, and finally the whole is plastered over, inside and out, with a thick layer of clay so that nothing remains visible of the wooden framework except, at most, the ends of the main beams (cf. Figure 158). This upper story, which is not used for living quarters but only for storage, bears the Persian name bala-khana, from bala (upper) and khana (room), from which the Russian balagan (fair-booth) has obviously been derived, and probably also our "balcony".

The dwelling houses have no foundation, and they would be quite superfluous anyway because the ground, consisting of loess, has the same solidity as the walls themselves, which are constructed of the same material. The absence of foundations has the dis-

342 advantage, however, that during the rainy season the lower part of the walls absorbes moisture from the ground, which is soaked through, and the solidity of the walls suffers thereby. Some of the richer people, who usually place their dwelling places on a higher level than is usual among the huts of the poor, have the foresight to build the lowest part of the walls of firebricks for this reason, or at least to place their houses on a terrace which has been artificially raised.

The inner and outer walls of the houses remain just as they are, as a rule, and consequently they have the yellow grey color of the street floors. Whitewash of slaked lime was not formerly in use in [363] Turkestan and was introduced only by the Russians. On the other hand the rich people cover the inner walls of their dwellings with stucco work of alabaster, /232/ in the Arabic style. One finds wall frescoes only rarely. These consist of arabesques in the brightest and most vivid colors possible, or else of stylized flowers which always remind me strongly of a story in the Münchner Fliegende Blätter /Munich Broadsides (?)/ according to which a house painter who had been advanced to a room painter put the flowers and leaves on the walls to be decorated by dipping his hands alternately in red and green paint, then pressing them to the wall with outspread fingers and finally adding the stems to the flowers and leaves with a stroke of a brush.

The roofs of the dwellings are erected as simply as the walls. The roof beams, which are usually untrimmed, with only the branches and bark removed, are placed horizontally across two facing walls at a distance from each other of about 70 centimeters, and are fixed in the walls in this position. A layer of brushwood is used which is about twenty centimeters thick. This forms the ceiling of the room, just as it is. The richer people use decorative carved roof beams, and instead of the reeds, short round willow sticks about five centimeters thick, which are laid right next to each other, between one beam and the next, as is shown in Figure 84, p. 66a.

/Figure 84. Caption: Sart Room Ceilings/

In those rare cases when the ceilings of the rooms are made of short boards which are laid perpendicularly across the roof beams, these boards are cut in such a way as to give the impression of being not boards but round sticks of wood. This proves that the original way of construction of the ceilings was of sticks of wood, and therefore it is still considered the norm.

342 Among the rich the ceilings of the rooms are painted, often
363 very artistically, with very intricate and highly complicated arabesques,

342

Fig. 8. Sart Room Ceilings.

342 [353] which are composed of the brightest possible blue, red, green and yellow colors; and sometimes gold is also used.

The ceilings which are made, as described above, of beams and reeds, brushwood, wooden sticks or boards, are now covered again with a layer of clay about a foot thick, which likewise consists of loess earth and straw. The clay intended to cover the roofs is prepared with special care, for the horizontal roofs suffer much more from rain and snow than the walls, which are affected by the downpours only /233/ /Figure 85, p. 67a. Caption: A View of Hissar in East Bukhara. (After a photograph by Willy R. Rickmers.). /234/ from the side, and in any case dry out again quickly. The clay intended to cover the roofs is mixed with a large quantity of straw, up to fifty per cent, moistened with much water, and then it is left to ferment for about a week, and is stirred frequently. When the material is properly prepared it is put on top of the roof in layers, and each layer is flattened down with the greatest care with bare feet. Those who are flattening down the roofs, usually half-naked workers, move in their work with a dance step which gives them a very comical appearance.

During the rainy season these clay roofs are always covered with a luxurious growth of grass and in early spring with a mass of wild tulips.

Since these flat roofs are exposed in winter to the direct effects of rain and snow, they always develop defects in a relatively short time, and cracks appear, through which water from the rain and snow leaks into the houses. The dogs are particularly hard on these roofs and are always running about on them and harming them with their scratching. For these reasons the layers of clay must be repaired every fall before the rainy season begins, and must be completely replaced from time to time.

The flat houseroofs are a favorite place of abode of the natives: during the hot season people sleep on them, and they are a place where the morning and evening prayers are performed, while on sunny winter days the women perform their domestic tasks there. (Figure 62, p. 20a, p. 173; Figure 85, p. 67a, p. 233; Figure 86, p. 68a.).

The dwelling houses of the natives, which are built in the manner described above, are absolutely fireproof, and during the entire fifteen years of my stay in Central Asia there was never a fire to my knowledge. When the agent of a fire insurance company appeared in Tashkent several years ago, he was greeted with the same kind of hilarity by the people of Tashkent as someone would be among us if he wanted

L von Schwarz--67A N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 8. A View of Hissar in East Bukhara. (After a photograph by Willy R. Rickmers.)

342 to insure our houses against some sort of damage from aerolites.

The manner of building used today in Turkestan obviously dates back to very ancient times, and one can assume, with certainty, that the houses here have never been built in any other way than they are at present. The loess earth which is available in abundance at every building site is such a tractable and useful material, and the buildings constructed with it are so solid and relatively long lasting thanks to the extraordinary dryness of the climate, that the inhabitants have never had occasion to look around for another material. The lack of firewood does not permit the use of firebricks for the building of private houses, for /235/ Figure 56. Caption: A View of Khiva from the West. / /236/ there are no woods in the oases of Turkestan and only reeds and the wood of garden trees can be used for burning material. Two important circumstances stand in the way of using stones for house construction. First of all, walls erected from unhewn stones can withstand earthquakes much less successfully than clay walls; secondly, there are no stones at all in loess regions, and they would have to be collected from the mountains, hundreds of kilometers away, which in the absence of highways and bridges is absolutely unthinkable. It can be clearly concluded from the history of Alexander the Great, that already in his time the houses and town walls were erected in the same way as today. Arrian writes that the town walls of Ghaz (probably the modern Nau, as I have deduced in my monograph Alexanders des grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/) were built of earth and were not high.

> /He reports further that Alexander had the town of Alexandria on the Tanais, the present-day Khodzhent /Leninabad/ built in 20 days, with town walls and houses. Gurtius has reduced this to 17 days. This would only have been possible if Alexander had built the town in the way that the Khodzhent of today and the other towns of Turkestan are still being built. --Translator/

342 It can be concluded, that the towns of Turkestan were built in
172 the manner still used today even during the periods of glory under the rule of the Arabs and the Timurides, from the fact that no remnants of masonry erected of stone or firebricks have been found in any great volume. All the town ruins still in existence prove that everywhere only public buildings were built of firebricks, and even this was only since the time of the Arabs; on the other hand, except for the splendid

: von Schwarz--68a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RLI Turkestan RLI

342
361

Fig. [illegible] A View of Khiva from the West.

342 Tamerlane buildings in Samarkand, one finds not a trace of stone buildings
172 in the plains. These are found only in mountain regions, in the Darvaz and Badakhshan ranges and the like, where even today in some places the houses are erected of unhewn stones, for the simple reason that there is no loess there and the climate is damper than in the lowlands.

In prehistoric times the inhabitants of Turkestan must have lived in artificial underground caves and passages made in the loess ground; this is demonstrated among other things by the passages and holes found in Samarkand and lately also near Karti on the Amu-Darya. These are extensive and form unmistakable underground towns.

354 The interior arrangement of the dwellings is just as simple as the dwellings themselves. There are no stoves anywhere; instead, usually, I have found a 'kamin' /fire place/ in Afghan Turkestan and among the Taranchis of the Ili valley. /237/ which are completely similar to those used by us. Real heating of the living rooms would not be possible in any case even with a stove, because the doors close only very imperfectly, and are even completely lacking among the poorer people, and because the window openings, when there are any are either quite open or most often pasted over with thin paper. Glass windows are not used by the natives, and both the very rich people and the khans themselves pass the cold season of the year in unheated rooms into which the air enters freely. The felt yurts /tents/ of the nomads offer much better protection in winter against the cold and inclement weather than the dwellings of even the richest of the sedentary population. The Kazakhs are therefore perfectly right in preferring their yurts to the walled dwelling houses.

In order to keep warm during the bitterest cold the natives of Turkestan use wrought-iron braziers, resting on four legs, like those in use in ancient times in Greece and Rome. /Figure 87, p. 69a. Caption: Brazier of Turkestan./ This brazier, after it is filled with glowing embers, is placed under a small table, round or square, twenty to forty centimeters in height, which is then covered with a large quilted cotton coverlit. The members of the family now seat themselves on the floor around this little table and stretch their hands and feet out under the coverlet in the space warmed by the coals. In Figure 87 there is such a brazier drawn from life, shown with the tongs and coal shovel which belong to it.

For the poor people who cannot afford the luxury of a brazier, there is nothing left but to freeze and sometimes to freeze to death, par-

354 ticularly if they lack an adequate supply of warm clothes and covers as well. Every great cold costs a number of lives in the towns of Turkestan and the natives judge the degree of cold, in the absence of meteorological instruments, by the number of persons frozen to death during the course of a night. In 1879, when the temperature once sank to 27° Centigrade below freezing in Tashkent, in the Sart section of [171] that town, 126 natives froze to death /238/ in one night. Here one can marvel at the stubborness with which the people hang on to what is traditional. Although the natives have the Russian household establishments before their eyes and are aware of their efficiency, it still does not occur to them to imitate the latter, even when they have the means to do so.

342 The doors which lead from the courts into the living rooms are usually very low, so that one can only pass through by stooping. In most cases, these doors take the place of the window as well, and therefore are present in large numbers in the larger rooms. The doors always consist of two parts which do not move on hinges but on two pegs fixed in the lintel and the threshold. They always push inward and are so small that each time one must open both parts in order to enter. [353] Among the rich the door wings are usually adorned with artistic intertwining arabesques carved in the wood, or at least painted with bright red, green or blue colors. Since in Turkestan poplar wood, which is not very solid, is used almost exclusively for building and wood carving and it is usually worked and finished before it has completely dried out, the door posts and door wings are always more or less warped as they dry out, and consequently they close either badly or not at all. The fastening of the door is peculiar: outside one part of the door is a short iron chain, and on the other part a peg is fastened ending in a ring. The last link of the chain, which has a slit through it, is hung over this ring. If such doors are to be locked, a padlock is hung on the ring mentioned above.

There are windows only in the houses of the richer people, while the poorer ones must be satisfied with the light entering through the doorway. The window opening in its dimension is always greater horizontally than vertically in private houses, is always found over the door, and therefore in every room there are as many windows as doors. The window opening is either left completely open or it is covered with a grating of wood or alabaster in order to prevent the entrance of swallows and sparrows, of which there is an enormous number here, as well as of other birds. The sticks of which the wooden

grating is put together, are not simply set in crosswise, but are inter- 342
twined in more or less complicated ways into arabesques. One of the simplest forms of this window grating is that shown in Figure 88. The basic form of the alabaster grating is often an imitation of the wooden grating. During the winter these window gratings are often covered with white cigarette paper or with writing paper treated with oil to keep out the draughts of air. The interior of the dwellings is almost always veiled in half darkness because of the lack of windows, and the /239/ wide projecting roofs of the verandas; and when the door wings are open one can read or do close work right next to the door (cf. Figure 72, p. 201, and Figure 79, p. 223). /Figure 88. Caption: Window Grating of Turkestan. /

Just inside the main entrance of the living quarters is a square recess which serves as a washing and bathing place, a place where one can pour water, and for the removal of overshoes.

The floor of the room consists simply of clay, and is always [352]
covered with a plain reed mat or felt covering, depending on the financial means of the owner, or with a greater or smaller number of costly carpets.

For ventilation there is an opening in the roof in which a short cylindrical pipe of burned clay is placed. Since rain and snow can enter unhindered through this opening, the ventilation openings are often found also in the sides of the walls just under the roof.

Room furniture in the dwellings of the Central Asians is either 352
completely absent or is found in very small quantity. They have no 342
idea of tables, chairs, couches and our many cupboards and chests of drawers. In place of our clothing and kitchen cupboards and chests of drawers, in Turkestan various niches are fixed in the walls for this purpose, occupying all four walls of the room as a rule. These niches are either simple recesses in the walls, like our blind windows, or they are partitions made artistically of alabaster, as can be seen in Figure 123. These niches serve for the hanging up of clothes and underwear and for the storage of dinner plates, wash basins, water pitchers and teapots, water pipes, candlesticks, preserves and food, occasional books, and the like. As for real furniture, the natives of Turkestan are only acquainted with bedsteads, cradles, chests, and the small low table already mentioned for the coal pan.

The poorer population and also a good part of the rich simply 513
sleep on the floor. A blanket serves as a bed, over which one or more quilted cotton covers are spread, depending on what can be afforded.

1: von Schwarz--71a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

342



Fig. 88. Window Grating of Turkestan.

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92. p.85a Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native. In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p.164a p. 165, and Figure 85, p.67a p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75--Analysis]

351 to water the trees, for, of course, nothing grows without artificial irrigation. What makes the Europeans uncomfortable in these otherwise splendid gardens is the complete absence of green grass. This is caused by the fact that the canals which serve only for the watering of the trees all cut deeply into the earth, and therefore cannot be used to water the surfaces. For this reason the earth floor in the gardens has the same monotonous yellow gray coloring as the courts, streets and garden walls, and in the best cases it is grown over with dry straw-yellow spear grass and other weeds which have grown up from the previous rainy season.

/248/ Somewhere in the middle of the garden a pool is dug out and along its edge a square terrace is built of clay, one to two meters high, depending on the circumstances, which serves as a place to stay during the warmer part of the year. These terraces, which one finds in the courts and gardens of the natives and also at every step in the open squares of the towns and villages, are necessary in order to escape from the dampness and the effluvia and fevers which announce themselves especially after sundown by a peculiar aroma.

The natives live on these terraces, which are shaded by tall
342 trees whenever possible. They live either under the open sky or set up so-called Bukharan tents on the terraces, if their means permit. The Russians also have a special fondness for these tents and use them on journeys and in their gardens because of their efficiency. The tents have the form of a cube and are covered with a pyramid-shaped roof. They are very light and convenient to carry, and never take more than a few minutes to set up. /Figure 95. Caption: Bukharan tent. /

The Bukharan tents are made of three parts: two folding screens, and an umbrella-like roof which is set up between them. The folding-screens, which are each 2 meters high and 6 meters wide, consist of strong doubled cotton material of a light green color, into which are sewn nine thick upright wooden poles at equal distances from each other. These screens are set up in such a way that the third and seventh upright posts form the corners and the rest of the posts form the sides. (Figure 95). The four edges of the pyramid-shaped roof are also formed by wooden poles sewn into the material. The roof is simply set on the ends of the vertical corner poles of the folding screens by means of special nooses made of cotton bands which are fastened around the poles. In addition, a number of small wooden pins are fastened around the edges of the roof, and over them are

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

Fig. 95. Bukharan tent.

342 hung the nooses which are sewn on the upper borders of the folding screens. /249/ This is done in order to make a tighter fit between the roof and the walls. White cotton cords are fastened to the upper ends of the four corner poles and their other ends tied as tightly as possible to four wooden tent-pins hammered into the earth or to nearby trees. This is done to give the tent the necessary stability and to protect it from being blown over by the wind. The roof is provided all the way around with an edging about the breadth of a hand, and this edging hangs outside the side walls and thus prevents rain from entering. The tent walls are lined on the inside with strips of silk and silk mixed with cotton which are tastefully cut and form a pleasing design as a whole, as well as increasing the thickness of the walls at the same time. The ends of the wooden poles which are sewn in, as well as the ends of the roof are covered over with strong yellow leather to prevent their being worn out easily. A tent of this kind has a total height of 3 meters, covers an area of about 9 square meters, and at the same time weighs only 36 kilograms. The Bukharan tents afford complete protection against rain and wind; when it is very hot, however, one uses only the front and rear wall, so that it is open where the two folding screens meet, in order to provide comfortable cross ventilation.

The form of the Bukharan tent just described is the usual one. There are in addition to these, however, tents of much larger dimensions but with the same arrangement, and these are used, especially in Bukhara, by personages of high rank for rooms of state and for the reception of important guests.

What has been said thus far about the living arrangements of the natives of Turkestan relates chiefly to the quarters intended for the men. The women's quarters differ from the men's chiefly in that the stables are naturally omitted, and therefore their quarters take up much less space than the men's. In other respects, however, the women's quarters also retain the division into living quarters, courtyards, and gardens, and also the living quarters and their arrangement do not differ essentially from that of the men's quarters.

162 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other
619 side of the border. The domiciled population
184 there is made up of the so-called Turki people, more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

●342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

1 [See cat. 116, p 24.-- Analyst]
2 [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts --Analyst]

287 yet at the same time pliable material consists of several stages. First of all the wool is spread out on the ground in a thick layer, where it is vigorously beaten with rods, a task performed by women and girls. It is then placed on a straw mat, also in an even layer, and sprayed with hot water in order to make it pliable. After that the mass is rolled up in the mat, and this roll is moved to and fro for hours until the wool has become felted. In Eastern Turkestan the Kirghiz make their yak oxen drag the roll back and forward. The felt is of the same colour as the natural wool, that is to say, white, brown, or fawn. White felt is regarded as the [531] best of all. Patterned rugs are made by cutting out pieces of felt of contrasting colours, and arranging them on the layer of wool as desired. They are then stamped and pressed in until the whole mass becomes firmly felted together. In Western Turkestan the Kirghiz prefer angular geometrical patterns, in Eastern Turkestan undulating ribbon-like lines are more usual (see ill. p. 1460).*

342 The felt made in the manner described above is so strong that the Kirghiz and other nomad peoples of Asia use it as a material for making tents; these are called alajak by the Kirghiz, kibitka in Russian, and yurt in Turk-

*[See p. 75--Analyst]

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

342

Kirghiz tents. The tent on the right shows part of the wicker framework of the roof.

67

342 ish. The Kirghiz tent may be described as a portable house (see ill. p. 1457). The frame consists of three parts, the walls, which are made of trellissed laths that can easily be folded up, the roof-frame, and a ring to which wall-frame and roof-frame are secured. The whole structure can be taken to pieces in a very short time, transported by a camel to a fresh pasture, and re-erected without great difficulty. After the framework has been set up, it is first surrounded by mats made of reeds, which bear a pattern formed by wrapping coloured threads round the stalks. These bold patterns with their angular geometrical figures are visible from afar. According to the time of the year the roof or the whole kibitka is covered with felt, which is tied down by means of cords. Against the burning heat of summer as well as the icy winter blizzards the felt kibitka affords the best protection imaginable.

287 531 Tents of similar kind are used by the Turkoman nomads. Unlike those of the Kirghiz, where the materials consist mainly of felt and leather, the Turkoman tents are characterized by the predominance of fabrics worked according to the technique of carpet-knotting.

[184] The perfection of this technique and the great variety of articles produced demonstrate the advanced stage of Turkoman civilization as compared with that of the Kirghiz. The knot-technique gives to the tent as well as to articles of daily use an artistic character which in no way impairs the mobility of the household.

Most of the rectangular Turkoman rugs were hung in the opening of the tents, where they served as substitutes for doors. None of the older pieces are larger than the moderately wide tent-openings. Some Turkoman tribes fixed a specially decorative piece, also worked in the knot-technique, above the entrance. The

7 [See p 67 -- Analyst]

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues
[353] sleeping on the floor."[8] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of whitewash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[8] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

[1] [i.e., the discarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

8:Kostenko -91-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

000 The Characteristics of the Native Dwellings.

The characteristics of the populated places of the native population. The structure of the houses: walls, roofs, floors, windows, etc. The interior decoration of the lodging. Means of heating. The general appearance of the towns and villages. The nomad dwelling. The yurt: the component parts, the decoration, etc. The value of the Kazakh portable domicile.

342 The form of life of the two chief representatives of the peoples of the Turkestan region, the nomads and the sedentary people, also determines the character of their dwellings.

361 All the locations of the sedentary, so called Sart population in the Turkestan territory are very similar to each other externally, so it is enough to see one to get an idea of all of them.

Although the native sedentary settlements in Turkestan are divided into towns and villages (kishlaks), this division is only nominal. The entire difference between the Central Asian town and the village lies in the fact that a town, according to Moslem law, must be surrounded by a public wall, must have a citadel (ark), and must include not less than
342 three mosques. The town walls and the houses are always made of clay, a material directly available under foot. The houses are flat and squat. They consist of one or several square courtyards, surrounded with buildings. The living quarters are primarily one-story buildings and in general all are without foundations and socles.

342 If one does find a two-story building, the second story is either a covered terrace (balakhane), or there is a storage place there for the drying of fruit and vegetables. The actual construction of the native /389/ buildings is done by a process resembling a framework construction. On the place where the walls are to be, low frames are placed in one row or two.(foundation beams). Supports are laid on top of these, close to each other, which are also reinforced from above by a frame (capping). Cross beams are placed on the slant in the spaces between the supports. Then they begin to build the walls of lumps of clay. These walls are usually very thin, not thicker than 6 vershok (one vershok is 1-3/4 inches -ed.). After this beams are laid across the top, spaced 12 vershok apart, and these spaces between the beams are filled in with sticks (about three-quarters of an inch long) on which they throw reeds or reed wattlings. After this they need only smear clay on this structure several times, mixing thin straw in the clay, and the roof (ceiling) is ready. The windows for the most part open on the courtyard and are closed over with wooden sticks in the manner of barred windows in prisons. They are sometimes covered with greased paper. The windows are made quite high up on the walls and are extremely small, not larger than half an inch in diameter. Wealthy Sarts build a veranda (gallery) on the eastern side of the courtyard, supported by wooden columns decorated with carving.

In such houses the walls are usually plastered with alabaster with carved decorations which the Sarts do with great skill.

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
133 the snakes winding over the precipices, all this makes an unforgettable impression. With every step the views change, as though in a kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is the tree which grows in the greatest abundance. After it, but much less abundant, are the apple trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees, the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the following parts: the Almata station (the old part of the town), the Almata settlement, the Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually the town which has developed since the beginning of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a considerable degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick buildings, while the old parts of the town are built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been [363] planned regularly. The streets are straight, level and wide, in most cases planted (although quite sparsely) with trees. There are often small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/ partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the birds, for which reason cracks are always forming in the walls.

8:Kostenko 137-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 1. In Russia, as we know, a special
342 kind of moss is used for this purpose, which is called kukushkin len (cuckoo flax).

Secondly, the wooden floors and ceilings, as they shrink, acquire cracks, which also admit the cold. In addition the inhabitants do not know the use of double windows in winter.(1)

1. One must add the danger of fire to the inconveniences of the wooden structures. In 1871 there were three fires in Vernyy with losses figured at 3,462 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The number of buildings in Vernyy are as follows:

Types of buildings	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches (2)	1	1

2. A cathedral is being built, for which the foundation is already laid.

Mosques	-	1
Houses	234	972
Uninhabited buildings	4	9
[366] Stalls		226
Bins and Booths		164
Eating establishments (3)		21

3. Some of these are built of adobe clay and some of softened clay.

Mills		62
Total number of buildings	239	1,456

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

[Kuldja]

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
[346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

354 For the baking of bread a special baking oven of burnt clay is
252 used. It has the form of a large overturned water /245/ cask, with no floor and an opening in the side. This oven, which is made all in one piece and sold ready-made at the bazaar is either /Figure 93. p764/ Caption: Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place./ buried underground or walled into the court wall and surrounded with a thick layer of clay so that both openings /246/, the one on top and that on the side, remain open. When bread is baked in such an oven a strong fire is laid inside it; after this has gone out, the coals and ashes are removed and then the thin flakes of bread are pasted to the heated inner walls of the oven from above. In many places, especially in the colder mountainous regions like Badakhshan, these baking ovens are buried in the middle of the living rooms, in the floor, and thus they also serve for the heating of the living quarters (Figure 94). p765 /Figure 94. Caption: Baking Oven of Turkestan./

343 The privies in the dwellings of the natives are arranged very suitably and in keeping with the local conditions. In a distant part of the court a separate large room is built. In the middle of this space there is a pit about 8 meters deep with a diameter of about 3 meters, which is covered over with heavy, well cut, wooden planks. In these planks a small bamboo-shaped slit is cut out. Naturally there are no seat boards since the natives are not accustomed to sitting on chairs. A hole is left in the roof just over the slit mentioned above, in which a short pipe of burnt clay is placed. The open door opening and this roof opening provide adequate ventilation and there is no sign of a bad smell. When the sunken pit is finally almost full after many years it is then filled up with earth and the privy is moved to another place. Care is taken almost always to have a canal flowing by in which the residents may make their ablutions in the manner prescribed by the Koran.

Since in Turkestan every house owner is at the same time an owner of horses, the stables have a very important role in the dwellings of the natives. The stalls are always built next to the court wall, and are usually on the opposite sides of the court square from the dwelling quarters, sometimes even occupying three sides of the court. The stalls are little more than sheds and the supporting girders are fixed in the court wall on one side and are supported on the other by

wooden posts, as can be seen in Figure 82, p. 229. Facing the court, 343
the stalls are as open as the verandas and therefore they provide shelter only against rain and snow, while the animals are exposed, without protection against the winter cold. Fodder troughs made of clay run the length of the walls of the stalls. /247/ Their borders are made of beams to prevent their crumbling away.

These stalls serve not only as shelter for the horses, donkeys and oxen of the owner but also for the riding animals and beasts of burden of the visitors and guests. Therefore they are always laid out on a much larger scale than would be necessary for the needs of the owner alone. In addition, the stalls are also used for the storage of grain, alfalfa, straw, etc. and for the night lodging of the boys and servants during the rain. The winter provisions are piled up on dry alfalfa on the roofs of the stables and are either exposed without protection to the rain and snow or in the best circumstances are covered on top with reed mats.

Threshed grain is stored in the same kind of underground pits as the nomads use. The historians of Alexander the Great already mention these underground storage granaries, which they called seir or sir, as a characteristic of the Bactrians and the Sogdians who were the inhabitants of Turkestan of that time. (1)

1. Curtius, for example, writes in Chapter 17 of Book VII concerning the presence of underground granaries in Bactria, the Afghan Turkestan of today: Siros vocabant barbari scrobes, quos ita sollerter abscondunt, ut, nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint: in his conditae fruges erant.

In the middle of the court there is a pond of a larger or smaller 312
size and its stagnant and usually incredibly dirty water is used not only for drinking water for cattle but also for humans, as well as being used for the preparation of tea and food and in the meantime for washing clothes as well.

From the court one enters the gardens by a small low door, and 351
this is the real dwelling place of the more prosperous Central Asians during the warm part of the year. The gardens are usually planted very densely with trees to provide as intense a shade as possible, and they are intersected by a countless number of small canals which serve

[illegible] Kolesnikov 10a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Bl.1 Turkestan Bl.1

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

Fig. 14 Palace of the Emir of Bukhara.

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

Fig. 4. The palace of the khan of Khiva

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

Fig. 70. The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand.

k von Schwarz--40b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. n. The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan.

1: von Schwarz--41a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 11 Maxim mosque in Tashkent.

576 wear, soiled from the filth of the unpaved streets, before entering
368 a dwelling. For one does not sit on chairs in the dwellings of the natives or in the mosques, but simply sits on the floor. Consequently they do not demand of the Europeans that they pull off their boots before entering a mosque.

346 There are two types of mosques in Turkestan: the large cupola structures of firebricks with high facades and broad gate arches, most of which go back to the time of Tamerlane (Figure 70, p. 199 and Figure 71, p. 200), and the modern mosques, which consist of simple buildings, similar to an ordinary dwelling, with adjoining colonnades, like the one shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). In Tashkent there are only two mosques of the first type: the old half-ruined mosque, Hodja Akhrar, the mosaics of which are still partly preserved and prove that it was built in the same style as the Tamerlane mosque in Samarkand, and the more recent /203 Figure 73. Caption: The Interior of a Mosque in Bukhara. //204/Beklyar Beg mosque, which dominates the bazaar.

All the other mosques in Tashkent, and their number reaches 255, are more or less similar to the Maxim mosque, shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). As a rule they consist of one greater or smaller chamber, constructed of firebrick or simply of clay, and an adjoining portico with carved wooden columns and a level wooden roof. The floor of the portico is always raised several feet above the surrounding court. Sometimes there is no closed space at all, and the mosque then consists solely of a shelter, open in the front with walls constructed of clay. The interior of the mosques (Figure 73, p. 203), exhibits as a rule no decorations nor objects of furnishing, and the walls are in most cases not whitewashed even once. An elevation consisting of some steps built of bricks or clay serves as a pulpit for the mullah who is speaking. The mosques are always oriented in such a way that the wall opposite the entrance, toward which the supplicants turn during the prayer, whenever possible is perpendicular to the direction facing Mecca. Also in their prayers outside the mosque, the Moslems always seek to face toward Mecca, and in this connection they take the matter so seriously, that I have been asked by the inhabitants of all the towns I have visited during my travels, to indicate to them by means of my astronomic instruments as exactly as possible the direction toward Mecca. In every mosque there is a court or

1: von Schwarz--42a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

Fig. 11 The interior of a Mosque in Bukhara.

346 garden of greater or smaller size with a pond in the middle at which Moslem visitors to the mosque make their prescribed ablutions before the prayers, if they have not already done so at home. These mosque courtyards form a favorite meeting place for all the residents whose only task in life consists in an unbroken delightful idleness, but who consider it beneath their dignity to loiter about with the younger men
793 at the bazaar and in the tea shops. At every mosque there is an 'imam' or permanent leader of prayers, with an assistant, who bears the title of 'sufi,' as well as a caller, endowed with a powerful voice, who must announce from the minaret of the mosque (Figure 74) the time of the morning and evening prayers and at the same time the curfew hour for the public houses. None of these ordinarily receives any regular salary. Instead, voluntary gifts are received, at the time of the high festivals from the vistors of the mosque in question, and at harvest time they are given a specified part of the fruit of the earth.

788 During the group prayers, inside the mosque as well as outside, the participants arrange themselves in rank and file like a detachment of soldiers, while the prayer leader (imam) is at the front in order to be visible to everyone. During the prayer people stand and kneel in rapid succession /205/ and touch the ground with the forehead from time to time; all these movements, to which are added various manipulations of the hands, are made first by the prayer leader and then imitated by the entire group, as though by command. This makes an extremely comical impression upon the non-participants, for the whole thing resembles an exercise in callisthenics more than a religious act, the more so since it all proceeds in deathly silence, for
[562] the prayers are not spoken aloud. Women may not participate in such common prayers nor visit the mosques. /Figure 74, p. 43a. Caption: The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva./

785 The Moslem fasts, which last all through the month of Ramadan, and are designated as 'urza', are completely different from the Christian fasts. They do not consist in abstinence from meat nor of moderation in eating, but instead in the prohibition of food or drink from sunrise to sundown, including even a drink of water. The Moslems are so strict in this connection that they do not even permit themselves to bathe fro some water could get into the body unintentionally through the nose or the ears. It can be easily seen that the observance of such strict fasts, especially during the burning heat of Turkestan, is no trivial thing. But scarcely has the sun set and the evening prayer is finished, before a solemn banquet begins with singing and dancing, a

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

Fig. 14. The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva.

l: von Schwarz--52a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 11. The Mir-Arab Minaret in Bukhara, The place of execution f serious criminals.

1: von Schwarz --57a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

The Madrese of Rustem Beg in Uha-Tyube.

872 ly. For this reason the number of schools is very large. In Tashkent there are such schools in most of the 149 quarters into which the Sart town is divided. In 1879 Tashkent claimed to have 119 elementary schools, not counting those schools built by the Russians.

874 The Central Asian higher schools or medreses have only a distant similarity to our universities; they would be more comparable to the clerical seminaries in many Catholic countries for the education of theologians. They are boarding schools where teachers and students live together and are fully supported at the expense of the institution. The medreses receive no support from the state but are supported exclusively from the incomes of the wakf foundations, established by the founders of the medrese in question.

346 The medrese buildings (Figure 78, p. 57a, p. 221, Figure 79, p. 58a, and Figure 80, p. 58b, p. 224) are all built in the same style. They are as a rule two-storied (1) edifices of firebricks with a quadrangular /223/ /Figure 79.

1. Here and elsewhere I use the expression two-storied in the Russian sense of the term, while a house consisting only of a ground-floor is designated as one-storied, for I consider the Russian expressions more correct and practical than those used in most parts of Germany.

Caption: The Great Medrese in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./ /224/ groundplan. Inside there is a roomy courtyard, usually paved with firebricks, which is enclosed on all sides by the dwellings of students and scholars. Stables, kitchens and other offices are not found in these institutions. One reaches the courtyard through a gate in the middle of the main facade which is covered by a disproportionately high archway. The living quarters consist of two superimposed rows of cells, which are all of the same size. Before each cell there is a high niche-like entrance-hall which is open at the front. The cells are relatively dark, since they are lighted only by a single window placed over the door, which consists of a wooden grating pasted over with thin paper. /Figure 80, p. 58b. Caption: The Omar Medrese in Kokand./ The teachers and students remain in their cells mostly only at night and during the cold season of the year, but carry on their studies during the warmer weather in the open entrance-halls. The cells are not heated. The entire furnishing of the cells, for scholars and students alike, consists of a reed mat, a few blankets and pillows, which lie rolled up in

Li von Schwarz-58a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 11. The Great Medrese in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

L. von Schwarz--58b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 4. The Omar Medrese in Kokand.

a corner during the day, and are simply spread out on the floor at 346
night; also of a candlestick or an oil lamp, a brass washbowl and water pitcher, and finally, also of a few books, which the resident of the room is studying just at the moment. /225/ Each of the scholars usually has a cell to himself, while the students on the other hand live two to a cell. At the medrese there is also, as a rule, a mosque for the religious needs of those belonging to the medrese.

The business affairs of every medrese are administered by a mut- 874
eval, who, has charge of the management and utilization of the property which has been given to the medrese, the lands, caravansaries, mills, etc., and also the salaries and stipends paid to the teachers and students, as we have said above.
/Figure 81. Caption: Yunus Hodja, Mullah of Tashkent. (After a photograph by G. Merzbacher. /

The number of teachers and students in a medrese naturally depends on its income, and for this reason it is restricted for each medrese. In Tashkent the largest and richest is the Beklyar Beg medrese, which supports about 250 students.

Thanks to the undemanding and simple way of life of the natives, the costs of maintenance of a medrese are, by our standards, extremely low, and many European professors receive a higher salary than the whole college of professors and the collective student body of a higher school of the first rank in Turkestan taken together. For this reason the number of medreses is relatively large, the town of Tashkent alone is counted to have seventeen altogether, of which six are distinguished for their wealth and large number of students. Some of these medreses have existed for four or five hundred years. The greateset number of higher schools are in Bukhara, the Rome of the Central Asian Moslems.

The teachers at the medreses are extremely respectable men and honestly deserve the veneration accorded them by the population. They 875
have renounced all the pleasures of the world and live only for knowledge. My former teacher Lamont, formerly Director of the Munich Observatory, was by disposition and way of life the true image of a medrese professor in Turkestan. The latter /226/ receive no honorarium from their students and are entirely dependent upon the modest means granted them by the medrese, which is only enough to provide the simplest food and clothing for themselves. The medrese teachers are mullahs who in most cases have finished their studies at the same medrese. They spend all their time either on their own studies or in the instruction of their students. Outwardly they are distinguished by their very dignified appear-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 European scholars, but also among Europeans generally as giving an increased insight into the Turkish world. The question of the historical unity of Turkish culture is being more and more explained. The two mystics, Ahmed Yesevi of the XIIth century in Yese [the town now itself called Turkistan near the Sir Darya] and Yunus Emre 150 years later in Anatolia, represented one and the same school and culture. The ancient enmity typified by the war between Bayezid and Timur, the respective national heroes of the Western and Eastern Turks, began to lose its force. The national literature of Azerbaijan shows how Chingiz and Timur are becoming the greatest heroes of a national consciousness common to all Turks. There is no doubt that Ismail Gaspirali's [1] work had an influence in Turkey, and was the first sign of the reforms which took shape 50 years later under Atatürk.

The Yesevite School of Ahmed Yesevi in the realm of religion; the epics of Oghuz Khan, Dede Korkut and Köroghlu [2] in the domain of literature; the works of art and monuments of the East Turks and the West Turks; all these are a pledge of the universal significance of Turkish civilization. Until recently [346] historians of the art of the Osmanli period held the Green Mosque at Bursa to be purely an Osmanli work; it now transpires that it is ornamented by Tabriz tile-artists who knew the art of the Ilkhans, and by a Bursa decorator who had learned his craft in the time of Timur at Samarkand. The monuments of the Ilkhan period at Tabriz, the mosques of the Timurids at Meshed and Herat, the glorious *medreses* at Samarkand, Yese and Urgench are of one and the same Turkish civilization.

In the Caucasus a pan-Turkish ideal arouses jealousies among those who are not Turks, or even Muslims. But that is another story; here in Turkistan emphasis on this ideal need not weaken the national resistance from Europe against the Great Russians, nor should Georgians and Armenians suspect motives which inspire those who seek the independence of the homelands of the Turks.

On the narrower stage of Turkistan east of the Caspian,

[1] Crimean writer, XIXth century. See Chapter XIII, p. 226.

[2] Old epics of the Uzbek, Kazak and Turkmen tribes handed down by word of mouth. Soviet scholars have done much to reduce them to writing, but usually to Russian and not in the original. The latest Ukase is that this is the literature of a bygone feudal age, teaching a false bourgeois nationalism and must be shunned. On this subject see Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(iii) *Timur and the Timurids*

175 Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh on the Kashka Darya south of Samarkand. The fact that he came from an irrigated and settled part of the country is significant: while he maintained the tradition of close relations with the nomads who, with their horses and arms, provided the sinews of war, he was attracted by the garden pleasances and the flavour of the already hoary civilization whose cities were grouped along the mountain-skirts where the fertilizing waters spring. In the matter of martial tradition, Timur may have felt himself closer to the men of the steppe than to the people of the towns and villages, but, as Barthold says, he had recourse to a procedure gravely suspect in Chaghatai and Mongol eyes, for he chose a great city to serve as his dwelling-place, and he began to 346 construct in it great buildings. Nor was it only in Samarkand 175 that Timur is remembered for the splendid architecture that bears his name. At Yese too he built a magnificent shrine over the grave of the mystic Ahmed, and at Shahr-i-Sabz, his native place, there still stand the immense piers of the Ak Serai, the white palace of his dreams. Though after the manner of his kind Timur carried fire and terror across all Western Asia, his memorials attest not only a passion to build grandiosely, as have many conquerors before and after him, but something more intimate. He had a feeling for the setting of a shrine — at Yese in the plain beneath the Kara Tav not far from the flowing Sir Darya, at Samarkand the jewels in a green garden against a mountain background. Man of violence himself, his grandsons, and their grandsons, had that peculiar touch and feeling after beautiful things, the work of nature, the product of man's artistry, that we associate with the Muslim spirit at its best. Most famous is the Registan in Samarkand with its three *medreses*, the oldest built by Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg. Of it Curzon said he found it still in his time, even in ruin, the noblest public square in the world, a triumph of massive simplicity and grandeur with which nothing in Europe, save

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86.

[2] Op. cit. p. 326.

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

The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

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find expression in habits and customs, dress and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page 145). The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

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[See cat. 116, p. 52 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

346

Tamerlane's tomb at Samarkand.

175 cient times it was the northernmost part of Persia, closely united to that country by ties of religion and culture. Its inhabitants, even those of the extreme northern districts in the neighbourhood of the Aral Sea are frequently depicted on sculptures of the tombs of Persian kings, and are seen among the tribute bearers on the friezes of Persepolis (see ill. page 1439). They are shown wearing caps that cover the entire head with the exception of the face; these caps are not unlike those worn by some Kirghiz tribes as a protection against sand and snow-storms. The figures depicted as subjects of Persia may have belonged to a nation which spoke one of the Indo-Germanic languages, and it is assumed that Turkestan was originally peopled by one of the many Indo-Germanic races. However that may be, large-scale migrations of tribes, the effects of which were felt throughout Asia and sometimes even in Europe, swept over the country, and changed the character of the population. In 329 B.C. Alexander the Great conquered Turkestan,

* [see cat. 116, p. 19 --Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

346

View of the courtyards of Mohammedan houses in Samarkand. In the background the ruins of the great mosque built by Timur between 1398–1403.

162 and to profess a pure form of Islam. For that
69 reason the Uzbegs contain all the elements of
184 the Turkestan population, Arab, Turkish, and Tajik.

The two million Sarts who in the main make up the municipal population of Western Turkestan are even more of a racial mixture than the Uzbegs. That is not surprising considering the fact that the cities of Turkestan have always been great trading centres of international character. Nowadays, the differ-

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
[Kuldja] RL1

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
• [342] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

361 the laws of Confucius. Each lad has a book in
his hand, but they all study together, shouting,
346 similar to the way it is done in Jewish and
Moslem schools.

The chapel itself is housed in a dark but quite spacious room. The furnishings are strongly reminiscent of a Catholic church. By the front wall there is a large altar, set with various viands, church lamps and vessels from which smoke issues forth. Behind the altar as well as along the side walls there are images of a dragon. The figures of saints are distinguished by their corpulence and rotundity. Flags are hung along the walls like banners.
788 Finally, bells are hung up near the altar. The divine service is carried out by a dirty and ragged personage, who, with a bundle of smoldering candles in his hands, and accompanied by measured beating of the bells, makes endless bows, to the ground and halfway to the ground as he approaches and retires from the sacrificial table or altar.

On important occasions, instead of spoken prayers they burn little pieces of paper with written prayers or wishes, in the belief that prayers born up in this manner reach God more quickly. (1)

1. There is still another original way of praying. They fasten a small piece of paper to a wheel, with a prayer written on it. The wheel turns about quickly, and each turn of the wheel is considered as a whole prayer, separately uttered.

8:Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 Among the Chinese of Kuldja there are
795 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

In general the Kuldja "Catholics" are very insecure in the foundations of their faith. They wear crucifixes around their necks, and read prayers /434/ in Latin. When they appear before the authorities with a plea they set their crucifixes outside.

In the houses of the Kuldja Catholics one sees on the walls an image of the cross instead of icons. In addition, one may also see from time to time rosaries with a crucifix, or a palm on which a crucifix hangs.

[797] Christianity was brought to Kuldja by French missionaries, who came here from Peking.

361 Here are the statistical data for the number of houses and population in Kuldja. In 1872 there were in Kuldja:

[346]

Eastern Orthodox Churches	1
Roman Catholic Churches	1
Chinese temples of idols	2
Mosques	36
Houses	1,258
Total number of buildings	1,298

361 The population of Kuldja divides accord-
162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

361 world. For one hundred years Samarkand was the seat of broad scholarly, administrative and commercial activity, and contained over 150,000 inhabitants. The massive remains of ancient buildings testify even today to the past glory of this city. The new (Moslem) town is not strikingly beautiful. Like all other Central Asian towns, it is made up of narrow crooked streets, lined with clay walls, ugly squat little houses, miserable small stalls similar to dog kennels, etc. etc.

361 /438/ The pleasantest place in town is
346 the Rigistan - a small town square, which is formed by three ancient mosques and medresses, situated perpendicular to each other: the Tillya-kari (i.e., gold) medresse, the Shir-dar (named for the mosaic figures on the front of two animals resembling lions; the Persian word for lion is shir, and the Ulu-begi. This last building was once famous for its seat of learning and its observatory, but now it has suffered much from the ravages of time and earthquakes.

361 In the eastern section of Samarkand an
764 ancient building of Persian architecture is to be seen, known by the name of Gur-emir (the tomb of the emir), and containing the tomb of Timur. This mausoleum is crowned by a cupola which looks like a truncated melon. Along the sides there were two minarets, but one recently collapsed. The interior of the building is octagonal and consists of two rooms. The floors are laid with white marble, and the walls are covered with graceful azure arabesques and with quotations from the Koran in gold. The tomb of Timur is made of dark green jasper, and has the shape of a truncated pyramid, about

361 three feet wide and six feet long, turned with
764 the foundation uppermost. (1)

1. This stone constitutes a remarkably large single piece of nephrite.

This stone was split in two while in transport, after the conquest of Samarkand by Shakh-Nadir. Next to the tomb of the Emir are tombs of his teacher and various other members of his family. All these tombs are enclosed by a carved marble grating. By a narrow staircase one reaches the dark vault, which is also decorated with arabesques and on the floor of which there are the tombstones in the same order as they are placed up above. The copy of the Koran copied by Osman himself (the third Caliph of the faithful) was preserved in this underground vault, which still show traces of the Caliph's blood, for he was killed apparently while he was working on it. This historical document was sold for 100 rubles by Samarkand mullahs when the Russians took the city, and was placed in the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg.

361 /439/ The most interesting of the
346 monuments of the past are the ruins of the Bibi-Khanum mosque, which was built by one of Timur's wives, the Chinese princess Khanum. The best artists and architects were engaged for the erection of this building, which is imposing in its proportions and magnificence. This temple occupies a large area, and consists of three mosques, connected with each other by a square structure in which the cells and the auditorium of one of the largest medresses are located. The main entrance gates were at one time cast in bronze and covered with

361 inscriptions and arabesques. Later one of the
346 impecunious rulers of Bukhara had the gates melted down for coins. With the passing of time the walls of the building have cracked and fallen into ruin in many places. The western cupola is the best preserved part. Here the walls are covered with tile mosaics which are strikingly colorful, and in addition the design has been made very artistically and shows highly original taste. In some places the azure and gold are as fresh as though they
364 had been put on the walls only recently. In the middle of the building is a huge table of white marble on nine short legs. This table is turned toward the window behind which was the enclosed place of Timur's wife - Khanum. On the table lay a huge Koran, on pages of parchment, so that the wife of the terrible conqueror could read it from her window. Not far from this building they show the tomb of the founder herself, Khanum. But this tomb is scarcely remarkable, being a formless pile of ruins.

361 Not far outside the town are the extensive ruins of the summer palace of Timur, the Khozreti-Shakh-Zinda, where the former rulers of Samarkand went to worship, and then made their triumphal entrance into the town. Samarkand, like most of the Central Asian towns, is enclosed by a wall, which is 13 versts in length. The town has quite a regular square shape, on the western side of which is an extensive citadel, which itself is enclosed by a wall which is 8 feet (3½ arshins) high by 10½ feet (1½ sazhen's) at the base. The walls are crenelated, and have flanking projections. This citadel is the most extensive in all of

361 population. In the Kalinau district the po-
247 pulation is more densely settled as a result of the fact that the largest of the two town bazaars is located there, and therefore practically all the trading estate lives /445/ in that district. In the Razak district the inhabitants work more in gardening.

361 Of the town buildings in Khodzhent,
346 three medresses of fire brick are particularly remarkable. One was begun by Ak Buta Beg, who was mentioned above, and finished by his wife Izyat Alyam, about 150 years ago. In this medresse one teacher (mudaris) instructs about 50 students, who live in 28 separate rooms. The remaining medresses were built 40 to 50 years ago. One was built by the Khodzhent Beg Shakhi Divan Begi, and has 23 apartments. In it there are about 40 students and 2 teachers The other medresse was built by Mukhamed Sadyk Alim, also with 23 lodgings, in which 30 students live and one teacher. These medresses are named for the persons who built them.

Of the medresses which are built not of firebrick but of clay the following are worthy of note. One is the medresse Namazga, which was built about 60 years ago by Beg Khaly Kum Mirza. In it are 23 lodgings, 2 teachers and about 50 students. Another is the medresse Hazret Sheik Maslah-Eddin, which was built about 20 years ago by Mirza Hakim Potavali, with 10 lodgings, in which there are 14 students A third is the medresse Mahomed-Hussar, built by the Beg Hash Barkan Bay, about 180 years ago. It contains 13 cells, in which one teacher instructs 30 students.

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[176] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built a mosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

361 finally it became an independent dominion. This happened when the begs stopped recognizing the emir or khan as their sovereigns and ruled the town independently for a while until they finally fell under the rule of the neighboring khans again.

Ura-Tyube is situated at the foot of two elevations. On one of these stands a citadel, and on the slopes of the other is the northwestern part of the town. The town is about 6 versts in circumference, and is enclosed by a double wall which contains 7 gates: 1) Chakmak-tash; 2) Yase-Bak; 3) Say-Bala; 4) Kara-Bek; 5) Darvoaza-Bala; 6) Darvoaza-Nidzhsany; 7) Saypayak.

/449/ The town is divided into 'Guzars', of which there are 58 and which correspond to the mahalas of Khodzhent. This division into Guzars has existed for a long time, but it is not known when and by whom it was introduced and what factors were taken into account when it was done, since the guzars are unequal both in size and in number of population. In the town there are almost no gardens, so that all the houses are crowded close together. They are distributed mostly on side streets, which are entered through large wooden gates. The bazaar is placed almost in the middle of the town and occupies a large area.

361 Of the town buildings two medresses
346 which are constructed of firebrick are worthy of note. One is the Kok-Gumbes medresse, which has 17 lodgings (cells) in which 6 teachers instruct 20 students. This medresse was built 320 years ago by Abdul Latyf sultan. The

361 other, which is the completely new Rustam beg
346 medresse, was built about 15 years ago. In its 49 separate apartments live 50 students, who are instructed by 4 teachers. There are two remaining medresses built of clay. In the Namazga medresse there are 12 apartments for 30 students which were built by the two begs Mohammed Rakhim Attalyk and Khudoyar Vallyami, and 18 other lodgings for 25 students, built by another beg. The mosque at this medresse was built by the first two begs out of firebrick. It has four teachers. At the fourth medresse, built by the Beg Said Gaza Hodja, there are 12 apartments for 15 students, who are instructed by 1 teacher.

361 There are 1,398 houses in Ura-Tyube and
162 the population is counted as 4,804 persons of both sexes. The predominating nationality is Tadzhik. After them come the Uzbeks with 900 persons. There are in addition 6 Jews and 12 Hindus in the town. Not having their own households they live permanently in caravanseries which belong to them.

There are no other native peoples in the town. The Kazakhs never settle there but travel only to the bazaar to sell wood, coal and cattle and to buy such necessary objects for themselves which they are unable to produce in their own domestic industry, and indeed their own produce does not satisfy almost all their needs.

361 /450/ Outside the town, to the south, west, north and northeast, there are the gardens and plowed land of the town dwellers, who move out in the summer to these gardens, so that

or citadel which was blown up by the Russians immediately after 712
the capture of the town. It was located on the upper left bank of 361
the Bos-su canal, and the site today is within the Russian town and barracks and various public and private buildings are built on it.

2. The Bazaar

The bazaar has a meaning for the Central Asians which it is 366
difficult for the European to grasp properly. The Central Asian spends the greater part of his life in the bazaar, and for him it takes the place of our newspapers, restaurants, coffeehouses, townhalls, amusement places, stock exchanges, law courts, etc. At the bazaar the entire public life and a great part of the private life of the male urban population takes place, and day in, day out, in winter and summer almost the entire population, when it is not occupied with work in the fields, is gathered in the bazaar. The bazaar is the real home of the townsman; since his private dwelling serves him primarily as a lodging for the night, and as a depository for his property and his wives and children, he therefore expends relatively /161/ little trouble on it.
/Figure 55. Caption: Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace. /

The arrangement of the bazaars is the same everywhere, and 361
the bazaars of the different towns differ from each other only /162/ 366
in size. The bazaar in Tashkent is one of the largest in all Central Asia, containing about four thousand shops and workshops. The streets of the bazaar are relatively wide and mostly covered with reed mats, which are spread along beams diagonally placed over the streets from one row of stalls to another. The result is a pleasant twilight and a refreshing coolness, which is increased by a constant sprinkling of the bazaar streets with water. It is a beneficent contrast to the dazzling sunlight and the stifling ovenlike heat of the nearby streets leading into the dwelling quarters. (Figure 56).

The booths which range along both sides of the bazaar streets, 347
serving either for selling goods or as workshops for the various craftsmen, all look alike and have nothing in common with European shops. They are rooms two and a half to three meters high, four and a half to six meters long, and from two to two and a half meters deep, which are completely open to the street. The walls are made of clay or else of reed screens spread over on both sides with clay. The roof also is

347 made only of beams, reeds and clay. The floor of the booth is usually raised a few feet above the street level, as is the small footpath which runs along the booths. The booths serve, without difficulty as places to sell all kinds of ware, or as workshops for all kinds of handicrafts, in effect whole industries are carried on at the bazaar. There are no windows or doors in the bazaar stalls, so that the merchants and craftsmen carry on their business all year round in all weather in these places, enclosed by only three walls. At night the shops are closed either by a boarded partition or by folding screens made of reeds. Those merchants who are unable to take all their wares home with them every evening spend the night in their shops, both winter and summer.

Merchants and craftsmen sit on the floor during their work on reed mats or blankets, with their legs crossed, sitting either inside the booth or on the footpath which leads into the booths (Figure 57, p. 15a, p. 165). The buyers also take their places on the ground beside the merchants, unless they prefer, for the sake of greater convenience to undertake the selection of wares on horseback, in which case the wares are brought out one by one to be inspected from the horse. Naturally, since in winter it is not particularly comfortable to sit on the ground which is soaked through, there are a few wooden benches covered with blankets or carpets for the greater comfort of the public in front of the better shops, especially tea houses, and eating places, /163/ (Figure 58, p. 15a, p. 165), and on these one can take his place with his legs crossed and conclude his business comfortably. /Figure 56, p. 14a. Caption: Covered bazaar streets/

366 443 A peculiarity of Central Asian bazzars is the strict separation of various industries and various types of goods /164/ from each other, which makes the search for and the choice of the necessary wares far easier for the buying public. One row of booths is, for example, exclusively devoted to clothing merchants, the next occupied by merchants in cotton material, the third by silk merchants; furs, linen, boots, saddles, metal wares, crockery, vegetables, fruit, meat, in short, everything there is to buy can be bought only in one specific row of booths. In the same manner all the eating places are in one row, where they prepare their national dishes right out on the street before all eyes: 'Plov' /pilaf/, 'pelmene' /small meat dumplings/, 'shashlik' and 'lepeshki' /small meal cakes/; and they poison the air far around with their burned 'shaffet' and 'kunshut' /sesame/ oil.

The handicrafts, like the wares are all organized strictly according to categories. In one street the kettle and teapot smiths make an

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

Fig. 10. Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place.

363 the main street as a result of an unlucky chance that just as they
361 were passing through a bottomless mire their carriage broke down and they were unable to work their way out of the soft mud. More than once have I witnessed riders sunk to the waist in the soft ground, and once I saved the life of a youth near the bazaar who fell head first into mud a meter thick when his horse stumbled, and only his legs stuck out. In most recent times, thanks to the efforts of the Russian /169/ administration, the street conditions have improved considerably, but they still leave much to be desired. A fundamental improvement is impossible /Figure 60. Caption: The main street of Tashkent. / without quite disproportionate costs, for the loess base, which becomes bottomless every winter, makes paving and macadamizing far more /170/ difficult, as the Russians have often enough discovered in the laying out of the streets in their town.

A basic fault of the Turkestan streets is that, with the exception of the few main streets, they are so narrow that two carriages cannot pass each other and always one of the two vehicles which meet must back up until he succeeds in passing through a side alley. On bazaar days traffic jams lasting for hours often occur as a result of this. Four-wheeled wagons cannot be used at all in such narrow alleys because one cannot turn around with them. This bad situation is clearly caused by the fact that the street inside the town wall had to be used sparingly in order not to increase the circumference of the town walls too much. For otherwise the Central Asian towns have a disproportionately large expansion since all the houses consist only of a ground floor, and are always surrounded by more or less extensive courts and even gardens.

363 If the streets in Central Asian towns are bad enough for these
● 351 reasons, their unfavorable aspect is increased substantially by the
361 fact that there are no houses along them but only uniform courtyard walls of yellow clay the endless monotony of which is broken only here and there by a tiny gate which one would sooner take for the entrance to a pigsty than to a human dwelling. For the dwelling houses are all located within the courts, and even the view of the courts, when one opens the gate off the street, is cut off, for behind each gate is a special wall. The height of the court walls which enclose the streets on both sides is arranged so that one cannot see over even when on horseback or riding a camel; they are, therefore, usually three to three and a half meters high. The streets which lead through the dwelling quarter inside the town walls differ in no way

from those passing between the gardens and fields outside the circular 363
walls, since the latter are enclosed in walls exactly like those around 351
the dwellings within the town. Therefore, upon entering a strange town 361
the only way to tell whether one is still among the fields and gardens, or already between the rows of houses, is on the basis of whether one has passed through the town gate. In all Central Asian towns the streets are crooked, and continue in a perpetual zigzag, the natives have no notion of a regular arrangement of rows of streets, and preliminary plans in the erection of houses. Only the main streets of Tashkent, which /171/ lead from the bazaar to the outlying districts have a semblance of regularity, although they also possess numerous bends and turns.

The terrible monotony of the streets in Sart Tashkent is only 361
broken here and there by a mosque or 'medrese' /religious school/, by isolated tombs which are found in the middle of the town along the roads, by the rising or downward slope of the ground, and by the many streams, sometimes flowing in deep ravines, which cut across the entire town in all directions. In this respect Tashkent makes a much better impression, in spite of everything, than /Figure 61. p.199
Caption: Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ most of the other towns of Turkestan, most of which lie in more or less level terrain.

Concerning the traffic in the streets of Tashkent, this differs 363
greatly in different parts of the town. In the side streets one sees only 361
isolated riders or strollers; the main streets leading to the bazaar, especially on market days, are filled all day long with endless lines of camel, horse and donkey caravans, wagons, and riders of horses, donkeys and camels, through which it is often difficult to make one's way, even with the assiduous use of the horsewhip. This means is not used only by the Russians, but also and even more widely by the natives /172/ themselves, for in Turkestan everyone who is prominent, either [554]
through rank or wealth, considers himself entitled to enforce his precedence, by the 'ultima ratio' of the 'nagaĭka' /whip/ over less fortunate creatures, while the victims of this treatment consider it perfectly in order and use it themselves against those still lower in rank. Yielding is considered a sign of weakness by the Central Asians, and there is no better way of gaining their respect than a show of arrogance and the use of brute force. The Russians, therefore, are born, as it were, to the rule of the Central Asians.

p63a

wooden posts, as can be seen in Figure 82, p. 229. Facing the court, 343
the stalls are as open as the verandas and therefore they provide shelter only against rain and snow, while the animals are exposed, without protection against the winter cold. Fodder troughs made of clay run the length of the walls of the stalls. /247/ Their borders are made of beams to prevent their crumbling away.

These stalls serve not only as shelter for the horses, donkeys and oxen of the owner but also for the riding animals and beasts of burden of the visitors and guests. Therefore they are always laid out on a much larger scale than would be necessary for the needs of the owner alone. In addition, the stalls are also used for the storage of grain, alfalfa, straw, etc; and for the night lodging of the boys and servants during the rain. The winter provisions are piled up on dry alfalfa on the roofs of the stables and are either exposed without protection to the rain and snow or in the best circumstances are covered on top with reed mats.

Threshed grain is stored in the same kind of underground pits as the nomads use. The historians of Alexander the Great already mention these underground storage granaries, which they called seir or sir, as a characteristic of the Bactrians and the Sogdians who were the inhabitants of Turkestan of that time. (1)

1. Curtius, for example, writes in Chapter 17 of Book VII concerning the presence of underground granaries in Bactria, the Afghan Turkestan of today: Siros vocabant barbari scrobes, quos ita sollerter abscondunt, ut, nisi qui defoderunt, invenire non possint; in his conditae fruges erant.

In the middle of the court there is a pond of a larger or smaller 312
size and its stagnant and usually incredibly dirty water is used not only for drinking water for cattle but also for humans, as well as being used for the preparation of tea and food and in the meantime for washing clothes as well.

From the court one enters the gardens by a small low door, and 351
this is the real dwelling place of the more prosperous Central Asians during the warm part of the year. The gardens are usually planted very densely with trees to provide as intense a shade as possible, and they are intersected by a countless number of small canals which serve

351 to water the trees, for, of course, nothing grows without artificial irrigation. What makes the European uncomfortable in these otherwise splendid gardens is the complete absence of green grass. This is caused by the fact that the canals which serve only for the watering of the trees all cut deeply into the earth, and therefore cannot be used to water the surfaces. For this reason the earth floor in the gardens has the same monotonous yellow gray coloring as the courts, streets and garden walls, and in the best cases it is grown over with dry straw-yellow spear grass and other weeds which have grown up from the previous rainy season.

/248/ Somewhere in the middle of the garden a pool is dug out and along its edge a square terrace is built of clay, one to two meters high, depending on the circumstances, which serves as a place to stay during the warmer part of the year. These terraces, which one finds in the courts and gardens of the natives and also at every step in the open squares of the towns and villages, are necessary in order to escape from the dampness and the effluvia and fevers which announce themselves especially after sundown by a peculiar aroma.

The natives live on these terraces, which are shaded by tall
342 trees whenever possible. They live either under the open sky or set up so-called Bukharan tents on the terraces, if their means permit. The Russians also have a special fondness for these tents and use them on journeys and in their gardens because of their efficiency. The tents have the form of a cube and are covered with a pyramid-shaped roof. They are very light and convenient to carry, and never take more than a few minutes to set up. /Figure 95. Caption: Bukharan tent. /

The Bukharan tents are made of three parts: two folding screens, and an umbrella-like roof which is set up between them. The folding-screens, which are each 2 meters high and 6 meters wide, consist of strong doubled cotton material of a light green color, into which are sewn nine thick upright wooden poles at equal distances from each other. These screens are set up in such a way that the third and seventh upright posts form the corners and the rest of the posts form the sides. (Figure 95). The four edges of the pyramid-shaped roof are also formed by wooden poles sewn into the material. The roof is simply set on the ends of the vertical corner poles of the folding screens by means of special nooses made of cotton bands which are fastened around the poles. In addition, a number of small wooden pins are fastened around the edges of the roof, and over them are

l: von Schwarz--15a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 57. Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent.

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

Fig. 58. Wooden platform.

grating is put together, are not simply set in crosswise, but are inter- 342
twined in more or less complicated ways into arabesques. One of the
simplest forms of this window grating is that shown in Figure 88. The
basic form of the alabaster grating is often an imitation of the wooden
grating. During the winter these window gratings are often covered
with white cigarette paper or with writing paper treated with oil to
keep out the draughts of air. The interior of the dwellings is almost
always veiled in half darkness because of the lack of windows, and
the /239/ wide projecting roofs of the verandas; and when the door
wings are open one can read or do close work right next to the door
(cf. Figure 72, p. 201, and Figure 79, p. 223). /Figure 88. Caption:
Window Grating of Turkestan./

Just inside the main entrance of the living quarters is a square
recess which serves as a washing and bathing place, a place where
one can pour water, and for the removal of overshoes.

The floor of the room consists simply of clay, and is always [352]
covered with a plain reed mat or felt covering, depending on the
financial means of the owner, or with a greater or smaller number
of costly carpets.

For ventilation there is an opening in the roof in which a short
cylindrical pipe of burned clay is placed. Since rain and snow can
enter unhindered through this opening, the ventilation openings are
often found also in the sides of the walls just under the roof.

Room furniture in the dwellings of the Central Asians is either 352
completely absent or is found in very small quantity. They have no 342
idea of tables, chairs, couches and our many cupboards and chests
of drawers. In place of our clothing and kitchen cupboards and
chests of drawers, in Turkestan various niches are fixed in the walls
for this purpose, occupying all four walls of the room as a rule. These
niches are either simple recesses in the walls, like our blind windows,
or they are partitions made artistically of alabaster, as can be seen
in Figure 123. These niches serve for the hanging up of clothes and
underwear and for the storage of dinner plates, wash basins, water
pitchers and teapots, water pipes, candlesticks, preserves and food,
occasional books, and the like. As for real furniture, the natives of
Turkestan are only acquainted with bedsteads, cradles, chests, and
the small low table already mentioned for the coal pan.

The poorer population and also a good part of the rich simply 513
sleep on the floor. A blanket serves as a bed, over which one or more
quilted cotton covers are spread, depending on what can be afforded.

513 A quilted cotton cover serves likewise as a top covering but it is of finer material than the one underneath. Quilted covers of silk and silk mixed with cotton are not rare. They are usually about two meters square, so that at times of extreme /240/ cold they can be wrapped all the way around. On my journeys I have camped in the open under such covers, sometimes in a cold of 20° to 30° centigrade, and have been quite comfortable. The natives do not know of sheets; as a result the bed covers, which cannot be washed because of their quilting, leave much to be desired as regards cleanliness after being used for some time. During the day the bed covers are rolled up together and stacked up along the walls with the pillows. For pillows they use cylinders stuffed with cotton and covered with silk or cotton material, similar to our window cushions, which are definitely preferable according to my experience to the feather head pillows used in Europe for they are not only more hygienic but also more comfortable. Only the very rich allow themselves the luxury of bedsteads.

[352] The bedsteads in Turkestan, the arrangement of which may be seen in Figure 89, in spite of their simplicity are the most suitable I have ever seen, and no improvement of our bedsteads, no matter how refined, can compete with them. They combine the advantages of ordinary bedsteads with those of American hammocks and can satisfy the demands of the most pampered sybarite. I have grown so spoiled by using Turkestan bedsteads over many years, that even now I have not yet been able to reconcile myself to the European bed. The bedsteads of Turkestan consist of a wooden frame joined together from a rough beam about ten centimeters thick, resting on four turned legs each about half a meter high, and this frame is covered by a net of thin strings made of horsehair. The bedsteads are something over two meters long and from one to one and a half meters wide. When such a framework is covered with a half dozen soft quilted cotton covers, it affords the greatest comfort imaginable. The body assumes its most comfortable position, thanks to the elasticity of the horsehair net, and one can stretch out on all sides without hindrance and without ever feeling the slightest pressure. If one is contented with a single cover during the hot season, one has a cool bed and need not suffer under the unbearable and unwholsome heat which the European featherbeds produce.

354 The cradles are portable, with a frame covered with a fly net of transparent gauze material, which serves as well for rocking as for carrying the infants. Their arrangement makes one think of a bird cage or of the frames used in Munich for the carrying of large numbers of beermugs (Figure 90; cf. also Figure 157). The heads

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead. / In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan. /

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots. /

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

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Fig.a Turkestan Bedstead.

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

Fig.a Child's cradle in Turkestan

415 with long pouring spouts are used to pour out the water for the washing. These washbasins with the water pitchers which accompany them are sometimes made very luxuriously, as show pieces; in Bukhara I was once offered a fine specimen which was gold plated, with beautiful chased work and set with many semi-precious stones, for which the maker asked 300 marks (Figure 92). p.75 a

Porcelain plates have come into use in Turkestan only in recent times through the Russians. Until that time the natives had only relatively large round plates, quite shallow, with small almost perpendicular rims, similar to our serving plates. These are made of brass or tin-plated copper, are sometimes nearly a meter in diameter and are used only for the serving of fruit, sweetmeats and the countless cups and basins which are carried in all at once for the accomodation of distinguished guests.

276 The (tobacco) waterpipes, which are inevitable in every Turkestan household are called chilim by the Sarts and Uzbeks, and kalyan by the Tajiks, and differ from the water pipes of Turkey. They consist of a hollowed-out gourd container in which reeds are placed at both the top and on one side. The reed at the side serves as the mouthpiece, and the vertical reed for the attachment of the bowl of the pipe, /243/ which consists of burnt clay either unglazed, or glazed in blue or green. In the upper part of the water pipe a small hole is bored on the side. This serves to blow out the smoke during the kindling of the coals which are laid on top of the tobacco, and it must be held shut with the finger during the actual smoking. The poor use the pipe in this simplest form; richer people, on the contrary, sheathe the brown-stained body of the pipe with bronze and decorate the mounting with chased work and mounted turquoises; then they provide the reeds with burnt-in decorations and cover the bowl of the pipe with strings of beads and semi-precious stones, so that this kind of apparatus finally acquires a pleasing appearance. In rare cases the body of the water pipe is made entirely of brass; but even in such cases the vessel always has the shape of a gourd container (cf. Figure 105, 118 and 123).

352 Finally, an article of furniture which is missing in only a few [623] households is the bird cage, for the natives are great bird lovers. The bird cages are made in the same artless fashion as almost all the products of native industry. They consist of a simple round wooden or cardboard box without a lid (discarded Russian hatboxes are often used for this purpose) on which a pointed dome-shaped net is placed made of many-colored cotton yarn. This is held tight by the weight of the box

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92, p. 75a Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native.[1] In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p. 165, and Figure 85, p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[1 Cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analysis]

287 finest examples of this kind are those made by
the Yomuds; they are pentagonal in shape,
531 and are ornamented with long black fringes.
From the point of view of ethnology the most interesting fabric of this kind is a strip about forty or forty-five feet long and not more than about fourteen inches wide. Such strips are called daur-i-khirgah, and are passed right round the tent. They are covered with pictorial scenes or patterns made up of conventionalized landscapes or trees, all worked on a white ground according to the knot-technique. The figural scenes show caravans on the march, laden and grazing camels, horsemen, and other scenes from the daily life of the Turkomans. It is possible that certain events from the history of the tribe or clan are represented there. Religious or magic elements may also be discerned in these friezes. Essentially similar figures are found among primitive or semi-civilized peoples all over the world, executed in the style predominant in the respective areas.

531 In the tent of the Turkomans, as in the
dwellings of all Islamic peoples, the floor-
352 carpet is one of the most important items. It is very likely that the Turkomans made no distinction between ordinary rugs and prayer mats, as their carpets had no pictorial patterns, and did not, therefore, run counter to Islamic law. One very common type of rug, patterned, strangely enough, with almost cruciform figures and claw-shaped ornaments interspersed with them, certainly served both as a floor-covering and a prayer-mat. Pillows and cushions on which the Turkoman rests his arms when seated are never made in knot-technique, but always covered with cloth.

415 The fronts of the various bags and pouches which the Turkomans use as receptacles for everything, even for butter and cheese, are al-

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a
531 seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are
287 distinguished from all others by their simple
186 but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur.
[352 The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

[cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

The characteristic octagon preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

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

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.

287 plained by the strongly developed organiza-
531 tion of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on
186 a long tradition which is strictly observed. There are only a limited number of patterns for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

287 In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the
531 fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separately as rugs—usually go under the name of
352 Bokhara, though not one of them was ever knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

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531
[462]

in so far as the best known kinds are made by the women of the Tekke Turkomans, whose pastures are in the Merv area. Incidentally, all Turkoman carpets are made exclusively by women. Typical of the rugs of Merv is an octagonal star which is checkered red and white; the octagon is divided into four parts, each of which is in a colour contrasting to that of the adjacent part. The figures which fill the octagon are very simple and severely geometrical in style. The octagons are dispersed over the surface in even rows (see ill. p. 1459). The rugs of the Tekkes found their way to the West in large quantities; they are very popular, and have often been imitated.

The women of the Saryk tribe, which lives southward from Merv to the Afghan frontier, also use octagons as patterns, and arrange them in a manner similar to that of the Tekke rugs. There is, however, a difference in so far as the edges of these figures are not jagged. The rugs made in the southermost part of this area, known as Punjdeh (five towns), have a style of their own. They avoid red altogether, and are distinguished by a very finely graded scale of colours, in which brown and black predominate, yellow and white being used very sparingly. These dark colours form a marked contrast to the brilliant tints of all other Turkoman rugs. They correspond to the natural colour of the wool or hair used in making all Turkoman rugs. And even though these colours are often obtained artificially by dyeing, the origin of the colour scheme is doubt-

* [See p. 72 -- Analyst]

73

287 less to be sought in the use of undyed wool.
531 The western neighbours of the Saryks are the
352 Salors. They, too, use the octagon as the sole ornament of their knotted rugs; it is filled with hook-shaped figures on an undivided ground of even red (see ill. page 1459). *

Of entirely different pattern are the rugs of the northermost Turkoman tribe, the Yomuds. They prefer scalloped figures and rows of hooks. Instead of octagons, lozenges form the ground of their rugs (see ill. page 1461).

In addition to these principal motives a number of minor ones are used, none of which are, however, of importance for the distinction of the various kinds of Turkoman rugs. Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to put some symbolic interpretation on these figures. That may be justified to a certain extent, but there can be no doubt that for some centuries at least the Turkomans have been as unconscious of the symbolic significance of these elements of designs as the Persian carpet-knotters are of that of the Buddhist symbols which they use as decorative elements. The intellectual and religious life of the early Turk peoples is far too little known to permit of anything more than surmise in this respect. Moreover, Turkestan has in the last few centuries been less accessible to foreigners that in Marco Polo's day.

287 The Turkoman rugs of the best period are so closely knotted that they must from a technical point of view be classed among the best Oriental carpets. Really good rugs

* [see cat. 116, p. 71 -- Analyst]
74

2/* [see cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

386 rials such as pyrites were used, which had the effect of corroding the wool, so that the black parts of many otherwise good rugs give the impression of having been eaten away. In spite of the limited selection of colours the shades and the number of combinations are surprisingly
287 varied. The Turkomans are good observers,
531 and were not slow in making use of the fact that the colours varied with the time of the year at which the plants were gathered, or with the length of time during which they were allowed to boil, to ferment, or to be exposed to the rays of the sun. For that reason the simplicity which characterizes these rugs is never monotonous. Both technically and artistically they are the perfect expression of that form of life which ethnologists describe as nomadic. They fulfil all the requirements of daily use, and the patterns are designed and perpetuated by skilled workers of a tribe, whose members all live under precisely the same geographical and social conditions.

287 These connections between the knotting
352 technique and nomad life are so striking that one feels tempted to regard the craft as an invention of wandering tribes. For the town-dwellers of Persia and India, of Egypt and Asia Minor, who developed the craft of carpet-knotting into an art, the necessity to use such light and easily transportable «textile furniture» is not nearly so great, and it is but natural that they should have adopted the

287 technique primarily for the making of floor-
352 coverings. The fact that Sir Aurel Stein discovered fragments of pile rugs during his excavations of the stations along the ancient silk road through Eastern Turkestan, distinctly points to the origin of the technique among the nomads of Central Asia. Apart from that, nothing certain is known of the origin and development of the different kinds of Turkoman rugs. Some examples may date back to the early eighteenth century. That is, however, no more than surmise, probable though
287 it may be. The one established fact is that all
178 the good examples of the craft now in existence must have been made before the seventies of the last century, that is to say, before the conquest of the country by the Russians. The reason for this is the complete transformation of the life of the Turkoman tribes under Russian rule. As the Russians put an end to the activities of the Turkomans as caravan robbers and slave traders, they were obliged to cast about for some other means of livelihood. From that time on the burden of providing a substitute for the gains formerly achieved by robbery fell to the women, whose skill in carpet-knotting was exploited. Carpets of huge size were made for the palaces of Russian nobles and generals. In time the desire to execute these profitable orders as speedily as possible led to a decline in the great care formerly exercised in the making of Turkoman rugs.

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues
[353] sleeping on the floor."[5] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of whitewash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[5] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

[1] [i.e., the discarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

342 advantage, however, that during the rainy season the lower part of the walls absorbes moisture from the ground, which is soaked through, and the solidity of the walls suffers thereby. Some of the richer people, who usually place their dwelling places on a higher level than is usual among the huts of the poor, have the foresight to build the lowest part of the walls of firebricks for this reason, or at least to place their houses on a terrace which has been artificially raised.

The inner and outer walls of the houses remain just as they are, as a rule, and consequently they have the yellow grey color of the street floors. Whitewash of slaked lime was not formerly in use in [363] Turkestan and was introduced only by the Russians. On the other hand the rich people cover the inner walls of their dwellings with stucco work of alabaster, /232/ in the Arabic style. One finds wall frescoes only rarely. These consist of arabesques in the brightest and most vivid colors possible, or else of stylized flowers which always remind me strongly of a story in the Münchner Fliegende Blätter /Munich Broadsides (?)/ according to which a house painter who had been advanced to a room painter put the flowers and leaves on the walls to be decorated by dipping his hands alternately in red and green paint, then pressing them to the wall with outspread fingers and finally adding the stems to the flowers and leaves with a stroke of a brush.

The roofs of the dwellings are erected as simply as the walls. The roof beams, which are usually untrimmed, with only the branches and bark removed, are placed horizontally across two facing walls at a distance from each other of about 70 centimeters, and are fixed in the walls in this position. A layer of brushwood is used which is about twenty centimeters thick. This forms the ceiling of the room, just as it is. The richer people use decorative carved roof beams, and instead of the reeds, short round willow sticks about five centimeters thick, which are laid right next to each other, between one beam and the next, as is shown in Figure 84, p. 66a.

/Figure 84. Caption: Sart Room Ceilings/

In those rare cases when the ceilings of the rooms are made of short boards which are laid perpendicularly across the roof beams, these boards are cut in such a way as to give the impression of being not boards but round sticks of wood. This proves that the original way of construction of the ceilings was of sticks of wood, and therefore it is still considered the norm.

342 Among the rich the ceilings of the rooms are painted, often
363 very artistically, with very intricate and highly complicated arabesques,

342 [353] which are composed of the brightest possible blue, red, green and yellow colors; and sometimes gold is also used.

The ceilings which are made, as described above, of beams and reeds, brushwood, wooden sticks or boards, are now covered again with a layer of clay about a foot thick, which likewise consists of loess earth and straw. The clay intended to cover the roofs is prepared with special care, for the horizontal roofs suffer much more from rain and snow than the walls, which are affected by the downpours only /233/ /Figure 85, p. 67a. Caption: A View of Hissar in East Bukhara. (After a photograph by Willy R. Rickmers.)./ /234/ from the side, and in any case dry out again quickly. The clay intended to cover the roofs is mixed with a large quantity of straw, up to fifty per cent, moistened with much water, and then it is left to ferment for about a week, and is stirred frequently. When the material is properly prepared it is put on top of the roof in layers, and each layer is flattened down with the greatest care with bare feet. Those who are flattening down the roofs, usually half-naked workers, move in their work with a dance step which gives them a very comical appearance.

During the rainy season these clay roofs are always covered with a luxurious growth of grass and in early spring with a mass of wild tulips.

Since these flat roofs are exposed in winter to the direct effects of rain and snow, they always develop defects in a relatively short time, and cracks appear, through which water from the rain and snow leaks into the houses. The dogs are particularly hard on these roofs and are always running about on them and harming them with their scratching. For these reasons the layers of clay must be repaired every fall before the rainy season begins, and must be completely replaced from time to time.

The flat houseroofs are a favorite place of abode of the natives: during the hot season people sleep on them, and they are a place where the morning and evening prayers are performed, while on sunny winter days the women perform their domestic tasks there. (Figure 62, p. 20a, p. 173; Figure 85, p. 67a, p. 233; Figure 86, p. 68a.).

The dwelling houses of the natives, which are built in the manner described above, are absolutely fireproof, and during the entire fifteen years of my stay in Central Asia there was never a fire to my knowledge. When the agent of a fire insurance company appeared in Tashkent several years ago, he was greeted with the same kind of hilarity by the people of Tashkent as someone would be among us if he wanted

354 ticularly if they lack an adequate supply of warm clothes and covers as well. Every great cold costs a number of lives in the towns of Turkestan and the natives judge the degree of cold, in the absence of meteorological instruments, by the number of persons frozen to death during the course of a night. In 1879, when the temperature once sank to 27° Centigrade below freezing in Tashkent, in the Sart section of [171] that town, 126 natives froze to death /238/ in one night. Here one can marvel at the stubborness with which the people hang on to what is traditional. Although the natives have the Russian household establishments before their eyes and are aware of their efficiency, it still does not occur to them to imitate the latter, even when they have the means to do so.

342 The doors which lead from the courts into the living rooms are usually very low, so that one can only pass through by stooping. In most cases, these doors take the place of the window as well, and therefore are present in large numbers in the larger rooms. The doors always consist of two parts which do not move on hinges but on two pegs fixed in the lintel and the threshold. They always push inward and are so small that each time one must open both parts in order to enter. [353] Among the rich the door wings are usually adorned with artistic intertwining arabesques carved in the wood, or at least painted with bright red, green or blue colors. Since in Turkestan poplar wood, which is not very solid, is used almost exclusively for building and wood carving and it is usually worked and finished before it has completely dried out, the door posts and door wings are always more or less warped as they dry out, and consequently they close either badly or not at all. The fastening of the door is peculiar: outside one part of the door is a short iron chain, and on the other part a peg is fastened ending in a ring. The last link of the chain, which has a slit through it, is hung over this ring. If such doors are to be locked, a padlock is hung on the ring mentioned above.

There are windows only in the houses of the richer people, while the poorer ones must be satisfied with the light entering through the doorway. The window opening in its dimension is always greater horizontally than vertically in private houses, is always found over the door, and therefore in every room there are as many windows as doors. The window opening is either left completely open or it is covered with a grating of wood or alabaster in order to prevent the entrance of swallows and sparrows, of which there is an enormous number here, as well as of other birds. The sticks of which the wooden

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Embroidery in Turkestan

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In every moderately well-to-do house in Bokhara embroidered cloths serve as wall-coverings, the interesting patterns and brilliant colours of which immediately attract the visitor's eye. A good example of wall-coverings of this type is seen in the picture of a married couple of Bokhara, which was reproduced in Ciba Review No. 10, page 332. What makes them so attractive is the simplicity of the pattern, which, however, on closer inspection proves to be richer than at first supposed. It is embroidered on a background of unbleached cotton, which not only remains visible between the figures, but which is intended to heighten the effect of the whole.

The same artistic taste is revealed in the distribution of the pattern itself. The principal forms are usually large circular flowers dispersed over the surface of the cloth with unfailing sense of rhythm. Between them are smaller floral elements, conventionalized carnations, tulips, and irises, accompanied by twigs and garlands. In spite of its stylized character, the pattern is very vivid in its effect, an effect which owes a great deal to the brightness of the colours. The principal colour is a rich red, supplemented by many other shades of the same colour, and by green, purple, and black.

These susanis as they are called are not only made at Bokhara, but also at Samarkand, Karshi, and in other towns of Turkestan, though not always with the same discriminating artistic taste. They do not serve as wall-coverings only. Narrow strips are used to frame doorways, other pieces serve as prayer-mats, and it

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Embroidered wall-hanging of the mountain Tajiks. The figures seen in the pattern are conventionalized peacocks, and probably continue an ancient Persian tradition.

is not regarded as improper to cover the biers on which the dead are borne to rest with these colourful textiles.

These embroideries form part of a larger group which has not yet received the study it deserves. In Western Turkestan alone there are two other kinds in addition to the susanis, each of these is the heritage of a different tribe. The Turkomans made ornaments for their tents in the same technique as that of the susanis. Pentagonal pieces were embroidered by the Salors as decorations for tent-openings,

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 R1.1 Turkestan R1.1

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

Embroidered tent ornament of the Salors which is hung above the tent-opening. The figures of the pattern are stylized flowers.

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very much like those which they knotted. It is possible that they were used for the summer tents (see ill. page 1464). As is the case with all nomad work of this kind, the patterns are severely stylized. There is, however, no doubt that they are derived from floral patterns, and that the embroideries of the Salors are to be regarded as a variety of the susanis.

Hangings in the houses of the Tajiks (see ill. page 1464), who inhabit the mountainous regions to the south-east of Bokhara, show patterns of a very different character. Isolated as they are in a remote area, the Tajiks have retained many characteristics of an archaic civilization (confer page 1441). Among these must be numbered the embroidered fabrics made public by Count Bobrinskoi forty years ago. The principal elements in their patterns are birds arranged in pairs and in rows. They are so severely stylized that only the tufts on their heads permit of them being identified as peacocks. They represent an ancient formal tradition of the Orient, which goes back to the pre-Islamic period, and which can be traced without interruption down to the present day. In

[See p. 84-- Analyst]
[See p. 83-- Analyst]
[See p. 23-- Analyst]

85

531 the remote mountain districts of Central Asia
[353] the forms have been handed down so carefully that the figure of the bird has retained traces of medieval stylization.

Embroideries discovered by Le Coq in sparsely populated districts of Eastern Turkestan are in technique and design frequently almost identical with the susanis of Bokhara. They show the same stylized flower-patterns in the same combination of colours, usually as decorations of women's trousers (tambal). It may, therefore, be assumed that the style of the susanis is characteristic of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

More than twenty years ago Le Coq reported that such embroidery was no longer being made in Eastern Turkestan. The examples that he saw had been made by the mothers of
656 the generation then living. In Western Tur-
562 kestan the tradition not only exists to this day, but the government has set up special workshops where the women embroider susanis. This is part of the policy by means of which the state seeks to draw women out of the secluded life of the harem.

352 The same principle[1] applies to housing and furniture. The natives adopt
177 freely and widely articles of utility, such as kerosene lamps, samovars, and iron stoves. But they resist efforts of the authorities to introduce chairs, tables, and bedsteads, which to them seem quite unnecessary. "Not only those collective farm families sleep on the floor which as yet have no bedsteads," writes a recent Soviet observer of conditions in the Kirghiz republic. "Sometimes a purchased bedstead, instead of being used for its purpose, stands all made up as a decoration, while the family continues [353] sleeping on the floor."[8] Even the most Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the cities demonstrate a desire to preserve a link with tradition by decorating a single room of an otherwise Western-style apartment in the native manner.

342 House construction among the old settled groups of the population seems
177 to follow traditional lines, with minor innovations, such as the use of whitewash for the walls and floors. Among the recently settled nomads, whom the Soviet regime wishes to have acquire permanent buildings, a curious compromise has been attained: the natives spend one part of their time in the permanent structures and another part in the traditional yurt (nomadic tent) erected alongside the houses. On the whole, one gains the impression that among the Turkic groups which had been settled during and since the period of collectivization, the yurt continues to prevail, while in the mountains it is still the exclusive shelter of native inhabitants.

183 The general picture which emerges from a survey of native customs
177 indicates that they are adhered to far more loyally than are religious traditions. The causes for this are threefold. In the first place, a considerable part of the native population of Central Asia was only superficially affected by Islam, while remaining loyal to local traditions. In the second place, national traditions are on the whole not contrary to the spirit of Westernization, and can in most cases be well adapted to the demands of a secular, utilitarian society. And, finally, the Soviet regime treats local customs far more gingerly than religion, trying to destroy them more through example and infiltration than through outright suppression. The native population clings to its customs, surrendering them only when they are utterly incompatible with material progress of society, and when it does modify traditions, it tries to synthesize the innovations with tradition. The native may be persuaded that it is a good thing to possess an iron bedstead, but often he cannot be convinced that sleeping on a bed is preferable to sleeping on the floor. Similarly, he may agree that eating by fork and spoon is hygenically preferable to eating by hand, but he refuses to agree that pork and potatoes are superior to lamb and rice. This attitude gives native customs a considerable resiliency to external pressures.

[8] S. M. Abramzon, *Ocherki kul'tury kirgizskogo naroda* (Frunze, 1946), p. 75. Abramzon's book supplies interesting data on the culture of the Kirghiz in the post-World War II era, much of which supports the conclusions derived from interviews with refugees.

[1] [i.e., the discarding of traditions for no reasons other than utility -- Analyst]

342 Tamerlane buildings in Samarkand, one finds not a trace of stone buildings
172 in the plains. These are found only in mountain regions, in the Darvaz and Badakhshan ranges and the like, where even today in some places the houses are erected of unhewn stones, for the simple reason that there is no loess there and the climate is damper than in the lowlands.

In prehistoric times the inhabitants of Turkestan must have lived in artificial underground caves and passages made in the loess ground; this is demonstrated among other things by the passages and holes found in Samarkand and lately also near Karti on the Amu-Darya. These are extensive and form unmistakable underground towns.

354 The interior arrangement of the dwellings is just as simple as the dwellings themselves. There are no stoves anywhere; instead, usually, I have found a 'kamin' /fire place/ in Afghan Turkestan and among the Taranchis of the Ili valley. /237/ which are completely similar to those used by us. Real heating of the living rooms would not be possible in any case even with a stove, because the doors close only very imperfectly, and are even completely lacking among the poorer people, and because the window openings, when there are any are either quite open or most often pasted over with thin paper. Glass windows are not used by the natives, and both the very rich people and the khans themselves pass the cold season of the year in unheated rooms into which the air enters freely. The felt yurts /tents/ of the nomads offer much better protection in winter against the cold and inclement weather than the dwellings of even the richest of the sedentary population. The Kazakhs are therefore perfectly right in preferring their yurts to the walled dwelling houses.

In order to keep warm during the bitterest cold the natives of Turkestan use wrought-iron braziers, resting on four legs, like those in use in ancient times in Greece and Rome. /Figure 87, p. 69a. Caption: Brazier of Turkestan./ This brazier, after it is filled with glowing embers, is placed under a small table, round or square, twenty to forty centimeters in height, which is then covered with a large quilted cotton coverlit. The members of the family now seat themselves on the floor around this little table and stretch their hands and feet out under the coverlet in the space warmed by the coals. In Figure 87 there is such a brazier drawn from life, shown with the tongs and coal shovel which belong to it.

For the poor people who cannot afford the luxury of a brazier, there is nothing left but to freeze and sometimes to freeze to death, par-

l: von Schwarz--69a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 5. Brazier of Turkestan.

354 ticularly if they lack an adequate supply of warm clothes and covers as well. Every great cold costs a number of lives in the towns of Turkestan and the natives judge the degree of cold, in the absence of meteorological instruments, by the number of persons frozen to death during the course of a night. In 1879, when the temperature once sank to 27° Centigrade below freezing in Tashkent, in the Sart section of [171] that town, 126 natives froze to death /238/ in one night. Here one can marvel at the stubborness with which the people hang on to what is traditional. Although the natives have the Russian household establishments before their eyes and are aware of their efficiency, it still does not occur to them to imitate the latter, even when they have the means to do so.

342 The doors which lead from the courts into the living rooms are usually very low, so that one can only pass through by stooping. In most cases, these doors take the place of the window as well, and therefore are present in large numbers in the larger rooms. The doors always consist of two parts which do not move on hinges but on two pegs fixed in the lintel and the threshold. They always push inward and are so small that each time one must open both parts in order to enter. [353] Among the rich the door wings are usually adorned with artistic intertwining arabesques carved in the wood, or at least painted with bright red, green or blue colors. Since in Turkestan poplar wood, which is not very solid, is used almost exclusively for building and wood carving and it is usually worked and finished before it has completely dried out, the door posts and door wings are always more or less warped as they dry out, and consequently they close either badly or not at all. The fastening of the door is peculiar: outside one part of the door is a short iron chain, and on the other part a peg is fastened ending in a ring. The last link of the chain, which has a slit through it, is hung over this ring. If such doors are to be locked, a padlock is hung on the ring mentioned above.

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354 For the baking of bread a special baking oven of burnt clay is
252 used. It has the form of a large overturned water /245/ cask, with no floor and an opening in the side. This oven, which is made all in one piece and sold ready-made at the bazaar is either /Figure 93. P764
Caption: Court with veranda in the fortress at Samarkand. In the background is the stone, on which the accession to the throne of the emirs of Bukhara in earlier times took place./ buried underground or walled into the court wall and surrounded with a thick layer of clay so that both openings /246/, the one on top and that on the side, remain open. When bread is baked in such an oven a strong fire is laid inside it; after this has gone out, the coals and ashes are removed and then the thin flakes of bread are pasted to the heated inner walls of the oven from above. In many places, especially in the colder mountainous regions like Badakhshan, these baking ovens are buried in the middle of the living rooms, in the floor, and thus they also serve for the heating of the living quarters (Figure 94). P765
/Figure 94. Caption: Baking Oven of Turkestan./

343 The privies in the dwellings of the natives are arranged very suitably and in keeping with the local conditions. In a distant part of the court a separate large room is built. In the middle of this space there is a pit about 8 meters deep with a diameter of about 3 meters, which is covered over with heavy, well cut, wooden planks. In these planks a small bamboo-shaped slit is cut out. Naturally there are no seat boards since the natives are not accustomed to sitting on chairs. A hole is left in the roof just over the slit mentioned above, in which a short pipe of burnt clay is placed. The open door opening and this roof opening provide adequate ventilation and there is no sign of a bad smell. When the sunken pit is finally almost full after many years it is then filled up with earth and the privy is moved to another place. Care is taken almost always to have a canal flowing by in which the residents may make their ablutions in the manner prescribed by the Koran.

Since in Turkestan every house owner is at the same time an owner of horses, the stables have a very important role in the dwellings of the natives. The stalls are always built next to the court wall, and are usually on the opposite sides of the court square from the dwelling quarters, sometimes even occupying three sides of the court. The stalls are little more than sheds and the supporting girders are fixed in the court wall on one side and are supported on the other by

k von Schwarz--76b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 94. Baking Oven of Turkestan.

342 In the walls there are many niches of various sizes, decorated with arabesques and sometimes with a painting of a flower, without perspective. The depiction of animals or humans is strictly forbidden by the Koran. In addition to this, the rich decorate the ceilings with bright colors and make their windows, if not of glass, at least with decorated wooden or plaster lattices. The floors of the houses are either of earth or paved with flat square fire brick.

Sart houses and the old clay partitions, which always have many cracks, are inhabited [136] by 'falanga' (a kind of poisonous spider) and scorpions. The sting of the falanga, if precautionary measures are not observed, can be very painful and can sometimes be fatal.

The living quarters are divided into two halves: the men's and the women's (the harem). Usually below the harem there is another deeper courtyard.

352 /390/ There is no furniture. The furnishing of the rooms consists of Russian chests sometimes covered by rugs. The rich also cover their floors with rugs or carpets 354 without nap (palas). They do not make stoves. In order to keep warm in winter, they put hot coals in a hollowed out place in the middle of the room, or simply into a clay vessel (pan), and over this they put a stool. The stool is covered with a blanket and its ends touch the ground. Then the Sart sits or lies around the heater and covers his feet with the blanket.

341 In their construction they use neither a level nor a plumb line, so that all the

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/140/ Tashkent, the Capital of Russian Turkestan

1. General Remarks

1. Historical.

Tashkent played but a secondary role in the history of Turkestan until its capture by the Russians, who immediately made it the capital of their Central Asian possessions, although in population and wealth, and through its favorable position near the well-watered Chirchik river, it held first place among all the towns of Turkestan of that time. This arose from the following circumstances. 361

First of all, Tashkent is an oasis, completely isolated on all sides. North of Tashkent, 120, 284 and 308 kilometers away, are the three outlying, unimportant towns of Chimkent, Turkestan and Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/; their population can never have been other than small. Immediately beyond these towns begins the fearful Kazakh steppe. East of Tashkent, between it and the Ala Tau mountains /Dzungarskiy Ala-Tau/ lie only solitary little villages, separated from each other by large distances. In the south, Tashkent is cut off from the town of Khodzhent /Leninabad/ and the Fergana valley by sterile steppe land as well as the completely bare Mogol-Tau mountains and the Syr-Darya. In the west, however, a waterless steppe, Bet-Pak-Dala /Hungry Steppe/, 140 kilometers wide, stretches between the Syr-Darya and the town nearest Tashkent, Dzhizak, which also is completely isolated. Thus, although Tashkent, because of its large population and proportionate wealth should have been best suited of all the towns of Turkestan of that time to rule the others, it had to renounce the leading role, because, as a result of its isolated position, it could rely only on its own resources and was not in a position to hold in subjection the far-flung towns and to maintain its position successfully over a long period.

A second important circumstance standing in the way of Tashkent's expansion of power was its exposed position. It always took the first blow from all the attacking hordes entering Turkestan from Dzungaria on the northern piedmont of the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains; first, it had to withstand the Yüeh Chi then the Hsiung-Nu or Huns and the other Turkic peoples, finally the Mongols of Chinggis

361 Khan; likewise, the Russian conquest of Turkestan proper began with the capture of Tashkent. Consequently Tashkent has a more mixed population than any other town in Turkestan; until recent times it has been almost entirely composed of Sarts, the mixed race par excellence.

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175 Of the earlier history of Tashkent little is known. The date of its origin is unknown, although it certainly goes back far into antiquity. /141/ At the time of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the region of Tashkent was still populated by the Indo-European Scythians, ancestors of the present Slavs /sic/ for at that time the Syr-Darya formed the boundary between the Persian Kingdom and the land of the Scythians. If Tashkent already existed then, as is almost certain on the basis of local relationships, it was in any case the seat of that Scythian king whose subjects Alexander fought on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, and who sent a legation to Alexander after the battle near Khodzhent /Leninabad/ to Alexandria Eskate, founded by Alexander. (1)

1. Cf. my monograph: Alexanders des Grossen Feldzuge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/ Munich, 1893.

Tashkent is first mentioned by a Chinese traveler Hsüan Tsang, who went through it in the Seventh century A. D. on his pilgrimage to India. From the second half of this century on it belonged to the realms established by the Arabs in Central Asia. Later it came under the rule of the Seljuks, who ruled Bukhara from 1004 on, as well as under a series of various other Turkic peoples who constantly were coming from Dzungaria. About the year 1220, Tashkent was taken by Chinggis Khan and remained thereafter under his rule and that of his successors until Tamerlane incorporated it into his great empire. Later it came into the possession of the famous Uzbek Prince Shaibani Khan, who took Bukhara from the last successors of Tamerlane. In 1598 Tashkent was captured by the Kazakhs, whose power reached its height at that time, and it remained in their power until 1723. In that year the Kazakhs were overpowered by the Dzungarians under the command of Galdan Tseren, and pushed back to the west, whereupon Tashkent remained for a time a part of the land of Dzungaria. When this empire was destroyed by the Chinese in 1757, who shortly thereafter slew almost all the Dzungarians, over a million people, Tashkent remained independent for a time, and set up a sort of confederation with the towns of Turkestan and Chimkent, but was forced

from time to time to recognize the supremacy of the emir of Bukhara. 361
In 1814, Tashkent was captured by the Khan of Kokand and remained 175
in his possession until the Russian conquest. Only transitorily did it pass again into the possession of the emir of Bukhara Nasr Allah, when he conquered Kokand in 1840 and executed the current ruler, Khan Mohammed Ali. The association between Kokand and Tashkent was always loose, however, and the Tashkent people revolted at every favorable and unfavorable /142/ opportunity. Tashkent was usually ruled by a beg appointed by the khan, but was also temporarily the residence of the khan and as such was the capital of the Kokand Khanate.

Tashkent was taken by storm by the Russians in 1865. This is not the place for a detailed history of the Russian conquest of Turkestan; I will only explain the general course of events and the circumstances surrounding them, which led the Russians, actually against their will, to advance into Central Asia and to the subjugation of these distant lands.

The advance of the Russians into Turkestan, which ultimately led them in a relatively short time to the borders of India, was brought about by the Kazakhs. As mentioned above, the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, having already seized the towns of Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/, Turkestan and Chimkent, in 1598 captured Tashkent as well and made it their chief stronghold. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, they were so hard pressed by the Dzungarians, that they felt impelled to turn to Russia for aid. Since this help could not be granted by Russia because of her position at that time, the Kazakhs were defeated by the Dzungarians and forced westward, away from the Tashkent region. As a result of this involuntary westward advance of the Middle Horde, the Little Horde/the westernmost Kazakhs/ was cramped in its nomadic grounds. For this reason, in 1732, the Little Horde sought to become subjects of Russia, and this was granted in the following year. Two years later, the Middle Horde also submitted voluntarily to Russian rule. In 1801, part of the Little Horde migrated, with permission of the Russian authorities, into the region vacated by the Kalmycks between the Ural and the Volga Rivers and from that time these Kazakhs have been known as the Inner Horde or Bukey Horde. In 1847 the Great Horde finally submitted to the Russians as well. Eight years later, part of the Kirgiz followed the example of the Kazakhs, when those nomadizing in the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains, likewise submitted to the Russians.

The submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule, however, was in

175 fact only nominal. The Kazakhs understood their relation to the
361 Russians to be one in which the latter were obliged to protect the Kazakhs against enemy attack, while the Kazakhs for their part recognised no obligation to the Russians and with the greatest impartiality plundered the Russian caravans and settlers as much as their neighbors on the Turkestan side. The Russian administrators tried everything possible to establish some order among the Kazakhs and to stop the attacks of banditry /143/ on the Russian settlements and caravans. At first, they sought to achieve this by installing khans who were completely loyal to them. Since these men, however, precisely because they were installed by the Russians, enjoyed no influence with and no attention from the Kazakhs, the irritation increased and almost complete anarchy reigned. The post of honor of khan was, for this reason, entirely abolished in 1833, and the Kazakhs were divided into a number of Volosts /small administrative unit/ and auls /nomadic village/ with elders elected by them, who were subordinate to the Russian district head. This measure, which subsequently proved very useful because thereby the power of the sultan and the previous hereditary tribal heads was permanently broken, created a violent ferment among the Kazakhs, which was used by the eminent Sultan Kasym and his son Kenesary to call for a general uprising of the Kazakhs in 1838 against the Russian rule which was not completely suppressed until 1844.

For all that, the establishment of peace and order in the Kazakh steppe was still unsuccessful, because the Kazakhs were continually incited by their neighbors in Turkestan, the peoples of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva against Russia, and because the Kazakh bandits, after perpetrating an act, could always flee without difficulty to the Central Asian khanates, since the borders along the territories of China, Kokand Bukhara and Khiva were not in Russian hands.

The Russian regime, therefore, had recourse to other means, which finally achieved the end in view, but which entangled the Russians in a new and much more serious action and one of much greater consequence, with the Central Asian khanates. These means consisted in gradually surrounding the whole Kazakh steppe on the Turkestan side with an unbroken line of defences, on the one hand, to make it more difficult for the Kazakhs to slip over the border after an attack on the Russians, and on the other hand to secure themselves against attacks from the Khiva and Kokand. These defences were pushed forward simultaneously from two sides, out from Orenburg /Chkalov/

which had been founded in 1735, and from Siberia, gradually nearing the Syr-Darya on one side, and the Tyan Shan on the other. After the Russians reached the Syr-Darya, near the Aral Sea, they advanced eastward along the river, while a series of fortresses were built from the east along the northern piedmont of the Alexander range /Kirgizskiy khrebet/ until these two fortifications met at Chimkent. From Orenburg, the forts of Emba and Ak-Bulak were established in 1839, Orenburgsk and Uralsk in 1845, Raim or Aralsk in 1847, and Koss-Aralsk and Kara-Butak in 1848. From Siberia /144/ the forts of Kopal, Vernoye /Alma Ata/ and Kastek were established in 1847. Sergiopol /Ayaguz/ was already founded in 1831. 175 361

Until this time the establishment of fortified works proceeded without particular difficulties, being within Russian territory. Upon the continuation east from the Aral Sea, and west from Vernoye /Alma Ata/, there was frequent fighting with Kokand, since further fortresses all had to be built on Kokand territory, for their establishment in the desert was naturally impossible.

The battle was opened from the west by General Perovsky, who took the first Kokand fort on the Syr-Darya, Ak-Mechet', by storm in 1853, despite a brave defence by the Kokand commander, Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg was destined for still greater things, for he later rose to be independent ruler of Kashgar, and as such inspired the respect of Russians and Englishmen alike. On the site of the destroyed Ak-Mechet' a Russian fortification, Fort Perovsk, /Kzyl-Orda/ was established, and in addition the forts of Kazalinsk and Karmakchi, /Dzhusaly/ were built in the same year. In 1861 Fort Dzhulek was added to these. From Vernoye /Alma Ata/ out, where a Russian town was founded in 1854, the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak and Pishpek /Frunze/ were conquered in 1860, and that of Merke in 1862. /From middle page 144 to middle page 149 of the original text has not been translated--Translator/

The capture of Tashkent was, to be sure, against the express will of the Russian regime and Cherniaev was subsequently removed from his position for disobedience. Nevertheless it was impossible to give the town back to Kokand, for the pro-Russian party in Tashkent, which had essentially facilitated the taking of the town, was too compromised, and would have been abandoned without defense to the revenge of its fanatical enemies, and because then Russia would have lost the confidence of the natives of Turkestan for all time. For this

175 361 reason in 1866, Tashkent was joined to the regions conquered previously into a single province /Government/ called the Syr Darya province, which was assigned to the general province of Orenburg. Since, however, no governor could get along with the General Governor Kryzhanovski, in 1867, the Syr-Darya province was again separated from Orenburg and combined with the Semirechiye province into a separate General Government which retained the name Turkestan. General Adjutant Konstantin Petrovich von Kauffmann was named first General Governor of Turkestan with his capital in Tashkent, and he later added the region of Samarkand (1868), the districts of Amu Darya (1873), Fergana (1876) and temporarily also the region of Kuldja (1871 to 1881) to the Turkestan General Government.

2. The Meaning and Origin of the Name "Tashkent."

103 361 Concerning the origin of the name of the town of Tashkent, etymologists have often wracked their brains without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. /150/ The word Taskent means "city of stone," and is a combination of two words from different languages: the Turkish 'tash' (stone) and the Iranian 'kent' (city). Now Tashkent is built not of stone but of clay throughout, and in the surrounding region there is no stone to speak of because the ground on which the town is built is an extensive and thick stratum of loess. One can therefore explain Tashkent according to the theory of 'lucus a non lucendo, as a city in which there is no stone. Many have therefore interpreted the name as indicating a city with the diameter of a 'tash,' since a tash is used by the natives as a unit of measurement, in this case, eight kilometers. I think, however, that the origin of the name Tashkent can be explained much more naturally. The Chinese monk Hsüan Tsang, who passed Tashkent on his pilgrimage to India (629-645 A. D.), calls the town in his travel account Chashkent in Chinese orthography; among the later Arabic writers it appears under the name Shashkent, (1) and

1. Sultan Baber already knows Tashkent by the name Tashkend; he notes expressly, however, that this appeared in the works of earlier writers as Shash or Djadj.

this is oviously the original Indo-European name of the town; for

shash means "six" in Sanskrit, and therefore Shashkent had the same 103
meaning as the Greek Hexapolis. Probably Tashkent developed in 361
ancient times with the five other towns in the Scythian wastes on the
right bank of the Syr-Darya, which later bore the names Turkestan,
Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, Otrar and Sauran, of which the last two are
long since in ruins, forming a league of six towns, and as the capital
of the league it had the name of 'City of Six' Such word formations,
which are known to have been employed often by the ancient Greeks,
are still in use in Turkestan today. Thus, for example, the realm
founded by Yakub Beg in the Tarym Basin which was originally designated as Alty-Shaar (City of Six), had the name of Djety-Shaar
(City of Seven) after Yakub Beg incorporated a seventh city, Kara-
Shaar, into his dominion. The later Turkic invaders, for whom the
word Shashkent, a foreign word, was incomrehensible, probably
changed it, because of its similar sound into Tashkent, which means
in their language (city of stone). In similar manner they also changed
the name Baktra into Balkh or "capital", the name Chashmkent (well
city) into Chimkent or (turf city), and the like. The second /151/
/Figure 48. Caption: Loess landscape near Tashkent Bridge over the
Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph
by G. Merzbacher.)/ syllable, kent, although it was Indo-European,
was /152/left unchanged by the Turkic peoples because they were
already accustomed to it; for many other city names in Turkestan
had the same formation, such as Kokand, Samarkand, Chimkent, Pskent,
Yarkand, etc. 'kand' and 'kent' have the same meaning; the form
'kand' is used when the preceding syllable contains the vowels a, o or
u, otherwise it is 'kent'. Thus in our case the correct orthography
would be Tashkand, which is also the way the natives pronounce it.
The Russians, however, who had little familiarity with linguistics,
adopted the form Tashkent from the beginning, and this is now the
official name of the town.

3. The Situation of the Town of Tashkent

Tashkent is situated 4° 37' 11" east of Greenwich on a latitude 131
of 41° 19' 32" N. lat.; thus it lies approximately on the parallel of 361
Naples; it is 488 meters above sea level. The coordinates correspond
to the observatory of Tashkent, which is one kilometer east of the
former city wall.

1:von Schwarz--8 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 M.1 Turkestan M.1
Tashkent

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In all of Turkestan there are only a few places which have in every sense as favorable a situation as does Tashkent. It lies in a broad valley, flanked on both sides by the low thrust of the Chatkal mountains, a valley which is fed from one side by the river Chirchik, from the other by the Keles. The ground on which Tashkent is built, consists, as already mentioned, of a thick loess stratum which continues all the way to the bank of the Syr-Darya, sixty kilometers away. The terrain of Tashkent is undulating and, like all loess landscapes, furrowed through, here and there, by deep cuts, made by the flowing water. As for water resources, upon which all life and success depends in the steppes of Turkestan, no other town in Central Asia can be compared with Tashkent. Ten kilometers away, the well-watered Chirchik, largest of all the tributaries of the Syr-Darya, flows southeast of Tashkent. The town itself lies upon the Salar, a tributary of the Chirchik, which supplies the fields and gardens east of the town and the Russian town with water through its numerous canals. The deeply cut Bos-su canal flows through the native city, which is also a tributary of the Chirchik. (Figure 48, p. 151)

Tashkent is an oasis surrounded by undulating steppe land. The steppe reaches from the bank of the Syr-Darya to the Chatkal mountains, about eighty kilometers east of Tashkent, and its slopes likewise consist, for the most part, of steppe soil. Every year during the spring rain this steppe is covered with relatively luxuriant steppe grass which dries up immediately when the rainy season ends, whereupon the steppe all the way to the mountains /153/ has a frightfully monotonous, pale appearance throughout the summer. West of Tashkent is an extensive marshy landscape, to which the town is probably indebted for a fair share of its fevers. From the Syr-Darya to the mountains the steppe is covered with a number of villages, which are scattered like oases very far apart along the rivers and in the mountain valleys.

Looking out from Tashkent there is a lovely view of the whole spreading steppe country to the northeast, east and southeast between the town and the mountains, and of the Chatkal mountains themselves, which are covered with snow the greater part of the year. Only during the hottest summer months does the snow disappear from the highest peaks. Because of the extraordinary purity of the air the mountains appear to be much closer than they really are. Only during the dry summer months, when no rain has fallen for a long time, does the view become somewhat overcast by the fine

1: von Schwarz--8a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1
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

Fig. 41. Loess landscape near Tashkent. Bridge over the Chirchik river between Tashkent and Chimgan. (After a photograph by C. Merzbacher.)

361 133 dust in constant suspension in the air. When the air is particularly pure one can see from Tashkent the Turkestan mountain range, two hundred kilometers away, the continuation of the Alai mountains, with snow-covered crests, glistening like silver in the sunlight, are a magnificent sight.

[132] Tashkent has a very advantageous position in respect to climate as well. The town is protected in winter from the icy northeast winds by the high mountains in the northeast, so that Tashkent has a much warmer temperature during the coldest part of the year than locations farther west in the open steppe. Furthermore, since the valley of the Chirchik opens to the southwest, the amount of precipitation is relatively great, and Tashkent always has, for this reason, even during the worst droughts, a more than adequate water supply, an advantage of which hardly any other town in Turkestan can boast.

2. A Description of Sart Tashkent

361 ### 1. The Grounds and Fortifications of the Town

The Tashkent of today falls into two sharply separated and fundamentally different parts: the native town, so-called Sart Tashkent, and the Russian town, founded only after the Russian occupation. The later lies between the Bos-su canal and the Salar; Sart Tashkent extends primarily west of the Bos-su canal and has today, on the whole, the same dimensions and the same appearance as it did before the Russian conquest.

All Central Asian towns and even the larger villages divide into three separate parts: the bazaar, the most important part of the town, /154/ the residential quarters, which surround the bazaar, and finally the gardens and fields which surround the town proper from all sides. In Figure 49 this division of Turkestan towns is shown schematically. All the towns more or less approximate the basic type shown in the drawing, and deviate from it only insofar as the respective terrain and water conditions require. In the center of the town is the free bazaar square, in which are held the weekly bazaars or fairs as well as all sorts of public gatherings, executions, and the like. Along the bazaar square the permanent shops are joined together, mostly concentrically, while these again are surrounded by the residential quarters, consisting o simple clay huts. /Figure 49 p. 9a/ The sections we have mentioned so far, which together form the real town, are surrounded by an unbroken

1: von Schwarz--9a N-5 (ca 1895)-1900-RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 42.

361 town wall, beyond which extend the gardens and fields of the towns-
people. On a place elevated naturally or artifically /155/ /Figure 50, p. 10a. Caption: Palace of the Emir of Bukhara./ /156/ inside the town wall, which is not intended to serve as a bulwark against an outside enemy, but as a castle to defend the ruler or commanding officer against any kind of uprising of the subject townsmen. The ruler or governor therefore always lives in the Urda. (cf. Figure 50, p. 155 and Figure 51, p. 10b, p. 157). From the bazaar square a larger or smaller number of streets lead out in a radial manner through the rows of shops, the houses, and on through the town gates the the outlying gardens and fields to the neighboring villages. Immediately beyond the gardens and fields the dry steppe begins, or the sand or gravel desert, completely without vegetation.

On the basis of the schematic drawing (Figure 49, p. 9a), and taking the climate into consideration, anyone can orient himself easily in any town in Turkestan, without a guide and without knowing a word of the native language, as I myself have proven a hundred times.

Also in Tashkent in earlier days, before the Russian conquest, the main town was surrounded by a high and very strong wall which
333 was made of loess as almost everywhere in Turkestan. For local purposes the loess is the best building material one could wish for. When dry it is as hard as stone, and is therefore very well adapted for the building of walls, because of the extraordinary dryness of the air and the slight precipitation. When dampened with water, however, the loess becomes quite soft and is as easy to work with as ordinary clay. All circular walls, towns walls as well as garden and courtyard walls, are made in the following manner in Turkestan. First, along the place where a wall is to be built, a ditch of the proper width and depth is dug and water is led into it. The earth from the ditch is mixed with straw, and by treading on it with the bare feet it is kneaded into a sticky paste. After this paste has been properly worked, it is piled up on the earth by means of a heavy hoe, used in the field, simply and without any sort of foundation, and is tamped down firmly with the feet. At first only a layer of about 0.6 meters high is laid down, and this is left until it is dry enough to hold the weight of a new layer without its sinking in. Then a second layer of the same height is laid on top, and so it continues until the wall has reached the desired height. The uneven places resulting from this type of building on the sides of the walls are usually eliminated by smoothing over the various layers with the

hoes before putting on a new layer. The direction of the strokes for 333
one layer will be diagonal, from left /157/ to right, and for the next one from right to left, and so forth, from which the walls in Figure 52 (p. 158) retain a marked zigzag effect. /Figure 51. Caption: The palace of the khan of Khiva/

Considering the nature of the material, the walls must naturally be thicker at the bottom than at the top. The upper edge of the wall 712
is indented, /158/ and it serves partly as decoration and partly pro- 361
vides loopholes for shooting. Inside the town walls runs a platform on which the defenders can place cannons, and on which a person can walk all the way around the entire town. (Figure 53) For the walls continue without any interruption over rivers, canals, and ravines. /Figure 52. Caption: Turkestan town wall. / Therefore the water courses are bridged over with thick beams and on these the walls are built in the same manner as on dry land. The height of the town walls differs according to the terrain, the importance of the place, and the greater or lesser danger of the position. The walls of Tashkent, which are among the strongest, still standing at the time of my visit in 1874, had a height of from four and a half to six meters. Their circumference was about 25 kilometers. /Figure 53. Caption: Turkestan town wall, cross section. / The houses were not built against the town walls, but instead a wide street went around the whole town inside the wall, clearly to facilitate the defense. The gardens and fields nearly all lay outside the town walls, but each of them was likewise surrounded by its own wall, also made of clay. From the basic town twelve gates led out to the gardens and the nearby settlements, and these were usually named after the towns /159/ to which they led, as, for example, the Kokand gate, the Samarkand gate, etc. The arrangement of the town gates is quite a characteristic one in Turkestan. To shoot breaches in a loess wall is very difficult, because thin walls can be easily penetrated by the bullets without causing further damage, whereas from thick walls the bullets ricochet. In attacking a Turkestan town, therefore, the gates must always be stormed. These are therefore always built as solidly as possible. On both sides of the gate, very solid, more or less conical, round towers are built with platforms on which to put the fortification guns (Figures 52 and 54). The gate, provided with these massive wings, leads into a large , high, quadrangular hall, the floor of which is raised about two meters above the road. /Figure 54. Caption: The town gate of Khiva. / In this hall, through which everyone who walks, rides horseback or drives through the gate

712 must pass, the gate watch is placed. During the day the gates are
361 continually open, but at nightfall they are closed and the keys delivered to the chief of police in charge, to avoid any sort of surprise through the carelessness or treachery of the guards at the gate.
[696] In the gate halls mentioned above* in those regions which are still independent, the judges often take their places on bazaar days to administer justice to each one who has some sort of request. The punishments decreed are carried out in the same place, so that perhaps those criminals sentenced to hang will be hung upon the ceiling beams, and those visiting the bazaar must pass under them. When General von Kauffmann retreated from the rebellious town of Kokand, immediately after his departure, the Khan he had installed was stuck up like a pig in the bazaar, and when he regained control there for the second time /160/ he ordered the ringleaders to be hung in groups in all the gates of the town, as a horrible example.

In order to assure the safety of their town, the people of Tashkent not only built a very strong wall which was practically impregnable under Turkestan conditions., but they also installed a number
[721] of observation posts outside the town. Since declarations of war were not the custom among the people of Turkestan, and the great art of the Turkestan battle leaders lay precisely in the execution of sudden and unexpected attacks in time of peace, the people of Tashkent built a number of artificial conical hills in the steppe, from twelve to fifteen meters high, on which various sentinels were placed, who were supposed to report the approach of enemies. These observation hills are usually found in pairs and are usually located in the even steppe where there are no suitable natural rises in the ground. They extend along the road to Fergana, from which Tashkent was most often exposed to surprise attacks, as far as the modern relay station Uralskaya, seventy kilometers from Tashkent.

Today the town wall of Tashkent, which no longer has any function, has fallen completely into decay, and on the east side, where the Sart and Russian towns meet, it has been entirely levelled because the material of the wall has been used by the Russians and the natives for brick-making.

Like all the towns of Turkestan, Tashkent once had an Urda(1)

1. In the towns inhabited by Tadzhiks, as, for example, Khodzhent/Leninbad/and Samarkand, the fortresses were designated by the name 'Ark' obviously the same root as the Latin arx. /citadel. /

*[Cf. cat #6, p. 8 -- Analyst]

or citadel which was blown up by the Russians immediately after 712
the capture of the town. It was located on the upper left bank of 361
the Bos-su canal, and the site today is within the Russian town and barracks and various public and private buildings are built on it.

2. The Bazaar

The bazaar has a meaning for the Central Asians which it is 366
difficult for the European to grasp properly. The Central Asian spends the greater part of his life in the bazaar, and for him it takes the place of our newspapers, restaurants, coffeehouses, townhalls, amusement places, stock exchanges, law courts, etc. At the bazaar the entire public life and a great part of the private life of the male urban population takes place, and day in, day out, in winter and summer almost the entire population, when it is not occupied with work in the fields, is gathered in the bazaar. The bazaar is the real home of the townsman; since his private dwelling serves him primarily as a lodging for the night, and as a depository for his property and his wives and children, he therefore expends relatively /161/ little trouble on it.
/Figure 55. Caption: Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace. /

The arrangement of the bazaars is the same everywhere, and 361
the bazaars of the different towns differ from each other only /162/ 366
in size. The bazaar in Tashkent is one of the largest in all Central Asia, containing about four thousand shops and workshops. The streets of the bazaar are relatively wide and mostly covered with reed mats, which are spread along beams diagonally placed over the streets from one row of stalls to another. The result is a pleasant twilight and a refreshing coolness, which is increased by a constant sprinkling of the bazaar streets with water. It is a beneficent contrast to the dazzling sunlight and the stifling ovenlike heat of the nearby streets leading into the dwelling quarters. (Figure 56).

The booths which range along both sides of the bazaar streets, 347
serving either for selling goods or as workshops for the various craftsmen, all look alike and have nothing in common with European shops. They are rooms two and a half to three meters high, four and a half to six meters long, and from two to two and a half meters deep, which are completely open to the street. The walls are made of clay or else of reed screens spread over on both sides with clay. The roof also is

1: von Schwarz --13a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig.4. Bazar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace.

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Fig. 51. Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent.

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

Fig. 52. Wooden platform.

[105]

[Tashkent]

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

363 Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for the streets
361 of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiquitous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets, running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch. Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very uncomfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy road safely.

[491] In the towns, bridges are built only over those of the numerous brooks and canals with banks which are too high and steep to walk or ride over easily. Otherwise it is left to the pedestrian to get through the water as
[492] best he can. This is based on the fact that in Turkestan every halfway respectable person, man, woman and child is mounted and only the poorest beggars and tramps go on foot; for these there is no pity if they must walk with bare feet through the ice cold water and the knee-deep mud, in the winter.

In Tashkent the streets in the Sart town are considerably better than in many other Central Asian towns, but even here the conditions are such, that among other things, once eleven women drowned in

363 the main street as a result of an unlucky chance that just as they
361 were passing through a bottomless mire their carriage broke down and they were unable to work their way out of the soft mud. More than once have I witnessed riders sunk to the waist in the soft ground, and once I saved the life of a youth near the bazaar who fell head first into mud a meter thick when his horse stumbled, and only his legs stuck out. In most recent times, thanks to the efforts of the Russian /169/ administration, the street conditions have improved considerably, but they still leave much to be desired. A fundamental improvement is impossible /Figure 60. Caption: The main street of Tashkent. / without quite disproportionate costs, for the loess base, which becomes bottomless every winter, makes paving and macadamizing far more /170/ difficult, as the Russians have often enough discovered in the laying out of the streets in their town.

A basic fault of the Turkestan streets is that, with the exception of the few main streets, they are so narrow that two carriages cannot pass each other and always one of the two vehicles which meet must back up until he succeeds in passing through a side alley. On bazaar days traffic jams lasting for hours often occur as a result of this. Four-wheeled wagons cannot be used at all in such narrow alleys because one cannot turn around with them. This bad situation is clearly caused by the fact that the street inside the town wall had to be used sparingly in order not to increase the circumference of the town walls too much. For otherwise the Central Asian towns have a disproportionately large expansion since all the houses consist only of a ground floor, and are always surrounded by more or less extensive courts and even gardens.

363 If the streets in Central Asian towns are bad enough for these
351 reasons, their unfavorable aspect is increased substantially by the
361 fact that there are no houses along them but only uniform courtyard walls of yellow clay the endless monotony of which is broken only here and there by a tiny gate which one would sooner take for the entrance to a pigsty than to a human dwelling. For the dwelling houses are all located within the courts, and even the view of the courts, when one opens the gate off the street, is cut off, for behind each gate is a special wall. The height of the court walls which enclose the streets on both sides is arranged so that one cannot see over even when on horseback or riding a camel; they are, therefore, usually three to three and a half meters high. The streets which lead through the dwelling quarter inside the town walls differ in no way

from those passing between the gardens and fields outside the circular 363
walls, since the latter are enclosed in walls exactly like those around 351
the dwellings within the town. Therefore, upon entering a strange town 361
the only way to tell whether one is still among the fields and gardens, or already between the rows of houses, is on the basis of whether one has passed through the town gate. In all Central Asian towns the streets are crooked, and continue in a perpetual zigzag, the natives have no notion of a regular arrangement of rows of streets, and preliminary plans in the erection of houses. Only the main streets of Tashkent, which /171/ lead from the bazaar to the outlying districts have a semblance of regularity, although they also possess numerous bends and turns.

The terrible monotony of the streets in Sart Tashkent is only 361
broken here and there by a mosque or 'medrese' /religious school/, by isolated tombs which are found in the middle of the town along the roads, by the rising or downward slope of the ground, and by the many streams, sometimes flowing in deep ravines, which cut across the entire town in all directions. In this respect Tashkent makes a much better impression, in spite of everything, than /Figure 61. p. 192a Caption: Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ most of the other towns of Turkestan, most of which lie in more or less level terrain.

Concerning the traffic in the streets of Tashkent, this differs 363
greatly in different parts of the town. In the side streets one sees only 361
isolated riders or strollers; the main streets leading to the bazaar, especially on market days, are filled all day long with endless lines of camel, horse and donkey caravans, wagons, and riders of horses, donkeys and camels, through which it is often difficult to make one's way, even with the assiduous use of the horsewhip. This means is not used only by the Russians, but also and even more widely by the natives /172/ themselves, for in Turkestan everyone who is prominent, either [554]
through rank or wealth, considers himself entitled to enforce his precedence, by the 'ultima ratio' of the 'nagaika,' /whip/ over less fortunate creatures, while the victims of this treatment consider it perfectly in order and use it themselves against those still lower in rank. Yielding is considered a sign of weakness by the Central Asians, and there is no better way of gaining their respect than a show of arrogance and the use of brute force. The Russians, therefore, are born, as it were, to the rule of the Central Asians.

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

1: von Schwarz--20a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 EL1 Turkestan EL1

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

Fig. a. A view of Kuldja (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

of the organs of security, and take the necessary precautions accordingly. At the observatory in Tashkent which /191/ is surrounded by a high wall and which, in addition, has a special night watchman for every single building, there was the curious occurrence that while one of the night watchmen was energetically clapping away in discharge of his duty, his own dwelling, which was within the region he was watching, was completely sacked. 625

As representatives of the population of the towns and villages in regard to the government authorities, there are certain elders, chosen by the people themselves, who are designated as 'aksakals' or "greybeards" and play a role completely analogous to that of European mayors. Sart Tashkent divides into four districts or yurts, /Figure 68. Caption: Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral - Asien.) /Through Central Asia/Leipzig, 1888, F. A. Brockhaus.)/ in which each nominates a special aksakal. These districts, which bear the names Shaikhantaur, Bish-Agach, Sibzor and Kukchi, subdivide further into a larger number of quarters or mahalas, each of which again has its own name. The district of Shaikhantaur, which includes the northeastern part of the town, is divided into forty-eight quarters; the district of Bish-Agach, the part of the town bordering on the Russian town has thirty-two quarters; the northwest part of the town constitutes the Sibzor district, with thirty-eight quarters, and the southwest part is the Kukchi district, with thirty-one quarters. Since its subjection to Russian authority, Tashkent constitutes /192/ administratively a separate part of the Syr-Darya province which includes in addition the districts of Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Amu-Darya, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, and the Kurama or rural district of Tashkent. Today Tashkent is under a Russian captain of the civil guard with the rank of colonel, for whom two assistants are appointed: one for the Russian part of the town, the other, appointed from the native population, for the Asiatic town. With regard to the inner organization of Sart Tashkent, the Russians have changed almost nothing. As before, the natives choose their aksakals and kazis /judges/ themselves, pay the same taxes as before, only on a noticeably diminished scale, and their police organizations also remain unchanged. There is only the limitation that Russians passing through the Sart town at night are not to be arrested. By this compromise the Russians derive a double advantage. In the first place the natives are flattered that no one has disputed their traditional arrangements; secondly the Russians are relieved of the expense of providing street lighting, police, courts of justice and the like; furthermore they have achieved a much greater

632 632 361

632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

: von Schwarz--68a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan Rl1

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

Fig. [illegible] A View of Khiva from the West.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Turning to irrigation, we note that
Sir Darya starts in Kirghizia, passes into Uzbekistan, thence 131
into Tajikistan, thence again into another part of Uzbekistan, 312
and finally runs out into Kazakistan. The Amu Darya too 133
starts in Tajikistan, passes along the short southern side of Uzbekistan, thence flowing into Turkmenia, pursues a course close to the Uzbek boundary until it re-enters Uzbekistan in the Khiva region, only to touch Turkmenia once more at Takhya Tash opposite Nukus, and finally to flow back into Uzbekistan again. In both cases the irrigation canals often have to cross what on the original Soviet showing were nothing short of national frontiers between independent units of a federal State, and it is not easy to uphold the claim that the irrigation systems have been kept within single administrative units. The difficulty of organizing irrigation across 000
a real administrative frontier is obvious to anybody who possesses experience, for there is no administrative question which leads to so much disagreement and disharmony as the disposal of competing claims to irrigation waters from the same canal or from different canals on the same river. Assuming for the sake of argument the official Soviet theory that these republics are real sovereign autonomous units in a federal structure, it would be impossible for them, situated as they are up and down the same rivers, to reach the necessary agreements for the season-to-season, week-to-week, and even day-to-day distribution of water, without which an irrigation system does not work. The conclusion is irresistible that one reason for so drawing these boundaries was to compel a degree of central direction which makes nonsense of a real autonomy. Or we may say if we like that it did not matter how the boundaries were drawn, for the administration of all essential matters would be in central hands. In either case their only meaning would be to divide artificially stretches of territory like the Farghana or Khorezm oases, each of which has a natural geographical and agricultural unity. The best that can be said for them is that the convolutions look pretty on the map.

There is another curious feature of political geography in 131
Soviet Central Asia. The five capitals are — of the Kazaks 361

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

p. 12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1/A [p. 3 -- Analyst]

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the best in the world for artistic purposes and for calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. To this day the town has remained an important centre of culture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see ill. page 1438) became not only wealthy towns, but places of extravagant luxury in the European sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of many wars in the course of its history, was from the middle of the eighteenth century onward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara; Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the Russian administration, in these towns the Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[139] in size and importance. At the present time the country's commerce with India and China is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civilization has made progress, modernization has not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely surprising in view of the extreme conservatism prevailing among the Islamic population of Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different tribes that are found both in town and country and whose manifold ethnological differences

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

175 and for a time took up residence at Samarkand. At a later period it became the subject of conflict between Persia and the Chinese. The ethnological fate of Turkestan was, however, finally decided by the Turks. It formed the Western part of the Great Empire which the Turks founded in the centre of Asia in the sixth century, and in the following period other Turkish tribes pressed after those who [162] had preceded them. To this day they form the major portion of the population of Eastern and Western Turkestan beside which the other components are comparatively insignificant. Even the conquest of the country by Islam, so decisive an event in the history of the peoples of other countries, such as North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, was in Turkestan of almost exclusively religious significance. Turkish predominance in Central Asia was in no way shaken by this new movement, the originators and pioneers of which were Arabs. On the contrary it was the Turks who after their conversion assumed the leadership in the Islamic world of Asia. They founded powerful dynasties in Afghanistan, India, and even in Egypt; Turkestan itself, geographically the extreme outpost of the Mohammedan world, was in political respects very often its centre. That was particularly the case under Timur (Tamerlane) (see ill. page 1437) 361 175 who brought artists and craftsmen from all his conquering raids to Samarkand, which he made a city of marvels, far surpassing in its magnificence any other town within the world of Islam (see ill. on this page). Its superb buildings are entirely covered with coloured glaze that reflects the brilliant sun, producing an effect of beauty which would almost seem beyond anything in the nature of mere brick and stone. The tradition of this art outlived Timur's feeble successors; later Turkestan rulers like the Emirs of Bokhara continued to support the arts, though their standard had by then perceptibly declined. In ethnographic respects too, the inhabitants have changed but little, and the country has remained the centre of the Turkish world in Inner Asia.

[See p. 12--Analyst]

[See cat. 116, p. 20--Analyst]

000 have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian tribes.

361 Between the customs and mode of life of these two peoples there are many interesting distinctions. To neither of them does the soil afford the conditions necessary for permanent settlement. Wherever there is a well or a water-hole which provides the moisture necessary to vegetation, they pitch their tents at will, and allow their herds to graze. When the pastures are exhausted, the camp is transferred to a favourable spot elsewhere, and the [241] same process is repeated. Where the soil is suitable, the nomads of Turkestan grow grain and other food-plants, without, however, becoming permanently settled. Only in the oases have the Turkomans abandoned the nomad form of life, and have become domiciled.

231 The two nomad peoples of Turkestan, the Turkomans and the Kirghiz, breed livestock — horses for riding, sheep for food and for their skins, and camels as beasts of burden. In addition to the horse the Turkomans also breed donkeys for riding. The different domestic animals kept by the two tribes explains another characteristic distinction between 234 their otherwise very similar habits. Both are skilled in the preparation of a beverage of sour milk, which is particularly refreshing at the time of the burning summer heat. The Turkomans make yogurt of sheep's milk, whilst the Kirghiz ferment a similar drink known as kumyss from mare's milk. The reason for this is that the Turkomans, who

* [The Kara Kirghiz and the Turkomian --. Analyst]

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers. 475 162

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred. 361 177 167

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

1 [In Semirechie - Analyst]

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain cultivation the peasants work in orchards and do
[691] vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

8:Kostenko -91-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
/388/ RL1

II.

000 The Characteristics of the Native Dwellings.

The characteristics of the populated places of the native population. The structure of the houses: walls, roofs, floors, windows, etc. The interior decoration of the lodging. Means of heating. The general appearance of the towns and villages. The nomad dwelling. The yurt: the component parts, the decoration, etc. The value of the Kazakh portable domicile.

342 The form of life of the two chief representatives of the peoples of the Turkestan region, the nomads and the sedentary people, also determines the character of their dwellings.

361 All the locations of the sedentary, so called Sart population in the Turkestan territory are very similar to each other externally, so it is enough to see one to get an idea of all of them.

Although the native sedentary settlements in Turkestan are divided into towns and villages (kishlaks), this division is only nominal. The entire difference between the Central Asian town and the village lies in the fact that a town, according to Moslem law, must be surrounded by a public wall, must have a citadel (ark), and must include not less than
342 three mosques. The town walls and the houses are always made of clay, a material directly available under foot. The houses are flat and squat. They consist of one or several square courtyards, surrounded with buildings. The living quarters are primarily one-story buildings and in general all are without foundations and socles.

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

8: Kostenko 113-G-4, 5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1
Kazak KQ2

K
342

at the top so that the kosh looks like a felt cone.

[177] The incomparable qualities of a yurt in summer have been appreciated not only by the armies but also by the Russian inhabitants of Turkestan. The householder who is only the slightest bit wealthy provides himself with such a yurt or yulameika, which he puts up in his garden near his house. In such yulameikas they can be free of the suffocating heat which makes it impossible to sleep in the house.

/404/ III

000

A Description of Some Important Populated Places

A description of the town of Tashkent: the Asiatic and Russian parts. Vernyi /Alma Ata/. Kuldja. Samarkand. Khodzhent /Leninabad/. Ura-Tyube.

Tashkent

T
261

Tashkent is the center of the government of the whole region of Turkestan. Both in size and in expanse it is one of the most spacious towns not only in the Turkestan region but in all of Central Asia. In number of inhabitants it is comparable only with Bukhara, and in expanse with Kokand. This is one of the oldest towns, and its origin is lost in the mists of time. It is situated at 41° 19'32" north, and 38° 57'58" east. Tashkent is located on a flat plateau beginning about 30 versts from Chimkent, and is surrounded on three sides with gardens, while the fourth side is contiguous with the Russian town.

8:Kostenko 114-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 At the present time one must think of it as two essentially different towns: the Asiatic and the European. The latter, although it lies directly next to the former on the eastern side, has a completely different appearance. Therefore we will describe Asiatic Tashkent first, and then give a few data about the European town.

361 Both the Asiatic and the European Tash-
312 kent are irrigated by aryks /irrigation canals, led from the Chirchik river, which flows 8 versts south of the town. A large aryk which looks like a river flows from the Chirchik 45 versts from Tashkent. /405/ This is the Zakh-Aryk (1) which passes 10 versts north of the town.

1. The entire length of the Zakh-aryk is 85 versts. In the upper part it is 77 feet (eleven sazhen's) wide and 3 feet deep. It flows into the river Keles.

Another aryk, the most important one for the town is the Bos-Su, which is conducted from the Chirchik 31 versts from the town. At the Lyabzak gates it enters Tashkent in two branches and flows through the town under various names. A third aryk is led from the Chirchik around Niaz-bek 25 versts east of Tashkent, and flows directly to the Russian part of town. It then flows into the Gadragan aryk, and after that, branching out into small trenches it irrigates the gardens of Russian Tashkent.

[133] The small river Salar, a branch of the Chirchik, independent of the aryks already mentioned, flows 2 versts south of the town.

8:Kostenko 115-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Tashkent, like all important Central Asian towns, used to be surrounded by a high crenelated wall, to which there were 12 gates (darvaza). The wall had a rounded form and extended over an area of 20 versts. The gates bore the names of the towns toward which they opened. Today, the part of the town wall on the side of the Russian town has been completely demolished and the moat filled up. The gates on this side were also destroyed. On the other sides, although they still exist, they are no longer closed.

361 632 Administratively, Tashkent is divided into four parts (yurts) which were formerly under the administration of special officials called ming-bashi. These districts are: Shaikhantaur, Sibzor, Kukchi and Bish-Agach.

361 312 The Shaikhantaur district constitutes the northeastern part of the town. Situated in a flat locality, it is divided almost in half by a deep ravine, through which the Ankhor flows, a wide and swift aryk. The other main aryk flowing through this part of the town, called Gadragan, enters the Russian town not far from the beginning of Tash-Kuche street, and provides it with water, flowing out in
361 small aryks. The Shaikhantaur district has 48 'mahalas' (wards), which are: Tadzhik, /406/ Kashgar, five Yangi-shakhars, Sellim-mechet, Illya, Kiot, Keriady, Tash-kucha, Mir-gancha, Okhche, Zandzhilik, two Kator-turas, Tyurk, Igerchi, Ol'mazar, Doom-begi, Kurgan-araksy, Balyan-mechet, Goukush, Shur-tepe, Degriot, Khadrya, Khouz-bok, Dzhangokh, Khish-mechet, Khodzharush-noye, two Okh-mechets, Darkhon, Padar-kush, Kuduk-bashi, Badak, Shatak,

8:Kostenko 116-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

●361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since [574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the [161] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty [368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town,[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

8:Kostenko 117-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Much more is used for plowland (1814 tanaps) and rice planting (1896 tanaps).

The Sibzor district, occupying the northwestern corner of the town, is divided into 38 mahalas, which are: Kagat, Great /407/ Middle and Little Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-Saray, Yau, Mazar-khan, Kanly-kucha, Dessin-kucha, Pshta-khammom, Masse-duz, Khatyn-mechet, Khich-kupriuk, Khodzha-kugachi, Labzak, Rabat, Kunlak, Khodja-kucha, Yakhkachub, Khazret-imam, Tyk-kuche, Shakar, Dzhim-kucha, Parchabob, Batyr, Akhun-guzar, Kundzhak, Tchinchak, Kadavod, Chegyt-bashi, Khodja-Taressekon, Turnau-bashi, Big Sibzor, Darbaza-kent, Shakyr-guzar, Kazy-kucha, and Agmem-seid. In addition, four settlements also belong to this part of the town: Ibrahim-ata, whose inhabitants are agriculturists and raise 'dzhenushka', Chalo-kazak, Shano-vod, and Kosh-kizyl. The houses in the Sibzor district total 2230, with a population
361 of 18,650. The Keikaus(1) aryk, which divides
312 off from the Bos-Su aryk 8 versts away and enters the town at the Takhtapul' gates, is the main aryk in this part of town.

1. This aryk is named for Keikaus, the chief of the Tashkent okrug.

It irrigates the Big Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kunlak and Yau mahalas, then flows into the Kukcha district, from which it goes
[256] out of the town at the Kuchi-mazar gates. All the flour mills and crushing mills of Sibzor are concentrated on this aryk. The other mahalas are irrigated by small trenches which lead out of the main Keikaus aryk, and bear the names of the mahalas through which they

8:Kostenko 118-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 flow. The plowed land belonging to Sibzor
312 is irrigated by water which is led from the Zakh aryk and Bos-Su, as we have mentioned before.

361 The chief productivity of this district
438 of the town is making boots. The boots made by the inhabitants of the Sibzor district are distributed even to other towns in the territory. After this comes weaving and the decoration of cotton materials. The inhabitants have worked at the last two occupations for a very long time. The most important class of people, as regards wealth, are the herdsmen. The residents of all four settlements are agriculturists, as well as the people of the Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-sarai, Yau, Sibzor and Kazykucha mahalas.

361 /408/ Three medresses (higher insti-
368 tutions of learning): Beklyar-beg, Barakhon, and Kizyl-Kurgan, with about 260 students, make up almost all the educational provision of this part of the town. In addition to the medresses there are also schools (mekhtebe) here, located in private houses.

There are ten major mosques: Odin-mechet, Okhun-guzar, Khatyn-mechet, Mazar-khan, Muimubarek, Khonoki, Tokhtonun, Rebot, Khodji-Toroskon and Kara-saray.

361 Kukcha, the western part of the town, consists of thirty-one mahalas: Khafiz, Guyaki, Kuttut, Kupryuk-bashi, Big and Little Sauvan, Chakara, Tyapi, Kunzhak, Chagatai, Psyakchi, Chikchiman, Tokle-dzhalob, Kalalan, Ishkuvat, two Langars, Uzgan, Kisya-kurgan, Khuavon,

361 Chukchi, Kunchi, Padikhan, Chukur-Kishlak, Sara-khundan, Kukchi, Abnazar, Ailish, Khalimkup, Damak and Yangy. In all these mahalas together, there are 2511 houses with a population of 22,088 Three main streets cut through this part of town: Sauvan, Kukcha and Chagatai. There are four main [362] aryks which irrigate the Kukcha district: the Keikaus, which enters from the Sibzor district, the Zakh aryk, the Kara-kamysh, and the Dzhangag. The last branches off from the Keikaus at the Lyabzak gates and divides the town into two sections.

The land on which this part of the town is laid out is quite hilly. It is cut through with deep trenches and has many gardens, situated both inside and outside the town. The main [363] production of the Kukcha district is leather working. Thus of the 695 workshops in 1871, 341 were in leather, and 218 were for bootmaking. After this there are 6 brick factories, 7 places making earthenware vessels, 22 mills for grinding and crushing, and also 22 oil manufacturing [364] places. There are two medresses in this part of the town and 34 schools. There are 51 mosques and 18 tombs, of which one, Sheikh Zenedzhin-Baba, deserves attention for its antiquity. The Sheikh came from Bagdad and was buried here 400 years ago.

The Bish-agach district, in the southern corner of the town, consists of 32 mahalas: Yany-Bakhan, Kamalan, Chakar, Darkhan, Zivak-khish-kupryuk, Balyan-mechet, Sarparaz, Char-su, Ishan-Guzar, Samarkand, Okshi, Darbaza, Zenfata, Millyar, /409/ Chupan-ata, Suzugata, Sary-chapak, Dzhillik-mechet, Uzbek, Mirza-khazy, Gul'-bazar, Kugurmach, Ters-aryk, Kuk-mechet, Kul'gulyk,

361 are grouped in the districts in accordance with their occupations. Of course in each district one can also find other occupations (blacksmiths, bootmakers, etc.), but they are much less developed than the specific industry. The extent of the town is so great that many of its residents never learn to know all its winding streets, even though they live there a whole lifetime.

The figures for all the buildings in Asiatic Tashkent are as follows:

Houses occupied by the residents	13,260
Empty courts and separate courts for non-residents	322
Sheds (including 519 stalls)	23
[368] /410/ Medresses	8
Baths	8
Mosques	255
Flour mills	116
Crushing mills	42

[366] Booths in the large bazaar:

Occupied by traders	2324
Empty booths	307
Booths in the town streets	594
Empty booths in the town streets	96

Booths occupied by Sarts in Russian Tashkent	69

361 The population of Asiatic Tashkent ac-
162 cording to the census of 1868 was:

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

		Families	Males	Females
361	Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162	non-residents	22	987	68
	Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
	non-residents		37	
	Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
	non-residents		122	29
	Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
	non-residents			
	Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
	non-residents		6	
	Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
	non-residents		18	
	Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	73
	non-residents		11	
	Hindus		93	
	Chinese			3
	Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 Russian or European Tashkent is directly
[312] next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by
a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the town is developing very quickly.

[31] /411/ All the okrug administration
as well as the oblast' administration for the
Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent.

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

8:Kostenko 124-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
217

A Central Asian museum has been established here also, and a Public Library. The foundation of the latter was laid by the Governor General of Turkestan, von Kaufmann.

At the present time there are 5,381 book titles in this library and 9,734 volumes, of which there are:

		Titles	Volumes
	in Russian	2,695	5,018
	in French	1,444	2,761
	in German	850	1,450
/412/	in English, Latin, Italian Swedish, Dutch, Czech, etc.	392	505
	Total	5,381	9,734

The wealth of the Tashkent Public Library lies in the collection of material on the region of Turkestan, and in general on Central Asia, a collection which is known as "the Turkestan Collection." This collection has been brought together, by order of General Kaufmann by the well-known bibliographer Mezhov, who has already gathered 200 volumes up to now. All newspaper and magazine articles, as well as separate pamphlets and books are being catalogued by Mr. Mezhov in chronological order in large tomes, specially bound. He is also compiling an alphabetic list, and a catalogue to make it easier to find the articles in the tomes.

The Tashkent Public Library receives a subsidy of 1300 rubles from the treasury, of which 800 rubles go for the salary of the librarian, and 500 toward the subscription to newspapers, magazines, the purchase of various books, bindings, etc.

8:Kostenko 125-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 In 1878 there were over 183 subscribers,
217 and 2780 volumes were in circulation, that is, the average number would be between 15 and 16 volumes per reader.

361 The number of residents in Russian Tash-
162 kent was determined by a one day census in 1875. According to this census the total number of residents was 4,859 persons, not including the military personnel. One should note that this is a minimal figure for the Russian population in Tashkent.

The total number of Russians in Tashkent can be divided as follows:

By Religious Belief:

	Orthodox Christian	3,473
	Moslem	938
	Jewish	159
/413/	Catholic	155
	Lutheran	115
	Hindus	4
	Evangelical	4
	Armenian - Gregorian	2
	Reform	1
	Anglican	1
	Total	4,859

Of this number:

Males	2,982
Females	1,877

According to occupation, the residents of Russian Tashkent can be divided as follows:

B:Kostenko 126-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
162

Clergy and Church workers	10
In military service	613 (1)

/416/ 1. Not counting the army and the officers But the army clerks and in general the army personnel living in separate quarters are included here.

In civil service	525 (2)

2. This figure does not include hired clerks.

Doctors	11
Obstetricians	2
Doctors' assistants (Russian: fel'dsher)	9 (3)

3. This figure does not include those permanently assigned to hospitals, and resident there.

Traders	144 (4)

4. Mostly small traders, carrying on trade at the bazaars. Included in this figure are also proprietors of hotels and cafe restaurants, the keepers of public houses, wine cellars, and various stalls and stores.

Owners and Directors of factories	3
Shop clerks	118 (5)

5. Including the advanced clerks also, or the so-called 'doveronnye' (in Russian - trusted assistants, agents)

361
162

Proprietors in shops and stalls (sidel'tsev) 30 (6)

6. Primarily in drinking establishments. This figure also includes women.

Office clerks	3
Contractors	4
Keepers of Exchanges (Russian: birzha)	18(7)

7. Of this number 6 are occupied only with transport.

Carters	84 (8)

8. Mostly Tatars

Manufacturers of tobacco	2
Skilled workers in leather	2
Skilled workers in making brandy	1
Brandy distillers	2
Wine growers	3
Photographers	9 (9)

9. Counting the photographers' helpers: the retouchers, the pressers and also apprentices.

Type setters	9
Printers	3
Supervisors for printing	1
/414/ Post Office staff	4 (10)

10. This includes the station inspector and the overseer.

Postillions, drivers	11 (11)

8.Kostenko 128-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361
162

11. Mostly Kazakhs from the Kurame uyezd.

Messengers	2
Foremen	2
Drivers of arbas (two-wheeled wagons)	14 (12)

12. All Sarts.

Mullahs	1 (13)

13. A mullah and an 'azanchi' (the man who calls from the minaret at prayer time) are at the mosque for the Moslem population of Russian Tashkent.

Azanchi	1
Watchmen and Guards	40
Unskilled workmen	241 (14)

14. Most of these are Moslems: Sarts, Kazakhs and Tatars.

Cigarette manufacturers	2
Florists	1
Confectioners	2
Sausage makers	4
Brewers	2
Hairdressers and barbers	5
Butlers	6
Markers at billiards	3
Economists	5
Apothecaries	4
Tutors	4
Teachers	6 (15)

15. Including governesses and female teachers.

8:Kostenko 129-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361	Hired clerks	31
162	Soap boilers	1
	Engravers	1 (16)

16. This same man cuts the print.

	Bookbinders	2
	Skilled match workers	2
	Chimney sweeps	1
	Furriers	1
	Locksmiths	3
	Coopers	6
	Smiths	30
	Carpenters	26
	Cabinet makers	50
	Hammerers	3
	Planers	1
	Water carrier	1
	Harness makers	3
	Stove makers	8
	Tailors	55
	Boot makers	36
/415/	Makers of bast shoes	1
	House painters	11
	Plasterers	2
	Turners	1
	Parquet floor layers	1
	Cartwrights	3
	Coachmakers	1
	Carriage spring makers	1
	Gardeners	15 (17)

17. Including kitchen gardeners.

	Bread bakers and bakers	37
	Embroiderers in gold	3
	Clockmakers	3
	Fishermen	5
	Musicians	11 (18)

8:Kostenko 130-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RIL

361 18. All hired, and mostly Jews.

162

Bread sellers	6
Keepers of the baths	5 (19)

19. Those who work at the baths are counted as attendants.

Skilled weapon makers	3
Masons	18
Hatters	2
Upholsterers	1
Butchers	3
Skilled goldsmiths	4 (20)

20. Including their apprentices.

Roofers	1
Sawyers	3
Translators	5
Glaziers	1
Brothel keepers	18 (21)

21. All Moslems. They include also women.

Prostitutes	66 (22)

/417/ this and following footnotes
22. All Moslem women. Some of these are married, and live in the brothels together with their husbands, brothers, fathers, small children, etc.

Attendants and Servants	314 (23)

23. Also including orderlies.

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Coachmen	32
Cooks	111
Chefs	41
Grooms	16
Nurses	67
Wetnurses	4
Chambermaids	25
Seamstresses and milliners	31
Laundresses	61
Without known occupation	1708
Total:	4859

/416/ Of this number 532 women have known occupations.

/417/ According to age the population of the Russian part of Tashkent divides as follows.

Less than 10 years old	880
From 10 to 15	230
From 15 to 20	461
From 20 to 30	1588
From 30 to 40	1156
From 40 to 50	396
From 50 to 60	100
From 60 to 70	24
Over 70 years of age	24

From the above table it can be seen that young people predominate in the population of Russian Tashkent, followed by those in the prime of their lives (from 20 to 40 years old), and after that children up to the age of 15.

8:Kostenko 132-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Vernyy (Alma Ata)

361 After the Russian occupation of the
132 Trans-Ili region in 1853, the fortress town of Vernoe (Alma Ata) was established in the following year, 1854, with the aim of consolidating the Russian domination of the Great Horde. It was founded on the spot where the town of Almata, which means 'apple', had been, a town known for its trade and as a station on the great road to China in the Middle Ages frequented, among others, by the Genoese merchants.

At first the fortress town of Vernoe was the administrative center for the Alatau okrug, subordinate to the military governor of the Semipalatinsk oblast'. After the establishment of the Turkestan military okrug, however, the fortress was made the capital town of the Semirechie oblast' and began to be called Vernyy. The natives and many Russians call Vernyy "Almata", as it was formerly called.

361 /418/ Vernyy lies on even sandy clay place, just at the foot of the Trans-Ili Alatau mountains, along the small Almatinka river.

133 The Almatinka has its source in an unusually picteresque spot in the mountains, and flows very swiftly, roaring and foaming along its course which is sprinkled with large rocks in many spots. After it emerges from the mountains it retains its swiftness and the special quality of the river bottom even though flowing through level country.

8:Kostenko 133-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

133 The Almatinka is no wider than 7 feet (3 arshins), with a depth of about 9 feet (4 arshins) and it can be forded anywhere. Furthermore the amount of water in the river is decreasing every year.

[312] This decrease of the water of the Almatinka is caused, first of all, by the fact that aryks or canals are led off from it, just after its emergence from the mountains, for the irrigation of the fields, gardens and kitchen gardens. Secondly, it is affected by the cutting down of the trees in the upper reaches of the river. The Almatinka flows into another mountain river, the Keskelen, which in turn flows into the Ili river. The Almatinka owes its name to the fact that its source in the mountains is thickly overgrown with apple trees ('alma') and apricot trees (uryuk).

•361 132 Vernyy is located at a height 2500 feet above sea level, and enjoys a warm and healthy climate. The summer heat rises to 30° centigrade in the shade. The inhabitants have remarked that the climate of the town is growing dryer every year. Formerly the winter cold was more bearable and the snow lasted only a few days. In more recent years the winters have begun to be Russian, about three months long. There is no doubt that here too the cutting down of the forests in the environs of the town has had a somewhat deleterious effect.

The summer heat spells are almost unbearable, but in the evenings and at night it is always cool because of the proximity

361 132 of the Alatau peaks, which are always covered with snow.

[164] The sudden change of temperature during the day causes intermittent fevers, which also constitutes the main sickness in Vernyy. Diarrhea is added to this in the summer, resulting from eating too much ripe and moderately unripe fruit.

361 364 /419/ The lack of endorsement of measures to keep the air and water pure also has a bad effect on the health of the residents from time to time. Every kind of filth and impurity is left uncovered, either in the courtyards or in the streets, or they throw it into the water, so that both the air and the water are poisoned. The Kalmyks play a particularly active part in this. They are known for their unusual slovenliness, and are settled both in the town and on the outskirts along the Almatinka river.

361 132 The prevailing winds are the northwest, from Lake Balkhash, and the east wind, which blows in the spring. The former carries with it the sand, picked up from the dry and sandy Bet Pak Dala steppe and brings rain clouds.

Apples ripen at the beginning of August in Vernyy and apricots in the second half of June, while rye and wheat ripen in July.

The mean temperature of Vernyy, as determined by Golubev in 1861 is 7° centigrade. The city of Marseilles, which is situated on almost the same latitude as Vernyy, has a median annual temperature of 14.1° centigrade so that plums, peaches and tomatoes will grow there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

000 there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

• 361 133 The environs of Vernyy, with the exception of the mountains, are level and depressingly monotonous.

On the other hand, the Alatau mountain range, which closes off the horizon of Vernyy on the south, is usually picturesque. The altitude of the range rises to 14,000 feet, and [137] the crests are always covered with snow. In the recent past, not only the slopes but also the foothills were covered with dense forests. Now only grass grows in the foothills, a bright emerald green which harmonizes with the dark green of the spruce forest growing in the mountains themselves. All this is topped by a crown of white snow, etched against the bright blue sky. In the mountains it rains frequently, and when it does the mountains are overcast, as though enveloped in a shroud, with dark clouds, which grow whiter, as they rise higher, /420/ assume all sorts of whimsical contours, and gradually diminish and vanish into space.

The foothills are a particularly beautiful sight in the spring time (in April), when the nomads spread a pall over them, that is, they burn the old grass to make the new grass grow better. The skies are filled with a glowing fire, and it fills the whole surrounding countryside with waves of light. Yet no matter how beautiful the Alatau mountains are from the side, the views in the mountains themselves are still more wonderful, and more striking. The thick undergrowth of the valleys and ravines, streams bubbling with foam against

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
the snakes winding over the precipices, all
133 this makes an unforgettable impression. With
every step the views change, as though in a
kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking
and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is
the tree which grows in the greatest abundance.
After it, but much less abundant, are the apple
trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees,
the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the
following parts: the Almata station (the old
part of the town), the Almata settlement, the
Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually
the town which has developed since the beginning
of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a consider-
able degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick
buildings, while the old parts of the town are
built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been
[363] planned regularly. The streets are straight,
level and wide, in most cases planted (although
quite sparsely) with trees. There are often
small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look
like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked
up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/
partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the
birds, for which reason cracks are always forming
in the walls.

361 1. In Russia, as we know, a special
342 kind of moss is used for this purpose, which is called kukushkin len (cuckoo flax).

Secondly, the wooden floors and ceilings, as they shrink, acquire cracks, which also admit the cold. In addition the inhabitants do not know the use of double windows in winter.(1)

1. One must add the danger of fire to the inconveniences of the wooden structures. In 1871 there were three fires in Vernyy with losses figured at 3,462 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The number of buildings in Vernyy are as follows:

Types of buildings	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches (2)	1	1

2. A cathedral is being built, for which the foundation is already laid.

Mosques	-	1
Houses	234	972
Uninhabited buildings	4	9
[366] Stalls		226
Bins and Booths		164
Eating establishments (3)		21

3. Some of these are built of adobe clay and some of softened clay.

Mills		62
Total number of buildings	239	1,456

8:Kostenko 138-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

		Stone	Wood
[368]	Churches		1
	Houses	1	678
[366]	Stores and Stalls		55
	Mills		32
	Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar dominions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

8:Kostenko 139-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 There are also Chinese here who have come from
563 the Celestial Empire on commercial business. Finally, there are Jews, also making their living in commerce.

361 Here is an inventory of the Vernyy po-
162 pulation by nationality and estate:

In 1871		Male	Female	Total
Aristocracy	Hereditary	109	46	155
	Non-hereditary	71	52	123
Notable Citizens		8	5	13
Secular Clergy		8	12	20
Merchants		174	107	281
Lower Middle Class		1,176	1,306	2,482
Peasants		174	101	275
Colonists		5	3	8
Military Estate		2,512	250	2,762
Cossacks		2,048	1,839	3,887
Soldiers retired or on indefinite leave		583	180	763
Sarts		459	106	565
Chinese		9	3	12
Kazakhs		271	132	403
Kalmyks	Christians	91	52	143
	Non-Christians	107	81	188
/423/ Persons not belonging to the above estates		187	93	280
Transients with passports		194	83	277
	Total	8,186	4,451	12,637

From this table it can be seen that 1) there is a considerable preponderance of the Russian population over the other nationalities; 2) there is a considerable preponderance of males over females. For 100 males here, there are 54 females.

361 In 1863 there were 4,322 men and 1,842
162 women, totalling 6,164. At that time there were 43 women for every 100 men.

Thus, although the population also doubled in the eight year period, the numerical proportion of men to women changed much less.(1)

1. According to the one day census, made on April 5, 1879 in Vernyy and the stations and suburbs belonging to it, the population of both sexes was 14,837, excluding the military, which numbered 3,586. Thus the total population of Vernyy, including the military, came to 18,423 persons of both sexes. The figure 14,837 is the sum of the following figures:

6,934, the population of both sexes in the new town.

2,230, in the Tatar suburb, in the pastures, in the Khokhlats suburb, in Great valley (Bol'shoi log), in Soroch'ye ostrova (Magpie island), in the prison, the hospital and the Kuznetsov brandy factory.

5,673, in the Great Almata station with the Little Almata settlement. In the first 3,505, in the second 1,868.

361 Concerning births and deaths in the town
163 of Vernyy, we have the following data, which refer especially to the Russian population,
165 which, as was said before, is considerably more numerous than the native.

In 1871 in Vernyy:	Males	Females	Total
Births	308	288	596
Deaths	263	220	483

361 Thus the predominance of male births
163 over deaths is 45, while the females show 68
more births than deaths. The total figure for
165 the predominance of births over deaths is 113
persons of both sexes.

361 /424/ The number of deaths according
165 to age are divided as follows:

Deaths in 1871:	Males	Females	Total
From birth to 1 year, inclusive	99	94	193
From 1 year to 5 years of age	47	57	104
From 5 years 10	4	5	9
From 10 to 15 years	7	2	9
From 15 to 20	2	2	4
From 20 to 25	22	6	28
From 25 to 30	16	6	22
From 35 to 40 (sic)	8	6	14
From 40 to 45	9	6	15
From 45 to 50	8	5	13
From 50 to 55	2	2	4
From 55 to 60	6	4	10
From 60 to 65	4	4	8
From 65 to 70	4	4	8
From 70 to 75	5	6	11
From 75 to 80	3	1	4
From 80 to 85	3	3	6
From 85 to 90	1	-	1
From 90 to 95	-	-	-
From 95 to 100	-	2	2
Total	263	220	483

000 Concerning religious belief, the distribution is as follows:

361 Concerning religious belief, the [Vernyy] distribution is as follows:

	Males	Females	Total
162 Roman Catholic	136	1	137
Protestant	22	2	24
Moslem	550	152	702
Buddhist	136	67	203
Jewish	14	-	14
Old Believers (raskol'niki)	15	13	28

All the rest of the population is of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

361 The chief occupation of the inhabitants
241 is agriculture. The types /425/ of grain grown here are spring and winter rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet and buckwheat. In addition potatoes are grown in considerable quantity.

In 1871 there was:		chetverts sown	chetverts reaped
Rye	spring	249	2,922
	winter	498	1,754
Spring wheat		1,937	19,022
Oats		3,079	33,831
Barley		420	1,881
Buckwheat		23	191
Potatoes		223	1,239

The grain is used for domestic consumption and is not exported abroad. A part of it is disposed of to the Kazakhs, however, and a part goes to the distilleries and breweries.

361 The residents of Vernyy are very active
244 in kitchen gardening. Among their products there is a special kind of sweet melon planted with seeds from Kuldja, which is particularly worthy of note.

361 It would be impossible to pass over
231 another branch of Vernyy production, one which is very rare in Central Asia, namely, apiculture. (1)

1. In addition to Vernyy, apiculture is carried on in the Lepsinskaya station.

The raising of bees began here in 1857. In 1859 there were 254 hives, and in 1871 there were 75 apiaries and up to 1,456 hives. One should mention, furthermore, that 1869 and 1870 were bad years for apiculture because of drought, which dried the flowers in the grass, and the trees, so that the bees had no food.

After agriculture the main branch of Vernyy production is livestock raising. In 1871 Vernyy had the following number of animals:

Horses	3,611 head
Horned cattle	2,266
Sheep	729
Pigs	449
Goats	126
Camels	88
Total	7,369

/426/ In 1862 there were only 4,460 animals.

361 One may mention distilling, vodka making,
438 leather and brick making among the large factory enterprises. The remaining industries are in the form of home industries.

The factories in 1871 were:

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Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
[433] Distillery	1	146,000 gal.	171,000	145
Brewery	1	5,700 gal.	1,540	5
Leather	3	23,659 pieces	82,774	57
Brick	11	520,000 pieces	7,800	52
Vodka	1	5,500 gal.	7,524	6
Total	17	-	270,638	265

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The commerce of Vernyy is developing quite perceptibly, due to the favorable position of the town at the junction of roads from Kuldja to Tashkent and to Kokand, and from Kashgar to Semipalatinsk. Formerly the caravans passed through Vernyy without stopping. In recent times they have begun to be unloaded for roadside sale. In addition, many merchants from Tashkent and neighboring dominions have come here purposely for continuous trade.

In the environs of Vernyy every year there is a considerable purchase of animals from the Kazakhs, not only for Tashkent and Kuldja, but also for Petropavlovsk, which is over 1200 versts away.

[366] At the present time there are two bazaars in Vernyy: a large and a small one. The total number of stalls in 1871 came to 390, whereas in 1863 there were only 50, and in 1859 about 20.

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The trade in Vernyy is developing in proportion to the strengthening of tranquility

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

1. Here are the prices for certain
361 articles on the Vernyy market:
435 A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

361 at which 175 boys and 39 girls are enrolled.
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2) elementary school in the Almata settlement, where 45 boys are enrolled.

3) a Moslem school in the Tatar suburb, with 40 pupils, taught by a mullah.

4) a trade school with 21 pupils, who learn various trades in addition to reading and writing.

5) a school of gardening with 21 pupils, who study with an experienced gardener from the Crimea.

6) A classical preparatory school for girls.

7) A classical preparatory school for boys.

Children of the privileged estate as well as the Cossack estate may enter the elementary schools and the trade school, although the number of the former is not large.

361 In 1878 at the Military Club quite a
217 good library was established, which now contains 2,000 volumes on various subjects. There is a marked trend among the population to use books from this library. From August 5, 1878 to April 5, 1879, i.e., in a period of 8 months, there were 1,474 recipients to whom 2,749 books were distributed.

8:Kostenko 147-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar
RL1

Kuldja

361 The town Kuldja discussed here is also
133 called "Old Kuldja" or "Taranchi Kuldja", as distinguished from "New Kuldja" or "Chinese Kuldja" which was destroyed in 1866, and was 35 versts southwest of the old town. Old Kuldja is situated in the broad valley of the river Ili, on its right bank, 3 versts from the river. Near Kuldja the Ili flows between wide banks, a broad and well-watered river. The right bank is steeper than the left both here and along the entire course of the river. Its width is about 136 feet. It is crossed by three ferryboats, maintained by a Russian businessman. It flows so swiftly, especially when there is a wind, so that the crossing is slow. The river freezes over 60 days a year, from the end of December to the end of February. Wood has long been floated down the Ili from the upper reaches to the middle course of the river.

[134] The soil in the environs of the town is
132 sandy loam and very fertile. The climate of Kuldja is warm, healthy and pleasant. Although
361 the summer heat here goes up to 41° centigrade in the shade, the heat is modified considerably by the summer rains. Because of the spring rains, grain takes root in the environs of Kuldja even without watering. The winters here are uniform, and the snow remains on the ground up to a month and a half. The cold in winter reaches 32° centigrade.

The Kuldja valley is protected by high mountains from all sides except the west, and apparently this fact goes far to explain the moderateness of the climate, which notwithstanding, permits the growing of delicate trees and

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[137] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry
trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley
563 in general, the most different nationalities
are mixed together. Until the beginning of the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

361 were obliged to maintain at their own expense
563 the numerous herds of the Chinese Emperor. The property of the population was not safeguarded in any way. If something was pleasing to a Chinese official he took it without any discussion. The same thing happened if the official found the wife or daughter of a Dungan or Taranchi attractive. In addition to all this, the people also suffered other kinds of humiliation. When a person of another nationality met a Chinese, he had to stand if he was sitting, or dismount from his horse, if he were riding. This chain of insults, humiliations and affronts could no longer be born with patience. The Dungans and Taranchi revolted and had a terrible accounting with their oppressors. The central Chinese government, being powerless, remained a non-participating observer of the massacre and the loss of her provinces.

The Dungans, having thrown off the yoke of the Chinese, soon yielded the rule of the Ili province to the Taranchi.

563 The origin of the Dungans is unsolved.
173 The coming of this people into their present abode is lost in the mists of time. There is a tradition in Kuldja that the Dungans came here with Timur and that this hero, when he married a Chinese princess, received the Ili province as a dowry from the Chinese Emperor. The followers obeyed the example of their leader and also married Chinese girls. Later, when Timur went on his way these followers remained and received the land as a gift, as a result of which the Dungans also consider themselves its rightful rulers.

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
[346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

RL 1

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

361 shooing away the flies with a special instru-
366 ment, a whisk made of hair, attached to a handle. In the Chinese bazaar there is constant movement, bustle and noise. The vendors of wares cry out and invite the customers in. Hordes of children some half-naked, some completely naked, scurry back and forth.

In a group of men the Chinese women stand out in their original costumes, on their tiny misshapen, squeezed little feet, on which they walk with difficulty, as though on stilts, tottering sideways.

/432/ With every step one runs into vendors, carrying all their goods in one hand, and charging two or three kopecks for it. Here is an unbelievably dirty urchin holding a piece of mutton on his finger, yelling with all his might, announcing his wares../sic/

The greatest crowding, noise and throng takes place in the so-called row of eating houses, where various food is sold. A beggar can satisfy his appetite for some three or four kopecks here. Having satisfied their hunger, Chinese beggars lie down somewhere in the shade along the booths and spend the whole day doing nothing.

361 Trade at the Chinese bazaar is divided
443 into three categories:

1) The permanent trade, which is carried on in booths, and in which the more valuable articles are sold: mats, cotton prints, tea, sugar, iron, etc. 2) Mobile trade, on small tables set up in front of the booths. Here the articles sold are already cheaper: ordinary

361 soap, mirrors, wooden combs, dirty tobacco,
443 needles, handfuls of two Russian candies, etc. These wares are gathered up at night and spread out again in the morning. 3) Hawking, carried about in baskets or simply in the hands. To this category belongs the sale of eggs, fruit, birds, etc.

There are practically no proper goods in Kuldja now. Up until 1866 one could find Chinese silk textiles, porcelain articles, and precious stones here. Now decent textiles and porcelain have gradually become an archeological rarity and are much more expensive.

After our occupation of Kuldja a special article of trade were the Chinese "burkhans" (small copper or cast iron representations of gods). But even the burkhans have all been sold.

361 This town, which is dirty and unattractive
364 from the outside, appears even filthier inside, that is, in the courtyards and the houses. The courtyards are filled with every sort of refuse, and in the houses the dirt and disorder is beyond imagination. Even the lodgings of the rich and those who are comfortably well off suffer from the absence of light, ventilation and cleanliness. In addition the Chinese houses are distinguished by some sort of a special sharp odor, peculiar to them.

/433/ Of the public buildings in Kuldja, in addition to the two mosques, mentioned above,[7] the Chinese temple of idols is worthy of mention. The entrance to the temple leads through several dirty courts. In the front court in a dark hovel is the school where the children gather to study

[7] [See category 116, p. 151 — Analyst]

361 the laws of Confucius. Each lad has a book in
his hand, but they all study together, shouting,
346 similar to the way it is done in Jewish and
Moslem schools.

The chapel itself is housed in a dark but quite spacious room. The furnishings are strongly reminiscent of a Catholic church. By the front wall there is a large altar, set with various viands, church lamps and vessels from which smoke issues forth. Behind the altar as well as along the side walls there are images of a dragon. The figures of saints are distinguished by their corpulence and rotundity. Flags are hung along the walls like banners.
188 Finally, bells are hung up near the altar. The divine service is carried out by a dirty and ragged personage, who, with a bundle of smoldering candles in his hands, and accompanied by measured beating of the bells, makes endless bows, to the ground and halfway to the ground as he approaches and retires from the sacrificial table or altar.

On important occasions, instead of spoken prayers they burn little pieces of paper with written prayers or wishes, in the belief that prayers born up in this manner reach God more quickly. (1)

1. There is still another original way of praying. They fasten a small piece of paper to a wheel, with a prayer written on it. The wheel turns about quickly, and each turn of the wheel is considered as a whole prayer, separately uttered.

8:Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

[Kuldja]

361 Among the Chinese of Kuldja there are
795 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

In general the Kuldja "Catholics" are very insecure in the foundations of their faith. They wear crucifixes around their necks, and read prayers /434/ in Latin. When they appear before the authorities with a plea they set their crucifixes outside.

In the houses of the Kuldja Catholics one sees on the walls an image of the cross instead of icons. In addition, one may also see from time to time rosaries with a crucifix, or a palm on which a crucifix hangs.

[797] Christianity was brought to Kuldja by French missionaries, who came here from Peking.

361 Here are the statistical data for the number of houses and population in Kuldja. In 1872 there were in Kuldja:

[346]

Eastern Orthodox Churches	1
Roman Catholic Churches	1
Chinese temples of idols	2
Mosques	36
Houses	1,258
Total number of buildings	1,298

361 The population of Kuldja divides accord-
162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

8:Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
585] Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn

361 the Ili province have slowed down the useful
433 activity by the population considerably, and they are now beginning to breathe easily and recover.

361 The number of booths in the town is con-
438 siderable: there are 650. The amount of wares, however, is insignificant, and is limited to
439 the absolute needs of the population. The more important trade is carried on by Sarts from Tashkent, Kokand and Kashgar, and Tatars from Vernyy and Kopal. The chief articles of import are mats and khalats (long cloaks) from Kashgar and other Moslem towns, inferior types of cotton prints, nankeen, calico, plush, broadcloth and metal objects from Vernyy and Kopal, and tea from Urumchi and China proper. In exchange for these products they export sheep (mostly from Kashgar), dressed lamb skins, raw hides, pottery wares, apples and apricots, fox pelts, young staghorns. These last are sold very profitably through Kyakhta by the Chinese and are used by them as a medicine against impotency.

361 The factory and craft industries are even
433 more insignificant than the trade. Here is a list of the largest industries:
438

Types of factories and workshops	number	sum of production in rubles	number of workers
Oil manufacturing	10	12,000	78
Paper mill	4	500	24
Cast iron foundries	5	600	20
/436/ Pottery	2	960	6
Dye works	1	300	5
Vermicelli makers	3	101	6
Total	25	14,461	139

8:Kostenko 159-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 Few of the population worked in agricul-
241 ture in the past because many hands were taken away for the forces of the Sultan's armies. Since 1872 the population has entered actively into the cultivation of the land, being free of recruitment and having no obligations to the soil.

The wheat harvest here has only a 30-fold yield. (1)

361 1. In 1872 prices in the Kuldja market
435 were as follows:

Wheat in ordinary times costs 7 to 8 kopecks for 36 lb., but in 1872, because of military activities, disturbance, and the large number of military personnel supported in 1871, the price went up to 1 ruble, 80 kopecks. After that ordinary prices were 15 kopecks for rice, 15 kopecks for millet, 15 kopecks for barley, 4 kopecks for clover for 36 lb.

One hundred eggs cost 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of beef and mutton varies from 70 kopecks to 2 rubles, 40 kopecks. Before Kuldja was taken a hen cost 30 kopecks, afterwards the price rose to 8 kopecks. A pound of butter costs 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of tallow candles cost 5 rubles, the average cost of sugar is 30 rubles for 36 lb. Ordinary tea is sold for 1 ruble, 50 kopecks a pound.

A piece of matting 42 ft. (18 arshins) long costs from 60 to 70 kopecks. Russian cotton print material is sold at 22 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

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Tent cloth is sold at 30 kopecks for 2 ft. (per arshin) and calico for from 25 to 35 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

A cow costs from 16 to 25 rubles. A horse costs from 20 to 60 rubles. A sheep costs 3 rubles and a bull from 25 to 40 rubles.

A beam of wood 14 in. (8 vershoks) in diameter and 14 ft. (2 sazhen's) long costs 2 rubles. A board 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide and 6 ft. (2½ arshins) long costs 10 kopecks. A board 7 ft. (3 arshins) long and 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide costs 50 kopecks.

Fire brick costs 2 rubles a thousand, and sun-dried brick 1 ruble 60 kopecks. An unskilled workman is paid 15 kopecks a day; a worker with a horse receives from 40 kopecks to 1 ruble daily.

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Education in Kuldja is shown by the following figures for schools and the number of pupils enrolled in them:

	No. schools	No. of pupils		Total
		Boys	Girls	
At the Chinese temple	1	25	-	25
At the great Moslem mosque	1	60	10	70
At the houses of the mullahs	4	82	21	103
Total	6	167	31	198

/437/ The population of Kuldja has quite a gentle and peaceful character.

8:Kostenko 161-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Samarkand

361 Samarkand is situated at 39°38'50" latitude north and 36°57' longitude east (67° east of Greenwich), and is the administrative center of the Zeravshan okrug. This town is set out 6 versts south of the Zeravshan river and the gardens and fields belonging to the town are irrigated by the waters of the river.

The foundation of the town, according to tradition, is ascribed to an Arab sheikh, whose lust for conquest led him to the rich valley of the river Sogda (Zeravshan) in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At that time the town was called Marakanda. The armies of Alexander the Great came as far as this, and the residents of the town showed such strong resistance that, according to tradition, it was burned to its foundations after it was [103] taken. Afterwards it was soon rebuilt and fortified by the slave of Alexander of Macedonia, Samar, in honor of whom it received its name, and then became the capital of Sogdiana, one of the provinces formed on the ruins of the Alexandrian monarchy. The conquest of the region by the Greeks made it possible for Greek civilization to penetrate far into Central Asia, and even now Graeco-Bactrian coins are found in the ruins of ancient cities, lying in the basin of the Amu-Darya.

The Arabs brought a new religion and civilization into their conquered lands. Genghis Khan conquered Samarkand at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and Tamerlane chose it as the capital of his broad empire and thought of making it the first city of the

361 world. For one hundred years Samarkand was the seat of broad scholarly, administrative and commercial activity, and contained over 150,000 inhabitants. The massive remains of ancient buildings testify even today to the past glory of this city. The new (Moslem) town is not strikingly beautiful. Like all other Central Asian towns, it is made up of narrow crooked streets, lined with clay walls, ugly squat little houses, miserable small stalls similar to dog kennels, etc. etc.

361 34½ /438/ The pleasantest place in town is the Rigistan - a small town square, which is formed by three ancient mosques and medresses, situated perpendicular to each other: the Tillya-kari (i.e., gold) medresse, the Shir-dar (named for the mosaic figures on the front of two animals resembling lions; the Persian word for lion is shir, and the Ulu-begi. This last building was once famous for its seat of learning and its observatory, but now it has suffered much from the ravages of time and earthquakes.

361 764 In the eastern section of Samarkand an ancient building of Persian architecture is to be seen, known by the name of Gur-emir (the tomb of the emir), and containing the tomb of Timur. This mausoleum is crowned by a cupola which looks like a truncated melon. Along the sides there were two minarets, but one recently collapsed. The interior of the building is octagonal and consists of two rooms. The floors are laid with white marble, and the walls are covered with graceful azure arabesques and with quotations from the Koran in gold. The tomb of Timur is made of dark green jasper, and has the shape of a truncated pyramid, about

361 three feet wide and six feet long, turned with
764 the foundation uppermost. (1)

1. This stone constitutes a remarkably large single piece of nephrite.

This stone was split in two while in transport, after the conquest of Samarkand by Shakh-Nadir. Next to the tomb of the Emir are tombs of his teacher and various other members of his family. All these tombs are enclosed by a carved marble grating. By a narrow staircase one reaches the dark vault, which is also decorated with arabesques and on the floor of which there are the tombstones in the same order as they are placed up above. The copy of the Koran copied by Osman himself (the third Caliph of the faithful) was preserved in this underground vault, which still show traces of the Caliph's blood, for he was killed apparently while he was working on it. This historical document was sold for 100 rubles by Samarkand mullahs when the Russians took the city, and was placed in the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg.

361 /439/ The most interesting of the
346 monuments of the past are the ruins of the Bibi-Khanum mosque, which was built by one of Timur's wives, the Chinese princess Khanum. The best artists and architects were engaged for the erection of this building, which is imposing in its proportions and magnificence. This temple occupies a large area, and consists of three mosques, connected with each other by a square structure in which the cells and the auditorium of one of the largest medresses are located. The main entrance gates were at one time cast in bronze and covered with

361 inscriptions and arabesques. Later one of the
346 impecunious rulers of Bukhara had the gates melted down for coins. With the passing of time the walls of the building have cracked and fallen into ruin in many places. The western cupola is the best preserved part. Here the walls are covered with tile mosaics which are strikingly colorful, and in addition the design has been made very artistically and shows highly original taste. In some places the azure and gold are as fresh as though they
564] had been put on the walls only recently. In the middle of the building is a huge table of white marble on nine short legs. This table is turned toward the window behind which was the enclosed place of Timur's wife - Khanum. On the table lay a huge Koran, on pages of parchment, so that the wife of the terrible conqueror could read it from her window. Not far from this building they show the tomb of the founder herself, Khanum. But this tomb is scarcely remarkable, being a formless pile of ruins.

361 Not far outside the town are the extensive ruins of the summer palace of Timur, the Khoz-reti-Shakh-Zinda, where the former rulers of Samarkand went to worship, and then made their triumphal entrance into the town. Samarkand, like most of the Central Asian towns, is enclosed by a wall, which is 13 versts in length. The town has quite a regular square shape, on the western side of which is an extensive citadel, which itself is enclosed by a wall which is 8 feet (3½ arshins) high by 10½ feet (1½ sazhen's) at the base. The walls are crenelated, and have flanking projections. This citadel is the most extensive in all of

361 Central Asia. The circumference of the walls is 2½ versts, and the interior area occupies about 10 square versts. /440/ The Russian population lives in the citadel, and here also is the Russian church, which is nicely finished on the inside. Also in the citadel is the extensive court of the Emir, transformed into a hospital when Samarkand was taken. In this palace is the very famous stone said to be the throne of Timur. This stone is called kok-tash. (1)

1. Kok or kuk in Turkic means blue, green and grey.

It is set on a terrace bordered by an inside square court, which is paved by fire brick. The stone is greyish in color with dark veins. It has rather considerable dimensions, hewn in the shape of an oblong parallele piped on and decorated with carving. The rulers of Bukhara sat upon this stone when they took the reins of government into their hands.

Formerly there was a remarkable library in Samarkand, housed in a special building. The Armenian scholars believe that it contained a large collection of ancient Armenian books. But both the library and its building have disappeared without trace, as well as the Kalinder-khany, institute of higher learning, famous in its time, and the observatory Mirza-Ulugbegi. North of Samarkand, in the direction of the Zeravshan, there is an extensive area which is covered by the ruins of an ancient city and is now called Kala i Afrosiab (the fortress of Afrosiab).

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
435 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat,
437 rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

8:Kostenko 167-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361
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Types of factories, plants and other undertakings: (1)

1. According to evidence of Mr. Virskii, in Turkestanskii ezhegodnik (Turkestan Yearbook), IV, 1876.

a) Manufactories	Number
Cast-iron foundry	12
Soap boiling and fat melting	34
Leather	30
Pottery	37

b) Machine manufacture	
Taffeta	7
Mats	188
Cheap striped cotton	17
Silk scarves	3
'Alacha' /silk or halfsilk Turkish or Persian fabric/	4
'Adryas' /Bukharan and Persian halfsilk fabric with bright designs against a plain background/	27

c) Workshops and other undertakings	
Carpenters	42
Turners and Cabinetmakers	11
Weaving looms	7
Dye works	42
Bootmakers	162
Saddle makers	25
Gold and silver work	23
Makers of two-wheeled carriages	23
Horsehair ropes	17
Dye works for wood	15

8:Kostenko 168-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 Wooden combs	7
438 /442/ Water smoking pipes	8
Tailor shops	20
366 Copper wares	6
Smiths	56
Wattling and chiy (rush) weaving	12
Silk winding	15
Sesame oil manufacturers	23
Barbers	20
Bakers of flat cakes	33
Candy makers	7
Shops making pilaf and pil'mene	108
Tea shops	30
Commercial baths	7
Brick sarais (ovens)	4
Stalls at the bazaars	712
Bazaar places for traders	270
Various small stalls (dishes and utensils, horse trappings, clothing, iron, salt, dyes, cast iron, knives, wooden hoes, kettles, beef)	1,085

One should note that not all the factories and other undertakings mentioned here have the same arrangement as those in European Russia. These are no more than cottage industries, the trade of which is decidedly insignificant. The machines in all these undertakings are the most primitive, and there are no special accomodations in any of them. In the same hut where the proprietor lives he produces his wares. The figures on the number of the above undertakings certainly change often, if not every day.

8:Kostenko 169-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

Khodzhent (Leninabad)

361 The residents of Khodzhent consider
103 their town the oldest of all the towns in Central Asia, since it was founded according to legend by the daughter of Adam, whose name was Khodzhyanda. As a result, say the natives, the town was given the name of Khodzhent.

According to the explanation of some natives, who also consider Khodzhent one of the oldest towns in Central Asia, the /443/ town received the name of Khopchyant (from the two words khop and chyant) because it was built in a beautiful spot, and this is expressed in the words khop and chyant (very nice, beautiful) Later this was changed to Khodzhent. There also exists a third explanation for the name of Khodzhent; saying that it is a compound of the words hodja and kent, i.e., the village of hodjas. For in the town there are extremely many 'aksiyaks', men of the white bone (aristocracy), that is, hodjas.

361 Khodzhent, together with Ura-Tyube, Dzhizak and their regions, have always been a separate dominion, administered from time to time by independent begs. One of these, Ak Buta beg (Uzbek by birth), who ruled Khodzhent at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was particularly important. He was the first to reinforce the town, he built a citadel and divided the town into twenty-four wards. Gul'-bakh, the place of residence of the begs, was built by Shadman beg, born in Tashkent. Later, at the beginning of the present century, Khodzhent was taken by the ruler of Kokand, Alim Khan, and from that time it lost its

8:Kostenko 170-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

361 independence, being alternately under the rule of Kokand and the Bukharans until it was conquered by the Russians.

Although after he took Khodzhent, Alim Khan also conquered Tashkent and had a universal census taken there, this was never done in Khodzhent.

Khodzhent spreads out along the Syr-Darya river, which borders the town from the north and northwestern sides, and the town is surrounded from the east, south and southwest by gardens and plowed fields which take up a huge area. To the southwest they spread out approximately 6 to 7 versts, to the south 2 to 3 versts, to the east 7 to 8 versts. The town, which has a circumference of about 12 versts, is shaped like an irregular polygon, narrow in the middle part. The eastern half is much larger than the western. The town is surrounded on three sides by a double wall, and on the Syr-Darya side with a single wall, and it has eight gates. On the eastern side of the town are the Kalinau, Kazy and Kokand gates, and to the south are the Chervak, Chuyanchi, Char-Chrak and Machet'-Saur gates. There are no gates on the western /444/ side, and on the north the Yange-Darvuaza gate opens toward the Syr-Darya. There are many other small exits cut through the walls in addition to these gates.

As was mentioned above, Khodzhent was divided by Ak Buta Beg into 24 mahalas or wards, which were later subdivided into 80 mahalas. This is the present number of mahalas. Outside the town are 6 mahalas: 1) Undzhi,

•361 2) Ruman, 3) Kulangyr, 4) Sheikh Burkhan, 5) Pumchi-kur, 6) Gava or Kuruk, which are named after the aryks of greater or lesser importance which irrigate their plowed lands and gardens. These mahalas are formed from the outskirts of town which are laid out in gardens. Here part of the inhabitants live permanently and part move out from the town only for the summer.

Khodzhent is divided into two districts: Rozak on the west, and Kalinau on the east. The border line between them is taken as the aryk Mazar, which enters the town between the Chervak and Chuyanchi gates and flowes into the Syr-Darya near the Kalendar Khan mahala. The town is thus divided into two parts by this aryk. In one part, the Razak district, there are 2,800 dwellings together with the suburb mahalas Lova and Kuruk. In the other district of Kalinau, there are 3,000 dwellings including the remaining suburban mahalas. Cal-
[161] culating an average of 5 persons per house, one may infer that there are about 14,000 persons in the Razak district, and about 15,000 in the Kalinau district. Thus in the entire town of Khodzhent there are about 29,000 inhabitants. They are almost all Tadzhiks, except for about 100 Uzbeks, 50 Kashgarians, 30 Jews and 7 Hindus.

361 In Khodzhent there are many gardens in
247 addition to those which surround it from the outside. It is calculated that 733 tanaps (a tanap is 0.45 acres) in Khodzhent are in gardens. There is a particularly large number of gardens in the western part or district of town, Razak, which is larger in area than the Kalinau district although it has a smaller

361 population. In the Kalinau district the po-
247 pulation is more densely settled as a result of the fact that the largest of the two town bazaars is located there, and therefore practically all the trading estate lives /445/ in that district. In the Razak district the inhabitants work more in gardening.

361 Of the town buildings in Khodzhent,
346 three medresses of fire brick are particularly remarkable. One was begun by Ak Buta Beg, who was mentioned above, and finished by his wife Izyat Alyam, about 150 years ago. In this medresse one teacher (mudaris) instructs about 50 students, who live in 28 separate rooms. The remaining medresses were built 40 to 50 years ago. One was built by the Khodzhent Beg Shakhi Divan Begi, and has 23 apartments. In it there are about 40 students and 2 teachers The other medresse was built by Mukhamed Sadyk Alim, also with 23 lodgings, in which 30 students live and one teacher. These medresses are named for the persons who built them.

Of the medresses which are built not of firebrick but of clay the following are worthy of note. One is the medresse Namazga, which was built about 60 years ago by Beg Khaly Kum Mirza. In it are 23 lodgings, 2 teachers and about 50 students. Another is the medresse Hazret Sheik Maslah-Eddin, which was built about 20 years ago by Mirza Hakim Potavali, with 10 lodgings, in which there are 14 students A third is the medresse Mahomed-Hussar, built by the Beg Hash Barkan Bay, about 180 years ago. It contains 13 cells, in which one teacher instructs 30 students.

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[176] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built atmosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

8:Kostenko 174-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

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438
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Type of shop, workshop, etc. (1) Number

1. In Central Asian towns it is impossible to separate a shop from an industrial plant, because in most cases the manufacturer, or more accurately the craftsman works in his shop and also sells his wares there.

Silver products	4
Iron and iron mongers	13
Cast iron	6
Knives	5
Copper wares	8
Shops selling knives	7

Types of establishments	Number
Smithies	6
Leather factories	2
Sale of leather goods	23
Saddlers	5
Boots and footgear in general	54
Earthenware vessels	11
Tobacco (smoking)	15
Tobacco (snuff)	6
Oil producers	50
Sesame oil producers	22
Soap boilers	18
Stalls selling soap	8
/447/Candles	6
Meat	48
Cabinet makers	2
Dairy houses	32
Stalls with tea and sugar	22
Stalls with salt	5
Stalls with flour and grain crops	24
Rice	15

361
438
366

Types of establishments	Number
Fruit	27
Vegetables	4
Stalls with halva	10
Bakeries of flat cakes	12
Tea stalls	17
Stalls with thread	6
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	5
Woolen goods	9
Silk winding	20
Sawing	4
Silk weaving	95
Cotton weaving	115
Shops for finishing material of silk and cotton mixed	9
Stalls with silk textiles	7
Stalls with textiles of mixed silk and cotton	26
Stalls for khalats	10
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	5
Stalls with alacha /a kind of silk fabric/	6
Stalls with muslin and turbans	10
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	78
Money changing stalls	4
Barbers	4
Mills (1)	52

1. Rice mills are counted as mills.

361
366

There are two bazaars in Khodzhent: the big one and the small one. In the first

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[87] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later. as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

361 finally it became an independent dominion. This happened when the begs stopped recognizing the emir or khan as their sovereigns and ruled the town independently for a while until they finally fell under the rule of the neighboring khans again.

Ura-Tyube is situated at the foot of two elevations. On one of these stands a citadel, and on the slopes of the other is the northwestern part of the town. The town is about 6 versts in circumference, and is enclosed by a double wall which contains 7 gates: 1) Chakmak-tash; 2) Yase-Bak; 3) Say-Bala; 4) Kara-Bek; 5) Darvoaza-Bala; 6) Darvoaza-Nidzhsany; 7) Saypayak.

/449/ The town is divided into 'Guzars', of which there are 58 and which correspond to the mahalas of Khodzhent. This division into Guzars has existed for a long time, but it is not known when and by whom it was introduced and what factors were taken into account when it was done, since the guzars are unequal both in size and in number of population. In the town there are almost no gardens, so that all the houses are crowded close together. They are distributed mostly on side streets, which are entered through large wooden gates. The bazaar is placed almost in the middle of the town and occupies a large area.

361 346 Of the town buildings two medresses which are constructed of firebrick are worthy of note. One is the Kok-Gumbes medresse, which has 17 lodgings (cells) in which 6 teachers instruct 20 students. This medresse was built 320 years ago by Abdul Latyf sultan. The

361 other, which is the completely new Rustam beg
346 medresse, was built about 15 years ago. In its 49 separate apartments live 50 students, who are instructed by 4 teachers. There are two remaining medresses built of clay. In the Namazga medresse there are 12 apartments for 30 students which were built by the two begs Mohammed Rakhim Attalyk and Khudoyar Vallyami, and 18 other lodgings for 25 students, built by another beg. The mosque at this medresse was built by the first two begs out of firebrick. It has four teachers. At the fourth medresse, built by the Beg Said Gaza Hodja, there are 12 apartments for 15 students, who are instructed by 1 teacher.

361 There are 1,398 houses in Ura-Tyube and
162 the population is counted as 4,804 persons of both sexes. The predominating nationality is Tadzhik. After them come the Uzbeks with 900 persons. There are in addition 6 Jews and 12 Hindus in the town. Not having their own households they live permanently in caravanseries which belong to them.

There are no other native peoples in the town. The Kazakhs never settle there but travel only to the bazaar to sell wood, coal and cattle and to buy such necessary objects for themselves which they are unable to produce in their own domestic industry, and indeed their own produce does not satisfy almost all their needs.

361 /450/ Outside the town, to the south, west, north and northeast, there are the gardens and plowed land of the town dwellers, who move out in the summer to these gardens, so that

361 in summer the town is almost deserted.

In addition, separate groups of houses are scattered among these gardens, called all together Char mahala, where the proprietors live almost permanently, summer and winter. Char mahala constitutes 17 separate groups of houses.

361 There are 854 stalls, industrial and
438 manufacturing plants in Ura-Tyube.

366 This number is split up into the following categories:

Types of establishment	Number
Silver wares	3
Iron and iron mongers	14
Cast iron	4
Knives	7
Copper	5
Stalls selling knives	10
Smithies	7
Leather works	2
Stalls selling leather goods	15
Saddlers	4
Boots and footgear in general	40
Factories for production of clay vessels	10
Stalls selling smoking tobacco	14
Stalls selling snuff	5
Oil manufacturers	45
Stalls with sesame oil	24
Soap boiling factories	11
Stalls with soap	3
Candle workshops	9
Meat stalls	61

3:Kostenko 180-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1
[Ura-Tyube]

Types of establishments (ctd)	Number	
		361
/451/Cabinet makers	2	438
Milk stalls	28	366
Stalls with tea and sugar	40	
Stalls with salt	23	
Stalls with flour and grain	11	
Stalls with rice	22	
Fruit	46	
Stalls with vegetables	16	
Stalls with halva	4	
Bakeries of flat cakes	8	
Tea stalls (kharcheven)	25	
Stalls with thread	2	
Dye works	24	
Stalls with paint	9	
Furriers	4	
Woolen goods	25	
Sawing	3	
Cotton weaving	98	
Finishers shops for mixed cotton and silk material	7	
Stalls with silk textiles	5	
Stalls with mixed silk and cotton textiles	19	
Stalls with khalat textiles	13	
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10	
Stalls with mats	9	
Stalls with alacha /kind of silk fabric/	4	
Stalls with muslin and turbans	7	
Stalls with lining goods	10	
Stalls with textiles	25	
Money changers' stalls	18	
Barbershops	10	
Mills	73	

RL1
8:Kostenko 181-G-4, 5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

[Ura-Tyube]

361 There is one bazaar in the town, which
[366] contains 642 stalls. There are two bazaar days a week; Wednesday and Sunday.

There are three caravanseries, of which two are Sart and one is for Jews and Hindus.

Of the advanced schools (medresses)
[368] there are 4, and the lower schools number 35.

[452] There are 122 mosques altogether. Of these 9 large mosques perform the public prayers on Fridays. There are 147 clergymen serving at the mosques.

1: von Schwarz--14a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 366 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 173).

291 369 363 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

363 Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for the streets
361 of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiquitous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets, running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch. Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very uncomfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy road safely.

[491] In the towns, bridges are built only over those of the numerous brooks and canals with banks which are too high and steep to walk or ride over easily. Otherwise it is left to the pedestrian to get through the water as
[492] best he can. This is based on the fact that in Turkestan every halfway respectable person, man, woman and child is mounted and only the poorest beggars and tramps go on foot; for these there is no pity if they must walk with bare feet through the ice cold water and the knee-deep mud, in the winter.

In Tashkent the streets in the Sart town are considerably better than in many other Central Asian towns, but even here the conditions are such, that among other things, once eleven women drowned in

363 the main street as a result of an unlucky chance that just as they
361 were passing through a bottomless mire their carriage broke down and they were unable to work their way out of the soft mud. More than once have I witnessed riders sunk to the waist in the soft ground, and once I saved the life of a youth near the bazaar who fell head first into mud a meter thick when his horse stumbled, and only his legs stuck out. In most recent times, thanks to the efforts of the Russian /169/ administration, the street conditions have improved considerably, but they still leave much to be desired. A fundamental improvement is impossible /Figure 60. Caption: The main street of Tashkent. / without quite disproportionate costs, for the loess base, which becomes bottomless every winter, makes paving and macadamizing far more /170/ difficult, as the Russians have often enough discovered in the laying out of the streets in their town.

A basic fault of the Turkestan streets is that, with the exception of the few main streets, they are so narrow that two carriages cannot pass each other and always one of the two vehicles which meet must back up until he succeeds in passing through a side alley. On bazaar days traffic jams lasting for hours often occur as a result of this. Four-wheeled wagons cannot be used at all in such narrow alleys because one cannot turn around with them. This bad situation is clearly caused by the fact that the street inside the town wall had to be used sparingly in order not to increase the circumference of the town walls too much. For otherwise the Central Asian towns have a disproportionately large expansion since all the houses consist only of a ground floor, and are always surrounded by more or less extensive courts and even gardens.

363 If the streets in Central Asian towns are bad enough for these
351 reasons, their unfavorable aspect is increased substantially by the
361 fact that there are no houses along them but only uniform courtyard walls of yellow clay the endless monotony of which is broken only here and there by a tiny gate which one would sooner take for the entrance to a pigsty than to a human dwelling. For the dwelling houses are all located within the courts, and even the view of the courts, when one opens the gate off the street, is cut off, for behind each gate is a special wall. The height of the court walls which enclose the streets on both sides is arranged so that one cannot see over even when on horseback or riding a camel; they are, therefore, usually three to three and a half meters high. The streets which lead through the dwelling quarter inside the town walls differ in no way

1: von Schwarz--18a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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

Fig. 8. The main street of Tashkent.

from those passing between the gardens and fields outside the circular 363
walls, since the latter are enclosed in walls exactly like those around 351
the dwellings within the town. Therefore, upon entering a strange town 361
the only way to tell whether one is still among the fields and gardens, or already between the rows of houses, is on the basis of whether one has passed through the town gate. In all Central Asian towns the streets are crooked, and continue in a perpetual zigzag, the natives have no notion of a regular arrangement of rows of streets, and preliminary plans in the erection of houses. Only the main streets of Tashkent, which /171/ lead from the bazaar to the outlying districts have a semblance of regularity, although they also possess numerous bends and turns.

The terrible monotony of the streets in Sart Tashkent is only 361
broken here and there by a mosque or 'medrese' /religious school/, by isolated tombs which are found in the middle of the town along the roads, by the rising or downward slope of the ground, and by the many streams, sometimes flowing in deep ravines, which cut across the entire town in all directions. In this respect Tashkent makes a much better impression, in spite of everything, than /Figure 61. p.19a Caption: Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ most of the other towns of Turkestan, most of which lie in more or less level terrain.

Concerning the traffic in the streets of Tashkent, this differs 363
greatly in different parts of the town. In the side streets one sees only 361
isolated riders or strollers; the main streets leading to the bazaar, especially on market days, are filled all day long with endless lines of camel, horse and donkey caravans, wagons, and riders of horses, donkeys and camels, through which it is often difficult to make one's way, even with the assiduous use of the horsewhip. This means is not used only by the Russians, but also and even more widely by the natives /172/ themselves, for in Turkestan everyone who is prominent, either [554] through rank or wealth, considers himself entitled to enforce his precedence, by the 'ultima ratio' of the 'nagaika,' /whip/ over less fortunate creatures, while the victims of this treatment consider it perfectly in order and use it themselves against those still lower in rank. Yielding is considered a sign of weakness by the Central Asians, and there is no better way of gaining their respect than a show of arrogance and the use of brute force. The Russians, therefore, are born, as it were, to the rule of the Central Asians.

1: von Schwarz--19a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

363

Fig. 1. Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher.

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

361 their steep banks, pathways and narrow roads,
the snakes winding over the precipices, all
133 this makes an unforgettable impression. With
every step the views change, as though in a
kaleidoscope and appear more and more striking
and more effective.

[137] In the Alatau mountains the spruce is
the tree which grows in the greatest abundance.
After it, but much less abundant, are the apple
trees, the apricots, the 'dzhida', the ashtrees,
the juniper and even the birch.

361 The town of Vernyy is divided into the
following parts: the Almata station (the old
part of the town), the Almata settlement, the
Tatar suburb, and Novyy (New town), actually
the town which has developed since the beginning
of the 1870s.

The latter part consists to a consider-
able degree of stone, or, more precisely, brick
buildings, while the old parts of the town are
built up exclusively of spruce wood.

Both the old and the new town have been
[363] planned regularly. The streets are straight,
level and wide, in most cases planted (although
quite sparsely) with trees. There are often
small gardens near the houses.

361 The wooden houses of Vernyy, which look
like Russian huts with wooden roofs, are almost
342 all cold, first of all because they are caulked
up not with moss (1) but with hay, which /421/
partly rots, and is partly dragged apart by the
birds, for which reason cracks are always forming
in the walls.

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

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364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets,
nor about the purity of the water flowing through
the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the
[164] street or into the aryk. As a result both the
air and the water are infected and transmit,
one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which
exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy,
Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis,
727 goiter). In general /391/ our military admini-
stration in Turkestan has never billeted army
detachments in the native towns and villages,
first, because of the poor construction of the
[609] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness
of the population, who have not yet mixed at
all with the conquerors, and who, according to
their religious law, almost never permit stran-
gers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity,
712 occupy only such native dwellings as those
which are confiscated and can be made suitable
for European habitation. In most cases they
have occupied the homes of former rulers or
begs who have fled, and whose property conse-
quently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either
as barracks or as military hospitals. The
adaptation has consisted of putting in large
windows, installing ventilation, and so on.
The Russians who occupied Tashkent built bar-
racks for the army in the native manner, i.e.,
with the framework type of construction. But
they soon discarded this system and began to
build both the military buildings and the
living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a
regular manner.

[Vernyy]

361 132 of the Alatau peaks, which are always covered with snow.

[164] The sudden change of temperature during the day causes intermittent fevers, which also constitutes the main sickness in Vernyy. Diarrhea is added to this in the summer, resulting from eating too much ripe and moderately unripe fruit.

361 364 /419/ The lack of endorsement of measures to keep the air and water pure also has a bad effect on the health of the residents from time to time. Every kind of filth and impurity is left uncovered, either in the courtyards or in the streets, or they throw it into the water, so that both the air and the water are poisoned. The Kalmyks play a particularly active part in this. They are known for their unusual slovenliness, and are settled both in the town and on the outskirts along the Almatinka river.

361 132 The prevailing winds are the northwest, from Lake Balkhash, and the east wind, which blows in the spring. The former carries with it the sand, picked up from the dry and sandy Bet Pak Dala steppe and brings rain clouds.

Apples ripen at the beginning of August in Vernyy and apricots in the second half of June, while rye and wheat ripen in July.

The mean temperature of Vernyy, as determined by Golubev in 1861 is 7° centigrade. The city of Marseilles, which is situated on almost the same latitude as Vernyy, has a median annual temperature of 14.1° centigrade so that plums, peaches and tomatoes will grow there, but not at Vernyy. Yet vineyards grow here with some success.

361 soap, mirrors, wooden combs, dirty tobacco,
443 needles, handfuls of two Russian candies, etc. These wares are gathered up at night and spread out again in the morning. 3) Hawking, carried about in baskets or simply in the hands. To this category belongs the sale of eggs, fruit, birds, etc.

There are practically no proper goods in Kuldja now. Up until 1866 one could find Chinese silk textiles, porcelain articles, and precious stones here. Now decent textiles and porcelain have gradually become an archeological rarity and are much more expensive.

After our occupation of Kuldja a special article of trade were the Chinese "burkhans" (small copper or cast iron representations of gods). But even the burkhans have all been sold.

361 This town, which is dirty and unattractive
364 from the outside, appears even filthier inside, that is, in the courtyards and the houses. The courtyards are filled with every sort of refuse, and in the houses the dirt and disorder is beyond imagination. Even the lodgings of the rich and those who are comfortably well off suffer from the absence of light, ventilation and cleanliness. In addition the Chinese houses are distinguished by some sort of a special sharp odor, peculiar to them.

/433/ Of the public buildings in Kuldja, in addition to the two mosques, mentioned above[1] the Chinese temple of idols is worthy of mention. The entrance to the temple leads through several dirty courts. In the front court in a dark hovel is the school where the children gather to study

[1] [See category 116, p. 151 — Analyst]

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

or citadel which was blown up by the Russians immediately after 712
the capture of the town. It was located on the upper left bank of 361
the Bos-su canal, and the site today is within the Russian town and barracks and various public and private buildings are built on it.

2. The Bazaar

The bazaar has a meaning for the Central Asians which it is 366
difficult for the European to grasp properly. The Central Asian spends the greater part of his life in the bazaar, and for him it takes the place of our newspapers, restaurants, coffeehouses, townhalls, amusement places, stock exchanges, law courts, etc. At the bazaar the entire public life and a great part of the private life of the male urban population takes place, and day in, day out, in winter and summer almost the entire population, when it is not occupied with work in the fields, is gathered in the bazaar. The bazaar is the real home of the townsman; since his private dwelling serves him primarily as a lodging for the night, and as a depository for his property and his wives and children, he therefore expends relatively /161/ little trouble on it.
/Figure 55. Caption: Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace. /
p.130a

The arrangement of the bazaars is the same everywhere, and 361
the bazaars of the different towns differ from each other only /162/ 366
in size. The bazaar in Tashkent is one of the largest in all Central Asia, containing about four thousand shops and workshops. The streets of the bazaar are relatively wide and mostly covered with reed mats, which are spread along beams diagonally placed over the streets from one row of stalls to another. The result is a pleasant twilight and a refreshing coolness, which is increased by a constant sprinkling of the bazaar streets with water. It is a beneficent contrast to the dazzling sunlight and the stifling ovenlike heat of the nearby streets leading into the dwelling quarters. (Figure 56).
p.140a

The booths which range along both sides of the bazaar streets, 347
serving either for selling goods or as workshops for the various craftsmen, all look alike and have nothing in common with European shops. They are rooms two and a half to three meters high, four and a half to six meters long, and from two to two and a half meters deep, which are completely open to the street. The walls are made of clay or else of reed screens spread over on both sides with clay. The roof also is

1: von Schwarz --13a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig.11. Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace.

347 made only of beams, reeds and clay. The floor of the booth is usually raised a few feet above the street level, as is the small footpath which runs along the booths. The booths serve, without difficulty as places to sell all kinds of ware, or as workshops for all kinds of handicrafts, in effect whole industries are carried on at the bazaar. There are no windows or doors in the bazaar stalls, so that the merchants and craftsmen carry on their business all year round in all weather in these places, enclosed by only three walls. At night the shops are closed either by a boarded partition or by folding screens made of reeds. Those merchants who are unable to take all their wares home with them every evening spend the night in their shops, both winter and summer.

Merchants and craftsmen sit on the floor during their work on reed mats or blankets, with their legs crossed, sitting either inside the booth or on the footpath which leads into the booths (Figure 57, p. 15a, p. 165). The buyers also take their places on the ground beside the merchants, unless they prefer, for the sake of greater convenience to undertake the selection of wares on horseback, in which case the wares are brought out one by one to be inspected from the horse. Naturally, since in winter it is not particularly comfortable to sit on the ground which is soaked through, there are a few wooden benches covered with blankets or carpets for the greater comfort of the public in front of the better shops, especially tea houses, and eating places, /163/ (Figure 58, p. 15a, p. 165), and on these one can take his place with his legs crossed and conclude his business comfortably. /Figure 56, p. 14a. Caption: Covered bazaar streets/

●366 443 A peculiarity of Central Asian bazzars is the strict separation of various industries and various types of goods /164/ from each other, which makes the search for and the choice of the necessary wares far easier for the buying public. One row of booths is, for example, exclusively devoted to clothing merchants, the next occupied by merchants in cotton material, the third by silk merchants; furs, linen, boots, saddles, metal wares, crockery, vegetables, fruit, meat, in short, everything there is to buy can be bought only in one specific row of booths. In the same manner all the eating places are in one row, where they prepare their national dishes right out on the street before all eyes: 'Plov' /pilaf/, 'pelmene' /small meat dumplings/, 'shashlik' and 'lepeshki' /small meal cakes/; and they poison the air far around with their burned 'shaffet' and 'kunshut' /sesame/ oil.

The handicrafts, like the wares are all organized strictly according to categories. In one street the kettle and teapot smiths make an

366
363

[Tashkent]

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[295] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, [305] insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.

485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

1: von Schwarz--15a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

361
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Fig. 57. Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent.

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

Fig. 58. Wooden platform.

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian
366 bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 173).

291 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the
369 streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining
363 as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

341 buildings come out crooked and not beautiful. There are no architects and everyone builds as he knows best. The living quarters are in general somber, damp and dark, which gives birth to eye diseases, in addition to which,
363 the houses are not solid. The streets in the towns are crooked and narrow, so much so that the native vehicle, the two wheeled 'arba', can pass only on the main streets. On the side streets a horseman often has difficulty getting through.

The main streets are sometimes improved with cobblestones, but these pavements rarely protect a town from the mud.

366 Stalls, tea-houses and barber shops extend along both sides of the main street leading from the main gates to the middle of the town, to the trading square. This square is usually called 'rigistan'.

312 The towns and villages are provided with water from 'aryks' (irrigation canals) which also serve to irrigate the neighboring gardens, fields and kitchen gardens. Wells help the aryks as well.

361 The general appearance of the populated places makes a very unattractive impression. The only adornment of Central Asian settlements is a mass of verdure which in most cases covers the towns and villages.

364 The conditions of life in all the settlements are just as inconvenient as the native houses from the hygienic point of view. The population does not worry in the least about

361 are grouped in the districts in accordance with their occupations. Of course in each district one can also find other occupations (blacksmiths, bootmakers, etc.), but they are much less developed than the specific industry. The extent of the town is so great that many of its residents never learn to know all its winding streets, even though they live there a whole lifetime.

The figures for all the buildings in Asiatic Tashkent are as follows:

Houses occupied by the residents	13,260
Empty courts and separate courts for non-residents	322
Sheds (including 519 stalls)	23
[368] /410/ Medresses	8
Baths	8
Mosques	255
Flour mills	116
Crushing mills	42

[366] Booths in the large bazaar:

Occupied by traders	2324
Empty booths	307
Booths in the town streets	594
Empty booths in the town streets	96

Booths occupied by Sarts in Russian Tashkent	69

361 The population of Asiatic Tashkent ac-
162 cording to the census of 1868 was:

8:Kostenko 123-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

8:Kostenko 137-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 1. In Russia, as we know, a special
342 kind of moss is used for this purpose, which is called kukushkin len (cuckoo flax).

Secondly, the wooden floors and ceilings, as they shrink, acquire cracks, which also admit the cold. In addition the inhabitants do not know the use of double windows in winter.(1)

1. One must add the danger of fire to the inconveniences of the wooden structures. In 1871 there were three fires in Vernyy with losses figured at 3,462 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The number of buildings in Vernyy are as follows:

Types of buildings	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches (2)	1	1

2. A cathedral is being built, for which the foundation is already laid.

Mosques	-	1
Houses	234	972
Uninhabited buildings	4	9
[366] Stalls		226
Bins and Booths		164
Eating establishments (3)		21

3. Some of these are built of adobe clay and some of softened clay.

Mills		62
Total number of buildings	239	1,456

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches		1
Houses	1	678
[366] Stores and Stalls		55
Mills		32
Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar dominions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

8: Kostenko 144-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 438

Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
[433] Distillery	1	146,000 gal.	171,000	145
Brewery	1	5,700 gal.	1,540	5
Leather	3	23,659 pieces	82,774	57
Brick	11	520,000 pieces	7,800	52
Vodka	1	5,500 gal.	7,524	6
Total	17	-	270,638	265

361 441 738 The commerce of Vernyy is developing quite perceptibly, due to the favorable position of the town at the junction of roads from Kuldja to Tashkent and to Kokand, and from Kashgar to Semipalatinsk. Formerly the caravans passed through Vernyy without stopping. In recent times they have begun to be unloaded for roadside sale. In addition, many merchants from Tashkent and neighboring dominions have come here purposely for continuous trade.

In the environs of Vernyy every year there is a considerable purchase of animals from the Kazakhs, not only for Tashkent and Kuldja, but also for Petropavlovsk, which is over 1200 versts away.

[366] At the present time there are two bazaars in Vernyy: a large and a small one. The total number of stalls in 1871 came to 390, whereas in 1863 there were only 50, and in 1859 about 20.

361 438 The trade in Vernyy is developing in proportion to the strengthening of tranquility

In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi
361 one (in the fortress), and the Chinese (in
366 the outskirts). The bazaars differ from the Central Asian ones in that the stalls are somewhat more roomy and counters have been installed, which obstruct the entrance and divide the interior premises from the buyers. The bazaar streets are not covered above, as a result of which they are not protected from rain or heat. In the Chinese bazaar women often trade in the stalls, and here occasionally one sees flowers, a purely Chinese feature, since in the Central Asian Moslem towns the sale of flowers would be considered the height of absurdity.

[265] In the Chinese part of town there are several restaurants at the bazaar in which those who wish can eat their fill for about 20 kopecks; the hungry man gorges himself on sweets. In these restaurants a remarkable variety of dishes is prepared. In order to enter a restaurant one must first pass through the kitchen, which is directly on the street to arouse the olfactory senses of the passer-by. In spite of the fact that the kitchens are kept very tidy and the preparation of the food is quite clean, a sharp and suffocating smell announces the presence of a restaurant at quite a long distance, and a European must have very strong nerves to bear this smell for very long.

[363] The main streets in town are paved with
[312] small stones. Aryks are laid out among them, nicely laid with brick. On the whole, the town is miserable and dirty, and the Chinese section is particularly dirty. However the movement of people is greater in the Chinese section, while in the Taranchi bazaar the staid Moslems sit sedately in their booths, yawning and

361 shooing away the flies with a special instru-
366 ment, a whisk made of hair, attached to a handle. In the Chinese bazaar there is constant movement, bustle and noise. The vendors of wares cry out and invite the customers in. Hordes of children some half-naked, some completely naked, scurry back and forth.

In a group of men the Chinese women stand out in their original costumes, on their tiny misshapen, squeezed little feet, on which they walk with difficulty, as though on stilts, tottering sideways.

/432/ With every step one runs into vendors, carrying all their goods in one hand, and charging two or three kopecks for it. Here is an unbelievably dirty urchin holding a piece of mutton on his finger, yelling with all his might, announcing his wares../sic/

The greatest crowding, noise and throng takes place in the so-called row of eating houses, where various food is sold. A beggar can satisfy his appetite for some three or four kopecks here. Having satisfied their hunger, Chinese beggars lie down somewhere in the shade along the booths and spend the whole day doing nothing.

361 Trade at the Chinese bazaar is divided
443 into three categories:

1) The permanent trade, which is carried on in booths, and in which the more valuable articles are sold: mats, cotton prints, tea, sugar, iron, etc. 2) Mobile trade, on small tables set up in front of the booths. Here the articles sold are already cheaper: ordinary

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
438 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat,
439 rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

8:Kostenko 167-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkesta:
[Samarkand] RL1

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Types of factories, plants and other undertakings: (1)

1. According to evidence of Mr. Virskii, in Turkestanskii ezhegodnik (Turkestan Yearbook), IV, 1876.

a) Manufactories	Number
Cast-iron foundry	12
Soap boiling and fat melting	34
Leather	30
Pottery	37

b) Machine manufacture	
Taffeta	7
Mats	188
Cheap striped cotton	17
Silk scarves	3
'Alacha' /silk or halfsilk Turkish or Persian fabric/	4
'Adryas' /Bukharan and Persian halfsilk fabric with bright designs against a plain background/	27

c) Workshops and other undertakings	
Carpenters	42
Turners and Cabinetmakers	11
Weaving looms	7
Dye works	42
Bootmakers	162
Saddle makers	25
Gold and silver work	23
Makers of two-wheeled carriages	23
Horsehair ropes	17
Dye works for wood	15

[Samarkand]

		RL1
361	Wooden combs	7
438	/442/ Water smoking pipes	8
	Tailor shops	20
366	Copper wares	6
	Smiths	56
	Wattling and chiy (rush) weaving	12
	Silk winding	15
	Sesame oil manufacturers	23
	Barbers	20
	Bakers of flat cakes	33
	Candy makers	7
	Shops making pilaf and pil'mene	108
	Tea shops	30
	Commercial baths	7
	Brick sarais (ovens)	4
	Stalls at the bazaars	712
	Bazaar places for traders	270
	Various small stalls (dishes and utensils, horse trappings, clothing, iron, salt, dyes, cast iron, knives, wooden hoes, kettles, beef)	1,085

One should note that not all the factories and other undertakings mentioned here have the same arrangement as those in European Russia. These are no more than cottage industries, the trade of which is decidedly insignificant. The machines in all these undertakings are the most primitive, and there are no special accomodations in any of them. In the same hut where the proprietor lives he produces his wares. The figures on the number of the above undertakings certainly change often, if not every day.

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[176] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built a mosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

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Type of shop, workshop, etc. (1) Number

1. In Central Asian towns it is impossible to separate a shop from an industrial plant, because in most cases the manufacturer, or more accurately the craftsman works in his shop and also sells his wares there.

Silver products	4
Iron and iron mongers	13
Cast iron	6
Knives	5
Copper wares	8
Shops selling knives	7

Types of establishments	Number
Smithies	6
Leather factories	2
Sale of leather goods	23
Saddlers	5
Boots and footgear in general	54
Earthenware vessels	11
Tobacco (smoking)	15
Tobacco (snuff)	6
Oil producers	50
Sesame oil producers	22
Soap boilers	18
Stalls selling soap	8
/447/Candles	6
Meat	48
Cabinet makers	2
Dairy houses	32
Stalls with tea and sugar	22
Stalls with salt	5
Stalls with flour and grain crops	24
Rice	15

8: Kostenko 175-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

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Types of establishments	Number
Fruit	27
Vegetables	4
Stalls with halva	10
Bakeries of flat cakes	12
Tea stalls	17
Stalls with thread	6
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	5
Woolen goods	9
Silk winding	20
Sawing	4
Silk weaving	95
Cotton weaving	115
Shops for finishing material of silk and cotton mixed	9
Stalls with silk textiles	7
Stalls with textiles of mixed silk and cotton	26
Stalls for khalats	10
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	5
Stalls with alacha /a kind of silk fabric/	6
Stalls with muslin and turbans	10
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	78
Money changing stalls	4
Barbers	4
Mills (1)	52

1. Rice mills are counted as mills.

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There are two bazaars in Khodzhent: the big one and the small one. In the first

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[371] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later. as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

361 in summer the town is almost deserted.

In addition, separate groups of houses are scattered among these gardens, called all together Char mahala, where the proprietors live almost permanently, summer and winter. Char mahala constitutes 17 separate groups of houses.

361 There are 854 stalls, industrial and
438 manufacturing plants in Ura-Tyube.

366 This number is split up into the followin categories:

Types of establishment	Number
Silver wares	3
Iron and iron mongers	14
Cast iron	4
Knives	7
Copper	5
Stalls selling knives	10
Smithies	7
Leather works	2
Stalls selling leather goods	15
Saddlers	4
Boots and footgear in general	40
Factories for production of clay vessels	10
Stalls selling smoking tobacco	14
Stalls selling snuff	5
Oil manufacturers	45
Stalls with sesame oil	24
Soap boiling factories	11
Stalls with soap	3
Candle workshops	9
Meat stalls	61

3: Kostenko 180-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1
[Ura-Tyube]

Types of establishments (ctd)	Number
/451/Cabinet makers	2
Milk stalls	28
Stalls with tea and sugar	40
Stalls with salt	23
Stalls with flour and grain	11
Stalls with rice	22
Fruit	46
Stalls with vegetables	16
Stalls with halva	4
Bakeries of flat cakes	8
Tea stalls (kharcheven)	25
Stalls with thread	2
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	4
Woolen goods	25
Sawing	3
Cotton weaving	98
Finishers shops for mixed cotton and silk material	7
Stalls with silk textiles	5
Stalls with mixed silk and cotton textiles	19
Stalls with khalat textiles	13
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	9
Stalls with alacha /kind of silk fabric/	4
Stalls with muslin and turbans	7
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	25
Money changers' stalls	18
Barbershops	10
Mills	73

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RL1
8:Kostenko 181-G-4, 5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

[Ura-Tyube]

361 There is one bazaar in the town, which
[366] contains 642 stalls. There are two bazaar days a week; Wednesday and Sunday.

There are three caravanseries, of which two are Sart and one is for Jews and Hindus.

Of the advanced schools (medresses)
[368] there are 4, and the lower schools number 35.

[452] There are 122 mosques altogether. Of these 9 large mosques perform the public prayers on Fridays. There are 147 clergymen serving at the mosques.

8:Kostenko 116-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Ganah-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since
[574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district[2] according to the
[441] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty
[308] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[458] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[504] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

8:Kostenko 123-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

576 wear, soiled from the filth of the unpaved streets, before entering
36 a dwelling. For one does not sit on chairs in the dwellings of the natives or in the mosques, but simply sits on the floor. Consequently they do not demand of the Europeans that they pull off their boots before entering a mosque.

346 There are two types of mosques in Turkestan; the large cupola structures of firebricks with high facades and broad gate arches, most of which go back to the time of Tamerlane (Figure 70, p. 199 and Figure 71, p. 200), and the modern mosques, which consist of simple buildings, similar to an ordinary dwelling, with adjoining colonnades, like the one shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). In Tashkent there are only two mosques of the first type: the old half-ruined mosque, Hodja Akhrar, the mosaics of which are still partly preserved and prove that it was built in the same style as the Tamerlane mosque in Samarkand, and the more recent /203 Figure 73. Caption: The Interior of a Mosque in Bukhara. //204/Beklyar Beg mosque, which dominates the bazaar.

All the other mosques in Tashkent, and their number reaches 255, are more or less similar to the Maxim mosque, shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). As a rule they consist of one greater or smaller chamber, constructed of firebrick or simply of clay, and an adjoining portico with carved wooden columns and a level wooden roof. The floor of the portico is always raised several feet above the surrounding court. Sometimes there is no closed space at all, and the mosque then consists solely of a shelter, open in the front with walls constructed of clay. The interior of the mosques (Figure 73, p. 203), exhibits as a rule no decorations nor objects of furnishing, and the walls are in most cases not whitewashed even once. An elevation consisting of some steps built of bricks or clay serves as a pulpit for the mullah who is speaking. The mosques are always oriented in such a way that the wall opposite the entrance, toward which the supplicants turn during the prayer, whenever possible is perpendicular to the direction facing Mecca. Also in their prayers outside the mosque, the Moslems always seek to face toward Mecca, and in this connection they take the matter so seriously, that I have been asked by the inhabitants of all the towns I have visited during my travels, to indicate to them by means of my astronomic instruments as exactly as possible the direction toward Mecca. In every mosque there is a court or

8:Kostenko 116-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since [574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the [161] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty [368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

361 flow. The plowed land belonging to Sibzor
312 is irrigated by water which is led from the Zakh aryk and Bos-Su, as we have mentioned before.

361 The chief productivity of this district
438 of the town is making boots. The boots made by the inhabitants of the Sibzor district are distributed even to other towns in the territory. After this comes weaving and the decoration of cotton materials. The inhabitants have worked at the last two occupations for a very long time. The most important class of people, as regards wealth, are the herdsmen. The residents of all four settlements are agriculturists, as well as the people of the Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-sarai, Yau, Sibzor and Kazy-kucha mahalas.

361 /408/ Three medresses (higher insti-
368 tutions of learning): Beklyar-beg, Barakhon, and Kizyl-Kurgan, with about 260 students, make up almost all the educational provision of this part of the town. In addition to the medresses there are also schools (mekhtebe) here, located in private houses.

There are ten major mosques: Odin-mechet, Okhun-guzar, Khatyn-mechet, Mazar-khan, Muimu-barek, Khonoki, Tokhtonun, Rebot, Khodji-Toroskon and Kara-saray.

361 Kukcha, the western part of the town, consists of thirty-one mahalas: Khafiz, Guyaki, Kuttut, Kupryuk-bashi, Big and Little Sauvan, Chakara, Tyapi, Kunzhak, Chagatai, Psyakchi, Chikchiman, Tokle-dzhalob, Kalalan, Ishkuvat, two Langars, Uzgan, Kisya-kurgan, Khuavon,

8:Kostenko 119-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Chukchi, Kunchi, Padikhan, Chukur-Kishlak, Sara-khundan, Kukchi, Abnazar, Ailish, Khalimkup, Damak and Yangy. In all these mahalas together, there are 2511 houses with a population of 22,088. Three main streets cut through this part of town: Sauvan, Kukcha and Chagatai. There are four main [312] aryks which irrigate the Kukcha district: the Keikaus, which enters from the Sibzor district, the Zakh aryk, the Kara-kamysh, and the Dzhangag. The last branches off from the Keikaus at the Lyabzak gates and divides the town into two sections.

The land on which this part of the town is laid out is quite hilly. It is cut through with deep trenches and has many gardens, situated both inside and outside the town. The main [938] production of the Kukcha district is leather working. Thus of the 695 workshops in 1871, 341 were in leather, and 218 were for bootmaking. After this there are 6 brick factories, 7 places making earthenware vessels, 22 mills for grinding and crushing, and also 22 oil manufacturing [368] places. There are two medresses in this part of the town and 34 schools. There are 51 mosques and 18 tombs, of which one, Sheikh Zenedzhin-Baba, deserves attention for its antiquity. The Sheikh came from Bagdad and was buried here 400 years ago.

The Bish-agach district, in the southern corner of the town, consists of 32 mahalas: Yany-Bakhan, Kamalan, Chakar, Darkhan, Zivak-khish-kupryuk, Balyan-mechet, Sarparaz, Char-su, Ishan-Guzar, Samarkand, Okshi, Darbaza, Zenfata, Millyar, /409/ Chupan-ata, Suzugata, Sary-chapak, Dzhillik-mechet, Uzbek, Mirza-khazy, Gul'-bazar, Kugurmach, Ters-aryk, Kuk-mechet, Kul'gulyk,

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

361 are grouped in the districts in accordance with their occupations. Of course in each district one can also find other occupations (blacksmiths, bootmakers, etc.), but they are much less developed than the specific industry. The extent of the town is so great that many of its residents never learn to know all its winding streets, even though they live there a whole lifetime.

The figures for all the buildings in Asiatic Tashkent are as follows:

Houses occupied by the residents	13,260
Empty courts and separate courts for non-residents	322
Sheds (including 519 stalls)	23
[368] /410/ Medresses	8
Baths	8
Mosques	255
Flour mills	116
Crushing mills	42

[366] Booths in the large bazaar:

Occupied by traders	2324
Empty booths	307
Booths in the town streets	594
Empty booths in the town streets	96

Booths occupied by Sarts in Russian Tashkent 69

361 The population of Asiatic Tashkent ac-
162 cording to the census of 1868 was:

8:Kostenko 123-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Syr-Darya oblast' are in Tashkent. The Russian town has been built very regularly and originally. The broad streets are lined with two rows of poplar trees growing at the same rate, and this gives the town the appearance of a luxurious [342] park. Little sun-dried brick houses, almost all of one story, appear through the trees. Many of them have iron roofs decorated with red or green paint. In recent times, moreover, several public and private buildings have been built of fired brick and some are several stories high. Beside almost every small house is its own little garden, in which there are se- [367] veral fruit trees. The best garden in the town is the one by the house of the Governor General. His garden is kept up very well, and all through the summer and fall it is open to the public. On certain days there is military band music there. In addition, a garden planted earlier by the natives also adjoins the town. This is known as 'myn-uryuk'(which means, 'a thousand apricot trees'), and it too is visited by the [312] Tashkent public. The streets and gardens are irrigated by broad aryks, which serve in addition for sprinkling the streets. The streets are sprinkled every day in the summer, and as a result there is much less dust in the town, [366] and it also makes it cooler. Many handsome stores have been built in Tashkent, in which all products of European industry can be procured, only they are very expensive here. At [368] the bazaars one can obtain native goods. There is an observatory in Tashkent (2½ versts from the town), a theater, a classical preparatory school for boys and one for girls, and several hotels.

361 1. In Russia, as we know, a special
342 kind of moss is used for this purpose, which is called kukushkin len (cuckoo flax).

Secondly, the wooden floors and ceilings, as they shrink, acquire cracks, which also admit the cold. In addition the inhabitants do not know the use of double windows in winter.(1)

1. One must add the danger of fire to the inconveniences of the wooden structures. In 1871 there were three fires in Vernyy with losses figured at 3,462 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The number of buildings in Vernyy are as follows:

Types of buildings	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches (2)	1	1

2. A cathedral is being built, for which the foundation is already laid.

Mosques	-	1
Houses	234	972
Uninhabited buildings	4	9
[366] Stalls		226
Bins and Booths		164
Eating establishments (3)		21

3. Some of these are built of adobe clay and some of softened clay.

Mills		62
Total number of buildings	239	1,456

8:Kostenko 138-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches		1
Houses	1	678
[366] Stores and Stalls		55
Mills		32
Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar dominions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[87] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later, as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

RL1
8:Kostenko 181-G-4, 5 (1868-80)1880 R L1 Turkestan

[Ura - Tyube]

361 [366] There is one bazaar in the town, which contains 642 stalls. There are two bazaar days a week; Wednesday and Sunday.

There are three caravanseries, of which two are Sart and one is for Jews and Hindus.

[368] Of the advanced schools (medresses) there are 4, and the lower schools number 35.

[452] There are 122 mosques altogether. Of these 9 large mosques perform the public prayers on Fridays. There are 147 clergymen serving at the mosques.

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 366 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 172).

291 369 363 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed 291
as much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, 363
but sit about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Cen- 369
tral Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed,
not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the
European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short
/167/ /Figure 59. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photo- p. 17a
graph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars,
small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing,
their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and
audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels
no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at
an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for 363
the streets of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiqui- 361
tous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot
deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places
collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and
there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets
are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by
camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of
their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets,
running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch.
Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very un-
comfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as
one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled
wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy
road safely.

In the towns, bridges are built only over those of the numerous [491]
brooks and canals with banks which are too high and steep to walk or
ride over easily. Otherwise it is left to the pedestrian to get through
the water as best he can. This is based on the fact that in Turkestan
every halfway respectable person, man, woman and child is mounted [492]
and only the poorest beggars and tramps go on foot; for these there
is no pity if they must walk with bare feet through the ice cold water
and the knee-deep mud , in the winter.

In Tashkent the streets in the Sart town are considerably better
than in many other Central Asian towns, but even here the conditions
are such, that among other things, once eleven women drowned in

369 625 361 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan inhabited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on [365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr
101 and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar,
[197] thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the rain-
369 drops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik

The man of the oasis is often small-
boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142]
the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369
beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman; the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly 101
called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appellation Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan, the old North-West Frontier. There too the town populations, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the *indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as 'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word *Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation (as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

against a low-lying plain, is favourable to the harnessing of a great reserve of water-power, draining from the everlasting snows and glaciers of the Tienshan and convertible into electricity.

Propagandists are apt to confuse figures of capacity of power stations (in kilowatts) with those of output (in kilowatt hours *per annum*), and there is a notable inclination to brandish the latter with the object presumably of impressing the reader with astronomical cyphers. It is easier to stick to capacity figures.

A useful yardstick in estimating hydro-electric development in Turkistan is available in the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon in Ireland. The capacity of this station, working with one turbine in reserve, is a little under 100,000 kilowatts on a fall of 28½ metres with a maximum volume discharge of 250 cubic metres a second. Although of course the Shannon is a very small stream in comparison with the great rivers of Turkistan, the Shannon hydro-electric station has several points of interest to the student of Central Asia. Central Ireland is a flat country, and it is not easy to secure sufficient fall for the efficient generation of hydro-electric power. The lack of fall must be made up by a greater volume, and that is not available on the small rivers of these islands. The result has been that the Shannon Station has by no means fulfilled the hopes of its German designers. It does not supply all Ireland with electric power, and it has been necessary to develop an additional station in Dublin, deriving power from steam, not water, with a capacity of 118,000 kilowatts to carry the present loads. In other words water-power in Ireland does not carry even half the load.

377 If we neglect Davidov's figures[1] and turn to a recent forecast of capacity to be reached by the stations in Soviet Central Asia at the end of the fourth Five-Year Plan, we find an aggregate figure of 1,000,000 kilowatts or about ten times the capacity of the Irish station. The largest stations now working are at Farkhad at the approaches to the Hungry Steppe (Mirza Chöl) on the Sir Darya, where a 1148 foot-long dam

[1] [See cit. 116, p. 207 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

has been erected and the longest derivation canal in the Union 377
has been excavated. Work was begun in 1943, and the station is supposed to have started to operate in 1948. The capacity is stated to be 200,000 kilowatts. The next largest is on the Chirchik and Boz-Sir, near Tashkent, where there is a series of linked stations, six of them finished in 1945 and four more in 1947. Others are planned. The capacity stated is 150,000 kilowatts. There is also planning for the construction of a [185]
series of generating stations on canal falls on the Upper Oxus–Zarafshan project, to reach an aggregate capacity of 1,000,000 kilowatts, and for three similar stations of an aggregate capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, also on canal falls on the great project for a Turkmenian Canal along the old Amu-Darya bed of the Özboy. There are, moreover, numerous small power stations, listed in hundreds, on mountain torrents and streams, and also on canal falls in Farghana and elsewhere in the piedmontane area. The largest recently mentioned seem to be in Tajikistan on the Varzob and Vakhsh rivers, 13,000 and 10,000 kilowatts respectively.

The impression derived is that the Soviet engineers have two techniques: the first for the establishment of large stations at canal headworks or on canal falls, and the second for the dispersal of large numbers of small local plants on mountain torrents.

Now, on a general view, the terrain of Turkistan should be OOO
admirably suited for the harnessing of water-power in the east where the mountains merge into the plains. But it is unlikely to be so favourable well out in the plains, where the declivity is very small in the direction of the Caspian and Aral Seas. Canal falls do not normally provide good sites for large stations, the fall being insufficient except in favourable circumstances. The plains of Turkistan are flatter than central Ireland. It may be that the great volume of the Turkistan rivers will make up for any insufficient fall. The discharge of the Oxus in flood may be anything up to 10,000 cubic metres a second, but water for a generating plant must be canalized in a derivation channel. Some scepticism is

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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286

Man from Bokhara wearing a chalat made according to the ikat technique. The threads are dyed before weaving.

286 ones which are made in Ferghana (see ill.
294 below) and the neighbouring districts of Eastern Turkestan are not nearly so rich and so vivid as Indian and Indonesian ikat patterns.
386 With the exception of indigo, which was imported from India, all the dyestuffs used in

386

Turkestan were of native origin. Madder (Rubia tinctorum) grew wild, and was also cultivated. The plants on which the kermes shield-louse feeds (see Ciba Review No. 7, page 206) also grow in many parts of the country as well as in neighbouring Persia. In the steppes the flowers of "esparuk" (Delphinium sulphureum), the infusion of which yields a strong yellow of sulphur shade, were gathered in large quantities. Another yellow dye was extracted from the blossoms of Sophora japonica (known to the natives as "tukmak"). Safflor (Carthamus tinctorius), "maksar" in the vernacular, a third plant for yellow dyes, also

386 grows in Turkestan. Green was produced by mixing indigo with a yellow.

These dyes were the most important ones, being used almost exclusively in the dyeing of dress materials, and the people of Turkestan were fully aware of their economic significance for the textile crafts. It is, therefore, not impossible that the Khan of Khokand forbade imports of artificial dyestuffs because his revenues were directly or indirectly bound up with the production of native dyestuffs, a fact which gave him reason to fear that the introduction of the new dyes would bring about a decrease of his income.

287 number from 420 to 450 knots to the square inch, and some times even more than that. The knot is usually the Persian Sennah knot; the Turkish Ghiordes knot occurs in exceptional cases only (cf. Ciba Review No. 15). The material used is the wool of camels, sheep, and goats. The strong knee-hair of the camel serves as material for the warp-threads. For the knot-thread the soft under-wool which goats and camels grow in the cold season is used. Unlike the camels of other Oriental countries the heavy beasts of burden in Turkestan, the so-called Bactrian camels, have an exceedingly thick coat of hair, which covers their bodies in thick tufts during the winter months. Cotton is never used in the making of Turkoman rugs, and silk only very rarely, usually in making small knotted bags from the region of Merv and Punjdeh, and then only for a few details of the pattern.

The treatment of the wool used in knotting rugs has been brought to great perfection in the course of a long tradition. Washing, which is done in running water, is of great importance. It is very difficult to remove all the grease from the fibre, and if that is not done there is danger of maggots finding their way into the pile and destroying it.

386 The same care and skill are devoted to the dyeing of the wool. As elsewhere in the East the important red dye was extracted from the root of the madder-plant (known in the vernacular as rujan) or from the kermes shield-louse. Madder grew wild throughout Turkestan, and

386 was also cultivated. Blue was achieved by means of indigo, which had to be brought from India, and for that reason it is rarely found in Turkoman rugs. Black was usually extracted from the gall-nuts of the pistachio (known as busgunch) and from pomegranate skins. Sometimes mate-

287 *Pattern in knot-technique as used by the Yomud Turkomans. Lozenges and rows of hooks are distributed over the background.*

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

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

386 rials such as pyrites were used, which had the effect of corroding the wool, so that the black parts of many otherwise good rugs give the impression of having been eaten away. In spite of the limited selection of colours the shades and the number of combinations are surprisingly 287 varied. The Turkomans are good observers, 531 and were not slow in making use of the fact that the colours varied with the time of the year at which the plants were gathered, or with the length of time during which they were allowed to boil, to ferment, or to be exposed to the rays of the sun. For that reason the simplicity which characterizes these rugs is never monotonous. Both technically and artistically they are the perfect expression of that form of life which ethnologists describe as nomadic. They fulfil all the requirements of daily use, and the patterns are designed and perpetuated by skilled workers of a tribe, whose members all live under precisely the same geographical and social conditions.

287 These connections between the knotting 352 technique and nomad life are so striking that one feels tempted to regard the craft as an invention of wandering tribes. For the town-dwellers of Persia and India, of Egypt and Asia Minor, who developed the craft of carpet-knotting into an art, the necessity to use such light and easily transportable «textile furniture» is not nearly so great, and it is but natural that they should have adopted the

1: von Schwarz--33a M-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Bl.1 Turkestan Bl.1

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

Fig. 88. Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral-Asien.) / Through Central Asia/ Leipzig 1888, F. A. Brockhaus. /

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
P.73a
piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead./ In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan./
P.73a

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
P.73b
tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
P.73b
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots./

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

l: von Schwarz--73b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Bl.1 Turkestan Bl.1

415

Fig. 11. Teapots.

415 with long pouring spouts are used to pour out the water for the washing. These washbasins with the water pitchers which accompany them are sometimes made very luxuriously, as show pieces; in Bukhara I was once offered a fine specimen which was gold plated, with beautiful chased work and set with many semi-precious stones, for which the maker asked 300 marks (Figure 92). P.75 6

Porcelain plates have come into use in Turkestan only in recent times through the Russians. Until that time the natives had only relatively large round plates, quite shallow, with small almost perpendicular rims, similar to our serving plates. These are made of brass or tin-plated copper, are sometimes nearly a meter in diameter and are used only for the serving of fruit, sweetmeats and the countless cups and basins which are carried in all at once for the accomodation of distinguished guests.

276 The (tobacco) watergipes, which are inevitable in every Turkestan household are called chilim by the Sarts and Uzbeks, and kalyan by the Tajiks, and differ from the water pipes of Turkey. They consist of a hollowed-out gourd container in which reeds are placed at both the top and on one side. The reed at the side serves as the mouthpiece, and the vertical reed for the attachment of the bowl of the pipe, /243/ which consists of burnt clay either unglazed, or glazed in blue or green. In the upper part of the water pipe a small hole is bored on the side. This serves to blow out the smoke during the kindling of the coals which are laid on top of the tobacco, and it must be held shut with the finger during the actual smoking. The poor use the pipe in this simplest form; richer people, on the contrary, sheathe the brown-stained body of the pipe with bronze and decorate the mounting with chased work and mounted turquoises; then they provide the reeds with burnt-in decorations and cover the bowl of the pipe with strings of beads and semi-precious stones, so that this kind of apparatus finally acquires a pleasing appearance. In rare cases the body of the water pipe is made entirely of brass; but even in such cases the vessel always has the shape of a gourd container (cf. Figure 105, 118 and 123).

352 Finally, an article of furniture which is missing in only a few
[623] households is the bird cage, for the natives are great bird lovers. The bird cages are made in the same artless fashion as almost all the products of native industry. They consist of a simple round wooden or cardboard box without a lid (discarded Russian hatboxes are often used for this purpose) on which a pointed dome-shaped net is placed made of many-colored cotton yarn. This is held tight by the weight of the box

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92, p.75a Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native.[1] In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p.165a, p. 165, and Figure 85, p.267a, p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

1 [cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analys]

l: von Schwarz--75a N-5 (c# 1895) 1900 EH Tenesia EH

415

Fig. 22. Washing Utensils.

287 finest examples of this kind are those made by
531 the Yomuds; they are pentagonal in shape, and are ornamented with long black fringes. From the point of view of ethnology the most interesting fabric of this kind is a strip about forty or forty-five feet long and not more than about fourteen inches wide. Such strips are called daur-i-khirgah, and are passed right round the tent. They are covered with pictorial scenes or patterns made up of conventionalized landscapes or trees, all worked on a white ground according to the knot-technique. The figural scenes show caravans on the march, laden and grazing camels, horsemen, and other scenes from the daily life of the Turkomans. It is possible that certain events from the history of the tribe or clan are represented there. Religious or magic elements may also be discerned in these friezes. Essentially similar figures are found among primitive or semi-civilized peoples all over the world, executed in the style predominant in the respective areas.

531 In the tent of the Turkomans, as in the
352 dwellings of all Islamic peoples, the floor-carpet is one of the most important items. It is very likely that the Turkomans made no distinction between ordinary rugs and prayer mats, as their carpets had no pictorial patterns, and did not, therefore, run counter to Islamic law. One very common type of rug, patterned, strangely enough, with almost cruciform figures and claw-shaped ornaments interspersed with them, certainly served both as a floor-covering and a prayer-mat. Pillows and cushions on which the Turkoman rests his arms when seated are never made in knot-technique, but always covered with cloth.

415 The fronts of the various bags and pouches which the Turkomans use as receptacles for everything, even for butter and cheese, are al-

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are 531 287 186 [352 distinguished from all others by their simple but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur. The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

*[cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

287 531



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

A "torba" or small camel-bag as used by the Turkomans. An early example, the pattern of which is knotted. Privately owned. New York.

On the Amu-
162 Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive
[148] community composed of twelve separate clans.
[123] They use the land jointly according to common
right.

162 9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-
101 Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the
total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form
of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the
Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the
rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the
militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now
they have been put on a level with the other groups
of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in re-
gard to obligations, and must themselves maintain
the irrigation required for their needs.

101 10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the
permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The
name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese,
meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in
the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chi-
nese government in the middle of the last century,
just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettle-
ment was undertaken as a form of punishment for
these people for their participation in the revolt of
1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley,
which was ruined and depopulated at that time.
[162] There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in
the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local
population. Their form of life is the same as that
of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the
Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi
gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into
their hands. They routed the Dungans (under
Bayandai) and formed an independent state under
the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The
proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil
Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge
in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The
875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.' 474 661

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they 433 [474] [562]

[1] [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

000 The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

233 In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[474] [245]

[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232–4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Scott, who shared these labours and saw the heroism and misery of the workers, speaks with understanding of the passionate idealism that sustained the Russians who made the sacrifice. He and they thought of it all as a war, in which the soldiers must be prepared to die. It was, he felt, a society for which it was worth while to shed blood and tears. The expropriated peasants, the political exiles, were a lost tribe, sacrificed on the altar of progress. They would die off, but by their death Socialism would win through to a time when it could function without scrapping blocks of its population every decade. A cruel concept, but there it was.

There was most certainly a great Russian idealism, even a grandeur in this plan and its achievement. But, like the valour of Sparta, it was a heroism that depended for survival on the labour of countless slaves and helots, pitilessly ground down and made to work at menial tasks without thought of human dignity. The helots of Turkish stock had not been born into the ranks of citizens, but they were set in the forefront of the battle to fight a cause that was not theirs. Most of them were inarticulate at the time, but later events were to demonstrate clearly enough that the iron had entered into their souls. Unlike the Russians, these did not believe the papers which told them daily they were the luckiest people in the world. The vast metallurgical combine of the Urals, the centre of the heavy industry of Soviet Asia, was set up just beyond and on the fringe of the most northerly of the five Central Asian republics. Their part in it was only to sweat and groan and die in mine or mill, to be frozen stiff on a scaffold at construction work or burned at a furnace mouth. In their own homeland they did not fare much better.

Beyond the Urals and within the political boundaries of the five republics the industrial lay-out was not quite so intensive and was certainly more varied. There are indeed non-ferrous metals in Turkistan of great importance. North of Balkhash at Kunrad, and in the Jezkazgan area of the northern steppe,

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

433 are situated the largest copper-workings and smelting plants
328 in the Union, and there is another at Almalik close to Tashkent and therefore better placed for transport than the larger mines farther north. At Chimkent is the largest lead centre in the Union, working ore from many quarters, including the Tajik hills. And there are important minerals, said to include mercury, radium and uranium, in the mountains surrounding
433 the Farghana Valley. But, apart from the man-power they can supply to feed the industrial Moloch, the main importance of the five republics in this field is to be found in the production of the raw material for textiles — cotton and silk — and the availability of supplementary sources of power, which include oil, coal and water-generated electricity. The production of the last, hydro-electric power, is tied up in the minds of Soviet engineers with large-scale irrigation, and this in turn with transport, both by waterway and railway. In all these spheres there has been ambitious planning, and forecasts are often extravagant and even grandiose. In almost all cases it is hard to disentangle prospective targets from actual results, publicity media being regularly used to give an impression that projects which have not in fact left the draughtsman's table are on the point of realization in the field. Indeed it can fairly be said that almost any account of planned development in Soviet Russia, industrial or agricultural, calls for question on this ground. Usually the more poetic the vision of the publicist, the less advanced will be found to be the execution of the work. Another tendency is to claim as the triumph of the Soviet genius works which were in fact conceived and carried to an advanced stage by Tsarist engineers. This is particularly apparent in the field of railway works.

185 It is convenient to view industrial development in this region under four main heads:

(*a*) power, including oil, coal and hydro-electric;
(*b*) light industry, mainly cotton and silk textiles;
(*c*) irrigation;
(*d*) transport, railway and waterway.

2: Carroll S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

[p. 213]

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1950 TARGETS[1]

	Population 1939		Heavy Industry (Millions of Tons)			Textiles (Millions of Metres)			Crops (Millions of Hectares *)	
	Total	'Native'	Coal	Oil	Steel	Cotton	Silk	Woollen	Cash	Grain
Kazakistan	6,146,000	3·09	16·4 (Karaganda)	1·2 † (Emba)	0·07	19·0	Nil	2·9	0·34	5·34
Kirghizia	1,459,000	0·88	1·6	0·08	Nil	0·7	0·92	0·5	0·11	0·7
Tajikistan	1,485,000	1·22	0·44	0·06	Nil	18·0	5·1	Nil	0·18	0·63
Turkmenia	1,254,000	0·83	0·06	1·1 (Nebit Dagh)	Nil	22·0	0·83	0·82	0·16	0·16
Uzbekistan	6,282,000	4·98	1·1 (Angren)	1·1	0·1	161·0	14·0 (Samarkand and Margilan)	Nil	1·13	1·38
Total	16,626,000	11·00	19·6 =7·8% of USSR total of 250 m. tons	3·54 =9·9% of USSR total of 35·4 m. tons	0·17 USSR total given as 25 m. tons	220·7 =4·7% of USSR total of 4·686 m. metres	20·85 USSR total not ascertained	4·22 USSR total not ascertained	1·92 of which 1·35 m. is under cotton =80·4% of USSR total	8·21 =7·7% of USSR total of 105·8 m. hectares

* 1 hectare = 2·5 acres approx.

† Does not include Ural oilfields at Ishimbay, producing in 1950 at the rate of, say, 7 million tons a year.

1 [i.e. of Fourth Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

8:Kostenko 144-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 438

Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
[433] Distillery	1	146,000 gal.	171,000	145
Brewery	1	5,700 gal.	1,540	5
Leather	3	23,659 pieces	82,774	57
Brick	11	520,000 pieces	7,800	52
Vodka	1	5,500 gal.	7,524	6
Total	17	-	270,638	265

361 441 438 The commerce of Vernyy is developing quite perceptibly, due to the favorable position of the town at the junction of roads from Kuldja to Tashkent and to Kokand, and from Kashgar to Semipalatinsk. Formerly the caravans passed through Vernyy without stopping. In recent times they have begun to be unloaded for roadside sale. In addition, many merchants from Tashkent and neighboring dominions have come here purposely for continuous trade.

In the environs of Vernyy every year there is a considerable purchase of animals from the Kazakhs, not only for Tashkent and Kuldja, but also for Petropavlovsk, which is over 1200 versts away.

[366] At the present time there are two bazaars in Vernyy: a large and a small one. The total number of stalls in 1871 came to 390, whereas in 1863 there were only 50, and in 1859 about 20.

361 438 The trade in Vernyy is developing in proportion to the strengthening of tranquility

8: Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
325] Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn

361 the Ili province have slowed down the useful
433 activity by the population considerably, and they are now beginning to breathe easily and recover.

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361 The factory and craft industries are even
433 more insignificant than the trade. Here is a list of the largest industries:
438

Types of factories and workshops	number	sum of production in rubles	number of workers
Oil manufacturing	10	12,000	78
Paper mill	4	500	24
Cast iron foundries	5	600	20
/436/ Pottery	2	960	6
Dye works	1	300	5
Vermicelli makers	3	101	6
Total	25	14,461	139

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

1. Here are the prices for certain
361 articles on the Vernyy market:
435 A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

8:Kostenko 159-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361
241 Few of the population worked in agriculture in the past because many hands were taken away for the forces of the Sultan's armies. Since 1872 the population has entered actively into the cultivation of the land, being free of recruitment and having no obligations to the soil.

The wheat harvest here has only a 30-fold yield. (1)

361
435 1. In 1872 prices in the Kuldja market were as follows:

Wheat in ordinary times costs 7 to 8 kopecks for 36 lb., but in 1872, because of military activities, disturbance, and the large number of military personnel supported in 1871, the price went up to 1 ruble, 80 kopecks. After that ordinary prices were 15 kopecks for rice, 15 kopecks for millet, 15 kopecks for barley, 4 kopecks for clover for 36 lb.

One hundred eggs cost 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of beef and mutton varies from 70 kopecks to 2 rubles, 40 kopecks. Before Kuldja was taken a hen cost 30 kopecks, afterwards the price rose to 8 kopecks. A pound of butter costs 30 kopecks. 36 lb. of tallow candles cost 5 rubles, the average cost of sugar is 30 rubles for 36 lb. Ordinary tea is sold for 1 ruble, 50 kopecks a pound.

A piece of matting 42 ft. (18 arshins) long costs from 60 to 70 kopecks. Russian cotton print material is sold at 22 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

8:Kostenko 160-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

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435

Tent cloth is sold at 30 kopecks for 2 ft. (per arshin) and calico for from 25 to 35 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

A cow costs from 16 to 25 rubles. A horse costs from 20 to 60 rubles. A sheep costs 3 rubles and a bull from 25 to 40 rubles.

A beam of wood 14 in. (8 vershoks) in diameter and 14 ft. (2 sazhen's) long costs 2 rubles. A board 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide and 6 ft. (2½ arshins) long costs 10 kopecks. A board 7 ft. (3 arshins) long and 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide costs 50 kopecks.

Fire brick costs 2 rubles a thousand, and sun-dried brick 1 ruble 60 kopecks. An unskilled workman is paid 15 kopecks a day; a worker with a horse receives from 40 kopecks to 1 ruble daily.

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Education in Kuldja is shown by the following figures for schools and the number of pupils enrolled in them:

	No. schools	No. of pupils Boys	Girls	Total
At the Chinese temple	1	25	-	25
At the great Moslem mosque	1	60	10	70
At the houses of the mullahs	4	82	21	103
Total	6	167	31	198

/437/ The population of Kuldja has quite a gentle and peaceful character.

DOO 438

statistics are available. The best silk came on to the market in Bokhara and the towns of Ferghana; Khokand and Khojent were the main trading centres for both silk and cotton. Another important cotton market was Andishan. At the present day the breeding of silkworms and to an even greater extent the growing of cotton in Western Turkestan are promoted by the government in every possible way.

286

In Turkestan fabrics are woven in narrow pieces only about twenty inches wide; these are then sewn together to make garments. The type of loom generally used in Western Turkestan (see ill. page 1446) consists of a frame of four roughly hewn poles driven vertically into the ground. It is maintained in a state of equal tension by means of a rope fixed tightly above it. Breast-beam and warp-beam are slung in rollers at so short a distance from each other that very little of the fabric is visible. Unlike the weavers of other districts the craftsman of Turkestan passes the shuttle through the rear shed at the other side of the batten. In order to impart lustre, smoothness, and thickness to the fabric it is beaten on a wooden block with a heavy mallet (see ill. page 1446). The rhythmical beats of the fuller's mallet are heard everywhere in the bazaars of Turkestan. The mallet used for fulling is shaped like a blunt wooden wedge. It has a short handle which is not fixed to the centre of the head, but close to the narrower striking surface. This increases the efficacy of the instrument, but it requires great strength to wield it.

[See p 39-- Analyst]

[See p 39--Analyst]

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since [574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the [161] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty [368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

361 flow. The plowed land belonging to Sibzor
312 is irrigated by water which is led from the Zakh aryk and Bos-Su, as we have mentioned before.

361 The chief productivity of this district
438 of the town is making boots. The boots made by the inhabitants of the Sibzor district are distributed even to other towns in the territory. After this comes weaving and the decoration of cotton materials. The inhabitants have worked at the last two occupations for a very long time. The most important class of people, as regards wealth, are the herdsmen. The residents of all four settlements are agriculturists, as well as the people of the Takhtapul', Chuvalachi, Kara-sarai, Yau, Sibzor and Kazy-kucha mahalas.

361 /408/ Three medresses (higher insti-
368 tutions of learning): Beklyar-beg, Barakhon, and Kizyl-Kurgan, with about 260 students, make up almost all the educational provision of this part of the town. In addition to the medresses there are also schools (mekhtebe) here, located in private houses.

There are ten major mosques: Odin-mechet, Okhun-guzar, Khatyn-mechet, Mazar-khan, Muimu-barek, Khonoki, Tokhtonun, Rebot, Khodji-Toroskon and Kara-saray.

361 Kukcha, the western part of the town, consists of thirty-one mahalas: Khafiz, Guyaki, Kuttut, Kupryuk-bashi, Big and Little Sauvan, Chakara, Tyapi, Kunzhak, Chagatai, Psyakchi, Chikchiman, Tokle-dzhalob, Kalalan, Ishkuvat, two Langars, Uzgan, Kisya-kurgan, Khuavon,

8:Kostenko 119-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Chukchi, Kunchi, Padikhan, Chukur-Kishlak, Sara-khundan, Kukchi, Abnazar, Ailish, Khalimkup, Damak and Yangy. In all these mahalas together, there are 2511 houses with a population of 22,088. Three main streets cut through this part of town: Sauvan, Kukcha and Chagatai. There are four main [312] aryks which irrigate the Kukcha district: the Keikaus, which enters from the Sibzor district, the Zakh aryk, the Kara-kamysh, and the Dzhangag. The last branches off from the Keikaus at the Lyabzak gates and divides the town into two sections.

The land on which this part of the town is laid out is quite hilly. It is cut through with deep trenches and has many gardens, situated both inside and outside the town. The main [438] production of the Kukcha district is leather working. Thus of the 695 workshops in 1871, 341 were in leather, and 218 were for bootmaking. After this there are 6 brick factories, 7 places making earthenware vessels, 22 mills for grinding and crushing, and also 22 oil manufacturing [368] places. There are two medresses in this part of the town and 34 schools. There are 51 mosques and 18 tombs, of which one, Sheikh Zenedzhin-Baba, deserves attention for its antiquity. The Sheikh came from Bagdad and was buried here 400 years ago.

The Bish-agach district, in the southern corner of the town, consists of 32 mahalas: Yany-Bakhan, Kamalan, Chakar, Darkhan, Zivak-khish-kupryuk, Balyan-mechet, Sarparaz, Char-su, Ishan-Guzar, Samarkand, Okshi, Darbaza, Zenfata, Millyar, /409/ Chupan-ata, Suzugata, Sary-chapak, Dzhillik-mechet, Uzbek, Mirza-khazy, Gul'-bazar, Kugurmach, Ters-aryk, Kuk-mechet, Kul'gulyk,

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

8:Kostenko 143-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 It would be impossible to pass over
231 another branch of Vernyy production, one which is very rare in Central Asia, namely, apiculture. (1)

1. In addition to Vernyy, apiculture is carried on in the Lepsinskaya station.

The raising of bees began here in 1857. In 1859 there were 254 hives, and in 1871 there were 75 apiaries and up to 1,456 hives. One should mention, furthermore, that 1869 and 1870 were bad years for apiculture because of drought, which dried the flowers in the grass, and the trees, so that the bees had no food.

After agriculture the main branch of Vernyy production is livestock raising. In 1871 Vernyy had the following number of animals:

Horses	3,611 head
Horned cattle	2,266
Sheep	729
Pigs	449
Goats	126
Camels	88
Total	7,369

/426/ In 1862 there were only 4,460 animals.

361 One may mention distilling, vodka making,
438 leather and brick making among the large factory enterprises. The remaining industries are in the form of home industries.

The factories in 1871 were:

8:Kostenko 144-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 438

Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
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Cast iron foundries	5	600	20
/436/ Pottery	2	960	6
Dye works	1	300	5
Vermicelli makers	3	101	6
Total	25	14,461	139

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

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[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

8:Kostenko 167-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

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Types of factories, plants and other undertakings: (1)

1. According to evidence of Mr. Virskii, in Turkestanskii ezhegodnik (Turkestan Yearbook), IV, 1876.

a) Manufactories	Number
Cast-iron foundry	12
Soap boiling and fat melting	34
Leather	30
Pottery	37

b) Machine manufacture	
Taffeta	7
Mats	188
Cheap striped cotton	17
Silk scarves	3
'Alacha' /silk or halfsilk Turkish or Persian fabric/	4
'Adryas' /Bukharan and Persian halfsilk fabric with bright designs against a plain background/	27

c) Workshops and other undertakings	
Carpenters	42
Turners and Cabinetmakers	11
Weaving looms	7
Dye works	42
Bootmakers	162
Saddle makers	25
Gold and silver work	23
Makers of two-wheeled carriages	23
Horsehair ropes	17
Dye works for wood	15

361	Wooden combs	7
	/442/ Water smoking pipes	8
438	Tailor shops	20
366	Copper wares	6
	Smiths	56
	Wattling and chiy (rush) weaving	12
	Silk winding	15
	Sesame oil manufacturers	23
	Barbers	20
	Bakers of flat cakes	33
	Candy makers	7
	Shops making pilaf and pil'mene	108
	Tea shops	30
	Commercial baths	7
	Brick sarais (ovens)	4
	Stalls at the bazaars	712
	Bazaar places for traders	270
	Various small stalls (dishes and utensils, horse trappings, clothing, iron, salt, dyes, cast iron, knives, wooden hoes, kettles, beef)	1,085

One should note that not all the factories and other undertakings mentioned here have the same arrangement as those in European Russia. These are no more than cottage industries, the trade of which is decidedly insignificant. The machines in all these undertakings are the most primitive, and there are no special accomodations in any of them. In the same hut where the proprietor lives he produces his wares. The figures on the number of the above undertakings certainly change often, if not every day.

8: Kostenko 173-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[774] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built a mosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

8:Kostenko 174-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

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Type of shop, workshop, etc. (1)	Number

1. In Central Asian towns it is impossible to separate a shop from an industrial plant, because in most cases the manufacturer, or more accurately the craftsman works in his shop and also sells his wares there.

Silver products	4
Iron and iron mongers	13
Cast iron	6
Knives	5
Copper wares	8
Shops selling knives	7

Types of establishments	Number
Smithies	6
Leather factories	2
Sale of leather goods	23
Saddlers	5
Boots and footgear in general	54
Earthenware vessels	11
Tobacco (smoking)	15
Tobacco (snuff)	6
Oil producers	50
Sesame oil producers	22
Soap boilers	18
Stalls selling soap	8
/447/Candles	6
Meat	48
Cabinet makers	2
Dairy houses	32
Stalls with tea and sugar	22
Stalls with salt	5
Stalls with flour and grain crops	24
Rice	15

8:Kostenko 175-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Khodzhent] RL1

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Types of establishments	Number
Fruit	27
Vegetables	4
Stalls with halva	10
Bakeries of flat cakes	12
Tea stalls	17
Stalls with thread	6
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	5
Woolen goods	9
Silk winding	20
Sawing	4
Silk weaving	95
Cotton weaving	115
Shops for finishing material of silk and cotton mixed	9
Stalls with silk textiles	7
Stalls with textiles of mixed silk and cotton	26
Stalls for khalats	10
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	5
Stalls with alacha /a kind of silk fabric/	6
Stalls with muslin and turbans	10
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	78
Money changing stalls	4
Barbers	4
Mills (1)	52

1. Rice mills are counted as mills.

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There are two bazaars in Khodzhent: the big one and the small one. In the first

361 in summer the town is almost deserted.

In addition, separate groups of houses are scattered among these gardens, called all together Char mahala, where the proprietors live almost permanently, summer and winter. Char mahala constitutes 17 separate groups of houses.

361 There are 854 stalls, industrial and manufacturing plants in Ura-Tyube.
438

366 This number is split up into the following categories:

Types of establishment	Number
Silver wares	3
Iron and iron mongers	14
Cast iron	4
Knives	7
Copper	5
Stalls selling knives	10
Smithies	7
Leather works	2
Stalls selling leather goods	15
Saddlers	4
Boots and footgear in general	40
Factories for production of clay vessels	10
Stalls selling smoking tobacco	14
Stalls selling snuff	5
Oil manufacturers	45
Stalls with sesame oil	24
Soap boiling factories	11
Stalls with soap	3
Candle workshops	9
Meat stalls	61

3:Kostenko 180-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1
[Ura-Tyube]

Types of establishments (ctd)	Number
/451/Cabinet makers	2
Milk stalls	28
Stalls with tea and sugar	40
Stalls with salt	23
Stalls with flour and grain	11
Stalls with rice	22
Fruit	46
Stalls with vegetables	16
Stalls with halva	4
Bakeries of flat cakes	8
Tea stalls (kharcheven)	25
Stalls with thread	2
Dye works	24
Stalls with paint	9
Furriers	4
Woolen goods	25
Sawing	3
Cotton weaving	98
Finishers shops for mixed cotton and silk material	7
Stalls with silk textiles	5
Stalls with mixed silk and cotton textiles	19
Stalls with khalat textiles	13
Stalls with tubeteikas /skull caps/	10
Stalls with mats	9
Stalls with alacha /kind of silk fabric/	4
Stalls with muslin and turbans	7
Stalls with lining goods	10
Stalls with textiles	25
Money changers' stalls	18
Barbershops	10
Mills	73

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438
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23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL1

rigated farming, with intensive crops adapted to land irrigation (mainly cotton); (2) dry farming, including chiefly grain crops on mountain slopes having sufficient rainfall; (3) lowland livestock raising, including sheep and camels, adapted to the dry steppe and the desert; (4) highland livestock raising of cattle, goats, and sheep, adapted to valley pastures. Of all these activities, irrigated farming is by far the most important; it employs the greater portion of the population and covers more than two thirds of the sown area. The main crop in the irrigated area is cotton, remarkably well suited to the fertile loess soil of the lower valleys and the warm, sunny climate of Central Asia. The chief cotton areas are the Fergana Valley, the oases of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the Vakhsh valley. The cotton is processed in local ginning plants, the seeds are sent to oil-extracting presses, and the husks are used for fodder. Other irrigated crops are rice, alfalfa, wheat, corn, sesame, and melons. The irrigated fields are generally bordered by mulberry trees, on which the silkworm is cultivated. One of the most common fruit-trees is the apricot; widespread orchards also produce peaches, apples, pears, pomegranates, grapes. Dried fruits (apricots, peaches, and raisins) form important articles of export. Grain crops occupy a very small portion of the irrigated area and are grown mainly on the non-irrigated mountain slopes.

Livestock is raised all year round, generally in the high mountain valleys in the summer and the lowland steppe and desert in the winter. The most important herds are sheep (including the karakul sheep), camels, cattle, horses, and mountain goats and yak.

Beside the mining industry developed at the deposits of petroleum, coal, salt, sulphur, and nonferrous metals, the industry is concentrated in the region of Tashkent, where it is supplied with power by the two large hydroelectric installations, the Chirchik and the Farkhad power plants. Tashkent is the center of the heavy metallurgy, textile, machine-construction, and food industries. Plants which process agricultural products are located in many other parts of Central Asia; they include ginning plants, oil presses, tanneries, fruit canneries, sugar refineries, and cotton and silk mills.

The basic transportation route is the Trans-Caspian Railroad, which sends many branches ~~into the chief economic regions of Central Asia;~~ the spur from Mary to Kushka, on the Afghan border, and the branches from Chardzhou to Kungrad (now under construction), from Kagan to Termez and Stalinabad, and from Ursat'yevskaya to Andizhan-Ko-
Kand-Namangan

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the best in the world for artistic purposes and for calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. To this day the town has remained an important centre of culture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see ill. page 1438) became not only wealthy towns, but places of extravagant luxury in the European sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of many wars in the course of its history, was from the middle of the eighteenth century onward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara; Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the Russian administration, in these towns the Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[439] in size and importance. At the present time the country's commerce with India and China is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civilization has made progress, modernization has not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely surprising in view of the extreme conservatism prevailing among the Islamic population of Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different tribes that are found both in town and country and whose manifold ethnological differences

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[See cat 116 p 18--Analyst]

361 the Ili province have slowed down the useful
433 activity by the population considerably, and they are now beginning to breathe easily and recover.

361 The number of booths in the town is con-
438 siderable: there are 650. The amount of wares, however, is insignificant, and is limited to
439 the absolute needs of the population. The more important trade is carried on by Sarts from Tashkent, Kokand and Kashgar, and Tatars from Vernyy and Kopal. The chief articles of import are mats and khalats (long cloaks) from Kashgar and other Moslem towns, inferior types of cotton prints, nankeen, calico, plush, broadcloth and metal objects from Vernyy and Kopal, and tea from Urumchi and China proper. In exchange for these products they export sheep (mostly from Kashgar), dressed lamb skins, raw hides, pottery wares, apples and apricots, fox pelts, young staghorns. These last are sold very profitably through Kyakhta by the Chinese and are used by them as a medicine against impotency.

361 The factory and craft industries are even
433 more insignificant than the trade. Here is a list of the largest industries:
438

Types of factories and workshops	number	sum of production in rubles	number of workers
Oil manufacturing	10	12,000	78
Paper mill	4	500	24
Cast iron foundries	5	600	20
/436/ Pottery	2	960	6
Dye works	1	300	5
Vermicelli makers	3	101	6
Total	25	14,461	139

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[Samarkand] RL1

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3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

districts: 1, Tomsk; 2, Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk; 3, Southern Steppes; 4, Yenisei; 5, Altai; 6, Minusinsk; 7, Northern Steppes. Probably some gold deposits could be found in Bokhara and Turkestan. 135

The silver deposits are found in great number in the Altai and north of Semipalatinsk. The richest deposits of coal, iron, and copper are found in the district between Novo-Nikolaevsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, and Kuznietsk; also in the region of Semipalatinsk. The Kuznietsk basin alone occupies some 15,000 sq. klm.

The best-known oilfields are situated on the western coast of the Caspian. But it is possible that the Transcaspian oilfields, now almost entirely limited to Chikishliar and some other points along the railway, may prove to be no less abundant. In Ferghana the oilfields are being exploited in four regions: 1, Shar-Su; 2, Maili-Su; 3, Chimionand; 4, Sel-Kokko, but so far the export is fairly limited; in 1914 it amounted to some 2,000,000 puds.

But it is cereals that form the most important product of export from Western Siberia, and 90 per cent. of the population is devoted to agriculture. Agriculture is found chiefly between 60° of N. lat. and 50° of S. lat. Beyond these limits the country is only half agricultural; while fishing, shooting, and cattle-breeding is carried on alongside. Out of some 12 million dess. occupied by cornfields in Asiatic Russia in 1911, some 4½ millions were situated in Western Siberia, 2½ millions in the Steppe country, and 3½ millions in Turkestan. The chief centres of the corn export are Novo-Nikolaevsk, Omsk, Kurgan, Pyetukhovo, Barnaul, and Semipalatinsk. In 1906–10 average early export = 93,014·4 thousand puds. 241 [62] [439]

Closely connected with agriculture is sheep-breeding, which is especially carried on in the Kirghis Steppes. While in European Russia at the outbreak of war for a hundred inhabitants there were only 32 sheep, in Russian Central Asia it amounted to some 200. The area of pasture land in Western Siberia amounted to some six million dess.; in the Steppe country some three million, and in Turkestan half 233

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

233 a million. Next to sheep in importance is the breeding of
[234] horses and cows. In the cattle-breeding area the butter industry is very successfully carried on, especially in the governments of Tomsk and Tobolsk, and the chief centres
• 439 of its export are Barnaul, Omsk, and Kurgan. In 1913 the exports equalled 4·9 million puds as against 1·7 million puds in 1903. Closely allied to these industries is the export of live stock, bacon, game, wool, hair, skins and furs. But although they occupy a considerable place, it is the corn which comes first in quantity and cotton first in value among all Central Asiatic products. The pre-war export along the railway shows the following proportion between the various goods: Corn, 35·6 per cent. (of all exported goods); cotton, 4·3 per cent.; butter, 1·5 per cent.; fish, 1·2 per cent.; meat, 1·0 per cent.

162 In the production of corn Western Siberian ranks first; 7 per cent. of the native population scarcely take any part in this industry; while out of 93 per cent. of European population, 87 per cent. is composed of Great Russians, on whom agriculture chiefly depends. The cattle- and especially sheep-breeding depend to a great extent on the Kirghis and other Turkic tribes, forming 50 per cent. of the population in the Akmolinsk and 85 per cent. in the Semipalatinsk territories. But it is the cotton industry which almost entirely rests upon the native (Sarts and other Turkic tribes) labour.

312 The cotton industry is closely connected with irrigation, and again the irrigation canals form the most valuable possession of the natives. The canals seem to have been much more numerous in ancient times, and the remnants of them are found even in such barren deserts as Kizyl-Kumakh or Gary-ishek-otran. The native law codes (*shariat* as well as *'ādat*) recognize that the water is common property, which cannot be sold or bought, and that the land belongs to him who irrigates it. To look after the equal use of the irrigation canals, called *aryka*, an elder, called *mirab*, is chosen from among one settlement, and over several *mirabs* an *aryk-*

8:Kostenko 144-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

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Type of Factory		Quantity of Production	Production in rubles	Number of workers
[433] Distillery	1	146,000 gal.	171,000	145
Brewery	1	5,700 gal.	1,540	5
Leather	3	23,659 pieces	82,774	57
Brick	11	520,000 pieces	7,800	52
Vodka	1	5,500 gal.	7,524	6
Total	17	-	270,638	265

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The commerce of Vernyy is developing quite perceptibly, due to the favorable position of the town at the junction of roads from Kuldja to Tashkent and to Kokand, and from Kashgar to Semipalatinsk. Formerly the caravans passed through Vernyy without stopping. In recent times they have begun to be unloaded for roadside sale. In addition, many merchants from Tashkent and neighboring dominions have come here purposely for continuous trade.

In the environs of Vernyy every year there is a considerable purchase of animals from the Kazakhs, not only for Tashkent and Kuldja, but also for Petropavlovsk, which is over 1200 versts away.

[366]

At the present time there are two bazaars in Vernyy: a large and a small one. The total number of stalls in 1871 came to 390, whereas in 1863 there were only 50, and in 1859 about 20.

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The trade in Vernyy is developing in proportion to the strengthening of tranquility

[Tashkent]

347 made only of beams, reeds and clay. The floor of the booth is usually raised a few feet above the street level, as is the small footpath which runs along the booths. The booths serve, without difficulty as places to sell all kinds of ware, or as workshops for all kinds of handicrafts, in effect whole industries are carried on at the bazaar. There are no windows or doors in the bazaar stalls, so that the merchants and craftsmen carry on their business all year round in all weather in these places, enclosed by only three walls. At night the shops are closed either by a boarded partition or by folding screens made of reeds. Those merchants who are unable to take all their wares home with them every evening spend the night in their shops, both winter and summer.

Merchants and craftsmen sit on the floor during their work on reed mats or blankets, with their legs crossed, sitting either inside the booth or on the footpath which leads into the booths (Figure 57, p. 15a, p. 165). The buyers also take their places on the ground beside the merchants, unless they prefer, for the sake of greater convenience to undertake the selection of wares on horseback, in which case the wares are brought out one by one to be inspected from the horse. Naturally, since in winter it is not particularly comfortable to sit on the ground which is soaked through, there are a few wooden benches covered with blankets or carpets for the greater comfort of the public in front of the better shops, especially tea houses, and eating places, /163/ (Figure 58, p. 15a, p. 165), and on these one can take his place with his legs crossed and conclude his business comfortably. /Figure 56, p. 14a. Caption: Covered bazaar streets/

366 443 A peculiarity of Central Asian bazzars is the strict separation of various industries and various types of goods /164/ from each other, which makes the search for and the choice of the necessary wares far easier for the buying public. One row of booths is, for example, exclusively devoted to clothing merchants, the next occupied by merchants in cotton material, the third by silk merchants; furs, linen, boots, saddles, metal wares, crockery, vegetables, fruit, meat, in short, everything there is to buy can be bought only in one specific row of booths. In the same manner all the eating places are in one row, where they prepare their national dishes right out on the street before all eyes: 'Plov' /pilaf/, 'pelmene' /small meat dumplings/, 'shashlik' and 'lepeshki' /small meal cakes/; and they poison the air far around with their burned 'shaffet' and 'kunshut' /sesame/ oil.

The handicrafts, like the wares are all organized strictly according to categories. In one street the kettle and teapot smiths make an

[Tashkent]

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[275] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, [305] insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.

485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Cotton bazaar in Andishan (Ferghana). The cotton is offered for sale by veiled peasant women.

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4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

A bazaar in Turkmenistan. In the regions inhabited by nomads bazaars for the surrounding districts are held twice a week at certain places. The merchants are townsmen. On the right a Turkoman, in the background a Russian official.

57

361 shooing away the flies with a special instru-
366 ment, a whisk made of hair, attached to a handle. In the Chinese bazaar there is constant movement, bustle and noise. The vendors of wares cry out and invite the customers in. Hordes of children some half-naked, some completely naked, scurry back and forth.

In a group of men the Chinese women stand out in their original costumes, on their tiny misshapen, squeezed little feet, on which they walk with difficulty, as though on stilts, tottering sideways.

/432/ With every step one runs into vendors, carrying all their goods in one hand, and charging two or three kopecks for it. Here is an unbelievably dirty urchin holding a piece of mutton on his finger, yelling with all his might, announcing his wares../sic/

The greatest crowding, noise and throng takes place in the so-called row of eating houses, where various food is sold. A beggar can satisfy his appetite for some three or four kopecks here. Having satisfied their hunger, Chinese beggars lie down somewhere in the shade along the booths and spend the whole day doing nothing.

361 Trade at the Chinese bazaar is divided
443 into three categories:

1) The permanent trade, which is carried on in booths, and in which the more valuable articles are sold: mats, cotton prints, tea, sugar, iron, etc. 2) Mobile trade, on small tables set up in front of the booths. Here the articles sold are already cheaper: ordinary

361 soap, mirrors, wooden combs, dirty tobacco,
needles, handfuls of two Russian candies, etc.
•443 These wares are gathered up at night and spread out again in the morning. 3) Hawking, carried about in baskets or simply in the hands. To this category belongs the sale of eggs, fruit, birds, etc.

There are practically no proper goods in Kuldja now. Up until 1866 one could find Chinese silk textiles, porcelain articles, and precious stones here. Now decent textiles and porcelain have gradually become an archeological rarity and are much more expensive.

After our occupation of Kuldja a special article of trade were the Chinese "burkhans" (small copper or cast iron representations of gods). But even the burkhans have all been sold.

361 This town, which is dirty and unattractive
364 from the outside, appears even filthier inside, that is, in the courtyards and the houses. The courtyards are filled with every sort of refuse, and in the houses the dirt and disorder is beyond imagination. Even the lodgings of the rich and those who are comfortably well off suffer from the absence of light, ventilation and cleanliness. In addition the Chinese houses are distinguished by some sort of a special sharp odor, peculiar to them.

/433/ Of the public buildings in Kuldja, in addition to the two mosques, mentioned above[3] the Chinese temple of idols is worthy of mention. The entrance to the temple leads through several dirty courts. In the front court in a dark hovel is the school where the children gather to study

[3] [See category 11b, p. 151 — Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universi- 517
ties, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves 517
superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling 461
with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which [668]
aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the charac- 517
teristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addi- 177
tion it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in 517
Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this 177
may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian 186
"Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

593 wives and prefer to pass their time in association with men and to
562 idle about the whole day in the bazaar whenever their time is not taken up with work in the fields, commercial transactions or some kind of handicraft. This has its basis in the complete absence of schooling among all the women, even those of the best families. This is likewise a consequence of the seclusion of the female sex which makes it impossible for women to achieve a higher education in schools. The women are therefore unable to be companionable and good company to their husbands in the best sense.

000 A sense of how boring, even unbearable the whole life is in one of the towns inhabited by natives, as a result of the circumstances described, can only be felt by someone who has once been lost by some misfortune for a period of time in such a town. Such a life, as I can confirm from my own experience, is particularly depressing for Europeans accustomed to association with women and to the European forms of society. For Europeans a long stay in purely Mohammedan towns can be absolutely disastrous, and I have known of several cases, in which living for several years in an exclusively Mohammedan environment has led a man to suicide or madness.

462 There is one positive feature for the women in the towns and villages of Turkestan resulting from their strict separation and cloistered state: they are less drawn into heavy labor than is the case among the Kazakhs, and they are spared the work in the fields and gardens and the heavy work or the handicrafts. The chief task of the Sart and /195/ Tadjik women is the care and rearing of their children, the preparation of food, the making and washing of clothes, the spinning of yarn and the weaving of cloth for clothing for the household, and the like; above all the growing of silkworms is entirely in the hands of the women. All work which must be performed in the open and publicly, such as field and garden cultivation, handicrafts, commercial transactions, cattle raising, is done exclusively by men, which is quite different from the custom among the nomads. All the domestic labor, however, is done by the wives, even among the highest dignitaries and the khans, since there are no female domestic servants, but only male ones. It is not at all unusual for the wives of the highest officials, even of the khans, to send the products of their domestic industry, such as embroidered housecaps, belts, little pockets and the like, to the bazaar to be sold, in order to gain a little income.

in so far as the best known kinds are made by the women of the Tekke Turkomans, whose pastures are in the Merv area. Incidentally, all Turkoman carpets are made exclusively by women. Typical of the rugs of Merv is an octagonal star which is checkered red and white; the octagon is divided into four parts, each of which is in a colour contrasting to that of the adjacent part. The figures which fill the octagon are very simple and severely geometrical in style. The octagons are dispersed over the surface in even rows (see ill. p. 1459). The rugs of the Tekkes found their way to the West in large quantities; they are very popular, and have often been imitated.

The women of the Saryk tribe, which lives southward from Merv to the Afghan frontier, also use octagons as patterns, and arrange them in a manner similar to that of the Tekke rugs. There is, however, a difference in so far as the edges of these figures are not jagged. The rugs made in the southermost part of this area, known as Punjdeh (five towns), have a style of their own. They avoid red altogether, and are distinguished by a very finely graded scale of colours, in which brown and black predominate, yellow and white being used very sparingly. These dark colours form a marked contrast to the brilliant tints of all other Turkoman rugs. They correspond to the natural colour of the wool or hair used in making all Turkoman rugs. And even though these colours are often obtained artificially by dyeing, the origin of the colour scheme is doubt-

[See p. 72 -- Analyst]

73

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
●463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[1] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R [1]

464 The sites of heavy industry are, however, in the Urals and in the Kuznetz basin in Central Siberia, both outside the five republics of Turkistan. This great combine, with its iron-ore at Magnitogorsk, and very rich coal deposits in the Kuznetz, supplied the metallurgical foundation of the heavy industry base which was to supplement, and if necessary replace, the old industrial areas of the Ukraine. At Magnitogorsk, next door to the iron-ore mines, were sited the steel-foundries. Also in Bashkiria, not far away, is Ishimbay, the [315] focal point of the region now known as the Second Baku,[1] the wells of which may now be yielding as much as 19 million tons of oil a year. All these, although beyond the northern limit of Kazakistan, are situated in what was once a country of Turkish nomads, and their development was made possible largely by the use of Kazak unskilled labour. As John Scott wrote:[2]

> His ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the flat plains of Kazakistan. They had been dimly conscious of the Czarist government; they had had to pay taxes. Reports of the Kirghiz insurrection in 1916 had reached them. They had heard stories of the October Revolution; they even saw the Red Army come and drive out a few rich landlords. They had attended meetings of the Soviet without understanding very clearly what it was all about. Now he was building a blast furnace bigger than any in Europe. He had learned to speak Russian, he read newspapers. His life had changed more in a year than that of his antecedents since the time of Tamerlane.
>
> Some fifty thousand Magnitogorsk workers were directly under GPU supervision. About eighteen thousand de-Kulakized well-to-do farmers, and from twenty to thirty-five thousand criminals — thieves, prostitutes, embezzlers who performed unskilled labour usually under guard — these formed the reservoir of labour power needed to dig foundations — and do other heavy work.

[1] 'The Second Baku' is the propaganda name attached to a vast region stretching from the Volga to the Urals, producing over 11 m. tons of oil in 1950 and expected to reach an output of some 19 m. tons in 1952. Ishimbay is the centre of the most productive wells. Others are at Tuimazi, also in Bashkiria, at Syzran and Buguruslan, near Kuibishev, on the Volga bend, and at Krasnokamsk on the Kama farther north. Most of this was once Golden Horde territory.

[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 16 and 70.

[see cat. 116, pp. 89-90 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

disentangle achievement from expansive visions existing only 653
in the planner's mind, there is no doubt that in Farghana, in 312
the Chu–Talash area, and also on the Zarafshan and the Vakhsh, much good work has been brought to a conclusion. The best-known completed works are:

(*a*) The Stalin Great Farghana Canal, 270 km. long.
(*b*) The Mikoyan, or Northern Farghana, Canal, 165 km. long.
(*c*) The Andreev, or Southern Farghana, Canal, 108 km. long.
(*d*) The Katta Kurgan and Verkhno-Bukhara Reservoirs on the Zarafshan.
(*e*) The Great Chu Canal, 270 km. long.
(*f*) The Vakhsh Canal.

The construction of the first was widely advertised, with due 653
praise allotted to the 160,000 *Kolkhoz* members who dug it 312
out, and completed it in forty-five days. The availability of 464
corvée labour of this kind, which can be used in the off-season for irrigation work, must greatly aid the authorities in their task, not only on construction but on maintenance and silt-clearance. The official case is that a considerable percentage of all *Kolkhoz* workers in canal areas is used for such duties, and the labourers while absent from their homes receive their fair share of *Kolkhoz* produce. That may work in the rich and smiling Farghana Valley. But how is the case with those transported to dig in the wastes of the deserts? The logistical effort alone needed to feed armies of workers in the Karakum must be colossal.

It has been suggested that construction of the Stalin-Farghana Canal called out nearly one million labourers and that there was suffering on a large scale. Yet, in the face of all criticism, there remains an impression that this in itself was a great work, which has added much to the fertility of an already productive region. Systems of government change, but an irrigation work remains.

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander 653
312

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

1. Here are the prices for certain
361 articles on the Vernyy market:
435 A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mean that Social Democrats (*i.e.* the Party) will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations, and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[1]

It is not the national but the agrarian question that will decide the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate question.[2]

Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching.[3]

I am referring to the deviation towards local native nationalism which is at times to be observed in the ranks of native Communists and which in the East expresses itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan Turkism.[4]

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right of self-determination, and applied to 'native nationalists', who *ex hypothesi* have no proletariat of their own, by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. Leaving aside the instruments of enforcement lurking at every corner, it is hard to think of a series of pronouncements which could be more discouraging to a Central Asian patriot, or less in tune with the proud declaration of the liberty of the colonial peoples to decide on their own future.

THE PARTY

The period from 1918 to 1929 was spent in the integration of these colonial areas with Great Russia, using as instrument the Party. Collectivization had not yet been launched; up to 1929 the aim was to cut off the smaller landholders from their national leaders. Here again it is to be remembered that the Russian peasantry in the countryside and the Russian proletariat on the communications and in the towns were ready to hand to implement a policy. Whatever the theory the Party has always been in fact a single unified structure bound by the tightest possible discipline. To parody Stalin,

[1] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 53. [2] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 25. [3] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 110.
[4] Stalin, report to Communist Party, 10th Mar. 1921, *op. cit.* p. 104.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

it is unitary in content, federal only in form, a solid structure working like an army from the central command. Affairs throughout the Union are controlled from one apex at Moscow. The Party has often been called a monolith; it is perhaps more like a banyan tree, whose branches spread from the central trunk and return to earth sending up fresh trunks all of the same species as the central tree, still nourished from the centre and killing all other growths in the surrounding lands. Party missionaries from this central stem went out to spread the gospel and fight nationalism as Stalin had instructed. The central tree killed any local shrub that tried to root itself on ground which the banyan could reach. In such a conflict the local nationalists had little chance. The wonder is that their resistance was so prolonged.

471 In the cities the authority of the clergy was shaken by the confiscation of religious endowments (*evkaf*). In the settled countryside the land was nationalized, all holdings over a certain area being seized and redistributed, including cattle and agricultural implements considered surplus to the maximum allotment. At the outset a show was made of racial impartiality by confiscating Cossack lands, the Cossacks in the main having been the only Russians who resisted the new régime and the largest Russian landholders on the steppe. (Incidentally, they were the Russians on the best terms with the indigenous population.)

It remained to secure control of the water which is the life-blood of all intensive cultivation in sub-tropical continental tracts. It is broadly true to say that the people of the soil in all lands enjoying an indigenous irrigation system in the Muslim East had worked out over the centuries elaborate systems apportioning responsibilities (for channel maintenance) and rights (to turns of water), usually based on ancient tribal records of the account of profit and loss within a tribe. When older tribal theories of common lands had given way to individual user, the water continued to be regarded as a common possession to be distributed in accordance with a well-known roster, disputes being settled by the chief. For

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

nearly a decade from the time of introduction of their collective drive in 1929 to wear down the free Kazaks and Kirghiz, the nomads of the steppe and the mountain, to the point at which in 1936 they thought it safe to treat them on an equal footing with the settled Uzbeks in the south. Yet academic argument continues on questions such as that posed above, research bodies quote blueprints, and argue like Stalin from first principles. The more involved and philosophic the discussion, the less account it seems to take of the concrete case, the actual cost in human suffering. And even those who enter the lists against the Soviet apologist are apt to speak in terms of thousands or millions of human lives from the standpoint of recorders of casualties in some phantom war. The spirit and the dignity of man is given no place in all these bickerings.

Let us try to see what really befell the men and women of Kazakistan of 1929. By that year a centralized control had been imposed in the areas of settled cultivation in Soviet Central Asia; hereditary leaders of the people had been pulled down by confiscations from their position in city and field and, less certainly, from their paramountcy on the steppe also; land and water had been nationalized and, after taking a large share for the *Sovkhozes* or state farms, redistributed in an arbitrary fashion. But here more than elsewhere in the USSR up to 1928 Lenin's New Economic Policy had given some freedom at least to the small man; small-holders still worked on lands they counted their own, yoking their own oxen to the plough, milking their own cattle, riding their own horses; herdsmen roamed the steppe or hillside tending their own flocks and herds of camels, cattle, horses, sheep and goats; both brought their produce to market in cart or on hoof — grain, vegetables, fruit, eggs and chickens, milk, cheese and meat — and sold it in shops at reasonable prices. Except that the chiefs and big men had been removed, the social and economic system of agricultural production and distribution remained much as it had been before the Revolution. On the steppe and in the mountains there even remained vestiges of

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

> A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

lands their families had occupied for generations, and put at 474 unfamiliar work in unfamiliar surroundings. Fewer still made 661 any effort to escape, their experiences seemed to have broken up any spirit of defiance they may have had before. He explains how the numbers of peasants available made the federal police the largest single employers in Russia, and gave them a reputation for getting things done. They could always count on a steady supply of labour, that great forced-labour army which started from the days of the so-called liquidation of the Kulaks. In this way the double end was served, opposition to collective farming stifled and the sinews of industry provided.

The policy of collectivization was directed both at the settled farmers and at the nomads, but with the former was easier to achieve. In Central Asia the peasants do not usually live in scattered farms on their lands but congregate in villages huddled together for protection and defence and enjoying from ancient times some degree of communal life based on their tribal past. Each cultivator goes out daily, and sometimes nightly, from the village to his fields which are often in several parts of the village lands. One man, for instance, will cultivate his ancestral share of the best irrigated land, a similar share of land not so good, perhaps dependent on rainfall, and a share in the village common or waste where the herds pasture. The water-rights will be held in theory in common, and approportioned by ancestral shares according to traditional needs. This system was not without a collective tribal background and with sympathy and vision it might not have been impossible to have introduced reforms gradually leading to a commonalty which, taking account of tradition, should have combined the incentive of individual user with the needs of the whole village community. That, however, is what Communists would nowadays call a feudal survivalist deviation, and it is not what happened. As we have seen, the Communists aimed not at a form of collectivism which should be the most efficient consistent with its acceptability by the people, but at very greatly reducing the number of workers in the fields in order to supply industry. Redeployment in industry was

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

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perhaps the most important part of the plan — proletarianization as they called it.[1] They did not therefore try for a revivified tribal system, but aimed at a complete reorganization of village life, by means of a consolidation of small-holdings into large fields to be worked by a mechanized agriculture. In practice, this meant not only the dispossession of the more efficient and more prosperous farmers, but such an amalgamation of lands as to produce complete confusion of the identities of possession and user.

Essential grazing-lands came under the plough. All incentive was at least temporarily removed, and the Party slave-driver could not be everywhere at once. Thousands of cattle died of starvation or were deliberately slaughtered by the peasants in protest. The initial disasters caused even the Soviet planners to modify original plans and eventually to allow homestead holdings of a limited acreage for the individual peasant to cultivate outside the commonalty. Togan describes the position in Farghana, the richest part of Turkistan. The people were starving, and half the people landless. Draught oxen had perished in thousands. The people were exposed to every form of official tyranny and persecution — imprisonment, plunder, deportation, execution for those that stood out. Draught cattle that remained were seized and tractors brought in and shown to the farmers on condition that they should be used for cotton cultivation only and by those only who would join the *Kolkhoz*. The peasants, robbed of their horses and oxen, found their fate depending on machinery from Russia, using oil which then had also to be imported, and mechanics then also Russian. They were helpless.

Another American, John Scott,[2] has a vivid description of the methods adopted for the 'dekulakization' of a village.

'How did they decide who was to be dekulakized ?' 'Ah, that's a hell of a question to ask a guy that's trying to expiate his crimes in

[1] During the second Five-Year Plan directions were issued to release 1,500,000 workers *annually* from agriculture to industry. This was for the whole Union.

[2] Bib. I, 85. A sincere admirer of the indomitable determination shown by Stalin and others in pushing through industrialization beyond the Urals, Scott also underlines the cost in blood and tears. He worked for five years at Magnitogorsk.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.'

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they

[1] [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

433 are introduced to banquets spread out in garden pavilions, where *Kolkhoz* officials uneasily may take their ease.[1]

000 The cultivated lands of the southern oases are in a favoured part of the earth's surface. They are indeed restricted, but acre for acre, they are probably among the most productive in Asia. Throughout history the population was thick on the land and, once subdued, could be subjected to police control village by village without being able to put up much of a resistance. State management of the essential water-supply gave to authority the final weapon that could scarcely be gainsaid. Even the second Revolution could not destroy the natural prosperity of such favoured lands as these. But on the steppe and in the mountains it was different.

THE NOMADS

233 In order to understand the situation facing the Soviet planners of the collective farm in the wide unirrigated territory north of the Sir Darya, and in the more remote mountain glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. There are two forms of nomadism: that of the spreading open steppe, and that of the nomads who move with the season to the mountains. The first form, that of the steppe, is not unlike the nomadism of the Beduin in the Arabian deserts, for much of the steppe melts into a desert colder and less hospitable than Arabia. It has indeed a considerable snow precipitation, and therefore usually affords excellent pasture when the snows melt in the spring. But

[474] [245]

[1] Cf. Coates, *op. cit.* pp. 232-4. This contains an amusing account of a princely entertainment offered in 1947 in the garden surrounding his private house near Tashkent by the Uzbek chairman of a *Kolkhoz*. The meal was spread in a pavilion — one among many — looking down a garden avenue, flanked with vines laden with grapes. The first course consisted of pies, sausages, bread and cakes, fried pelmets, fruit, almonds, sweets, wine and cognac, with soup, tea and yoghurt as aids to digestion. There followed the *pièce de résistance*, a pilav, an hour's gorged rest and to finish up a rich dessert of melons, grapes and other fruit. 'What', asked the visitors, 'has become of the former owners of the land?' 'Some', replied the chairman, 'were killed during the fighting, others had fled the USSR, but some of the younger people have settled down to honest labour. The son of my former master, for instance, is now a member of this *Kolkhoz*.'

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries free-born and untrammelled, meeting only with rivalry from their own kind if they should overstep their limits. Their flocks were part of their family and they lived by and on them. For houses they had only tents (*yurts*) and wooden or adobe huts. For their Khans they had a real veneration recorded in epic poetry handed down by minstrels by word of mouth. The way of their life implied that they would be here today and gone tomorrow, and it had always been difficult for authority to control or tax them. If the seasons were kind, a tribe was self-contained and asked little of any man. In bad seasons there might be raiding and local forays. By 1929 the Soviets had not fully succeeded in driving a satisfactory wedge between the Khans and the other tribesmen on the steppe. In the settled areas it had been possible to appeal to the cupidity of the lesser men by redistributing the land of the richer; but on the steppe the redistribution of pasture lands was a most difficult operation, and that of flocks and herds almost impossible. In either case the bond between Khan and free tribesman was too close and intimate to brook official interference of that kind. It was for this reason, that, when Littlepage arrived on the steppe in 1928, he was able to record that the old life and manners of the tribes up to that time remained unchanged. Some of the old loyalties to the chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula or prohibition, the old laws of hospitality, were still in force. At that time the tribal herds were increasing every year and the tribes supplied meat and dairy products ample for themselves and for the dwellers in cities alike. It was this system that the Soviets had to break up, if they needed these men for industry. It was a tough job.

177,47 474

In a pregnant passage Littlepage[1] states both points of view:

000 The nomads were among the principal sufferers when the Second Communist Revolution started in 1929. But the nomads were dirty and superstitious, and I could understand how the Communist

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 185-6.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking up their old forms of life and persuading them, even by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more civilized and sensible. On this trip, however (undertaken in 1934), as we pushed along day after day through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. . . . I could see how the life might appeal to them. . . . I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

The job[1] was done not by redistribution, but by the indiscriminate rounding-up of the nomads with their animals. Nearly half those who did not die, men and women, went off to slavery. Three-quarters of the flocks and herds were slaughtered or perished uncared-for in the wilderness. When all was over, nothing remained to be seen on the steppe but once in a while a small village of Russian settlers whose ancestors had pushed into the Kazak country half a century earlier and, very occasionally, a small group of felt huts occupied by miserable-looking down-at-heel Kazaks who had been induced to settle down in cattle-breeding farms.

Lest it be thought that this picture is too highly coloured, let us turn to Soviet sources. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, a cautiously written compilation, relates[1] that, in spite of preventive measures taken by the Central Committee, most serious deviations from the Party line took place in Kazakistan, making it easier for the beys, the Kulaks and the Alash-Orda elements to carry out anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary activity. 'But', it concludes, 'with the help of the Central Committee of the Communist Party these mistakes in the set-up of the *Kolkhoz* system were put right.' We need only turn to the census returns to see how matters were put right, by measures leading to the death of one in three of the Kazak population, whether by mass starvation or by violence. That is the true picture of Soviet colonial imperialism. To allow of due completion of this process it was necessary for the

[1] *G. S. Encycl.* vol. 30, p. 598. Bib. III, 10.

[1 [i.e. collectivization -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 661 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233 [474] The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers.

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred.

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

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A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.

101 pulated countries in the world. It is also known
133 as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of
492 this territory, along which the roads run. All
133 commerce goes by way of caravans which re-
484 quire months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

1 [Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]
2 [See cat 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
●484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] 175 The municipal civilization which has grown up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1/1 [p. 3 -- Analyst]

[Tashkent]

366 earsplitting racket; in another street the ferries and nail smiths are at
443 work; gold and silversmiths, shoemakers, tailors, chandlers, turners, saddlers (cf. Figure 57, p. 15a), embroiderers in silk, etc., each take a special street for themselves. The division into branches, however, is not simply limited to the general classification but even applies to the separate booths. As a rule, each merchant handles only a single article. In one booth one finds, for example, only horse saddles, in another, only harnesses for horses, in a third, only fur hats, in a fourth, only fur coats, in a fifth, only 'khalats' /wide flowing Oriental dressing gown/ etc. Among the shoemakers, one sells only riding boots, another only overshoes with leather stockings, a third only cut-out boot leather, and so on. Even in the production of the plov /pilaf/, the carrots, which must be cut into fine pieces, are not prepared by the cook himself, but are furnished already prepared by a merchant who is occupied exclusively with the cutting and sale of carrots.

[295] Of all the bazaar booths, the tea booths or 'chaikhanas' enjoy the largest number of customers, and those natives who can afford it pass the greatest part of the day in tea booths, chatting, drinking tea, smoking and playing chess. Most of the tea booths are located around the bazaar square at the intersections of the various streets which run through the
[305] rows of shops. Near the tea booths are also found the booths of the barbers, insofar as they have their own shops at all; most of the barbers are ambulatory and practise their trade on the street or in the tea booths.

485 The caravansaries (1) erected in various places in the bazaar re-

1. Not Karavanserei, as it is usually written in German, for it is made up of two words, 'karavan' - "caravan", and 'sarai' - "shed".

place our hotels for the travellers in Central Asia, for hotels /165/ do not exist there. The caravansaries are open buildings for the temporary shelter of traveling merchants together with their wares, horses and camels. They consist of a roomy, quadrangular court, which /Figure 57, p. 15a. Caption: Sart saddlers at the bazaar in Tashkent/ surrounds a one or two-story building, in which there are rooms assigned for the shelter of the travelers and their wares. These are simple, windowless, smoke-blackened rooms with clay floors, containing no furniture at all, since in Central Asia every traveler carries with him all the necessary things, like beds, footrugs, drinking and cooking utensils, teapots, and the like. Tables and chairs, however, are unknown on the whole. The beasts of burden are tied up in the middle of the court,

485 where there are several water basins. The travelers receive only water in the caravansaries and, for a suitable price, fodder for their beasts; for the lodging itself nothing is paid. /Figure 58. Caption: wooden platform. / Food /166/ is not provided and the travelers must either provide their own or have it fetched from the bazaar. (Figure 59).

364 366 What strikes the European as most unpleasant in a Central Asian bazaar is the incredible filth and the intolerable stench which poisons the air everywhere. The water, which runs in countless open canals through almost all the streets, acquires, before it leaves the bazaar, an unbelievable degree of impurity so that it actually stinks. All excrement flows from the street into the canals, the inhabitants perform their incessant ablutions in them as prescribed by the Koran, horses and mangy dogs bathe in them, and the water from these same canals is not only used to sprinkle the streets, but also employed for drinking and for the preparation of food and tea, without even superficial filtering. The butchers slaughter their cattle in the middle of the street and hang the meat on the outside of their booth where it can be seen, just as in other booths clothing, silk cloth, and gold and silver jewelry is displayed. Since the meat begins to spoil in a short time in the great heat there, and futhermore, since it is always entirely covered with flies and other insects, one can imagine what sort of aroma wafts from the butcher's booth. To this is added the smoke and stench of the numerous eating houses, and the drying of the horse and camel manure lying all over the streets, for all the bazaar streets, are covered with riders and caravans from morning till night, but the dung is never removed from the streets.

3. Streets. (Figures 60 to 62, pages 169, 171, 173).

291 369 363 One would, perhaps, not believe that a stroll through the streets of a Central Asian town could be as agreeable and entertaining as, for example, here in Munich, a walk along the Maximilianstrasse. Of ladies who are the chief decoration of a European street, there one sees not a trace. Only the initiated knows that under the formless loose tunics stealing furtively through the streets here and there, under which nothing appears but a pair of feet clad in equally formless boots and overshoes, a female creature is concealed; but whether these feet belong to an eighteen year old beauty or an octogenarian Megara, only Allah knows. As for the second adornment (?) of European street

1: von Schwarz--17a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 38. Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)

492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this waterless and treeless country. The temperature
[132] varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries
487 excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

[In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

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4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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[172]
[487]

the trade-routes between China and the West. In ancient and medieval times they were numbered among the busiest caravan-routes in the world (see Ciba Review No. 10, page 316). Silks, brocades, precious stones, Chinese porcelain, metal and glass goods of enormous value were transported by these roads. Nevertheless Marco Polo's report shows that even in his day, that is to say towards the end of the thirteenth century, the population must have been very small, and that the water-works were falling into decay. It is very probable that the Mohammedan invasion which destroyed the Buddhist civilization of Eastern Turkestan was not entirely responsible for this decline; a general change of climatic conditions must be presumed to have taken place. In Marco Polo's

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23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia R1 1

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kand–Namangan. Water transport is rather unimportant, the only suitable route being the Amu Darya below Chardzhou. In the mountain regions transport has to rely on highways, the main routes linking Osh with Khorog, Tashkent and Leninabad with Stalinabad, and Stalinabad with Khorog. In the desert, camel caravans continue to be the main commercial link, supplying particularly the oasis of Khorezm.

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

489 It has been said that this rich area has no communication with the world outside, and difficult communications within. It is true that the only sea-outlet is through the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei; but with the recent re-opening of the Kara Sea route the northern river-ways have a great commercial value. This will especially be the case when, on the completion of the Ob–Arctic Ocean Railway, there will be no necessity to cross the Kara Sea with its dangerous straits.

Within this region the communication is carried on—

491 (*a*) By means of natural roads, of which there are some 109,000 versts in Siberia, and 58,000 versts in Russian Central Asia, not counting the secondary roads.

133 505 (*b*) By means of river-ways, in which especially Western Siberia is very well endowed. The basin of the River Ob alone is navigable for a distance of some 15,000 versts, while some 16,000 more is passable for floating. Turkestan, with its two chief rivers Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria, has much more limited river communications; Amu-Daria is navigable for a distance of some 1,400 versts, but for steam-ships only 800 versts. Syr-Daria could be made navigable for a distance of 1,200 versts, but at present the river is more important for irrigation purposes. The southern rivers are free from ice for about six months in the year, while the rivers north of the Altai Mountains are navigable from three to four months a year.

496 (*c*) The railway is, of course, the most important means of communication, and each new line causes a great industrial and social upheaval in the district. The Trans-Siberian has only a relative value, and much greater importance is attached to the southern line of the Trans-Siberian (Chelyabinsk–Omsk) and the new branches; the Altai (Novo-Nikolaevsk–Biisk–Semipalatinsk) and the Minusinsk (Achinsk–Minusinsk). The Central Asiatic (Krasnovodsk–Andijan), covering 2,368 versts, and the Tashkent Railway (Orenburg–Tashkent), covering some 1,756 versts, unite to some extent Russian Central Asia with Western Siberia. A line between Semipalatinsk and some point on the Tashkent Railway will be of enormous importance for the further development of Western Siberia,

[Tashkent]

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

363 Paving or macadamizing is of course out of the question for the streets
361 of Turkestan. The street bed consists simply of the ubiquitous loess, and is therefore covered in summer with dust half a foot deep, and in winter with mud a foot deep, which in the lower places collects in such masses that the horses sink in to their bellies and there can be no further thought of a pedestrian. Since the streets are primarily traveled by riding horses and wagon horses, and by camels, all of which are accustomed to following the foot prints of their predecessors, definite footprints have been formed in the streets, running across the road, which remind one vividly of a potato patch. Travel on such a street even in a carriage with springs is very uncomfortable, and, for the equipage itself, mortally dangerous, as one can easily imagine. Only the native, wide-tracked, two-wheeled wagon with its huge wheels is capable of passing along this bumpy road safely.

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3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

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[Tashkent]

291 life, the dandy, these are found in the towns of Central Asia indeed as
363 much as in Europe; but there they do not move about the streets, but sit
369 about in the bazaar and especially in tea booths. The Central Asian dandies differ from their European colleagues, and indeed, not to their disadvantage, in several essential points. While the European dandies are distinguished by their walking sticks, short /167/ /Figure 59, p. 17a. Caption: Caravansary in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ /168/ stockings and coats, high collars, small hats, heelless pointed shoes, and an orangutan-like bearing, their Central Asian colleagues are recognised by their proud and audacious bearing, their long boots with unbelievably high heels no thicker than a finger, short khalats, turbans or house caps set at an angle, and the flowers stuck behind their long ears.

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492
484

A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.

101 pulated countries in the world. It is also known
133 as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of
492 this territory, along which the roads run. All
133 commerce goes by way of caravans which re-
484 quire months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

[Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]

[See cat. 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

492 to Kashgar. Only Bactrian camels, very heavy
133 double-humped animals, whose thick coat of hair protects them against the snow-storms and the bitter cold, are strong enough to carry burdens of merchandise through this water-
[132] less and treeless country. The temperature varies between + 35° centigrade in the summer and — 25° in the winter.[1]

172 It is probable that conditions were not al-
133 ways so unfavourable. The ruins of richly adorned Buddhist temples and monasteries
487 excavated by Sir Aurel Stein, Albert von Grünwedel, and Albert Le Coq, and an astonishingly large number of frescoes, sculptures, fabrics, and documents discovered by these scholars bear witness to this fact. The so-called silk-roads which passed these monasteries were

1 [In Eastern Turkestan --Analyst]

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

Interior view of a caravanserai in Samarkand. In the foreground some of the high two-wheeled carts which are the most important vehicles of transport in Western Turkestan.

16

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 Khans, Farghana in the Russian era has achieved first place in the economic life of Turkistan, agricultural and more recently industrial also. In many respects, ringed round by protecting hills and watered by streams from every quarter, it is like a larger and even more fertile edition of the vale of Peshawar farther south, even to the narrow exit for the waters at Khojent (Leninabad) — a northern Attock — and its central desert only waiting for the water that gives life — another Yusufzai *maira*.[1]

There was much behind this policy. It was not only cotton that the Russians needed; they sought to impose a measure of economic dependence. The cultivation of cotton was pressed by the appeal of higher prices and the fact that it requires less water and less labour than that of grain — much less water than rice. The consequent diminution in the area under grain entailed the import of corn from Russia to meet a marginal deficiency which was high enough at the time of the Revolution to bring famine to the country when grain imports failed owing to breakdown in communications. This policy could not fail to set Turkistan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary matter of the basic food supply.

175 496 If it was to become the main source of the all-important raw material of cotton, Turkistan required above all a means of rapid transport to Europe. We have seen how the Russian advance came from the north along the line of the Sir Darya, and pre-dated by some decades the conquest of the Turkmen steppe. At first the plan was to use the Sir Darya, and after the conquest of Khiva and the practical absorption of Bukhara in 1873 the streams of the Amu Darya, as channels of river navigation, both fed by a flotilla on the Aral Sea. But the Sir Darya was so beset with shoals that even today the difficulty of navigating it has not been properly surmounted and, although the Amu Darya is rather more satisfactory as a waterway, it too did not then provide the solution that was needed, nor indeed is the Aral Sea ideally situated as an

[1] Pashtu word for a barren rolling plain or steppe, equivalent to Persian *dasht* Kazak *dala*.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

entrepôt of commerce. It followed that the practical problems 175 of railway construction had to be faced, and were indeed met, 496 by Tsarist Russia in Turkistan before they had presented themselves in the other parts of her Asiatic Empire. It is interesting that the Trans-Siberian Railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Trans-Caspian line, on the other hand, was begun in 1880 from an original terminus at Uzun Ada (later extended to Krasnovodsk), and reached Samarkand in 1888, whence it was extended subsequently both to Tashkent, the capital, and up the Farghana Valley to Andijan.

Thus railway construction in Russian Central Asia was carried out in inverse order to the initial penetration by force of arms. The Turkmen country, which was the last to be subdued, was the first to enjoy rail communications with the west, and that in spite of the interruption caused by the need to break the journey for the Caspian crossing from Baku. It was not until the end of 1905 that uninterrupted communication with the Russian railway network was achieved by means of a line skirting the Aral Sea and traversing the original road of the Russian advance up the Sir Darya and past the town of Turkistan to Tashkent.

The Russians had at first envisaged the initial approach as leading up the Sir Darya from the north, and did not commit themselves to the Trans-Caspian line without much thought and in the face of strong opposition from Chernaiev[1] and others. The Trans-Caspian project was largely tactical at the outset: it was put forward by their engineer Annenkov as a means of supplying the forces engaged against the Turkmens which had failed disastrously under Lomakin. When Skobelev took over in 1880, he lent his powerful support to the idea, not so much because he needed it to win his campaign — indeed he boasted, and fulfilled the boast, that he would subdue the Turkmens without such adventitious aids — as that his eyes had been opened to what seemed to him its strategic possibilities. It would afford a rapid means of consolidating and

1 [first Governor-General of Turkistan (1865, 1882-84) -- Analyst

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might
496 even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

175 It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes
669 when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293. [2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Railway Network 1952
Broad Gauge 5′ 0″

From Soviet sources
(very contradictory)

Working line with centre or junction

In final stages of construction

International frontier

Boundaries of Republics

N.B. Trans-Siberian, Central Asian, Trans-Aral, and most of Farghana network, constructed by Tsars; and Turk-Siberian, planned and surveyed by Tsars.

OLAF CAROE: SOVIET EMPIRE (MAC)

-192(A)-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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

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EMERY WALKER LTD., SC.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

185 These four overlap, as for instance in the case of irrigation and hydro-electric works, or irrigation and navigation canals, both of which Russian engineers like to set side by side. They do not by any means give an exhaustive analysis — the copper and lead mines and works above mentioned are instances of this — and at many points they have to be considered in relation to agricultural development also. But they do provide some general idea of the all-over Soviet plan for the development of Turkistan. In broad terms this may be said to be to continue the Tsarist policy of using Central Asian products to make Russia self-sufficient in the raw materials of the finer textiles (cotton and silk); to improve on that by bringing the mills to the fields in order to manufacture on the spot; largely to increase the area under cash-crops by irrigation; to use the irrigation canals to aid in the supply of power; to increase also to the limit the fuel sources of power available within these territories; and finally to provide the rail transportation necessary for bringing the whole agricultural and industrial complex within the all-Union economic system.[1]

496 I mention transportation by rail last because the Soviet record in the matter of railway construction has been remarkably unimpressive, and one has the impression that the provision of enough and efficient transportation links does not precede or synchronize with, but follows, developments in other fields, seriously handicapping the prospect of a balanced economy. Only one really important trunk railway is known to have been fully completed in Turkistan during the thirty-five years of the Soviet era, and that is the Turk-Sib. Even that was planned and surveyed under the Tsars, and but for the Revolution would almost certainly have been put through much earlier than 1930, which was the year in which the Soviets with a great fanfare announced its eventual completion. The Tsarist engineers completed the Trans-Caspian (or Central Asian) Railway in the eighties of last century and the

[1] A table of a few targets set under the fourth Five-Year Plan which ended in 1950 follows this chapter. The targets for the most part are said to have been reached, and the Soviets have now moved on to a fifth Plan. For rail-network see map opposite.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 Trans-Aral line up the Sir Darya by the end of 1905. They also laid down and completed the main network of the very important branches to Khojent, Kokand and Andijan in the Farghana Valley, and the line to the Afghan frontier at Kushk. Soviet propagandists, conscious of this damaging comparison, seek to disarm criticism by saying that only Soviet energy could fulfil the Tsarist plans; but in making this claim they overlook the fine pioneer work done by their predecessors. In a larger field it is remarkable that it was the Tsars, not the Soviets, who built railways to the Pacific. The Soviets frequently announce the construction of a second 'Relief' Siberian line farther to the south, but so far only bits of this exist on the ground. It is indeed remarkable how Soviet enterprise has been found wanting in this sphere.

There are two good examples of the other tendency to confuse prospect with performance. In April 1940[1] it was stated in the Soviet press that a new Oxus Valley line — this too, be it noted, a Tsarist scheme — was to have been completed northward from Charjui as far as Urgench in Khorezm some time in that year. But later notices establish that this important trunk (designed, it seems, eventually to link up with the main European system north of the Caspian) was only begun, much less completed, as lately as October 1947. In the words of the panegyrist:[2]

> One of the great railway-building feats of all time is being carried out in Soviet Asia. A few months ago the restless wind was the only intruder in this wilderness of shifting sands. Then one October day, an army of 70,000 people crossed the horizon, making for the Amu Darya River. They had come to carry out a task laid down in the Five-Year Plan — to build a railway from the Transcaspian Line to the Aral Sea, from Chardzhou to Kungrad. The idea of building a railway across the desert is not new. Attempts were made before the Revolution in 1899 and again in 1913 — to survey a route; but, like other great projects, the Karakum scheme was destined to be realized only in Soviet times. Soviet life in all its cheerful busy variety has invaded the desert. In the evening when the moon rises and the sandhills turn blue, cinema operators

[1] *Pravda* (3rd Apr. 1940).

[2] Bib. II, 10.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496

set up their portable projectors, professors give science lectures, hundreds of newspaper editors get busy in their offices among the dunes, and brilliant companies of musicians and singers entertain the multitude. . . . By 1950 the Amu Darya Valley will be transformed.

It is clear that an important railway of which the completion was forecast in 1940 was not even started until seven years later, and was due for completion on a rough estimate as much as ten years later. This line may not be finished even now (1953). A recent manual on Uzbekistan [1] includes it on sketch-maps as having been constructed as far as Kungrad in the Amu Darya delta, but a less convincing text suggests that the work is far from complete. This line will be of the greatest importance, if the Soviets mean to realize their vast project for a Turkmenian Canal with a headworks at Takhya Tash in the delta.

Another case in which promise and performance are not equated is that of the Mointy–Chu line. The most important new railways actually constructed by the Soviets in Turkistan during the Five-Year plans are those leading to Karaganda, their coal centre, with branches to their two main copper regions north of Balkhash and round Jezkazgan. These had to be constructed if the coal and copper were to be worked at all. (They include an important branch, destined in due course to become a link in a Relief Siberian Line, from Akmolinsk to Kartali, near Magnitogorsk.) In July 1946 Kovalev, the Central Minister of Railways, announced that the Balkhash line was being extended from Mointy to join up with the Turk-Sib line at Chu, so providing a fourth through-trunk connecting Tashkent with the outside world. But it was not until 1952 that news came through of a single special train passing over this line to mark the occasion of the Kazakistan Congress. The line has now gone back to the list of construction works for further attention to the permanent way. In the case of the Oxus Valley line the reasons for delay may be sought in the impact of the war, although this did

[1] Bib. III, 26. Vitkovich.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

496 not prevent large-scale construction in Turkistan in certain spheres. Delays over the Mointy–Chu line must be attributed to other causes. Whatever the actual cause in any given case, it is possible to affirm with certainty first that it has become a habit for engineers and announcers alike to make a point of confusing blueprints with actual construction, and secondly that Soviet railway construction in Turkistan up to the present time has not added very materially to the network which existed twenty years ago.

Shortcomings and delays of this kind are worth mentioning, for the picture must be seen in light and shade. But the general impression would be as true, namely, that the five republics have now become, for their population if not for their size, a highly industrialized area. Statistics, if nothing else, show something like one in three of the population as
316 living in towns and centres. Karaganda, the centre of the coal-
135 field in Kazakistan, has grown from nothing to 200,000. Like Magnitogorsk in earlier days, it is in fact a concentration camp of helot labour, producing over sixteen million tons of coal a year and qualifying as the third most productive coal-field in the Union, the next after the Don and Kuznetz basins. There are large coal deposits in the Angren Valley close to Tashkent, well sited to serve the industries of the capital and near the nodal point of the railway network. There is also
315 coal in the Tajik foothills. Ishimbay, the heart of the Second Baku in the Urals, already mentioned, is not far outside the five republics and within Bashkiria, while in the republics are three most important groups of oil-wells. The first is in the Emba area (in Kazakistan north-east of the Caspian), with the fields round Guryev and pipe-line to Orsk, the third most productive field in the Union. Next is the Nebit Dagh field close to Krasnovodsk, followed by various smaller wells in the Farghana Valley at Kim-Shorsu, at Yarkurgan and Chimion and also near Andijan. Others find mention in enthusiastic articles in press and encyclopedia alike. Some 1950 targets of production — all realized — are given in the selective table appended to this chapter. 2

2 [see cath 116, p213 -- Analysis]

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

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23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Soviet Central Asia RL1

rigated farming, with intensive crops adapted to land irrigation (mainly cotton); (2) dry farming, including chiefly grain crops on mountain slopes having sufficient rainfall; (3) lowland livestock raising, including sheep and camels, adapted to the dry steppe and the desert; (4) highland livestock raising of cattle, goats, and sheep, adapted to valley pastures. Of all these activities, irrigated farming is by far the most important; it employs the greater portion of the population and covers more than two thirds of the sown area. The main crop in the irrigated area is cotton, remarkably well suited to the fertile loess soil of the lower valleys and the warm, sunny climate of Central Asia. The chief cotton areas are the Fergana Valley, the oases of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the Vakhsh valley. The cotton is processed in local ginning plants, the seeds are sent to oil-extracting presses, and the husks are used for fodder. Other irrigated crops are rice, alfalfa, wheat, corn, sesame, and melons. The irrigated fields are generally bordered by mulberry trees, on which the silkworm is cultivated. One of the most common fruit-trees is the apricot; widespread orchards also produce peaches, apples, pears, pomegranates, grapes. Dried fruits (apricots, peaches, and raisins) form important articles of export. Grain crops occupy a very small portion of the irrigated area and are grown mainly on the non-irrigated mountain slopes.

SCL 241 SCA 241 SCL [248] SCA [248] SCL

Livestock is raised all year round, generally in the high mountain valleys in the summer and the lowland steppe and desert in the winter. The most important herds are sheep (including the karakul sheep), camels, cattle, horses, and mountain goats and yak.

SCL 231 SCA 231 SCL

Beside the mining industry developed at the deposits of petroleum, coal, salt, sulphur, and nonferrous metals, the industry is concentrated in the region of Tashkent, where it is supplied with power by the two large hydroelectric installations, the Chirchik and the Farkhad power plants. Tashkent is the center of the heavy metallurgy, textile, machine-construction, and food industries. Plants which process agricultural products are located in many other parts of Central Asia; they include ginning plants, oil presses, tanneries, fruit canneries, sugar refineries, and cotton and silk mills.

SCL 438* SCA 438 SCL

The basic transportation route is the Trans-Caspian Railroad, which sends many branches into the chief economic regions of Central Asia: the spur from Mary to Kushka, on the Afghan border, and the branches from Chardzhou to Kungrad (now under construction), from Kagan to Termez and Stalinabad, and from Ursat'yevskaya to Andizhan-Ko-
Kand-Namangan

SCL 496 SCA 496

3: Czaplicka E-4 (no date) 1918 RL4 Turkic Peoples
Turkestan RL1

489 It has been said that this rich area has no communication with the world outside, and difficult communications within. It is true that the only sea-outlet is through the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei; but with the recent re-opening of the Kara Sea route the northern river-ways have a great commercial value. This will especially be the case when, on the completion of the Ob–Arctic Ocean Railway, there will be no necessity to cross the Kara Sea with its dangerous straits.

Within this region the communication is carried on—

491 (*a*) By means of natural roads, of which there are some 109,000 versts in Siberia, and 58,000 versts in Russian Central Asia, not counting the secondary roads.

133 505 (*b*) By means of river-ways, in which especially Western Siberia is very well endowed. The basin of the River Ob alone is navigable for a distance of some 15,000 versts, while some 16,000 more is passable for floating. Turkestan, with its two chief rivers Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria, has much more limited river communications; Amu-Daria is navigable for a distance of some 1,400 versts, but for steam-ships only 800 versts. Syr-Daria could be made navigable for a distance of 1,200 versts, but at present the river is more important for irrigation purposes. The southern rivers are free from ice for about six months in the year, while the rivers north of the Altai Mountains are navigable from three to four months a year.

496 (*c*) The railway is, of course, the most important means of communication, and each new line causes a great industrial and social upheaval in the district. The Trans-Siberian has only a relative value, and much greater importance is attached to the southern line of the Trans-Siberian (Chelyabinsk–Omsk) and the new branches; the Altai (Novo-Nikolaevsk–Biisk–Semipalatinsk) and the Minusinsk (Achinsk–Minusinsk). The Central Asiatic (Krasnovodsk–Andijan), covering 2,368 versts, and the Tashkent Railway (Orenburg–Tashkent), covering some 1,756 versts, unite to some extent Russian Central Asia with Western Siberia. A line between Semipalatinsk and some point on the Tashkent Railway will be of enormous importance for the further development of Western Siberia,

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92, p. 75a Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native.[1] In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p. 165, and Figure 85, p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[1 [cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analysis]

grating is put together, are not simply set in crosswise, but are intertwined in more or less complicated ways into arabesques. One of the simplest forms of this window grating is that shown in Figure 88. The basic form of the alabaster grating is often an imitation of the wooden grating. During the winter these window gratings are often covered with white cigarette paper or with writing paper treated with oil to keep out the draughts of air. The interior of the dwellings is almost always veiled in half darkness because of the lack of windows, and the /239/ wide projecting roofs of the verandas; and when the door wings are open one can read or do close work right next to the door (cf. Figure 72, p. 201, and Figure 79, p. 223). /Figure 88. Caption: Window Grating of Turkestan. / 342

Just inside the main entrance of the living quarters is a square recess which serves as a washing and bathing place, a place where one can pour water, and for the removal of overshoes.

The floor of the room consists simply of clay, and is always covered with a plain reed mat or felt covering, depending on the financial means of the owner, or with a greater or smaller number of costly carpets. [352]

For ventilation there is an opening in the roof in which a short cylindrical pipe of burned clay is placed. Since rain and snow can enter unhindered through this opening, the ventilation openings are often found also in the sides of the walls just under the roof.

Room furniture in the dwellings of the Central Asians is either completely absent or is found in very small quantity. They have no idea of tables, chairs, couches and our many cupboards and chests of drawers. In place of our clothing and kitchen cupboards and chests of drawers, in Turkestan various niches are fixed in the walls for this purpose, occupying all four walls of the room as a rule. These niches are either simple recesses in the walls, like our blind windows, or they are partitions made artistically of alabaster, as can be seen in Figure 123. These niches serve for the hanging up of clothes and underwear and for the storage of dinner plates, wash basins, water pitchers and teapots, water pipes, candlesticks, preserves and food, occasional books, and the like. As for real furniture, the natives of Turkestan are only acquainted with bedsteads, cradles, chests, and the small low table already mentioned for the coal pan. 352 342

The poorer population and also a good part of the rich simply sleep on the floor. A blanket serves as a bed, over which one or more quilted cotton covers are spread, depending on what can be afforded. 513

513 A quilted cotton cover serves likewise as a top covering but it is of finer material than the one underneath. Quilted covers of silk and silk mixed with cotton are not rare. They are usually about two meters square, so that at times of extreme /240/ cold they can be wrapped all the way around. On my journeys I have camped in the open under such covers, sometimes in a cold of 20° to 30° centigrade, and have been quite comfortable. The natives do not know of sheets; as a result the bed covers, which cannot be washed because of their quilting, leave much to be desired as regards cleanliness after being used for some time. During the day the bed covers are rolled up together and stacked up along the walls with the pillows. For pillows they use cylinders stuffed with cotton and covered with silk or cotton material, similar to our window cushions, which are definitely preferable according to my experience to the feather head pillows used in Europe for they are not only more hygienic but also more comfortable. Only the very rich allow themselves the luxury of bedsteads.

[352] The bedsteads in Turkestan, the arrangement of which may be seen in Figure 89, p. 73a, in spite of their simplicity are the most suitable I have ever seen, and no improvement of our bedsteads, no matter how refined, can compete with them. They combine the advantages of ordinary bedsteads with those of American hammocks and can satisfy the demands of the most pampered sybarite. I have grown so spoiled by using Turkestan bedsteads over many years, that even now I have not yet been able to reconcile myself to the European bed. The bedsteads of Turkestan consist of a wooden frame joined together from a rough beam about ten centimeters thick, resting on four turned legs eac about half a meter high, and this frame is covered by a net of thin strings made of horsehair. The bedsteads are something over two meters long and from one to one and a half meters wide. When such a framework is covered with a half dozen soft quilted cotton covers, it affords the greatest comfort imaginable. The body assumes its most comfortable position, thanks to the elasticity of the horsehair net, and one can stretch out on all sides without hindrance and without ever feeling the slightest pressure. If one is contented with a single cover during the hot season, one has a cool bed and need not suffer under the unbearable and unwholsome heat which the European featherbeds produce.

854 The cradles are portable, with a frame covered with a fly net of transparent gauze material, which serves as well for rocking as for carrying the infants. Their arrangement makes one think of a bird cage or of the frames used in Munich for the carrying of large numbers of beermugs (Figure 90, p. 73a; cf. also Figure 157). The heads

XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

000 IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[8]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[8] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[7]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[7] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65-66.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

191 with each other in Russian, even on occasions when, because of diverse
•517 ethnic origins, communication in Turki presents considerable difficulties.

It is as yet too early to estimate the effects of Soviet linguistic policy
17·7 aimed at Russification through methods which are both negative (division
191 of Muslim groups) and positive (the imposition of Russian through com-
517 pulsion, linguistic infiltration, and career inducements). On the eve of World War II the Muslim rural masses seemed to have been quite unaffected by Soviet linguistic measures, and so were the poorer and less educated elements in the cities. These groups continued, as before, to communicate exclusively in their native dialects, being ignorant of Russian. Soviet policies did cause the numerous and growing Muslim intelligentsia to acquire a working knowledge of Russian; but instead of becoming Russified these groups became bilingual, using Russian for the purposes of work, and Turki or Persian, as the case may be, for all other purposes. Of linguistic assimilation there does not seem the slightest evidence; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong external pressures.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

5/7 668 The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers, teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

5/7 661 Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

5/7 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universities, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training. 517

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action. 517 461 [668]

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia. 517 177

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian "Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult. 517 177 186

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

517 177 186 tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits previously discussed: they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 175 177 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the history of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 517 175

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats. 177 668

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 177 668

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

T. 871 555 [191] S.U. 871 563 555 of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the S.U. 563 554 T. 563 554 Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

T. [517] The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Ka. 101 Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral 000 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

415 with long pouring spouts are used to pour out the water for the washing. These washbasins with the water pitchers which accompany them are sometimes made very luxuriously, as show pieces; in Bukhara I was once offered a fine specimen which was gold plated, with beautiful chased work and set with many semi-precious stones, for which the maker asked 300 marks (Figure 92). R75 &c

Porcelain plates have come into use in Turkestan only in recent times through the Russians. Until that time the natives had only relatively large round plates, quite shallow, with small almost perpendicular rims, similar to our serving plates. These are made of brass or tin-plated copper, are sometimes nearly a meter in diameter and are used only for the serving of fruit, sweetmeats and the countless cups and basins which are carried in all at once for the accomodation of distinguished guests.

276 The (tobacco) waterpipes, which are inevitable in every Turkestan household are called chilim by the Sarts and Uzbeks, and kalyan by the Tajiks, and differ from the water pipes of Turkey. They consist of a hollowed-out gourd container in which reeds are placed at both the top and on one side. The reed at the side serves as the mouthpiece, and the vertical reed for the attachment of the bowl of the pipe, /243/ which consists of burnt clay either unglazed, or glazed in blue or green. In the upper part of the water pipe a small hole is bored on the side. This serves to blow out the smoke during the kindling of the coals which are laid on top of the tobacco, and it must be held shut with the finger during the actual smoking. The poor use the pipe in this simplest form; richer people, on the contrary, sheathe the brown-stained body of the pipe with bronze and decorate the mounting with chased work and mounted turquoises; then they provide the reeds with burnt-in decorations and cover the bowl of the pipe with strings of beads and semi-precious stones, so that this kind of apparatus finally acquires a pleasing appearance. In rare cases the body of the water pipe is made entirely of brass; but even in such cases the vessel always has the shape of a gourd container (cf. Figure 105, 118 and 123).

352 Finally, an article of furniture which is missing in only a few [523] households is the bird cage, for the natives are great bird lovers. The bird cages are made in the same artless fashion as almost all the products of native industry. They consist of a simple round wooden or cardboard box without a lid (discarded Russian hatboxes are often used for this purpose) on which a pointed dome-shaped net is placed made of many-colored cotton yarn. This is held tight by the weight of the box

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

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ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regarded as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

287 yet at the same time pliable material consists of several stages. First of all the wool is spread out on the ground in a thick layer, where it is vigorously beaten with rods, a task performed by women and girls. It is then placed on a straw mat, also in an even layer, and sprayed with hot water in order to make it pliable. After that the mass is rolled up in the mat, and this roll is moved to and fro for hours until the wool has become felted. In Eastern Turkestan the Kirghiz make their yak oxen drag the roll back and forward. The felt is of the same colour as the natural wool, that is to say, white, brown, or fawn. White felt is regarded as the [531] best of all. Patterned rugs are made by cutting out pieces of felt of contrasting colours, and arranging them on the layer of wool as desired. They are then stamped and pressed in until the whole mass becomes firmly felted together. In Western Turkestan the Kirghiz prefer angular geometrical patterns, in Eastern Turkestan undulating ribbon-like lines are more usual (see ill. p. 1460).

342 The felt made in the manner described above is so strong that the Kirghiz and other nomad peoples of Asia use it as a material for making tents; these are called alajak by the Kirghiz, kibitka in Russian, and yurt in Turk-

[See p. 75 -- Analyst]

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

Section of a tent band (dam-i-khirgah) which the Turkomans wrap round their tents. The pattern shows a caravan executed in the dam-technique.

342 ish. The Kirghiz tent may be described as a portable house (see ill. p. 1457). The frame consists of three parts, the walls, which are made of trellissed laths that can easily be folded up, the roof-frame, and a ring to which wall-frame and roof-frame are secured. The whole structure can be taken to pieces in a very short time, transported by a camel to a fresh pasture, and re-erected without great difficulty. After the framework has been set up, it is first surrounded by mats made of reeds, which bear a pattern formed by wrapping coloured threads round the stalks. These bold patterns with their angular geometrical figures are visible from afar. According to the time of the year the roof or the whole kibitka is covered with felt, which is tied down by means of cords. Against the burning heat of summer as well as the icy winter blizzards the felt kibitka affords the best protection imaginable.

287 531 Tents of similar kind are used by the Turkoman nomads. Unlike those of the Kirghiz, where the materials consist mainly of felt and leather, the Turkoman tents are characterized by the predominance of fabrics worked according to the technique of carpet-knotting.

[184] The perfection of this technique and the great variety of articles produced demonstrate the advanced stage of Turkoman civilization as compared with that of the Kirghiz. The knot-technique gives to the tent as well as to articles of daily use an artistic character which in no way impairs the mobility of the household.

Most of the rectangular Turkoman rugs were hung in the opening of the tents, where they served as substitutes for doors. None of the older pieces are larger than the moderately wide tent-openings. Some Turkoman tribes fixed a specially decorative piece, also worked in the knot-technique, above the entrance. The

[See p 67 -- Analyst]

287 finest examples of this kind are those made by
531 the Yomuds; they are pentagonal in shape, and are ornamented with long black fringes. From the point of view of ethnology the most interesting fabric of this kind is a strip about forty or forty-five feet long and not more than about fourteen inches wide. Such strips are called daur-i-khirgah, and are passed right round the tent. They are covered with pictorial scenes or patterns made up of conventionalized landscapes or trees, all worked on a white ground according to the knot-technique. The figural scenes show caravans on the march, laden and grazing camels, horsemen, and other scenes from the daily life of the Turkomans. It is possible that certain events from the history of the tribe or clan are represented there. Religious or magic elements may also be discerned in these friezes. Essentially similar figures are found among primitive or semi-civilized peoples all over the world, executed in the style predominant in the respective areas.

531 In the tent of the Turkomans, as in the
352 dwellings of all Islamic peoples, the floor-carpet is one of the most important items. It is very likely that the Turkomans made no distinction between ordinary rugs and prayer mats, as their carpets had no pictorial patterns, and did not, therefore, run counter to Islamic law. One very common type of rug, patterned, strangely enough, with almost cruciform figures and claw-shaped ornaments interspersed with them, certainly served both as a floor-covering and a prayer-mat. Pillows and cushions on which the Turkoman rests his arms when seated are never made in knot-technique, but always covered with cloth.

415 The fronts of the various bags and pouches which the Turkomans use as receptacles for everything, even for butter and cheese, are al-

415 ways knotted like carpets (see ill. p. 1461). Of these there are three principal kinds, the juval, a large camel-bag about five feet long and three feet wide, the somewhat smaller torba, and the karjin, which is carried on donkey-back. Whereas the juval and the torba, which are slung on either side of the camel, are always made in pairs, the karjin is a double pouch which is flung over the donkey's back, so that a bag hangs down on either side. These various receptacles, which take the place of cupboards or boxes, and which are used both on the march and in camp, may justly be described as textile furniture, no less so than the floor-carpet which serves the Islamic peoples both as a
531 seat and as a bed. Turkoman carpets are
287 distinguished from all others by their simple
186 but vigorous beauty. All their patterns are geometrical, pictorial designs do not occur.
[352 The elements of the patterns are grouped in straight lines and at angles. Curves and circles are entirely foreign to the Turkoman style. Red, the favourite colour for women's dress, is also predominant in the carpets. All other colours are no more than accessories to red, the shade of which varies from deep purple to scarlet.

This uniformity is not only the result of a peculiar sense of style, but is also to be ex-

*[cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

The characteristic design preferred by the Salor Turkomans for their textile fabrics.

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

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

The jagged octagon, the figure found on all knotted work of the Tekke Turkomans.

287 plained by the strongly developed organiza-
531 tion of the Turkoman peoples. It is based on
186 a long tradition which is strictly observed. There are only a limited number of patterns for knotted work, each of which is the property and the distinctive badge of a certain tribe. The scope for variation is very limited, and deliberate artistic innovations do not occur. The probable reason for this is the fact that the Turkomans take a pride in proclaiming their membership of a certain tribe from afar, by the patterns of their camel-pouches when on the march, and by those of their tent-flaps when in camp. In principle this custom is not unlike that of the Scottish Highlanders to proclaim to which clan they belong by displaying its tartan in kilt and plaid.

287 In Europe Turkoman carpets—and the
531 fronts of the camel-bags, which are sold separately as rugs—usually go under the name of
352 Bokhara, though not one of them was ever knotted there. In Bokhara a variation of a Persian design was used for ornamenting carpets. The name for Turkoman carpets current in the Indian carpet-trade indicates the region of Merv as their place of origin. That is correct

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in so far as the best known kinds are made by the women of the Tekke Turkomans, whose pastures are in the Merv area. Incidentally, all Turkoman carpets are made exclusively by women. Typical of the rugs of Merv is an octagonal star which is checkered red and white; the octagon is divided into four parts, each of which is in a colour contrasting to that of the adjacent part. The figures which fill the octagon are very simple and severely geometrical in style. The octagons are dispersed over the surface in even rows (see ill. p. 1459). The rugs of the Tekkes found their way to the West in large quantities; they are very popular, and have often been imitated.

The women of the Saryk tribe, which lives southward from Merv to the Afghan frontier, also use octagons as patterns, and arrange them in a manner similar to that of the Tekke rugs. There is, however, a difference in so far as the edges of these figures are not jagged. The rugs made in the southernmost part of this area, known as Punjdeh (five towns), have a style of their own. They avoid red altogether, and are distinguished by a very finely graded scale of colours, in which brown and black predominate, yellow and white being used very sparingly. These dark colours form a marked contrast to the brilliant tints of all other Turkoman rugs. They correspond to the natural colour of the wool or hair used in making all Turkoman rugs. And even though these colours are often obtained artificially by dyeing, the origin of the colour scheme is doubt-

[See p. 72 -- Analyst]

73

287 less to be sought in the use of undyed wool.
531 The western neighbours of the Saryks are the
362 Salors. They, too, use the octagon as the sole ornament of their knotted rugs; it is filled with hook-shaped figures on an undivided ground of even red (see ill. page 1459).

Of entirely different pattern are the rugs of the northermost Turkoman tribe, the Yomuds. They prefer scalloped figures and rows of hooks. Instead of octagons, lozenges form the ground of their rugs (see ill. page 1461).

In addition to these principal motives a number of minor ones are used, none of which are, however, of importance for the distinction of the various kinds of Turkoman rugs. Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to put some symbolic interpretation on these figures. That may be justified to a certain extent, but there can be no doubt that for some centuries at least the Turkomans have been as unconscious of the symbolic significance of these elements of designs as the Persian carpet-knotters are of that of the Buddhist symbols which they use as decorative elements. The intellectual and religious life of the early Turk peoples is far too little known to permit of anything more than surmise in this respect. Moreover, Turkestan has in the last few centuries been less accessible to foreigners that in Marco Polo's day.

287 The Turkoman rugs of the best period are so closely knotted that they must from a technical point of view be classed among the best Oriental carpets. Really good rugs

* [see cat. 116, p. 71 -- Analyst]
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2/* [see cat. 116, p. 78 -- Analyst]

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Felt rug from Eastern Turkestan with the rounded ornaments popular in that area.



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

A "torba" or small camel-bag as used by the Turkomans. An early example, the pattern of which is knotted. Privately owned. New York.

386 was also cultivated. Blue was achieved by means of indigo, which had to be brought from India, and for that reason it is rarely found in Turkoman rugs. Black was usually extracted from the gall-nuts of the pistachio (known as busgunch) and from pomegranate skins. Sometimes mate-

287 *Pattern in knot-technique as used by the Yomud Turkomans. Lozenges and rows of hooks are distributed over the background.*

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

386 rials such as pyrites were used, which had the effect of corroding the wool, so that the black parts of many otherwise good rugs give the impression of having been eaten away. In spite of the limited selection of colours the shades and the number of combinations are surprisingly
287 varied. The Turkomans are good observers,
531 and were not slow in making use of the fact that the colours varied with the time of the year at which the plants were gathered, or with the length of time during which they were allowed to boil, to ferment, or to be exposed to the rays of the sun. For that reason the simplicity which characterizes these rugs is never monotonous. Both technically and artistically they are the perfect expression of that form of life which ethnologists describe as nomadic. They fulfil all the requirements of daily use, and the patterns are designed and perpetuated by skilled workers of a tribe, whose members all live under precisely the same geographical and social conditions.

287 These connections between the knotting
352 technique and nomad life are so striking that one feels tempted to regard the craft as an invention of wandering tribes. For the town-dwellers of Persia and India, of Egypt and Asia Minor, who developed the craft of carpet-knotting into an art, the necessity to use such light and easily transportable «textile furniture» is not nearly so great, and it is but natural that they should have adopted the

Embroidery in Turkestan

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In every moderately well-to-do house in Bokhara embroidered cloths serve as wall-coverings, the interesting patterns and brilliant colours of which immediately attract the visitor's eye. A good example of wall-coverings of this type is seen in the picture of a married couple of Bokhara, which was reproduced in Ciba Review No. 10, page 332. What makes them so attractive is the simplicity of the pattern, which, however, on closer inspection proves to be richer than at first supposed. It is embroidered on a background of unbleached cotton, which not only remains visible between the figures, but which is intended to heighten the effect of the whole.

The same artistic taste is revealed in the distribution of the pattern itself. The principal forms are usually large circular flowers dispersed over the surface of the cloth with unfailing sense of rhythm. Between them are smaller floral elements, conventionalized carnations, tulips, and irises, accompanied by twigs and garlands. In spite of its stylized character, the pattern is very vivid in its effect, an effect which owes a great deal to the brightness of the colours. The principal colour is a rich red, supplemented by many other shades of the same colour, and by green, purple, and black.

These susanis as they are called are not only made at Bokhara, but also at Samarkand, Karshi, and in other towns of Turkestan, though not always with the same discriminating artistic taste. They do not serve as wall-coverings only. Narrow strips are used to frame doorways, other pieces serve as prayer-mats, and it

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Embroidered wall-hanging of the mountain Tajiks. The figures seen in the pattern are conventionalized peacocks, and probably continue an ancient Persian tradition.

is not regarded as improper to cover the biers on which the dead are borne to rest with these colourful textiles.

These embroideries form part of a larger group which has not yet received the study it deserves. In Western Turkestan alone there are two other kinds in addition to the susanis, each of these is the heritage of a different tribe. The Turkomans made ornaments for their tents in the same technique as that of the susanis. Pentagonal pieces were embroidered by the Salors as decorations for tent-openings,

4: Leix U-5 (no date) 1961 Kl.1 Turkmen Kl.1

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

Embroidered tent ornament of the Salors which is hung above the tent-opening. The figures of the pattern are stylized flowers.

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very much like those which they knotted. It is possible that they were used for the summer tents (see ill. page 1464).[2] As is the case with all nomad work of this kind, the patterns are severely stylized. There is, however, no doubt that they are derived from floral patterns, and that the embroideries of the Salors are to be regarded as a variety of the susanis.

Hangings in the houses of the Tajiks (see ill. page 1464),[2] who inhabit the mountainous regions to the south-east of Bokhara, show patterns of a very different character. Isolated as they are in a remote area, the Tajiks have retained many characteristics of an archaic civilization (confer page 1441).[3] Among these must be numbered the embroidered fabrics made public by Count Bobrinskoi forty years ago. The principal elements in their patterns are birds arranged in pairs and in rows. They are so severely stylized that only the tufts on their heads permit of them being identified as peacocks. They represent an ancient formal tradition of the Orient, which goes back to the pre-Islamic period, and which can be traced without interruption down to the present day. In

[2] [See p. 84-- Analyst]
[2] [See p. 83-- Analyst]
[3] [See p. 23-- Analyst]

531 the remote mountain districts of Central Asia
[353] the forms have been handed down so carefully that the figure of the bird has retained traces of medieval stylization.

Embroideries discovered by Le Coq in sparsely populated districts of Eastern Turkestan are in technique and design frequently almost identical with the susanis of Bokhara. They show the same stylized flower-patterns in the same combination of colours, usually as decorations of women's trousers (tambal). It may, therefore, be assumed that the style of the susanis is characteristic of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

More than twenty years ago Le Coq reported that such embroidery was no longer being made in Eastern Turkestan. The examples that he saw had been made by the mothers of
656 the generation then living. In Western Tur-
562 kestan the tradition not only exists to this day, but the government has set up special workshops where the women embroider susanis. This is part of the policy by means of which the state seeks to draw women out of the secluded life of the harem.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
• 532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens—and certainly not erotic poetry—, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone. [538]

This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Bokhara ruler of the 16th century cutting a melon. The features show a pronounced Turkic-Mongol cast. Contemporary miniature.

133 the Caspian Sea, and it is possible that at one time the entire river ran into that sea. Therefore, we find in the middle of the Kara Kum desert the ruins of large medieval towns marking the course which the water at one time took. At the present day both the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya run into the Aral Sea.

312 The four other rivers have no outlet, and would disappear in the desert, were it not for the fact that a system of irrigation which has been developed over a period of thousands of years serves to turn their waters to useful account. By means of this system the water is conducted through a net-work of canals which finally become mere ditches (ariks); thus it finds its way all over the country into every field, cotton-plantation, and orchard (see ill. page 1436). The distribution of the water is so well regulated that every peasant in Western Turkestan knows exactly on what day he can water his fields. Among these four rivers there are two particularly important ones, the Serafshan, the waters of which fill the ariks and mosque-ponds of Bokhara and Samarkand, and the Murghab, on which the prosperity of the oasis of Merv depends. In war-time the first thing to be destroyed was invariably the canal-system. The ancient city of Merv, at one

p. 12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt
245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are
484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown
175 up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*

1/A [p. 3 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
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186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

when it is hung up on the ceiling of the room or veranda or on a tree 352
branch. /Figure 92, p.75a Caption: Washing Utensils. /

/244/ If we add to what has already been mentioned a number [534]
of tambourines and various instruments, then we have accounted for practically everything which is to be found among the furnishings of a dwelling of a prosperous native. In the dwellings of the poor most of the objects mentioned are missing, and the whole set of furniture for them is reduced to a water pitcher, a water pipe of the simplest kind, some earthenware basins and reed mats and some bed covers full of holes, richly stained and shining with dirt.

This relatively simple arrangement and equipment of the dwell- 342
ings is primarily due to the fact that it is intended for the residence [512]
of the occupants only during the short winter. Otherwise it serves only as a storage place for the movable property of the owner, who lives for the greater part of the year above all in the courts or in the gardens and also sleeps in the open. The veranda is much more important for the Central Asian than the living quarters, for on the veranda, winter and summer, he carries on his household tasks, if he has any, talks with his neighbors and acquaintances, takes his meals and the like. Thus the veranda cannot be omitted even in the dwelling of the poorest person. This is a covered colonnade, raised somewhat above the level of the court, and attached to the living quarters (Figure 93). The roof of the veranda forms the continuation of the roof of the living quarters and is supported on the outer side by a series of wooden columns, made either of completely rough and unhewn beams or else carved more or less artistically. Among the richer people the floor of this colonnade is covered with blankets or carpets, and among the poorer people it is covered with reed mats (cf. also Figure 57, p.15a p. 165, and Figure 85, p.67a p. 233).

There are no real kitchens in the houses of the natives. The 252
fireplace is simply established in the court in the summer, while in 415
the winter it is in the middle of the living room. The only cooking utensil, in which practically all the native dishes are prepared, consists, as among the nomads, of a cast iron kettle. This varies in size, is imported from Russia, and resembles those used by our washwomen. This kettle is either placed over a trench dug in the ground, or on a semicircular elevation made of clay. For the roasting of small pieces of meat, called shashlik, they use a wooden skewer which is held with the hand alone over the fire on top of the ground. There are no further utensils in the kitchen of a Turkestan household.

[cf. cat. 116, pp. 71-75 -- Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 clash between Eastern and Western Turk at Ankara, where Timur defeated the Ottoman Bayezid in 1402, had small significance. He returned to die three years later at Otrar on the Sir Darya, while the Ottomans, girding up their loins, half a century later finally shattered the Byzantines by storming Constantinople, and went on to thunder at the gates of Vienna. Yet it is rightly said that Timur left a heritage, greater than that of a warrior. It is enough to name his grandson Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer; the [538] Timurid the Sultan Hussain Baikara (1438–1506), with his splendid city at Herat and the great literature fostered there by the poet Alishir Nevai; Hussain's cousin that other Timurid, Babur (1482–1530), author of the Memoirs and founder of the Chaghatai Empire in Hindustan. All these men were Turks self-confessed, they thought and spoke and wrote in the Eastern Turkic language called by the Mongol name Chaghatai. The annals of this house were rendered illustrious by the names of poets, philosophers and theologians, still household words throughout the East.[1]

000 It was a glorious flowering. There is need to live in Muslim lands in order to understand how close are the deeds and words of the men of the classic age to the minds of men today, closer in some strange way than are the Elizabethans to us. The reason for this nearness may be found perhaps in the fact that deeds and words in the East have been handed on so much by word of mouth, and a man will speak of forebears who lived centuries ago as if he had known them as a child. Thus the flowering of the Timurid age is to the Eastern Turks what the Elizabethans are to us, and more: it was a positive achievement for all time which cannot be annulled, a guarantee which later men may strive to redeem. To those who are lost it still provides a rallying-point.

(iv) *Period of Dissolution*

176 Much of the first part of Babur's Memoirs is occupied with stirring accounts of his struggles against Shaibak or Shaibani

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 88, p. 180.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia KL

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains
538 had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous
829 resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

000 men who live the open life of the wanderer in the desert. It is perhaps the very simplicity of this nomadic attitude which makes the nomad impervious to an indoctrination with ideas which easily permeate more recondite minds. Thus in part we can explain the original resistance of the Turk to the winds of new doctrine. On this showing there is little need for surprise that those two parts of Asia, China and Turkistan, should have reacted differently to the Marxist-Leninist appeal.

But before it is possible to arrive at any demonstrable conclusion on the strength of traditional belief and observance in the face of Communist indoctrination, it is necessary to see whether there exists in the minds and thoughts of the people of Soviet Central Asia any monument, *aere perennius*, strong enough to stand up to the corrosive influences of time and adverse weather. This monument must be looked for in the existence of a continuing literature, without which any civilization, however grand its arts or its architecture in the past, will be hard put to it to live on into the present. It must not only be built of durable material but must be developed and restored to meet the changes and chances of the age, and so buttressed as to resist successfully even the shock of an earthquake. Can such a literature be found in Turkistan? And, if so, in what does its strength consist, how far is it up to date and what is the quality of the forces which seek to overthrow it?

•538 Leaving aside for the moment the sacred books of Islam — and let no man underrate the effect of these in bestowing on man a certain firmness of spirit possibly stronger than with other faiths — there is the limited but undoubtedly great literature of the Timurid age written in the Chaghatai language. Its great representatives are the Emperor Babur in prose, and Mir Ali Shir Nevayi in poetry. Babur is the prince of autobiographers. Boon companion, warrior in single combat and in command of armies, man of letters, lover of nature and all beautiful things, a sinner grand enough to confess and make good his repentance, free of all cant, bearing no malice, frank, honourable, born a prince and in the end

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

the founder of an empire, he sets to the Eastern Turks, from whose ranks he came, a pattern of manhood and simplicity such as no one Elizabethan can show to us. Whether he deals in battle or statecraft, in the love of nature or the kindness of friends, in the good-fellowship of a carouse or in resolutions (which he kept) to break his goblets and abstain from wine, in wise and humorous counsel to a son or the mature appraisement of good verse, in the littleness of man or the supreme efficacy of prayer, in all things, Babur has a quite inimitable charm. Combining as he does in one person so great a versatility, and passing, as only he knows how, from the extremes of ill-fortune to the summit of glory, he keeps to the end and unspoiled his grand simplicity. He was a very king of men.

Among many treasures in the *Baburnama*[1] is one, seldom quoted, but in many ways revealing of the man he was. It is a letter to his son Humayun, written after long separation:

To Humayun, whom I remember with much longing to see again, health.

Thanks be to God, who has given you a child, a child to you and to me a comfort and an object to love. . . . You have called him Al Aman [mercy, peace]; may the Almighty prosper him.

This is the season for you to expose yourself to danger and hardship, to exert your prowess. Fail not to meet strenuously every situation as it arises; for indolence and ease go ill with kingship. . . . Remember too always to act handsomely by your brother. The great should exercise self-command; and I do hope that you will always keep good understanding with him. He on his part is a correct and worthy youth, and will be careful to maintain the fidelity due to you.

In many of your letters you complain of separation from your friends. It is wrong for a prince to indulge in such a complaint, for as Saadi says:

If thy foot be fettered, choose to ride resigned,
If thou ride alone, take the course of thine own fancy.

There is no greater bondage than that in which a king is placed,

[1] Babur's memoirs have been translated into English twice — (*a*) by Erskine and Leyden in 1826, (*b*) by Mrs. Beveridge in 1922 (Bib. I, 12 and 61).

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 and it becomes him not to complain of partings.

As I bade, you have indeed written to me, but certainly never read your letters over before despatch. Had you done so, you would have put them by. I did indeed manage, though with much difficulty, to decipher the meaning of your last letter, but the style is crabbed and even the spelling is not right. . . . Letter-writing is not your strong point, and this because you are too anxious to show off your acquirements. Pray write unaffectedly, with clearness, using plain words, such as cost less trouble both to writer and reader.

Waste no time in private parties, but, if you desire my approbation, indulge in liberal talk and frank intercourse with all about you. Attempt always the utmost courtesy of manners. . . . Forget not to pay attention to the state and discipline of the army.

Once more I salute you and long to see you.

Of Babur's literary style Mrs. Beveridge, one of his translators, writes that it is terse, word-thrifty, restrained and lucid, and that it comes over neatly into English, perhaps through primal affinities. 'It is neither regal nor self-magnifying but co-operative, as beseems the chief whose volunteer and nomad following makes or unmakes his power, and who can lead and command only by remittent consent accorded to him.' And Erskine, his earlier translator, said of Babur that, if we change but the circumstances, we might imagine we were among the Knights of Froissart. This, and the simplicity of his language, he owed to his being a Turk. That style which wraps up worthless meaning in a mist of words, and the etiquette which annihilates the courtier in the presence of his prince, were still, fortunately for Babur, foreign to the Turkish race. He was a great exemplar, to be remembered by those who are today subjected to the turns and twists of the new jargon.

Babur died at Agra in 1530, aged only forty-eight. A generation older, Mir Ali Shir Nevayi, the master of Chaghatai verse as Babur was of narrative prose, was born in Herat in 1441 and died there in 1501. He was the most esteemed subject of Babur's Timurid cousin, Hussain Baikara, at whose court he is represented as not only a Maecenas of letters and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

the arts, but a great poet in his own name both in his native Chaghatai and in Persian. Sometimes charged with being only a neat translator of Persian into Chaghatai, Nevayi has won the approbation of many recent critics as the creator of an original school of Eastern Turkish poetry instinct with its own peculiar inspirations and responsive to the tastes of the time.[1] Fuad Köprülü, now Foreign Minister of Turkey, has claimed greatness for Nevayi on the ground that his poetry was inspired not only by a real and tolerant faith but by an embracing patriotism. He was also the first among the Eastern Turks to crystallize a Turkic language and *esprit* in words which were not slavish copies of the Persian. But better than all of these is the testimony of Babur himself, Nevayi's junior by some forty years.

Ali Shir Beg [he writes] was celebrated for the elegance of his manners, and this elegance and polish were ascribed to the conscious pride of high fortune; but this was not the case — they were natural to him, and he had precisely the same manner when he was in misfortune in Samarkand. Indeed Ali Shir Beg was an incomparable person. From the time that poetry was first written in the Turkish[2] language, no man has written so much and so well. Some of his Persian verses are not bad, but the greater part are heavy and poor. He has also left excellent pieces of music, excellent both as to the airs themselves and as to the preludes. There is not upon record in history any man who was a greater patron and protector of men of talent than Ali Shir Beg. He had no son, nor daughter, nor wife, nor family. He passed through the world single and unencumbered, and in the end, victim of a sudden stroke, he departed to the Mercy of God.

Ali Shir adapted the *mesnevi* (rhymed couplet) to Turkic verse and, apart from his own poetry, he introduced to the Turks the *Teẓkere*, or biography, in the form of a *Lives of the Poets* (*Mejalis-un-nefais*).[3] But, unlike Dr. Johnson, he was

[1] Cf. Haidar Bammate (Bib. I, 6), pp. 424-30. This writer also cites MM. Berthels and Barthold, Russian savants, in support of his views. Incidentally, at this moment Nevayi is enjoying a Soviet vogue, but Soviet approbation is fickle.

[2] *Turki* (ترکی) in the original, as then generally used for the language and other Turkish or Turkic attributes, without the circumscription of modern thought.

[3] The Arabic words literally convey the idea of a symposium of elegant people.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 at the centre of things and had no cause to be troubled or cast down. To him and to Jami, the illustrious Persian and Nevayi's colleague at the Herat court, Gibb [1] gives honour as the twin suns in the east, by whose warmth West-Turkish Ottoman poetry was kindled into light.

> By the middle of the XVth century [writes Gibb] there was nothing wanting but the man of destiny, the man who by stammering, if not by singing, was to inaugurate the literature of the Osmanic Empire and become the van-courier of Ottoman poets. The voice of the age cried aloud for a leader, and in response arose Ahmed Pasha. Vaguely conscious of an ideal which he could not clearly conceive, Ahmed was stumbling along his way when, lo, out of the East came light, the light for which he and all his fellows were straining with eager gaze. When the *ghazels* sent by Nevayi to Constantinople came into the hands of Ahmed, his eyes were opened; he saw before him embodied in a form, fairer than which he could not picture, these very moods and fantasies which he and his companions had been vainly striving to express.

Ali Shir Nevayi, like Babur, was an Eastern Turk of Turkistan, and Herat under the Timurids was a Turkish city where the Turkic and Persian cults met. It was Nevayi's poetry, which for a century and more after Ahmed, was the main source of inspiration of all the Ottoman lyric writers. In this way the Eastern Turks not only gave the ancestors of the men who carved out the Western Turkish empires, but added those currents of song and poesy which can be traced in Turkish poetry even today.

198 538 It was a bequest of which the Eastern Turks may well be proud. But Chaghatai as a medium had its limitations. It was in essence a literary language of the court and, although many have claimed for it that at one time it had in the East the same currency as literary Osmanli had in the West, it was deeply impregnated with Arabic and Persian extravagances and therefore not well adapted to become the medium of business and cultural relations. Moreover, so strong was Persian influence in Transoxiana that it became the habit of the Khivan and Bukharan courts in the Uzbek period to use Persian as the official language for administration and the law.

[1] Bib. I, 38.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

objective designed to promote a union of thought over a wider than parochial field, any effort of this kind deserves respect. If it is to have any prospect of success, it must be based on a living literature, good enough and strong enough to drive inferior coin out of currency. It may be that Babur and Nevayi supply the prose and verse foundations on which such literature can successfully be built up. Both stand for a period of splendour in the history of the Eastern Turks, both are widely read in all Turkish lands, and the renown of one, Babur, has spread far beyond the limits of Turkdom.

538 It is unfortunate that Chaghatai literature is of relatively narrow scope. One reason may well be sought in the lamentable destruction of the famous library burned by the Soviet armies at the taking of Bukhara in 1920. Apart from the contents of that library, now lost to us as irretrievably as Alexandria, there are probably many manuscripts collected in the libraries of Russian Academies of Sciences in the five republics, but, even if so, they are not much use to Western scholars. Moreover, although at one time the study of the literatures of the Eastern Turks was most diligently pursued under Soviet auspices, the tendency is now all the other way. It is even difficult now to obtain outside Russia the works of Eastern Turk poets in the original, and translations into Russian are the vogue. Almost one might be persuaded that these are Russian poets!

The Chaghatai literature was the sophisticated product of the settled oases of the south. Not unexpectedly we find the familiar distinction between the sedentary population of the cities and the men of the steppe carried through into their several literatures. The Kazak, Turkmen and Kirghiz traditions — the spirit of Abilay and Kine Sari Khan — were expressed in a fine literature of ballads (*dastan*) and epic minstrel poetry, handed down originally by word of mouth and later, often at the suggestion of earlier Russian admirers, reduced to writing. Such were the *Köroghlu*, the *Dede Korkut*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(or *Korkut Ata*) of the Turkmens and Azeris, the *Edige batir* 538 and the *Kublandi-batir* (*batir* means hero)[1] of the Kazaks, the *Alpamish* of the Uzbeks, the *Manas* epics of the Kirghiz.

But here again, with the exception of the Kirghiz Manas transcribed by Radloff,[2] these poems are for the most part inaccessible in the original tongue. Many examples of Central Asian verse will be found cited in a recent English book on the epos, but the distinguished author[3] has to confess having had to work entirely on Russian translations without access to any original texts. In fact, outside Soviet Academies, these texts are just not to be obtained, if only for the reason that the minstrels sang of heroes of the resistance, and their original work is therefore banned as tainted with 'survivalism'. On the other hand, versions of this literature, carefully edited and expurgated, are to be had in Russian translation, and must be read, even in Central Asia, in Russian.

The Russians perhaps forget that poetry of this kind is in the oral tradition, learned at the mother's knee or in the congregations of the young men. It does not depend on texts for its survival. One of the merits of Togan's writing is that he is able to hand on passages in the Turkic from some of these poems. The examples I quote are taken from his book, inadequately rendered into English.

In all these stories the hero stands four-square in the line of Eastern chivalry. He glories in his countryside and his tribe,[4] he venerates old age, he is a paragon of manly beauty and bravery, he is loyal in his love, above all his military honour is beyond reproach. The wife or beloved of the hero is endowed with equal womanly virtues: as courageous as her lover, she may surpass him in wit and intuition, and she is his equal. During the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries a more lyrical line of minstrelsy, originally handed down from bard to bard, was reduced to writing by such poets as Yirav, Nisembay Akin, Abay[5] and Maghjan Jumabay, and was expressed in a series

[1] Bib. II, 7, Dr. Wiener. [2] Bib. I, 78. [3] Bib. I, 14, Sir M. Bowra.
[4] Cf. the Pathan proverb: *Har cha tah khpal mulk Kashmir dai* — 'Unto every man his own land is Kashmir'. [5] Bib. III, 1.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 of national poems directed against the Russian expansion. This expression of a renewed nationalism grew directly out of the epic tradition, with its stress on the valour of the warriors who defended their people at all costs. In these epics and lyrics the horse and the herds form a part of the family life of the hero; indeed the horse himself, the hero's nearest companion, is as splendid as the horses in the Psalms. We are reminded of the horse Rakhsh, nuzzling the dying Sohrab in Matthew Arnold's classic poem.

The name of Kine Sari has been celebrated in Kazak poetry ever since he fell in fratricidal battle with the Kirghiz chiefs near Issik Köl. He became the symbol of Kazak national pride, and even the Kirghiz, who slew him, regard him as the hero of all Turkistan. His death is the subject of a poem by Nisembay:

He was a man, strong in heart and body,
As though he had been born in armour,
Fate, that favoured him,
Girt him about the loins with a sword;
When he saw the foe in battle, he shouted 'Abilay'
And chased them from the field;
He chose his horse from the wild horses,
And fed him, as he rode, from the bag,
Or gave him honey for fodder
And the milk of a barren mare. . . .

Togan has a moving account of some of the poetry and prose writers of the Eastern Turks since the Russian occupation. While he emphasizes the conflict of soul which gave them unrest, he is generous enough to recognize the debt they owed to the inspirations of Russian liberalism under the Tsars, and brings this out prominently in his accounts of Abay and Ismail Gaspirali. The following selections give an idea of the tradition of the more prominent writers since the Russian conquest.

Abay (1845–1906), Kazak poet

He was born in the Chingiz Tav in Yedisu. About 1880 he came into contact with Russian literature through a

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Russian revolutionary named Mikhailis, who introduced him to the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and more particularly Lermontov 'with his model Byron'. He combined with this the Persian strain of the centenarian Saadi and the Turkic strain of Nevayi. 538

He was a poet of the steppe, describing nomadic life in a series of beautiful lyrics, written in such simple language that even the herdsmen could take in his philosophic ideas. Or so they thought: Abay himself in one of his best-known poems, grieved that the Kazaks could not follow him.

The footman is left behind, the horsemen ride on,
Who of them will turn aside to listen to my plaint?

Abay created a society for himself, described as an Islamic milieu, loving Russian literature, and knowing the intellectual life of Russia. His poems are current in the Russia of today, but in Russian translation, not in the original Kazak.

Chokan Velikhan

Chokan was born about 1837 and died of consumption in 1865.

He too was a Kazak and a descendant of Chingiz in the Kazak nomadic tradition. His career is described as a national tragedy in that he was a great admirer of Russian liberalism and Western inspirations, but in the end suffered grievous disillusionment. He started by trying to cleanse the Turkish tradition from its accretions, brought by the priesthood and feudalism, and to attune it to a new synthesis with what he saw to admire in Russia. He graduated at the Russian War Academy and was a friend of Dostoievsky. But he was betrayed and his ideals broken in pieces. Throughout his life he followed his star; as long as he believed in Russia, he spoke out in friendship. Later he expressed his hatred, having seen a Russian bayonet a Kazak woman on the march. Exclaiming 'This land is the land of my fathers: I cannot bear it', he threw off his uniform, and withdrew to the steppe, where he died.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

538 For him the Turkish epics were a source of inspiration. He was the first to study the Kirghiz Manas epic, and to transcribe parts of it into literary Turkish. He believed that the nomad Turks, even if they sat lightly to Islam, had in them a civilization strong enough to prevent them being sacrificed to any foreign machinations whatever. Though he admired the new Russian XIXth-century humanism, he had no opinion of the political aims behind the Orthodox Church. His great contribution was to make known the ballads of the famous singers, as a possession for ever for those who loved the old Turkish nomadic tradition of the mountain and the steppe.

Ismail Gaspirali (1851–1914)

Gaspirali was a Crimean, and only a few years younger than Chokan. He was taken up as a promising young Turk, and went through the Russian War Academy, where he was influenced by the liberalism of the middle XIXth century. His life's work was to appeal to the Russians in a spirit of brotherly loving-kindness to forsake policies of assimilation, while attracting the Turks to what was good in Russian civilization. He also planned the creation of a literary language which should be common to all Turks. In him perhaps are to be found the first stirrings of the spirit which spread abroad, and became known to all the world, in the speeches and actions of Mustafa Kemal. Gaspirali's idea was that of the renewal and purification of the Ottoman language by means of currents from farther east. It is curious to note the emphasis which all these Turks, and Russians too, place on language as a social, cultural, economic and political counter, and to reflect how far removed is this attitude from that of the protagonists of a united Europe. Using language as a symbol, Gaspirali dreamed of a cultural Turkish unity which should transcend all differences and even lead to a larger association of idea.

The conflicts of soul that tore at patriots such as Gaspirali is described in a moving passage by Togan. He writes :

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

I came across Gaspirali's book in the home of Ebubekir Agha, in Russian service. I remember saying to him that Ismail Bey (Gaspirali) had been too servile: the Russians had abolished slavery, but introduced a new slavery in its place. It was dangerous for us to encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a big brother, creep into our hearts, give us decorations and uniforms, make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. Ebubekir replied — 'The ideas of that period were rather different; moreover, had Ismail Bey said that, his book would never have passed the censorship. In the bad times he brought us at least some comfort,' and, smiling sweetly, he played on his harmonium some old Bashkurd melodies, more beautifully than I could have imagined. His own eyes, and the eyes of his wife, filled with tears.[1] 538

Maghjan Jumabay

He was a Kazak national poet, born in 1894 in Yedisu, east of Balkhash. His collected poems were published in Tashkent in 1923, but the collection is incomplete, for many were too patriotic to pass the censors. Here are some quotations; even a distillation through more than one language does not entirely destroy the inspiration of the original, and they have the stir of genuine poetry.

The Sacred Issik Köl, on which the first Turk,
Born of the grey wolf, saw the light of the world;
The two rivers Jaihun and Saihun,
And between them the holy graves of thine ancestors;
The great mountains of Turan, Khan Tenri reaching to heaven —
Look now to the mountains and think how the Turks suffer in bondage!

And again:

Aksak [lame] Timur, who set the world afire,
Sent forth a beam like a lightning-flash.
Tanri, the God in heaven, has no descent,
But Timur's descendants, the Gods on earth,
Are the Turks, and their sign is fire.

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 556.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

538 And in a poem addressed to Turkey at the end of World War I:

My brother, far away, so greatly suffering,
My brother, like a tulip broken,
Is not Altai our common mother?
Have we not played on her slopes,
Did not the cool mountain springs
Splash for us, run for us through the rocks,
Were not our horses the wild steeds,
Running like the whirlwind?
In the golden days thou didst part from me
And go to the Middle and Black Seas.
But I remained like a bird,
Spreading not my wings,
And none was left to show me the way.
The enemy's bullet struck my heart and I sank down:
I was thrust into a dark prison and shut in.
And thou, O Master?
Have we Turks lost the heart of the lion,
Become cowards and weary of war?
Is the fire in our hearts put out?
And our fathers' blood dried up?
Oh brother, thou there, and I here,
Both in dire distress.
Come, let us go again to the Altai,
And mount the golden throne of our fathers.

And addressing God:

Thou gavest to every land, to the poor Arabia,
Nurse of camels,
A Prophet to show the way
And a holy Book,
But to us Turks this grace thou hast not vouchsafed.
We have followed prophets from divers lands,
And set our faith in holy words,
But the way has not been shown us.
Send us a prophet to show us that way.

The renascence of Turkey under Atatürk — has it been the answer to this prayer?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL3

Cholpan

He was an Uzbek, whose real name was Abdul Hamid Suleiman. He was born in 1897 in Andijan, where (as the Emperor Babur said more than 400 years ago) the literary language of Alishir Nevayi is at its best. He graduated in an Islamic school, learned Russian, and studied in Moscow. Until 1926 he wrote in the national spirit, choosing as his patterns the older poets, particularly Alishir Nevayi. He also translated from the Russian, and from the Indian poet Tagore. After 1926 he and Maghjan were exposed to much persecution and forced to write to order. They evolved a kind of poetic cypher system, Maghjan using the words *Kun men tun* (day and night) when referring to Turks and Russians, and Cholpan *east and west*, referring to the oppressed and the tyrants. Many of his earlier poems are now very difficult to come by, but the following are quotations:

He is the enemy who knows not
The limit of his going,
Who hides what lies
To his right and to his left.
It may be that all must bow before the tyrant,
But if the tyrant oversteps the mark,
It may be that the heavens will come down to earth.

Such poems as these are described by Russian commentators as works of the period when the poet was caught up in the stream of nationalism, and they have disappeared from print. But they are preserved like the ballads of old in the souls of Turks who were persecuted or forced to leave Russia.

The languages in which these poems are written, Uzbek and Kazak, are for all practical purposes a closed book to Western students, and, until such time as it becomes possible to read them in the original, it is not easy to appraise their value. But for us the question is this. How enduring is this literature, starting with Ali Shir Nevayi and ending with Cholpan? What does it represent? We shall be in a better position to answer after seeing what the Soviets think in the matter.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various 186
versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not 538
been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not 626
people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmens persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846–1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 7

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens—and certainly not erotic poetry—, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone. [538]

This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

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ward from the border of Turkestan almost to the Volga. The Kara Kirghiz, who number about 540,000 in all, are native to Turkestan. Most of them live on the inclement slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains.

The differences in the character of these two Kirghiz tribes find expression in many details. The itinerant minstrels who wander from camp to camp of the Kara Kirghiz recite for the most part epic poems of heroic character, in which the glorious past and the great men of bygone days are praised. On the other hand the poetry of the Kirghiz Kasaks, who range the wide plains, consists mainly of romantic lays and love songs.

[538]

In spite of these differences both are hardy nomad peoples, insensible to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They have retained the Turco-Mongol type comparatively purely, and are of sturdy build. Their obliquely set eyes, high cheek-bones, and sparse growth of beard proclaim them as genuine Mongols. The well-known Mongolian spot (a blue blotch on the skin of the lower part of the back) has been observed in their children up to the age of two years.

[144]

The Turkomans number about 700,000 in all, they roam the western part of the country between the Persian frontier and the Aral Sea. The finest types are found among the Tekke Turkomans, a group comprising

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Russians who forced it on urban Muslim populations. Something in this matter may be learned from the political and educative part played by women who have become public figures in Kemalist Turkey.

Thus the impression we receive of the spiritual impact of Islam on the Turks of Central Asia owes nothing to the rigidity of doctrine. Clericalism those in the true line abhor. Yet here is an intimate sense of a real inspiration, owing much to the life of the tent and something to the pantheistic worship of Shamanist ancestors on the beautiful uplands of Central Asia, but infused with the mysticism of such men as the saint Ahmed of the XIIth century, whose tomb at Yese on the lower Sir Darya was once a great centre of pilgrimage. Ahmed himself stands in the line of Turkish mystics leading to Yunus Emre of Anatolia two centuries later. No amount of indoctrination in materialism will exorcise from the hearts of men and women a spirit which far transcends any doctrine.

There is a Western Turkish poet who has expressed in a few simple words that clear and shining faith in God which is here claimed as the peculiar inheritance of the sons of the steppe. Such men may see a holy book or a great mosque at journey's end, but their daily worship is attuned to the roving life, to infinite horizons beneath the sun, and at night to a multitude of stars:

Ye read a book
And ask for the writer,
A glorious building have ye seen?
Ye seek for the builder.
Have the earth and skies then no master?
O man, think and understand!
Unto us all things prove
There is one God, the Great, the Almighty.[1]

Okursunuz bir Kitabî
Sahibini sorarsiniz
Gördünüz mü bir hosh yapî
Ustasinî ararsiniz.

Sahipsiz mi yerler, gökler?
Düşününce insan anlar!
Herşey bize ispat eder
Büyük, Kadir bir Allah var.

IBRAHIM ALAEDDIN

7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs 771
profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs 656
are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially 661
the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of [548] prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

from those passing between the gardens and fields outside the circular 363
walls, since the latter are enclosed in walls exactly like those around 351
the dwellings within the town. Therefore, upon entering a strange town 361
the only way to tell whether one is still among the fields and gardens, or already between the rows of houses, is on the basis of whether one has passed through the town gate. In all Central Asian towns the streets are crooked, and continue in a perpetual zigzag, the natives have no notion of a regular arrangement of rows of streets, and preliminary plans in the erection of houses. Only the main streets of Tashkent, which /171/ lead from the bazaar to the outlying districts have a semblance of regularity, although they also possess numerous bends and turns.

The terrible monotony of the streets in Sart Tashkent is only 361
broken here and there by a mosque or 'medrese' /religious school/, by isolated tombs which are found in the middle of the town along the roads, by the rising or downward slope of the ground, and by the many streams, sometimes flowing in deep ravines, which cut across the entire town in all directions. In this respect Tashkent makes a much better impression, in spite of everything, than /Figure 61. p.19a
Caption: Street scene in Bukhara (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher)/ most of the other towns of Turkestan, most of which lie in more or less level terrain.

Concerning the traffic in the streets of Tashkent, this differs 363
greatly in different parts of the town. In the side streets one sees only 361
isolated riders or strollers; the main streets leading to the bazaar, especially on market days, are filled all day long with endless lines of camel, horse and donkey caravans, wagons, and riders of horses, donkeys and camels, through which it is often difficult to make one's way, even with the assiduous use of the horsewhip. This means is not used only by the Russians, but also and even more widely by the natives /172/ themselves, for in Turkestan everyone who is prominent, either [554]
through rank or wealth, considers himself entitled to enforce his precedence, by the 'ultima ratio' of the 'nagaika,' /whip/ over less fortunate creatures, while the victims of this treatment consider it perfectly in order and use it themselves against those still lower in rank. Yielding is considered a sign of weakness by the Central Asians, and there is no better way of gaining their respect than a show of arrogance and the use of brute force. The Russians, therefore, are born, as it were, to the rule of the Central Asians.

644
[701]

II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzat-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of
554 their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stable-boy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consier it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of firty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

634 The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

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291 p. 29

Chalat of Bokhara with striped pattern.

cotton trousers (see ill. page 1441),[1] the material of which is rather coarsely woven, and is neither bleached nor dyed. The name given to this material is "bes". The trousers are secured by an attractively worked band, which is drawn through the upper seam, and tied round the waist. The upper part of the body is covered with a blouse cut in the manner of a shirt. It is also of cotton, and is girded round the waist with a diagonally folded square of [294] cloth. This cloth is often prettily embroidered or decorated with regular ornaments in the block-printing style (see ill. page 1442).[2] Before beginning his devotions the wearer unties it, and spreads it out before him, thus making it serve as a prayer-mat. These garments form the customary dress of the labourers, artisans, 554 and of the poorer classes generally. Merchants, 291 priests, and all men of wealth and rank wear as an additional item of dress the chalat, which is also put on by poorer people on festive occasions (see ill. page 1442).[2]

The word "chalat" signifies a rich garment of honour of the kind traditionally bestowed by Oriental princes as a badge of distinction. Hermann Vámbéry, who in the second half of the nineteenth century travelled in Central Asia under the disguise of a dervish, reports that in Khiva he met a high official sorting chalats which were intended as rewards for soldiers, and the value of which was graded according to the number of enemies' heads

[1] [See p 25 -- Analyst]
[2] [See " 116, p 28 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 which each man had brought home from the war. The chalat as the usual outer garment is [554] known in the vernacular as "chapan". It is cut like an overcoat, reaches to the ankles, and has very long sleeves, into which the wearer [834] can withdraw his hands in order to comply with the Mohammedan law that no part of the body should be uncovered (see ill. below).

It is the chalat which gives the crowds in the cities of Turkestan their colourful appearance. When on the great Mohammedan feast-days the crowds of the faithful in their many-coloured chalats stand in front of the glittering mosques, when they kneel or throw themselves on the ground to pray, the scene is one which can probably be parallelled nowhere in 291 Europe or in the East. The patterns and colours of the chalats are of an extraordinary 294 variety, and their edges are trimmed with narrow borders of embroidered or woven material from which small tassels are suspended at regular intervals. Though the materials of the costly gold-brocaded garments worn by the very rich and the cheap printed cottons common to the poorest classes were of Russian manufacture, the greater part of the chalat fabrics were and still are characteristic products of the weavers and dyers of Turkestan. These fabrics are gaily striped, pattern-

Men of Bokhara in striped chalats and white turbans.

291

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1
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T. 871 555 [191] S.U. 871 563 555 of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the S.U. 563 554 T. 563 554 Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

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Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Ka. 101 Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral 000 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
652 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported
662 by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time . In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruited from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6] S.U. 563 T. 177 626

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system. S.U. 563 185 S.U. [871]

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority T. 871 555 S.U. 871 563 555

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

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as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the 643
following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one 558
of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made
a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask
if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that
he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result
immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost
the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated
by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game
that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his
property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's
abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there
was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread.

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always 643
treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat [669]
mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last
Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects
three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah,
who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in
constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers,
and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure
himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought direct-
ly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and
each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants
before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for
the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these
same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the
Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no
signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food
would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same
procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir.
Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to
leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for
the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in
his absence.

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khan- 631
ates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government
officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on
the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which
he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials

632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

593 562 [586] self must put up with any treatment from them. Only wives born in the better families can force better treatment from their husbands through their family ties, and in case of mistreatment by their husbands, such wives can by a legal action cause the husbands to separate from them. All other wives are exposed without protection to the arbitrary will of their husbands, who may at any time separate from them or take younger wives besides them if the older ones no longer please them, all this without giving reasons.

The most important circumstance which makes all public life unbearably monotonous and boring in Turkestan towns, and prevents the rise of a real social and family life, is the absolute seclusion, worse than in a cloister, of the women from the world of men. On the street the women must either not appear at all, or else they must be so heavily veiled that nothing at all can be seen of their figures. At home, however, they must live in a special section which can never be entered by any man other than their husbands and children. The groom is not allowed [584] to see his bride even once before the wedding, and even during the marriage ceremony the bride and groom are in two different places. Thus the men must, unfortunately, depend on the judgments of their female relatives or on professional matchmakers for their choice of wives. Substitutions, such as those by which the patriarch Joseph was tricked by his father-in-law Laban are therefore easily made. At best the wives can live the rest of their lives communicating only with their brothers and parents in addition to their husbands, while all other men are for them as /194/ good as nonexistent. The women cannot take part in any public festivity, not even in family celbrations or receptions of guests in their own houses. A more joyless existence than that of the native wives in the towns of Central Asia can scarcely be imagined. (1)

[839] 1. I will note here that in Turkestan the institution of eunuchs is unknown. Even the harems of the khans there are no eunuchs.

On the whole, however, the life of the men too is in no way enviable as a result of the sharp separation of the sexes. A man without family never meets a female face to face at all, all his life, and is left exclusively to associate with men. The result of these unnatural conditions is an unbelievable moral depravity and a really horrifying increase of all possible unnatural vices.

The married men, too, have relatively little contact with their

593 wives and prefer to pass their time in association with men and to
562 idle about the whole day in the bazaar whenever their time is not taken up with work in the fields, commercial transactions or some kind of handicraft. This has its basis in the complete absence of schooling among all the women, even those of the best families. This is likewise a consequence of the seclusion of the female sex which makes it impossible for women to achieve a higher education in schools. The women are therefore unable to be companionable and good company to their husbands in the best sense.

000 A sense of how boring, even unbearable the whole life is in one of the towns inhabited by natives, as a result of the circumstances described, can only be felt by someone who has once been lost by some misfortune for a period of time in such a town. Such a life, as I can confirm from my own experience, is particularly depressing for Europeans accustomed to association with women and to the European forms of society. For Europeans a long stay in purely Mohammedan towns can be absolutely disastrous, and I have known of several cases, in which living for several years in an exclusively Mohammedan environment has led a man to suicide or madness.

402 There is one positive feature for the women in the towns and villages of Turkestan resulting from their strict separation and cloistered state: they are less drawn into heavy labor than is the case among the Kazakhs, and they are spared the work in the fields and gardens and the heavy work or the handicrafts. The chief task of the Sart and /195/ Tadjik women is the care and rearing of their children, the preparation of food, the making and washing of clothes, the spinning of yarn and the weaving of cloth for clothing for the household, and the like; above all the growing of silkworms is entirely in the hands of the women. All work which must be performed in the open and publicly, such as field and garden cultivation, handicrafts, commercial transactions, cattle raising, is done exclusively by men, which is quite different from the custom among the nomads. All the domestic labor, however, is done by the wives, even among the highest dignitaries and the khans, since there are no female domestic servants, but only male ones. It is not at all unusual for the wives of the highest officials, even of the khans, to send the products of their domestic industry, such as embroidered housecaps, belts, little pockets and the like, to the bazaar to be sold, in order to gain a little income.

346 garden of greater or smaller size with a pond in the middle at which Moslem visitors to the mosque make their prescribed ablutions before the prayers, if they have not already done so at home. These mosque courtyards form a favorite meeting place for all the residents whose only task in life consists in an unbroken delightful idleness, but who consider it beneath their dignity to loiter about with the younger men
793 at the bazaar and in the tea shops. At every mosque there is an 'imam' or permanent leader of prayers, with an assistant, who bears the title of 'sufi,' as well as a caller, endowed with a powerful voice, who must announce from the minaret of the mosque (Figure 74) the time of the morning and evening prayers and at the same time the curfew hour for the public houses. None of these ordinarily receives any regular salary. Instead, voluntary gifts are received, at the time of the high festivals from the vistors of the mosque in question, and at harvest time they are given a specified part of the fruit of the earth.

788 During the group prayers, inside the mosque as well as outside, the participants arrange themselves in rank and file like a detachment of soldiers, while the prayer leader (imam) is at the front in order to be visible to everyone. During the prayer people stand and kneel in rapid succession /205/ and touch the ground with the forehead from time to time; all these movements, to which are added various manipulations of the hands, are made first by the prayer leader and then imitated by the entire group, as though by command. This makes an extremely comical impression upon the non-participants, for the whole thing resembles an exercise in callisthenics more than a religious act, the more so since it all proceeds in deathly silence, for
[562] the prayers are not spoken aloud. Women may not participate in such common prayers nor visit the mosques. /Figure 74, p. 43a. Caption: The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva./

785 The Moslem fasts, which last all through the month of Ramadan, and are designated as 'urza', are completely different from the Christian fasts. They do not consist in abstinence from meat nor of moderation in eating, but instead in the prohibition of food or drink from sunrise to sundown, including even a drink of water. The Moslems are so strict in this connection that they do not even permit themselves to bathe fro some water could get into the body unintentionally through the nose or the ears. It can be easily seen that the observance of such strict fasts, especially during the burning heat of Turkestan, is no trivial thing. But scarcely has the sun set and the evening prayer is finished, before a solemn banquet begins with singing and dancing, a

872 Girls and boys are usually taught together; nevertheless there are also special girls' schools, but in these as well, the teaching is done by a mullah. Elementary education begins, as with us, at the age of from five to six years, as a rule, and for the boys usually lasts seven years. Many parents take their boys out of school before this, however, if they can use them in their business or for labor. The whole course is com-
[562] pleted usually only by those who wish to enter a medrese later. For girls school attendance usually ends when they are eight or nine years old, for they are already of marriageable age when they are ten, and must receive instruction before that time in needlework, embroidery, weaving and other domestic tasks.

The instruction is strenuous for teachers and pupils alike, for it lasts nine hours a day, from six o'clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, with only a little free time for recreation and for eating the /220/ modest meals of bread and fruit, which the children have brought with them in their school bags. The pupils have only one day a week free, that is, Friday. Otherwise they have little vacation, only a week each at the time of the three high Moslem festivals.

872 The instruction in the elementary schools of Turkestan is limited
876 primarily to the teaching of reading and writing. There are no courses, as we know them. The pupils are first taught the alphabet, and then they begin to read and copy from selected parts of the Koran, from which they proceed to the reading of various other books. The study of one book is held to be finished when the pupil is able to read it and copy from it without difficulty. Whoever has completed a half dozen books in this manner has finished the course and can proceed to study in a high school if he feels in himself the desire and capacity to do so. In addition to reading and writing the children in the elementary schools also learn the most important prayers and precepts of the Koran and the complicated ceremonies which must be observed during the prayers and the ablutions prescribed by the Koran. The methods of instruction used by the teachers in the elementary schools in Turkestan are characteristic and completely different from our customs and they explain why in these schools the time and work expended by the teacher and pupils corresponds so little to the results obtained. The instruction is already made very difficult by the fact that pupils at all levels must be taught at the same time by one and the same teacher; it is further encroached upon, quite needlessly, in that the various pupils at a given time are not occupied with one subject, such as reading or writing, but each is

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.'

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they

[1] [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kirghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipation of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

[1] It is not easy to recognize in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination -oglu, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

531 the remote mountain districts of Central Asia
[353] the forms have been handed down so carefully that the figure of the bird has retained traces of medieval stylization.

Embroideries discovered by Le Coq in sparsely populated districts of Eastern Turkestan are in technique and design frequently almost identical with the susanis of Bokhara. They show the same stylized flower-patterns in the same combination of colours, usually as decorations of women's trousers (tambal). It may, therefore, be assumed that the style of the susanis is characteristic of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

More than twenty years ago Le Coq reported that such embroidery was no longer being made in Eastern Turkestan. The examples that he saw had been made by the mothers of
656 the generation then living. In Western Tur-
562 kestan the tradition not only exists to this day, but the government has set up special workshops where the women embroider susanis. This is part of the policy by means of which the state seeks to draw women out of the secluded life of the harem.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional-habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

000 preponderance of males over females.

161 In order to judge the growth of population we have data from three uyezds of the
163 Semirechie oblast which show
165

1 birth for every 20 persons
1 death for every 21 persons
Natural increase: 0.3%

It is clear from this that the birth rate among the natives is very high, which is in agreement with the general rule: the more civilized a people is, the lower is its birth rate. On the other hand the death rate of the native population also is considerably higher than the death rate of other peoples. Thus the percent of natural increase is two-thirds below that of the population of European Russia, where the annual increase is up to 1%.

The birth rate and mortality and the natural increase of the Russian population living in the Turkestan region corresponds to the data for European Russia.

165 /335/ Among the Kazakhs and Sarts one observes a high female mortality, which results in a preponderance of males, as mentioned above. This predominance is reported to be as much
562 as 10%. The high female mortality among the Kazakhs and Sarts (and in general among our Moslem subjects in the Turkestan region) is due, apparently, to the more terrible and oppressed position which the woman occupies in the Mosler world here. Doomed to heavy labor, knowing no rest and peace, suffering various hardships, the Moslem woman ages early and dies before her time.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange, but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings, they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours, so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or completely losing their own in the process. The language of a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care. Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the population in this part of the world, language does in fact give some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor, namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] [cat. 116 p105 - Analyst] Bib. II, 8, R. E. Pipes.

2: Carre S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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> The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

2: Carce S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia 814

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

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In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

least he makes up much more than a fraction of the population.

The third distinction to remember is that at the time of the Revolution and for some time later, there was in Central Asia no organized indigenous urban proletariat. There was of course a large city population of merchants, traders, craftsmen and *religieux*, but it was the usual medley, without order or arrangement, at best following the medieval guild system to be found in the bazaar quarters of all eastern towns. Such factories as existed — mostly for cotton-ginning and carding — were staffed by Russians, and Russians alone were to be found on the railways and telegraphs. Industry and communications were in Russian hands, and, to cite Stalin himself, the only proletariat of consequence was Russian.

[563] The fact of the matter is that a number of peoples, mainly Turkic peoples — about thirty million in all — have not had time to pass through the period of industrial capitalism and consequently have no industrial proletariat [1].

He followed this up two years later with a conclusion which it might have been inopportune to state on the first occasion.

> The conditions now exist enabling these republics which . . . possess no proletariat to establish *with the aid of the Russian proletariat* their own centres of industry in order to create in these centres groups of local proletarians who will serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and the toilers of these republics. In this sphere serious work is required; and talk of schools and language alone is not enough.[1]

This interpenetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the countryside, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along the lines of communications, supplies perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia. It is seldom mentioned; indeed Stalin's reference to the bridge-like task of the Russian proletariat is perhaps the nearest we have to an admis-

[1] Stalin speaking on 10th Mar. 1921 and 23rd Apr. 1923 to the Tenth and Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party. Bib. I, 90, pp. 104 and 156.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

limited cultural field was acceptable to Soviet historians and scientists down to 1937. But the Great Russian revival set on foot at the time of the 1937 purges, and developed during and after the War, destroyed such multi-national concepts, and led to the abandonment of theories like that of Marr which drew inspiration from a colonial source. Great Russian chauvinism had won the day.

MISCEGENATION

There is another influence which goes deep. Unlike the English, says Togan,[1] the Russian pursues tactics — to him second nature — of pretending to be the friend of the people among whom he comes. He presents himself as their brother, tries to combine his blood with theirs in marriage, and creeps into intimacy with them. He knows how to suit his language, literature, music and architecture to the native taste. Himself half-Asian, he seeks to deal with the people of Asia as Asians, and in his letters and even in the appearance of his envoys, adopts the mannerisms of Asia. This elastic character and tact is the most menacing side of Russia's domination of Turkistan. He goes on:

> As regards family life the men who mix with Russians often marry Russian women. It is true that mixed marriages between nationals of different countries with common civilization strengthen their cultural inter-connection. But this is a menace to the Turkish idea in Turkistan. If one partner comes from the ruling nation and the other from one inferior politically and economically, it hastens the process of assimilation. Russian women like most Russians are fanatical, nationalistic and despotic. Not only by their caresses, but by their continual nagging at the quality of self-respect which they despise, they reduce their husbands to submission.

A recent account[2] tends to confirm this picture. As sympathizers these visitors took a different view when they met Satpaiev, the Kazak President of the Alma Ata Academy of Sciences, with his Russian wife. Nominally at least this

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 536 and 586. The author at the moment is speaking of Tsarist times. But a Commissar is as good as a Count.

[2] Coates, *op. cit.* p. 141.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 186 More recently there has been no pretence of the respectability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

1 [See cat. 116 pp. 104-05 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

was to be expected, there is testimony to a certain tension having existed between Uzbek and Kazak, heirs as they are to such very different traditions, but even here the forcing of the Kazaks into settled agriculture and the mines and factories may tend gradually towards assimilation.

Perhaps a fair conclusion would be this: there are, and always have been, very real distinctions of habit, language and bearing between the sedentary population of the towns and oases, who are now mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, and the men who come from the steppe and mountains, mainly Kazaks, Kirghiz and Turkmens. These differences have been accentuated by Russian policy. But it was proved in 1918–24, and has been proved again in 1941–5, that all these peoples are close enough to work together effectively in a close organism such as an army.[1] On this premise there is ground for supposing that, in spite of differences, trusted leaders may be able to exploit a common tradition to the degree of achieving political unity in action at least when the cry is liberation from a foreign yoke. It is even possible that Russianization may in the end assist this process, as did the introduction of the English language and administration into India. For it by no means follows that the higher Russian education, which provides a new level on which the more intellectual can communicate without regard of race, will cause Kazaks or Uzbeks to think or act as Russians. Judging from the history of World War II, they are more likely to act as Uzbeks and Kazaks, and to believe that freedom is just round the corner.

Finally there is this to be said. There are few emigration groups who have had so great a chance as this national committee to influence directly the hopes and thoughts of so many thousands of their fellow-countrymen over a period of three or four years. Conditions were difficult, the Germans lacked understanding, and after the first two years it was clear that the Eastern Turks had not backed a winning horse. If in spite of this they carried on, and the rank and file fought and died as they did, it proves at least they thought they had a cause to die for. In spiritual terms that cause was the redemption of

[1] [e.g. under the Nazis; see cat. 116, p. 296 ff. — analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

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[11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy, tekhnikums,* and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the dev- [181] elopment of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

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162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent
line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have
lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have
turned into a special family, so to speak, which
is known in Central Asia by the name of the
Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in
the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40%
of the total population. On the right bank of
the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks
constitute about 3% of the population and in
the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life,
and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans,
lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./
Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-
Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes,
a list of which was appended by him to his
well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva
(A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes.
Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that
the classification of Uzbek clans can probably
never be explained since the two essential
sources for this can never be thoroughly re-
conciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie
svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge
(Geographical and statistical inform-
ation on the Zeravshan okrug)
Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

8:Kostenko -88-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan
RLl

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to se-
[311] dentary life. However, because of the elevation of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

167 563 One can judge the success of the colonizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

8:Kostenko -89-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

1 [In Semirechie - Analyst]

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain cultivation the peasants work in orchards and do
[691] vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches		1
Houses	1	678
[366] Stores and Stalls		55
Mills		32
Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar doninions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

361 There are also Chinese here who have come from
563 the Celestial Empire on commercial business. Finally, there are Jews, also making their living in commerce.

361 Here is an inventory of the Vernyy population by nationality and estate:
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In 1871		Male	Female	Total
Aristocracy	Hereditary	109	46	155
	Non-hereditary	71	52	123
Notable Citizens		8	5	13
Secular Clergy		8	12	20
Merchants		174	107	281
Lower Middle Class		1,176	1,306	2,482
Peasants		174	101	275
Colonists		5	3	8
Military Estate		2,512	250	2,762
Cossacks		2,048	1,839	3,887
Soldiers retired or on indefinite leave		583	180	763
Sarts		459	106	565
Chinese		9	3	12
Kazakhs		271	132	403
Kalmyks	Christians	91	52	143
	Non-Christians	107	81	188
/423/ Persons not belonging to the above estates		187	93	280
Transients with passports		194	83	277
	Total	8,186	4,451	12,637

From this table it can be seen that 1) there is a considerable preponderance of the Russian population over the other nationalities; 2) there is a considerable preponderance of males over females. For 100 males here, there are 54 females.

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[137] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry
trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley
563 in general, the most different nationalities
are mixed together. Until the beginning of
the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the
Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

361 were obliged to maintain at their own expense
563 the numerous herds of the Chinese Emperor. The property of the population was not safeguarded in any way. If something was pleasing to a Chinese official he took it without any discussion. The same thing happened if the official found the wife or daughter of a Dungan or Taranchi attractive. In addition to all this, the people also suffered other kinds of humiliation. When a person of another nationality met a Chinese, he had to stand if he was sitting, or dismount from his horse, if he were riding. This chain of insults, humiliations and affronts could no longer be born with patience. The Dungans and Taranchi revolted and had a terrible accounting with their oppressors. The central Chinese government, being powerless, remained a non-participating observer of the massacre and the loss of her provinces.

The Dungans, having thrown off the yoke of the Chinese, soon yielded the rule of the Ili province to the Taranchi.

563 The origin of the Dungans is unsolved.
173 The coming of this people into their present abode is lost in the mists of time. There is a tradition in Kuldja that the Dungans came here with Timur and that this hero, when he married a Chinese princess, received the Ili province as a dowry from the Chinese Emperor. The followers obeyed the example of their leader and also married Chinese girls. Later, when Timur went on his way these followers remained and received the land as a gift, as a result of which the Dungans also consider themselves its rightful rulers.

8:Kostenko 150-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

563
144 In physical type the Dungans resemble the Turkic peoples, such as the Uzbeks and Sarts, populating Tashkent, Kashgar and other towns in Turkestan, more than they do the Chinese. By religious faith they are Moslems. In everything else - in language, dress and custom - they are true Chinese. Yet, in spite of the fact that they retain the Chinese costume completely, the Ili Dungans keep the Moslem custom of shaving the head and wear a skull cap (tubeteika) on their heads.

/430/ In any case it can be assumed that the Dungans first belonged to a Turkic people and then later mixed with the Chinese and adopted their civilization. Then, since the Chinese are the most passive people in the world in the matter of religion, while the Moslems, on the other hand are primarily fanatics, the Dungans took everything from the Chinese, but kept their old religious faith.

The Taranchi are purely Turkic in nationality. They were transferred to this area in the middle of the last century from eastern Turkestan (from the towns of Turfan, Ak-Su, Kashgar and others) in order to develop grain growing and agriculture in the Ili valley, which had been ruined and conquered shortly before then by the Chinese. The word "tarancha" in Chinese means "worker". By order of the Chinese government most of the people transferred were criminals and in general men of bad morals. About 7000 families of these settlers were sent out. By marrying Dungans they multiplied, became stronger, and were even able to wrest the power from the Dungans after the Chinese massacre.

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar RL1
[Kuldja]

563 177 Having lived in the midst of Chinese civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese [346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 342 There are a very few buildings left in Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

8:Kostenko 166-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Samarkand] RL1

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
438 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat,
439 rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL 1

India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Government of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 631 563 T. 631 563

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. 717 814 177 S.U. 563 658

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

T. of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in
871 methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school
555 training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek,
[191] Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage
S.U. in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete
871 command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when
563 trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his
555 mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the
S.U. Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the
563 Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain
554 privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important
T. key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local
●563 ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state
554 banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

T. The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even
[517] entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the
Ka. Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan,
101 which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral
000 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

VI. THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Tu 563 S.U 563

The problem of national minorities is of great importance for the Central Asiatic Republics. Each of the five Central Asiatic 'state nations' has minorities in the other four republics. Some of them are numerically fairly large, such as the Uzbeks in Kirghizistan and Tadzhikistan, or the Turkmenians in Uzbekistan.

In addition there are minorities who have their national territories outside Soviet Central Asia, but inside the U.S.S.R., such as Tartars, Mordvinians, Armenians, etc. Finally, there are ethnical groups who have no national republic either in Central Asia or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. These peoples, the bulk of whom live outside the U.S.S.R., are of considerable interest since they occupy a definite, even if subordinate, place in Russia's policy towards her Central-Asiatic neighbours. Into this category fall the Uigurs and Dungans, who live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Another nationality which may eventually become a tool of Soviet foreign policy are the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. There are also Arabs in Uzbekistan, who theoretically could be a formidable weapon in the hands of Soviet diplomacy, but who for practical reasons could not play this part.*

UIGURS AND DUNGANS

Tu 563 [101]

The Uigurs, a Turkic people racially related to the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, and the Dungans, of mixed Arab and Persian origin, who had kept the Moslem faith but adopted the Chinese tongue, are both peoples of Western China. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the two peoples endeavoured to shake off Chinese rule and set up independent Khanates of their own. When these attempts failed, many Dungans and Uigurs fled into Russian territory. A particularly heavy exodus of the Uigurs took place when, in 1881, Russia restored to China the Kuldzha border district which she had occupied during the Western Chinese troubles of 1871.

The Uigurs and Dungans were readily granted Russian citizenship and

* All these minorities already lived in Central Asia under the Czarist régime. The Soviet Government added to them some other ethnical groups who had not been previously associated with Central Asia. Their members came to the Central Asiatic Republics as inmates of forced labour camps, as evacuees during the war, and also as more or less voluntary settlers. A particularly interesting community formed by the latter is a Korean minority which has been living in the Kzyl Orda Province of Kazakhstan since 1928. The Koreans of Kazakhstan are very successful rice-growers and their collective farms, bearing such names as 'Bolshevik', 'Third International' and 'Gigant', have acquired a certain fame.** Other Korean groups have settled more recently and perhaps less voluntarily in the Khorezm Province and in the Tashkent Province of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Koreans are mostly cotton planters. Politically the Central Asiatic Koreans are without influence, except for one Korean deputy in the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

land for settlement purposes as well as exemptions from taxes for a period of ten years. The new subjects of the Russian Empire proved to be an asset, both economically and culturally, in South-East Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan. After 1881, in the Semirechie district on the skirts of China, the Uigurs founded sixty settlements. Most of the settlements survived the revolution and Soviet statistics mention the existence of forty-five Uigur villages in the same area. They are forming a 'Uigur National District' which is part of the Alma Ata Province of Kazakhstan. The Uigurs also have over sixty National Collective Farms in Uzbekistan. Tu. 563

The total number of Uigurs in the Soviet Union, together with ethnical groups who are practically identical with them, can be placed with some certainty in the neighbourhood of 100,000. In regard to the Dungans, Soviet statistics mention a total figure of 14,600 for the whole Soviet Union, but that figure would seem to be an understatement. The Dungans have been allotted a special 'National District' in Kazakhstan and have fifteen National Collective Farms in Kirghizistan.[59] Tu. 162

Considering their small numerical strength the two national minorities enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions. As many as five newspapers, two theatres (one each in Alma Ata and Andizhan) and two teachers' training colleges are at the disposal of the Uigurs, while the Dungans have two newspapers and a teachers' training college in addition to a Dungan department in the teachers' training college of Frunze. An Uigur-Dungan department has also been attached to the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan. Tu. 563 658

Such liberality by the Soviet authorities may be explained by the political-military role of considerable importance which, in addition to the economic and cultural one, the Uigurs and Dungans had all along been called to play. Having settled down in the Russo-Chinese frontier area the Uigurs and Dungans took upon themselves the tasks usually reserved for Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In the cultural and economic fields the Uigurs and Dungans exercised a stabilizing and beneficial influence on their nomad surroundings. In the domain of politics, thanks to their anti-Chinese outlook, they provided Russian frontier districts with a human wall as reliable as if composed of Russian colonists themselves. S.U. 563 721

From the point of view of Soviet diplomatic strategy the Uigurs, who are the largest people in multi-national Sinkiang, are by far the more important of the two. The 2,900,000 Uigurs of Sinkiang are, however, split up into a large number of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit. Soviet nationalities policy, taking the Soviet Uigurs as a basis, may assist them to develop a clearer national consciousness. S.U 563 648

During the decade of active Soviet interference (1933–43) in the

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL]

[Uigur]
[Baluchi]

S.U. 563 648 internal affairs of Sinkiang, certain progress was made in that direction mainly by means of forming national Uigur clubs, introducing Soviet textbooks in the new local schools and educating a certain number of young Sinkiang Uigurs in Tashkent and Alma Ata. The non-existence of an actual Uigur national movement in Sinkiang deprived Soviet policy of a reliable basis and made it depend almost exclusively on the assistance of the pro-Soviet Chinese governor – Shan Shi-tsai.

As in numerous other territories, so too in Sinkiang, Soviet anti-religious policy conflicted with Soviet policy on nationalities. The closing of mosques and the persecution of mullahs which was carried out during the period of the *de facto* Soviet protectorate antagonized the Sinkiang Moslems whose goodwill Russia might otherwise have won.[60]

After the authority of the Chinese central Government had been re-established in the province in 1943–44, it was not the Uigur population but the 319,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang who played the Russian game. In 1946, with the more or less open support of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs succeeded in obtaining a wide measure of local autonomy in three of the ten districts of Sinkiang, thus virtually dividing the province into two. Any further important Soviet action with the design of eliminating Chinese rule in Sinkiang altogether, would undoubtedly hinge on those 'brothers' of the peoples of the Soviet Union who inhabit the province; these include, in addition to the Uigurs and the Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 9,000 Tadzhiks and 92,000 Dungans. Since the establishment of Chinese communist rule in Sinkiang the Soviet cultural tutelage over that province has not come to an end but has become more effective. It is conducted more openly than ever before through a special Soviet cultural mission and through the Sinkiang branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. These two bodies have imported into Sinkiang large numbers of books, magazines and posters, particularly in the Uigur and Kazakh languages.

BALUCHIS

The existence of a few thousand Baluchis in Soviet Central Asia may be of some value from the point of view of Soviet policy towards Persia and Pakistan.

S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563 There are 200,000 Baluchis in Persian Baluchistan and 500,000 in the Indian province of the same name. However small the number of the Baluchis in the Soviet Union may be they represent an asset for Soviet policy in so far as they can be called upon to form part of a communist vanguard both in Persia and Pakistan if and when required. In Turkmenistan the Baluchis have nine National Village Soviets and twenty-three schools, where the Baluchi language is taught in the first

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [191]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1

Tu 663 659 771 Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

Tu 663 The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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I Von Schwarz 21 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad and Fergana, and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorporated into Russia. 642

The political and social arrangements were the same in all the Uzbek khanates. (1) The ruling classes were formed by the Uzbeks, 565 554

1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects [641] alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, 643 without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary 554 manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar

643 again or even have him executed for no reason at all. Most of the
554 influential figures and high dignitaries at the courts of the khans make many changes in the course of their careers as a result of this and moreover even the khans themselves are not always immune. The former envoy of Kokand, Mirza Hakim, who for the betrayal of his fatherland and his Khan later received the title of a Russian state councillor, had earlier been a shopkeeper. The Khan of Khiva, Kulman, was promoted to this position as a result of a conspiracy of day laborers. The former ruler of Kashgar, Yakub Beg, rose from the dregs of the population, having been in his youth a 'batsha', or 'public dancer.' The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, after his first dethronement in Dzhizak, established himself as a shopkeeper, and acquired such a fancy for business that he continued with it after he regained the throne, and declared a large part of the booths of the bazaar of Kokand to be his property. Indeed he did not consider it beneath his dignity to keep bands of musicians, as well as leaders of bears and monkeys, which he ordered led about the fairs on his account, and had them give concerts in private houses, uninvited.

● 565 Since the post of honor of the father, the bestowal of which unfortunately depended upon the whim of the ruler, was only rarely passed on to his son, the children of high-placed officials often enjoyed no more education than the children of ordinary townsmen and ran around with them barefoot and half-naked in the streets. During my stay of several weeks in Baysun in 1886, where I was the guest of the beg or governor there, the sons of the beg came to my court every day to consume the leftovers of my dinner in the company of my servants and cossacks. To see a former beg or court official or his sons working as dealers in old clothes, carters or even day laborers is not at all unusual.

'043 One can see from the following case how uncertain and in-
558 constant the favor of a khan is. During my first trip to Bukhara, a Bukharan who ranked as the best chess-player was staying with the former Emir of Bukhara, Muzafar al-Din, a chess-player who was as passionate a player as he was mediocre. The chess-player was held in great esteem and was overwhelmed by the Emir with /176/ honors and riches. Upon a later visit I met this favorite in a group of ragged vagabonds who were pushing their way into our quarter with the hope of obtaining some of the tidbits from our table which are usually found when guests are being entertained. When I inquired

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

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177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
578 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
• 565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
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[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

8: Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
365] Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn

162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Salors and Saryks extend their wanderings into Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the northermost of the Turkoman tribes, who number about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
[181] Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day knows how hospitable, frank, and trustworthy the people are. They are of a decidedly
567 warlike character. Until after the middle of
579 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put a stop to their activities, they were the most redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan, and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards kidnapping and the slave trade. They extended their raids far into Persia, seizing what prisoners they could. The wealthier of these were released after the extortion of as large a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be gathered from the fact that when the Russians conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000 slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and vigorous race with an abundant growth of beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow, skin. The women, too, are tall and slender; they are among the most beautiful in Asia. The tribe is much farther removed from the Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason for this may be that the Turkomans live so close to the Iranian frontier, and that they have for centuries been in close contact with Iranian Tribes.

811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The 875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our [427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com- [574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since [574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district,[2] according to the [141] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty [368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose
788 everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals: in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by
576 the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

576 wear, soiled from the filth of the unpaved streets, before entering
361 a dwelling. For one does not sit on chairs in the dwellings of the natives or in the mosques, but simply sits on the floor. Consequently they do not demand of the Europeans that they pull off their boots before entering a mosque.

346 There are two types of mosques in Turkestan: the large cupola structures of firebricks with high facades and broad gate arches, most of which go back to the time of Tamerlane (Figure 70, p. 199 and Figure 71, p. 200), and the modern mosques, which consist of simple buildings, similar to an ordinary dwelling, with adjoining colonnades, like the one shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). In Tashkent there are only two mosques of the first type: the old half-ruined mosque, Hodja Akhrar, the mosaics of which are still partly preserved and prove that it was built in the same style as the Tamerlane mosque in Samarkand, and the more recent /203 Figure 73. Caption: The Interior of a Mosque in Bukhara. //204/Beklyar Beg mosque, which dominates the bazaar.

All the other mosques in Tashkent, and their number reaches 255, are more or less similar to the Maxim mosque, shown in Figure 72 (p. 201). As a rule they consist of one greater or smaller chamber, constructed of firebrick or simply of clay, and an adjoining portico with carved wooden columns and a level wooden roof. The floor of the portico is always raised several feet above the surrounding court. Sometimes there is no closed space at all, and the mosque then consists solely of a shelter, open in the front with walls constructed of clay. The interior of the mosques (Figure 73, p. 203), exhibits as a rule no decorations nor objects of furnishing, and the walls are in most cases not whitewashed even once. An elevation consisting of some steps built of bricks or clay serves as a pulpit for the mullah who is speaking. The mosques are always oriented in such a way that the wall opposite the entrance, toward which the supplicants turn during the prayer, whenever possible is perpendicular to the direction facing Mecca. Also in their prayers outside the mosque, the Moslems always seek to face toward Mecca, and in this connection they take the matter so seriously, that I have been asked by the inhabitants of all the towns I have visited during my travels, to indicate to them by means of my astronomic instruments as exactly as possible the direction toward Mecca. In every mosque there is a court or

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632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union. 788 177

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed. 852 177

The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities. 793 661

As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate; after 177 584

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the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

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So far as the Communist authorities are concerned, the actual wedding act should consist merely of a registration in the local office of the ZAGS (*Zapis' aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia* — Registry of Civil Acts); any festivities connected with it should preferably be organized by the local Young Communist League, Trade Union, or other organization to which the young couple belongs. In fact, however, the natives prefer to celebrate weddings in a more traditional manner. Among the inhabitants of the steppe and desert, for instance, it is still customary on the wedding day for the bride (properly veiled) to wait at her parents' home for the friends of the bridegroom to take her to her new home — but whereas before the Revolution she was transported on a camel or a horse, she is now brought to the wedding place in a rented automobile. It is still customary, while the wedding party is in progress, for the young pair to retire to a separate room, and there have sexual relations, in order to be able to prove to the relatives of both parties the virginity of the bride. The entire wedding ceremony in Central Asia assumes ever more the character of a purely secular festivity, but insofar as possible it is carried out within the framework of traditional nonreligious forms and rituals. 585 177

The food habits of the natives seem to have undergone little change. Through contact with Russians they have been exposed to such novel foods as potatoes, bread, and boiled eggs, but their preference is for traditional native dishes: pilau, kumys, etc. They are often compelled to eat Russian food, including pork, in government and other restaurants and in the army, but they avoid it if at all possible. The natives seem to prefer to partake of their main meal in the evening, rather than at midday, as the Russians are in the habit of doing. 262 177 [264]

In clothing the natives of Central Asia appear to tend in the direction of a synthesis of traditional and Western garb. The basic articles of wear, their cut, and ornamentation are native; but some items of clothing are adopted from the Russians. Adult males have almost everywhere taken to wearing leather shoes, which are superior in comfort and durability to their native counterparts; Muslim girls like to wear, together with their national costumes, Western-style blouses. Soviet sources report a general tendency on the part of natives to wear mixed clothing, part Western, part native — the former apparently for comfort, the latter for national identification. In the cities, especially among the youth, Western clothing predominates; in the village, the opposite is the case. In clothes, as in other customs, the principle enunciated earlier holds true: the natives discard what is patently inconvenient and adopt from the Russians what is more practical, i.e., Western. They do not discard traditions for reasons other than utility. 291 177

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age of adolescence; the local press even reports occasionally instances of high-school graduating classes being completely devoid of girls, all of them having dropped out a few years earlier. See *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 47–53; vol. 2, no. 1 (1954), pp. 71–72.

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593 wives and prefer to pass their time in association with men and to
562 idle about the whole day in the bazaar whenever their time is not taken up with work in the fields, commercial transactions or some kind of handicraft. This has its basis in the complete absence of schooling among all the women, even those of the best families. This is likewise a consequence of the seclusion of the female sex which makes it impossible for women to achieve a higher education in schools. The women are therefore unable to be companionable and good company to their husbands in the best sense.

000 A sense of how boring, even unbearable the whole life is in one of the towns inhabited by natives, as a result of the circumstances described, can only be felt by someone who has once been lost by some misfortune for a period of time in such a town. Such a life, as I can confirm from my own experience, is particularly depressing for Europeans accustomed to association with women and to the European forms of society. For Europeans a long stay in purely Mohammedan towns can be absolutely disastrous, and I have known of several cases, in which living for several years in an exclusively Mohammedan environment has led a man to suicide or madness.

462 There is one positive feature for the women in the towns and villages of Turkestan resulting from their strict separation and cloistered state: they are less drawn into heavy labor than is the case among the Kazakhs, and they are spared the work in the fields and gardens and the heavy work or the handicrafts. The chief task of the Sart and /195/ Tadjik women is the care and rearing of their children, the preparation of food, the making and washing of clothes, the spinning of yarn and the weaving of cloth for clothing for the household, and the like; above all the growing of silkworms is entirely in the hands of the women. All work which must be performed in the open and publicly, such as field and garden cultivation, handicrafts, commercial transactions, cattle raising, is done exclusively by men, which is quite different from the custom among the nomads. All the domestic labor, however, is done by the wives, even among the highest dignitaries and the khans, since there are no female domestic servants, but only male ones. It is not at all unusual for the wives of the highest officials, even of the khans, to send the products of their domestic industry, such as embroidered housecaps, belts, little pockets and the like, to the bazaar to be sold, in order to gain a little income.

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595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets, nor about the purity of the water flowing through the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the [144] street or into the aryk. As a result both the air and the water are infected and transmit, one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy, Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis, 727 goiter). In general /391/ our military administration in Turkestan has never billeted army detachments in the native towns and villages, first, because of the poor construction of the [60] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness of the population, who have not yet mixed at all with the conquerors, and who, according to their religious law, almost never permit strangers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity, 712 occupy only such native dwellings as those which are confiscated and can be made suitable for European habitation. In most cases they have occupied the homes of former rulers or begs who have fled, and whose property consequently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either as barracks or as military hospitals. The adaptation has consisted of putting in large windows, installing ventilation, and so on. The Russians who occupied Tashkent built barracks for the army in the native manner, i.e., with the framework type of construction. But they soon discarded this system and began to build both the military buildings and the living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a regular manner.

RL1

162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
101 and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have turned into a special family, so to speak, which is known in Central Asia by the name of the Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40% of the total population. On the right bank of the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks constitute about 3% of the population and in the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life, and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans, lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./ Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes, a list of which was appended by him to his well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva (A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes. Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that the classification of Uzbek clans can probably never be explained since the two essential sources for this can never be thoroughly reconciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge (Geographical and statistical information on the Zeravshan okrug) Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

8:Kostenko --9-G-4,5(1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki (Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg. 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

162 [101] 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

162 Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive On the Amu- community composed of twelve separate clans. They use the land jointly according to common right.

162 101 9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now they have been put on a level with the other groups of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in regard to obligations, and must themselves maintain the irrigation required for their needs.

101 10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese, meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chinese government in the middle of the last century, just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettlement was undertaken as a form of punishment for these people for their participation in the revolt of 1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley, which was ruined and depopulated at that time. There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local population. Their form of life is the same as that of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into their hands. They routed the Dungans (under Bayandai) and formed an independent state under the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadiks
Kent Turks

101 Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, 186 figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description[1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

[191] 101 Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan[2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — [617] to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 440. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[193] [3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kazak

beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique 101
suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the 000
languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle 619
against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, 181
> courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirat*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, op. cit. p. 81.

[3] Togan, op. cit. p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 85.

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the best in the world for artistic purposes and for calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining) are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. To this day the town has remained an important centre of culture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see ill. page 1438) became not only wealthy towns, but places of extravagant luxury in the European sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of many wars in the course of its history, was from the middle of the eighteenth century onward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara; Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the Russian administration, in these towns the Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[439] in size and importance. At the present time the country's commerce with India and China is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civilization has made progress, modernization has not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely surprising in view of the extreme conservatism prevailing among the Islamic population of Central Asia.

184 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
619 the development of a great number of different tribes that are found both in town and country and whose manifold ethnological differences

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

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find expression in habits and customs, dress and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page 145) The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

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[See cat. 116, p 52--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Costumes of the Settled Population of Turkestan

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The wealthier portion of the population of Turkestan, the merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and peasants, live in the towns and the villages of the fertile areas. They differ considerably in culture, dress, and customs from the nomads who range the deserts. It is usual to distinguish between three different domiciled groups, the Tajiks, Uzbegs, and the Sarts.

Of these three groups the Tajiks are the most interesting. They number about 1,200,000, and live in the southern part of the former emirate of Bokhara, which now forms an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union under the name of Tajikistan. They are above all a mountain people, and are at the same time skilled agriculturists. As their language has preserved Iranian elements, it may be assumed that they are a remnant of the original population of the country, which retreated before the invasion of the Turks.

The Uzbegs, about two-million souls, form the majority of the agricultural population. They live in the heart of the fertile areas round about Samarkand, Bokhara, and Khiva. They appear to have originated in an army formed by Uzbeg Khan in the 14th century, which was made up of men who were willing to renounce the shamanistic customs which persisted and still persist throughout the country,

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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

View of the courtyards of Mohammedan houses in Samarkand. In the background the ruins of the great mosque built by Timur between 1398–1405.

162 and to profess a pure form of Islam. For that
619 reason the Uzbegs contain all the elements of
184 the Turkestan population, Arab, Turkish, and Tajik.

The two million Sarts who in the main make up the municipal population of Western Turkestan are even more of a racial mixture than the Uzbegs. That is not surprising considering the fact that the cities of Turkestan have always been great trading centres of international character. Nowadays, the differ-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Part of a waist-cloth of Bokhara. In addition to other motives the cashmere palmette is seen. Printed silk fabric.

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ence between Sarts and Uzbegs may be regarded as obliterated. Fifteen years ago the name Sart was officially given up; since then the people who formerly bore that name have been known as Uzbegs, and the most important republic in Western Turkestan is called Uzbegistan.

In Eastern Turkestan these three peoples are represented by a few merchants only, parti-

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

162 cularly in Kashgar, the first town on the other side of the border. The domiciled population
619 there is made up of the so-called Turki people,
184 more or less pure-blooded East Turks, who also profess the Mohammedan faith. As both Turkestans are provinces of countries of different race, the influence of ethnologically unrelated foreigners is strong: Russian influence in Western Turkestan and that of the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. These foreigners hold the more important government positions, and also engage in commerce, particularly in the export trade.

342 The houses of the people of Turkestan show the same character everywhere. They are cubic structures, built of sun-dried brick round open courts, and shut off from the street (see ill. page 1441).[1]

291 The dress of the groups mentioned above is also essentially similar. In all Islamic countries dress is governed by the same law, so that the same elements and even the same fabrics are found again and again. Needless to say, the profession of the wearer and his financial status result in differences, particularly in the quality and embellishment of the material. The various districts also show certain peculiarities of dress which make it possible to determine the part of the country from which the wearer comes. In all these cases, however, the differences are no more than variations of the same elementary forms.

The leg-wear of the men consists of white

1 [See cat. 116, p 24.--Analyst]
2 [Tajiks, Uzbegs, Sarts--Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The Nomads of Turkestan and Their Dress

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The picture presented by Turkestan and its peoples is very varied indeed; deserts, fertile country, and towns are areas clearly distinct from each other, each of which imposes different modes of life on its inhabitants. Such distinctions are found all over the world; they may be observed in Egypt, Arabia, and elsewhere. In Turkestan, however, they are the more striking as the inhabitants of these zones not only represent different stages of cultural advancement, but separate peoples and tribes, which differ markedly from each other in appearance, customs, and dress. Even nomad tribes, whose mode of life is essentially similar, have distinctive characteristics which vary with the nature of the districts which they range.

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In Western Turkestan there are two principal nomad tribes, the Kirghiz and the Turkomans. The Kirghiz are made up of two main groups, the Kirghiz Kasaks and the Kara Kirghiz. The Kirghiz Kasaks are by far the more numerous of the two tribes; they number about 1,600,000 souls, and form four groups (orda, hord). They roam through the Kizil Kum Desert in Western Turkestan between Tashkent and Khiva; they are scattered over a wide area, and have even encroached on the lands of the Turkoman tribes. Isolated groups are found all over the country. The majority of the Kirghiz Kasaks wander through the so-called Kirghiz Steppes which extend north-

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ward from the border of Turkestan almost to the Volga. The Kara Kirghiz, who number about 540,000 in all, are native to Turkestan. Most of them live on the inclement slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains.

The differences in the character of these two Kirghiz tribes find expression in many details. The itinerant minstrels who wander from camp to camp of the Kara Kirghiz recite for the most part epic poems of heroic character, in which the glorious past and the great men of bygone days are praised. On the other hand the poetry of the Kirghiz Kasaks, who range the wide plains, consists mainly of romantic lays and love songs.

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In spite of these differences both are hardy nomad peoples, insensible to heat and cold, hunger and thirst. They have retained the Turco-Mongol type comparatively purely, and are of sturdy build. Their obliquely set eyes, high cheek-bones, and sparse growth of beard proclaim them as genuine Mongols. The well-known Mongolian spot (a blue blotch on the skin of the lower part of the back) has been observed in their children up to the age of two years.

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The Turkomans number about 700,000 in all, they roam the western part of the country between the Persian frontier and the Aral Sea. The finest types are found among the Tekke Turkomans, a group comprising

162 about 3,000 tents, and having its centre in the
• 619 oasis of Merv. To the South of them the Sa-
lors and Saryks extend their wanderings into
Afghan territory, whilst the Yomuds, the nor-
thermost of the Turkoman tribes, who num-
[181] ber about 4,800 tents, live in the vicinity of
Khiva. Anyone who has ever taken refuge in
a Turkoman tent during the heat of the day
knows how hospitable, frank, and trustwor-
thy the people are. They are of a decidedly
567 warlike character. Until after the middle of
579 the nineteenth century, when the Russians put
a stop to their activities, they were the most
redoubtable caravan robbers in all Turkestan,
and had, moreover, a pronounced bent towards
kidnapping and the slave trade. They extend-
ed their raids far into Persia, seizing what
prisoners they could. The wealthier of these
were released after the extortion of as large
a ransom as possible, the remainder being sold
into slavery. The extent of this traffic may be
gathered from the fact that when the Russians
conquered Khiva in 1864 they freed 40,000
slaves who had been seized by the Turkomans
and sold there.

144 The Turkomans are a tall, well-built, and
vigorous race with an abundant growth of
beard, large eyes, and brown, not yellow,
skin. The women, too, are tall and slender;
they are among the most beautiful in Asia.
The tribe is much farther removed from the
Mongol type than are the Kirghiz. The reason
for this may be that the Turkomans live so
close to the Iranian frontier, and that they
have for centuries been in close
contact with Iranian Tribes.

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in 178
nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under 162
Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement [474]
that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline 619
of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance 177
of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the 167
Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This 563
is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, 186
and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate 177
social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a 000
full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

369 At night in Sart Tashkent, as in all other towns of Turkestan in-
625 habited by natives, all social intercourse is at a standstill. The secret
361 police which is also retained under Russian rule for the native towns, has hit upon the practical arrangement of regarding as an evildoer and taking into custody everyone, without regard to person, who is found on
[365] the street after dark. This measure has in addition the important advantage of making any outlay of money for street lighting superfluous. Nocturnal peace is, however, in no way essentially furthered by this. For the numerous nightwatchmen produce such a terrible racket and uproar with their drumming and clappers, which they are officially required to use constantly as a proof of conscientious execution of duty, in combination with the uninterrupted yelping of countless stray dogs, which alone populate the streets at night waging pitched battles with each other, that a newcomer is unable for nights on end to get a wink of sleep, especially during warm weather when one is forced by the great heat to sleep outdoors or at least by an open window.

4. The Population of Sart Tashkent.

161 In spite of the considerable expanse of the town, which, including the gardens, has as great an area as Paris, the population figure for Sart Tashkent is only about 125,000. It is impossible to give a more accurate figure, for to penetrate into the families for the purpose of a regular census is rendered impossible by the Mohammedan prejudices of the inhabitants. The Russian administration has had to limit itself to establishing the number of courts which are permanently occupied by a family, and which are taken as the basic unit in the allotment of taxes. For each family, one usually reckons five individuals, which should be fairly close to the truth. /173/ /Figure 62, p. 20a. Caption: A view of Kuldja (from a photography by G. Merzbacher)./

162 /174/ Tashkent has the most mixed population of all the towns in Turkestan, which is only to be expected, considering the position of the town and its history, for all the Mongol tribal groups pouring out of Dzungaria into Turkestan had to go through the region of Tashkent in the course of time, and could press forward only by conquering this powerful town. As a result, Tashkent's original Indo-European inhabitants have been perpetually mixed with the people deposited by all the later migrations, and consequently one encounters all possible types among the people of Tashkent.

726 They had the same tactical value as the army of Darius did in its time in battle with the Macedonian phalanx of Alexander (Figure 68, p. 191; cf. also Figure 152). A former Kokand officer told me that in the struggles between Kokand and Bukhara the armies on both sides were sometimes over 100, 000 strong. The battles waged between these formidable hordes were relatively bloodless, however. After the first shots had been exchanged by both sides from the great distances, one of the contending parties always wheeled about /187/ /Figure 66. Caption: Bukharan infantry (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher). / /188/ and fled, although no one could fathom why just this side fled and not the other. /Footnote containing anecdote omitted. / It was therefore a fully rational act on the part of the Russians to rely upon their own forces in their wars in Central Asia, no matter how few in number and to refuse magnanimously the support, many times offered, of the Bukharan, Kazakh and other native auxiliary troops. /Original text cut out of translation from middle of p. 188 to p. 189, including two footnotes. / /Figure 67. Caption: Bukharan artillery (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher). /

625 For the maintenance of peace and order in the towns of Turkestan there is a special police force consisting of a police chief or /190/ kur-bashi, and a number of policemen or mirshabs. In spite of the primitive organization of the police and the complete absence of street lighting, safety is much greater in the towns of Turkestan inhabited by the natives than in the Russian towns, even though in the latter there are street lights, the police are organized in the European manner, and in addition safety is enforced by a countless horde of nightwatchmen. This is because of the summary and ruthless procedure of the secret police and because the peculiar arrangement described earlier by which all traffic on the streets is forbidden from evening until morning devotions, and everyone seen on the street after dark for whatever reason is arrested. Lovers of nightly adventures, thieves, and other malefactors are therefore in a difficult position. The carrying out of their evil intentions is made easier to some extent, however, in that the policemen and nightwatchmen are obliged to pass the whole night banging on tom-toms, drums and various wooden clappers at brief intervals, partly to frighten the evildoers, and partly to prove that they are at their posts and have not gone to sleep somewhere. For one can count on the honesty and the conscientiousness of the police and the nightwatchmen just as little as on the other people. Those who wander by night on forbidden errands can therefore usually orient themselves with considerable accuracy as to the momentary locations

of the organs of security, and take the necessary precautions accordingly. At the observatory in Tashkent which /191/ is surrounded by a high wall and which, in addition, has a special night watchman for every single building, there was the curious occurrence that while one of the night watchmen was energetically clapping away in discharge of his duty, his own dwelling, which was within the region he was watching, was completely sacked. 625

As representatives of the population of the towns and villages in regard to the government authorities, there are certain elders, chosen by the people themselves, who are designated as 'aksakals' or "greybeards" and play a role completely analogous to that of European mayors. Sart Tashkent divides into four districts or yurts, /Figure 68. Caption: Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral - Asien.) Through Central Asia/Leipzig, 1888, F. A. Brockhaus.)/ in which each nominates a special aksakal. These districts, which bear the names Shaikhantaur, Bish-Agach, Sibzor and Kukchi, subdivide further into a larger number of quarters or mahalas, each of which again has its own name. The district of Shaikhantaur, which includes the northeastern part of the town , is divided into forty-eight quarters; the district of Bish-Agach, the part of the town bordering on the Russian town has thirty-two quarters; the northwest part of the town constitutes the Sibzor district, with thirty-eight quarters, and the southwest part is the Kukchi district, with thirty-one quarters. Since its subjection to Russian authority, Tashkent constitutes /192/ administratively a separate part of the Syr-Darya province which includes in addition the districts of Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Amu-Darya, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, and the Kurama or rural district of Tashkent. Today Tashkent is under a Russian captain of the civil guard with the rank of colonel, for whom two assistants are appointed: one for the Russian part of the town, the other, appointed from the native population, for the Asiatic town. With regard to the inner organization of Sart Tashkent, the Russians have changed almost nothing. As before, the natives choose their aksakals and kazis /judges/ themselves, pay the same taxes as before, only on a noticeably diminished scale, and their police organizations also remain unchanged: There is only the limitation that Russians passing through the Sart town at night are not to be arrested. By this compromise the Russians derive a double advantage. In the first place the natives are flattered that no one has disputed their traditional arrangements; secondly the Russians are relieved of the expense of providing street lighting, police, courts of justice and the like; furthermore they have achieved a much greater

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XIV

DEVIATIONISM

If I climb up into heaven, thou art there;
If I go down to hell, thou art there also.
If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me,
Then shall my night be turned to day.

000 IN Stalinist jargon every word I have quoted here would be termed ideological distortion, deviationism, apoliticality, gross manifestation of bourgeois-nationalism calling for immediate correction by means of a radical ideological-creative reorientation. Babur would not have liked it, but that is how they talk; indeed, each phrase comes straight from the current press. We have seen how in the earlier days the Soviets resolved the contradiction between their national professions and their real objectives by evoking the rights of the proletariat as a higher force which must overcome the right of national self-determination. In effect, although they did not then so formulate it, their case at that time was that the loss of a nation's right to independence is no doubt an evil, but it is a lesser evil than the sacrifice of the rights of the workers. (Note that the fact that in Central Asia all the 'workers' were then Russian is immaterial to the doctrine as a first principle.) Since, as they say, continued independence would have involved the latter, the loss of independence, regrettable in theory, must follow. But in the first years, as the Kremlin saw it, it was expedient to accord lip-service to an abstract nationalism so far as to encourage a local literature and a press which should play up Central Asian resistance to the Tsarist conquest. At the time this could do no harm; it diverted national patriotisms to a past age, and it drew a possibly useful distinction between the Bolsheviks and the outmoded Russian Empire to which they had suc-

● 626 517 186

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

ceeded. National tradition therefore was lauded, national epics were unearthed and reduced to writing, and there was a period of studious academic research into the national achievements of the various parts of Turkistan. These early years were indeed in many respects favourable to the work of profound Russian scholars such as Barthold and Samoylovich. The temporary relaxation also served to encourage the emergence of a native intelligentsia ambitious to combine pride in their national past with the outlook of a Communist on the contemporary world. It was a fool's paradise.

In those early years this encouragement of what may be called a cultural nationalism was expressed by the now outdated 'School of Pokrovsky'. Pokrovsky was a well-known Russian historian who lived from 1868 to 1932, so flourishing in both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. Once esteemed by the Soviets as an evangelist, he is now discredited, and with him the edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[1] which borrowed his learning and announced his gospel. His historical theory was the simple one of regarding the annexation of any non-Russian territory by Tsarist Russia as an absolute evil, resistance to which on the part of a national-liberation movement was a progressive and even a revolutionary act. Pokrovsky in fact was the mouthpiece of the apparent liberalism which prompted the Declaration of November 1917 on the right of all nations to independence, and incidentally was useful for export. It was not long before this school of thought was found too productive of national pride. After some preliminary outpost actions of a probing nature, the Pokrovsky theory met with definite official attack in a Decree dated 27th August 1937, issued by the jury of the Government Commission for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR.[2] This Decree assailed Pokrovsky as the slave of a defective anti-Marxist convention, the author of a heresy which has become anathema. In the place of his theory it propounded a new first principle known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil, now an immaculate doctrine in the Soviet Creed.

[1] Bib. III, 10. See Vol. 45, Column 856.

[2] Bib. II, 11.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 626 The dogma of the Lesser Evil is briefly this. Oppressive though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil and oppressive than the alternative then open to non-Russian nationalities, namely, annexation by Turkey. (At this time the case of Armenia was chiefly in point.) And oppressive and evil though the Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led the annexed peoples away from Feudalism through Capitalism along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser evil than a continued independence. Thus this dogma was an extension backwards into Tsarist history of the sort of reasoning from first principles which enabled the Soviets by means of the Doctrine of the Proletariat to justify to their own minds the crushing in their time of the new nationalism that arose in the interregnum period. Both dogmas were shafts aimed at one target, the native nationalists who, if they believed in the dialectic of historical materialism, wished that it should develop within the framework of a national and not a Great Russian consciousness. The difference was that under the newest dogma — that of the Lesser Evil — it was no longer even respectable for a 'Colonial' nationalist to take pride in the prowess of his people even against the Tsarist conqueror. Great Russia in both her incarnations was henceforward to be regarded as unassailable, above criticism, the instrument by which the ultimate reality was inevitably to prevail.

The ground was prepared for the propagation of this doctrine in 1937, before World War II, at about the period of the greatest intensity of the purges. But other preoccupations, with the War itself, prevented active steps being taken for its enforcement until the post-War period. From 1945 onwards enforcement has taken the form of an all-out campaign against nationalism in any form. Such tendencies are compendiously described as bourgeois-nationalism, feudal survivalism or pan-Islamic pan-Turkic capitalist distortions or deviations, and are detected in every field of thought or cultural endeavour, social, literary and aesthetic. In their most secret thoughts all men, women and children must turn

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL I

to Moscow as their Mecca; language, literature and the arts must follow suit; the praise of past achievement is ruled out; and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said[1] that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct views on the history of their republic in relation to its association with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

[1] [see cat. 116, pp. 230-33 Bib. II, 2 -- An-ly st]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

expunged from syllabuses and text-books. The various 186
versions of the Uzbek *Alpamish* epic are as bad, and have not 538
been saved by their translation into Russian. They are not 626
people's epics but Khan's epics. When an Uzbek panegyrist praises them as symbols of all that is heroic and noble in the conceptions of the Uzbeks, he slanders the Uzbek working people by ascribing to them the desires and ideals of the Khans. As a folk-lore expert he should correct his views by reference to the teachings of the classics of Marxism/Leninism. Other objectionable poems are the so-called *Korkut Ata* or *Dede Korkut* epics. Certain Turkmen savants have been shameless enough to plagiarize what is in origin an epic of Azerbaijan. But that is not all. The epic itself is an idealization of the feudal system, conceals the class-struggle, and reveals a non-Marxist attitude to the heritage of the past. It is symbolic of the tendency of nationalism to retire within the confines of a national frontier, refusing to see that which binds the workers of all nationalities of the Soviet Union. The task is to strengthen the struggle against the smallest manifestations of bourgeois-nationalism, against glorification of an outdated culture, against every capitalist survival to be met with in the Asiatic parts of the Union. Yet Uzbeks, Kazaks and Turkmens persist in abstract praises of their 'motherlands'. One Turkmen even had the insolence to write a poem 'My Turkmenistan', and another a lyric entitled 'Thou Turkmen'. Both poems merely isolate the Turkmen artificially, representing only themselves as excelling in valour. It is their contribution to the great assemblage of Soviet peoples that must be stressed. No more bards with a religious-nationalistic ideology, praising Khans and priests, can be allowed.

In their place there has grown up an obsequious literature, best represented by the Kazak laureate Jambul (1846–1945). Like Saadi in one respect alone — he was almost a centenarian —, he has given his name, if only for a season, to the old town of Aulie Ata, near Chimkent. He is the author of poems extolling the Soviet high-priests and the banners of the Red

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

186 Army, which he sees as pointing the way into a world where
538 man can at last realize his destiny. Not for him the old,
626 unhappy, far-off things.

In Jambul's company this ideological war is then carried on to the ground of individual figures in history, and Kine Sari Khan the son of Kasim, the Kazak leader, comes in for special castigation. Historians are taken to task for publicizing in their works the reactionary-monarchist movement of 'K. Kasymov, the robber Khan'. Kine Sari was a reactionary and no defender of the people. Such defects can only be due to neglect of Bolshevik criticism in the literary circles of Kazakistan. Historians and students alike must turn over a new leaf and cease to idealize brigands such as Kine Sari, Abilay and Nauruzbai. Artists and writers do not seem to realize the immense political changes which have taken place as a result of the carrying-out of the Lenin/Stalin national policy, and frequently take delight in an old and outworn past. They must not describe backward individuals as typical representatives of contemporary Soviet life. They must forswear literature of a formalist and cosmopolitan colour; that way lies pan-Turkism, pan-Iranism and pan-Islamism.

186 Music and the arts do not escape. In Kazakistan musical
533 science is backward and on the wrong lines. The national
626 handbook of music is full of gross errors and idealizes a feudal past, regretting lost freedom. This is bourgeois-nationalism at its worst. Kazak musicians even dare to refer all musical achievement in the republic to the pre-revolutionary period, and to express such views publicly. In Uzbekistan the development of musical culture is far behind the economic, political and cultural growth of the republic — note the order — and does not meet the demands prescribed by the Party to the musical art, as a powerful means of Communist educa-
186 tion of the workers. The minds of sculptors are low; they
532 do not deal with the heroic labour of the people in the pro-
626 duction of oil and cotton. One artist presumed to say his pictures would be appreciated in ten years' time: an anticipation of the future is as bad as a delight in the past, for it

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL7

is the duty of Soviet man to glory in the achievements of contemporary life. 186 532 626

There is some unconscious humour. There is the outrageous instance of a worker who, though a member of an anti-God league, was found with his Comsomol ticket in one pocket and his religious charm in the other. Too few, we are told, are worried by the fact that there are not enough girls in Comsomols; a massed attack must be made on the girls in the collective farms and an ideological-creative spirit must be displayed by the youth. The Deputy Chairman has even been seen going to the cinema, while his wife, suppressed by his bourgeois-nationalist outlook, remains at home to mind the children. Stalin wants no more decadent verses with descriptions of heroes and their horses and cattle, no more delight in the beauties of nature, no more sob-stuff about roses, nightingales and lovely maidens—and certainly not erotic poetry—, no more pictures of aged greybeards who close their eyes to pray and waste time on the job. All these are foreign to the aesthetic tastes of the Soviet people. The heroic labour of miners, metal-workers, cotton-growers and engineers — these are the true themes for contemporary literature and the arts. And, chiefly, let all remember their big Russian brother, without thought to spare for a separate world and a tradition dead and gone. [538]

This picture is not overpainted; it can be seen in its full colours by any casual visitor to the Stalinist public gallery. It is not imaginary to suppose that this unrelenting effort is prompted by a certain unease. Here in Central Asia is an exposed flank, the source of raw materials vital to the survival of the Empire, the home of peoples whose memories of their own civilization make them probably the least assimilable of all elements in the Union. At any cost then, in this quarter above all, it is necessary to suppress every tendency towards a separate national consciousness. The question to be asked is this — how far has this unceasing stream of exhortation and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

771 of the Basmachis that they submit to the Soviets. The Basmachi Achil Beg, addressing them, said: 'Let us leave the Bolsheviks on one side for the moment, and also those who speak for them. Come, tell me, on your conscience, whether God will be pleased by your attitude or no?' Said the priests, 'Sir, you know that better than we do.' Whereupon Achil Beg cried with a loud voice, 'You fools! If it is I that know God's will, why preach you in the name of God? Have you no shame to come to us today preaching for the Russians? I would kill you all, but that you are old and foolish and soon will die. Go, and God's curse be with you!' And the Basmachis applauded.

The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkistan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the clergy's authority undermined. 'Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples' clergy.' In fact, Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.

771 626 Current evidence from Russian sources goes to support the conclusion. The contemporary press harps on the defects of Islam, the prejudices of the clergy and the identification of Muslim ideas with a feudal patriarchal framework. Other themes constantly expressed are indignation over loss of time due to religious observances or prayer; persistence of religious influences even among Party members, preference for the Koran over medical attention or drugs; even the stupid story of the Comsomol member with his charm.

The spear-head of the Soviet drive against the faith of Muhammad is supposed to be the Comsomol organizations. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazak Com-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kisghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipation of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

[1] It is not easy to recognize in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination *-oglu*, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

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to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

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Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

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* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[6]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
TURKESTAN RL1

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6]

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

S.U. 563 185 S.U. [871]

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

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* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the 643
following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one 558
of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made
a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask
if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that
he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result
immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost
the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated
by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game
that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his
property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's
abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there
was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread.

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always 643
treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat [669]
mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last
Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects
three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah,
who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in
constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers,
and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure
himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought direct-
ly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and
each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants
before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for
the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these
same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the
Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no
signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food
would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same
procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir.
Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to
leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for
the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in
his absence.

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khan- 631
ates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government
officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on
the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which
he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials

631 and the judges, and personally arbitrates the more important issues of dispute or crime. The administration of the towns belonging to the khanate is assigned by the khan to governors who bear the title of beg and who administer their district almost independently. the begs name the officials and judges in their regions according to their own good judgment, usually from among their relatives; they gather the taxes, and are only obliged to pay the khan a specified sum every year for their region; and in case of war to produce an army from their region those men capable of bearing arms. Thus in actuality, the khanate consists, of a loose conglomeration of small states, all of which are made up of a larger town and the surrounding villages.

This arrangement has its basis in the local conditions. In Turkestan the individual states do not consist of a cohesive area but of isolated oases, scattered often hundreds of kilometers apart over the endless sandy deserts and hunger steppes. As a result of the great distances, the difficulty of communication and the general insecurity in these sparsely populated regions, it is impossible to keep these faraway oases completely under control by one center. For this reason, it was necessary to arm the governors with great powers of authority for all eventualities, and to transfer to them all responsibility for their oases.

The position of the begs in the Central Asian khanates was formerly quite similar to that of the satraps in the ancient kingdom of Persia. Like the satraps, the begs frequently revolted against their lords, often successfully, and they carried on wars with their neighboring begs without paying any attention to their khan. Only very recently, as a result of Russian influence in the khanates which still survive, the power of the khan over his begs has increased so much that they have to a great extent lost their former independence and sunk to the level of mere officials. The example of the two towns of Shaar and Kitab has contributed especially to the accomplishment of this change in the relation of the beg to the khans. The begs of these towns had also for years revolted together against the Emir of Bukhara and maintained their independence against all attacks on the part of the Emir, but they were conquered at last by the Russians on behalf of the Emir, and taken prisoner and interned within Russian territory, and since then no beg thinks of revolting against his lord.

103 /178/ Because of the circumstances mentioned above, there are also no distinctive names of countries in Turkestan, and each state takes its name from the most important oasis of those belonging to one political unit. Thus Kokand was that state of which the oasis

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sion of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration, and ensured for Russians a dominating position in Turkistan not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers with the main stakes in their hand. In parts of Turkistan we shall even see that with the years the Russians ousted the native population and attained an actual numerical preponderance.

THE FIVE REPUBLICS

With this clue in hand it is time to take up the tale from the point when the Soviets, having destroyed the national governments of Kokand, Alash Orda and Bashkiria, and having come to grips with the Basmachis, were free to devote serious attention to the execution of a firm colonial policy. The picture will be clearer if we pass in quick review the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of the five Soviet republics in the Central Asia of today.

The Kremlin inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia four units—(i) the Stepnoi Krai or Steppe Territory, roughly coincident with the northern steppe (northern Kazakistan of today); (ii) the Turkistan province with the Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, covering most of Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe; (iii) and (iv) the quasi-independent States of Bukhara and Khiva. (i) and (ii) had been directly administered under the Tsars, (iii) and (iv), as we know, were left in internal matters to their own Khans and during the interregnum had been the chief seat of the Basmachi troubles. As soon as the able Red General, Frunze, was in a position to report that conquest was secure and resistance only sporadic, Stalin announced[1] a territorial division which did not at first break entirely new ground.

The directly administered Tsarist provinces of the Steppe Territory and Turkistan had already been included in the

[1] Stalin, speaking on 26th Dec. 1922 to All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *op. cit.* pp. 22[illegible].

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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RSFSR [1] as Autonomous Republics (ASSRs); thus they had not attained a nominally equal status with the RSFSR, under whose wing they remained. Khiva and Bukhara were now declared to be *Peoples* Soviet Republics, the word 'Socialist' being omitted for the reason given by Stalin himself that they were not socialist.

> But [he added] I do not doubt, comrades, and I hope you do not doubt also, that these republics, as they internally develop towards Socialism, will also form part of the confederate State which is now being constituted.

The grim irony behind the words is clear enough.

By 1924 the way had been prepared for a further rationalization of the constitution of the Central Asian provinces. In September of that year, Bukhara and Khiva took Stalin's hint and declared their adherence to Soviet Socialism, and steps were taken to redistribute the territories on what was described as the national principle. By May 1925 these two, together with most of the old Turkistan province, had become the two full constituent SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (Tajikistan was at that time given the rank of an ASSR within Uzbekistan). Thus the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. There was at least one Russian to regret it.

> Le Khorezm fut complètement éliminé comme état. . . . Jusqu'à quel point une telle mesure, qui s'inspirait du principe des nationalités, était-elle souhaitable? On peut en discuter . . . en ce qui concerne ses traditions historiques il restait un organisme visible et original, et l'anéantissement de cet organisme . . . n'aura peut-être pas été effectué sans conséquences.[2]

There remained a fringe of the old Turkistan province. By 1926 this had been united with the old Steppe Territory

[1] In what follows:

USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the whole Russian Empire.

RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic — *i.e.* Russia proper, much the largest of the 16 constituent SSRs which make up the USSR.

SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* one of the other 15 of the 16 constituent Republics, *e.g.* Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

ASSR = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* a territory with limited 'autonomy' within an SSR, *e.g.* Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistan.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. 642
Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR 631
within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is 131
now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice 631
of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

131 admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihila-
631 tion of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

131 Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these
312 administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like
[162] the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

642 631 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a centralizing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

4-Leix U-5 (no date)1941 R.1 Turkestan R.1



Merv in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

133 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

101 By comparison with this desert area West-
131 ern Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

[634]

		Families	Males	Females
361	Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162	non-residents	22	987	68
	Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
	non-residents		37	
	Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
	non-residents		122	29
	Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
	non-residents			
	Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
	non-residents		6	
	Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
	non-residents		18	
	Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	78
	non-residents		11	
	Hindus		93	
	Chinese			3
	Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 Russian or European Tashkent is directly
[312] next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by
a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the town is developing very quickly.

[231] /411/ All the okrug administration
as well as the oblast' administration for the
• Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent,

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance.

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm.

The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.[1] (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL-1

India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Government of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 631 563 T. 631 563

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. 517 814 177 S.U. 563 658

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL1

SU 135 SCA 135

from the Caspian Sea (at Nebit-Dag), to the Fergana Valley and the lower Surkhan Darya, an affluent of the Amu Darya. Much importance is attached to the salt deposits in the Caspian gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. This inlet, acting as a natural evaporating basin for the water of the Caspian Sea, has large deposits of Glauber salt (mirabilite). Sulphur deposits are found here to a greater extent than in any other part of the USSR, mainly in the center of the desert Kara-Kum, at Gaurdak, near the Amu Darya, and in the Fergana Valley. The ranges which surround this valley abound in nonferrous and rare metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, mercury, and antimony. In the highlands of the Pamir, Iceland spar (a variety of calcite), precious stones, and gold are being mined at the present time. The combination of coal and iron deposits in and near the Fergana Valley have permitted the development of heavy industry.

SU 162 SCA 162

The population of Soviet Central Asia amounts to 10.4 million people, with an average density of 22 per square mile. While in the desert area the average density falls as low as a few people per 100 square miles, the fertile and well-irrigated oases have a population density of about 1,000–1,500 per square mile, the highest rural population concentration in the USSR. The basic elements of the population belong to the Turkic and Iranian groups. The former, by far the more numerous, includes Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks, while the latter takes in the Tadzhiks, the remaining members of an ancient nationality of Central Asia, who speak a language akin to Iranian. The Uzbeks number more than one half the total population, besides Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Turkmen. Russians (above 6 percent), Bukhara Jews, Chinese Dungans, and others make up the remainder of this colorful ethnic mélange.

SU 631 SCA 631

Until 1924 Soviet Central Asia was divided politically into the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (formed in 1922) and the Bukhara and the Khorezm Soviet People's republics (formed in 1920). Late in 1924 a reorganization of these territories and a redemarcation of boundaries along essentially ethnic lines led to the establishment of the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR), and the Kara-Kirghiz (later Kirghiz) Autonomous SSR, which became part of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 and 1936, respectively, the Tadzhik and Kirghiz Autonomous SSR became full union republics.

SU 241 SCA 241

Agricultural activities play the leading role in the economy of Central Asia. Depending upon the land form and the development of irrigation, the following branches of agriculture can be distinguished: (1) ir-

of the organs of security, and take the necessary precautions accordingly. At the observatory in Tashkent which /191/ is surrounded by a high wall and which, in addition, has a special night watchman for every single building, there was the curious occurrence that while one of the night watchmen was energetically clapping away in discharge of his duty, his own dwelling, which was within the region he was watching, was completely sacked. 625

As representatives of the population of the towns and villages in regard to the government authorities, there are certain elders, chosen by the people themselves, who are designated as 'aksakals' or "greybeards" and play a role completely analogous to that of European mayors. Sart Tashkent divides into four districts or yurts, /Figure 68. Caption: Central Asiatic weapons. (From H. Moser, Durch Zentral - Asien.) /Through Central Asia/Leipzig, 1888, F. A. Brockhaus.)/ in which each nominates a special aksakal. These districts, which bear the names Shaikhantaur, Bish-Agach, Sibzor and Kukchi, subdivide further into a larger number of quarters or mahalas, each of which again has its own name. The district of Shaikhantaur, which includes the northeastern part of the town , is divided into forty-eight quarters; the district of Bish-Agach, the part of the town bordering on the Russian town has thirty-two quarters; the northwest part of the town constitutes the Sibzor district, with thirty-eight quarters, and the southwest part is the Kukchi district, with thirty-one quarters. Since its subjection to Russian authority, Tashkent constitutes /192/ administratively a separate part of the Syr-Darya province which includes in addition the districts of Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Amu-Darya, Auliye-Ata, Chimkent, and the Kurama or rural district of Tashkent. Today Tashkent is under a Russian captain of the civil guard with the rank of colonel, for whom two assistants are appointed: one for the Russian part of the town, the other, appointed from the native population, for the Asiatic town. With regard to the inner organization of Sart Tashkent, the Russians have changed almost nothing. As before, the natives choose their aksakals and kazis /judges/ themselves, pay the same taxes as before, only on a noticeably diminished scale, and their police organizations also remain unchanged: There is only the limitation that Russians passing through the Sart town at night are not to be arrested. By this compromise the Russians derive a double advantage. In the first place the natives are flattered that no one has disputed their traditional arrangements; secondly the Russians are relieved of the expense of providing street lighting, police, courts of justice and the like; furthermore they have achieved a much greater

632 A33a 632 361

632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

8:Kostenko 115-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Tashkent, like all important Central Asian towns, used to be surrounded by a high crenelated wall, to which there were 12 gates (darvaza). The wall had a rounded form and extended over an area of 20 versts. The gates bore the names of the towns toward which they opened. Today, the part of the town wall on the side of the Russian town has been completely demolished and the moat filled up. The gates on this side were also destroyed. On the other sides, although they still exist, they are no longer closed.

361 632 Administratively, Tashkent is divided into four parts (yurts) which were formerly under the administration of special officials called ming-bashi. These districts are: Shaikhantaur, Sibzor, Kukchi and Bish-Agach.

361 312 The Shaikhantaur district constitutes the northeastern part of the town. Situated in a flat locality, it is divided almost in half by a deep ravine, through which the Ankhor flows, a wide and swift aryk. The other main aryk flowing through this part of the town, called Gadragan, enters the Russian town not far from the beginning of Tash-Kuche street, and provides it with water, flowing out in
361 small aryks. The Shaikhantaur district has 48 'mahalas' (wards), which are: Tadzhik, /406/ Kashgar, five Yangi-shakhars, Sellim-mechet, Illya, Kiot, Keriady, Tash-kucha, Mir-gancha, Okhche, Zandzhilik, two Kator-turas, Tyurk, Igerchi, Ol'mazar, Doom-begi, Kurgan-araksy, Balyan-mechet, Goukush, Shur-tepe, Degriot, Khadrya, Khouz-bok, Dzhangokh, Khish-mechet, Khodzharush-noye, two Okh-mechets, Darkhon, Padar-kush, Kuduk-bashi, Badak, Shatak,

8:Kostenko 132-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

The town of Vernyy (Alma Ata)

361 After the Russian occupation of the
632 Trans-Ili region in 1853, the fortress town of Vernoe (Alma Ata) was established in the following year, 1854, with the aim of consolidating the Russian domination of the Great Horde. It was founded on the spot where the town of Almata, which means 'apple', had been, a town known for its trade and as a station on the great road to China in the Middle Ages frequented, among others, by the Genoese merchants.

At first the fortress town of Vernoe was the administrative center for the Alatau okrug, subordinate to the military governor of the Semipalatinsk oblast'. After the establishment of the Turkestan military okrug, however, the fortress was made the capital town of the Semirechie oblast' and began to be called Vernyy. The natives and many Russians call Vernyy "Almata", as it was formerly called.

361 /418/ Vernyy lies on even sandy clay place, just at the foot of the Trans-Ili Alatau mountains, along the small Almatinka river.

133 The Almatinka has its source in an unusually picteresque spot in the mountains, and flows very swiftly, roaring and foaming along its course which is sprinkled with large rocks in many spots. After it emerges from the mountains it retains its swiftness and the special quality of the river bottom even though flowing through level country.

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II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzat-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of
554 their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stableboy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consier it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of firty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

634 The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

of the khan's court. The most important man at the court of a beg is always the Divan-Begi, who functions as the deputy of the beg in his absence and in addition looks after most of the duties of the beg. For the begs, who are mostly Uzbeks recruited from among the relatives and favorites of the khan, are usually people with no accomplishments and no scholarly training, and they govern their districts more or less in the same way as Sancho Panza, in his time, thought to "govern" his island. In those begdoms which cover an extensive area, particularly in the sparsely populated mountain regions, the beg appoints separate chiefs for the individual outpost towns and villages subject to him. /181/ These are usually chosen from among his relatives, are responsible only to him, and hold the title of 'amlakdar'. 634

The beg's administration is limited primarily to adjudications and the collection of taxes. The ordinary matters of dispute are adjusted by the kazis, who are named by the begs. More important cases as well as criminal matters are decided by the beg himself or by his Divan-Begi.

/Figure 64. Caption: Begs of Khiva (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher). /

The following taxes were exacted in the Khanate of Kokand before the Russian rule: 651

1. Haradj or field tax; this was collected 'in natura'.
2. Tanapna, a tribute in gold from the fruit and vegetable gardens
3. Syaket, a commercial tax, levied from the wares or cattle sold at the bazaar.
4. A bazaar tax, for the right to trade at the bazaar.
5. A weight tax, a tribute which the lessees of the public scales had to pay.
6. A salt tax.

/182/ There is a particular manner in Turkestan in which the begs must deliver their tribute to the khan. It must not be in gold, but in the form of gifts. In Bukhara, for example, the following behavior is observed. Twice a year, in spring and in fall, all the begs, with suites corresponding to their ranks, must be at the residence of the court of the emir and bring him gifts, the kind and number of which are prescribed exactly by the court ceremony, but their worth must correspond to the revenues of the district. These gifts consist of 651 635

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l: von Schwarz--27a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Bl.1 Turkestan Bl.1

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Fig.: Begs of Khiva (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

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the following objects:

1. Eighty-six horses, with saddle-cloths of silk and velvet, embroidered of gold and silver, and harnesses with turquoises and other semi-precious stones, mounted in silver.
2. The same number of 'khalats' or festive clothing of which a specified number must be of cashmere, of gold brocade, of velvet, of satin, of woolen cloth, of silk and of silk mixed with cotton.
3. A number of pieces of unworked silk.
4. A number of belts inlaid with turquoises.
5. A specific sum of money, in gold and silver coins.

Upon their arrival at the court, as well as upon their departure, however, the begs also receive gifts from the emir in return, which likewise consist of gold, silk materials, belts, festive clothing, and horses in splendid array, and the value and number of these gifts are calculated on the basis of the rank of the recipient as well as on the amount of goodwillof the emir.

In addition to these regular payments, whenever the emir happens to ride through or remain briefly in their districts, the begs must maintain his entire suite and the army which always accompanies him for the whole period of his stay, and offer him as well as his court officials the customary gifts upon his arrival and likewise upon his departure. The emir of Bukhara always passes the whole summer with his entire court and his bodyguard in the three towns of Karshi, Shaar and Kitab, and lives all this time at the expense of the respective beg, at the same time reckoning the length of his stay in each of the three towns exactly according to their wealth and capacity. The emir undertakes these migrations partly for his health, for it is not healthy to live in Bukhara during the hot weather, because of the lack of water. But he also travels in order to relieve his capital, which, must support him during the winter months. Before the Russian conquest of Samarkand it had been the summer residence of the emir. It is known that a perfectly parallel relationship existed in the ancient kingdom of Persia between the king and the satraps. Hence it follows that the present /183/ situation prevailing in Turkestan was not introduced by the Mongolian Uzbeks, but has its derivation earlier, from the times of the ancient Bactrians and Sogdians, or from the earliest Indo-European times, when Turkestan was still populated

only by Indo-Europeans. 651 635

In the towns where the standing garrisons of troops for the khan were lodged, the respective beg likewise had to support them.

The above-mentioned biannual trips to the court of the emir or khan are the only dark sides in the otherwise enviable existence of the begs. For no beg knows when he sets out whether he will see his town 635 and his family again. Since his entire power and existence is depend- 662 ent upon the often-changing mood of the khan, which in turn depends on the insinuations of his favorites, such a favorite need only to say a word to depose the most powerful beg. Thus the situation in the courts of the Central Asian khans are exactly the same as those so truly and clearly described in the Bible in the story of David, and in the Book of Esther. During my first trip to Hissar in 1875, we found in the village of Derbent no preparations for our reception. It later turned out that this happened because the Beg of Baysun, to whose district Derbent belonged, had not received the necessary communication in time because he was away on a trip. When the court official who had been attached to our party by the emir as a courier imparted this to the emir by letter, the latter became irritated at the beg in question, whereupon one of the court officials used this favorable opportunity in order to procure the post of the beg for one of his relatives: he informed the emir that the Beg of Baysun was really a bad fellow, for among the gifts which he had presented to the emir a torn khalat had been found. This infuriated the emir to such an extent, that without examining the matter further, or giving the probably innocent accused the opportunity to defend himself, he relieved the beg of his position and was irresolute for several days as to whether he should have him hung as well. The begs are thereby forced to send rich gifts to the court officials and favorites of the khan constantly, and to this end they must milk their subjects dry so as to have a spokesman near the khan in case of need. Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that when a khan dies, there is always a general upheaval in the whole administration. During my last official journey in 1886, I found completely new faces in offices and posts of honor everywhere in Bukhara, with the sole exception of the positions held by the brothers of the emir. All the begs from the time of the Emir Muzafar al-Din who had died only shortly before, had /184/ disappeared without trace, along with their numerous officials and favorites. Some

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
● 635 had been executed.

Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
652 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported
662 by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time . In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruited from all possible people and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

1 von Schwarz 21 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad/ and Fergana , and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorperated into Russia. 642

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1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar [641] 643 554

632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

8: Kostenko--17 G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 Kl.1 Turkestan Kl-1

161 If the percent of natural increase in the Turkestan region is not high, we will see something quite different if we examine the population increase which results from other causes. The annexation of new lands and the colonization of the region both by the Russians and by natives coming in from neighboring territories, has increased the population figure for the area threefold.

The table on the following page shows the population change in the region for the eleven years from 1867 through 1877.

/336/ From this table it is found that:

1) In general, the density of the population of the region almost tripled.

162 2) The newly occupied territories not only increased the actual population of the region by almost 60%, but what is more essential, with their annexation to the area, the earlier proportion of sedentary to nomadic population was changed favorably and decisively. The nomads, who constituted between 1867 and 1869 around 70 to 80% of the total population of the region, by 1876 had already lost the numerical superiority to the sedentary population. In 1877 the sedentary group numbered over 200,000 more than the nomads, and represented up to 53% of the total population.

3) The sedentary population in the region increases much faster than the nomadic population.

I I

The significance of the local population in relation to the composition of the military district.

GH 702 The native population of the Turkestan area is excused from the obligation of military recruitment. It is difficult to say whether this gift

641 of grace will continue long. It would seem
702 that in the name of justice, the sooner these people participate in recruit duties the better. Entering into the body of the empire, being made members of the broad Russian family, enjoying the same rights, the population of Turkestan should also bear the same burdens. Unfortunately, in regard to recruitment, these newly annexed provinces are still in a special and unusual posi-
703 tion. The natives are not yet accustomed to Russian procedures, have not yet succeeded in acclimatizing themselves to Russian rule and to the demands of reasonable discipline. For them military service would be too sharp a transition from the kind of life they know, and there is no doubt that the new recruits would turn into /337/ very bad soldiers. The proximity of independent Central Asian khanates would contribute very much to desertions by our native soldiers. After our occupation of the Turkestan region desertions from the service by our soldiers occurred mostly among the lower ranks, among men of Tatar origin. They took refuge in countries related to them in religion, and found more attractive careers than in the Russian military service. This state of affairs led the administration of the Turkestan area to advocate not using Tatars in the lower ranks of the service in that region.

000 Thus, if the Volga Moslems have shown themselves unsuitable for Russian service in Turkestan, it is useless even to speak of the natives, who are even less consolidated with the

J von Schwarz21 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sion of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration, and ensured for Russians a dominating position in Turkistan not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers with the main stakes in their hand. In parts of Turkistan we shall even see that with the years the Russians ousted the native population and attained an actual numerical preponderance.

THE FIVE REPUBLICS

With this clue in hand it is time to take up the tale from the point when the Soviets, having destroyed the national governments of Kokand, Alash Orda and Bashkiria, and having come to grips with the Basmachis, were free to devote serious attention to the execution of a firm colonial policy. The picture will be clearer if we pass in quick review the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of the five Soviet republics in the Central Asia of today.

The Kremlin inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia four units—(i) the Stepnoi Krai or Steppe Territory, roughly coincident with the northern steppe (northern Kazakistan of today); (ii) the Turkistan province with the Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, covering most of Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe; (iii) and (iv) the quasi-independent States of Bukhara and Khiva. (i) and (ii) had been directly administered under the Tsars, (iii) and (iv), as we know, were left in internal matters to their own Khans and during the interregnum had been the chief seat of the Basmachi troubles. As soon as the able Red General, Frunze, was in a position to report that conquest was secure and resistance only sporadic, Stalin announced[1] a territorial division which did not at first break entirely new ground.

The directly administered Tsarist provinces of the Steppe Territory and Turkistan had already been included in the

[1] Stalin, speaking on 26th Dec. 1922 to All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *op. cit.* pp. [illegible].

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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RSFSR[1] as Autonomous Republics (ASSRs); thus they had not attained a nominally equal status with the RSFSR, under whose wing they remained. Khiva and Bukhara were now declared to be *Peoples* Soviet Republics, the word 'Socialist' being omitted for the reason given by Stalin himself that they were not socialist.

> But [he added] I do not doubt, comrades, and I hope you do not doubt also, that these republics, as they internally develop towards Socialism, will also form part of the confederate State which is now being constituted.

The grim irony behind the words is clear enough.

By 1924 the way had been prepared for a further rationalization of the constitution of the Central Asian provinces. In September of that year, Bukhara and Khiva took Stalin's hint and declared their adherence to Soviet Socialism, and steps were taken to redistribute the territories on what was described as the national principle. By May 1925 these two, together with most of the old Turkistan province, had become the two full constituent SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (Tajikistan was at that time given the rank of an ASSR within Uzbekistan). Thus the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. There was at least one Russian to regret it.

> Le Khorezm fut complètement éliminé comme état. . . . Jusqu'à quel point une telle mesure, qui s'inspirait du principe des nationalités, était-elle souhaitable? On peut en discuter . . . en ce qui concerne ses traditions historiques il restait un organisme visible et original, et l'anéantissement de cet organisme . . . n'aura peut-être pas été effectué sans conséquences.[2]

There remained a fringe of the old Turkistan province. By 1926 this had been united with the old Steppe Territory

[1] In what follows:

USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the whole Russian Empire.

RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic — *i.e.* Russia proper, much the largest of the 16 constituent SSRs which make up the USSR.

SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* one of the other 15 of the 16 constituent Republics, *e.g.* Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

ASSR = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* a territory with limited 'autonomy' within an SSR, *e.g.* Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistan.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. 642
Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR 631
within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is 131
now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice 631
of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

● 642 631 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a centralizing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL2

THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance.

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm.

The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.[1] (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia.

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad/ and Fergana , and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorporated into Russia. 642

The political and social arrangements were the same in all the Uzbek khanates. (1) The ruling classes were formed by the Uzbeks, 565 554

1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar [641] 643 554

643 again or even have him executed for no reason at all. Most of the
554 influential figures and high dignitaries at the courts of the khans make many changes in the course of their careers as a result of this and moreover even the khans themselves are not always immune. The former envoy of Kokand, Mirza Hakim, who for the betrayal of his fatherland and his Khan later received the title of a Russian state councillor, had earlier been a shopkeeper. The Khan of Khiva, Kulman, was promoted to this position as a result of a conspiracy of day laborers. The former ruler of Kashgar, Yakub Beg, rose from the dregs of the population, having been in his youth a 'batsha', or 'public dancer.' The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, after his first dethronement in Dzhizak, established himself as a shopkeeper, and acquired such a fancy for business that he continued with it after he regained the throne, and declared a large part of the booths of the bazaar of Kokand to be his property. Indeed he did not consider it beneath his dignity to keep bands of musicians, as well as leaders of bears and monkeys, which he ordered led about the fairs on his account, and had them give concerts in private houses, uninvited.

565 Since the post of honor of the father, the bestowal of which unfortunately depended upon the whim of the ruler, was only rarely passed on to his son, the children of high-placed officials often enjoyed no more education than the children of ordinary townsmen and ran around with them barefoot and half-naked in the streets. During my stay of several weeks in Baysun in 1886, where I was the guest of the beg or governor there, the sons of the beg came to my court every day to consume the leftovers of my dinner in the company of my servants and cossacks. To see a former beg or court official or his sons working as dealers in old clothes, carters or even day laborers is not at all unusual.

1043 One can see from the following case how uncertain and in-
558 constant the favor of a khan is. During my first trip to Bukhara, a Bukharan who ranked as the best chess-player was staying with the former Emir of Bukhara, Muzafar al-Din, a chess-player who was as passionate a player as he was mediocre. The chess-player was held in great esteem and was overwhelmed by the Emir with /176/ honors and riches. Upon a later visit I met this favorite in a group of ragged vagabonds who were pushing their way into our quarter with the hope of obtaining some of the tidbits from our table which are usually found when guests are being entertained. When I inquired

as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread. 643 558

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah, who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers, and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought directly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two other officials and each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir. Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in his absence. 643 [669]

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khanates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials 631

Kokand was the most important one, and therefore the khan had his seat there. Bukhara has its name from Bukhara, the capital town, and Khiva has its name from the town of Khiva. The name Turkestan itself was originally only a town name, and has been adopted from the unimportant town of Turkestan for the whole area of Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Turkic peoples. (1) 103

1. Present-day Siberia has acquired its name in just the same way, for the Russians transferred the name of the capital town of the Siberian Tatars, Sibir, to the land which was then probably without a name.

The names Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, as names of states, as well as the regional name of Turkestan, are used, it must be emphasized, only by the Europeans; the natives of Turkestan even today mean by these terms only the respective towns.

The same situation arose already in ancient times, for the same reasons, for the chronicler of the campaigns of Alexander used the town names of Baktra and Sogdiana in like manner to designate the respective regions, a circumstance which led to many errors later regarding the geography of antiquity. (cf. my monograph, 'Alexanders des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan' /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great/, Munich, 1893).

As far as the court of the Central Asian khan is concerned, it likewise was organized in all the khanates in a completely similar fashion. The court household of the Khan of Kokand, similar to the ones in Bukhara (Figure 63) and Khiva as they still exist, is made up of the following dignitaries: 644 p. 26a

I. Court Officials

1. Kush Begi or 'Grand Falconer', who represents the Khan when he is absent from the capital.
2. Divan-Begi or Chancellor.
3. Taksaba or Cupbearer.
4. Mirakhur or Equerry.
5. Karaul-Begi or Chief of the Bodyguard.
6. Mirza-Bashi or Chief Scribe.

II. Military Officers

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II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzat-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of
554 their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stableboy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consier it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of firty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

634 The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

l: von Schwarz--264 N-5 (ca 1885) 1900 Ill Turkestan Ill

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

Fig. 4. The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLI Turkestan RLI

177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

of the khan's court. The most important man at the court of a beg is always the Divan-Begi, who functions as the deputy of the beg in his absence and in addition looks after most of the duties of the beg. For the begs, who are mostly Uzbeks recruited from among the relatives and favorites of the khan, are usually people with no accomplishments and no scholarly training, and they govern their districts more or less in the same way as Sancho Panza, in his time, thought to "govern" his island. In those begdoms which cover an extensive area, particularly in the sparsely populated mountain regions, the beg appoints separate chiefs for the individual outpost towns and villages subject to him. /181/ These are usually chosen from among his relatives, are responsible only to him, and hold the title of 'amlakdar'. 634

The beg's administration is limited primarily to adjudications and the collection of taxes. The ordinary matters of dispute are adjusted by the kazis, who are named by the begs. More important cases as well as criminal matters are decided by the beg himself or by his Divan-Begi.

/Figure 64. Caption: Begs of Khiva (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher). /

The following taxes were exacted in the Khanate of Kokand before the Russian rule: 651 ●

1. Haradj or field tax; this was collected 'in natura'.
2. Tanapna, a tribute in gold from the fruit and vegetable gardens
3. Syaket, a commercial tax, levied from the wares or cattle sold at the bazaar.
4. A bazaar tax, for the right to trade at the bazaar.
5. A weight tax, a tribute which the lessees of the public scales had to pay.
6. A salt tax.

/182/ There is a particular manner in Turkestan in which the begs must deliver their tribute to the khan. It must not be in gold, but in the form of gifts. In Bukhara, for example, the following behavior is observed. Twice a year, in spring and in fall, all the begs, with suites corresponding to their ranks, must be at the residence of the court of the emir and bring him gifts, the kind and number of which are prescribed exactly by the court ceremony, but their worth must correspond to the revenues of the district. These gifts consist of 651 635

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the following objects:

1. Eighty-six horses, with saddle-cloths of silk and velvet, embroidered of gold and silver, and harnesses with turquoises and other semi-precious stones, mounted in silver.
2. The same number of 'khalats' or festive clothing of which a specified number must be of cashmere, of gold brocade, of velvet, of satin, of woolen cloth, of silk and of silk mixed with cotton.
3. A number of pieces of unworked silk.
4. A number of belts inlaid with turquoises.
5. A specific sum of money, in gold and silver coins.

Upon their arrival at the court, as well as upon their departure, however, the begs also receive gifts from the emir in return, which likewise consist of gold, silk materials, belts, festive clothing, and horses in splendid array, and the value and number of these gifts are calculated on the basis of the rank of the recipient as well as on the amount of goodwillof the emir.

In addition to these regular payments, whenever the emir happens to ride through or remain briefly in their districts, the begs must maintain his entire suite and the army which always accompanies him for the whole period of his stay, and offer him as well as his court officials the customary gifts upon his arrival and likewise upon his departure. The emir of Bukhara always passes the whole summer with his entire court and his bodyguard in the three towns of Karshi, Shaar and Kitab, and lives all this time at the expense of the respective beg, at the same time reckoning the length of his stay in each of the three towns exactly according to their wealth and capacity. The emir undertakes these migrations partly for his health, for it is not healthy to live in Bukhara during the hot weather, because of the lack of water. But he also travels in order to relieve his capital, which, must support him during the winter months. Before the Russian conquest of Samarkand it had been the summer residence of the emir. It is known that a perfectly parallel relationship existed in the ancient kingdom of Persia between the king and the satraps. Hence it follows that the present /183/ situation prevailing in Turkestan was not introduced by the Mongolian Uzbeks, but has its derivation earlier, from the times of the ancient Bactrians and Sogdians, or from the earliest Indo-European times, when Turkestan was still populated

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only by Indo-Europeans.

In the towns where the standing garrisons of troops for the khan were lodged, the respective beg likewise had to support them.

The above-mentioned biannual trips to the court of the emir or khan are the only dark sides in the otherwise enviable existence of the begs. For no beg knows when he sets out whether he will see his town 635
and his family again. Since his entire power and existence is depend- 662
ent upon the often-changing mood of the khan, which in turn depends on the insinuations of his favorites, such a favorite need only to say a word to depose the most powerful beg. Thus the situation in the courts of the Central Asian khans are exactly the same as those so truly and clearly described in the Bible in the story of David, and in the Book of Esther. During my first trip to Hissar in 1875, we found in the village of Derbent no preparations for our reception. It later turned out that this happened because the Beg of Baysun, to whose district Derbent belonged, had not received the necessary communication in time because he was away on a trip. When the court official who had been attached to our party by the emir as a courier imparted this to the emir by letter, the latter became irritated at the beg in question, whereupon one of the court officials used this favorable opportunity in order to procure the post of the beg for one of his relatives: he informed the emir that the Beg of Baysun was really a bad fellow, for among the gifts which he had presented to the emir a torn khalat had been found. This infuriated the emir to such an extent, that without examining the matter further, or giving the probably innocent accused the opportunity to defend himself, he relieved the beg of his position, and was irresolute for several days as to whether he should have him hung as well. The begs are thereby forced to send rich gifts to the court officials and favorites of the khan constantly, and to this end they must milk their subjects dry so as to have a spokesman near the khan in case of need. Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that when a khan dies, there is always a general upheaval in the whole administration. During my last official journey in 1886 I found completely new faces in offices and posts of honor everywhere in Bukhara, with the sole exception of the positions held by the brothers of the emir. All the begs from the time of the Emir Muzafar al-Din who had died only shortly before, had /184/ disappeared without trace, along with their numerous officials and favorites. Some

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

652 Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
662 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time. In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruited from all possible people and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

241 water the lands where there existed traces of former irrigation,
312 as, for instance, the disused canal system of Gavkhore on the right bank of the Amu Darya opposite Khorezm? But no: Barthold was a mere professor, who had made for himself a picture of the country from 'Sart' sources. The Russian engineers were convinced of their wisdom, and money was devoted to schemes which, far from turning the land into a garden, in a few years led to water-logging, no measures having been taken to prevent the land turning into a morass, a home of reeds and waterfowl and a source of malaria.

In September 1922 [says Togan], I passed by the lower side of the canals in Mirza Chöl, and a Kazak showed me how the poplars planted by the Russians were drying up, and the surface of the land, cultivated a few years before with care and trouble, was now covered with saltpetre.[1]

•653 The Tsarist irrigation engineers seem to have had little
312 conception of the dangers of water-logging and saltpetre which arise in a flat riverain country under a tropical sun, when water is brought to it and the fall is insufficient for natural drainage. The remedy lies in the provision of artificial drainage by digging channels to lower the watertable, but this is not always easy and it is very expensive. Even in their weirs and dams the Russian engineers set their bricks much too loosely, as compared with the old brick walls of indigenous canals, which had held for centuries. An effort by the Grand Duke Nicholas at the end of the XIXth century to construct a perennial irrigation system on the Amu Darya in Khorezm resulted only in cutting across and destroying the old indigenous inundation channels. The project was conceived as one in line with British irrigation works in the Panjab and in Egypt, but it is evident that the Russian engineers of that time had much to learn both as regards original canal construction and the remodelling of old works.

The Soviets have given great attention to irrigation works in Central Asia, and have certainly profited from the mistakes of their predecessors. Although in this case also it is hard to

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 295.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

disentangle achievement from expansive visions existing only 653
in the planner's mind, there is no doubt that in Farghana, in 312
the Chu–Talash area, and also on the Zarafshan and the Vakhsh, much good work has been brought to a conclusion. The best-known completed works are:

(*a*) The Stalin Great Farghana Canal, 270 km. long.
(*b*) The Mikoyan, or Northern Farghana, Canal, 165 km. long.
(*c*) The Andreev, or Southern Farghana, Canal, 108 km. long.
(*d*) The Katta Kurgan and Verkhno-Bukhara Reservoirs on the Zarafshan.
(*e*) The Great Chu Canal, 270 km. long.
(*f*) The Vakhsh Canal.

The construction of the first was widely advertised, with due 653
praise allotted to the 160,000 *Kolkhoz* members who dug it 312
out, and completed it in forty-five days. The availability of 464
corvée labour of this kind, which can be used in the off-season for irrigation work, must greatly aid the authorities in their task, not only on construction but on maintenance and silt-clearance. The official case is that a considerable percentage of all *Kolkhoz* workers in canal areas is used for such duties, and the labourers while absent from their homes receive their fair share of *Kolkhoz* produce. That may work in the rich and smiling Farghana Valley. But how is the case with those transported to dig in the wastes of the deserts? The logistical effort alone needed to feed armies of workers in the Karakum must be colossal.

It has been suggested that construction of the Stalin-Farghana Canal called out nearly one million labourers and that there was suffering on a large scale. Yet, in the face of all criticism, there remains an impression that this in itself was a great work, which has added much to the fertility of an already productive region. Systems of government change, but an irrigation work remains.

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander 653
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2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Since the war there has been planning on a far grander
653 scale. The first two schemes which follow may be called
312 'local' in the sense that, in appearance at least, they are not
185 part of a continental linked project dealing in the waters of more than one river. These two projects are:

(i) *The Karakum Canal*

The project was an old one, but it was revived in 1945, and ratified in 1947. The main channel is to be some 350 miles long and to irrigate nearly half a million acres. The head-works were to be somewhere near Kerki on the Oxus left bank, and the main objective is to increase the cultivated area watered by the Murghab and Tejen rivers in the Merv and Serakhs oases. Work was stated to have been started in 1949.

A work of this kind, skirting the Kopet Dagh line of mountains which forms the Persian frontier, must cross the natural drainage lines of the country, and involve heavy bridging or siphoning and much danger of being breached by floods, to say nothing of being choked by sand-drifts. Without any local knowledge it is possible to affirm that this canal must take time to construct and will be expensive to maintain. Confidence in the Soviet engineers is not increased by loose talk that the canal will be used for shipping. Navigation and irrigation are ill partners.

(ii) *The Uzbek, or Upper Oxus, Canal*

This project was planned by the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in May 1947. It is a very large scheme for a canal 500 miles long to supplement the irrigation at the tail of the Kashka Darya and the Zarafshan systems — among the best cotton-lands in Central Asia — by water from the Oxus. The project was described at some length by a spokesman of the Central USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The plan envisages the construction of a headworks at Kelif on the Oxus right bank, where the river finally emerges from the hills into the plain. At this point the right bank rests on a spur of the Hissar Range, a rocky eminence which canalizes the channel

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

and prevents it from shifting as it is always doing in its course 653
through the plains lower down. On the face of it then the 185
site is well chosen for the headworks of a perennial canal. 312
At this point a dam described as 6 km. long and 20 metres high was to be constructed. For the next 100 km. the main canal would run along the skirt of the Hissar Range, passing on its way a point named Akyar where it would drop 34 metres, the fall being used to establish a hydro-electric power station. The canal would then swing northward to cross the Kaskha and Zarafshan rivers and augment the water-supply in both. The forecast spoke of opening up new irrigation to the extent of 1·2 million hectares, or nearly 3 million acres, and the estimated cost was 7000 million roubles. No date of completion was named.

This project, like the last, involves cutting across the natural drainage lines of the country, and the upper part of the main channel, skirting the great chain of the Hissar mountains (rising at one point to over 15,000 feet) will necessarily have to withstand occasional floods of extreme violence. Further, the crossing of the Kashka and Zarafshan basins at a point presumably not far distant from the debouchment of those rivers into the plains will demand engineering and constructional skill of no mean order.

The plan calls for the establishment on the falls of hydro-electric generating stations of an aggregate capacity of 1 million kilowatts, equal to about ten times that of the Ardnacrusha Station on the Shannon.

The spokesman said that these two canals together were expected to take nearly 2000 cubic metres per second [1] from the Amu Darya. On the assumption that each is designed to take 1000 cubic metres, each of these canals would be about twice as large as any of the great works constructed in the Panjab. This 2000 cubic metres volume is quoted as taking about half the total discharge of the river even in July and

[1] To convert cubic metres into the normal British engineer's standard of water-volume, viz., cubic feet per second, an adequate rule of thumb is to multiply by thirty. 1000 c.m.s. would therefore be equivalent to about 30,000 'cusecs'.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

653 185 312

August, the flood months owing to summer melting of snow in Oxus' 'high mountain cradle in Pamere'. A draught on the river of this order must of course put in jeopardy the irrigation down-stream in the Khorezm area, but the spokesman met this by explaining that three reservoirs were to be constructed to store 6000 million cubic metres in the seasons of low demand.

These two projects for irrigation from the Oxus, great as they are, pale into insignificance when set against an immense integrated plan, described as 300 times the size of the T.V.A.[1], for the application of the latest sciences to the Dnieper, Don, Volga and Amu Darya basins in the connected fields of irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power and afforestation. Here we are concerned with the Amu Darya only, but the plans announced cover much the same ground on the European rivers. Over the whole field the planners speak in terms of transforming an area of two million square miles, two-thirds the size of the United States. The rivers are to be dammed at a number of points, the dams forming reservoirs many miles across; power stations of great capacity are to be established at these barrages with irrigation canals taking off at the same points; ocean-going steamers are seen as penetrating to the lakes through locks; and finally belts of forest, three miles wide (quite modest this), are to be planted in the valleys 'to keep them damp and on the watersheds to let the run-off from melting snows down gently'. In the Karakum, an awkward place for labour, the forests are to be sown with seed broadcast from aircraft. Finally, the suggestion is that, to avoid a fall in the Caspian Sea following the diversion of rivers to irrigation, waters flowing to the Arctic are to be impounded to compensate the southern rivers. A presumably serious commentator[1A] has written that it is possible that ultimately no water from Siberia will go to the Arctic, and it has even been suggested that the consequent greater salinity of the Arctic Ocean may reduce the size of the Polar ice-cap.

[1] Tennessee Valley Authority.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

Turning more particularly to that part of the scheme to be derived from the waters of the Amu Darya, to be called the Turkmenian Caral, the same commentator [1A] stated: 653 185 312

> The scientists told me a great deal about how they had planned the scheme for the Karakum desert. . . . They are chosen to cover the whole range of interests . . . there are hydrologists, navigation experts, electrical experts, every kind of engineer, soil scientists, zoologists, botanists, geologists, there are also geo-physicists and seismologists . . . besides all these there are the archaeologists, who are considered a very important part of the scheme.

In the presence of this battalion of experts from Academies of Sciences, with some conflict of interest (one would think) even in Russia, the genie of the scheme will surely sigh for one good practical engineer.

The Turkmenian Canal itself was announced in September 1950 in a decree of the Central Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is nothing short of an attempt to realize the old dream for the redirection of the Oxus back into its ancient course to the Caspian Sea by means of a canal 700 miles long starting from Takhya Tash on the left bank close to Nukus, skirting the Sarikamish depression (which, being even deeper than the Caspian, would take too long to fill up), and thence along the old bed of the Özboy across the middle Karakum and through the Balkhan gap into the sea near Krasnovodsk.[1] It is not unamusing to reflect that this also was an idea in the minds of Tsarist engineers more than fifty years ago. Curzon, writing in 1889, mentions that as a navigation project it had even occurred to the fertile mind of Peter the Great, and quotes the scornful saying of the German engineer Kiefert referring to the project, when at the height of its favour in the seventies of last century, as the great Central Asian sea-serpent. But it seems clear that a decision has now been taken for a canal to irrigate 1,300,000 hectares or about 3,000,000 acres, and to carry three hydro-electric generating stations, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts (each about equivalent to the Shannon Station in Ireland). Work was to begin in

[1A] Professor J. Bernal, F.R.S., Bib. II, 1.

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 23-26 -- Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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1951 and is scheduled for completion in 1957. The official spokesman[1] stated:

> The idea of bringing life to the desert by turning the course of the Amu Darya towards the Caspian Sea originated long ago. Yet Tsarist Russia was incapable of carrying it out. It was on the initiative of Stalin that the Government decision was taken to revive the desert and fulfil the age-old dreams of the people of Central Asia. The special characteristic of the present scheme is that the waters will be used in their entirety for irrigation and will not be discharged into the Caspian Sea as proposed in all preceding projects. All remaining canals of the world, including those of America, Egypt and India, are considerably shorter. . . . Krasnovodsk will receive an abundant supply of water [is this inconsistent with the special characteristic?]. The new irrigation construction is an important link in the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature. The Caspian desert plain will soon be converted into a marvellous flourishing land.

The project is linked with the railway constructional plan already mentioned for a line northward from Charjui to Kungrad along the Oxus left bank, that described as one of the great railway building feats of all time.[2]

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In face of the admissions of short supply in the river which will follow the completion of the first two Amu Darya projects above mentioned, it is not easy to see how the Takhya Tash headworks — down-stream of Kelif and Kerki — would find sufficient volume to irrigate the whole of the Karakum from Khorezm to the Caspian. Can it be that this grandiose project for restoring the prosperity of the days before 1573, the year when the Oxus turned to the Aral Sea, is alternative and not supplementary to the Karakum project? It is possible that the surveys may have convinced the Soviet engineers of the difficulties of constructing a canal along the skirts of the Kopet Dagh, with all the dangers of breaching by flood, and induced them to have second thoughts. It is not inconceivable that they, or their political superiors, may have been influenced by the romance which appeals so greatly to the local bourgeois patriots, that of turning the Oxus back

[1] Deputy Minister, Cotton Cultivation USSR.

[2] Bib. II, 10.

7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs 771
profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs 656
are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially 661
the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of [548]
prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

531 the remote mountain districts of Central Asia
[353] the forms have been handed down so carefully that the figure of the bird has retained traces of medieval stylization.

Embroideries discovered by Le Coq in sparsely populated districts of Eastern Turkestan are in technique and design frequently almost identical with the susanis of Bokhara. They show the same stylized flower-patterns in the same combination of colours, usually as decorations of women's trousers (tambal). It may, therefore, be assumed that the style of the susanis is characteristic of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

More than twenty years ago Le Coq reported that such embroidery was no longer being made in Eastern Turkestan. The examples that he saw had been made by the mothers of
656 the generation then living. In Western Tur-
562 kestan the tradition not only exists to this day, but the government has set up special workshops where the women embroider susanis. This is part of the policy by means of which the state seeks to draw women out of the secluded life of the harem.

777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208) worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand. (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sick-
784 ness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show
824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

771 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the
659 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

land for settlement purposes as well as exemptions from taxes for a period of ten years. The new subjects of the Russian Empire proved to be an asset, both economically and culturally, in South-East Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan. After 1881, in the Semirechie district on the skirts of China, the Uigurs founded sixty settlements. Most of the settlements survived the revolution and Soviet statistics mention the existence of forty-five Uigur villages in the same area. They are forming a 'Uigur National District' which is part of the Alma Ata Province of Kazakhstan. The Uigurs also have over sixty National Collective Farms in Uzbekistan. Tu. 563 Tu. 162

The total number of Uigurs in the Soviet Union, together with ethnical groups who are practically identical with them, can be placed with some certainty in the neighbourhood of 100,000. In regard to the Dungans, Soviet statistics mention a total figure of 14,600 for the whole Soviet Union, but that figure would seem to be an understatement. The Dungans have been allotted a special 'National District' in Kazakhstan and have fifteen National Collective Farms in Kirghizistan.[50]

Considering their small numerical strength the two national minorities enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions. As many as five newspapers, two theatres (one each in Alma Ata and Andizhan) and two teachers' training colleges are at the disposal of the Uigurs, while the Dungans have two newspapers and a teachers' training college in addition to a Dungan department in the teachers' training college of Frunze. An Uigur-Dungan department has also been attached to the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan. Tu. 563 658

Such liberality by the Soviet authorities may be explained by the political-military role of considerable importance which, in addition to the economic and cultural one, the Uigurs and Dungans had all along been called to play. Having settled down in the Russo-Chinese frontier area the Uigurs and Dungans took upon themselves the tasks usually reserved for Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In the cultural and economic fields the Uigurs and Dungans exercised a stabilizing and beneficial influence on their nomad surroundings. In the domain of politics, thanks to their anti-Chinese outlook, they provided Russian frontier districts with a human wall as reliable as if composed of Russian colonists themselves. S.U. 563 721

From the point of view of Soviet diplomatic strategy the Uigurs, who are the largest people in multi-national Sinkiang, are by far the more important of the two. The 2,900,000 Uigurs of Sinkiang are, however, split up into a large number of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit. Soviet nationalities policy, taking the Soviet Uigurs as a basis, may assist them to develop a clearer national consciousness. S.U 563 648

During the decade of active Soviet interference (1933–43) in the

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771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 569

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [91]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 J.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1

Tu 663 659 771

Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

Tu 663

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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1:von Schwarz--37 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

7. Religion.

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prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

places, where upward of a dozen people are crammed together, whose 697
smell alone in the great heat would be unbearable. Over and above this, the unfortunates are tormented by an enormous number of bugs, ticks, lice, rats and every other sort of vermin, which in such a favorable and fertile medium, multiply to an unbelievable extent. The inmates of these terrible martyr cells are not always real criminals: the majority is completely innocent, brought here by the whims of the ruler and the intrigues of political enemies, and they are often completely forgotten, and must then breathe their last in this kind of hideous surrounding. The two English travelers, Stoddard and Connolly, who were executed by the Emir Nasr Allah in 1842, must have languished in such prisons in the town of Bukhara before they were executed. The Russians have naturally cleaned out such horrors within their possessions and use all their influence to make the conditions more humane in the states of Central Asia which are still independent; whether they are successful, no one is in a position to know.

Mutilations must have been employed rather frequently in earlier 681
times in Turkestan as legal punishment, judging by the large number 685
of persons one still saw in my time going about as beggars, with missing noses, hands, or even feet. These punishments were usually applied to thieves, whom they wished to render harmless or at least to single out in this fashion. For this reason most of those punished in this manner are Kazakhs, who see nothing wrong in stealing, but on the contrary consider it an honorable sport. The sedentary population fails to see the joke in this respect. The thieves had their hands cut off at the wrists, the feet were cut off at the ankles, but the noses were cut off as smoothly as though they had never had them. The ears of those who had already been legally punished once or more were slit or cut off as well, depending on the circumstances, and this kind of mutilation formed a kind of penalty list for those concerned in any sort of later conflicts with the law.

Death sentences were employed very often in the Central Asian 681
states, just as in Bukhara until the most recent times theft, adultery, 661
prostitution, and even the use of wine was punishable by death. But the greatest number of victims were always provided by the whim and suspicion /215/ of the rulers, who believed they could strengthen their thrones only by means of cruelty and the destruction of all individuals who were in any way suspicious. One may see from the example of the last Khan of Kokand to what extremes many khans went in this respect. He once ordered 20,000 Kipchaks executed, simply from vexation be-

681 cause until that time he had been under the tutelage of a Kipchak, and
661 this had inconvenienced him. The most ruthless tyrant was unquestionably the Bukharan Emir Nasr Allah who ordered the execution not only of the two Englishmen mentioned above, and the Khan of Kokand Mohammed Ali, but even of his own wife and nearest kin. He filled the prisons with favorites fallen into disfavor and with the highest dignitaries.

681 In Turkestan the commonest manner of execution is by cutting the throat; beheading is, on the other hand, not customary. The executioner places the offender in front of him on the ground, with his hands tied, takes him by the chin with his left hand, and cuts his throat in two with an ordinary table knife. As a rule, ordinary criminals are executed publicly in the bazaar in this manner, and little ceremony is made of it. /Figure 77. Caption: The Mir-Arab Minaret in Bukhara. The place of execution for serious criminals. / The executioner leads the criminals turned over to him into the bazaar, on market days without further escort or preliminaries. /216/ There he himself picks out the most elevated spot possible, and slaughters his victims one after another, exactly the way sheep are slaughtered.

Along with throat-cutting, hanging is also in general use. This is considered, as with us, the most disgraceful manner of death. Those condemned to die by the rope are either hanged over the gateways which is done especially in the cases of rebels and political criminals as a horrible example, or they are strung up on gallows which are erected permanently in the bazaar squares of every town. The condemned has a rope put around his neck by which he is pulled up in the air and tied fast about a meter above the ground. The native two-wheeled wagons are also often used for hangings when there happen to be no gallows near by. The person to be hung is fastened by a noose to one of the wagon shafts and then the back end of the wagon is pushed down to the ground, whereby the shaft with the person to be hung is speeded upwards. This manner of hanging was used, for example, for those Russians who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Kokand during the war in 1876 and who refused to be converted to Islam.

In Bukhara, being hurled down from the Minaret of Mir-Arab, shown in Figure 77 (p. 215), is considered the chief punishment. This minaret, which stands in an open square in the center of the town of Bukhara, is built of firebricks and is 52 meters high, the highest tower in all of Central Asia. The gravest criminals are thrown down from the platform of this minaret onto the pavement, which they reach, naturally, only as formless masses. During the stay of the Russian General Matveyev in Bukhara in 1884, a criminal was executed in this manner

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail.

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes,

[1] Bib. I, 62.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

• 661 186 More recently there has been no pretence of the respectability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 104-05 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to overcome any centrifugal impulse in the colonial territories of the Soviet Empire. First in order was the power derived from the presence of a Russian population, infusing into a plural society an outside element as strong as are the Chinese in Malaya. The monolithic Constitution, the rooting of the Party sprung from its parent stem, the artificial division of natural local unities, applied education and linguistics — all these pressures have been steadily brought to bear against the realization of national or industrial particularism over a period of some thirty years. And in the background, always present, is the secret police and military force at the disposal of the Union.

The flood is the same flood as that which swept over Turkistan in Tsarist days. Like the waters of the Oxus after storms in the mountains, it may be turgid, but it is the same river, unpredictable in the direction of its attack, but submerging the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance is overcome.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

471 an aristocracy. All this was to be violently changed by centralized decree from the Kremlin, a second Russian Revolution.

The outward shape of what was then conceived and carried through has often been described. The whole conception was indeed two-headed — to collectivize and mechanize agriculture, and use the displaced peasants and nomads as unskilled labour for the new industries which were being set up. The American mining engineer Littlepage,[1] who saw it all from the inside, describes well both the central conception and the manner of its execution.

> A conversation something like the following must have taken place at headquarters in Moscow. One of the big Communists said 'Well, what will we do about it? We can't put through our plans for industry unless we have a few million workers who will stay put. There will be too much of a howl if we simply make the free workers stay where they are. What can we do?' And someone would answer, 'Why not liquidate the Kulaks? We can kill two birds with one stone, get these obstinate small farmers away from the villages where they obstruct our scheme for collectivization and at the same time get plenty of industrial labor which will stay put because it is under police guard.'

THE PEASANTRY

474 661 He goes on to tell what he saw of the peasants being dragooned round the country under police escort and set down as forced labour to work in mines and factories. Men, women and children were driven out of their houses, and their furniture, domestic animals and all but a few clothes were taken from them, the confiscated houses being taken into use as clubs and offices. Some were herded along the camel-trails, others, packed like animals in cattle trucks, in stifling heat or bitterness of winter, were despatched by rail to centres where their labour was needed. Many died of hunger, cold or disease on the way. All seemed completely bewildered; they had lost their homes, had been forcibly removed from

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 78.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

lands their families had occupied for generations, and put at 474 unfamiliar work in unfamiliar surroundings. Fewer still made 661 any effort to escape, their experiences seemed to have broken up any spirit of defiance they may have had before. He explains how the numbers of peasants available made the federal police the largest single employers in Russia, and gave them a reputation for getting things done. They could always count on a steady supply of labour, that great forced-labour army which started from the days of the so-called liquidation of the Kulaks. In this way the double end was served, opposition to collective farming stifled and the sinews of industry provided.

The policy of collectivization was directed both at the settled farmers and at the nomads, but with the former was easier to achieve. In Central Asia the peasants do not usually live in scattered farms on their lands but congregate in villages huddled together for protection and defence and enjoying from ancient times some degree of communal life based on their tribal past. Each cultivator goes out daily, and sometimes nightly, from the village to his fields which are often in several parts of the village lands. One man, for instance, will cultivate his ancestral share of the best irrigated land, a similar share of land not so good, perhaps dependent on rainfall, and a share in the village common or waste where the herds pasture. The water-rights will be held in theory in common, and approportioned by ancestral shares according to traditional needs. This system was not without a collective tribal background and with sympathy and vision it might not have been impossible to have introduced reforms gradually leading to a commonalty which, taking account of tradition, should have combined the incentive of individual user with the needs of the whole village community. That, however, is what Communists would nowadays call a feudal survivalist deviation, and it is not what happened. As we have seen, the Communists aimed not at a form of collectivism which should be the most efficient consistent with its acceptability by the people, but at very greatly reducing the number of workers in the fields in order to supply industry. Redeployment in industry was

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia R L 1

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perhaps the most important part of the plan — proletarianization as they called it.[1] They did not therefore try for a revivified tribal system, but aimed at a complete reorganization of village life, by means of a consolidation of small-holdings into large fields to be worked by a mechanized agriculture. In practice, this meant not only the dispossession of the more efficient and more prosperous farmers, but such an amalgamation of lands as to produce complete confusion of the identities of possession and user.

Essential grazing-lands came under the plough. All incentive was at least temporarily removed, and the Party slave-driver could not be everywhere at once. Thousands of cattle died of starvation or were deliberately slaughtered by the peasants in protest. The initial disasters caused even the Soviet planners to modify original plans and eventually to allow homestead holdings of a limited acreage for the individual peasant to cultivate outside the commonalty. Togan describes the position in Farghana, the richest part of Turkistan. The people were starving, and half the people landless. Draught oxen had perished in thousands. The people were exposed to every form of official tyranny and persecution — imprisonment, plunder, deportation, execution for those that stood out. Draught cattle that remained were seized and tractors brought in and shown to the farmers on condition that they should be used for cotton cultivation only and by those only who would join the *Kolkhoz*. The peasants, robbed of their horses and oxen, found their fate depending on machinery from Russia, using oil which then had also to be imported, and mechanics then also Russian. They were helpless.

Another American, John Scott,[2] has a vivid description of the methods adopted for the 'dekulakization' of a village.

'How did they decide who was to be dekulakized ?' 'Ah, that's a hell of a question to ask a guy that's trying to expiate his crimes in

[1] During the second Five-Year Plan directions were issued to release 1,500,000 workers *annually* from agriculture to industry. This was for the whole Union.

[2] Bib. I, 85. A sincere admirer of the indomitable determination shown by Stalin and others in pushing through industrialization beyond the Urals, Scott also underlines the cost in blood and tears. He worked for five years at Magnitogorsk.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

honest labor. Just between the three of us, though, the poor peasants of the village get together in a meeting and decide: "So-and-so has six horses; we couldn't very well get along without those in the collective farm; besides he hired a man last year to help on the harvest." They notify the GPU and there you are. So-and-so gets five years. They confiscate his property and give it to the new collective farm. Sometimes they ship the whole family out. When they came to ship us out, my brother got a rifle and fired several shots at the GPU officers. They fired back. My brother was killed. All of which, naturally, didn't make it any better for us. We all got five years, and in different places. I heard my father died in December, but I'm not sure.' 474 661

All this[1] happened more than twenty years ago. Since then Communist ranks have swollen and absorbed hundreds of the people of the soil, official statistics show the usual propaganda figure of 98 or 99 per cent of the peasants in the *Kolkhoz*, and the Kazaks and Uzbeks have begun to qualify as mechanics. The new economy is settling down and the Soviets would have the world believe that, in spite of backslidings, the peasants are docile and apt to the mechanical age which has overtaken them. The cotton expansion policy has ridden on shortage and misery to triumph; industry and mineral wealth have been developed (the former largely by the establishment of textile mills for cotton and silk in Turkistan itself) and the connection with Siberia by the Turk-Sib Railway, opened in 1930, is a permanent symbol of a new economic era. Perhaps most significant of all, the Soviets have insisted on the emancipation of women, making the discarding of the veil the touchstone of loyalty to the new idea. In this, let it be remarked, they run counter only to the orthodox tradition of Bukhara and the south, and not to that of the nomad, whose women, riding freely on the steppe, were never veiled. On a short or a long view the removal of the *paranja* must be regarded as a beneficent reform, against which no Central Asian nationalist would find it easy to exclaim. Lastly, in the oases at least, there are signs of plenty, and even of the emergence of a new Party aristocracy. The fatted calf can still be killed, and favoured visitors lick their lips as they 433 [474] [562]

[1] [collectivization; see cat. 116, pp. 175-179 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

reformers believed that they were doing them a favor by breaking up their old forms of life and persuading them, even by the use of force, to adopt a manner of life considered more civilized and sensible. On this trip, however (undertaken in 1934), as we pushed along day after day through these pastured plateaus, my sympathies went out to those nomads who had forcibly resisted their conversion into proletarians. . . . I could see how the life might appeal to them. . . . I even began to understand how they might be willing to fight for this mode of existence if someone threatened to take them away from it.

The job[1] was done not by redistribution, but by the indiscriminate rounding-up of the nomads with their animals. Nearly half those who did not die, men and women, went off to slavery. Three-quarters of the flocks and herds were slaughtered or perished uncared-for in the wilderness. When all was over, nothing remained to be seen on the steppe but once in a while a small village of Russian settlers whose ancestors had pushed into the Kazak country half a century earlier and, very occasionally, a small group of felt huts occupied by miserable-looking down-at-heel Kazaks who had been induced to settle down in cattle-breeding farms.

Lest it be thought that this picture is too highly coloured, let us turn to Soviet sources. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, a cautiously written compilation, relates[1] that, in spite of preventive measures taken by the Central Committee, most serious deviations from the Party line took place in Kazakistan, making it easier for the beys, the Kulaks and the Alash-Orda elements to carry out anti-Soviet and anti-revolutionary activity. 'But', it concludes, 'with the help of the Central Committee of the Communist Party these mistakes in the set-up of the *Kolkhoz* system were put right.' We need only turn to the census returns to see how matters were put right, by measures leading to the death of one in three of the Kazak population, whether by mass starvation or by violence. That is the true picture of Soviet colonial imperialism. To allow of due completion of this process it was necessary for the

[1] *G. S. Encycl.* vol. 30, p. 398. Bib. III, 10.

1 [i.e. collectivization -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

474 Soviets to retain Kazakistan as a part of the RSFSR (the Great
661 Russian republic) up to 1936. It was only then, as it was openly stated, that it became possible and safe to confer on 'the Kazaks' even the circumscribed and illusory autonomy enjoyed by a non-Russian constituent republic. The delay is the more remarkable given the very large proportion of Russians in Kazakistan.

THE STOCK

233 The story is not yet complete. Herdsmen cannot be killed
[474] off without loss of the animals which serve them and which they serve. In Kazakistan in 1935 there was only 1·7 head of cattle for each household grouped in a collective farm, and 6500 collective farms were altogether without a herd. The livestock losses over the whole republic in the six years 1928–1934 were estimated at 73 per cent of the cattle, 87 per cent of the sheep, and 83 per cent of the horses.[1] The real wealth of the country in men and livestock had been sacrificed on the altar of the collective deity, and there is reason to think that the losses then suffered have not been restored even today.

A study of the current Soviet press on the subject of stock-raising and stock-farming throughout Soviet Central Asia reveals an attitude and atmosphere of inspissated gloom. In Uzbekistan, for instance, it is admitted that progress has been thoroughly unsatisfactory; the required increase in the number of publicly-owned sheep and cattle has in no case been achieved, the organization of winter feeding has broken down, and what is called mass-political work among the *Kolkhoz* and *Sovkoz* workers on the collective farms has been ineffective. The same tale comes from Kirghizia and Kazakistan, and also from the Tajik Republic. To go even farther afield, it is repeated in strident tones from the Caucasus, where special complaint is made of delays in the mechanization and electrification of processes in the care of stock. Plans have not been fulfilled; veterinary services, irrigation, scientific

[1] Soviet sources quoted by M. Holdsworth, Bib. II, 9.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union. 788 177

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed. 852 177

The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities. 793 661

As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate, after 177 584

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers:

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth.

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952.

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification,

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

517 668 The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers[1], teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

517 661 Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

517 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

only by Indo-Europeans. 651 635

In the towns where the standing garrisons of troops for the khan were lodged, the respective beg likewise had to support them.

The above-mentioned biannual trips to the court of the emir or khan are the only dark sides in the otherwise enviable existence of the begs. For no beg knows when he sets out whether he will see his town 635 and his family again. Since his entire power and existence is depend- 662 ent upon the often-changing mood of the khan, which in turn depends on the insinuations of his favorites, such a favorite need only to say a word to depose the most powerful beg. Thus the situation in the courts of the Central Asian khans are exactly the same as those so truly and clearly described in the Bible in the story of David, and in the Book of Esther. During my first trip to Hissar in 1875, we found in the village of Derbent no preparations for our reception. It later turned out that this happened because the Beg of Baysun, to whose district Derbent belonged, had not received the necessary communication in time because he was away on a trip. When the court official who had been attached to our party by the emir as a courier imparted this to the emir by letter, the latter became irritated at the beg in question, whereupon one of the court officials used this favorable opportunity in order to procure the post of the beg for one of his relatives: he informed the emir that the Beg of Baysun was really a bad fellow, for among the gifts which he had presented to the emir a torn khalat had been found. This infuriated the emir to such an extent, that without examining the matter further, or giving the probably innocent accused the opportunity to defend himself, he relieved the beg of his position and was irresolute for several days as to whether he should have him hung as well. The begs are thereby forced to send rich gifts to the court officials and favorites of the khan constantly, and to this end they must milk their subjects dry so as to have a spokesman near the khan in case of need. Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that when a khan dies, there is always a general upheaval in the whole administration. During my last official journey in 1886, I found completely new faces in offices and posts of honor everywhere in Bukhara, with the sole exception of the positions held by the brothers of the emir. All the begs from the time of the Emir Muzafar al-Din who had died only shortly before, had /184/ disappeared without trace, along with their numerous officials and favorites. Some

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
652 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported
662 by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time. In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruited from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

mean that Social Democrats (*i.e.* the Party) will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations, and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary it is the duty of the Party to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that they may arrange their affairs in the way which will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[1]

It is not the national but the agrarian question that will decide the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate question.[2]

Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching.[3]

I am referring to the deviation towards local native nationalism which is at times to be observed in the ranks of native Communists and which in the East expresses itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan Turkism.[4]

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right of self-determination, and applied to 'native nationalists', who *ex hypothesi* have no proletariat of their own, by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. Leaving aside the instruments of enforcement lurking at every corner, it is hard to think of a series of pronouncements which could be more discouraging to a Central Asian patriot, or less in tune with the proud declaration of the liberty of the colonial peoples to decide on their own future.

THE PARTY

The period from 1918 to 1929 was spent in the integration of these colonial areas with Great Russia, using as instrument the Party. Collectivization had not yet been launched; up to 1929 the aim was to cut off the smaller landholders from their national leaders. Here again it is to be remembered that the Russian peasantry in the countryside and the Russian proletariat on the communications and in the towns were ready to hand to implement a policy. Whatever the theory, the Party has always been in fact a single unified structure bound by the tightest possible discipline. To parody Stalin,

[1] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 53. [2] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 25. [3] Stalin, *op. cit.* p. 110.
[4] Stalin, report to Communist Party, 10th Mar. 1921, *op. cit.* p. 104.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

many years the Tsars had been toying with the idea of sweeping all this aside, but so strong was local sentiment that they had failed to act. But by a decree of May 1924 the Soviets vested all control of distribution of water in the State. And they applied it ruthlessly. The result was to remove settlement of disputes from the tribal authority near at hand, substituting an impersonal officialdom, and at the same time to enable authority at the desired moment to decree without gainsaying the kind of crop which should be sown and the arbitrary price for which it would be taken up. The reform also served the purpose of shifting the weight of economic and political power from the people to the Party. It was easier to carry out in the areas of intensive cultivation where farmers were tied to the land and must have water or starve, and where a redistribution by means of robbing Peter to pay Paul had at least some chance of pleasing Paul. But even here there was a fierce struggle between the Party and the traditional leaders who were often loved and trusted by the people and understood their minds. These leaders were at first able to prevail over the Party men in local elections, and the latter had to resort to confiscation of crops, hay and cattle, and even to expulsion of big landowners, before they could prevail.

On the steppe it was much more difficult to carry through the process, for the nomads were seldom tied to definite holdings, and the tribal allegiance to the chieftain was in the patriarchal tradition. John Littlepage,[1] the American mining engineer, who spent the ten years from 1928 in the midst of this country, has described with obvious sincerity exactly what he saw of conditions before the Second Russian Revolution of 1929 (as he calls it) and after it. In 1928, before collectivization, tribal life on the steppe was scarcely touched. Meat and food were plentiful and the tribes came and went with their herds as they had been used to do. But the Kremlin had already announced that the nomad's life was demoralizing and must be broken up. And that meant the destruction of the old tribal organization, and the conversion of the tribes,

[1] Bib. I, 62.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 631 563 T. 631 563 to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. 517 814 177 S.U. 563 658 Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626 The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665 * At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

2: Carne S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

●6668 It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political repre-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sentative in each capital. In the case of Bukhara there was a Russian resident at Kaghan (the new city on the main line eight miles from old Bukhara), working through a Russian commission of two which closely controlled the Bukharan ministers. The reality is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the Bukhara government had no army and only a rudimentary police force. It suited Russia to proceed gradually in the absorption of two States which stood for a centuries-old tradition of Muslim independence under Uzbek rulers.

Behind this façade there was much activity. Among the local nationals there were really three Parties,[1] the Conservatives, the Innovators (who were not Socialists) and the Socialists. The Conservatives the younger Parties despised — they included the *ulema* and many of the adherents of the ex-Amir whom the new idea disliked — but in the event, as all accounts of the Basmachi struggle show, it was they who had most influence with the tribes and their strength was underrated. The most distinguished of the Innovators was Mustafa Chokai, who had headed the ill-starred Kokand government and was chosen later as the man best suited to represent the new idea of Young Turkistan before the Peace Conference in Paris. Later he settled in France and we shall hear of him again. The Socialists were much farther to the Left but they were sincere Turkish patriots. Togan,[2] himself a man of the Left, showed breadth of mind in devoting time and thought to clandestine negotiations for the establishment of what would now be called a Popular Front with a common programme on which the two progressive groups, Socialist and non-Socialist, could unite. These Parties succeeded in the end in forming a coalition to which was given the name of National Union. Originally, on the wave of new-found 'democratic' enthusiasm which followed the Emir's fall, the Young Bukharans had felt themselves to be in tune with their Soviet Russian mentors. But with the arrival of Togan and his friends hot with news of the Baku Congress and Soviet perfidy in Bashkiria and elsewhere,[3] their enthusiasm for things

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 103-104 — Analyst] Togan, op. cit. p. 407.

2 [see cat. 116, pp. 7-8 — Analyst]

3 [See cat. 116, pp. 104-112 — Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 Russian waned, and they planned an active deviation. It is a good early instance of a tendency which has since become well known, what the Soviets call the deviation of the bourgeois-nationalist. They soon turned their thoughts to setting up a common front with the Basmachi rebels in the mountains against their Russian masters.

As might have been expected, these young intellectuals did not understand the tribes, who for their part ridiculed and distrusted the new-fangled antics and professions of city politicians. There were many comings and goings, but little real comprehension was achieved between elements so diverse. Togan understood the point of view of both sides and has much to say of the details of the negotiations. He puts the following words [1] in the mouth of a courier sent to Jemal Pasha, but it is just this sort of thing that the tribes heard and disliked:

> Our aim is to find means to force the Russians to accept our proposals, to strengthen the National Union, inspire a modern, national, political spirit into the organizations that are prepared to fight, to get rid of the shameful and disturbing activities of the Emir's adherents, to clear out fanatics and replace them by people faithful and useful to the League, and to convert the whole revolt into a military organization of young and educated revolutionaries which can become a partisan movement.

000 It is easy to imagine the reaction of Muslim tribal leaders to a manifesto of this sort issued by youths who themselves often sickened at the mere sight of blood (there were instances of craven conduct by young revolutionaries). They would look the schoolmen askance from under beetling brows, resent their disloyalty to the Emir and mock their orations to scorn as silly romance. There was a revealing and barbaric example. A young delegate was trying to win over to the cause a fierce old chieftain of the Basmachis, Toghay Sari of the Lakai tribe of Uzbeks. Toghay, a formidable grey-beard of 75 years, heard the envoy out, then turned on him and wrenched out from beneath his coat a bunch of human ears. With a sardonic

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 430.

XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

[See pp. 230-242 — Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 Mustafa Chokai was among the most eminent of the older emigration. A good French scholar, he was able to give voice to the aspirations of his countrymen in words which could reach the ears of Western Europe and America, and in turn to interpret Europe to his own people. 'We have to be', he said, 'at one and the same time the architects and masons of a healthy national structure in which we would wish to see harmonised our national liberation and our love and admiration for European culture.'[1] He started an organization named *Millij Türkistan Birligi* (Unity of National Turkistan), and was indefatigable in preaching the possibility of a smaller unity within Turkistan itself, which should embrace the different races without distinction of Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen or Kirghiz, and including the Tajiks on the ground that they are intermingled with the Uzbeks and often bilingual, speaking both their own dialect of Persian and Uzbek. These ideas, taken over by Kayum, were a good deal less ambitious than a plan formulated independently in Istanbul for the creation of a Greater Turkistan which should include with Turkistan proper the Turco-Tatar peoples of the Volga and the Bashkurds of the Urals. This plan has received the name of Türkili, possibly inspired by Togan's book. Its sponsors seek to justify it on the ground that neither Turkistan proper, which has an open frontier in the north and a settlement area crowded with Russians, nor the Volga–Ural region, surrounded as it is by Russians on all sides, could by themselves be regarded as viable units for a State. If then they are to aspire to independence, they must unite. As is usual among émigrés, there are also other splinter groups.

All groups are agreed that they are set on an autonomous Turkistan, and they do not seek political association with Turkey. But while Chokai's successors aim at independence, others have in view some sort of union or federation with a new United States of Russia. There has been a difference in emphasis on the point whether Eastern Turk patriots would do well to stand in with Russian émigré organizations in

[1] Speech to Royal Central Asian Society, 29th March 1933.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

seeking the overthrow of Bolshevism — a debate hotly contested.

There is support in America and elsewhere for this line of thought, so apparently consonant with democratic theory. The argument runs that all non-Slavs of the emigration, old and new, would do well to concentrate their hopes on the collapse of the Stalinist system, trusting that, when tyranny breaks, it will give way to a multi-national régime on a Western democratic model, to be set up in the whole of the Russian Empire. In this new house, it is suggested, all the 'minorities' would find it easy to meet and merge, just as the various stocks have been able to do in the United States.

The answer to this pleading is clear enough. In the first place, the term 'minority' is resented as a misconception, for each non-Slav people in its own land is the very people of that country, brought into subjection by conquest from without. Secondly, this attractive vision of a United States of Russia is seen by men who surely forget that immigrants entered America from the countries of Europe because they desired, often passionately, to lose their individual traditions and memories in the larger hospitality of the New World. In the Russian Empire, whether under Tsars or Soviets, the non-Slav peoples took no such initiative. They were twice conquered by Great Russians, whom they regard as their historical oppressors. Consequently, any Central Asian Turk of the emigration who may be persuaded to stand in with anti-Soviet Russians on a common platform against Stalinism tends to be spurned by the less equivocal group under Kayum Khan, which will have no dealings with any Russian who is not prepared to concede in advance the right of Turkistan to an existence as a free State bound in no way to any future Russia. This more rigorous view is founded on the belief that no Russian party with a programme confined to the overthrow of the existing régime can be trusted to give freedom to the national components of the present Russia. In such a succession State, they hold, the non-Slav peoples would only exchange one master for another, and in support of this view

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the
727 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] [For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

2: Cave 5-4 (no date) 1958 HLI Soviet Central Asia PL 1

régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga-Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 727 167 other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 727 167 officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal commissioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

727 of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out
668 of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the
167 body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *göz kanli* — bloody-eyes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

The national

•668 committee under Kayum Khan's direction followed a middle course. They stood for a single united Turkistan, including the Persian-speaking Tajiks, roughly coincident with the limits of the five Soviet Central Asian republics, and they strove to inculcate the political idea of a common Turkistani nationality and allegiance. Unwilling to recognize that the several languages spoken in Turkistan are in fact languages and not mere dialects of one language, they tried to serve their end by inventing a middle-language — *ortatili* — which should become a lingua franca for all the country. They also did their best to encourage the German commanders to mix up the rank and file without regard to racial or linguistic affinities, making no distinction between an Uzbek or a Kazak, a Kirghiz or a Tajik. Their aim was a deliberate one, to counter the Russian policy of breaking down into small units and to re-create a common tradition for Turkistan. On the other hand they would have nothing to do with suggestions for a wider Turkish organism which should be shared with Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars or Bashkurds. They stood for a smaller unity, confined to Turkistan alone.

000 It is not easy to pronounce with confidence how far this policy is consonant with realities. On the one hand it was [727] noted that the Azeris, the only substantial people of Turkish stock in the Caucasus area, proved to be better combatant troops than any of the volunteers from Turkistan. This result may be partly attributable to the fact that, being alone, the Azeris were not mixed with other stocks and knew how they stood. The mingling of the five main stocks of Turkistan without any regard for origin or language must have produced a result not unlike what would follow if Pathans, Baluches, Panjabis and Awans were thrown together haphazard in the army of what is now Pakistan. It was a bold experiment and it can hardly have promoted efficiency, at least at the outset. On the other hand there is evidence that Uzbeks and Tajiks at any rate get on well together. (The Soviet attempt to play up the Persian character of the Tajik tradition is probably misconceived: Tajiks are often bilingual in any case.) As

LANGUAGE

With the exception of the Tajiks, virtually all the Muslims of Central Asia speak local dialects of one and the same Turki language group. Varying cultural influences to which the individual subgroups have been subjected in the course of history have led to a certain differentiation in the vocabulary and grammar of the principal dialects. Uzbek especially, having been exposed to strong Iranian and Arabic influences, has changed much, even to the extent of losing the vowel harmony common to the sound system of the Turki languages. By and large, however, it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turki literary language for Central Asia. The latter, however, had not yet been formed when the Communists conquered Central Asia in the 1920's and suppressed its further development. 197 177

The importance of language for national consciousness is self-evident: language represents the most ready means of national identification, available alike to the literate and illiterate. While not absolutely indispensable for nationality (witness the Jews), it is so intimately connected with it as to make it one of nationality's very best criteria.

Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia has two principal aspects, both of which follow closely the general lines of Soviet nationality policy. In the first place it strives at all costs to prevent the formation of a single Turki literary language in Central Asia on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. In the second place, it endeavors to promote the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups. The first goal is fostered by exploiting all, even the minutest, dialectical differences among the various Turkic subgroups, and by granting the status of full-fledged national-literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turki language. The second is fostered through the official change of Turki alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and, finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of Russian for all citizens, regardless of nationality, desirous of making any kind of a career. It is apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, such policies will make Russian the language of all the socially dynamic elements of the Muslim population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance. 177 197 668

5/7 GGB The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers, teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

5/7 GGI Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

5/7 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universities, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training. 517

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action. 517 461 [668]

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia. 517 177

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian "Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult. 517 177 186

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 517 175

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats. 177 668

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 177 668

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the
668 Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 670 Tu. 569

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [91]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 669 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1

Tu 663 ESP 771

Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

Tu 663

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the 643
following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one 558
of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread.

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always 643
treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat [669]
mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah, who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers, and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought directly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir. Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in his absence.

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khan- 631
ates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 496

advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

175 669

It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293. [2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669

matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for non-combatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed
669 by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service
669 was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[1] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[1] [1916 of 1898 and 1916; see cat. 116, pp 88-90 — Analysis]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the 829
Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a 66%
reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by 175
widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the 000
Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

any authority offering them protection against the indigenous 175
population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia 000
between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does 114
at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is 175
understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern 669

[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

2: Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

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The fourth force should have bern these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine.

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At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

175 (Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During
669 the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

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[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also.

The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:

(1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
(2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states*. . . .

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175
669

colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] [cat. 116 p105 - Analyst] Bib. II, 2, R. E. Pipes.

2: Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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> The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

2: Carce S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, wa. in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia 814

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words:[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting:

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

2: Carse S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
● 669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 669 563

the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerlī*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerlī*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 and multiplicity of aims and counsels forbade cohesion. But there was a man from outside who went near to command success when native talent failed.

• 669 An interesting and obscure part of the history of the Turkistan interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the establishment of Soviet power is to be found in the dramatic intervention of the Western Turkish Pashas, Jemal and Enver. These were two of the Istanbul triumvirate which brought Turkey into her declaration of war on Germany's side in 1914 and thereafter led her through the bad years to the final defeat of 1918. Enver's exploits in the field had been gallant though of a somewhat Pyrrhic nature. On the Caucasus front, and particularly at Sarikamish, he won personal renown but lost an army. Jemal is well known for his ruthless direction of the war against the Arabs on the southern front. With Turkey's defeat at the end of 1918 neither man felt he had much to look for in his own country, and both gravitated towards the Bolsheviks who, as we know, were playing up a sympathy with 'down-trodden Muslim peoples'. And both Jemal and Enver probably felt that an alliance of this sort offered them the best hope of revenge on a Britain whose conquering arms had finally succeeded in breaking Turkey after so long a fight.

Jemal reached Tashkent from Moscow in August 1920, a few months before Togan's arrival. Both he and his successor Enver were sponsored by the Bolsheviks, who wished to use the war-born resentment of these Turkish leaders against the British conqueror of Turkey to stir up further trouble for Britain in Afghanistan and so keep her anxious for her own possessions in India. It was the policy of Tsarist Russia, noted by Curzon, to keep England engaged in Asia with a view to offsetting any movement by her against Russia in Europe. There may also have been some hope of diverting Eastern Turkish nationalism away from grievances against Russia, and starting it on the barren road of Islamic enthusiasm against the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

British in India across the mountains. But, as the event showed, the last thing Lenin wanted was a focus of nationalism in Turkistan itself. 669

Jemal, committed and with passion to this objective, went on to the Afghan capital, Kabul, to start what he called an Islamic Revolutionary League, whose object was to be the freeing of India from British domination. He talked at first of organizing armies in Afghanistan to seize the Panjab. (The short-lived Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 was just over, and difficult negotiations were in train for a peace settlement.) Later the Kremlin, who had agreed to his opening negotiations with the Basmachis, suspected him of a too effective organization of the rebels as a fighting force with the help of Turkish officers. What they wanted was to get the Basmachis into their bag. Jemal also negotiated ineffectively with the Bukhara National Union, but the negotiations broke on the latter's demand that he renounce all idea of using Turkistan as a base for freeing India, and concentrate on strengthening their organizations to enable them to bargain effectively with the Russians for their freedom. Jemal would not go so far, but Lenin suspected him of playing a double game and recalled him in October 1921. He was a bitter, cruel man who had failed in all he sought to do, and what he did he did without a generous gesture. He was murdered at Tiflis on 21st July 1922, probably at Bolshevik instigation.

Enver arrived at Bukhara on Jemal's heels in the same month of October. He too came under Russian auspices. His aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach — alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called Imperialism. But his own real object, confided to the National Union shortly after his arrival, was to mobilize Eastern Turkish resistance, and particularly the Basmachis, against the Soviets, and so set up an independent State in Central Asia. At first the National Union leaders strenuously endeavoured to dissuade him, pointing to the famine conditions still ruling, but at heart swayed by their belief that the time was inopportune for

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

669 anything but conspiratorial measures.

After some hesitation, Enver decided that his Turkish patriotism demanded of him a bold move in an endeavour to do just what the Bukhara leaders could not do — unite the Union Party, the intelligentsia, with the partisans, the Basmachis. Togan gives a moving description of Enver's last night in Bukhara, sitting cross-legged on the floor in his uncomfortable Turkish uniform, and making his decision as a *mūjahit*,[1] with tears in his eyes, feeling he was in the cradle of the Turkish race. Next morning Enver rode off with twenty-four companions, saying:

> I have decided I must go to eastern Bukhara. If we succeed we shall be *ghaziis* [victors for the faith]; otherwise we fall *shehits* [martyrs] on the battle-field. We must fight for Turkistan. Did we fear death ordained by fate, and choose the life of a dog, we should merit the curse of our ancestors and our descendants. But if we can bear to die for freedom, we shall have ensured the freedom and happiness of those who follow us.[2]

He rode first to Ibrahim Beg Lakai, of the Emir's party of Basmachis. Ibrahim, loyal to his Emir, held Enver captive as the man who had broken the power of the Ottoman Sultan and started the Young Turk movement. After many vicissitudes Enver succeeded in capturing the tribal imagination and, having secured his freedom, united a large number of tribesmen around him, under the leadership of Devletmand, the most chivalrous of the hill chiefs. He had also some notable Afghan adherents and a devoted Russian Cossack aide named Rayev. His forces, and he himself, gave an excellent account of themselves for some months, and caused the Soviet commanders much disquiet. He had achieved for the moment the impossible, infusing the new ideas and the old with a common enthusiasm. But it was not to last. After some successes, in August 1922 he was forced to retire on Beljuvan in the Tajik hills supported only by the faithful Devletmand and his partisans.

On 8th August Enver died gloriously. Early in the

[1] Islamic equivalent of a Crusader.

[2] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 437 *et seqq.*

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

morning he had heard that a detachment of 300 Russians was approaching a hill above Beljuvan. Without waiting for the rest of his soldiers to collect, he rode against the enemy with 25 men, reaching the top of the hill at the same moment as the Russians mounted it on the other side. Taking advantage of surprise, he succeeded in disarming a body 75 strong, and again advanced with drawn sword against the remainder, thrown into confusion by his onslaught. With him were 5 men only, the Turk Cherkes Hussein, the Kazanli Kerim, Enver's Afghan groom, the Cossack Rayev and the Kazak Ishmurad. The other soldiers under Devletmand were now coming on the scene, but fortune was against a reckless man, as it had been earlier on the Caucasian front by Sarikamish. A Russian machine-gun opened up from a flank and shot the Pasha through the heart. The gallant Devletmand, coming up in support, was killed a minute later. The Russians retired not realizing their triumph.[1]

Twenty thousand of the tribesmen around gathered weeping to Enver's funeral; many kissed the dead man's hands and feet, and took hairs from his beard in memory. A lament ran through the land, and his death was celebrated in a famous poem of the Uzbeks. In calmer moments Togan says that he was not Enver's man, and their views on political means and ends were widely different. He condemns Enver too for posing as a redeemer with a mission beyond his strength to unite the resistance movement. But the contemplation of a warrior who of his own will has made the final sacrifice moves the historian beyond measure, and he ends by acclaiming him as the hero of an epic which will resound so long as Turks are Turks. He calls him a great idealist, who ignored daily life and facts.

He had little knowledge of the geography or the statistics of Turkistan. In Bismarck's words, politics is the art of the possible. Yet by his death Enver redeemed all; he has become a legend and

[1] The account of Enver's death largely follows *Bugünkü Türkili*, pp. 451-60. It is drawn partly from the memoirs of one Mustafa Shahkul, one of Enver's advisers in Bukhara.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 R1.1 Soviet Central Asia R1.1

●669 a memory, even among the very men who would have fought against him in his time. All who knew him acclaim him a great man, a pure man, a man beyond the common measure.

He appears indeed in the story as a sort of Young Pretender, a hero for Turkistan to acclaim as was Shamil for the Caucasus, the embodied pattern in these latter days of Turkish heroism and ideals.

Among the tribes support for Enver came from the recognition that he stood for that ancient ideal of Turkish chivalry, and the intellectuals believed in him because, with all this, he had proved himself an innovator.

The chronicle proceeds:

Enver was before his time, yet his death sowed a seed. I said to him at Bukhara 'we are not ready for it yet'. Enver replied: 'And it will be some time before you are ready for it'. And he was right. Many years have now gone by since we first laid the charge that is to explode when Russia's internal and external situation becomes difficult, and we see it is not yet ready to go off. If Enver Pasha had taken no part in developments in Turkistan, the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance.

Nor did he really dream of pan-Islamism or even of pan-Turanism. He considered indeed that the interests of the Turks in western and central Asia were identical, and that it was the duty of clear-thinking men to make known in Turkistan the reality of such interests. But he said to me at Bukhara: 'Osmanli will never become the common language of Turkistan: a native Chaghatai must be invented. This has become obvious to me since, having been in Russia, I have come to Turkistan.' He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword — Victory or death in the field. By his death on Turkistan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks.

○○○ In Britain, the exploits of Enver Pasha have won no renown: he was our bitter enemy in World War I, and he met his death far away, in a period of confusion which we have never tried to understand. So far as there existed knowledge at that time, his exploits beyond the Oxus caused anxiety in India, and there was a tendency to echo the Soviets and cry

1 [See pp. 101, 119 cf. 116 -- Anakt]

2: Caroe 3-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

him down as a mere adventurer. But it is not the habit of Englishmen to withhold honour from a gallant foe. Enver was a good loser. And to many Turks, it seems, he remains a national hero, who brought about the revolution in Turkey and played a noble part in Central Asia. A Turkish historian of today has compared him with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan, who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul — the epic heroes — of the Turks.

The Basmachi rebellion was officially stated to have ended in 1924, but it did not die with Enver. In fact his death supplied just the impulse needed to bring the varied elements of the resistance together. The embers of the revolt smouldered on, supported from across the border in Afghan Turkistan, until the Afghan revolution in 1928[1] gave the Soviets a chance of intervention across the border during the interregnum. It was not until 1931 that Ibrahim Beg was finally captured, and there was evidence which filtered through of rebel movements in Soviet Turkistan much later than this.

The spirit which animated this struggle comes out in the story of Khan Junaid of Khiva, a gallant old man, who had fought the Russians steadily since 1873, when they captured that city. Ever since then he had refused to take Russian citizenship, and had been the Khan's chief minister more than once. In 1920, disgusted with the failure of the Bolsheviks to live up to their professions, he took up arms again, and continued to raid lines of communication until 1927, when he concluded peace on the terms that he would be left alone to farm his land near Urgench. Finding the Soviets were still after him, he withdrew once more into outlawry and fought on until 1929, when he was forced across the frontier into Afghanistan. It is now high treason for any admirer even to refer to Khan Junaid. Or there is Haji Sami, the Turk on whom Enver's mantle fell, a hard determined man who, unlike

[1] The abdication of Amanullah and accession of Nadir Shah after a short usurpation by Bacha Sakao.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia KL1

669 Enver, hanged traitors. He took Ibrahim Beg prisoner and compelled him to serve the cause, and found a way to make the intellectuals and the tribal fighters join together in the campaign. For many months he carried on with the utmost resolution in Karategin and around Farghana. When at last he was driven across the frontier into Afghanistan, Togan reproached him, saying he had been too confident when Enver was still alive, and had now lost heart. The answer was full of dignity: 'My heart is with me, but I am wounded and cannot ride'.

000 Togan has much to say of the crowded and confused events in Central Asia that followed the Russian revolution, but the proudest and the newest message he has to offer is to be found in his assessment of the historic significance of the Basmachi movement. In his account of it he rises from the ranks of the chroniclers to become the writer of a drama, almost a prophet; the style of his narration changes like that of Thucydides when he puts speeches into the mouths of his statesmen and generals, and he seems inspired. If this Basmachi struggle was indeed a real epic, it will still stir the hearts of the descendants of those who took part in it just as it moves him. It is represented as a great national impulse, which for years 669 absorbed all the forces capable of playing an active part. It was joined not only by men who had taken part in the Merdikar rising of 1916, but by those who had been with Dükchi Ishan in 1898 and old men who had fought against the Chinese in Kashghar. It mobilized the tribes, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazak, the young intellectuals of the cities, West Turk officers, many Afghans and Enver Pasha. Since the days of Shaibani Khan in the XVIth century there had been no national movement in Turkistan to compare with it. The movement had of course its negative side, for the need to meet the rebels on their own ground had forced the Russians to penetrate far into the mountains of eastern Bukhara and along the Chinese and Afghan frontiers, but this would have followed in time without any struggle. The Russian press professed to lament the losses caused to the rebels in battle, which they said had led

Carroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

to a large diminution in the population. But such losses were as nothing to the systematic mass-murder which inevitably followed if a revolting population was forced to throw itself on Soviet mercy. Only a few thousands fell in battle in Farghana, and only a few hundred in Bashkiria, but when the Bashkurds submitted in 1921 they were subjected to artificial famine and disease, their lands were handed to Russians and they themselves were forced into the mountains or the steppe after seizure of their flocks, with the result that they died in hundreds upon hundreds of thousands. The Soviets in fact adopted the Roman process; it was their peace which made a solitude and was more deadly than their war.

Of his own part, and the emotions to which the struggle gave rise, he speaks feelingly. In 1923 the hope of organized resistance was over and with a few friends he was crossing the Hindu Kush on his way to Kabul. As the little party mounted the foothills of the great rampart, they looked back sadly to the vast plains of the Turanian land stretched out beneath them and thought of the last six years since the Kerensky revolution, of all the effort which had been expended, and of the lives lost and the dreariness of the opening prospect. For six years they had ridden up and down that great land and calculated they had put perhaps 7000 miles behind them. But was all that endeavour in vain? Let him speak for himself.[1]

It is my delight that I was privileged to share in the severest struggles of my people in real earnest and not as a looker-on, even if that part had no historic significance. Everywhere we went we had seen the untold misery, the great-hearted uprightness, the saintliness of soul of our people. With our own eyes we beheld the things that travellers write about, and we exposed the lies told of the morale and character of the Turks. We observed the characteristics described as pacifist and cowardly, and knew these to be really the expression of the cool blood of a thoughtful, enduring and incredibly patient people, and also of a kind of wonder when face to face with the strange civilization the Russians had brought with them. Among the nomad and tribal Uzbeks and Kirghiz the old spirit of leadership, the master-soul, the true

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 472-4.

771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

khanates. The shariat, that is, the Koran, tradition and the decisions 671
of the first caliphs together with their commentaries and a large number of cases of precedence, are laid down in an endless number of books, and these are considered the basis for all administration of justice. Therefore only men who have made the study of these books 693
their life's work, can be judges, that is, the mullahs; and thus they 692
play the roles of theologian and jurist simultaneously. In the Moslem states of Central Asia, there are for all matters of law two courts of law. the kazi (the same as the kadi among the Turks) and the beg or khan. The kazis judge all civil law matters of dispute, and can also decide all lesser offenses. At the same time they also function as notaries and registrars of births, marriages and deaths, so that to them falls the preparation of deeds of purchase and sale, of the contraction of loans, of marriages and divorces and the like. The kazis are appointed for life by the beg or khan himself, after they have passed an exhaustive examination on the shariat. The number of kazis is unlimited, and no particular district is assigned to any. Everyone turns with his request to the kazi in whom he has the greatest confidence. There are no special chambers of justice. Every kazi practices his profession in his dwelling, also in the market and in the gateway halls. The kazis have only one scribe (mirza) to assist them from whom no further knowledge is required than that he have good handwriting. All the pleading is done 'viva voce'. The decisions, however, are [695]
entered in a special book by the mirza, and then confirmed by the kazi by the affixing of his seal. Among the Central Asians it is not the custom at all to sign a document or even a letter, an act of which only a few are capable; instead they always affix their seal in poster colors, in place of a signature. The kazis do not receive a regular salary; their income is made up of the taxes which they collect in the performance of their office as well as of the occasional gifts which they receive at weddings and the like. Those who are not satisfied with the decision of the kazi may appeal to the beg, or in the capitals, to the khan or his deputy.

The beg makes the decision of the higher court himself; in particularly important and difficult cases it becomes the concern of an assembly of the kazis, which makes the decision under the chairmanship of the highest kazi /211/ or kazi-kalyan. This decision may be corroborated by the beg or again it may be reversed. In all the more important cases, especially the criminal cases, the beg decides himself. He alone has the right to decree the heavier corporal punishments or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of the death sentences for himself.

all matters in dispute personally. In most cases, however, the begs 100
are completely illiterate persons, with no notion either of the shariat 696
or of reading and writing. In such cases the decision lies in the hands 693
of their divan-begis, who often simply transact legal business. I was once told how these divan-begis actually manipulate justice by the divan-begi of the Beg of Baysun, who had taken a great liking to me. He told me the following quite candidly. If someone has a dispute which he wants straightened out by the beg, he comes to the divan-begi, explains the affair to him, and meanwhile gives gifts to him as well as for the beg, corresponding to the importance of the case. The gifts may be fruit, silken stuffs, khalats or even a horse and trappings. The divan-begi informs the defendant of the complaint received, and the latter must likewise appear with corresponding gifts in order to explain the affair from his point of view. After the divan-begi has heard the arguments on both sides, and received the gifts both for himself and the beg, he reports to the beg about it, expressing at the same time his humble opinion, depending upon the circumstances, that the plaintiff or the defendant should be considered in the right, for the other brought inferior gifts, thereby disclosing his evil intentions. There, as a rule, the matter ends. It is obvious that under such circumstances a poor man has no chance of coming into his own rights, and must be satisfied with every injustice he suffers from the part of the richer man.

In the capitals, goverened by the khan or emir himself, the ruler 692
makes the ultimate judgments in person, and every subject has the right to turn directly to the khan, that is to say, of course, if he is admitted by the courtiers.

The punishments decreed for the criminals in Central Asian khan- 681
ates before the Russian domination, and to some extent in the independent states to the present day, were distinguished for their severity and fearsomeness. For less serious transgressions the bastonnade, arrest, prison and mutilation were decreed, and for more serious crime the death penalty was required, which was carried out in the various states in six different ways.

The bastonnade is practised by an usher of the court placing himself behind the one to be punished, putting the prisoner's arms over his shoulders and holding him by both hands, while a second man works over the prisoner's stripped back with a cudgel about a meter and a half long and as thick as a man's arm. /213/ Whiplashes too are often used instead of the cudgel. These are administered with the ordinary riding whips or nagaikas, and the prisoner receives half the lashes

681 on his back and half on the belly. This type of punishment is particularly horrible because the recipient is often so maltreated by it that his entrails hang out.

697 The manner in which those sentenced to a longer or shorter prison term must serve their sentence is quite distinctive. In Bayum in 1886 on the occasion of a visit to the Beg, I encountered on a terrace inside the fortress gate six individuals who had undergone the bastonnade the day before at the bazaar. They were accused of stealing and had been sentenced by the Beg to the bastonnade and six months imprisonment. Those under sentence were obliged to spend the entire period of their confinement here on this terrace, under the open sky, during which time the beg did not trouble himself about their maintenance or their guard. The feeding and shelter and the guarding of the prisoners was left to their closest relatives, who pledged with their persons and their property that the prisoners would make no break for freedom. The relatives were thereby forced to remain day and night beside those under arrest to prevent them from escaping. This is by all means the simplest, cheapest and most secure means for the state to dispose of its prisoners under sentence.

Horrible is the fate of those under dungeon sentence for various periods or for life. The native prisons, called zindans, are simple, dark, underground holes in the ground, six to twelve meters deep, which are narrow at the top like a bottle, and are closed over the top with a wooden lid. These prisons make any attempt at escape impossible, and at the same time make it unnecessary to keep a large staff of custodians. The prisoners are lowered into these prisons on ropes, as is the drinking water and the food which is brought them by compassionate souls. These are just the same sort of pits as those used for the storage of grain, and often they simply use empty underground storage rooms and deep dried-up wells as prisons. Anything more horrible than staying in such dungeons would be hard to imagine, and any manner of death would be a kindness compared with the life of such prisoners. These people are provided by the state neither with food not with drink, and if they have no relatives to feed them they are thrown entirely upon the charity of the public, which however, for reasons readily understood, avoids whenever possible such places of horror. It must not have been at all unusual in earlier times for the /214/ prisoners to eat the bodies of their deceased companions in misfortune from sheer hunger. Since the prisons have no ventilation at all, and the excrement of the prisoners and even the bodies of the dead are never removed, one can imagine what odors must collect in such

places, where upward of a dozen people are crammed together, whose 697
smell alone in the great heat would be unbearable. Over and above this, the unfortunates are tormented by an enormous number of bugs, ticks, lice, rats and every other sort of vermin, which in such a favorable and fertile medium, multiply to an unbelievable extent. The inmates of these terrible martyr cells are not always real criminals; the majority is completely innocent, brought here by the whims of the ruler and the intrigues of political enemies, and they are often completely forgotten, and must then breathe their last in this kind of hideous surrounding. The two English travelers, Stoddard and Connolly, who were executed by the Emir Nasr Allah in 1842, must have languished in such prisons in the town of Bukhara before they were executed. The Russians have naturally cleaned out such horrors within their possessions, and use all their influence to make the conditions more humane in the states of Central Asia which are still independent; whether they are successful, no one is in a position to know.

Mutilations must have been employed rather frequently in earlier 681
times in Turkestan as legal punishment, judging by the large number 685
of persons one still saw in my time going about as beggars, with missing noses, hands, or even feet. These punishments were usually applied to thieves, whom they wished to render harmless or at least to single out in this fashion. For this reason most of those punished in this manner are Kazakhs, who see nothing wrong in stealing, but on the contrary consider it an honorable sport. The sedentary population fails to see the joke in this respect. The thieves had their hands cut off at the wrists, the feet were cut off at the ankles, but the noses were cut off as smoothly as though they had never had them. The ears of those who had already been legally punished once or more were slit or cut off as well, depending on the circumstances, and this kind of mutilation formed a kind of penalty list for those concerned in any sort of later conflicts with the law.

Death sentences were employed very often in the Central Asian 681
states, just as in Bukhara until the most recent times theft, adultery, 661
prostitution, and even the use of wine was punishable by death. But the greatest number of victims were always provided by the whim and suspicion /215/ of the rulers, who believed they could strengthen their thrones only by means of cruelty and the destruction of all individuals who were in any way suspicious. One may see from the example of the last Khan of Kokand to what extremes many khans went in this respect. He once ordered 20,000 Kipchaks executed, simply from vexation be-

681 cause until that time he had been under the tutelage of a Kipchak, and
661 this had inconvenienced him. The most ruthless tyrant was unquestionably the Bukharan Emir Nasr Allah who ordered the execution not only of the two Englishmen mentioned above, and the Khan of Kokand Mohammed Ali, but even of his own wife and nearest kin. He filled the prisons with favorites fallen into disfavor and with the highest dignitaries.

681 In Turkestan the commonest manner of execution is by cutting the throat; beheading is, on the other hand, not customary. The executioner places the offender in front of him on the ground, with his hands tied, takes him by the chin with his left hand, and cuts his throat in two with an ordinary table knife. As a rule, ordinary criminals are executed publicly in the bazaar in this manner, and little ceremony is made of it. /Figure 77. Caption: The Mir-Arab Minaret in Bukhara. The place of execution for serious criminals./ The executioner leads the criminals turned over to him into the bazaar, on market days without further escort or preliminaries. /216/ There he himself picks out the most elevated spot possible, and slaughters his victims one after another, exactly the way sheep are slaughtered.

Along with throat-cutting, hanging is also in general use. This is considered, as with us, the most disgraceful manner of death. Those condemned to die by the rope are either hanged over the gateways which is done especially in the cases of rebels and political criminals as a horrible example, or they are strung up on gallows which are erected permanently in the bazaar squares of every town. The condemned has a rope put around his neck by which he is pulled up in the air and tied fast about a meter above the ground. The native two-wheeled wagons are also often used for hangings when there happen to be no gallows near by. The person to be hung is fastened by a noose to one of the wagon shafts and then the back end of the wagon is pushed down to the ground, whereby the shaft with the person to be hung is speeded upwards. This manner of hanging was used, for example, for those Russians who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Kokand during the war in 1876 and who refused to be converted to Islam.

In Bukhara, being hurled down from the Minaret of Mir-Arab, shown in Figure 77 (p. 215), is considered the chief punishment. This minaret, which stands in an open square in the center of the town of Bukhara, is built of firebricks and is 52 meters high, the highest tower in all of Central Asia. The gravest criminals are thrown down from the platform of this minaret onto the pavement, which they reach, naturally, only as formless masses. During the stay of the Russian General Matveyev in Bukhara in 1884, a criminal was executed in this manner

whose story I will present here because it is characteristic of the situation in Bukhara. The man in question had stolen a sum of about 100,000 marks from a rich merchant and had absconded with his booty to Afghanistan, the America for all of Central Asia. Since the Emir, for this reason, had no way of taking him into custody, he called two of his secret policemen and ordered them to deliver the thief, dead or alive; if they did not, he would have their throats cut; this is the usual perspective for all those who do not succeed in carrying out the orders of the emir which are often quite impossible to fulfill. The two unlucky detectives started on their way dressed as workers, stopped the thief, who had already bought himself wares and a caravan for the stolen gold, and hired themselves out to him as camel drivers. They had to trot along for several weeks on foot behind their victim until they finally /217/ obtained a favorable opportunity to carry out their plan. Then they fell upon the thief during the night, as he slept in the midst of his armed escort, gagged him, and carried him on their shoulders all the way to the Amu-Darya. Naturally they were in constant danger of death because they dared not allow themselves to be met by the Afghans who would have strung them up without further ado. They could therefore march with their dangerous burden only at night and by roundabout ways, but they finally brought their victim successfully to Bukhara. The Emir sentenced the culprit to death by throat-cutting, but since this form of death did not please the prisoner, he confessed that he had also snatched some property from the wakf. This was pure fabrication, but because of it he was sentenced to the ultimate punishment, to be thrown down from the minaret, which is what he had wished.

Shooting is used only rarely, and strangely enough, only against women who are found guilty of adultery, prostitution and the like, or whom the khan, for whatever reasons, wishes to punish or simply to eliminate. These are shot with pistols. Those wives of whom the khans have grown weary are not killed but are given away by the khans to their favorites. Thus, for example, the deposed Khan of Kokand, before his transfer to Orenburg /Chkalov/, divided his numerous harem in Tashkent among his acquaintances. Adulteresses were also stoned in earlier times. To this end they were buried in the ground up to the breast, and then stoned to death by the public with rocks or clods of earth.

Until the introduction of Russian rule in Kokand, impalement was also in use, being carried out in different ways. Either the condemned was simply thrust on a sharpened stake, as was also the custom earlier in Turkey, or he was bound to a two-wheeled wagon, with his legs clasped on the wagon shaft, while the stake was fastened to another

681 wagon, and then by running the two wagons together the condemned was run through the body with full force. Finally the stake with the impaled criminal was planted in the ground.

693 692 Of the earlier institutions of justice, the Russians have kept only the office of the kazi in their Central Asian possessions and even this has undergone certain modifications. They were induced to do this by the fact that it would have been impossible to submit the native Moslems altogether to the regular Russian jurisdiction without infringing profoundly upon their religious views. For these people were accustomed to see all their private disputes and their family affairs adjusted on the basis of the shariat and the Russian judges naturally could not be expected to have a knowledge of this. /218/ The Russian regime, however, renounced the power to nominate the kazis, who earlier had been appointed by the representatives of the state power, and left the choice to the common people. The Russian administration requires only that those chosen as kazis must all be persons over twenty-five years of age, of good reputation and never convicted. The special certificate of qualification which had formerly been required is no longer asked of the kazis. The kazis, like the aksakals are still generally elected for a definite period of years. The office of kazi-kalyan or chief justice has been abolished and all the kazis have the same rank. Each is assigned a special district, within which only the duly qualified kazi has the right to exercise judicial and notary functions. In the town of Tashkent, the number of kazis has been established at four, corresponding to the four old town quarters. The establishment of the kazi's salary or other income from his appointment, in the form of fees or taxes, has likewise been left by the regime to the common people. The kazis decide now as they did before all the disputes of the natives where the sum involved does not exceed 200 marks, and can also decide minor misdemeanors; thus, as judges, their sphere of action is similar to that of a Russian justice of the peace. More important disputes are settled by an assembly of all the kazis in a district. Criminal cases are judged by the regular Russian common law, just as are all disputes between Russians and natives. Moreover, it is left to the discretion of the natives to turn in all their affairs to the Russian jurisdiction, if they prefer.

681 Capital punishment has been abolished in Russia since the rule of the Empress Elizabeth, and all, even the most serious criminals, excepting only those guilty of high treason, are sentenced to deportation to Siberia (most recently also to the island of Sakhalin) and to forced labor. This law holds also for the Central Asian possessions of

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During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases,
of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876.
This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike.

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of 871
Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /210/
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The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in 872
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There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held 872
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In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held
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Until the introduction of Russian rule in Kokand, impalement was also in use, being carried out in different ways. Either the condemned was simply thrust on a sharpened stake, as was also the custom earlier in Turkey, or he was bound to a two-wheeled wagon, with his legs clasped on the wagon shaft, while the stake was fastened to another

places, where upward of a dozen people are crammed together, whose 697
smell alone in the great heat would be unbearable. Over and above this, the unfortunates are tormented by an enormous number of bugs, ticks, lice, rats and every other sort of vermin, which in such a favorable and fertile medium, multiply to an unbelievable extent. The inmates of these terrible martyr cells are not always real criminals; the majority is completely innocent, brought here by the whims of the ruler and the intrigues of political enemies, and they are often completely forgotten, and must then breathe their last in this kind of hideous surrounding. The two English travelers, Stoddard and Connolly, who were executed by the Emir Nasr Allah in 1842, must have languished in such prisons in the town of Bukhara before they were executed. The Russians have naturally cleaned out such horrors within their possessions, and use all their influence to make the conditions more humane in the states of Central Asia which are still independent; whether they are successful, no one is in a position to know.

Mutilations must have been employed rather frequently in earlier 681
times in Turkestan as legal punishment, judging by the large number 685
of persons one still saw in my time going about as beggars, with missing noses, hands, or even feet. These punishments were usually applied to thieves, whom they wished to render harmless or at least to single out in this fashion. For this reason most of those punished in this manner are Kazakhs, who see nothing wrong in stealing, but on the contrary consider it an honorable sport. The sedentary population fails to see the joke in this respect. The thieves had their hands cut off at the wrists, the feet were cut off at the ankles, but the noses were cut off as smoothly as though they had never had them. The ears of those who had already been legally punished once or more were slit or cut off as well, depending on the circumstances, and this kind of mutilation formed a kind of penalty list for those concerned in any sort of later conflicts with the law.

Death sentences were employed very often in the Central Asian 681
states, just as in Bukhara until the most recent times theft, adultery, 661
prostitution, and even the use of wine was punishable by death. But the greatest number of victims were always provided by the whim and suspicion /215/ of the rulers, who believed they could strengthen their thrones only by means of cruelty and the destruction of all individuals who were in any way suspicious. One may see from the example of the last Khan of Kokand to what extremes many khans went in this respect. He once ordered 20,000 Kipchaks executed, simply from vexation be-

000 or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of
695 the death sentences for himself. The law proceedings before the beg or khan are very succinct and take up very little time. During my trip through Bukhara in 1886, I once had the opportunity to study these proceedings of law in detail. In the town of Kitab where I was the guest of the Beg for two days, I was quartered in the citadel in the same court in which the Beg lived, and in fact my dwelling was just opposite that of the Beg. The second day of my visit was the weekly bazaar day, which for the natives is likewise day court , held for the greater convenience of the country-dwellers, who come on these days into the town from all directions. The Beg had already taken his place early in the morning beside an open window extending down to the ground, and awaited the arrival of the plaintiffs and defendants while reading a book. The latter, who were led in by servants in successive pairs, bowed down to the ground as soon as they were visible to the Beg, and with constant bowing and obviously with great anxiety approached the open window beside which the Beg was squatting. At a given sign the plaintiff began his speech, which was a bombast of one or two minutes, delivered with unbelievable speed and fluency. After the defendant had replied to this in similar fashion, the Beg, without looking up from his book and often without deigning to bestow a single glance on either of them, would deliver his judgment in a few words, immediately and without lengthy deliberation, and against this there was no further appeal. Both parties thereupon showed their gratitude for the judgment received by bowing to the ground repeatedly, and retired apparently in the greatest harmony. However, no sooner had they come under the archway of the gate, where they were no longer in view of the Beg, (I could still see them from my room,) then they usually came to blows all over again, until the men-at-arms serving the beg took them both by the collar and threw them into the street, in order to make way for the next parties. If a defendant was sentenced to corporal punishment, this was carried out on the spot. A carpenter was accused of not finishing a job promptly, for which he had already been paid and the beg sentenced him for this to forty lashes. The contract-breaking carpenter was forthwith seized, dragged before the gate and, to the great /212/ pleasure of the bazaar public, treated to the decreed thrashing. The man in question, the Beg of Kitab, who on this forenoon had settled fifty cases in the given fashion without straining himself particularly, was, by way of exception, a mullah himself and a very enlightened man, and for this reason he decided all matters in dispute personally.

[686]

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation.
177 It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain cultivation the peasants work in orchards and do
[691] vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

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their life's work, can be judges, that is, the mullahs; and thus they 692
play the roles of theologian and jurist simultaneously. In the Moslem states of Central Asia, there are for all matters of law two courts of law, the kazi (the same as the kadi among the Turks) and the beg or khan. The kazis judge all civil law matters of dispute, and can also decide all lesser offenses. At the same time they also function as notaries and registrars of births, marriages and deaths, so that to them falls the preparation of deeds of purchase and sale, of the contraction of loans, of marriages and divorces and the like. The kazis are appointed for life by the beg or khan himself, after they have passed an exhaustive examination on the shariat. The number of kazis is unlimited, and no particular district is assigned to any. Everyone turns with his request to the kazi in whom he has the greatest confidence. There are no special chambers of justice. Every kazi practices his profession in his dwelling, also in the market and in the gateway halls. The kazis have only one scribe (mirza) to assist them from whom no further knowledge is required than that he have good handwriting. All the pleading is done 'viva voce'. The decisions, however, are [695]
entered in a special book by the mirza, and then confirmed by the kazi by the affixing of his seal. Among the Central Asians it is not the custom at all to sign a document or even a letter, an act of which only a few are capable; instead they always affix their seal in poster colors, in place of a signature. The kazis do not receive a regular salary; their income is made up of the taxes which they collect in the performance of their office as well as of the occasional gifts which they receive at weddings and the like. Those who are not satisfied with the decision of the kazi may appeal to the beg, or in the capitals, to the khan or his deputy.

The beg makes the decision of the higher court himself; in particularly important and difficult cases it becomes the concern of an assembly of the kazis, which makes the decision under the chairmanship of the highest kazi /211/ or kazi-kalyan. This decision may be corroborated by the beg or again it may be reversed. In all the more important cases, especially the criminal cases, the beg decides himself. He alone has the right to decree the heavier corporal punishments or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of the death sentences for himself.

all matters in dispute personally. In most cases, however, the begs 100
are completely illiterate persons, with no notion either of the shariat 696
or of reading and writing. In such cases the decision lies in the hands 693
of their divan-begis, who often simply transact legal business. I was once told how these divan-begis actually manipulate justice by the divan-begi of the Beg of Baysun, who had taken a great liking to me. He told me the following quite candidly. If someone has a dispute which he wants straightened out by the beg, he comes to the divan-begi, explains the affair to him, and meanwhile gives gifts to him as well as for the beg, corresponding to the importance of the case. The gifts may be fruit, silken stuffs, khalats or even a horse and trappings. The divan-begi informs the defendant of the complaint received, and the latter must likewise appear with corresponding gifts in order to explain the affair from his point of view. After the divan-begi has heard the arguments on both sides, and received the gifts both for himself and the beg, he reports to the beg about it, expressing at the same time his humble opinion, depending upon the circumstances, that the plaintiff or the defendant should be considered in the right, for the other brought inferior gifts, thereby disclosing his evil intentions. There, as a rule, the matter ends. It is obvious that under such circumstances a poor man has no chance of coming into his own rights, and must be satisfied with every injustice he suffers from the part of the richer man.

In the capitals, goverened by the khan or emir himself, the ruler 692
makes the ultimate judgments in person, and every subject has the right to turn directly to the khan, that is to say, of course, if he is admitted by the courtiers.

The punishments decreed for the criminals in Central Asian khan- 681
ates before the Russian domination, and to some extent in the independent states to the present day, were distinguished for their severity and fearsomeness. For less serious transgressions the bastonnade, arrest, prison and mutilation were decreed, and for more serious crime the death penalty was required, which was carried out in the various states in six different ways.

The bastonnade is practised by an usher of the court placing himself behind the one to be punished, putting the prisoner's arms over his shoulders and holding him by both hands, while a second man works over the prisoner's stripped back with a cudgel about a meter and a half long and as thick as a man's arm. /213/ Whiplashes too are often used instead of the cudgel. These are administered with the ordinary riding whips or nagaikas, and the prisoner receives half the lashes

681 wagon, and then by running the two wagons together the condemned was run through the body with full force. Finally the stake with the impaled criminal was planted in the ground.

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entered in a special book by the mirza, and then confirmed by the kazi by the affixing of his seal. Among the Central Asians it is not the custom at all to sign a document or even a letter, an act of which only a few are capable; instead they always affix their seal in poster colors, in place of a signature. The kazis do not receive a regular salary; their income is made up of the taxes which they collect in the performance of their office as well as of the occasional gifts which they receive at weddings and the like. Those who are not satisfied with the decision of the kazi may appeal to the beg, or in the capitals, to the khan or his deputy.

The beg makes the decision of the higher court himself; in particularly important and difficult cases it becomes the concern of an assembly of the kazis, which makes the decision under the chairmanship of the highest kazi /211/ or kazi-kalyan. This decision may be corroborated by the beg or again it may be reversed. In all the more important cases, especially the criminal cases, the beg decides himself. He alone has the right to decree the heavier corporal punishments or the death sentence when the khan does not reserve the approval of the death sentences for himself.

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681 wagon, and then by running the two wagons together the condemned was run through the body with full force. Finally the stake with the impaled criminal was planted in the ground.

• 693 692 Of the earlier institutions of justice, the Russians have kept only the office of the kazi in their Central Asian possessions and even this has undergone certain modifications. They were induced to do this by the fact that it would have been impossible to submit the native Moslems altogether to the regular Russian jurisdiction without infringing profoundly upon their religious views. For these people were accustomed to see all their private disputes and their family affairs adjusted on the basis of the shariat and the Russian judges naturally could not be expected to have a knowledge of this. /218/ The Russian regime, however, renounced the power to nominate the kazis, who earlier had been appointed by the representatives of the state power, and left the choice to the common people. The Russian administration requires only that those chosen as kazis must all be persons over twenty-five years of age, of good reputation and never convicted. The special certificate of qualification which had formerly been required is no longer asked of the kazis. The kazis, like the aksakals are still generally elected for a definite period of years. The office of kazi-kalyan or chief justice has been abolished and all the kazis have the same rank. Each is assigned a special district, within which only the duly qualified kazi has the right to exercise judicial and notary functions. In the town of Tashkent, the number of kazis has been established at four, corresponding to the four old town quarters. The establishment of the kazi's salary or other income from his appointment, in the form of fees or taxes, has likewise been left by the regime to the common people. The kazis decide now as they did before all the disputes of the natives where the sum involved does not exceed 200 marks, and can also decide minor misdemeanors; thus, as judges, their sphere of action is similar to that of a Russian justice of the peace. More important disputes are settled by an assembly of all the kazis in a district. Criminal cases are judged by the regular Russian common law, just as are all disputes between Russians and natives. Moreover, it is left to the discretion of the natives to turn in all their affairs to the Russian jurisdiction, if they prefer.

681 Capital punishment has been abolished in Russia since the rule of the Empress Elizabeth, and all, even the most serious criminals, excepting only those guilty of high treason, are sentenced to deportation to Siberia (most recently also to the island of Sakhalin) and to forced labor. This law holds also for the Central Asian possessions of

khanates. The shariat, that is, the Koran, tradition and the decisions 671
of the first caliphs together with their commentaries and a large number of cases of precedence, are laid down in an endless number of books, and these are considered the basis for all administration of justice. Therefore only men who have made the study of these books 693
their life's work, can be judges, that is, the mullahs; and thus they 692
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695 the death sentences for himself. The law proceedings before the beg or khan are very succinct and take up very little time. During my trip through Bukhara in 1886, I once had the opportunity to study these proceedings of law in detail. In the town of Kitab where I was the guest of the Beg for two days, I was quartered in the citadel in the same court in which the Beg lived, and in fact my dwelling was just opposite that of the Beg. The second day of my visit was the weekly bazaar day, which for the natives is likewise day court , held for the greater convenience of the country-dwellers, who come on these days into the town from all directions. The Beg had already taken his place early in the morning beside an open window extending down to the ground, and awaited the arrival of the plaintiffs and defendants while reading a book. The latter, who were led in by servants in successive pairs, bowed down to the ground as soon as they were visible to the Beg, and with constant bowing and obviously with great anxiety approached the open window beside which the Beg was squatting. At a given sign the plaintiff began his speech, which was a bombast of one or two minutes, delivered with unbelievable speed and fluency. After the defendant had replied to this in similar fashion, the Beg, without looking up from his book and often without deigning to bestow a single glance on either of them, would deliver his judgment in a few words, immediately and without lengthy deliberation, and against this there was no further appeal. Both parties thereupon showed their gratitude for the judgment received by bowing to the ground repeatedly, and retired apparently in the greatest harmony. However, no sooner had they come under the archway of the gate, where they were no longer in view of the Beg, (I could still see them from my room,) then they usually came to blows all over again, until the men-at-arms serving the beg took them both by the collar and threw them into the street, in order to make way for the next parties. If a defendant was sentenced to corporal punishment, this was carried out on the spot. A carpenter was accused of not finishing a job promptly, for which he had already been paid and the beg sentenced him for this to forty lashes. The contract-breaking carpenter was forthwith seized, dragged before the gate and, to the great /212/ pleasure of the bazaar public, treated to the decreed thrashing. The man in question, the Beg of Kitab, who on this forenoon had settled fifty cases in the given fashion without straining himself particularly, was, by way of exception, a mullah himself and a very enlightened man, and for this reason he decided all matters in dispute personally.

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361 must pass, the gate watch is placed. During the day the gates are continually open, but at nightfall they are closed and the keys delivered to the chief of police in charge, to avoid any sort of surprise through the carelessness or treachery of the guards at the gate.
[696] In the gate halls mentioned above,* in those regions which are still independent, the judges often take their places on bazaar days to administer justice to each one who has some sort of request. The punishments decreed are carried out in the same place, so that perhaps those criminals sentenced to hang will be hung upon the ceiling beams, and those visiting the bazaar must pass under them. When General von Kauffmann retreated from the rebellious town of Kokand, immediately after his departure, the Khan he had installed was stuck up like a pig in the bazaar, and when he regained control there for the second time /160/ he ordered the ringleaders to be hung in groups in all the gates of the town, as a horrible example.

In order to assure the safety of their town, the people of Tashkent not only built a very strong wall which was practically impregnable under Turkestan conditions., but they also installed a number
[72] of observation posts outside the town. Since declarations of war were not the custom among the people of Turkestan, and the great art of the Turkestan battle leaders lay precisely in the execution of sudden and unexpected attacks in time of peace, the people of Tashkent built a number of artificial conical hills in the steppe, from twelve to fifteen meters high, on which various sentinels were placed, who were supposed to report the approach of enemies. These observation hills are usually found in pairs and are usually located in the even steppe where there are no suitable natural rises in the ground. They extend along the road to Fergana, from which Tashkent was most often exposed to surprise attacks, as far as the modern relay station Uralskaya, seventy kilometers from Tashkent.

Today the town wall of Tashkent, which no longer has any function, has fallen completely into decay, and on the east side, where the Sart and Russian towns meet, it has been entirely levelled because the material of the wall has been used by the Russians and the natives for brick-making.

Like all the towns of Turkestan, Tashkent once had an Urda(1)

1. In the towns inhabited by Tadzhiks, as, for example, Khodzhent/Leninbad/and Samarkand, the fortresses were designated by the name 'Ark' obviously the same root as the Latin arx. /citadel. /

*[cf. cat #6, p. 8 -- Analyst]

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681 on his back and half on the belly. This type of punishment is particularly horrible because the recipient is often so maltreated by it that his entrails hang out.

697 The manner in which those sentenced to a longer or shorter prison term must serve their sentence is quite distinctive. In Baysun in 1886 on the occasion of a visit to the Beg, I encountered on a terrace inside the fortress gate six individuals who had undergone the bastonnade the day before at the bazaar. They were accused of stealing and had been sentenced by the Beg to the bastonnade and six months imprisonment. Those under sentence were obliged to spend the entire period of their confinement here on this terrace, under the open sky, during which time the beg did not trouble himself about their maintenance or their guard. The feeding and shelter and the guarding of the prisoners was left to their closest relatives, who pledged with their persons and their property that the prisoners would make no break for freedom. The relatives were thereby forced to remain day and night beside those under arrest to prevent them from escaping. This is by all means the simplest, cheapest and most secure means for the state to dispose of its prisoners under sentence.

Horrible is the fate of those under dungeon sentence for various periods or for life. The native prisons, called zindans, are simple, dark, underground holes in the ground, six to twelve meters deep, which are narrow at the top like a bottle, and are closed over the top with a wooden lid. These prisons make any attempt at escape impossible, and at the same time make it unnecessary to keep a large staff of custodians. The prisoners are lowered into these prisons on ropes, as is the drinking water and the food which is brought them by compassionate souls. These are just the same sort of pits as those used for the storage of grain, and often they simply use empty underground storage rooms and deep dried-up wells as prisons. Anything more horrible than staying in such dungeons would be hard to imagine, and any manner of death would be a kindness compared with the life of such prisoners. These people are provided by the state neither with food not with drink, and if they have no relatives to feed them they are thrown entirely upon the charity of the public, which however, for reasons readily understood, avoids whenever possible such places of horror. It must not have been at all unusual in earlier times for the /214/ prisoners to eat the bodies of their deceased companions in misfortune from sheer hunger. Since the prisons have no ventilation at all, and the excrement of the prisoners and even the bodies of the dead are never removed, one can imagine what odors must collect in such

places, where upward of a dozen people are crammed together, whose 697
smell alone in the great heat would be unbearable. Over and above this, the unfortunates are tormented by an enormous number of bugs, ticks, lice, rats and every other sort of vermin, which in such a favorable and fertile medium, multiply to an unbelievable extent. The inmates of these terrible martyr cells are not always real criminals; the majority is completely innocent, brought here by the whims of the ruler and the intrigues of political enemies, and they are often completely forgotten, and must then breathe their last in this kind of hideous surrounding. The two English travelers, Stoddard and Connolly, who were executed by the Emir Nasr Allah in 1842, must have languished in such prisons in the town of Bukhara before they were executed. The Russians have naturally cleaned out such horrors within their possessions, and use all their influence to make the conditions more humane in the states of Central Asia which are still independent; whether they are successful, no one is in a position to know.

Mutilations must have been employed rather frequently in earlier 681
times in Turkestan as legal punishment, judging by the large number 685
of persons one still saw in my time going about as beggars, with missing noses, hands, or even feet. These punishments were usually applied to thieves, whom they wished to render harmless or at least to single out in this fashion. For this reason most of those punished in this manner are Kazakhs, who see nothing wrong in stealing, but on the contrary consider it an honorable sport. The sedentary population fails to see the joke in this respect. The thieves had their hands cut off at the wrists, the feet were cut off at the ankles, but the noses were cut off as smoothly as though they had never had them. The ears of those who had already been legally punished once or more were slit or cut off as well, depending on the circumstances, and this kind of mutilation formed a kind of penalty list for those concerned in any sort of later conflicts with the law.

Death sentences were employed very often in the Central Asian 681
states, just as in Bukhara until the most recent times theft, adultery, 661
prostitution, and even the use of wine was punishable by death. But the greatest number of victims were always provided by the whim and suspicion /215/ of the rulers, who believed they could strengthen their thrones only by means of cruelty and the destruction of all individuals who were in any way suspicious. One may see from the example of the last Khan of Kokand to what extremes many khans went in this respect. He once ordered 20,000 Kipchaks executed, simply from vexation be-

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often
563 completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

• 697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

Russia. Only those natives guilty of rebellion or the murder of Russian 681
officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by [687]
shooting, by court-martial, instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions
at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers [698]
and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General.
During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases,
of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876.
This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike.

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of 871
Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /219/
large, although education is a private matter, and the native governments provide neither for the erection of schools nor for the salaries of teachers. In Turkestan there are two classes of schools, elementary schools or 'mekhtebes', and higher schools or medreses.

The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in 872
the higher schools. In each elementary school there is only one teacher 875
who instructs the students of all ages in one and the same place. These teachers receive no fixed salary. Their entire income consists in the school fees which the students bring them voluntarily, which, however, are never more than a mark a year at most, and in occasional gifts of provisions, which they receive every Thursday, and festive clothes which they receive from the parents of their students at the time of the high Moslem festivals. There is a special custom that the father of a boy presents the teacher with a khalat when the boy has progressed far enough to start reading the Koran.

There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held 872
either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, windowless chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appropriate mosque.

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are frequented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

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II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzat-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of
554 their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stable-boy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consier it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of firty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

634 The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

L: von Schwarz--26a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 8. The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
652 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported
662 by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time . In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruted from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

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901 /185/ In Bukhara the mercenary troops mentioned above, designated as 'sarbaz' were and are until today made up of infantry and artillery (Figure 65, 66, and 67, p. 31a, 32a, and 32b.) /Figure 65: Caption: [714] The former regular army of Kokand./ The uniform of the sarbaz consists of tall black sheepskin caps, similar to those of the Turkmen, of /186/ heavy leather boots, red khalats or jackets with stand-up collars, and broad yellow breeches, which are put over the khalat and the boots. Soliders uniformed in this manner can have little claim to grace; for as a result of the khalats being stuffed into the trousers, their physical bulk, especially in back is so voluminous as to be strongly reminiscent of Kazakh fat-tailed sheep. The artillerymen have blue coats with red collars. Officers and non-commisioned officers wear in addition long coats made of cloth of red, blue or green, according to their branch of service, and long curved sabers. On top of this they adorn themselves with all possible kinds of cast-off Russian officers' epaulettes and officials' shoulder-straps, which they have received from Russian officers and officials as gifts, or bought from Jewish old-clothes dealers. The arms [713] of the infantry consists of weapons of all possible forms and calibers, beginning with the short, massive blunderbusses from the time of the discovery of America, with a flaring muzzle, all the way to the double-barreled sporting gun of today. Very recently the Bukharan army also received a number of Berdan rifles, which were given the emir by the Emperor of Russia at the time of the coronation. The cannon are mostly muzzle-loaders of the same make. When on the march, the sarbaz are transported on the usual native two-wheeled wagons, since all the Central Asians are poor foot soldiers. The sarbaz infantry and artillery have value only in fighting the natives; when opposing European troops they are without any significance.

726 In case of war in Kokand and Bukhara, the whole remaining male population capable of bearing arms would be called up in addition to the sarbaz. This totally untrained and undisciplined militia was made up solely of cavalry, armed in the most diverse manner with lances, heavy sabers, flintlock and slow-match guns, sticks set in brass slings and bows, or even simply whips (nagaikas). (1)

1. In the last Kokand war (1876) the Russian met fighters who still wore visored helmets and iron coats of mail.

l: von Schwarz--31a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Ml Turkestan Ml

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

Fig. 2. The former regular army of Kokand.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

161 If the percent of natural increase in the Turkestan region is not high, we will see something quite different if we examine the population increase which results from other causes. The annexation of new lands and the colonization of the region both by the Russians and by natives coming in from neighboring territories, has increased the population figure for the area threefold.

The table on the following page shows the population change in the region for the eleven years from 1867 through 1877.

/336/ From this table it is found that:

1) In general, the density of the population of the region almost tripled.

162 2) The newly occupied territories not only increased the actual population of the region by almost 60%, but what is more essential, with their annexation to the area, the earlier proportion of sedentary to nomadic population was changed favorably and decisively. The nomads, who constituted between 1867 and 1869 around 70 to 80% of the total population of the region, by 1876 had already lost the numerical superiority to the sedentary population. In 1877 the sedentary group numbered over 200,000 more than the nomads, and represented up to 53% of the total population.

3) The sedentary population in the region increases much faster than the nomadic population.

II

The significance of the local population in relation to the composition of the military district.

164 702 The native population of the Turkestan area is excused from the obligation of military recruitment. It is difficult to say whether this gift

641 of grace will continue long. It would seem
702 that in the name of justice, the sooner these people participate in recruit duties the better. Entering into the body of the empire, being made members of the broad Russian family, enjoying the same rights, the population of Turkestan should also bear the same burdens. Unfortunately, in regard to recruitment, these newly annexed provinces are still in a special and unusual posi-
703 tion. The natives are not yet accustomed to Russian procedures, have not yet succeeded in acclimatizing themselves to Russian rule and to the demands of reasonable discipline. For them military service would be too sharp a transition from the kind of life they know, and there is no doubt that the new recruits would turn into /337/ very bad soldiers. The proximity of independent Central Asian khanates would contribute very much to desertions by our native soldiers. After our occupation of the Turkestan region desertions from the service by our soldiers occurred mostly among the lower ranks, among men of Tatar origin. They took refuge in countries related to them in religion, and found more attractive careers than in the Russian military service. This state of affairs led the administration of the Turkestan area to advocate not using Tatars in the lower ranks of the service in that region.

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hoes before putting on a new layer. The direction of the strokes for 333
one layer will be diagonal, from left /157/ to right, and for the next one from right to left, and so forth, from which the walls in Figure 52 (p. 158) retain a marked zigzag effect. /Figure 51. Caption: The palace of the khan of Khiva/

Considering the nature of the material, the walls must naturally be thicker at the bottom than at the top. The upper edge of the wall 712
is indented, /158/ and it serves partly as decoration and partly pro- 361
vides loopholes for shooting. Inside the town walls runs a platform on which the defenders can place cannons, and on which a person can walk all the way around the entire town. (Figure 53) For the walls continue without any interruption over rivers, canals, and ravines. /Figure 52. Caption: Turkestan town wall. / Therefore the water courses are bridged over with thick beams and on these the walls are built in the same manner as on dry land. The height of the town walls differs according to the terrain, the importance of the place, and the greater or lesser danger of the position. The walls of Tashkent, which are among the strongest, still standing at the time of my visit in 1874, had a height of from four and a half to six meters. Their circumference was about 25 kilometers. /Figure 53. Caption: Turkestan town wall, cross section. / The houses were not built against the town walls, but instead a wide street went around the whole town inside the wall, clearly to facilitate the defense. The gardens and fields nearly all lay outside the town walls, but each of them was likewise surrounded by its own wall, also made of clay. From the basic town twelve gates led out to the gardens and the nearby settlements, and these were usually named after the towns /159/ to which they led, as, for example, the Kokand gate, the Samarkand gate, etc. The arrangement of the town gates is quite a characteristic one in Turkestan. To shoot breaches in a loess wall is very difficult, because thin walls can be easily penetrated by the bullets without causing further damage, whereas from thick walls the bullets ricochet. In attacking a Turkestan town, therefore, the gates must always be stormed. These are therefore always built as solidly as possible. On both sides of the gate, very solid, more or less conical, round towers are built with platforms on which to put the fortification guns (Figures 52 and 54). The gate, provided with these massive wings, leads into a large , high, quadrangular hall, the floor of which is raised about two meters above the road. /Figure 54. Caption: The town gate of Khiva. / In this hall, through which everyone who walks, rides horseback or drives through the gate

L. von Schwarz--11a N-5 (ca 1895)1900 Turkestan 11.1

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

Fig. 11. Turkestan town wall.

l: von Schwarz --11b[illegible]-8(c.1895) 1900 Pl.1 Turkestan Pl.1

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

Fig.sa. Turkestan town wall, cross section.

1: von Schwarz--11c N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

712

Fig. 54. The town gate of Khiva.

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361 must pass, the gate watch is placed. During the day the gates are continually open, but at nightfall they are closed and the keys delivered to the chief of police in charge, to avoid any sort of surprise through the carelessness or treachery of the guards at the gate.
[696] In the gate halls mentioned above* in those regions which are still independent, the judges often take their places on bazaar days to administer justice to each one who has some sort of request. The punishments decreed are carried out in the same place, so that perhaps those criminals sentenced to hang will be hung upon the ceiling beams, and those visiting the bazaar must pass under them. When General von Kauffmann retreated from the rebellious town of Kokand, immediately after his departure, the Khan he had installed was stuck up like a pig in the bazaar, and when he regained control there for the second time /160/ he ordered the ringleaders to be hung in groups in all the gates of the town, as a horrible example.

In order to assure the safety of their town, the people of Tashkent not only built a very strong wall which was practically impregnable under Turkestan conditions., but they also installed a number
[721] of observation posts outside the town. Since declarations of war were not the custom among the people of Turkestan, and the great art of the Turkestan battle leaders lay precisely in the execution of sudden and unexpected attacks in time of peace, the people of Tashkent built a number of artificial conical hills in the steppe, from twelve to fifteen meters high, on which various sentinels were placed, who were supposed to report the approach of enemies. These observation hills are usually found in pairs and are usually located in the even steppe where there are no suitable natural rises in the ground. They extend along the road to Fergana, from which Tashkent was most often exposed to surprise attacks, as far as the modern relay station Uralskaya, seventy kilometers from Tashkent.

Today the town wall of Tashkent, which no longer has any function, has fallen completely into decay, and on the east side, where the Sart and Russian towns meet, it has been entirely levelled because the material of the wall has been used by the Russians and the natives for brick-making.

Like all the towns of Turkestan, Tashkent once had an Urda(1)

1. In the towns inhabited by Tadzhiks, as, for example, Khodzhent/Leninbad/and Samarkand, the fortresses were designated by the name 'Ark' obviously the same root as the Latin arx. /citadel. /

*[cf. cat 16, p. 8 -- Analyst]

or citadel which was blown up by the Russians immediately after 712
the capture of the town. It was located on the upper left bank of 361
the Bos-su canal, and the site today is within the Russian town and barracks and various public and private buildings are built on it.

2. The Bazaar

The bazaar has a meaning for the Central Asians which it is 366
difficult for the European to grasp properly. The Central Asian spends the greater part of his life in the bazaar, and for him it takes the place of our newspapers, restaurants, coffeehouses, townhalls, amusement places, stock exchanges, law courts, etc. At the bazaar the entire public life and a great part of the private life of the male urban population takes place, and day in, day out, in winter and summer almost the entire population, when it is not occupied with work in the fields, is gathered in the bazaar. The bazaar is the real home of the townsman; since his private dwelling serves him primarily as a lodging for the night, and as a depository for his property and his wives and children, he therefore expends relatively /161/ little trouble on it.
p.136
/Figure 55. Caption: Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace. /

The arrangement of the bazaars is the same everywhere, and 361
the bazaars of the different towns differ from each other only /162/ 366
in size. The bazaar in Tashkent is one of the largest in all Central Asia, containing about four thousand shops and workshops. The streets of the bazaar are relatively wide and mostly covered with reed mats, which are spread along beams diagonally placed over the streets from one row of stalls to another. The result is a pleasant twilight and a refreshing coolness, which is increased by a constant sprinkling of the bazaar streets with water. It is a beneficent contrast to the dazzling sunlight and the stifling ovenlike heat of the nearby streets leading into the dwelling quarters. (Figure 56).
p.142

The booths which range along both sides of the bazaar streets, 347
serving either for selling goods or as workshops for the various craftsmen, all look alike and have nothing in common with European shops. They are rooms two and a half to three meters high, four and a half to six meters long, and from two to two and a half meters deep, which are completely open to the street. The walls are made of clay or else of reed screens spread over on both sides with clay. The roof also is

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets,
nor about the purity of the water flowing through
the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the
[164] street or into the aryk. As a result both the
air and the water are infected and transmit,
one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which
exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy,
Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis,
727 goiter). In general /391/ our military admini-
stration in Turkestan has never billeted army
detachments in the native towns and villages,
first, because of the poor construction of the
[309] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness
of the population, who have not yet mixed at
all with the conquerors, and who, according to
their religious law, almost never permit stran-
gers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity,
712 occupy only such native dwellings as those
which are confiscated and can be made suitable
for European habitation. In most cases they
have occupied the homes of former rulers or
begs who have fled, and whose property conse-
quently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either
as barracks or as military hospitals. The
adaptation has consisted of putting in large
windows, installing ventilation, and so on.
The Russians who occupied Tashkent built bar-
racks for the army in the native manner, i.e.,
with the framework type of construction. But
they soon discarded this system and began to
build both the military buildings and the
living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a
regular manner.

person, but without noticeably better luck.

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1. In the last Kokand war (1876) the Russian met fighters who still wore visored helmets and iron coats of mail.

1: von Schwarz--32b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 11. Bukharan artillery (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

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*[cf. cat 16, p. 8 -- Analyst]

person, but without noticeably better luck.

701 /185/ In Bukhara the mercenary troops mentioned above, designated as 'sarbaz' were and are until today made up of infantry and artillery (Figure 65, 66, and 67, p. 31a, 32a, and 32b.) /Figure 65: Caption: [714] The former regular army of Kokand./ The uniform of the sarbaz consists of tall black sheepskin caps, similar to those of the Turkmen, of /186/ heavy leather boots, red khalats or jackets with stand-up collars, and broad yellow breeches, which are put over the khalat and the boots. Soliders uniformed in this manner can have little claim to grace; for as a result of the khalats being stuffed into the trousers, their physical bulk, especially in back is so voluminous as to be strongly reminiscent of Kazakh fat-tailed sheep. The artillerymen have blue coats with red collars. Officers and non-commisioned officers wear in addition long coats made of cloth of red, blue or green, according to their branch of service, and long curved sabers. On top of this they adorn themselves with all possible kinds of cast-off Russian officers' epaulettes and officials' shoulder-straps, which they have received from Russian officers and officials as gifts, or bought from Jewish old-clothes dealers. The arms [713] of the infantry consists of weapons of all possible forms and calibers, beginning with the short, massive blunderbusses from the time of the discovery of America, with a flaring muzzle, all the way to the double-barreled sporting gun of today. Very recently the Bukharan army also received a number of Berdan rifles, which were given the emir by the Emperor of Russia at the time of the coronation. The cannon are mostly muzzle-loaders of the same make. When on the march, the sarbaz are transported on the usual native two-wheeled wagons, since all the Central Asians are poor foot soldiers. The sarbaz infantry and artillery have value only in fighting the natives; when opposing European troops they are without any significance.

726 In case of war in Kokand and Bukhara, the whole remaining male population capable of bearing arms would be called up in addition to the sarbaz. This totally untrained and undisciplined militia was made up solely of cavalry, armed in the most diverse manner with lances, heavy sabers, flintlock and slow-match guns, sticks set in brass slings and bows, or even simply whips (nagaikas). (1)

1. In the last Kokand war (1876) the Russian met fighters who still wore visored helmets and iron coats of mail.

626 They had the same tactical value as the army of Darius did in its time in battle with the Macedonian phalanx of Alexander (Figure 68, p. 191; cf. also Figure 152). A former Kokand officer told me that in the struggles between Kokand and Bukhara the armies on both sides were sometimes over 100, 000 strong. The battles waged between these formidable hordes were relatively bloodless, however. After the first shots had been exchanged by both sides from the great distances, one of the contending parties always wheeled about /187/ /Figure 66. Caption: Bukharan infantry (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher). / /188/ and fled, although no one could fathom why just this side fled and not the other. /Footnote containing anecdote omitted. / It was therefore a fully rational act on the part of the Russians to rely upon their own forces in their wars in Central Asia, no matter how few in number and to refuse magnanimously the support, many times offered, of the Bukharan, Kazakh and other native auxiliary troops. /Original text cut out of translation from middle of p. 188 to p. 189, including two footnotes. / /Figure 67. Caption: Bukharan artillery (from a photograph by G. Merzbacher). /

625 For the maintenance of peace and order in the towns of Turkestan there is a special police force consisting of a police chief or /190/ kur-bashi, and a number of policemen or mirshabs. In spite of the primitive organization of the police and the complete absence of street lighting, safety is much greater in the towns of Turkestan inhabited by the natives than in the Russian towns, even though in the latter there are street lights, the police are organized in the European manner, and in addition safety is enforced by a countless horde of nightwatchmen. This is because of the summary and ruthless procedure of the secret police and because the peculiar arrangement described earlier by which all traffic on the streets is forbidden from evening until morning devotions, and everyone seen on the street after dark for whatever reason is arrested. Lovers of nightly adventures, thieves, and other malefactors are therefore in a difficult position. The carrying out of their evil intentions is made easier to some extent, however, in that the policemen and nightwatchmen are obliged to pass the whole night banging on tom-toms, drums and various wooden clappers at brief intervals, partly to frighten the evildoers, and partly to prove that they are at their posts and have not gone to sleep somewhere. For one can count on the honesty and the conscientiousness of the police and the nightwatchmen just as little as on the other people. Those who wander by night on forbidden errands can therefore usually orient themselves with considerable accuracy as to the momentary locations

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the
● 127 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] [For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga–Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

668 other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the
727 Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not
167 formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

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officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal commissioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

727 of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out
668 of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the
167 body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *gōz kanli* — bloody-eyes.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL I

of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

The national

668 committee under Kayum Khan's direction followed a middle course. They stood for a single united Turkistan, including the Persian-speaking Tajiks, roughly coincident with the limits of the five Soviet Central Asian republics, and they strove to inculcate the political idea of a common Turkistani nationality and allegiance. Unwilling to recognize that the several languages spoken in Turkistan are in fact languages and not mere dialects of one language, they tried to serve their end by inventing a middle-language — *ortatili* — which should become a lingua franca for all the country. They also did their best to encourage the German commanders to mix up the rank and file without regard to racial or linguistic affinities, making no distinction between an Uzbek or a Kazak, a Kirghiz or a Tajik. Their aim was a deliberate one, to counter the Russian policy of breaking down into small units and to re-create a common tradition for Turkistan. On the other hand they would have nothing to do with suggestions for a wider Turkish organism which should be shared with Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars or Bashkurds. They stood for a smaller unity, confined to Turkistan alone.

000 It is not easy to pronounce with confidence how far this policy is consonant with realities. On the one hand it was
• [327] noted that the Azeris, the only substantial people of Turkish stock in the Caucasus area, proved to be better combatant troops than any of the volunteers from Turkistan. This result may be partly attributable to the fact that, being alone, the Azeris were not mixed with other stocks and knew how they stood. The mingling of the five main stocks of Turkistan without any regard for origin or language must have produced a result not unlike what would follow if Pathans, Baluches, Panjabis and Awans were thrown together haphazard in the army of what is now Pakistan. It was a bold experiment and it can hardly have promoted efficiency, at least at the outset. On the other hand there is evidence that Uzbeks and Tajiks at any rate get on well together. (The Soviet attempt to play up the Persian character of the Tajik tradition is probably misconceived: Tajiks are often bilingual in any case.) As

364 the cleanliness of the households or the streets, nor about the purity of the water flowing through the streets. All refuse is thrown out into the [64] street or into the aryk. As a result both the air and the water are infected and transmit, one must suppose, those epidemic diseases which exist among the natives of Turkestan (leprosy, Sart disease (a skin disease), dracontiasis, 727 goiter). In general /391/ our military administration in Turkestan has never billeted army detachments in the native towns and villages, first, because of the poor construction of the [60] houses, and secondly because of the aloofness of the population, who have not yet mixed at all with the conquerors, and who, according to their religious law, almost never permit strangers to enter their dwellings.

727 The Russians, in cases of necessity, 712 occupy only such native dwellings as those which are confiscated and can be made suitable for European habitation. In most cases they have occupied the homes of former rulers or begs who have fled, and whose property consequently has been turned over to the treasury.

712 These dwellings have been adapted either as barracks or as military hospitals. The adaptation has consisted of putting in large windows, installing ventilation, and so on. The Russians who occupied Tashkent built barracks for the army in the native manner, i.e., with the framework type of construction. But they soon discarded this system and began to build both the military buildings and the living quarters of unfired clay, laid in a regular manner.

183 by the glance of a stranger. In 1886 in Baysun when I had to carry out astronomical observations from the roof of my dwelling, because there was no other suitable place, all the surrounding houses were emptied of their occupants for the night in question.

342 Each of these two parts is divided again into two or perhaps three subdivisions, depending on the circumstances: the living quarters, the courtyard and the garden, the last of which is usually lacking among the poorer people. Especially in arid regions and in towns densely built up, the inhabitants must content themselves with a simple court, while the gardens are relegated to a place outside the town walls. Where there is a garden, it is usually divided from the court and dwelling houses by a wide partition wall. As a rule, the general arrangement of the dwelling houses, sheds, courts, and gardens is that indicated in the two sketches above (Figures 82, p. 63a and 83, p. 229), of which the first shows the vertical cross section, and the second the ground plan of an average dwelling.

The dwelling houses, which consist of one or more rooms situated next to each other, the number depending upon the financial means of the owner, are built along the outer wall in such a way that this wall always forms the rear wall of the dwelling. The dwellings are almost exclusively one-story houses, which is partly due to the building material used, and partly to the frequent earthquakes. (2)

731 2. The frequency of earthquakes differs widely in different parts of Turkestan. While rare in many regions, as in Samarkand, for example, other places are often visited by earthquakes. The town of Vernoye /Alma Ata/, for example, was almost completely destroyed by one on June 9th, 1887, and since then it has felt earth tremors of greater or lesser intensity almost every day. Also in Osh, at the eastern end of the Fergana valley, there were almost daily earthquakes for a period several years ago. In Tashkent there are on the average about a dozen earthquakes in the course of a year. On the whole in Turkestan the earthquakes are light and rarely result in the caving in of houses and the loss of human life. In Tashkent I experienced only two such earthquakes in fifteen years, of which the one of November 29, 1886 was the strongest and caused considerable damage. The greatest earthquake in Turkestan of recent times was the

731 one already mentioned in Vernoye /Alma Ata/, which was felt all over Turkestan.

342 The walls of the dwelling houses are made of the same material as the town, court and garden walls, and erected in practically the same manner. In the court a large pit is dug, and the earth from it is kneaded with water and chopped straw into a sticky paste. From this large balls are formed, and these are piled up on each other and stamped down with the feet. Like the town and garden walls the house walls too are erected by layers, for the lower layer must always be allowed to dry first /231/ before a further layer can be placed on top. The straw which is mixed with the clay gives the walls great solidity, especially since the seeds remaining with the straw turn into buds under the great heat of the sun and grow through the walls in all directions, so that on the outside of newly built houses countless barley and wheat stalks are sprouting forth. Such a wall holds up much better in an earthquake than one built, no matter how solidly, of firebricks. Firebricks are not used for the building of private houses and are employed only for the larger public buildings like mosques, medreses, caravansaries, and baths, where their use is unavoidable since clay walls naturally cannot hold up under the heavier weight. In the rare cases when a dwelling house has an upper story superimposed, the walls of the second story are produced in a special manner with a combination of wood and clay. First a wooden frame of medium heavy beams is joined together and a large number of short thin wooden sticks are set in between the beams in a completely irregular fashion, usually fanwise. The spaces between the main beams and the wooden sticks are then filled in with balls of clay, and finally the whole is plastered over, inside and out, with a thick layer of clay so that nothing remains visible of the wooden framework except, at most, the ends of the main beams (cf. Figure 158). This upper story, which is not used for living quarters but only for storage, bears the Persian name bala-khana, from bala (upper) and khana (room), from which the Russian balagan (fair-booth) has obviously been derived, and probably also our "balcony".

The dwelling houses have no foundation, and they would be quite superfluous anyway because the ground, consisting of loess, has the same solidity as the walls themselves, which are constructed of the same material. The absence of foundations has the dis-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation.
177 It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

782 796 177 233 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclopedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subterfuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 177 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving, known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 177 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Musim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

785 sort of compensation for the abstinence endured all through the day, /206/ and this feast sometimes lasts until morning, during which gluttony is as great as is humanly possible. When traveling, these Moslem fasts often drove me nearly to despair. During the days, the men could not be used for anything as a result of lack of sleep, and of hunger and thirst, and at night when one was exausted from the exertions of traveling there was not a moment of peace for all night long the shouting and howling and the noise of drums and all possible musical instruments never ceased. And people regard such unhealthy fasts, alternated with orgies night after night, as deeds pleasing to God.

778 776 As regards superstition, the Central Asian Moslems are second to no other religious body. The tombs and the alleged clothing and relics of their countless saints, whose claim to this rank is usually very questionable, play a great role among them. In Central Asia there are many apocryphal tombs of saints, as for example, the tombs of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, in Mazar -i-Sharif and in Shakh-i-Mardan. There is also the monument to Alexander the Great in Margelan, the tomb of Daniel in Samarkand, and many others. We know from history that Alexander always aspired to the honor of being nominated to the ranks of the gods during his lifetime, although his ambition was never realized; instead of this, he was subsequently granted an honor on which he had not reckoned, namely, to be venerated after two thousand years as a Moslem saint and as a propagator of Islam in Central Asia. The Moslems of Turkestan have an unshakable faith in the healing powers of relics and amulets. Chips from the tombstone (1) are regarded as an infallible means against

777 [755]

1. This tombstone is chiselled from a single block of dark green nephrite, and is of incalculable value. The stone has been cut in half in the middle by an unknown hand, and superstitious Moslems and Russian collecters have broken off pieces from this broken place, as can be seen in Figure 75.

all internal illnesses, which has resulted in an extensive trade in fake particles from the tomb of Tamerlane. How Tamerlane came to have the odor of sanctity is somewhat difficult for Westerners to understand. An equally lucrative trade is carried on by the mullahs with amulets which they have made themselves, and which ostensibly contain miraculous prayer formulas and charms. Their content, however, is often similiar to the

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/
764 After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
765 and buried directly in the ground. After the burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (13;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[2] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

361 world. For one hundred years Samarkand was the seat of broad scholarly, administrative and commercial activity, and contained over 150,000 inhabitants. The massive remains of ancient buildings testify even today to the past glory of this city. The new (Moslem) town is not strikingly beautiful. Like all other Central Asian towns, it is made up of narrow crooked streets, lined with clay walls, ugly squat little houses, miserable small stalls similar to dog kennels, etc. etc.

/438/ The pleasantest place in town is
361 the Rigistan - a small town square, which is
346 formed by three ancient mosques and medresses, situated perpendicular to each other: the Tillya-kari (i.e., gold) medresse, the Shir-dar (named for the mosaic figures on the front of two animals resembling lions; the Persian word for lion is shir, and the Ulu-begi. This last building was once famous for its seat of learning and its observatory, but now it has suffered much from the ravages of time and earthquakes.

361 In the eastern section of Samarkand an
764 ancient building of Persian architecture is to be seen, known by the name of Gur-emir (the tomb of the emir), and containing the tomb of Timur. This mausoleum is crowned by a cupola which looks like a truncated melon. Along the sides there were two minarets, but one recently collapsed. The interior of the building is octagonal and consists of two rooms. The floors are laid with white marble, and the walls are covered with graceful azure arabesques and with quotations from the Koran in gold. The tomb of Timur is made of dark green jasper, and has the shape of a truncated pyramid, about

361 three feet wide and six feet long, turned with
764 the foundation uppermost. (1)

1. This stone constitutes a remarkably large single piece of nephrite.

This stone was split in two while in transport, after the conquest of Samarkand by Shakh-Nadir. Next to the tomb of the Emir are tombs of his teacher and various other members of his family. All these tombs are enclosed by a carved marble grating. By a narrow staircase one reaches the dark vault, which is also decorated with arabesques and on the floor of which there are the tombstones in the same order as they are placed up above. The copy of the Koran copied by Osman himself (the third Caliph of the faithful) was preserved in this underground vault, which still show traces of the Caliph's blood, for he was killed apparently while he was working on it. This historical document was sold for 100 rubles by Samarkand mullahs when the Russians took the city, and was placed in the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg.

361 /439/ The most interesting of the
346 monuments of the past are the ruins of the Bibi-Khanum mosque, which was built by one of Timur's wives, the Chinese princess Khanum. The best artists and architects were engaged for the erection of this building, which is imposing in its proportions and magnificence. This temple occupies a large area, and consists of three mosques, connected with each other by a square structure in which the cells and the auditorium of one of the largest medresses are located. The main entrance gates were at one time cast in bronze and covered with

361 inscriptions and arabesques. Later one of the
346 impecunious rulers of Bukhara had the gates melted down for coins. With the passing of time the walls of the building have cracked and fallen into ruin in many places. The western cupola is the best preserved part. Here the walls are covered with tile mosaics which are strikingly colorful, and in addition the design has been made very artistically and shows highly original taste. In some places the azure and gold are as fresh as though they
364] had been put on the walls only recently. In the middle of the building is a huge table of white marble on nine short legs. This table is turned toward the window behind which was the enclosed place of Timur's wife - Khanum. On the table lay a huge Koran, on pages of parchment, so that the wife of the terrible conqueror could read it from her window. Not far from this building they show the tomb of the founder herself, Khanum. But this tomb is scarcely remarkable, being a formless pile of ruins.

361 Not far outside the town are the extensive ruins of the summer palace of Timur, the Khozreti-Shakh-Zinda, where the former rulers of Samarkand went to worship, and then made their triumphal entrance into the town. Samarkand, like most of the Central Asian towns, is enclosed by a wall, which is 13 versts in length. The town has quite a regular square shape, on the western side of which is an extensive citadel, which itself is enclosed by a wall which is 8 feet (3½ arshins) high by 10½ feet (1½ sazhen's) at the base. The walls are crenelated, and have flanking projections. This citadel is the most extensive in all of

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[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

1:von Schwarz--37 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs 771
profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs 656
are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially 661
the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of [548] prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

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777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulder. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sick-
784 ness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show
824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

0771 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the
657 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

771 importance, and that their own profit and amusement lies much closer
659 to their hearts than the zeal of their mullahs. The Russian regime grants the Moslems absolute religious freedom, and General von Kauffmann has, in this connection, from the very beginning prohibited any sort of missionary activity and all proselytizing by Orthodox priests as well as missionaries of the other Christian faiths. He has even prevented the choice of Tashkent as the seat of the bishop of Turkestan in the interests of avoiding all possible friction between Moslems and Christians. Instead he relegated to Vernoye, /Alma Ata/ the capital of the province of Semirechiye, the population of which is almost exclusively Russian and Orthodox. Naturally General von Kauffmann is blamed for all this by the Orthodox clergy; the result has shown, however, how correctly he calculated. The tolerance exercised by the Russians toward the Moslems has not only not strengthened Islam in the Russian dominions of Central Asia, but on the contrary it has resulted in a striking indifference on the part of its followers, which one would not have believed possible among Moslems. During the entire fifteen years of my stay in Turkestan, not a single conflict between Moslems and Christian was acknowledged such as those often forthcoming in an India made insecure by English missionaries. Moslems and Christians get on as well with each other in Turkestan today, as one could wish from different Christian sects side by side. The Moslem dignitaries and men of rank take part spontaneously in church burials of Russian officials, and at the time of the last illness of General von Kauffmann, who was universally respected by the natives, the Moslem mullahs asked permission to pray for his recovery in the palace of the Governor General in company with the Russian priests.

8. The Administration of Justice.

671 The legal views of the sedentary population of Turkestan and those of the Kazakhs and other nomads are diametrically opposed; the former are much closer to our concepts of right and wrong. While the Kazakhs, as we have seen above, /in section not translated/ have views similar to the ancient Spartans and Teutons regarding mine and thine /210/ and recognize no difference between the civil and criminal nature of a crime, among the sedentary population theft is very strictly punished and a precise distinction is made between an offense which only involves harm to a fellow creature, and one directed at the social order. Actual written laws do not exist in the Central Asian

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption [191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the [101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the 191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.1 Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle 177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for 771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

In so far as they are political and worldly we have already tried to study them, but in their deeper aspect they can only be spiritual. The leaders of the Eastern Turk nationalists were not priests' men, and were never tired of referring to the venality of the Bukharan clergy on the one hand and on the other to their fanatical devotion to an effete clericalism. A barren and rigid clericalism is indeed a phenomenon all too apparent on stages not far removed from Turkistan. Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul and Teheran can each supply recent examples. There too the fanatic has his day. But there too it is not he who best interprets the Kingdom of God on earth as seen in the light of the inspirations of Islam.

There are two strains in the spiritual inheritance of Turkistan, the first the *Yasa* or *Yasak*, the Turkish tribal tradition, and the second the *Sheriat*, the sacred law of Islam. The derivation of the first is traced in part to Shamanism and Manicheism, creeds which saw religion and the State as separate worlds, and this broadly is the nomad's faith. The second, the sacred law, inspired the ancient culture of Khorasan which overflowed into Transoxiana. It does not distinguish religion from politics and in practice, in its Sunni form, it exalts the priesthood. In the *medreses* of Samarkand, Bukhara and Balkh it prevailed, taking advantage of Turkish *laisser-faire*. But the torch of the older custom remained alight among the nomads.

While the modern nationalists[1] cannot sufficiently condemn the clerics — the picture is familiar — they are constrained to admit, with a deep sense of emotion, that Islam lives on in the hearts of the people, far beyond the precincts of the mosque. As a Kazak said in Mecca: 'Since we have no mosques, no official clergy, and no institution that the Communists can abuse, this means that they can do nothing with us'. It may be that the whole of Turkistan will come to Islam in this sense. Again, early in August 1922, the Bolsheviks commissioned a party of influential clergy to demand

[1] For Togan's exposition see *op. cit.* pp. 530-35, of which these paragraphs are in some sense a distillation.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 7

771 of the Basmachis that they submit to the Soviets. The Basmachi Achil Beg, addressing them, said: 'Let us leave the Bolsheviks on one side for the moment, and also those who speak for them. Come, tell me, on your conscience, whether God will be pleased by your attitude or no?' Said the priests, 'Sir, you know that better than we do.' Whereupon Achil Beg cried with a loud voice, 'You fools! If it is I that know God's will, why preach you in the name of God? Have you no shame to come to us today preaching for the Russians? I would kill you all, but that you are old and foolish and soon will die. Go, and God's curse be with you!' And the Basmachis applauded.

The conclusion is that, under Bolshevist pressure, religious institutions have for ever lost their old meaning and force in Turkistan, partly because the priesthood failed to stand to their brief, but more because religious endowments had been seized and the clergy's authority undermined. 'Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a spiritual possession in the hearts of the people. Unlike the Orthodox Church of Russia, it does not meet the Godlessness of Communism in an opportune spirit, but is becoming more and more unified with the traditions in our inmost hearts. It is the time of the peoples' clergy.' In fact, Islam has become the spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.

771 626 Current evidence from Russian sources goes to support the conclusion. The contemporary press harps on the defects of Islam, the prejudices of the clergy and the identification of Muslim ideas with a feudal patriarchal framework. Other themes constantly expressed are indignation over loss of time due to religious observances or prayer; persistence of religious influences even among Party members, preference for the Koran over medical attention or drugs; even the stupid story of the Comsomol member with his charm.

The spear-head of the Soviet drive against the faith of Muhammad is supposed to be the Comsomol organizations. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazak Com-

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

munist Party, Shayakhmetov,[1] went on the air just before 771
Christmas 1951, with a direction to the Comsomols in 626
Kazakistan to take an active part in the struggle against religious behaviour or feudal survivals, and to unmask the *advances* made by people of that way of thought. Whenever work on these lines slackened, he said, there emerged insubordination among individual Comsomols, bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and, worst of all, religion among the youth. Not for the first time those who worship Divus Augustus have found that there is no challenge to a living faith which goes without its response. Deviationism will remain for the Soviets an ever-present problem.

For the spiritual inheritance of a people, or group of peoples, 000
is not identifiable only with the direct inspirations of a revealed religion. There is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses which in his own estimation move him apart from other men. These have enabled him in the course of time to impress his personality, and even his language, on many who were not Turks, while he preserved his identity proudly for himself. That pride has lasted to this day, and the Turk, whose spirit has breathed over Persian and Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, Bashkurd and Kirghiz, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by the more complex influences around him. Many have been turcized; the Turk remains — a prince of deviationists.

It is even a question how far the much-lauded emancipa- [562]
tion of women has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or by schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on the

[1] It is not easy to recognize in Russian garb the Muslim name Shah Ahmed. Moreover, the habit of using the patronymic results in the world never knowing a man's own name. Although this is in tune with the use of the Turkish termination *-oghlu*, it is a break away from Muslim custom.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

them through heredity and upbringing, and a torch of that kind will be extinguished if there are not those who come to trim it or to supply fresh fuel to keep it alight. We have to determine from their history how far the inspirations of the Eastern Turks are strong enough to survive the immense pressures set in force to muffle them.

In the course of this survey we have noticed more than once the strength and weakness of the spiritual possessions of the various societies which have gone to make up the amalgam of peoples in Turkistan. We found two main strands of thought, that of the cities, and that of the steppe. After the impulses of expansion were spent with the end of the caravan age, the cities of Central Asia, cut off from any fertilizing stream, relapsed into a jealous medievalism, a bigotry proverbial even in an age and region where tolerance was not in fashion. Fertile enough to maintain themselves in self-sufficiency, with a respectable margin for these same leaders of bigotry, they refused or denied all outside influences which might have checked the negations of their narrow clericalism. The peculiar brand of scholastic religion associated with the [171] Central Asian *medreses* may have been as persistent as other Islamic manifestations, but it had become derelict and ossified. It was a strange mingling of the barren controversies of the schoolman with the emotional hysteria of the dervish, and it is not irreverent to find in the fanatical rigidity of the *emirs* and *ulema* of Bukhara and Khiva the very prototype of that Communist faith which in its turn was to admit no deviation and preach its own anathema. Even the religious mania of the dervish and the assassin has in it some quality which by a strange paradox is akin to the missionary endeavours of the high priests of Communism. Intolerance, bigotry, blood-purges, are common to all forms of fanaticism; they are the outward showing of the spiritual condition which prompts the fanatic — hatred and fear. All religions, Islam not excepted, have been guilty of aberrations such as these. It was this attitude more than anything else which, for the three centuries between the fall of the Timurids and the coming of

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan--Analyst]

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
578 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
TURKESTAN RL1

[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [19]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL2

Tu 668 659 771

Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

Tu 663

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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785 sort of compensation for the abstinence endured all through the day, /206/ and this feast sometimes lasts until morning, during which gluttony is as great as is humanly possible. When traveling, these Moslem fasts often drove me nearly to despair. During the days, the men could not be used for anything as a result of lack of sleep, and of hunger and thirst, and at night when one was exausted from the exertions of traveling there was not a moment of peace for all night long the shouting and howling and the noise of drums and all possible musical instruments never ceased. And people regard such unhealthy fasts, alternated with orgies night after night, as deeds pleasing to God.

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1. This tombstone is chiselled from a single block of dark green nephrite, and is of incalculable value. The stone has been cut in half in the middle by an unknown hand, and superstitious Moslems and Russian collecters have broken off pieces from this broken place, as can be seen in Figure 75.

all internal illnesses, which has resulted in an extensive trade in fake particles from the tomb of Tamerlane. How Tamerlane came to have the odor of sanctity is somewhat difficult for Westerners to understand. An equally lucrative trade is carried on by the mullahs with amulets which they have made themselves, and which ostensibly contain miraculous prayer formulas and charms. Their content, however, is often similiar to the

361 Takalyk-mazar, Kara-tash, Yalamkary, Mrat', Iskedzhua, Arpapaya, and Lyailak. In these mahalas the houses are counted as 1400 with a population of 12,450. The Bish-agach district is crossed by three main streets: Samarkand, [312] Kamalan and Bish-agach. The main aryks which irrigate this part of the town, and the gardens which belong to it are the Ankhor canal and the canals which branch out from it: the Dzhaty-German, the Big Tanyshar, the Arpapaya, aryk, the Kubyr aryk and the Alamdar. The best gardens and plowed fields belong to the residents of this part of the town, and this is one of the reasons for its sparse population, for the people there often move out of it in order to keep a closer watch on their gardens and plowed land. The settlement of Katartal was formed in this way and the village (kishlak) of Zengata, to which Bish-agach residents began to [776] move 180 years ago. This village is called Zengata, or, more exactly, Zengi-ata, because the tomb of Zengi-ata is located there. He is a venerated saint in Central Asia and every year when all the fruit has ripened enormous crowds of people gather here to worship him, even from such very distant places as Turkestan and Samarkand, not to mention Tashkent which moves out here almost to a man for the duration of this holiday.

[438] The main manufacture of the Bish-Agach district of the town is the production of brick, which belongs almost exclusively to this district [368] In this district there are 3 medresses, 16 home schools, and 68 mosques.

From the above survey of each district of the town it can be seen that the residents

361 There are also certain mosques which are
346 outstanding for their age and their relatively beautiful architecture. One is the mosque Hazret Baba, built by Tengri-Kul Divan Begi about 150 years ago. A second is the mechet Hazret Hodja Komal, built approximately 175 years ago by the Beg Abdul Kasim Kush begi.
[176] In honor of the chief saint, the patron saint of Khodzhent, Hazret Sheikh Maslah-Eddin, one of the residents of the Khodzhent suburb of Undzhi built a mosque about 150 years ago which is named for the saint. About 20 years ago it was repaired and rebuilt at public expense so that at the present time this mosque is really quite an attractive example of Central Asian architecture. A fourth is the Khosh mosque, built about 120 /446/ years ago. A fifth, the Takhto Tutti Kalyan mosque was built about 150 years ago, and named for the mulberry tree, actually of enormous proportions, which grows beside it. (Tuti kalyan means "large mulberry tree.") A sixth is Namazga. This mosque was built about 130 years ago by Fazil Beg, who was simultaneously Beg of Khodzhent and Ura-Tyube. A seventh is the Dzhamiya Pegu Arkysh mosque, which was built 80 years ago. The Darishikyaf mosque was built about 200 years ago. And the Dzhamyai Sary Sen mosque was built approximately 100 years ago.

361 The industrial character of Khodzhent
438 can be seen by the number of shops, and in-
366 dustrial and manufacturing plants (dukans); their total is 1,141. This total number of commercial and industrial plants is subdivided as follows:

785 sort of compensation for the abstinence endured all through the day, /206/ and this feast sometimes lasts until morning, during which gluttony is as great as is humanly possible. When traveling, these Moslem fasts often drove me nearly to despair. During the days, the men could not be used for anything as a result of lack of sleep, and of hunger and thirst, and at night when one was exausted from the exertions of traveling there was not a moment of peace for all night long the shouting and howling and the noise of drums and all possible musical instruments never ceased. And people regard such unhealthy fasts, alternated with orgies night after night, as deeds pleasing to God.

778 776 As regards superstition, the Central Asian Moslems are second to no other religious body. The tombs and the alleged clothing and relics of their countless saints, whose claim to this rank is usually very questionable, play a great role among them. In Central Asia there are many apocryphal tombs of saints, as for example, the tombs of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, in Mazar -i-Sharif and in Shakh-i-Mardan. There is also the monument to Alexander the Great in Margelan, the tomb of Daniel in Samarkand, and many others. We know from history that Alexander always aspired to the honor of being nominated to the ranks of the gods during his lifetime, although his ambition was never realized; instead of this, he was subsequently granted an honor on which he had not reckoned, namely, to be venerated after two thousand years as a Moslem saint and as a propagator of Islam in Central Asia. The Moslems of Turkestan have an unshakable faith in the healing powers of relics and amulets. Chips from the tombstone (1) are regarded as an infallible means against

777 [755]

1. This tombstone is chiselled from a single block of dark green nephrite, and is of incalculable value. The stone has been cut in half in the middle by an unknown hand, and superstitious Moslems and Russian collecters have broken off pieces from this broken place, as can be seen in Figure 75.

all internal illnesses, which has resulted in an extensive trade in fake particles from the tomb of Tamerlane. How Tamerlane came to have the odor of sanctity is somewhat difficult for Westerners to understand. An equally lucrative trade is carried on by the mullahs with amulets which they have made themselves, and which ostensibly contain miraculous prayer formulas and charms. Their content, however, is often similiar to the

777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sickness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show 784 824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

791 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the 657 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

k von Schwarz--45b N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1



Fig. 2. Amulet Holders.

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

Fig. 1a. The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand
(The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

faithfully observed by the Turkestan natives; those of the steppe region were less strict, prevented as they were by the exigencies of nomadic and seminomadic life. During Ramazan, Muslim communities in Central Asia customarily reversed their routine, resting daytimes, eating and entertaining at night. Shortly after the end of the fast there occurs a major holiday, *kurban bayram* (feast of sacrifice), attended by the slaughter of sheep and by festivities. 785

The difficulties of observing the Ramazan fast in the Soviet Union are obvious at first sight. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a period of a month is possible only for a people economically independent; it is inconceivable in a society in which virtually every breadwinner is an employee of the state, and the state drives relentlessly to increase production. Furthermore, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result, the Ramazan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. 785 177

Several of the refugees recalled instances of Communist Party officials subjecting Muslims suspected of fasting to "tests." Thus, for example, many Muslim employees of state institutions were called in for conferences with their superiors sometime during the month of Ramazan and there offered a drink or a cigarette; refusal to accept the offer was tantamount to an admission of fasting and could lead to expulsion from work. Similar "tests" were recalled by schoolteachers — during Ramazan teams of officials from neighboring towns often visited schools and checked on both the teachers and the students.

Nevertheless, the observance of the fast, although severely restricted, appears to have partly survived. Some Muslims, unable to fast for 28 consecutive days, compromise by abstaining for three days only: the 1st, 15th, and last days of Ramazan. Others, compelled to eat in order to have strength for work and to avoid the suspicion of authorities, eat and drink as little as possible. It is quite likely — although there is no direct evidence — that the fast may be observed more regularly among those who are not gainfully employed.

The *kurban bayram*, despite its originally religious significance, appears to have suffered the fate of most religious festivities in societies which are secularized or on their way to becoming so: the religious element has largely been forgotten, and the holiday has acquired a predominantly secular, national character. This, in part, may be one of the reasons for its survival. Almost all the informants agreed that the *kurban bayram* was widely observed at least until the outbreak of the war, even by members of the Communist Party. The main difficulty in observing this holiday is the shortage of sheep, which are essential for the ceremony. Not only are almost all the sheep in the hands of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and 782 796 177 233

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782 796 177 233 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclopedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subterfuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 177 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving, known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 177 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sick-
784 ness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show
824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

771 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the
657 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

346 garden of greater or smaller size with a pond in the middle at which Moslem visitors to the mosque make their prescribed ablutions before the prayers, if they have not already done so at home. These mosque courtyards form a favorite meeting place for all the residents whose only task in life consists in an unbroken delightful idleness, but who consider it beneath their dignity to loiter about with the younger men
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785 sort of compensation for the abstinence endured all through the day, /206/ and this feast sometimes lasts until morning, during which gluttony is as great as is humanly possible. When traveling, these Moslem fasts often drove me nearly to despair. During the days, the men could not be used for anything as a result of lack of sleep, and of hunger and thirst, and at night when one was exausted from the exertions of traveling there was not a moment of peace for all night long the shouting and howling and the noise of drums and all possible musical instruments never ceased. And people regard such unhealthy fasts, alternated with orgies night after night, as deeds pleasing to God.

778 776 As regards superstition, the Central Asian Moslems are second to no other religious body. The tombs and the alleged clothing and relics of their countless saints, whose claim to this rank is usually very questionable, play a great role among them. In Central Asia there are many apocryphal tombs of saints, as for example, the tombs of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, in Mazar -i-Sharif and in Shakh-i-Mardan. There is also the monument to Alexander the Great in Margelan, the tomb of Daniel in Samarkand, and many others. We know from history that Alexander always aspired to the honor of being nominated to the ranks of the gods during his lifetime, although his ambition was never realized; instead of this, he was subsequently granted an honor on which he had not reckoned, namely, to be venerated after two thousand years as a Moslem saint and as a propagator of Islam in Central Asia. The Moslems of Turkestan have an unshakable faith in the healing powers of relics and amulets. Chips from the tombstone (1) are regarded as an infallible means against

777 [755]

1. This tombstone is chiselled from a single block of dark green nephrite, and is of incalculable value. The stone has been cut in half in the middle by an unknown hand, and superstitious Moslems and Russian collecters have broken off pieces from this broken place, as can be seen in Figure 75.

all internal illnesses, which has resulted in an extensive trade in fake particles from the tomb of Tamerlane. How Tamerlane came to have the odor of sanctity is somewhat difficult for Westerners to understand. An equally lucrative trade is carried on by the mullahs with amulets which they have made themselves, and which ostensibly contain miraculous prayer formulas and charms. Their content, however, is often similiar to the

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected
177 with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverishment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

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various holes as large as a hand. Thus in comparison with a Central 792
Asian duvana, Antisthenes and his pupil Diogenes would look like absolute dandies. These khalats, torn and ragged to the point of indecency, are likewise part of the uniform of the duvana; for I have noticed more than once, upon closer inspection, that even when the duvana wore a new khalat, it was completely covered with rags, visibly sewn on, to create the appearance of being damaged. Shirts and any sort of underwear are usually completely absent among the duvanas. Their feet either remain completely bare winter and summer, or else they wear /198/ enormous clumsy slippers of the kind of the famous slippers of the Bagdad merchant Kazem, which in their time brought their master so many thrashings and similar troubles.

The 'ishans' play an entirely different role than the duvanas. Their number is much smaller than that of the duvanas, and many travelers mistakenly take them for Moslem clerics. Actual clergy, in the manner of the Christian church, does not exist among the Moslems at all, as is well known. The mullahs are nothing more than scribes and prayer leaders in the mosques, whose function can be taken over by any proper Moslem without the need of some higher authorization. The ishans are men who, like the duvanas, prefer a parasitic life at the expense of the believers to honorable labor, but at the same time they are too proud and genteel to attach themselves to the duvanas. They are usually men who have seen better days, but have squandered their fortunes in one way or another. They claim to have a monopoly on special piety and holiness, establish themselves beside some mosque or at the grave of an ostensible saint, and pass their free time with a sort of rosary in their hands in outward prayer, at which time they choose by predilection a position where they can be seen by everyone. Since of course the ishans have no time to earn their livelihood, because they pray aloud, their fellow religionists make sure that they lack for nothing, for they believe that they are building themselves a stairway to heaven by the support of such men who are enlightened by God. Thus the ishans lead a comfortable and untroubled life, clothe themselves in the finest materials of some striking color especially red or white, and keep servants and horses. At all festivities and banquets they are given the first place, and at the common prayers they are given the honorary office of the leader of the prayers.

Among the Moslems of Central Asia, a privileged position is 788
enjoyed also by all those who have made a pilgrimage to the grave of the prophet in Mecca. Here also these men bear the title of 'hadji'

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

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177 known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca,
177 the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union. 788 177

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed. 852 177

The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities. 793 661

As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate, after 177 584

361 the laws of Confucius. Each lad has a book in
346 his hand, but they all study together, shouting, similar to the way it is done in Jewish and Moslem schools.

The chapel itself is housed in a dark but quite spacious room. The furnishings are strongly reminiscent of a Catholic church. By the front wall there is a large altar, set with various viands, church lamps and vessels from which smoke issues forth. Behind the altar as well as along the side walls there are images of a dragon. The figures of saints are distinguished by their corpulence and rotundity. Flags are hung along the walls like banners.
●188 Finally, bells are hung up near the altar. The divine service is carried out by a dirty and ragged personage, who, with a bundle of smoldering candles in his hands, and accompanied by measured beating of the bells, makes endless bows, to the ground and halfway to the ground as he approaches and retires from the sacrificial table or altar.

On important occasions, instead of spoken prayers they burn little pieces of paper with written prayers or wishes, in the belief that prayers born up in this manner reach God more quickly. (1)

1. There is still another original way of praying. They fasten a small piece of paper to a wheel, with a prayer written on it. The wheel turns about quickly, and each turn of the wheel is considered as a whole prayer, separately uttered.

7. Religion.

The sedentary population of Turkestan as well as the Kazakhs 771
profess themselves to be Sunnite Moslems. But whereas the Kazakhs 656
are really Moslems only in name, the sedentary people, especially 661
the sedentary Uzbeks, have been marked from the beginning by great fanaticism, and probably in this connection they deserve first place among all the followers of Islam. This fanaticism was nurtured primarily by the so-called 'rais' 'duvanas' and 'ishans', of which the first have at present been abolished in the Russian possessions. The 'rais' were officials appointed by the government, whose chief task was to supervise the strict fulfillment of the precepts of the Koran, and to punish those who were indifferent or unconcerned. They were equipped for this purpose with a whip made of a wide, thick leather thong, and a wooden handle, with which they drove together to prayers those who systematically avoided the visits to the mosques. In addition, they mercilessly whipped the tradespeople in the bazaars who were guilty of profiting at the expense of the public through false measures or weights. Also the management of the control of [548]
prostitutes was transferred to the rais, and those evildoers caught 'in flagrante' were punished in a truly barbaric fashion. Since the rais were just as corruptible as the other officials, as a rule they called only those people to account who did not have the means to buy themselves off, so that the official activity of the rais appeared to be more of a well organized system of extortion. Since the Russians naturally had no particular interest in nurturing the fanaticism of the population of their Central Asian possessions, which was directed against all those of other creeds, they abolished the office of the rais in the areas under their domination, and they exist at the present time only in the khanates which are still independent.

/196/ The 'duvanas' are, in Turkestan, what the dervishes or 792
'kalantars' are in other Moslem lands. The duvanas usually live in a cloistered community and are celibates, although there are also married duvanas. Their number is rather large; at every bazaar and at every fair one meets whole crowds of singing, screeching duvanas, who assess the public for contributions. Their influence and the respect which they enjoy among the people is very great, which has always remained a mystery to me, for one can scarcely imagine a more vulgar, impudent, and repulsive throng than the duvanas. They

792 are recruited primarily from labor-shirking vagabonds who prefer to live at the expense of the stupidly credulous people, instead of earning their livelihood through honorable work. For this reason their conduct is no model for the ordinary folk. On the contrary they occupy about the lowest place in relation to moral depravity which a man can reach. /Figure 69. Caption: Duvanas (Moslem mendicant friars). /They are so addicted to the use of opium, 'nasha' or 'hashish', and all possible unnatural vices, that the consequences of their debaucheries are as a rule already visible in their idiotic and bestial facial expressions. Therefore in Turkestan the word duvana is also synonymous with idiot. At the same time, naturally only for mercenary reasons, they are great fanatics and with their public /197/ inflammatory addresses in the streets and bazaars they incite the common people to the same fanaticism and to a blind hate against all people of different faiths. In the Russian dominions, for this reason, the duvanas too are forbidden to hold public sermons. They are not occupied with scientific work nor with any other sort of work, and live solely upon alms, which they collect or rather exact in a showy manner and with the greatest impudence. Among them, gratitude for a gift received is out of the question, for on the contrary, they believe they are doing the donor a favor by receiving alms from him and giving him an opportunity to perform an act pleasing to God.

One may get a general impression of the external appearance of the duvanas from Figure 69, in which there appear two typical specimens of this worthy lot. The most characteristic feature of a duvana's costume is the disproportionately large, tall, conic cap, of carpet material, which they wear summer and winter, and which constitutes the actual uniform of the duvanas, since such caps are not worn by anyone else. For the collection of alms, they carry on their arm or belt a shallow pumpkin gourd, cut in half horizontally. The upper part of the gourd, which is fastened to the larger lower part by a rope just like the lid of the incense burners in the Catholic and Orthodox churches, constitutes the lid of this peculiar poor box. In the left hand, the duvanas carry two short elaborate rods, bound together with an iron ring, and by rattling this they seek to draw the attention of the public to themselves. Their outfit is completed by a long massive staff, which often has various pieces of metal suspended on it, likewise intended for rattling. The entire remaining costume of the duvanas consists of a khalat held together by a rope, which is covered with hundreds of stains of all possible colors, shapes and sizes. Countless rags, often artificially attached, and parts of the lining hang down below this, and the naked body is visible through

1: von Schwarz--38a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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Fig. 38. Duvanas (Moslem mendicant friars).

various holes as large as a hand. Thus in comparison with a Central 792
Asian duvana, Antisthenes and his pupil Diogenes would look like absolute dandies. These khalats, torn and ragged to the point of indecency, are likewise part of the uniform of the duvana; for I have noticed more than once, upon closer inspection, that even when the duvana wore a new khalat, it was completely covered with rags, visibly sewn on, to create the appearance of being damaged. Shirts and any sort of underwear are usually completely absent among the duvanas. Their feet either remain completely bare winter and summer, or else they wear /198/ enormous clumsy slippers of the kind of the famous slippers of the Bagdad merchant Kazem, which in their time brought their master so many thrashings and similar troubles.

The 'ishans' play an entirely different role than the duvanas. Their number is much smaller than that of the duvanas, and many travelers mistakenly take them for Moslem clerics. Actual clergy, in the manner of the Christian church, does not exist among the Moslems at all, as is well known. The mullahs are nothing more than scribes and prayer leaders in the mosques, whose function can be taken over by any proper Moslem without the need of some higher authorization. The ishans are men who, like the duvanas, prefer a parasitic life at the expense of the believers to honorable labor, but at the same time they are too proud and genteel to attach themselves to the duvanas. They are usually men who have seen better days, but have squandered their fortunes in one way or another. They claim to have a monopoly on special piety and holiness, establish themselves beside some mosque or at the grave of an ostensible saint, and pass their free time with a sort of rosary in their hands in outward prayer, at which time they choose by predilection a position where they can be seen by everyone. Since of course the ishans have no time to earn their livelihood, because they pray aloud, their fellow religionists make sure that they lack for nothing, for they believe that they are building themselves a stairway to heaven by the support of such men who are enlightened by God. Thus the ishans lead a comfortable and untroubled life, clothe themselves in the finest materials of some striking color especially red or white, and keep servants and horses. At all festivities and banquets they are given the first place, and at the common prayers they are given the honorary office of the leader of the prayers.

Among the Moslems of Central Asia, a privileged position is 788
enjoyed also by all those who have made a pilgrimage to the grave of the prophet in Mecca. Here also these men bear the title of 'hadji'

1: von Schwarz --18a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

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

Fig. 11 Bazaar scene in Tashkent: A mullah preaches in the open marketplace.

346 garden of greater or smaller size with a pond in the middle at which Moslem visitors to the mosque make their prescribed ablutions before the prayers, if they have not already done so at home. These mosque courtyards form a favorite meeting place for all the residents whose only task in life consists in an unbroken delightful idleness, but who consider it beneath their dignity to loiter about with the younger men
793 at the bazaar and in the tea shops. At every mosque there is an 'imam' or permanent leader of prayers, with an assistant, who bears the title of 'sufi,' as well as a caller, endowed with a powerful voice, who must announce from the minaret of the mosque (Figure 74) the time of the morning and evening prayers and at the same time the curfew hour for the public houses. None of these ordinarily receives any regular salary. Instead, voluntary gifts are received, at the time of the high festivals from the vistors of the mosque in question, and at harvest time they are given a specified part of the fruit of the earth.

788 During the group prayers, inside the mosque as well as outside, the participants arrange themselves in rank and file like a detachment of soldiers, while the prayer leader (imam) is at the front in order to be visible to everyone. During the prayer people stand and kneel in rapid succession /205/ and touch the ground with the forehead from time to time; all these movements, to which are added various manipulations of the hands, are made first by the prayer leader and then imitated by the entire group, as though by command. This makes an extremely comical impression upon the non-participants, for the whole thing resembles an exercise in callisthenics more than a religious act, the more so since it all proceeds in deathly silence, for
[562] the prayers are not spoken aloud. Women may not participate in such common prayers nor visit the mosques. /Figure 74, p. 43a. Caption: The Minaret of Madamin Hodja in Khiva./

785 The Moslem fasts, which last all through the month of Ramadan, and are designated as 'urza', are completely different from the Christian fasts. They do not consist in abstinence from meat nor of moderation in eating, but instead in the prohibition of food or drink from sunrise to sundown, including even a drink of water. The Moslems are so strict in this connection that they do not even permit themselves to bathe fro some water could get into the body unintentionally through the nose or the ears. It can be easily seen that the observance of such strict fasts, especially during the burning heat of Turkestan, is no trivial thing. But scarcely has the sun set and the evening prayer is finished, before a solemn banquet begins with singing and dancing, a

291 mans have had contact with municipal civilization. The most distinctive feature of their dress is the high lambskin cap, which is not even discarded when summer is at its hottest. It is usually worn over a kind of skull-cap. The high-crowned fur caps impart to the tall, well-built Turkomans a striking and exceedingly martial note. The tribes who roam the regions of Khiva wear caps which are lower and broader in shape than those of the others. Though both Turkomans and Kirghiz are Mohammedans, neither of the two tribes wear [793] turbans with the exception of the mollahs, teachers of law and religion, who, however, mainly occupy themselves with foretelling the future and writing amulets.

The dress of the Turkoman women, like that of the men, seems expressly designed to make their tall, slender figures appear even taller. They wear long, loose gowns of brilliant red, reaching to the ground, and a high head-band resembling a cap, from which a ribbon hangs down at the back over the wearer's 301 neck. The women are very fond of ornaments, particularly those of the wealthy Tekke Turkomans who inhabit the oasis of Merv. They wear bracelets and anklets, breast ornaments of silver coins, and each of their numerous plaits ends in a small silver tassel. Nose-rings are worn by the women of the Salor tribe only. Even the small helmet-like caps of the children end in a high silver point.

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the
177 regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation. It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

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177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
578 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes. 795 177

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes. 183 177

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority. 584 [562] [583]

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social 177 562

162 101 in the Kuldja region and are the remnants of RL1 military settlers once settled on the Ili river by the Chinese government.

16) The Tadzhiks constitute about 4.5% of the total population of the area. They are Aryans and are related to the Persians. These are the aborigines of the country, some of whom were forced out by the invasions of the Turko-Mongol peoples into the mountainous places, difficult of access. There are therefore two subdivisions of Tadzhiks: those who live in the valleys, and those in the mountains. These people are very intelligent; although oppressed by the Uzbeks, they have nevertheless had a good influence on their oppressors, with whom they have been mixing up to the present time. Within the okrug the largest number of Tadzhiks are in the Khodzhent uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast, where they constitute over 30% of the total population; then in the Zeravshan region they make up over 19% of the total, in the Kurama uyezd (in the mountains) they are 3% and in the Fergana oblast they are 1.6% of the total population. The mountain Tadzhiks in the Zeravshan okrug are called Galchas.

17) The Persians live in small numbers in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Amu-Darya otdel. They are former slaves who were freed when the Russians conquered this region. A large number of them were sent back to their [795] country at the expense of the state. Being of the Shi'ite religious sect the Persians are in /333/ sharp opposition to all the other Moslem people of Turkestan, who belong to the Sunnite sect.

18) The Hindus are scattered all over the

8: Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80) 1880 RL1 Turkestan RL1

[Kuldja]

361 Among the Chinese of Kuldja there are
795 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

In general the Kuldja "Catholics" are very insecure in the foundations of their faith. They wear crucifixes around their necks, and read prayers /434/ in Latin. When they appear before the authorities with a plea they set their crucifixes outside.

In the houses of the Kuldja Catholics one sees on the walls an image of the cross instead of icons. In addition, one may also see from time to time rosaries with a crucifix, or a palm on which a crucifix hangs.

[797] Christianity was brought to Kuldja by French missionaries, who came here from Peking.

361 Here are the statistical data for the number of houses and population in Kuldja. In 1872 there were in Kuldja:

[346]

Eastern Orthodox Churches	1
Roman Catholic Churches	1
Chinese temples of idols	2
Mosques	36
Houses	1,258
Total number of buildings	1,298

361 The population of Kuldja divides accord-
162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

741 In the Russian dominions of Central Asia the management of the wakf possessions has been taken over by the Russian authorities, but they use the income in the traditional manner for religious purposes. /Figure 72, p. 41a. Caption: Maxim mosque in Tashkent./

771 788 In spite of the willingness which the Central Asian Moslems disclose everywhere to make sacrifices for religious ends, their religiosity really lies only in externals; in the giving of alms, and in the strictest possible observance of all the other external religious practices prescribed by the Koran, exactly as it once was with the Jewish Pharisees. They perform their endless ablutions precisely before each prayer, before each prayer, before and after every meal, after every natural function of the body, if necessary even in the middle of the street, and I have never seen a Moslem omit his morning or evening prayer. Even on a journey in the worst weather and the most terrible mud they kneel in the middle of the road and say their prayer at sunrise /202/ and sunset without taking any notice of anything. Even when they are in the midst of the most heated battle, when the hour of prayer is proclaimed they cease hostilities at once, only to start up again with renewed strength after the prayers are over. But at the same time, this is all there is to it. They consider it completely irrelevant that along with this they allow themselves every kind of betrayal and cheating of their fellowman, especially if he is of another faith or a Kafir, and indulge in secret in the most wicked vices and debauchery as long as the decorum is maintained and nothing is brought out into the open.

796 The Moslems have no regularly recurring holidays like our Sundays. They have only three great festivals a year, each of which is celebrated for several days; otherwise, however, every day is like any other. Only on Fridays the men gather in the morning at the mosque for the group prayer, but afterwards they go about their work and their business as on every other weekday.

368 576 The mosques are not regarded as houses of God, as they are by the Christians, but are no more than places of assembly. Therefore the Moslems do not find it strange to have their mosques visited by non-believers. On my journeys in Bukhara, which is very orthodox, mosques were assigned to me as the preferred place for me to live in during the length of my stay, if no better place were forthcoming. Also the fact that the Moslems remove their shoes before entering a mosque has no religious basis, but is based on the universal custom, conditioned by the regard for cleanliness, of removing the outer foot-

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

faithfully observed by the Turkestan natives; those of the steppe region were less strict, prevented as they were by the exigencies of nomadic and seminomadic life. During Ramazan, Muslim communities in Central Asia customarily reversed their routine, resting daytimes, eating and entertaining at night. Shortly after the end of the fast there occurs a major holiday, *kurban bayram* (feast of sacrifice), attended by the slaughter of sheep and by festivities. 785

The difficulties of observing the Ramazan fast in the Soviet Union are obvious at first sight. To eliminate or even reduce daytime work for a period of a month is possible only for a people economically independent; it is inconceivable in a society in which virtually every breadwinner is an employee of the state, and the state drives relentlessly to increase production. Furthermore, a worker who fasts all day is, even when compelled to do a full day's work, a poor worker. As a result, the Ramazan fast is severely repressed by the authorities and can survive only in a greatly modified form. 785 177

Several of the refugees recalled instances of Communist Party officials subjecting Muslims suspected of fasting to "tests." Thus, for example, many Muslim employees of state institutions were called in for conferences with their superiors sometime during the month of Ramazan and there offered a drink or a cigarette; refusal to accept the offer was tantamount to an admission of fasting and could lead to expulsion from work. Similar "tests" were recalled by schoolteachers — during Ramazan teams of officials from neighboring towns often visited schools and checked on both the teachers and the students.

Nevertheless, the observance of the fast, although severely restricted, appears to have partly survived. Some Muslims, unable to fast for 28 consecutive days, compromise by abstaining for three days only: the 1st, 15th, and last days of Ramazan. Others, compelled to eat in order to have strength for work and to avoid the suspicion of authorities, eat and drink as little as possible. It is quite likely — although there is no direct evidence — that the fast may be observed more regularly among those who are not gainfully employed.

The *kurban bayram*, despite its originally religious significance, appears to have suffered the fate of most religious festivities in societies which are secularized or on their way to becoming so: the religious element has largely been forgotten, and the holiday has acquired a predominantly secular, national character. This, in part, may be one of the reasons for its survival. Almost all the informants agreed that the *kurban bayram* was widely observed at least until the outbreak of the war, even by members of the Communist Party. The main difficulty in observing this holiday is the shortage of sheep, which are essential for the ceremony. Not only are almost all the sheep in the hands of the *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and 782 796 177 233

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

782 *sovkhozy* (state farms) — four-fifths, according to the Soviet Encyclo-
796 pedia — which do not release them for religious purposes, but the over-all
177 number of sheep and goats in Turkestan has declined from 3 per native in
233 1913 to approximately 1.5 per native in 1938. Compromises and subterfuges are resorted to to overcome this difficulty. In some collective farms the sheep are stolen or slaughtered under one pretext or another, often with the tacit acquiescence of the collective's chairman. In the cities, the well-to-do purchase sheep on the free market, while the less affluent either enter into partnerships with other families to purchase and divide one ram, or else, if they are even too poor for that, sacrifice a chicken instead. The *kurban bayram* seems to be observed less publicly than in pre-Revolutionary years, and usually only in the circle of the immediate family, "with the windows shut and the doors locked," as several refugees put it.

735 The third fundamental Muslim duty is that of regular alms giving,
177 known as *zakat*, traditionally set at 2.5 percent of earnings. In Central Asia the *zakat* had lost even before the Russian conquest in the 19th century the character of a purely philanthropic measure, having been transformed into a *de facto* tax, collected for the benefit of the local secular authorities. The tsarist administration did its best to suppress this practice in territories under its control, replacing it with its own system of taxes. Today, nothing seems to remain of the *zakat* in Soviet Central Asia. The practice had no deep roots to begin with; the population is too impoverished to keep it up; and there is no one to collect it. Almost none of the refugees even knew the meaning of the term *zakat*, and upon being informed, denied ever seeing it practiced.

788 Finally, there is the obligation of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca,
177 the *hajj*. Of all the duties incumbent upon a Muslim this is the one most difficult to fulfill under Soviet conditions, inasmuch as the regime forbids travel of private citizens abroad for any purpose whatsoever. Occasionally, as in 1953, the Soviet government itself dispatches to Mecca official delegations headed by government-appointed muftis and shaykhs, but it is quite obvious that such delegations consist only of carefully screened individuals, liberally interspersed with employees of the security police, and that their primary purpose is not religion but foreign propaganda. For the private individual, the road to Mecca is barred. It appears, however, that pilgrimages to the graves of local saints continue to be popular, and in some sense may serve as a substitute for the forbidden *hajj*.

Thus, of the four practices which constitute the central elements of the Islamic ritual, the five Pillars of the Faith (the fifth being the profession of faith), one (prayer) is almost entirely neglected by the younger and middle-age groups, one (fasting) is observed rarely and even then imperfectly, and two (*zakat* and *hajj*) have completely disappeared. Religious *ritual* thus may be said to have declined considerably and no longer

8:Kostenko 156-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

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775 about eighty persons who are Christians and call themselves Catholics. They have a small church in the form of a chapel, located on the edge of the town. Inside the chapel is a litograph picture of the Mother of God, the Crucifixion, two copper candlesticks and a Latin bible.

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162 ing to peoples and estates in the following manner.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

between the orthodox of Bukhara and the Shiahs whom they regarded as Isfahani heretics, thus for the first time since the Arab conquest severing Transoxiana in the realm of thought from the south.

It is seldom realized how great has been the difference in outlook and ideology between Sunni and Shiah. Vambéry in 1863, on his way from Turkey through Persia in the garb of an Istanbul dervish, found himself spat upon as a supposed Sunni by Shiah wayfarers, while ten years later Schuyler in Turkistan was surprised to find that the orthodox pilgrim from Bukhara travelled to Mecca always by Istanbul or India rather than expose himself to Shiah taunts on the direct road through Persia. Thus even in Muslim times a curtain had begun to drop along the Oxus.

The Shaibanids ruled for a century from Bukhara, their greatest Khan being Abdullah, who before his death in 1598 succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana. Like Akbar and Elizabeth of England, his contemporaries, Abdullah ruled for nearly half a century. He conquered Meshed, Herat and Badakhshan, and at the height of his power even had designs on Akbar's India. After his death began a period of anarchy, confused by fighting with the Persian Safavids for the possession of Khorezm, which in the end became independent under another line of Uzbek Shaibanids, of whom the best known was the historian Abulghazi (d. 1663). He and his successors reversed the tables, making Khorezm for a time the overlord of Bukhara. But, as we have seen, its prosperity had been undermined before this time — according to some in 1573 — by a change in the course of the river, a disaster which led to the abandonment of the old capital at Urgench and the rise of a new city at Khiva. By this name the Khanate was thereafter known.

At Bukhara, after Abdullah's death, the power of the Shaibanids rapidly waned. It gave way first to the Janids, and then to the Mangits, both Uzbek houses tracing descent from Shaibani on the distaff side. Two centuries of nonentities are lit by a single high-light, the invasion in 1740 of the great

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in 101
religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being 771
predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refu- 115
gees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established 771
religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of 517
Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, 771
and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious 798
practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to 212
operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the
177 regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation. It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
578 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[8]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[8] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

8:Kostenko 116-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Tashkent] RL1

361 Gansh-burkh, Tanau-bashi, Chal'mak. Some of these mahalas, as for example, Yangi-shakhar, are formed of settlements which combined as a result of the expansion of the town. But since
[574] this settlement was too big, and according to local custom all the inhabitants of a mahala[1] are invited to the family celebrations like weddings, circumcisions, etc. which take place there, the frugal Sarts divided it into five separate mahalas. For this same reason there are two Kator-turas and two Okh-mechets. The population of this district[2] according to the
[141] data of the Tashkent organizational committee is 10,194, living in 3030 households. In this district of the town there are up to sixty
[368] mosques and 3 medresses: Ishan Kuli Leshkar kushbegi, Takht-tak and Dikzer. In addition to this, there are 10 schools housed at the mosques, with 230 pupils.

[438] The main producers in this part of the town[2] are smelters of cast iron, saddle makers, oil manufacturers and weavers of matting, these latter predominate. In 1870 the number of such workshops was 567. It was here that the weaving of mats was begun by Divana Burkh, who was the first to work at this trade. From him it then spread further, and therefore, the 'kishlak' (village) where Divana Burkh lived is named after him.

[367] A very small part of the land belonging to this part of the town[2] outside of what is occupied by buildings, is used in gardens, a total of 653 tanaps. (1)

[804] 1. A tanap is 1/6 of a desyatina (or 0.45 acres).

[1] [i.e. Ward - Analyst]
[2] [i.e. the Shaikhantaur district - Analyst]

811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The
875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL I

to Moscow as their Mecca; language, literature and the arts must follow suit; the praise of past achievement is ruled out; and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said[1] that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are far more alive over the question of nationality than in any other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in national costume; hence the need to be ever vigilant against the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*, published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed, in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics. What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Sometimes there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move is a direction to historians to hold correct views on the history of their republic in relation to its association with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assistance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

[1] [See cat. 116, pp. 230-33 -- Bib. II, 2 -- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL2

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919–20 period. Even
814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists, no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia. Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past. At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical historical process working through the Russian people; that absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were, the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological distortion, bourgeois-nationalism, patriarchal feudal survivalism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The *Kublandi-batir*, for instance, is no longer a paean of national virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

XII

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

I shall follow the arduous trail blazed by the surveyors, who are charting the course of irrigation systems, by the botanists and forestry experts, who are determining the future flora of the desert, and by the zoologists and ornithologists, who are to populate the new forests and gardens with beasts and birds. I shall meet the soil scientists and agronomists engaged in selecting the crops to be grown on the fields and plantations that will alter the face of the desert. My path will be the path of the archaeologists, who are doing their share to help the canal builders by unearthing the secrets of ancient cultures buried for centuries in the sands. . . .

BORIS KRINITSKY, on Turkmenian Canal [1]

816

THE main objective of the two first Five-Year Plans was to create a centre of heavy and light industry in the Urals [2] and beyond, which should be out of reach of any invader, whether Germans coming from the west or Japanese from the east. At an immense cost in human lives and suffering, through scenes of welter and confusion, often sadly lagging but always driven on by a grim determination from above, the great programme staggered through fantastic difficulties during construction until it reached the serious production stage, round about 1935. It was an immense mechanical achievement, and there can be no doubt that it is mainly to Stalin's foresight in building this stronghold that Russia in 1941–2 owed her capacity to stand fast against the German onslaught long enough to receive that unacknowledged margin of assistance from the West which enabled her to survive.

[1] Bib. II, 5. Anthropologists escape notice.

[2] The Urals themselves are just outside Kazakistan, and coincident in the main with Bashkiria, in which is situated Ishimbay. Magnitogorsk is in a narrow strip of RSFSR territory between Kazakistan and Bashkiria. In the industrial picture all this region must be viewed as part of the Central Asian complex.

777 well-known slips of paper of Passau, which were supposed to make the owner invulnerable, but which actually contained no more than the sentence "Scoundrel, defend yourself!" These amulets can be purchased for precious /207/ gold, mostly from the apothecaries and the Jews, who are especially competent in such things, and are usually in a small three-cornered bag, or in a cylinder of thin silver or cardboard and the like (Figure 76, p. 208), worn on a cord around the neck or over the shoulders. /Figure 75. Caption: The Tombstone of Tamerlane and his family in Samarkand (The dark, disfigured stone in the middle is Tamerlane's tombstone.)/ Even /208/ the domestic animals, especially the horses are hung with amulets in order to protect them from bad luck and sickness. The Moslems of Turkestan, especially the Tadjiks, often show 784 824 particular veneration for certain holy trees. These are, as a rule, ancient trees, standing in isolation, which are ostensibly planted by some saint and their shade is naturally very much desired by weary travelers. The travelers manifest their veneration for these holy trees by cutting off rags from their clothes and tying them to the twigs. The appearance of the trees decorated in this fashion naturally leaves something to be desired, particularly if the rags attached are as numerous as the leaves, as is often the case. This tree cult is obviously still another survival from Indo-European antiquity. It is known that Xerxes on his journey to Greece gave gifts to a tree under the shade of which he had rested, hanging on its twigs golden chains and clasps. It is likewise known how much veneration the ancient Teutons showed for their holy trees, so much so that the Christian missionaries found themselves induced to cut these trees down in order to accelerate the conversion of the Teutons. The May trees and Christmas trees still used among the Germans today probably go back in like manner to an earlier tree cult.
/Figure 76. Caption: Amulet Holders./

771 The Central Asian Moslems were unusually fanatical before the 657 Russian domination, as we have already mentioned, and there was great anxiety on the part of the /209/ Russians at first as to how they would live peaceably with such fanatics. As it turned out later, however, this fanaticism was only the work of a few interested circles, those of the rais, the duvanas, the ishans and the mullahs, who held the common people in their grip. Since the power of these professional fanatics has been broken in the Russian dominions in that they are no longer supported from above, and the people are left to themselves, it has turned out that the people's fanaticism is not nearly of so much

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86. Op. cit. p. 326.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia KL

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 538 829 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

175 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed
669 by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service
669 was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[1] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[1] Lit. of 1898 and 1916; see cat. 116, pp 88-90 — Analyst

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1

291 which each man had brought home from the
[554] war. The chalat as the usual outer garment is known in the vernacular as "chapan". It is cut like an overcoat, reaches to the ankles, and has very long sleeves, into which the wearer
[834] can withdraw his hands in order to comply with the Mohammedan law that no part of the body should be uncovered (see ill. below).

It is the chalat which gives the crowds in the cities of Turkestan their colourful appearance. When on the great Mohammedan feast-days the crowds of the faithful in their many-coloured chalats stand in front of the glittering mosques, when they kneel or throw themselves on the ground to pray, the scene is one which can probably be parallelled nowhere in
291 Europe or in the East. The patterns and co-
294 lours of the chalats are of an extraordinary variety, and their edges are trimmed with narrow borders of embroidered or woven material from which small tassels are suspended at regular intervals. Though the materials of the costly gold-brocaded garments worn by the very rich and the cheap printed cottons common to the poorest classes were of Russian manufacture, the greater part of the chalat fabrics were and still are characteristic products of the weavers and dyers of Turkestan. These fabrics are gaily striped, pattern-

Men of Bokhara in striped chalats and white turbans.

291

291
834

The Uzbeg woman is beyond doubt more closely veiled than anyone else in the Orient. When she goes out (see ill. page 1444)[1] she wears a heavy cloak (faranji) which in Samarkand and in the Ferghana district is usually of blue material; in Bokhara the colours are sometimes brighter, for instance yellow and green. This cloak is drawn over the head, and hangs down to the ground in straight heavy folds. The long narrow sleeves are never used, but are allowed to hang down the wearer's back (see ill. adjoining). In the majority of cases they could not be used even if it were desired, being more like long narrow ribbons than sleeves; they are only retained because tradition demands it. In addition to this veiling of her figure, the Uzbeg woman does not even reveal a shadowy outline of her face. The narrow opening left by the cloak is covered with a close veil of black horse-hair (chashpent). If a woman carries a baby in her arms, which is frequently the case, it is also completely covered by the cloak. Thus the woman of Turkestan is completely enveloped in a tent of cloth; in this respect she differs very considerably from the lightly veiled Mohammedan women of Egypt. One of the first measures taken by the Soviet government in Turkestan was to forbid this method of veiling. However, this decree met with the stubborn resistance of the strictly orthodox Islamic population of Central Asia, a resistance offered both by men and women. As a result, the authorities were unable to enforce the decree even in Tashkent itself, the seat of the government.

[1] [See cat. 116 p. 32 -- Analyst]

177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads. Their occupations are agriculture, gardening
463 and various crafts. They make no celebration
●844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/ After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
764 and buried directly in the ground. After the
765 burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the lapse of ninety days. In family life parental
593 authority is very strong and the father is the absolute head of the family. The women do not
291 cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (18;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live
[1 [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union. 788 177

Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed. 852 177

The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities. 793 661

As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate, after 177 584

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[1] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

513 A quilted cotton cover serves likewise as a top covering but it is of finer material than the one underneath. Quilted covers of silk and silk mixed with cotton are not rare. They are usually about two meters square, so that at times of extreme /240/ cold they can be wrapped all the way around. On my journeys I have camped in the open under such covers, sometimes in a cold of 20° to 30° centigrade, and have been quite comfortable. The natives do not know of sheets; as a result the bed covers, which cannot be washed because of their quilting, leave much to be desired as regards cleanliness after being used for some time. During the day the bed covers are rolled up together and stacked up along the walls with the pillows. For pillows they use cylinders stuffed with cotton and covered with silk or cotton material, similar to our window cushions, which are definitely preferable according to my experience to the feather head pillows used in Europe for they are not only more hygienic but also more comfortable. Only the very rich allow themselves the luxury of bedsteads.

[352] The bedsteads in Turkestan, the arrangement of which may be seen in Figure 89, in spite of their simplicity are the most suitable I have ever seen, and no improvement of our bedsteads, no matter how refined, can compete with them. They combine the advantages of ordinary bedsteads with those of American hammocks and can satisfy the demands of the most pampered sybarite. I have grown so spoiled by using Turkestan bedsteads over many years, that even now I have not yet been able to reconcile myself to the European bed. The bedsteads of Turkestan consist of a wooden frame joined together from a rough beam about ten centimeters thick, resting on four turned legs each about half a meter high, and this frame is covered by a net of thin strings made of horsehair. The bedsteads are something over two meters long and from one to one and a half meters wide. When such a framework is covered with a half dozen soft quilted cotton covers, it affords the greatest comfort imaginable. The body assumes its most comfortable position, thanks to the elasticity of the horsehair net, and one can stretch out on all sides without hindrance and without ever feeling the slightest pressure. If one is contented with a single cover during the hot season, one has a cool bed and need not suffer under the unbearable and unwholsome heat which the European featherbeds produce.

354 The cradles are portable, with a frame covered with a fly net of transparent gauze material, which serves as well for rocking as for carrying the infants. Their arrangement makes one think of a bird cage or of the frames used in Munich for the carrying of large numbers of beermugs (Figure 90; cf. also Figure 157). The heads

and feet of these cradles are made of two wooden hoops bent in the 854
form of semicircles, which are bound together by several horizontal wooden mouldings usually turned and painted in bright colors. /241/ The bottom and the low sidewalls are made of thin boards or shavings. The mothers carry their infants not wrapped up in swaddling clothes as we do but in these portable cradles, which is not only more convenient for the mothers but decidedly more favorable to the development of the child than our methods are. For rocking, the cradle is hung on the branch of a tree outdoors, or in a room or on the veranda on a ceiling beam, by means of a rope fastened to the middle of the upper cross-
P.736
piece. /Figure 89. Caption: Turkestan Bedstead./ In this cradle, [141]
which is in use among all Central Asians, the children lie continually on their backs, and as a consequence the back of the head becomes very much flattened eventually. The noticeable brachycephaly of all [171]
Central Asians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Sarts, Tadzhiks, Galchas, etc. goes back to this. Therefore the cephalic index is not a physical anthropological index as the physical anthropologists believe, but an ethnographic one. /Figure 90. Caption: Child's cradle in Turkestan./
P.736

For the storage of their valuables the urban people of Turkestan 352
use the same wooden boxes imported from Russia, as the nomads use. These are painted red and green and mounted with sheet-iron and are a primary adornment of the living quarters.

In addition to the furnishings already mentioned, in the dwellings 415
of the sedentary population of Turkestan, there remain to be mentioned only the characteristic teapots and teacups, the washbasins, the brass plates, the water pipes and the bird cages.

The teapots (Figure 91, p. 242) are made either of brass or
P.736
tin-plated copper, are always encased more or less artistically, and have the same shape as the water pitchers and wine pitchers used during mass in the Catholic church. These teapots are filled with water [272]
and set on the fire and after the water comes to a boil a proportionate quantity of tea is thrown in. The teacups are either of clay, and thus of domestic manufacture, or else of real or imitation porcelain from China (Figure 123).
P.737
/242/ /Figure 91. Caption: Teapots./

The shape of the native washbasins is characteristic. These are used before and after every meal and also often during the day, and are, as a rule, of good and ornamental workmanship. They are likewise made of brass or tin-plated copper and consist of a shallow basin with a sieve-like perforated bottom, under which a vessel like a chamber pot is attached to catch the dirty water from washing. Brass pitchers

l: von Schwarz--73a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

352

Fig. Turkestan Bedstead.

854



Fig. Child's cradle in Turkestan

798 Latin in the late 1920's, and again from Latin to Cyrillic ten years later),
212 the impounding of religious texts, including the Qur'an, and the total cessation of all publication of a religious nature. These antireligious policies would of themselves make an active religious life most difficult.

795 The interviews, however, indicate that equally important in hampering
735 the religious life of Central Asian Islam are forces not directly connected with the Communist antireligious policies, such as the general impoverish-
177 ment of the population, which compels the inhabitants to devote all their time and energies to attain bare survival, and leaves little freedom for time-consuming actions required by religion; the shortage of animals used in certain Muslim festivals; and the requirements of a highly dynamic society, geared primarily for production and not for the satisfaction of
[793] the needs of its citizens. If, despite such formidable difficulties, Islamic practices have not altogether vanished from Central Asia, the reason must be sought both in the great hold which this religion exercises on its followers (Bartold had once observed that history knows many cases of mass conversion *to* Islam, but not a single instance of a society being converted *from* Islam), and the secondary role of leaders and institutions in that religion; the latter factor permits Muslims, like the Jews, to survive better under extreme oppression than other religions for which the clergy, the hierarchy, the supreme spiritual authority are essential.

788 One of the most important — perhaps the single most important — ele-
177 ment in the Muslim ritual are the five daily prayers. This practice seems to have declined among Soviet Muslims to such an extent as to have all
[687] but vanished. The principal cause for its disappearance is the inability of Soviet Muslims to take time off from work in order to recite the prayers; such stoppage of work is considered "economic sabotage" and involves serious retribution. The fact that since the 1930's Friday — the day of rest and public prayer — is considered a regular working day in Central Asia prevents the adult population from engaging in communal worship as well. The only times of the day when a Muslim may perform his prayers undisturbed occur at sunrise and at sunset — the first and the last of the daily prayers; that is, when he is at home, with his family. This is the reason why, to the extent that the daily prayer is observed at all, it survives largely among that part of the population which is not gainfully employed: above all, the women and the elders.

788 The younger generation is further handicapped by its ignorance of the
• 869 prayers. Only a few of the refugees interviewed knew how to perform the regular daily prayers; none of those belonged to the younger generation.
177 It may also be added that not one of these refugees had cared to learn the prayers since his arrival in the West.

785 Another important duty of Muslims is to observe daytime fasting during the entire 28 days of the month of Ramazan. Prior to 1917 the fast was

Russia. Only those natives guilty of rebellion or the murder of Russian 681
officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by [687]
shooting, by court-martial, instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions [688]
at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers
and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General.
During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases,
of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876.
This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike.

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of 871
Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /219/
large, although education is a private matter, and the native govern-
ments provide neither for the erection of schools nor for the salaries
of teachers. In Turkestan there are two classes of schools, elementary
schools or 'mekhtebes', and higher schools or medreses.

The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in 872
the higher schools. In each elementary school there is only one teacher 875
who instructs the students of all ages in one and the same place. These
teachers receive no fixed salary. Their entire income consists in the
school fees which the students bring them voluntarily, which, however,
are never more than a mark a year at most, and in occasional gifts of
provisions, which they receive every Thursday, and festive clothes
which they receive from the parents of their students at the time of
the high Moslem festivals. There is a special custom that the father
of a boy presents the teacher with a khalat when the boy has progressed
far enough to start reading the Koran.

There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held 872
either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, window-
less chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does
not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appro-
priate mosque.

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held
outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School
attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are fre-
quented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of
the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially
from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

871 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral-village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way
875 of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

10. Dwellings.

342 The characteristic family relationships and the complete seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special consruction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each house is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is completely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter
[574] gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

000 and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.*

177 This policy of linguistic Russification is far more subtle than that prac-
197 ticed by the tsarist regime in some of its borderlands during the darkest days of modern Russian autocracy (1881–1903), and, if successful, could deal a very considerable blow to Muslim prospects in Central Asia. Thirty-five years is admittedly too short a time to judge the effects of a set of measures apparently designed to operate for several generations; but certain evidence permits us to draw some conclusions about its efficacy and prospects of success.

177 Soviet linguistic policies seem to have had very little effect on the speech
191 habits of the bulk of the Muslim *rural* population. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with Russians, the Muslim peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. They seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been. None of the peasants interviewed knew more than a few words of Russian; after ten years in Germany several could speak better German than they could Russian after several decades of residence in the Soviet Union. For most of the rural Muslims in the USSR, the first important contact with Russians and the Russian language comes with entrance into military service. After being drafted they are distributed among Russian soldiers and are expected to learn the language as best they can. For many of them, the military service is the first and most efficient school of Russian.

191 The situation is somewhat different in the cities and small towns, where
•871 Muslims live side by side with Russians, and where a large proportion of Muslim youths attend high schools and institutions of higher learning. It
177 is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the linguistic training in Central Asia, because it varies from area to area and from time to time. If there is a general principle, it seems to consist in a direct correlation between level of education and Russian language instruction. In the elementary schools, the instruction is predominantly in the prevailing local language, either Turki or Russian, and in areas where both groups are numerous, in both. In the secondary schools Russian is either the principal language of instruction (in schools attended largely by Russian students) or else it is taught

191 * An alternate interpretation of Soviet linguistic policies in Central Asia is suggested by a
177 British authority, G. E. Wheeler: "[The Soviet authorities] evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the 'Arabization' of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics." G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 41 (July–Oct. 1954), p. 181.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[7]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[7] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65–66.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

1. Here are the prices for certain
361 articles on the Vernyy market:
435 A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

8:Kostenko 146-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Vernyy] RL1

361 at which 175 boys and 39 girls are enrolled.
871

2) elementary school in the Almata settlement, where 45 boys are enrolled.

3) a Moslem school in the Tatar suburb, with 40 pupils, taught by a mullah.

4) a trade school with 21 pupils, who learn various trades in addition to reading and writing.

5) a school of gardening with 21 pupils, who study with an experienced gardener from the Crimea.

6) A classical preparatory school for girls.

7) A classical preparatory school for boys.

Children of the privileged estate as well as the Cossack estate may enter the elementary schools and the trade school, although the number of the former is not large.

361 In 1878 at the Military Club quite a
217 good library was established, which now contains 2,000 volumes on various subjects. There is a marked trend among the population to use books from this library. From August 5, 1878 to April 5, 1879, i.e., in a period of 8 months, there were 1,474 recipients to whom 2,749 books were distributed.

8:Kostenko 160-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361
435 Tent cloth is sold at 30 kopecks for 2 ft. (per arshin) and calico for from 25 to 35 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

A cow costs from 16 to 25 rubles. A horse costs from 20 to 60 rubles. A sheep costs 3 rubles and a bull from 25 to 40 rubles.

A beam of wood 14 in. (8 vershoks) in diameter and 14 ft. (2 sazhen's) long costs 2 rubles. A board 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide and 6 ft. (2½ arshins) long costs 10 kopecks. A board 7 ft. (3 arshins) long and 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide costs 50 kopecks.

Fire brick costs 2 rubles a thousand, and sun-dried brick 1 ruble 60 kopecks. An unskilled workman is paid 15 kopecks a day; a worker with a horse receives from 40 kopecks to 1 ruble daily.

361
871 Education in Kuldja is shown by the following figures for schools and the number of pupils enrolled in them:

	No. schools	No. of pupils Boys	Girls	Total
At the Chinese temple	1	25	-	25
At the great Moslem mosque	1	60	10	70
At the houses of the mullahs	4	82	21	103
Total	6	167	31	198

/437/ The population of Kuldja has quite a gentle and peaceful character.

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[87] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later, as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6] S.U. 563 T. 177 626

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system. S.U. 563 185 S.U. [871]

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority T. 871 555 S.U. 871 563 555

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

Kazakhstan RQ1

of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek, Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan, which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

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officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by [687]
shooting, by court-martial, instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions
at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers [698]
and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General.
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either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, windowless chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appropriate mosque.

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are frequented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

●872 Girls and boys are usually taught together; nevertheless there are also special girls' schools, but in these as well, the teaching is done by a mullah. Elementary education begins, as with us, at the age of from five to six years, as a rule, and for the boys usually lasts seven years. Many parents take their boys out of school before this, however, if they can use them in their business or for labor. The whole course is com-
[562] pleted usually only by those who wish to enter a medrese later. For girls school attendance usually ends when they are eight or nine years old, for they are already of marriageable age when they are ten, and must receive instruction before that time in needlework, embroidery, weaving and other domestic tasks.

The instruction is strenuous for teachers and pupils alike, for it lasts nine hours a day, from six o'clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, with only a little free time for recreation and for eating the /220/ modest meals of bread and fruit, which the children have brought with them in their school bags. The pupils have only one day a week free, that is, Friday. Otherwise they have little vacation, only a week each at the time of the three high Moslem festivals.

872 The instruction in the elementary schools of Turkestan is limited
876 primarily to the teaching of reading and writing. There are no courses, as we know them. The pupils are first taught the alphabet, and then they begin to read and copy from selected parts of the Koran, from which they proceed to the reading of various other books. The study of one book is held to be finished when the pupil is able to read it and copy from it without difficulty. Whoever has completed a half dozen books in this manner has finished the course and can proceed to study in a high school if he feels in himself the desire and capacity to do so. In addition to reading and writing the children in the elementary schools also learn the most important prayers and precepts of the Koran and the complicated ceremonies which must be observed during the prayers and the ablutions prescribed by the Koran. The methods of instruction used by the teachers in the elementary schools in Turkestan are characteristic and completely different from our customs and they explain why in these schools the time and work expended by the teacher and pupils corresponds so little to the results obtained. The instruction is already made very difficult by the fact that pupils at all levels must be taught at the same time by one and the same teacher; it is further encroached upon, quite needlessly, in that the various pupils at a given time are not occupied with one subject, such as reading or writing, but each is

876 doing something different. One would think it quite impossible for the
872 teacher to attend to each one. While one is copying his alphabet, another the Koran, a third some other book, a fourth is spelling out the alphabet, a fifth the Koran, a sixth some other author, etc. Since all read at the same time and as loudly as possible, and each reads something different, there results such a confusion and such an infernal racket that one becomes unpleasantly aware of such schools even some distance away, and anyone who is near a school is quite stunned. The teacher sits in the midst of this noisy throng, on the floor, like his pupils, armed with a long switch with which he can reach from his position all the way to those seated on the outermost fringes, and call to order immediately those who do not demonstrate the necessary zeal. As a result the pupils strain their lungs to the utmost and yell until they are as red in the face as lobsters, so that the veins swell out on their foreheads and /221/ their eyes are popping out of their heads; each tries to shout louder than his neighbor in order to earn the favor of the teacher.

/Figure 78, p. 57a. Caption: The Medrese of Rustem Beg in Ura-Tyube./

The pupils squat while they read and write, with their legs crossed and their bodies bent forward, on the floor, which is /222/ covered with a felt carpet or a simple reed mat. During their reading and copying they place their books in front of them on the floor--a good protective device against shortsightedness. Instead of our slates for writing, they use small spade-shaped wooden boards, which they hold firmly by the handle in the left hand, while with the right they draw their attempts at caligraphy with a pointed reed and ordinary ink. When they write on paper, they hold the sheet on the palm of their left hand, and here also a pointed reed and ink are employed. The natives of Turkestan write only on one side of the paper, which has already been covered with a special gloss, while the other side has been left rough.

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346 The medrese buildings (Figure 78, p. 57a, p. 221, Figure 79, p. 58a, and Figure 80, p. 58b, p. 224) are all built in the same style. They are as a rule two-storied (1) edifices of firebricks with a quadrangular /223/ /Figure 79.

1. Here and elsewhere I use the expression two-storied in the Russian sense of the term, while a house consisting only of a ground-floor is designated as one-storied, for I consider the Russian expressions more correct and practical than those used in most parts of Germany.

Caption: The Great Medrese in Bukhara (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./ /224/ groundplan. Inside there is a roomy courtyard, usually paved with firebricks, which is enclosed on all sides by the dwellings of students and scholars. Stables, kitchens and other offices are not found in these institutions. One reaches the courtyard through a gate in the middle of the main facade which is covered by a disproportionately high archway. The living quarters consist of two superimposed rows of cells, which are all of the same size. Before each cell there is a high niche-like entrance-hall which is open at the front. The cells are relatively dark, since they are lighted only by a single window placed over the door, which consists of a wooden grating pasted over with thin paper. /Figure 80, p. 58b. Caption: The Omar Medrese in Kokand./ The teachers and students remain in their cells mostly only at night and during the cold season of the year, but carry on their studies during the warmer weather in the open entrance-halls. The cells are not heated. The entire furnishing of the cells, for scholars and students alike, consists of a reed mat, a few blankets and pillows, which lie rolled up in

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5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[7]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[7] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65–66.

Russia. Only those natives guilty of rebellion or the murder of Russian 681
officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by [687]
shooting, by court-martial, instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions [698]
at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers
and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General.
During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases,
of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876.
This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike.

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of 871
Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /219/
large, although education is a private matter, and the native governments provide neither for the erection of schools nor for the salaries of teachers. In Turkestan there are two classes of schools, elementary schools or 'mekhtebes', and higher schools or medreses.

The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in 872
the higher schools. In each elementary school there is only one teacher 875
who instructs the students of all ages in one and the same place. These teachers receive no fixed salary. Their entire income consists in the school fees which the students bring them voluntarily, which, however, are never more than a mark a year at most, and in occasional gifts of provisions, which they receive every Thursday, and festive clothes which they receive from the parents of their students at the time of the high Moslem festivals. There is a special custom that the father of a boy presents the teacher with a khalat when the boy has progressed far enough to start reading the Koran.

There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held 872
either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, windowless chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appropriate mosque.

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are frequented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

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l: von Schwarz--59a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1

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811 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The
875 teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

342 10. Dwellings.

The characteristic family relationships and the completely seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special construction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each home is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

872 Girls and boys are usually taught together; nevertheless there are also special girls' schools, but in these as well, the teaching is done by a mullah. Elementary education begins, as with us, at the age of from five to six years, as a rule, and for the boys usually lasts seven years. Many parents take their boys out of school before this, however, if they can use them in their business or for labor. The whole course is com-
[562] pleted usually only by those who wish to enter a medrese later. For girls school attendance usually ends when they are eight or nine years old, for they are already of marriageable age when they are ten, and must receive instruction before that time in needlework, embroidery, weaving and other domestic tasks.

The instruction is strenuous for teachers and pupils alike, for it lasts nine hours a day, from six o'clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, with only a little free time for recreation and for eating the /220/ modest meals of bread and fruit, which the children have brought with them in their school bags. The pupils have only one day a week free, that is, Friday. Otherwise they have little vacation, only a week each at the time of the three high Moslem festivals.

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876 primarily to the teaching of reading and writing. There are no courses, as we know them. The pupils are first taught the alphabet, and then they begin to read and copy from selected parts of the Koran, from which they proceed to the reading of various other books. The study of one book is held to be finished when the pupil is able to read it and copy from it without difficulty. Whoever has completed a half dozen books in this manner has finished the course and can proceed to study in a high school if he feels in himself the desire and capacity to do so. In addition to reading and writing the children in the elementary schools also learn the most important prayers and precepts of the Koran and the complicated ceremonies which must be observed during the prayers and the ablutions prescribed by the Koran. The methods of instruction used by the teachers in the elementary schools in Turkestan are characteristic and completely different from our customs and they explain why in these schools the time and work expended by the teacher and pupils corresponds so little to the results obtained. The instruction is already made very difficult by the fact that pupils at all levels must be taught at the same time by one and the same teacher; it is further encroached upon, quite needlessly, in that the various pupils at a given time are not occupied with one subject, such as reading or writing, but each is

876 doing something different. One would think it quite impossible for the
872 teacher to attend to each one. While one is copying his alphabet, another the Koran, a third some other book, a fourth is spelling out the alphabet, a fifth the Koran, a sixth some other author, etc. Since all read at the same time and as loudly as possible, and each reads something different, there results such a confusion and such an infernal racket that one becomes unpleasantly aware of such schools even some distance away, and anyone who is near a school is quite stunned. The teacher sits in the midst of this noisy throng, on the floor, like his pupils, armed with a long switch with which he can reach from his position all the way to those seated on the outermost fringes, and call to order immediately those who do not demonstrate the necessary zeal. As a result the pupils strain their lungs to the utmost and yell until they are as red in the face as lobsters, so that the veins swell out on their foreheads and /221/ their eyes are popping out of their heads; each tries to shout louder than his neighbor in order to earn the favor of the teacher.

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astronomy, physics, medicine, chemistry, geography, etc., are 874
absolutely ignored. The supreme principle is still that axiom imputed to the Caliph Omar, that the content of all more recent books is either in the Koran already, and therefore superfluous, or else it is not in the Koran, and is consequently heretical.

The period of study at the medrese varies greatly, according to the abilities of the individual students and the greater or lesser degree of learning which each wishes to attain, and amounts to from fifteen to thirty years. Usually a student remains in the medresse until he is appointed as professor, judge, imam and the like, and in case he loses his position he returns there once more.

The teaching methods of the medrese professors have much in 876
common with the methods adopted by many of our philologists who analyze the ancient classics. They discuss the works they are going through with their students both as to language and substance with a a thoroughness in no way inferior to the hair-splitting of such philologists, so that they often take a whole year to expound a single work. If such a pedant succeeds in interpreting a completely meaningless passage in the Koran in a new way, a passage which has been expounded before in a hundred different ways, then he is a made man, and he will be admired by his students and colleagues just as much as we would admire the discoverer of the law of gravitation or of the cholera bacillus, etc. Students and scholars in such a case come from great distances to gaze in astonishment at such a light of the church, and whenever possible, to take instruction from him. At most, one can only deplore the fact that so much time and labor and so much sincere effort is employed with so little profit upon the eternal repetition of deeds of eras and generations long past, through which mankind and science have not been advanced one single step.

Among all the scholarly schools of Central Asia the medreses of 873
the town of Bukhara enjoy the greatest esteem, and the most celebrated leaders of Moslem scholarship are numbered among their teachers.

In addition to the medreses, which have in view the general education and training of scholars, there are in Tashkent and also in other towns of Turkestan various other special schools, which are established for specific purposes; thus there is the Karikh Khana medrese, in which the students are solely engaged in memorizing the Koran; the Salivat Khana medrese, where only prayers are taught; the Masnavi Khana medrese, in which the works of the writer Masnavi are studied, and the like.